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Andreas Rasche
As If It Were Relevant – A Social Systems Perspective
on the Relation Between Theory and Practice
Address for Correspondence:
Dr. rer. pol. Andreas Rasche
Assistant Professor of Organization Studies
Department of Organization and Logistics
Helmut-Schmidt-University, University of the Federal Armed Forces
Holstenhofweg 85
22043 Hamburg, Germany
Phone: + 49-40-6541 3635
Fax: + 49-40-6541-3767
E-Mail: [email protected]
http://www.arasche.com
Biographical Note:
Andreas Rasche is Assistant Professor at the University of the Federal Armed Forces in
Hamburg, Germany. He holds teaching appointments in Strategic Management and
Business Ethics at different universities in Germany and France. His research interests
include reflections about the theoretical status of strategic management, the discussion
of global governance and corporate accountability, as well as the connection of the
philosophy and sociology of science to the field of organization studies.
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Abstract:
This paper discusses the concept of ‘research relevance’ from a systems theoretical
perspective. Based on the claim that many scholars still think of relevance as something
that can be achieved and enhanced by choosing the ‘right’ measures (e.g., ‘user
friendly’ writing style), I argue that such a perspective obscures the self-referential
status of ‘science’ and ‘practice’ as social systems in society. My systems theoretical
discussion, which is based on the work of the German sociologist Niklas Luhmann,
shows that, strictly speaking, science cannot produce relevant knowledge prior to
application. Instead, practice has to make scientific knowledge relevant by incorporating
it into the specific logic of its system. I argue that such an integration of knowledge is
only possible by first acting as if the offered knowledge was relevant to then modify and
extend it according to the idiosyncrasies of the system. I characterize these as-if
assumptions as fictions and show their significance for rethinking the concept of
relevance.
Word Count: 6.970
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The field of organization studies is usually defined as an applied science (Whitley 1984)
and its practical irrelevance has been subject of complaint throughout many years
(Buckley et al. 1998; Tranfield and Starkey 1998; West 1990). In this paper, I seek to
understand why these claims persist despite the field’s awareness of them and
considerable attempts to ‘bridge’ the relevance gap (Starkey and Madan 2001).
Although there is a substantial amount of literature making various suggestions
regarding how to close the relevance gap (Gibbons et al. 1994; Rynes et al. 2001;
Thomas and Tymon 1982), I am asking a provocative, yet essential and necessary,
question that has been neglected so far: Can we be relevant at all? Within the literature
there seems to be the implicitly held assumption that the relevance gap occurring
between ‘theory’ and ‘practice’ can be closed quite easy if we just find the right
measures to do so.
I argue that much of the debate on the relevance gap is based on a rather linear
understanding of knowledge transfer between theory and practice. For instance, in their
much cited article ‘Bridging the Relevance Gap’, Starkey and Madan (2001: S6)
introduce a knowledge chain which supposes that tested theories lead to knowledge that
in turn influences managerial decision making and thus brings about effective action.
This chain promotes a linear understanding of knowledge transfer in which the
academic community sends out information that is consumed by practitioners.
Although, Starkey and Madan (2001) are much in favor of interaction between science
and practice when it comes to knowledge creation (e.g., cooperation between academics
and practitioners) and knowledge dissemination (e.g., by so-called ‘knowledge
brokers’), the underlying assumption is that knowledge flows from theory to practice in
an almost unhindered way. Thus, the achievement of relevance itself is not considered
to be a big problem.
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Even though Starkey and Madan (2001) and others (Aldag 1997; Buckley et al. 1998)
have provided important and much welcomed insights to the debate on the relevance of
management research, this relationship is far more complex than suggested by the rather
linear models of knowledge transfer that underlie these contributions. Hence, there is a
research deficit when it comes to better understand how the systems of research and
practice interact with each other, whether they can interact at all, and what this means
for our understanding of relevance. To address the outlined deficit in research on
relevance, the research goal that underlies this contribution is twofold.
First, I aim at challenging the rather linear understanding of knowledge transfer by
outlining a model that discusses the relation between research and practice from a
systems theoretical perspective based on the work of the German sociologist Niklas
Luhmann. This perspective allows me to address the most fundamental question that
underlies the relevance debate: Can researchers be relevant at all? Luhmann’s systems
theory fits well into this discussion since he has explicitly addressed the relation
between science in general and its application in practice (Luhmann 1992, 2005a,
2005b). According to Luhmann (1992), ‘science’ and ‘practice’ can be understood as
two distinctive systems which are operationally closed and thus determine internally
what constitutes relevant knowledge. In consequence, relevance cannot be easily
achieved because knowledge cannot be transferred in a linear fashion.
Second, I outline implications of my system theoretical discussion of relevance. Most of
all my aim is to demonstrate that we do not need (and cannot have) perfect ‘bridges’ to
close the relevance gap, but instead need insightful fictions on both sides of the divide.
A social systems perspective teaches us that it is not knowledge per se that can be made
relevant (e.g., by writing more user friendly [Buckley et al. 1998: 36]), but that the
managerial system itself needs to make it relevant. Hence, I claim that in order to make
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scientific knowledge relevant, managers need to act as if the generated knowledge was
relevant. Of course, such fictions are self-referential and certainly not every fiction
becomes fulfilled in practice. However, fictions establish a ground for sensemaking
processes that contextualize knowledge and thus produce relevance (Weick 1979,
1995).
To reach these two research objectives, I proceed as follows. I start by reviewing in how
far scholars within organization studies have followed the traditional linear model of
application when discussing the relevance of research (section two). This will help me
to identify the assumptions on which the linear model of application rests. Then, I
introduce a social systems perspective on the relation between theory and practice in
organization studies which upsets the identified assumptions of the linear model and
allows for novel insights about the possibility of relevance as such (section three). I
proceed by discussing the implications of the system theoretical discussion and show
the need to (a) be more careful when requiring bridges for relevance and (b)
acknowledge the role of as if-assumptions (i.e. fictions) when discussing relevance
(section four). I close with a brief conclusion and outlook (section five).
THE DISCUSSION OF RELEVANCE
IN MANAGEMENT RESEARCH
Dimensions of Relevance
Although the topic of relevance has attracted a lot of scholarly attention in the field of
management as the existence of various special forums indicates (Aldag 1997;
Hodgkinson 2001; Rynes et al. 2001), the underlying dimensions of relevance are often
presented in a rather unstructured way or even obscured at all. To structure the field, I
suggest clustering existing research on relevance with regard to two dimensions. First,
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some authors believe that the relevance of research can be improved by rethinking the
way knowledge is produced. For example, Gibbons et al.’s (1994) contribution reaches
in this direction since they are arguing that we are experiencing a fundamental shift in
the way knowledge is produced and what knowledge is produced. Hence, scholars who
have taken up their trail-blazing book either argue that relevance can be improved by
redesigning the process of knowledge production (MacLean et al. 2002) and/or
rethinking the nature of the knowledge that is produced by this process (van Aken
2005).
Second, other authors have focused more on the mode of knowledge transfer and the
resulting communication between academics and practitioners (Buckley et al. 1998;
Hambrick 1994; Kelemen and Bansal 2002). This dimension of research on relevance
often makes the assumption that the knowledge produced by academics is relevant and
valid but not perceived as such by practitioners because of an inaccessible style of
writing and a resulting low attractiveness of scholarly journals for practicing managers.
For instance, Buckley et al. (1998: 35) argue that “the information presented in such
articles may be potentially useful to practitioners, but is inaccessible in its present
form.” Similarly, Hambrick (1994) in his 1993 presidential address to the Academy of
Management suggests a variety of measures (e.g., joint conferences with practitioners,
‘translation’ sections in major journals) to improve the dissemination of knowledge.
Whereas I think that some of the recommendations presented by scholars that wish to
improve knowledge production and/or transfer can actually have a positive impact, I
argue that the underlying model of relevance within both lines of research and its
assumptions prevent us from understanding the entire complexity of the problem of
achieving relevance to managerial practice. To reveal these assumptions, I will now
discuss some contributions and their understanding of relevance.
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Traditional Assumptions in the Discussion of Relevance
Although the concept of relevance has been discussed with quite some frequency and
passion, the underlying question of the nature of the relation between ‘science’ and
‘practice’ is rarely asked and hardly ever critically discussed (for an exception see
Nicolai 2004). The assumption that scholars, who argue for increased relevance of
research, make is that relevance can be achieved if the right measures are taken. In
particular, there is the assumption that knowledge ‘flows’ from the domain of science to
the one of practice. We can find this assumption with regard to both dimensions of
relevance research introduced above (i.e. transfer and production).
On the side of scholars who wish to improve relevance by enhancing knowledge
transfer Starkey and Madan (2001: S6) portray the interplay between science and
practice by using a ‘knowledge chain’. According to this chain, knowledge – which can
be jointly developed by practitioners and scholars – influences managerial decisionmaking and subsequently effective action. The guiding principles of this chain are “that
knowledge should inform action; and that action becomes knowable if we understand
better the underling principles that link cause and effect.” (Starkey and Madan 2001: S
6). What underlies this perspective is a linear model of relevance in which scientific
knowledge is characterized as something material that flows from the domain of science
to the one of practice.
Other scholars who focus on knowledge transfer and plead for ‘bridges’ between
science and practice also leave the basic assumption of a linear knowledge flow
unquestioned. Buckley et al. (1998), for instance, aim at “repairing the disconnect” and
suggest to chose a more application-oriented language. Hambrick’s (1994: 14)
conclusions lead in a similar direction but stress the institutional requirements in order
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to talk more ‘user friendly’ (e.g., new journals). Not much different, Bettis (1991)
encourages scholars to pay more attention to practitioner-oriented journals such as the
Harvard Business Review, while Shrivistava (1987) suggests documenting the
conditions where research results where generated to allow scholars to “transfer
practical insights from one situation to another.” Without any doubt, these
recommendations can have a positive impact on research relevance. Nevertheless, the
underlying assumption that by choosing any of these measures we can ‘bridge’ the gap
between science and practice obscures the non-linear relationship between doth
domains. Consequently, there often is hope that research can be made more and more
relevant if we just choose the right measures (Weick 2001).
On the side of scholars who wish to improve relevance by enhancing knowledge
production a contribution that deserves special attention due to its popular and
widespread nature is Gibbons et al. (1994) book The New Production of Knowledge.
According to Gibbons et al. (1994) there are two modes of knowledge production.
Mode 1 knowledge is largely discipline-based, intra-scientifically produced, and not
related to a specific context of application, whereas Mode 2 knowledge is
transdisciplinary, jointly produced between a variety of actors, and bound to a specific
context of application. Gibbons et al. explicitly reject the linear model of relevance for
Mode 2 knowledge because such knowledge is produced in the context of application
and can only be consumed in this context (MacLean et al. 2002: 202). In the end, Mode
2 knowledge radically blurs the traditional boundaries between science and practice
since both interact in dynamic and flexible networks. Besides the fact that such
networks are hardly found in practice (even in MacLean et al’s 2002 example of Mode
2 knowledge production the traditional roles are still very visible), Gibbons et al. still
follow the traditional (linear) model of relevance with regard to Mode 1 knowledge
which is assumed to be mobile and can move rapidly across organizational boundaries
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(Gibbons et al. 1994: 24). Since Gibbons et al. claim to make no judgment as to the
value of either mode of knowledge and also believe that Mode 2 will not replace Mode
1 knowledge, their argumentation remains at least partly influenced by the linear model
of relevance.
Overall, when considering the various recommendations to close the relevance gap,
there is the question why – despite the various attempts to produce and transfer
knowledge about organizations in a more applicable style – the problem of relevance
seems to persist. As already indicated, I believe that one possible reason for the
continued persistence of the relevance gap is scholars’ underlying assumptions that
inform their thinking on relevance. In fact, the linear model of relevance assumes that
the domains of ‘science’ and ‘practice’ can communicate with one another if we just
implement the right measures (e.g., enhance the accessibility of writing). These
considerations, however, come about without a deep appreciation and discussion of the
epistemological and ontological assumptions that inform scholars’ debate on research
relevance.
A SYSTEMS THEORETICAL VIEW ON RELEVANCE
In the following, I am outlining a systems theoretical perspective on relevance that (a)
helps me to challenge the linear model of relevance and (b) allows me to address the
question to what extent relevance can be achieved at all. My remarks complement and
extend Nicolai’s (2004) system theoretical discussion of relevance which considers
systems theory in a more general sense, but does not provide a discussion that is aligned
around Luhmann’s detailed system theoretical argumentation.
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Luhmann’s Systems Theory – The Autopoiesis of Functional Systems
Luhmann’s (1995) systems theory is concerned with social systems (i.e. society,
organizations, interactions). For Luhmann (1995: 408-410), society encompasses the
other two forms of social systems as it includes all communications. Society itself as a
social system underlies what Luhmann (1982) calls functional differentiation – the
existence of a variety of societal subsystems that serve particular social functions and
that represent themselves social systems (e.g., economy, art, science, religion). All
functional systems are autopoietic (i.e. self-referential) systems which means they
reproduce themselves from within themselves. According to Luhmann (2006), this is
not just a characteristic of functional systems but of social systems in general. All social
systems reproduce their own elements on the basis of these elements. The elements of
social systems, and thus functional systems, are communications. Hence, societal
subsystems reproduce themselves on the basis of communications, or more precisely:
communicative events (Seidl and Becker 2006).
Because of their autopoietic nature, functional systems cannot determine each other.
Each functional system is closed on the basis of a binary code. For instance, the
functional system ‘science’ refers to the code truth/untruth, whereas the economic
system uses the code payment/non-payment (Luhmann 1982). Each communication of a
system relates to other communications of the same system on the basis of the functionspecific code. Thus, only communications within the functional system can add to the
reproduction of this system. For example, only scientific communications that refer to
the accepted code truth/untruth can reproduce science. As a consequence, each
autopoietic functional system reproduces itself based on its own communications and
registers the communications of other systems as irritations only – irritations which are
processed according to the internal logic of the receiving system. Functional systems
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thus represent ‘environment’ for each other and cannot determine their operations. This,
however, does not mean that they cannot influence each other.
Following Luhmann (2005b: 372), there are three different references that a functional
system can make. First, the system can reflect itself. Second, the system can be reflected
according to the function it fulfils. Third, the system can be reflected with regard to its
interactions with other functional systems. Applied to the context of this paper, in which
‘science’ is characterized as one functional system, the first point (self-reflection) would
mean to reflect existing theory traditions and thus conduct ‘intra-scientific’ research.
The second point would require reflecting on the function of the scientific system,
which, according to Luhmann (1992), is fixed by its code truth/untruth. In the following
sub-section, we explore the third point, the interaction of the functional system ‘science’
with other functional systems which we summarize, for the ease of use, under the
heading ‘practice’, or as Luhmann (2005b: 378) himself calls it: ‘the system of
application’.
A System-Theoretical Perspective on ‘Science’ and ‘Practice’
Luhmann (2005a, 2005b, 1992) has discussed the relation between science and practice
several times. His system theoretical interpretation characterizes ‘sciene’ and ‘practice’
as self-referential systems of meaning production, which are, because of their selfreferential nature, decoupled from each other. Decoupling does not imply that
communication between both systems is completely impossible, but that external
references (e.g., scientific knowledge) can only be integrated based on the historically
developed logic of a system. In other words, the system of practice itself decides what
knowledge is relevant and how this knowledge is interpreted according to already
established meaning structures.
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For Luhmann (2005b: 374) this perspective has consequences for the discussion of the
applicability of knowledge:
Science can, under these conditions, never be fully applicable; it can never be
fully instrumentalized. Its traditions are too clumsy and its methods not contextspecific enough. Science is thus autonomous because of its status as a
differentiated functional system within society, and this is what we can show by
taking the detour of a system theoretical analysis.
As a consequence, a system theoretical view shows the limits of the linear model of
relevance. In particular, systems theory helps us to challenge two fundamental
assumptions of the linear model of relevance. First, contrary to conventional wisdom
which suggests that relevant knowledge can be produced if the right measures are taken
(e.g., user friendly writing), a systems theoretical perspective argues that the relevance
of knowledge can never be fully judged in advance, but is produced in the context of
application (i.e. the internal logic of the system of practice). Second, contrary to the
assumption of the linear model of relevance in which knowledge flowed passively, a
systems theoretical view emphasizes that the dissemination of knowledge is not a
passive process but involves an active (re)construction of the ‘receiving’ system –
practice can be irritated but not determined by science. Thus, to speak of knowledge
transfer may be misleading. Instead, Luhmann (2005b: 379) chooses the phrase ‘nonidentical reproduction’ which points to the fact that whenever knowledge is reproduced
by practice it is also necessarily altered and adjusted according to the ‘local’
circumstances (for this see also Derrida 1995, 1992).
This interpretation of the interaction between science and practice is not just based on
the insight that academics and practitioners have fundamentally different frames of
references (Shrivastava and Mitroff 1984), but allows for a more comprehensive
12
understanding of the limits of the relationship between science and practice. In the
following, we outline four points that Luhmann (2005a, 2005b) himself raised with
regard to the science-practice link. First, both systems – ‘science’ and ‘practice’ – need
to give consideration to their function in society. Because scientists are interested in
(and judged according to) the distinction truth/untruth, they do not ‘leave this code’ but
instead tend to ‘dig deeper’ to better understand phenomena and to explore so far
unknown explanations. This, of course, increases the needed theoretical complexity and
often requires new terminology which practitioners are unfamiliar with (Luhmann
2005a). As a consequence, user-friendly writing is hard to achieve without changing the
nature of the argumentation since a differentiation of research problems requires new
terminology and references to existing theory. For instance, the discussion of the
dynamic character of organizational capabilities (Teece et al. 1997) required a new term
(i.e. ‘dynamic capabilities’) to describe and explain a new phenomenon and also gave
reference to already existing streams of research (e.g., organizational learning) in order
to develop the argument (Zollo and Winter 2002).
Second, the autopoietic nature of science is best understood when looking at the
network of scientific publications that are linked by references (Kieser 2002; Nicolai
2004). In this sense, every publication needs to be understood as a communication that
refers to yet other communications. Accordingly, attempts to ‘translate’ the work of
scholars (Hambrick 1994) may not turn out to be successful because in order to
understand an argument one needs to have some basic knowledge of preceding
communications that were used to work out the argument. Luhmann (2005b: 378) thus
claims that one needs to ensure that people in the context of application have at least
some, even if a reduced, understanding of those theories that were used in the context of
production. Hence, the relevance problem is not just about researchers being caught in
13
an ‘ivory tower’ (West 1990), but also about practitioners who cannot understand
science due to their lack of necessary theoretical fundamentals.
Third, a system theoretical perspective also connects the problem of time to the
relevance debate. If the development of science really is a self-referential endeavor, it is
less likely that scientific practice can be synchronized to whatever happens in the
system of practice (Luhmann 2005b: 378). Science, thus, is likely to remain decoupled
from practice not only because of its discipline-based organization, but also because it
‘lags behind’ the problems that occur in practice. Partly, this problem can be solved by
integrating practitioners into the research process (e.g., to identify problems) and
conducting research in the context of application (Gibbons et al. 1994). However, to
expect a quick and comprehensive solution from such measures disregards that the
problem of relevance, from a systems theoretical perspective, is a structural problem
that concerns the interaction of two autopoietic functional systems.
----------------------------------Insert Figure 1 About Here
-----------------------------------
Fourth, a systems theoretical perspective allows us to discuss the ‘double problem of
scientific relevance’. What I mean by the term ‘double problem’ refers to the
autopoietic nature of (a) the functional systems themselves and (b) the organizations
that are part of these functional systems (see Figure 1). In discussions about relevance
we oftentimes neglect that, strictly speaking, we are not just dealing with the interaction
of functional systems, but most of all with the communication of different organizations
within these functional systems (e.g., ‘universities’ are organizations in the functional
system science, whereas ‘firms’ or ‘government agencies’ are organizations in the
functional system practice). As discussed above, Luhmann (1995) not only thinks of
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functional systems as being autopoietic in nature but also characterizes organizations in
this way. Knowledge, thus, has to overcome a ‘double hurdle’, to borrow a term used by
Andrew Pettigrew (1997). Organizations within ‘practice’ need to acknowledge that the
context of application of scientific knowledge not only refers to a different functional
system that operates on the basis of an unfamiliar code, but also that knowledge is
produced by scholars who are themselves part of particular organizations that operate
according to an own logic – what constitutes ‘good research’ is often quite organization
specific. Heugens and Mol (2005: 122), for instance, mention that quantitative research
is much more common in US business schools than in the rest of the world and that
tenure decisions are based on these organization specific ‘traditions’ (see also Park and
Gordon 1996).
‘So, Can Research Be Relevant?’ – A Systems Theoretical Answer
The outlined system theoretical perspective on research relevance allows for a better
understanding why the many efforts to create ‘bridges’ between theory and practice
(Gibbons et al. 1994; Rynes et al. 2001; Starkey and Madan 2001) have not as yet
resulted in an increased satisfaction with the produced knowledge. The demand for
stable and well worked out ‘bridges’ between theory and practice obscures the selfreferential logic that underlies both systems. The problem of relevance is misunderstood
because there still is the desire to have the same piece of knowledge simultaneously
present in two conflicting functional systems that operate not only in different social
contexts but also with regard to distinct functional codes.
Strictly speaking, we cannot achieve relevance – if we refer to relevance as the direct
application of scientific knowledge – because the application of knowledge requires a
modification by the system of practice. This modification is a necessity and by no
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means a shortcoming of poor theorizing or an outcome of ‘non-user friendly’ writing.
Of course, scholars should, whenever they can, write in an accessible way and team up
with practitioners to identify research problems and thus converge the agendas of both
systems (Gopinath and Hoffman 1995). This, however, does not change the autopoietic
nature of the two functional systems. Practice itself creates relevance by either
incorporating scientific knowledge into the logic of the system or leaving it aside.
Consequently, relevance cannot be decided prior to application, but rather, and most of
all, is an outcome of the latter.
Of course, one may reply to this argument that there are pieces of academic knowledge
that seem to have created successful bridges by combining academic rigor and practical
relevance. Porter’s (1980) Competitive Strategy, for instance, is often referred to as an
academic book that flowed into practice and was applied there. Nicolai (2004), though,
explains the simultaneous presence of Porter’s book in science and practice in a
different way. According to Nicolai, the success of Porter’s book was not the outcome
of research that was exceptionally high in relevance and thus could be directly applied
to practice. Instead, Porter’s practical relevance was constructed out of the reputation of
his university (Harvard Business School), the use of symbolic labels (e.g., ‘5-Forces’),
and selectively chosen case examples that were retrofitted (i.e. success stories from
practice that were told in a way that they seemed to be the result of Porter’s scientific
research process).
To come back to the initial question of this sub-section: Can research be relevant? Of
course, research can be relevant. However, relevance is nothing that is decided by
academics, or practitioner-academic teams, prior to application. Research relevance is
decided where it occurs: in the system of practice. Surely, scientific knowledge can
influence practice and joint research efforts or user friendly writing can have positive
16
effects on the consumption of knowledge, but research relevance cannot be determined
in an ex ante manner. To produce relevance we do not need ‘bridges’ or ‘translations’,
but insightful practitioners who do not quickly follow the latest management fad
(Abrahamson 1996) but instead understand the necessary ‘emptiness’ (i.e. non-contextspecific nature) of scientific knowledge as a chance to modify this knowledge according
to their specific circumstances (Ortmann and Salzman 2002).
Overall, a system theoretical perspective shows the limits of the linear model of
relevance that still implicitly underlies many contributions discussing relevance in
management research. Certainly, Luhmann’s point of view is a skeptical one
questioning the viability of rather simple solutions (e.g., collaboration) and showing
their limits. This, however, does not indicate that knowledge that is used by
practitioners is solely an internal construction of the system of practice. Then, the
question is: In which ways do the systems of ‘science’ and ‘practice’ influence each
other?
IMPLICATIONS – ‘AS IF IT WERE RELEVANT’
The system theoretical discussion emphasizes that science and practice influence each
other based on fictions that need to be established in each system to integrate the
knowledge claims that are produced in the other system. Practitioners and scholars need
to become aware of the fictional ground of knowledge production in their respective
system. The quest for ‘applicable knowledge’ is hopeless insofar as ‘practical’
knowledge is based on fictions that need to be (ful)filled in actu. In the following, I
discuss the role of fictions and link them to the debate on research relevance.
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Relevance and the Importance of the ‘As If’
To start with, we should look at the role of fictions from the perspective of the
practitioner who wishes to apply knowledge. If practitioners cannot consume relevant
knowledge in a direct way, we need to ask what can be done to at least support the
reconstruction of scientific knowledge by practice. My answer to this question aims at a
so far neglected phenomenon: as if-assumptions (i.e. fictions). Because practitoners
cannot consume relevant knowledge in a direct way, they have to act as if the
knowledge they are applying was relevant (see Figure 2). Strictly speaking, scholarly
knowledge can never be fully relevant due to the autopoietic nature of the involved
systems. However, the established fiction provides a ground from which further
sensemaking processes can unfold. A fiction represents an ‘irritation’ (Luhmann 1995)
to the system of practice which introduces a key idea (e.g., ‘just-in-time
manufacturing’) and/or label (e.g., ‘lean management’). These irritations are then
processed according to the logic of the system and thus modified, extended or
supplemented. Of course, fictions operate on a self-referential basis (scientific
knowledge is relevant because the system made it relevant) and we can thus agree with
Weick’s (1979: v) assertion that organizations draw the lines that they themselves
stumble over.
----------------------------------Insert Figure 2 About Here
-----------------------------------
Not every fiction becomes realized in practice or leads to improvements for the
organization. To have an effect, fictions need to be accepted and prove their viability in
social praxis (Ortmann 2004; Watzlawick 2002). In other words, not every fiction will
do. The scientific knowledge that is put into a fiction needs to fit with the context that
18
the organization currently faces. For instance, a company that is in need of restructuring
may respond very well to ‘lean production’, while a firm that has recently faced a
scandal concerning social issues may find ‘stakeholder management’ very attractive.
Fictions need to – to put it in a social constructivist terminology – be institutionalized
and legitimized within the organization to create corresponding actions (Berger and
Luckmann 1967). Even though the consequential actions correspond to academic
knowledge, they are not determined by it – they are modified/extended/ supplemented
by the system of practice. The resulting organizational actions are not the outcome of a
successful ‘bridge’ between theory and practice or particularly relevant knowledge
claims, but an internal organizational construction based on the fiction that the offered
knowledge was relevant.
As a case in point we can discuss Benders and van Bijsterveld’s (2000) empirical study
on the reception of ‘lean production’ in Germany. In the 1990s, lean production was
perceived as a practically relevant management tool (Kieser 1993) promoted by books
that circumvented academic jargon and instead were written in a user friendly way
(Womack and Jones 1996; Womack et al. 1990). According to the traditional model of
relevance, lean production represents a good example for academic research that flowed
into practice. Benders and van Bijsterveld (2000), however, show that the managerial
practices that resulted from the implementation of lean management in German
companies had virtually nothing to do with the original concept that Womack et al.
(1990) proposed. Lean production never really represented highly relevant research, but
was used as a ground for organizational fictions that resulted in more general
restructuring activities. This is not to say that lean production is a useless concept, but
that it does not represent knowledge that ‘flowed’ into practice just because some
relevance-enhancing measures were adopted (e.g., accessible writing, practitioneracademic partnerships). Other empirical studies that researched the adoption of
19
academic knowledge in practice come to similar conclusions (Hackman and Wageman
1995; Lozeau et al. 2002; Zbaracki 2000). Thus, we should value academic knowledge
for what it is (a ground for organizational fictions) and not for what some want it to be
(directly applicable knowledge).
The role of fictions can also be discussed from the perspective of the researcher (see
Figure 2). If management research really is a practically-oriented social science, as for
instance claimed by Whitley (1984), its research problems should be rooted in practice.
However, just as academic knowledge cannot simply flow from science to practice,
practical problems can also not plainly flow from practice to science. Researchers have
to act as if the problem they are working on is the ‘true’ problem that practice is
concerned with. They make sense of problems according to the logic of science and its
belonging code and connect it to already existing communications (i.e. publications).
This is not to say that an impressive mismatch concerning the agendas of practitioners
and researchers, as for instance reported by Gopinath and Hofmann (1995), cannot be
fixed (e.g., by increased communication). It is to say that even highly specified research
problems (e.g., ‘trust in strategic partnerships between US and UK firms’) mean
different things to different people and that, consequently, scholars can only act as if
they knew what practitioners want them to research.
Of course, one could counter these arguments by suggesting that cooperation between
science and practice can overcome communication barriers and thus the need for
fictions. Cooperation is often discussed as a cure against the irrelevance of management
research (Buckley et al. 1998; Starkey and Madan 2001). It is argued that jointly
produced knowledge is more relevant and easier to apply. From the perspective of this
paper, this would indicate that collaboration supersedes fictions. If knowledge can be
applied more directly due to collaboration and a contextualization prior to its use, there
20
is no need for fictions anymore. In the following, I discuss the limits and value of
cooperation between practitioners and researchers from a system theoretical perspective
and explore the consequences for the role of fictions.
Beyond Fictions? – Opportunities and Problems of Joint Research
Partnerships between practitioners and scientists are often presented as the way to
enhance relevance because research becomes more involved and integrated within a
specific local context. The most well known claim in favor of partnerships comes from
Gibbons et al.’s (1994) Mode 2 knowledge production in which the context of
application drives the form and content of the knowledge sought after. This context of
application involves a heterogeneous set of practitioners and scholars, working together
on a problem defined in a specific and localized context. For Gibbons et al. (1994: 81)
this leads to ‘hybrid science’ in which “the boundaries between the intellectual world
and its environment have become blurred.” This statement is interesting when
interpreted from a systems theoretical perspective. When taken seriously it indicates the
emergence of a new functional system within society which would downplay the
significance of communication barriers. Relevance would be ‘build into the system’ as
knowledge production and consumption are both highly contextualized.
Without any doubt, joint research projects are a valuable option to ‘traditional’ (i.e. noncollaborative) research and an alternative of getting more external funding for research
in a time of diminishing public funds. However, collaboration that is based on truly
heterogeneous networks of practitioners and scholars is currently not as widespread as
some authors want it to be (Buckley et al. 1998; von Aken 2005). For instance,
MacLean et al.’s (2002) description of a collaborative management research project
reads more like an ideal example than everyday research practice. Nevertheless,
21
assuming that collaborative research really ‘takes over’ and emerges as the dominant
form of research practice, there still is the question whether such kind of research
supersedes the necessity of fictions as described above. I think there are particularly
three reasons why collaborative (Mode 2) research cannot do without ‘traditional’
(Mode 1) research which is based on fictions.
First, fictions remain important because, according to Gibbons et al. (1994), knowledge
that is the outcome of joint research projects (i.e. Mode 2 knowledge) will not supplant
traditional Mode 1 knowledge, but supplement and interact with it. Partners in Mode 2
research are primarily looking for straightforward problem-solving outcomes that fit in
their context and are unlikely to be interested in more general models and solutions.
However, contextualized research findings often depend on more general theory
(Whetten 1989). Hence, without continued work in Mode 1, Mode 2 would not be able
to exist as the latter depends substantially on key concepts and frameworks developed in
the former.
Second, a replacement of Mode 1 by Mode 2 management knowledge is also quite
unlikely because the outcome of Mode 2 research is highly contextualized knowledge
that follows a different code than Mode 1 science. Whereas Mode 1 science operates
according to the code truth/untruth, Mode 2 knowledge is not interested in truth per se,
but truth with regard to a specific context (e.g., a particular firm). Such contextualized
knowledge is more constrained by the idiosyncrasies of the situation and thus less likely
to foster ‘experiments’. Experiments, however, are necessary to bring about new Mode
1 knowledge that is, as stated above, needed for Mode 2 knowledge to occur in the first
place. Provocative experiments that do not immediately lead to straightforward,
contextualized solutions are indispensable to ‘see’ new phenomena and novel relations
between existing phenomena. As George Sarton (1959: 88) says: “The most difficult
22
thing in science, as in any other field, is to shake off accepted views.” Fictions foster
experiments, both by practitioners and researchers because they are based on a
necessary emptiness of knowledge. Filling this emptiness means to experiment and
improvise.
Third, authors that highlight the importance of Mode 2 knowledge often assume that
practitioners have a quite detailed understanding of (a) what their problem is and (b)
what knowledge is useful to them (see for instance Starkey and Madan 2001). Often,
however, practitioners turn to scientists precisely because they do not know their
problem and have no exact idea about what knowledge they need (Grey 2001). Again, I
like to highlight the role that Mode 1 knowledge (and its belonging fictions) can play in
this context. If practitioners have to act as if the knowledge offered by scholars was
relevant, they have to reflect on their organization, work on their fundamentals, and thus
explore their problem situation. This is because Mode 1 knowledge is noncontextualized (i.e. ‘empty’) and consequently requires a competent filling according to
the specific circumstances of an organization – a filling that also means modification
and extension of existing knowledge claims. Even though Mode 2 knowledge
production fosters collaboration between science and practice, practitioners may miss
the chance to determine their problem and knowledge needs and instead rely on the
input from academics and/or their own established assumptions.
These are not arguments for disengagement with practice or even a decrease of
collaboration between researchers and practitioners. The issue is the terms of
engagement and collaboration. Too many scholars are overenthusiastic when it comes to
the value of collaborative research and understate existing collaborative efforts which
may not necessarily fall under Mode 2 knowledge production (i.e. context specific
collaboration) but are nevertheless advisable. Understanding the relation between
23
science and practice as being based on fictions does not indicate that science and
practice cannot work together, but shows (a) that collaboration is only possible and
meaningful if we also accept the legitimate role of ‘traditional’ research that requires
fictions and (b) that joint research has its limits which we should not devalue.
CONCLUSIONS
The objective of my contribution is to rethink the process of application in organization
studies from a system theoretical perspective which not only introduces a different set
of assumptions about what constitutes ‘relevant knowledge’, but also asks us to rethink
the tenets of the very concept of relevance. Overall, my contribution is a critical and
provocative one. Being critical does not imply to deny that there can be a connection
between theory and practice, but to highlight that ‘bridges’ depend on ‘empty’ fictions
that need to be contextualized. Knowledge creation by firms is apt to be firm and
problem-specific (Weick 1996) so that universal bridges, which consistently link the
decoupled logic of the two systems, may be hard to build.
All of this leads me to two major points that I think should be considered within our
future thinking on research relevance. First, scholars (but also practitioners) need to
state more precisely what is meant by ‘research relevance’. As discussed throughout this
paper, relevance cannot mean to expect straightforward and ‘theory-free’ solutions for
complex practical problems. From a system theoretical perspective, research is relevant
if necessary fictions enable organizations to produce new alternatives for action to see
things they have not seen before. Science is a successful undertaking if the unavoidable
differences between scientific and practical problem construction result in a constructive
dialogue (Kieser and Nicolai 2005). Managers can and should use this dialogue to find
answers to their questions instead of expecting ready-made prescriptions. Prescriptions
24
are most of all the job of practitioners themselves as they face an issue within a context
(Mintzberg 2005). Researchers have to deliver the ground (i.e. fictions) on which such
prescriptions can be developed by catching the interest of practitioners. ‘That’s
Interesting!’ (Davis 1971) may thus be a better expression for relevance than
conventionally assumed.
Second, the relevance problem is too often framed either as a problem of knowledge
production and/or knowledge transfer (see section two). This neglects the knowledge
consumer who makes knowledge relevant in her/his context of application. If we set up
the relevance problem this way, we need to focus on practitioners’ competence to
produce viable fictions and not solely ponder about scholars’ apparent inability to
deliver relevant knowledge. The relevance debate can profit from a more balanced
perspective that equally considers the roles of knowledge producers and consumers.
This perspective emphasizes practitioners responsibility to make knowledge relevant to
the same extent as scholars’ responsibility to produce knowledge that can be used as a
ground for viable fictions.
Concerning future conceptual and empirical research, we need more investigations that
question the assumptions underlying our concept of relevance. Conceptual research
should, for instance, rethink the science-practice link from other theoretical lenses such
as Giddens’ (1984) structuration theory, which would allow us to understand knowledge
production and consumption as a process of reflexive structuration, or Weick’s (1995,
1979) sensemaking approach, which would allow us to better understand how
practitioners enact problems and how researchers look for cues to find solutions to these
problems. Qualitative empirical studies can supplement such conceptual research. For
instance, the role of practitioners’ fictions can be empirically researched. Case study
research can expose how practitioners come up with fictions, to what extent they
25
correspond to the ‘original’, and whether they are aware of the fictional ground of
knowledge consumption. Jarzabkowski’s (2005: 10) case-based research, for example,
reports that managers are not interested in the concept of a Porterian value chain per se,
but rather use it as a communication tool; they establish a fiction (‘Let us act as if the
value chain approach is relevant for us.’) and then fill this fiction with context specific
meaning.
My discussion demonstrates that there are still many unanswered questions and
probably even more unquestioned answers when it comes to investigating the link
between science and practice. Ralph Waldo Emerson once said that ‘Science does not
know its debt to imagination’. Based on my remarks about the role of fictions, I would
like to add that also practice does not know its debt to imagination.
26
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Figures
Figure 1: Organizations, Functional Systems, and Society as Autopoietic Systems
Figure 2: ‘As If’-Assumptions and the Relation between Theory and Practice
31