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Towards a Policy for Canada’s
Penitentiaries
The Evolution of Canada’s Prison System
and
the Transformation of the Correctional Officer’s Role
(1950 - 2002)
Towards a Policy for Canada’s Penitentiaries
2
Table of Contents
Sommaire .....................................................................................................................4
Introduction ................................................................................................................17
I- The evolution of Canada’s Prison System (1950-2002).......................................19
1-A Typology of Prison Organization.....................................................................19
The Coercitive Prison Organization................................................................ ...20
The Normative Prison Organization..................................................................20
2-The Phases in the Evolution of the Penal Institution.......................................21
The First phase: Enlightenment.........................................................................22
The Second phase: The Warehouse.................................................................22
The Third phase: A remedial Approach............................................................23
The Fourth phase : Interaction...........................................................................23
3-The Major Reforms to Canada’s Prison System..................................................24
a) From Enlightenment to Warehouse..............................................................25
b) From the Warehouse to Rehabilitation.........................................................27
c) The Penitentiary Under Attack ......................................................................29
d) From Rehabilitation to Pluralism..................................................................32
e) Towards a Hierarchical..................................................................................34
f) Pluralism and Feminism..................................................................................39
g) Pluralism and Risk Management...................................................................41
h) Towards a Polarized and Conflictual Pluralism...........................................43
II –The Problem of Security in the Penitentiary.......................................................51
1-Portrait of the Situation ........................................................................................51
a) Inmates Murdere...........................................................................................52
b) Guards Murdered..........................................................................................52
c) Hostage Takings................................................ .............................................53
d) Grievous Attacks Against Prison Staff..........................................................53
e) Grievous Attacks Amongst Inmates.............................................................54
f) Inmate Suicides.............................................................................................55
g) Riots ...............................................................................................................55
h) Escapes...........................................................................................................56
i) Brawls (Severe...)..........................................................................................57
Towards a Policy for Canada’s Penitentiaries
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2-The Bottoms Model............................................... ..............................................63
3-The Principle of Precaution...............................................................................72
4-What is a Penitentiary?........... ........................................................... .................76
5-Architectural and Functional Evolution of Canada’s Penitentiaries...............77
III-Prisonization and the Correctional Officer’s Role in this Process...................105
1-The Correctional Officer’s four Tasks..............................................................105
2- Prisonization or the Integration into the Prison Environment Function.....111
3- Prisonization and Reintegration into the Community...................................115
4-Prison Integration Routines...............................................................................116
a) Activities and Programs...............................................................................116
b) The Correctional Officer’s Authority..........................................................119
- Moral Authority............................................................................................119
-Legal Authority............................................................................................123
5-The Correctional Officer’s Job Description.....................................................125
a)The Security Task.......................................................................................126
b)The Tasks Related to Reintegration into
the Community and Prison Integration.......................................................126
Conclusion : Towards a Policy for Canada’s Penitentiary...................................131
References.......................................................... .......................................................140
Towards a Policy for Canada’s Penitentiaries
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Summary
This study examines the evolution of Canada’s prison system and the
transformation of the correctional officer’s role from 1950 to 2000.
It is divided into three parts.
„Part One
In the first part, we shall explore the evolution of Canada's prison system in
relation to the transformation of the correctional officer's role. The objective in
this first part is to sketch the thrust of the transformations that have shaped
Canada's prison system and the correctional officer's role within it, based upon
a typology rooted in the evolution of the penal institution and drawing from the
principal investigation reports that have made their mark upon the post-war
federal prison system.
In order to accomplish this, we shall examine the following subjects:
- the forms that prison organization can take
- the phases in the evolution of the penal institution
- the major reforms that have been made to Canada's prison system.
At the outset, we shall define, based upon four criteria (the decision-making
process, the objective being sought, the means employed to reach this objective
and the key position in the institution), the two major types of penal institutions:
the coercive institution and the normative institution. The coercive institution is
a centralized organization whose goal is to maintain order by means of
discipline and a system of privileges, under the authority of the assistant warden
in charge of security. Meanwhile, the normative institution is an organization
that favours decentralization; it focuses upon reintegration into the community
by means of persuasion and group-oriented living, under the responsibility of
the program director. These two types of institutions are considered to be
incompatible.
Secondly, we shall describe the four phases in the evolution (tendencies) of the
penal institution, on the basis of the nature of the relationships of power that
characterize a prison. During the first phase, that of enlightenment, the inmate is
isolated, cut off from society and almost totally dependent upon the guard –a
unipolar authority. In the second phase, dubbed that of the warehouse, the
inmates exist as a group opposed to that of the guards, where the latter must
secure the former's cooperation in order to maintain order –a bipolar authority.
During the third remedial phase, the offender achieves the status of an
Towards a Policy for Canada’s Penitentiaries
5
individual; the prison opens itself up to society (training programs, parole);
power is now shared between educators, guards and inmates –a tripolar
authority. In the fourth interactive phase, society penetrates into the prison: the
relationships of power become multipolar (offenders, correctional officers,
educators, administrators, government, judges, the mass media and public
opinion). From one phase to the next, power becomes more and more diffuse
and the correctional officer's authority is progressively eroded. An evolution has
occurred from a coercive institution to a normative institution, without ever
existing as such as a finalized model.
Thirdly, we shall apply the typology and evolutionary phases defined above to
Canada's prison system. An examination of the investigation commissions and
reports dealing with the prison milieu will elucidate the thrust of how this
system has evolved. Several investigation commissions and reports have made
their mark upon Canada's correctional system. The 1836 Special Committee for
the Implementation of an Effective Prison System marks the transition from
enlightenment to the warehouse. The 1849 Brown Commission signals the
remedial phase. But it is not until the 1956 Fauteux Report that a genuine reform
is carried out (rehabilitation programs, parole, etc.). In 1977, after noting the
failure of the foregoing, the MacGuigan Commission attacks the reform and
advocates a return to discipline, without however entirely challenging the
achievements of the previous period. At the end of the 1970s and throughout the
1980s, the movement for the recognition of human rights, of which the feminist
movement was a part, gains momentum. This movement will have significant
repercussions upon Canada's prison milieu, as will be the case with the 1982
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The 1988 Correctional Service of
Canada Mission Statement advocates an ideology of active intervention and
adopts a new mode of operation, namely, unit management. In 1989, the Task
Force Report on Federally Sentenced Women proposes a new approach to
correctional services for women, based upon communal living arrangements
and a front line service provider role to be played by correctional officers. In
1996, the Arbour Report also advocates a return to the normative philosophy
and endorses the new legal order based upon the rule of law and human
respect. In point of fact, near the end of the 1970s, Canada's correctional system
entered into its fourth evolutionary phase, that of interaction.
Towards a Policy for Canada’s Penitentiaries
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This phase is characterized by a syncretistic approach, where all the trends coexist within the prison, in a more or less equal and coherent fashion, under the
burden of diverse social demands. Differing viewpoints meet head on. Prison
democracy advocates the formation of a government of inmates in charge of
managing the deprivation of their liberty (including discipline). Actuarial justice
seeks to predict violence, by reducing the offender to a risk, to a “statistic”, who
must be neutralized and kept (as in a warehouse) at a particular level of
security. Over time, this pluralism becomes more and more polarized and
conflictual. Neo-conservative penological theory, which emphasizes
punishment and superprisons, and liberal penological theory, focused upon
remedial justice, emerge as the only solutions to the prison problem. Remedial
justice views positive interaction between individuals and a “culture of respect”
of their rights as the ideal prison security framework (dynamic security).
Moreover, this cultural approach to the problem of security is recommended by
the 1999 Security Task Force Report, along the same lines as the reports on
federally sentenced women. This report is typical of the interactive phase,
where the dynamic security concept that it puts forward provides the means to
integrate and rank several trends together (security, rehabilitation, risk
management, democratization, etc.), but all in the direction of a greater
normalization of the penitentiary.
„Part Two
In the second part of our study, we shall examine the problem of security in the
penitentiary and more specifically that of violence. The objective in this second
part is to demonstrate that our knowledge about violence in the penitentiary
and the impact of the various reforms affecting security is embryonic, both
quantitatively and qualitatively and that, accordingly, caution is imperative. This
caution must be translated into a prison policy based upon striking a balance
between opposing approaches: coercive and persuasive, static security and
dynamic security. We will see, in the light of some concrete examples, that
such a balance tends to come about as circumstances dictate, but also partially
in reaction to events and under the pressure that is exercised by diverse actors.
In order to accomplish this, we will sketch a portrait of the situation, analyze
and critique the Bottoms model (the prevailing explanatory paradigm), make
the case for the principle of exercising caution and we shall review the
architectural and functional evolution of Canada’s penal institutions, by
examining in depth the case of the special handling units and the institutions for
female offenders.
Towards a Policy for Canada’s Penitentiaries
7
To begin with, we will sketch a portrait of the situation. Contrary to what the
Correctional Service of Canada (CSC) has been implying, there does not exist a
falling trend with regards to violence in Canada’s penitentiaries. The major
serious incidents that occur in Canada’s penitentiaries are natural (ostensibly)
cyclical phenomena (inmates murdered, hostage takings, grievous attacks
amongst inmates and inmate suicides) or random occurrences (grievous
attacks against prison staff, riots, escapes from medium security penitentiaries,
severe brawls).
Depending upon the kind of violent incident under consideration, it is either a
somewhat recurrent phenomenon or else something that can happen more or
less predictably at any time at all. Each of the phenomena that has been
recorded indicates that there is no genuine trend of decreasing violence in
Canada’s penitentiaries. Although the total number of major incidents
diminished as of 1995-1996, this number has remained stable subsequently;
and, it is still too early to talk about any kind of underlying declining trend.
On the other hand, the causal relationship between the CSC’s new prison
philosophy, based upon dynamic security, and the decline under discussion has
not been demonstrated scientifically. It appears more likely to be a coincidence.
Indeed, a number of paradoxical events have occurred over the last few years,
such as outbreaks of violence in the new penitentiaries built around the notions
of dynamic security, outbreaks that have compelled the CSC to resort to static
security measures, which measures could very well explain, at least in part, the
decrease in the total number of major incidents!
More generally speaking, violence in the penitentiary remains a complex
phenomenon, with numerous poorly understood underlying causes, which are
difficult to quantify accurately and objectively, and tricky to subsequently relate
to specific policies. Several prevailing notions must be challenged, including the
one that claims that inmate violence against guards is sporadic and only
represents a small proportion of prison violence. Contradictory phenomena
would rather seem to be at play here: the normalization of the penitentiary, in
some cases, appears to improve relations between inmates and correctional
officers, while in other cases, seems to be undermining these relations, a
deterioration that is revealed by an increase in everyday violence and the risks
of violence against correctional officers (nominally and moderately serious
incidents that are not recorded by the CSC).
After initially drawing a distinction between order (patterns of stable social
relationships) and control (an assortment of routine practices), the three major
approaches towards reaching a dynamic social equilibrium (mutual interest,
Towards a Policy for Canada’s Penitentiaries
8
coercion and consensus based upon norms and values) and the three criteria
underlying legitimacy (compatibility with the law, morality and shared beliefs),
Bottoms puts forward a theoretical model to explain “prison peace”, based
upon eight factors that are in conflict one with the other (legitimacy, structural
constraints, reward/punishment system, physical constraints, incidents that
have marked the penitentiary, the prison staff’s philosophy and skills).
The studies used by Bottoms to build his model expose six situational and
temporal contexts that are conducive to violence. Bottoms concludes that
attacks against prison staff take place at the rubbing points of the prison’s social
order, when correctional officers are exercising their authority.
Bottoms model is a theoretical model, built upon an assortment of case studies
and narrow investigations, which has not been tested empirically. Indeed, the
virtue of his model is its ability to demonstrate how the same decision is
capable of producing opposing outcomes. The liberalization of the penitentiary
(the reduction of physical constraints, the development of direct surveillance
and the multiplication of interactions between prison staff and inmates) may
just as well lead to an increase or a decrease in the level of violence. And, as
some experiences have also shown, it might just simply lead to displacing or
creating new rubbing points and causes of friction, or then again to the entirely
random occurrence of violence.
Bottoms defines the penitentiary as a relatively stable dynamic system, while in
reality, it far more resembles an unstable dynamic system, constantly
threatened by disorder and difficult to predict. In an unstable system, trivial
causes may give rise to profound consequences; nominally or moderately
serious incidents can potentially turn into serious incidents. Also, prison peace
(order and control) is not the most significant phenomenon in the penitentiary,
but rather the clash between order and disorder, and the transition from one to
the other. The principal problem that has to be addressed from then on is one of
managing the tension between order and disorder. And the best way to do this
is to combine and balance coercive and persuasive methods, static security and
dynamic security, direct surveillance and indirect surveillance. This new
conception of the penitentiary calls for the exercise of caution.
Thirdly, we propose to apply the principle of precaution to the major reforms
that affect Canada’s prison system. We draw a distinction between the notions
of danger (an actual known threat) and risk (the probability of a dangerous
event occurring), the notions of prevention (reducing the likelihood of danger at
the source) and protection (reducing the seriousness of danger), as well as the
more traditional notions of prevention/protection and precaution. The principle
of precaution is an action principle that compels us to prevent potentially
Towards a Policy for Canada’s Penitentiaries
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serious danger from happening, without waiting to know what actual
consequences might result from a given situation and without dispelling the
scientific uncertainty pertaining to these effects. In a context of high risk and
scientific uncertainty, the principle of precaution takes over from the principle
of prevention.
The consequences of ultra-liberal and neo-conservative prison reform are
unknown and uncertain; these reforms risk causing major social and
institutional damage. We have no choice but to avoid these potentially serious
damages. The principle of precaution requires that a constant balance be
maintained between opposing and extreme trends, in order to minimize the
risks embodied by certain phenomena, about which we do not know their
more or less long-term effects. It demands that the CSC adopt a conscious and
carefully thought out prison policy, based upon striking a balance between
coercion and persuasion, as well as between dynamic security and static
security.
Fourthly, we shall define the notion of a penitentiary. A penitentiary is not
merely a brick building, with bars and gates, nor a university campus, nor a
prison without walls (virtual prison). Regardless of the form it takes, the
penitentiary is a zone characterized by separation and segregation, which in
itself constitutes a sub-system within society.
Fifthly, we shall trace the architectural and functional evolution of Canada’s
penitentiaries. By examining the history of penitentiaries, we shall demonstrate
that the balance between coercion and persuasion, between static security and
dynamic security, tends to materialize as circumstances dictate, in reaction to
events and bit by bit, under the pressure that is exercised by various actors who
defend opposing interests and approaches. We will also show that this more or
less spontaneous process generates confusion and incoherence, while wasting
a good deal of time, energy and money; and that things will continue along this
path as long as the CSC does not carefully think through and officially adopt a
prison policy based upon striking a balance between the opposing approaches.
In the traditional penitentiary, spatial segregation and its corollary, the fence,
prevail. Contemporary penitentiary design challenges the “architectural
cleavage”, the principles of separation and the fence at each of the levels of
spatial organization (between the penitentiary and society, and within the
institution itself). However, the penitentiary's evolution has not really been
linear, as the CSC would appear to believe. It resembles more of a swing
between opening traditional penitentiaries and closing new penitentiaries,
between dynamic security and static security, in other words, between
reforming activism and objective constraints. The architectural cleavage and the
Towards a Policy for Canada’s Penitentiaries
10
former modes of operation are not simply remnants from the past or then again
a mundane transition phase along the road to the ideal penitentiary (the prison
without walls).
The evolution of the special handling units (SHU) and the regional institutions
for women (RIFW) are two fine examples of rebalancing. The evolution of the
SHU provides us with a good example of rebalancing in favour of normalization
and static security. This example demonstrates that should it be necessary,
rebalancing in favour of normalization (reintegration programs) and dynamic
security (limited control, control via the interaction between employees and
offenders) in the special handling units must not be done to the detriment of
static security, and that the problems encountered cannot be resolved by
perpetually side stepping the real issues, by repeatedly formulating yet another
new program.
The evolution of the institutions for women provides us with another relevant
example of rebalancing in favour of static security and the spatial segregation of
different categories of female inmates and this, all the more so since the CSC is
planning to apply the institution for women model to the penitentiaries for men.
This example demonstrates that the CSC, driven by necessity, partially recreated
the traditional penitentiary right within the regional institutions for women. In
the first regional institutions for women, static security was barely evident.
These institutions did not have a maximum security unit. Following a number of
violent incidents, the CSC decided to increase the static security measures, by
reintroducing the perimeter fence, the control and detection system and limits
on moving about depending upon the level of risk represented by the female
offenders; as well as by creating Secure Units to accommodate the female
offenders classified as maximum security risks; by formulating a normalized
instrument to reassess the level of security of female offenders; by developing
an intensive behaviour management program and finally, by creating Structured
Living Environment houses for female inmates with serious mental health
problems.
The CSC was thus acknowledging that it had gone too far in neglecting security
within the institutions for women and that it had underestimated the level of risk
represented by female offenders, when judging them to be far less violent than
the men. On the other hand, the CSC has not fully understood that the so-called
“situational” violence perpetrated by women (violence directed against people
they know) could easily turn its sights against correctional officers. By counting
too heavily upon the development of interrelations between female inmates
and prison staff, upon relational intimacy, the risk of violence increases. Getting
to really know the female inmate does not necessarily represent the best of
protections.
Towards a Policy for Canada’s Penitentiaries
11
Despite all this, the CSC has not modified its policy pronouncements. The
ideology of the CSC and the partisans of liberal penology echoes, throughout the
proposals made by the investigative committee on the Security Norms in the
Institutions for Women, in the imbalance between static security and dynamic
security measures, as pertains to prison staff and their placement.
The rebalancing within the institutions for women in favour of static security
remains incomplete. Even though the CSC claims to employ an integrated
approach, the institutions for women will still be based upon the notion of
dynamic security. The CSC is incapable of conceiving of a genuine balance
between the two forms of security.
„Part Three
In the third part of our study, we shall explore prisonization, the integration of
inmates into the penitentiary and the correctional officer's role in this process.
The objective in this third part is to demonstrate that there is not only one
alternative, one single choice that is available to correctional officers: security
and/or reintegration into the community. Amongst the correctional officer's
primary formal and informal functions, we shall discover, identify and describe
the integration into the prison environment function. This function differs from
the reintegration into the community function and is likely to become the
fundamental issue in the technical division of labour within the penitentiary.
In order to fulfil the objective of part three, we shall delve into four subjects: the
correctional officer's primary functions, prisonization or the integration into the
prison environment function, prisonization and reintegration into the
community, the key prison integration routines and the correctional officer's job
description.
At the outset, we shall describe the correctional officer's status in the prison
milieu and their four primary tasks. The correctional officer is deemed a
subordinate civil servant who doesn’t participate in the formulation of prison
policy. In the scholarly literature, three major functions are attributed to the
correctional officer: the security function, the service function (looking after
inmate needs) and the reintegration into the community function. The security
task is the correctional officer's primary function; the tasks related to
reintegration into the community are a secondary function. The correctional
officer's three major functions contradict one another. The service function is at
odds with the security function, which demands that the officer remain in a
position of authority and respect. The development of various activities to
support reintegration into the community increases the circulation of goods and
Towards a Policy for Canada’s Penitentiaries
12
people in the prison and sends correctional officers back to their security task.
Should we surmise, as several people do, that it would suffice to prioritize the
reintegration into the community function in order to remove all the
contradictions that burden the penal institution? Reintegration into the
community is a penological model based upon the prison opening up to the
community and upon the notion of the inmate's eventual release. This model
thwarts the offender from “living for the moment and behind the walls”; it
encourages the inmate's psychological escape. According to the specialists, the
normative institution must be very selective. Reintegration into the community
is not suitable for a majority of inmates, namely, for those people serving
medium and long-term sentences. What does one do then with these
offenders? Must we conclude that only one alternative exists for correctional
officers: security and/or reintegration into the community? In fact, the
correctional officer fulfils a fourth function: that of integration into the prison
environment.
Secondly, we shall explore the “prisonization” phenomenon. The latter was the
focus of penological research from the 1940s to the 1980s. Prisonization, which
is measured by the conformity of the inmate's values with the values of the
prison staff, translates the phenomenon of the integration of inmates by the
prison milieu and may be classified as a function of their incorporation into the
prison environment. Prisonization is fostered by both universal and individual
factors (a new lifestyle, the length of the inmate's sentence, an absence of
relations with the outside, dependency upon the guards, etc.). The integration
of the inmate into the prison milieu is a cyclical phenomenon with a slight
negative tendency. This negative tendency can be explained by the prospect of
returning back into the community. The problem is that the transformations that
have marked the prison milieu over the past decades (the prison's increased
permeability to the community, the improvement in the inmate's living
conditions and the modification of the relationship of power between offenders
and correctional officers) have played a role in neutralizing the process of the
inmate's integration by the penal institution. Today, prisonization can no longer
be measured by the conformity to values, but more modestly by the conformity
of the inmate's behaviour with what is required by the institution.
Thirdly, we shall study the link between prisonization and reintegration into the
community. Prisonization doesn't make irreversible changes to the values and
behaviour of individuals; it is neither the cause of a failure to reintegrate into the
community nor that of a repeat offence. Much to the contrary, integration into
the prison environment would favour, to some extent, reintegration into the
community. In reality, prisonization and reintegration into the community are
simultaneously complementary and contradictory. They are two facets of the
same phenomenon, integration into society. They clash when they are put into
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13
action at the same time and in the same place and, they complement each
other when they are arranged sequentially over time, in different physical
locations. Integration into the prison environment is a prerequisite to
reintegration into the community. What distinguishes the measures geared
towards integration into the prison environment from the measures designed
for reintegration into the community is their focus. Integration into the prison
environment measures are focused upon life within the prison walls, the here
and now, while reintegration into the community measures are focused upon
life in the community, elsewhere, at some later date. The place where
integration into the prison environment occurs is the maximum or medium
security penitentiary, while the locus for reintegration into the community is the
minimum security penitentiary or the halfway house.
Fourthly, we shall review the key prison integration routines, routines that the
authors frequently confound with the means used to control and reduce tension
within the prison. There are two key measures that foster integration into the
prison environment: activities and programs, on the one hand, and the
correctional officer's authority, on the other. Integration into the prison
environment is conditional upon keeping busy. The nature and finality of what is
being done are just as important as the simple fact of doing something.
Generally speaking, the activities and programs geared towards reintegration
into the community do not favour the integration of inmates into the prison
environment. The purpose of an activity or program must be compatible with
the needs of the prison milieu and not solely with those of the community.
There are too few activities and programs geared specifically towards
integration into the prison environment. The correctional officer's moral and
legal authority is the second key to successfully integrating inmates into the
prison environment. Their moral authority grows out of the relational process. It
is based upon communication, keeping one's distance, etiquette, services
rendered (as distinct from mandatory tasks) and professional principles.
Communication and the services rendered are the two cornerstones of the
correctional officer's moral authority. Communication secures the inmates'
cooperation. Rendering services enables the correctional officer to build some
discretionary room to manoeuvre. Meanwhile, the correctional officer's legal
authority is rooted in formal disciplinary procedures. But this authority is based
far more upon the deterrent effect of the punishment than the actual
punishment itself, which weakens the relational process, undermines the
officer's authority when it is not enforced, and is often interpreted as a lack of
know-how by authorities. By selecting which offences to deal with, or by
imposing informal penalties, correctional officers extend their discretionary
power to disciplinary procedures. But, to avoid weakening their discretionary
power in granting privileges and enforcing regulations (to avoid the inflationary
spiral of delinquent demands and behaviour), correctional officers must be in a
Towards a Policy for Canada’s Penitentiaries
14
position to enforce their authority, and over and above the foregoing, to
maintain a balance between their moral and legal authority, in as much as
society provides them with the means to do so, which is no longer the case
today.
Fifthly, we shall describe the occupations of correctional officers I and II, as
defined by the CSC. The tasks of correctional officers I and II are numerous and
complex. They pertain to the functions of security, looking after inmate needs,
reintegration into the community and integration into the prison environment.
The tasks related to security and reintegration into the community are explicit,
while the tasks related to looking after inmate needs and integration into the
prison environment are implicit. The tasks of a level I officer pertain primarily to
the security function, while those of a level II officer pertain primarily to the
reintegration into the community function. The tasks of a correctional officer I
related to reintegration into the community are combined into two categories:
participation in case management and participation in program development
and implementation. Their participation, however, is fairly symbolic. Two
additional categories supplement the tasks of a correctional officer II:
participation in essential activities and influence upon inmate behaviour. These
latter tasks are what most directly call upon the officer's moral authority. They
are implicitly linked to integration into the prison environment. Level II officers
will also play a more important role than level I officers in case management
tasks and program development and implementation. When correctional
officers II perform their case management tasks, and more specifically when
they participate in planning day passes or the inmate's parole plan, this is
precisely when their reintegration into the community function is most at odds
with their integration into the prison environment function. For lack of time and
means, the tasks performed by correctional officers differ considerably from
those described by the CSC. Generally speaking, even though the correctional
officer's tasks have been enriched, the latter have the feeling that their work is
not acknowledged.
Finally, we shall conclude with a description of a prison policy proposal that is
more compatible with the recent evolution of Canada's prison milieu and with
the objective interests of correctional officers. At the heart of this policy lies the
principle of precaution embodied in the tasks related to integration into the
prison environment, in equilibrium with the security task.
The CSC's prison policy and routines are based upon the twin contradictions
between the goal of security and of reintegration into the community, on the
one hand, and between the objective of reintegration into the community and
of integration into the prison environment, on the other. To change this situation
in the prisons, it would not suffice to give priority to reintegration into the
Towards a Policy for Canada’s Penitentiaries
15
community over security. The contradiction between reintegration into the
community and integration into the prison environment would not be any closer
to a solution. The alternative between security and/or reintegration into the
community is not the only one available to correctional officers. In our opinion,
another choice exists, which involves balancing the security function and the
integration into the prison environment function, by upgrading the security
function, on the one hand, and by recognizing and cultivating the integration
into the prison environment function, on the other. In order that correctional
officers can fully participate in the formulation of prison policy on the basis of
their know-how, they must be recognized as professionals and no longer as
subordinate civil servants.
The two primary means that foster the integration of inmates into the prison
environment are activities and programs, on the one hand, and the correctional
officer's moral and legal authority, on the other. In order to ensure that inmates
behave in accordance with what the prison requires, not only must activities
and programs be developed that are geared towards prison integration, but they
also must be made mandatory, and correctional officers should be given a more
important role in their development and implementation. The correctional
officer's moral and legal authority should likewise be reinforced. Generally
speaking, the officer's discretionary powers in granting privileges and enforcing
regulations have to be reinforced too, in order to secure the inmates'
cooperation, all the while avoiding the inflationary spiral.
These measures imply three major changes to Canada's prison policy: first of all,
inmates would no longer be the top person in charge of their evolution in
prison; secondly, reintegration into the community programs would only be
dispensed two years before the inmate's prospective release; and, thirdly, the
tasks related to integration into the prison environment would be assigned to
correctional officers, while the tasks related to reintegration into the community
would remain the prerogative of case management officers.
The correctional officers' prison policy proposal cannot be implemented
without a twofold equilibrium being established between the coercive
approach and the normative approach, on the one hand, and between the
needs of the prison milieu and an opening up to the community, on the other.
Throughout its history, Canada's correctional system has been marked by acute
tension and by a swinging back and forth between opposing objectives, namely,
the protection of society via coercive measures and the protection of society via
normative measures. As the examination of the investigation commissions and
reports shows us, Canada's prison system has undergone four developmental
phases: enlightenment, warehouse, remedial and interactive. But as it settles
into its fourth phase, under the burden of opposing social pressures, some
Towards a Policy for Canada’s Penitentiaries
16
observers have claimed that the objectives of the coercive method could be
reached by simply pursuing the objectives of the normative method. In view of
the nature and function of the penitentiary in our society, –a dynamic unstable
system, constantly threatened by disorder and difficult to predict– the contradiction between the coercive and the normative methods cannot be resolved. The
best model of security is one that combines both methods, by avoiding
extremes (democracy and totalitarianism). The consequences of both ultraliberal and neo-conservative prison reform are unknown and uncertain. These
reforms risk causing significant social and institutional damage. We thus have
no choice but to apply the principle of precaution. It has become imperative to
move away from a pluralism that generates disorder and incoherence to a
limited, restrained and rational pluralism that ensures the integration of the
inmates. The CSC must officially adopt a prison policy based upon a balance
between opposing approaches. Over the past few decades, Canada's prisons
have opened up to the community. The system of actors has become more
complex. Power over and within the institution has become multipolar and
diffuse, such that the penal institution is no longer evolving according to its own
formulas and is poorly fulfilling its function. Power must be refocused and the
prison must reclaim a certain autonomy with respect to society.
Needless to say, the correctional officers' prison policy proposal will not resolve
all the contradictions that characterize Canada's prison system, but it will greatly
contribute to reducing them and making them a little more manageable.
Towards a Policy for Canada’s Penitentiaries
17
Introduction
The current state of affairs in Canada's penitentiaries may be described in a few
sentences. There has been a wide-ranging deterioration in the prison climate.
Prisons are poorly fulfilling their twin functions of security and rehabilitation.
Internal tension has considerably increased over the past few years, without
anyone managing to bring the situation under a semblance of control.
Reintegration into the community is for the most part a failure and the
penitentiary is incapable of integrating inmates. Correctional officers are
profoundly dissatisfied with their professional status and their work, whose
value is not properly recognized. The prison has become dysfunctional. How
has this happened? And how can the situation be improved without professing
to resolve the “prison question”?
The CSN Labour Relations Department has commissioned us to undertake a
research study of the evolution of Canada's prison system over the past fifty
years in relation to the transformation of the correctional officer's role.
This study has been undertaken with a bias towards the correctional officer's
perspective. This implies not only putting correctional officers at the very heart
of our study, but also formulating a prison policy proposal that corresponds to
their particular interests, in other words, to their position in the social and
technical division of work in the penitentiary. In contrast to several other
researchers who have studied the prison milieu “du côté des surveillants de
prison (from the perspective of prison attendants)” (to cite the sub-title of a
book written by Dominique Lhuilier and Nadia Aymard), we have chosen to
study it from outside the box, by espousing a bias that shields us from any false
objectivity.
Our study is divided into three major parts.
The first part deals with the evolution of Canada's prison system in relation to
the transformation of the correctional officer's role. The objective in this first part
is to sketch the thrust of the transformations that have shaped Canada's prison
system and the correctional officer's role within it, based upon a typology rooted
in the evolution of the penal institution and drawing from the principal
investigation reports that have made their mark upon the post-war federal
prison system.
The second part of our study addresses the problem of security in the
penitentiary and specifically that of violence. The objective in this second part is
to show that our knowledge about violence in the penitentiary and the impact
of the various reforms affecting security is embryonic, both quantitatively and
Towards a Policy for Canada’s Penitentiaries
18
qualitatively and that, accordingly, caution is imperative. This caution must be
translated into a prison policy based upon striking a balance between opposing
approaches: coercive and persuasive, static security and dynamic security. We
will see, in the light of concrete examples, that such a balance tends to come
about as circumstances dictate, but also partially in reaction to events and
under the pressure that is exercised by diverse actors.
The third part of our study deals with prisonization, the integration of inmates
into the penitentiary, and the correctional officer's role in this process. The
objective in this second part is to demonstrate that there is not only one
alternative, one single choice that is available to correctional officers: security
and/or reintegration into the community. Amongst the correctional officer's
primary formal and informal functions, we shall discover, identify and describe
the integration into the prison environment function. This function differs from
the reintegration into the community function and is likely to become the
fundamental issue in the technical division of labour within the penitentiary.
We conclude by formulating a prison policy proposal that is more compatible
with the recent evolution of Canada's prison milieu and with the objective
interests of correctional officers. At the heart of this policy lies the principle of
precaution embodied in the tasks related to integration into the prison
environment, in equilibrium with the tasks related to security.
In order to properly carry out our study, we have availed ourselves of the
principal research studies that have examined the prison milieu and prison
guards over the last decade. Even though we have often adopted a different
point of view, our study owes a significant debt to those done by Stastny and
Tyrnauer, Bottoms, Clemmer, Wheeler, Chauvenet, Orlic and Benguigui,
Lhuilier and Aymard, Lemire, Laplante, de Vacheret and numerous others, from
whose work we have often reproduced certain formulations. We do not claim
to have resolved the “prison question”. We are also more than aware that the
subjects we are examining here often stir up controversy and that in the final
analysis, the real issue at hand is the very nature of the work performed by
correctional officers.
Towards a Policy for Canada’s Penitentiaries
19
I- The Evolution of Canada’s Prison System (1950-2002)
In the first part of our study, we shall explore the evolution of Canada's
prison system in relation to the transformation of the correctional officer's
role1. The objective in this first part is to sketch the thrust of the
transformations that have shaped Canada's prison system and the
correctional officer's role within it, based upon a typology rooted in the
evolution of the penal institution and drawing from the principal
investigation reports that have made their mark upon the post-war federal
prison system.
In order to accomplish this, we shall examine the following subjects: the
forms that prison organization can take, the phases in the evolution of the
penal institution and the major reforms to Canada's prison system
To our knowledge, an overview of the evolution of government policies and
the orientations of the Correctional Service of Canada (CSC) does not exist.
We have thus had to "patch one together" from a smorgasbord of sources.
Beginning with a typology of prison organization, we have pinpointed the
major reforms that have shaped Canada's prison system in the phases of the
evolution of the penal institution, as defined by Stastny and Tyrnauer, which
has not been done up until now.
An enormous amount of work remains to be done. We hope that we will
have modestly made a contribution to the task.
1- A Typology of Prison Organization
From an organizational perspective, there are two major types of penal
institutions: the coercive institution and the normative institution.
Between these two types, there are blended institutions, which are more
or less coercive or normative. In each type of institution, authority will be
ensured by one key person, while the guards' main function and the
importance of their role will differ, and this, according to the nature of the
institution2.
1
The terms guard, prison attendant, correctional officer and corrections officer are all synonymous. The
academic literature uses the terms guard and prison attendant, while the Correctional Service of Canada,
uses the term correctional officer.
2
LEMIRE, 1990.
Towards a Policy for Canada’s Penitentiaries
20
The Coercive Prison Organization
A coercive prison organization is autocratic (hierarchical), centralized
(from the standpoint of decision making, information and
communications) and charismatic (leadership plays a dominant role). It
is based upon brutal force and passive obedience (physical strength, fear,
isolation, threats, privileges, etc.). Its primary objective is maintaining
order. This is what characterizes traditional penal institutions.
Order is ensured by a system of privileges. Such a system involves
granting rewards and favours to inmates in exchange for their
cooperation and support (calculated). Through negotiations and
bartering, the institution's staff buys peace, and will exercise greater or
lesser tolerance in their enforcement of a multitude of internal
regulations. Disciplinary measures guarantee compliance with tacit
agreements. Accordingly, informal mechanisms spring up where staff
and inmates work out a relationship of interdependency, of "corruptive
reciprocity" (internal rules and justice are sacrificed for the maintenance
of order). Indeed, in coercive institutions, the system of privileges is the
prison staff's essential work instrument 3.
In these institutions, the key person is the assistant warden in charge of
security. The latter oversees the prison population via informal surrogate
leaders. By granting privileges to the prisoner elite, and through them to
the mass of inmates (better jobs, greater freedom of movement,
extension of recreation periods, etc.), loyalty to the institution is
reinforced. Meanwhile, the guards are assigned a second role. They
negotiate less important privileges. However, due to the daily contact that
they have with the mass of inmates, the guard/inmate system of
privileges is more stable than the assistant warden/surrogate leaders
system. Hence the fundamental role played by the guards in maintaining
order and security.
The Normative Prison Organization
The normative prison organization prefers a more egalitarian approach
(decentralization of decision making) and gives priority to interpersonal
relations (exchanges, discussions, consultations and consensus). It is
based upon persuasion, participation, accountability, motivation,
voluntary and positive allegiance and upon the recognition of inmate
rights. It's primary objective is reintegration into the community. Order
3
SYKES, 1958; cited by LEMIRE, 1990.
Towards a Policy for Canada’s Penitentiaries
21
and security are secondary concerns. Authority is imposed as a last
resort, in compliance with the rules (an end to arbitrariness). This type of
organization will exist in institutions whose primary mission is
rehabilitation.
Group-oriented living –at the unit level, the cell block level and the district
level– is the preferred remedial instrument in normative institutions. The
educator/inmate relationship is a microcosm of society, a symbol of the
outside world. Learning how to live in a group is like learning how to live
in society, how to recognize and internalize its norms. Group-oriented
living provides the means for a degree of "normalization" of the prison
milieu; and, from there, it generates a certain order and stability.
The key role in a normative institution is no longer played by the assistant
warden, but by the remedial program director and/or by their assistant.
The key people are qualified employees, who have authority and specific
skills, who work in the cell blocks or living units: team leaders and
professional educator-facilitators. With the relaxing of security, the
guard's stature is downgraded and ambiguous. An attempt is made to
transform the latter into a front line educator.
On an organizational level, the two penal institution models are deemed
incompatible, even contradictory. Institutions whose primary objective is
the maintenance of order and security are necessarily coercive, while
institutions whose primary mission is of a psycho-cultural nature
(reintegration into the community) are necessarily normative. Normative
institutions consent to greater liberty for inmates and tolerate greater
disorder, a reflection of society itself. Coercive institutions cannot
seriously claim to rehabilitate offenders. The two types of institutions are
incapable of pursuing and attaining both objectives simultaneously.
Coercive control and helping relationships are an antinomy, just as much
as rehabilitation and maximum security 4.
2- The Phases in the Evolution of the Penal Institution
The organizational form of the penal institution has evolved over time,
and the guard's role has evolved in conjunction with the latter.
The evolution has been from a coercive institution to a normative
institution. However, the evolution has not been linear. It has taken the
form of a broad tendency, without ever turning into a pure replica of
4
LEMIRE, 1990.
Towards a Policy for Canada’s Penitentiaries
22
either of the above, such that the majority of prisons today are institutions
with a somewhat blended orientation, more or less coercive or more or
less normative, as the case may be.
According to Stastny and Tyrnauer, the prison milieu has undergone four
major phases in its evolution since the XIX century, which correspond to
four major types of prisons 5.
The First Phase: Enlightenment
The first phase, with its roots in religion, is one of enlightenment. The
inmate is called upon to mend his/her ways through penitence (hence
the word "penitentiary") and good work habits. The prisoner is isolated,
reduced to silence, confined to a solitary cell, with no group activity, cut
off from society and totally dependent. The relationship of power that
characterizes this type of prison is unipolar (unidirectional): the guards
exercise power over the inmates. Compromise and negotiation simply do
not exist. The prison is a totalitarian institution6.
The Second Phase: The Warehouse
The second phase, of a utilitarian nature, is the prison as warehouse. The
religious ideal gives way to pragmatism. The principal function of the
prison is no longer to make the inmate mend his/her ways but to
neutralize him/her. The traditional coercive institution is born, in
response to the form that is taken by the inmates' spontaneous social
organization and to the rise in individual and group violence. The inmates
now exist as a group. They have their own code of ethics (loyalty, selfcontrol, straightforwardness, courage, and solidarity) and their very own
hierarchy. The prison is no longer a purely totalitarian institution,
although it still remains cut off from the community. The relationship of
power is transformed: from unipolar, it becomes bipolar; guards against
inmates. The relationship becomes antagonistic. Order in the prison (the
absence of disorder) and security are no longer ensured exclusively by
coercion (punishment, separation, isolation). The guard needs the
inmate's cooperation. To fulfil their tasks, the guards must constantly rely
upon compromise and negotiation. The system of privileges is put into
place.
5
6
STASTNY, TYRNAUER, 1982; cited by LEMIRE, 1990.
GOFFMAN, 1968; FOUCAULT, 1975.
Towards a Policy for Canada’s Penitentiaries
23
The Third Phase: A Remedial Approach
The third phase is the remedial stage, or the scientific treatment of
criminality. Its aspirations mark somewhat of a return to the first phase.
The principal function of the prison is no longer to neutralize the inmates,
but to rehabilitate them based upon a medical and educational
paradigm. The goal is to reintegrate prisoners into the community, and
they are now considered as people, as individuals with specific needs. In
order to accomplish this, a dialogue is launched between the prison and
the community (the community penetrates behind the prison walls and
the prison goes out into the community!). On the one hand, the prison
calls upon social science and health care professionals to formulate and
provide a series of treatments, as well as training and educational
programs. On the other hand, the sentence to be served by the inmate is
split up between the prison and the community (parole). The classical
coercive order is profoundly under attack. The power relationships are
also transformed. They become tripolar. Power is now shared between
educators, guards and inmates.
The Fourth Phase: Interaction
On the one hand, the prison opens up more forthrightly to the
community, reclaiming its responsibility for the norms of social
functioning (normalization). With the surge in individual freedoms, the
inmates acquire rights that go beyond the needs that were being taken
into account during the previous phase. The prisoners' conditions of
confinement improve. But henceforth, more privileges have to be granted
to the inmates in order to get their support. The system of privileges leads
to an inflationary spiral that calls into question the very nature of the
prison milieu.
On the other hand, the community penetrates into the prison, and more
profoundly influences the institution's management approach. The prison
increasingly reflects social divisions and antagonisms. The action system
becomes more complex. Internal and external groups and conflicts of
interest shape the prison's functions and the nature of the relationship of
power. In an effort to respond to these numerous demands, the prison
becomes polyfunctional: punitive, dissuasive, neutralizing, remedial,
democratic, etc. Confusion and incoherence settle in, all in a context of
budget constraints. From this point onwards, the prison organization
appears to be the product of the forces that make themselves felt, rather
than the fruit of consultation and rationality. The former tripolar
Towards a Policy for Canada’s Penitentiaries
24
relationship of power now becomes multipolar. Power is shared
between inmates and their committee, guards, educators, as well as
local, regional and top level administrators, Governments, judges, the
mass media and public opinion. The warden metamorphoses into a
simple mediator, often incapable of balancing the many competing
forces that are present.
As the prison becomes more and more permeable to the community (a
process whereby totalitarianism fades away), power becomes more and
more diffuse. The guards are the big losers in this evolution. From one
phase to the next, they witness their power wither away, going from
absolute power to power that is challenged by the inmates, then shared
with the educators, until finally the contemporary disintegration of
whatever was left.
3- The Major Reforms to Canada’s Prison System
The commissions and investigation reports dealing with the prison
milieu, and more specifically with various events that have occurred in
Canada's prisons, make clear to us the thrust of the evolution of the
federal correctional system. Over the past few decades, numerous
reports have been written. Within the limited framework of the present
analysis, it would be difficult to undertake an exhaustive study of the
foregoing.
However, the various commissions and investigation reports are not all
equally relevant. Five reports and three documents have particularly
made their mark upon the post-war federal correctional system: the
1956 Fauteux Report, the 1977 MacGuigan Report, the 1989 Task Force
Report on Federally Sentenced Women, the 1996 Arbour Report and the
1999 Report of the Task Force on Security, the 1982 Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms, the 1988-91 Correctional Service of Canada
Mission Statement and the 1992 Corrections and Conditional Release
Act. These reports and documents signal breaks or at the very least shifts
in the CSC's philosophy. They draw attention to the penological
concerns, values and choices made at different periods. They
accordingly led to many significant reforms that lie at the foundation of
the contemporary sentence management model.
Towards a Policy for Canada’s Penitentiaries
a)
25
From Enlightenment to the Warehouse
But in order to properly understand the evolution of Canada's prison
system and the challenges that lie ahead, a look back into the past
is essential.
The penitentiary appeared at the end of the XVIII century as an
alternative to corporal punishment, deportation and the death
sentence. Prior to this period, inmates were kept in prison to await
their trial or their punishment7.
The first penitentiary was built in England in 1779, in line with the
reformist theories of John Howard as summarized in his book The
State of the Prisons in England and Wales. The first Canadian
penitentiary, in Upper Canada, opened its doors in 1835, in
Portsmouth.
A penitentiary is distinguishable from a prison, which is
characterized by overcrowding (one common room), unsanitary
conditions (an absence of hygiene) and idleness (the inmates
spend their day doing nothing). The former entails a new model
based upon isolation (an individual cell), remedial labour (in
isolation or in a group, which is mandatory most of the time),
discipline and silence8.
At that time, any illicit act is deemed a “fault”, a sin for which the
criminal must atone through “penitence”. The inmate is deemed a
“convicted offender” that society calls upon to reform
himself/herself spiritually through meditation, and physically
through hard work. He/she must take care of his/her own physical
and psychological needs.
Just as prison reform sparked many political debates at the end of
the XVIII century, the development of the penitentiary provided
fodder throughout the XIX and XX century.
As of 1836, the Special Committee for the Implementation of an
Effective Prison System wrote that “the sole purpose (for society) is
to prevent the guilty party from henceforth doing any more harm to
it” and that it may only “hope for his/her repentance and reform”9.
7
LEMIRE, 1990.
LAPLANTE, 1989.
9
Cited by LAPLANTE, 1989, p. 116.
8
Towards a Policy for Canada’s Penitentiaries
26
The religious fervour to reform ("penitence") quickly gives way to
the warehouse!
But in 1849, the Brown Commission, appointed to investigate the
administration of the Kingston penitentiary –an overcrowded
penitentiary, marked by severe unrest and by a high rate of repeat
offences committed by former inmates– condemned the failure of
the reform. The commissioner blamed the failure upon
authoritarianism (the excessive and arbitrary recourse to corporal
punishment), the absence of discipline (undermined by favouritism
towards certain inmates) and a lack of surveillance. He reiterated
that the purpose of a penitentiary is to physically separate and
segregate the inmates in order to encourage their moral
development. To accomplish this, the commissioner proposed to
reduce management’s power by enhancing the role and status of
inspectors, the guardians of order in the penitentiary. Which is
indeed what is done.
At that point in time already, the penitentiary sets its sights upon a
twofold objective: ensuring the protection of society and reforming
the criminal. But the penitentiary remains, in point of fact, a
warehousing facility.
Over the next one hundred years, the inspectors’ conduct will give
rise to repeated investigations; and they will each follow in the
other's footsteps, reproducing the same observations and levelling
the same criticisms at the penitentiary.
The inmates’ conditions of confinement progress very slowly and
parsimoniously: Sunday walks in the institution's yard, lights on in
the cells in the evening, more frequent letter writing and reading
privileges, gradual liberalization of the obligation to remain silent,
replacement of the whip by isolation, of solitary confinement and
the withdrawal of food by the cell (darkened) and bread and water
diet, in the event of disruptive behaviour, a modest opening towards
time off for good behaviour (about one sixth of the sentence, in
1868) and academic training courses are some of the measures that
alleviate the harshness of the inmates’ living conditions, but that do
not change the fundamental nature of the penitentiary.
Towards a Policy for Canada’s Penitentiaries
27
To respond to the growth in the prison population, four
penitentiaries are built between Confederation and 1880, along the
lines of the Kingston model. We shall more thoroughly examine the
architectural and operational evolution of Canada’s penitentiaries in
Section II of this paper.
In 1914, the MacDonnell Commission, after shedding light on all
kinds of irregularities and wrongdoing in the penitentiaries, insists
upon the necessity of undertaking a new reform. In 1921, the Biggar
Committee (committee appointed to review penitentiary
regulations and to modify the legislation governing penitentiaries)
proposes replacing the restrictions and repression that characterize
the penitentiaries of that period with a virtually scientific approach
towards the inmate’s development and treatment.
In 1938, the Royal Commission to Investigate the Penal System of
Canada, presided by Joseph Archambault, which is troubled by the
growing rate of criminality and repeat offences committed by
inmates in Canada, as well as by the riots and inmate strikes that
marked the period of the Great Depression, notes the almost
complete absence of rehabilitation programs in the penitentiaries
and recommends that British programs now be adopted 10. The
commissioner's report emphasizes the importance of prevention
and rehabilitation and recommends abolishing punitive measures.
Discipline is indispensable, but it has to maintain a human face.
The penitentiary as a warehouse facility is increasingly contested.
b)
From the Warehouse to Rehabilitation
After the Second World War, the overcrowding in Canada’s
penitentiaries gave rise to significant unrest. And as the problems
continued to multiply, the Canadian Government created a new
commission in 1953.
The Fauteux Commission explains the failure of the Archambault
reform by the fact that the latter was significantly incomplete and
that it was poorly and only partially implemented11.
10
11
LAPLANTE, 1989.
LAPLANTE, 1989.
Towards a Policy for Canada’s Penitentiaries
28
The Fauteux Report, Report of the committee appointed to
investigate the principles and methods employed by the remission
service of the Department of Justice Canada was “written in
reaction to the Dark Ages of the traditional totalitarian institution”12.
Released in 1956, it marks the passage of Canada's penitentiaries
into the third phase in the evolution of the prison system, namely,
the remedial phase.
The Fauteux Commission follows the same path as previous
commissions, but does so more coherently. It digs deeper and
generalizes the measures and proposals that had already been put
forward by others.
The Fauteux Report poses the problem of imprisonment and of its
very nature. By proposing to more systematically formulate and
administer rehabilitation and training programs, in order “to change
how inmates behave”, it opens the door to the recognition of
inmates as people and as citizens. By recommending to classify
offenders according to their degree of dangerousness, it announces
the arrival of risk management. But above all, by affirming that
“monitored freedom replace imprisonment”, and by proposing the
creation of a Board of Parole and a Parole Supervision Department,
it paves the way for the implementation of a probation system and
proclaims that there are alternative measures to imprisonment that
will follow13. Classification, rehabilitation, training and probation all
go together.
Several recommendations from the Fauteux Report will ultimately
be adopted. As of 1958, the Remission Service grants early parole, in
order to improve the efficiency of the prison system and to alleviate
the problem of overcrowding. At about the same time, the Federal
Government implements a building modernization program geared
towards adapting prison architecture to the new policies of
rehabilitation and the scientific treatment of offenders. In 1959, the
Correctional Planning Committee draws up a construction plan
consisting of four types of penitentiaries: super-maximum security,
maximum security, medium security and minimum security
institutions. Over the next two decades, about forty penitentiaries
will be built across Canada, twelve of which will be in the Province
of Quebec.
12
13
LEMIRE, 2000, p. 6.
LAPLANTE, 1989.
Towards a Policy for Canada’s Penitentiaries
c)
29
The Penitentiary Under Attack
During the 1960s and 1970s a movement gains momentum in the
West for the increased recognition of human rights, in which
inmates' rights are not excluded. The latter mobilize their forces and
make their conditions of confinement known by means of
numerous riots, strikes and hostage takings –of which the most
celebrated is the 1971 Kingston riot that will last five days–, thereby
accelerating the pace of reform to Canada’s prison system.
In 1971, following the Kingston riot, the Trudeau government makes
rehabilitation the cornerstone of Canada’s prison policy. In 1973, the
Correctional Investigator office is created, in order to consolidate
the Government’s monitoring powers over the penitentiaries. In
1972, the Penitentiary Act is modified to outlaw corporal
punishment. Henceforth, coercion is dissociated from physical
punishment to be reduced to isolation. And, in 1975, Canada adopts
the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules regarding the
treatment of inmates.
However, all of this was not sufficient to calm things down. The
Kingston riot is followed by an extended period of unrest in several
penitentiaries, and more specifically, in maximum security
institutions. During the sole year of 1975-1976, 69 major incidents
occur in Canada’s penitentiaries, including 35 hostage takings,
resulting in 92 victims amongst whom one correctional officer loses
his/her life; while only 65 major incidents are tallied between 1932
and 197414. As of March 1976, the Government announces a new
penitentiary construction program with institutions that will be
smaller and better adapted to the new philosophy.
In fact, over the two decades that follow its implementation, the
Fauteux reform is vigorously criticized.
In 1969, the Ouimet Report calls attention to the discrepancies
between the structure of the penitentiary and its rehabilitation
mission. It recommends using smaller institutions, residential
community centres and more appropriate classification services. In
1973, the Solicitor General observes in his report, The Criminal and
Canadian Society: An Overview of the Correctional Process, that the
advent of extramural and intramural treatment of offenders has not
14
CSC, 1991, p. 93.
Towards a Policy for Canada’s Penitentiaries
30
emptied the penitentiaries. In 1976, the Law Reform Commission of
Canada very categorically declares the penitentiary to be an
unsuitable setting for rehabilitation15.
However, the most virulent criticism will come from the 1977
MacGuigan Commission in their Report to Parliament from the Subcommittee on the Penitentiary System in Canada. This report reacts
to the chaos that has settled into Canada's prison system
subsequent to the reforms carried out in the 1960s and 1970s. The
authors declare that imprisonment has proved to be ineffective and
that, with a repeat offence rate ranging from 60% to 80%, the
penitentiaries have failed in their two principal missions, namely,
protecting society and rehabilitating offenders. The Government of
Canada has needlessly spent millions of dollars. The third phase in
the evolution of Canada's penal institutions draws to a close with an
acknowledgment of failure. The report asserts that probation and
parole are less costly alternatives to locking people up, to building
penitentiaries, and no longer advocates imprisonment for
specifically rehabilitation purposes.
Nonetheless, the MacGuigan Report proposes to immediately
undertake a thorough reform to solve the crisis that is undermining
Canada’s penitentiaries. The Trudeau Government retains 53 of the
66 recommendations put forward, including that of hiring women
as correctional officers and setting up elected inmate committees,
as well as a grievance system for the offenders. The penitentiaries
are called upon to become more democratic.
The correctional democratization current is all a part of the evolving
human rights and individual freedom movement that sweeps
Western societies. The advocates of prison democracy portray it as
the best solution to the problems of instability and violence
besieging the penitentiary. It is, they argue, the only reliable penal
institution management model. It is based upon a new distribution
of power. After formulating their own charter, the inmates elect a
Council by universal suffrage -the inmates' government.
The notion of democratizing penitentiaries takes shape in the
United States during the 1970s. Some experiments are conducted
and various more or less elaborate approaches to democratization
are put forward: democratization that is limited to the organization
of recreational activities and consultations with the inmates’
15
LAPLANTE, 1989.
Towards a Policy for Canada’s Penitentiaries
31
committee; partial-democratization, involving participation in
management, but excluding management of the disciplinary
process and direct control over the guards; and extensive
democratization, encompassing all of the institution's activities, with
the warden, however, conserving paramount authority.
In this third form of democratization, the inmate Council has the
power not only to manage the institution’s day-to-day activities, but
also the disciplinary process. The inmates themselves exercise
power over their deprivation of liberty; they are responsible for their
delinquent behaviour and for their rehabilitation. In some ways,
they are their own guards! as the real guards’ prerogatives are for
the most part taken away from them, they are transformed at best
into educators, and at worst, into passive witnesses 16.
All the attempts at extensive democratization (Sing-Sing, WallaWalla, etc.) have been failures. Most of the time, this solution was
adopted to prevent crisis situations or looming riots. Democracy and
the penitentiary are by their very nature an antinomy. Prison
democracy is not compatible with the inmate’s situation where
their liberty has been taken away from them. It leads to far-fetched
demands, the reinforcement of delinquent oligarchies within the
institution and, in the end, to a genuine assumption of power! It is
not only a bogus solution that is dangerous for the guards, but a
tactical demand put forward by people who seek to abolish the
penitentiary (the abolitionists), with the inmates at the very top of
this list.
But the MacGuigan report does not go so far as to propose extensive
prison democracy. It does not reject the established order, much to
the contrary: “All the needs of the Canadian Penitentiary Service are
embodied in the term discipline. By discipline, we essentially mean
an order that is imposed upon behaviour in pursuit of a given goal”,
reads the report17. A new order must thus be introduced that is
based upon managerial rationality, regulations and procedures.
16
17
LEMIRE, 1990.
Cited by LEMIRE, 2000, p. 6.
Towards a Policy for Canada’s Penitentiaries
d)
32
From Rehabilitation to Pluralism
Indeed, near the end of the 1970s, Canada’s correctional system
enters into the fourth phase in its evolution, that of diversity, a phase
during which all the trends come into play (punitive, dissuasive,
neutralizing, remedial, democratic, etc.), as long as the protection
of society is ensured. This period is characterized by an increasingly
syncretistic approach, where several trends are allowed to co-exist,
in a more or less coherent fashion, in order to better respond to
various competing social pressures. Generally speaking, the
coercive and normative methods are deemed to share the same
objectives. Discipline is considered a means to reform and
rehabilitate, while normalization becomes a means to maintain
order and security.
During the 1980s, the movement for more and better recognition of
human rights surges forward and intensifies.
In 1980, the Supreme Court of Canada writes that people who are
incarcerated do not lose their rights as citizens. In 1982, the Federal
Government adopts the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
The Charter will have significant repercussions upon the
Correctional Service of Canada, compelling it to respect the rights of
offenders and to grant increasing importance to the judicial process.
Under the terms of the Charter, “an offender retains all the rights of
an ordinary citizen, with the exception of those that have been
taken away from him/her under the terms of the law (pursuant to
explicit provisions in the law) or by virtue of the fact, unavoidably, of
his/her imprisonment”18. The rights of offenders will be clearly set
out over the ensuing years in the Corrections and Conditional
Release Act, as well as in the policies of the CSC and the NPB
(National Parole Board). The Charter entitles offenders to address
the federal courts when they believe that their rights have not been
respected.
The movement for the recognition of human rights, and in particular
that of inmate rights, surfaces in the triple context of a growing
prison population, due to an increase in drug trafficking and sexrelated crimes, budget belt-tightening and an increase in prison
violence coming from the increased use of drugs and alcohol in the
institutions.
18
CSC, 1999, p. 44.
Towards a Policy for Canada’s Penitentiaries
33
In 1984, the Government creates the Prison Administration Advisory
Commission, presided by the rector of the University of Ottawa, Mr.
John Carson, to formulate solutions to all of these problems.
Several of the 56 recommendations from the Carson Report
emphasize the importance of finding viable alternatives to
imprisonment and of conducting research on violence in the
penitentiary. The Commission predicts that there will be more and
more offenders who are violent, disturbed and sentenced to serve
lengthy prison terms in Canadian institutions. Even more ominous,
violent behaviours will increase and become the norm, the
dominant model of behaviour, such that penitentiaries will
transform inmates into increasingly dangerous criminals and will be
unable to ensure the protection of society. Overcrowding (sharing a
cell) combined with increased drug use will lead to a considerable
upsurge in stress, violence and suicides. The commissioner
recommends attacking drug use and drug trafficking head on by
carrying out searches, blood tests and urine tests 19. Surreptitiously,
the prison order is being confronted and threatened from within. As
we shall see later in Section II, our knowledge about violence in the
penitentiary is still very sketchy.
Towards the end of the 1980s, the penitentiaries are overflowing
with inmates. Instead of building new institutions, or shortening the
length of the inmates’ sentences -which would not have pleased the
electorate-, the Government decides to have release on parole
begin sooner. It bases its decision upon a research study conducted
in 1986 in the ten Ontario federal penitentiaries. The research
project, commissioned by the Solicitor General of Canada and
carried out by Professors Zambie and Porporino from Queen’s
University, demonstrated that imprisonment was ineffective in
eradicating criminal behaviour.
The penitentiary acts as a sort of machine that makes time stand
still, that “freezes” the inmates’ anti-social behaviour up until the
time they are ultimately released. The chances of modifying
criminal behaviour would be higher if rehabilitation programs were
dispensed either at the end or the very beginning of a sentence,
hence the futility of having the latter remain in effect. Penitentiaries
and long term imprisonment should thus be reserved primarily for
serious offenders and hardened criminals.
19
HARRIS Michael, 2001, p. 162-163.
Towards a Policy for Canada’s Penitentiaries
34
The Correctional Service of Canada is at a crossroads.
Imprisonment over a long period of time ends up being too costly
and not sufficiently effective and should be used with great caution.
In August 1988, the Daubney Commission report recommends that
the Government make greater use of releasing offenders on parole,
community sentences and services, victim/offender conciliation
and electronic surveillance20.
e)
Towards a Hierarchical Pluralism
In November of the same year, the Task Force on the CSC’s Mission
and Organizational Development, appointed to carry out a structural
reorganization and to formulate a strategic plan, under the aegis of
Commissioner Ole Ingstrup21, adopts the new draft of the
Correctional Service of Canada’s mission, at a conference held in
Banff. This draft, which was revised and completed in 1991, marks a
turning point in the CSC's history.
The Mission Statement reads as follows:
“The Correctional Service of Canada, as part of the
criminal justice system, contributes to the protection of
society by actively encouraging and assisting offenders to
become law-abiding citizens.”22
The ultimate goal of the CSC's Mission is to “contribute to the
protection of society”, where the principal strategy to accomplish
this involves “actively encouraging (the inmates) to become lawabiding citizens”, and where the best way to perform this task is to
exercise “reasonable, safe , secure and humane control,” in other
words “to be firm - without exercising coercion”23.
20
HARRIS, 2001, p. 165-166.
As of 1983, and up until 2000, Ole Ingstrup played a key role in the transformation of Canada’s prison
system. A Danish immigrant, who arrived in Canada in 1983, he was often criticized for wanting to
establish a prison system in North America that was more in line with a European environment, and this, in
an authoritarian fashion.
22
CSC, 1991, p. 52.
23
CSC, 1991, p. 53.
21
Towards a Policy for Canada’s Penitentiaries
35
Five core values lie at the foundation of this Mission. The first three
values deal with human rights, compliance with the rule of law and
with the essential role played by the staff:
•
“We respect the dignity of individuals and the rights of all
members of society, as well as the human being’s potential for
personal growth and development.”
•
“We recognize that the offender has the potential to live as a
law-abiding citizen.”
•
“We believe that the Service’s staff constitutes its force and its
principal resource needed to achieve its goals, and we believe
that the quality of human relationships is the cornerstone of its
Mission.”24
The Mission statement and the three core values that underlie it
clearly imply that “penitentiaries must not only provide humane
living conditions, they must also work towards correcting the
behaviour of the offenders and preparing their reintegration into the
community”25. Practically speaking, this means that offenders
should be “placed in institutions according to the risk that they
represent for others, themselves and for the community at large,
and according to their own individual needs” and that penitentiaries
must offer “a range of treatment and training programs, as well as
recreational and other activities” 26.
The Mission statement also implies that the CSC espouse “an
ideology of proactive intervention”, where control is “better ensured
by a positive interaction between staff and offenders than by the
crude recourse to static security measures” 27. The statement
stipulates that the Service adopt a new organizational structure,
namely, unit management28.
24
CSC, 1991, p. 52-55. The fourth and fifth values are as follows: « We believe that sharing ideas,
knowledge, values and experiences, both nationally and internationally, is essential to the achievement of
our Mission »; « Answerable to the Solicitor General, we believe in a management approach to the Service
that is characterized by open and honest attitudes ».
25
CSC, 1991, p. 79.
26
CSC, 1991, p. 79.
27
CSC, 1991, p. 99.
28
This management approach was first put forward in the 1984 Statement of the CSC’s Values Report.
Towards a Policy for Canada’s Penitentiaries
36
The early stages of organizational reform come about in the 1960s,
with the introduction of the “living unit” concept into some federal
penitentiaries. This operation involves dividing the prison population
“into small groups depending upon the proximity of the cells” and
assigning staff to each of these groups, on a permanent basis. The
living unit officers had a double role to play: that of a guard and that
of a front line case management officer. However, the creation of
the living units results in the staff being divided into two categories:
the officers who are responsible only for the static security
perimeter and those assigned to dynamic security. The former had
few contacts with the inmates and scarcely got to know the prison
population and, for all practical purposes, they were left out of the
institution’s (internal) activities. Meanwhile, the latter worked more
directly with the inmates, but were disconnected from the
employees in charge of the security perimeter. Throughout the
penitentiary, dynamic security had to be improved29.
As the CSC explains it, the new management model, unit
management “aims to create a certain balance between static and
dynamic security”30. More precisely, it “aims essentially to ensure a
meaningful interaction, on the one hand, between the various
employee work teams (thanks to the integration of case
management, program management and security) and, on the
other hand, between staff and the inmate groups 31”.
At the end of the 1980s, unit management becomes the only
organizational model for all of the CSC's institutions. As its name
implies, each institution is divided into units, consisting of a cell
block that accommodates between 80 and 120 inmates and
designated sectors of the institution (security posts, areas reserved
for programs and activities, etc.), under the direction of a Unit
Manager. The latter is assisted by a team made up of correctional
supervisors, case management officers and correctional officers
belonging to two hierarchical levels. On a rotating basis, the
correctional officer I will perform all of the static security tasks
(control of the perimeter, control of the inmate’s movements,
counting of inmates, searches, etc.). Meanwhile, the correctional
officer II will participate in case management (program
development and follow up, evaluation of the inmate’s behaviour,
case analysis, etc.), in addition to performing the same tasks as the
29
CSC, 1991, p. 107-108.
CSC, 1991, p. 109.
31
CSC, 1991, p. 110.
30
Towards a Policy for Canada’s Penitentiaries
37
correctional officer I. The supervisory officers are responsible for
overseeing the day-to-day work of the unit correctional officers,
while the case management officers have the overall and ultimate
responsibility of managing all the dossiers32. (We will examine the
correctional officer’s role more thoroughly in Section III.)
During the first few years, even according to Ole Ingstrup, the
implementation of the Mission encountered several difficulties: the
postponement of its application due to the 1988 federal elections,
staff cynicism towards organizational renewal, the interpretation of
the Mission as an extension of employee rights, the resistance to
change and difficulty experienced by managers and staff in
adapting to participatory management and management by results
(opposition to new labour and management standards), the
program group employees strike in the fall of 1989 (dealing
primarily with work schedules), the Solicitor Generals’ fears
regarding the Service's capacity to coordinate the numerous
projects that had been elaborated to put the Mission statement into
practice, and budget belt-tightening in 1990 and 1991 that
compelled the CSC to forgo several renovation projects.
But the foremost difficulty came above all from the sober common
sense of a significant part of the staff and management. Indeed,
how could one possibly expect a staunch commitment from the
people in the CSC, when the chief promoter of the reform declares
that ”It would be wrong to conclude that the correctional staff
should be able to ensure the reintegration into the community of all
offenders, or even a large number of them, as citizens who, over the
long term, will comply with the rule of law.”33
On the other hand, the CSC recognizes that “The Mission evolved
out of the various influences that came to bear upon the Service
during the 1970s and 1980s” 34, and portrays it as an attempt to leave
the pluralism era behind:
32
CSC, 1991, p. 111-112.
INGSTRAP Ole, CSC, 1991, p. 242.
34
CSC, 1991, p. 45.
33
Towards a Policy for Canada’s Penitentiaries
38
“For several years, the federal Correctional Service was
performing its duties within a clearly defined and well
balanced
strategic
framework.
Punishment,
rehabilitation,
resocialization,
reintegration,
neutralization and denunciation were simply presented
as some of the principal objectives being sought. The
absence of an overall strategic framework therefore
represented a major obstacle for the CSC in its pursuit of
excellence, in addition to preventing the Government,
and more specifically the Solicitor General, from properly
understanding what were supposed to be the priorities
amongst the correctional service’s many objectives,
which were often contradictory. In addition, what was
expected from the Service varied considerably depending
upon which objective was being given precedence:
punishment (to systematically and deliberately chastise)
or successful reintegration into the community (to ensure
that the offenders do not commit another criminal
offence)”35.
To which the CSC concluded that, in the past, it was ranking
“imprisonment at the top of the list”, putting far too much emphasis
“upon the surveillance and control of inmates”, placing
“considerable weight upon security”; in short, that it was paying too
little attention to preparing the inmate’s successful transition from
the penitentiary into the community.
We now encounter the formal contradiction that characterizes this
Mission. It claims all at the same time to create a balance between
static and dynamic security and yet to give precedence to dynamic
security, a security that it defines as the positive interaction between
staff and offenders (case management, programs, etc.).
As we shall see later on, this contradiction will be mitigated in
subsequent CSC policy statements. It will increasingly proclaim its
partiality towards dynamic security, even though in practice, it will
sometimes have to backtrack and ever so slightly re-establish the
balance between static and dynamic security, under the pressure of
certain groups, of which the Unions can be counted as one.
35
CSC, 1991, p. 19.
Towards a Policy for Canada’s Penitentiaries
f)
39
Pluralism and Feminism
During the 1980s, alongside the movement for the recognition of
human rights, feminist groups intensify the pursuit of their goals.
Feminism will have significant repercussions upon Canada's prison
milieu. The values and practices advocated by feminists –human
rights, and in particular, women’s rights, gender equality,
community-oriented living (group-oriented living, home life), the
elevation of the status of domestic chores and sharing them, mutual
assistance and solidarity, and more generally speaking, a holistic
approach to human and social problems– will directly or indirectly
influence the commissions and task forces that are created from
the end of the 1980s onwards.
In 1989, the Commissioner of the Correctional Service of Canada
sets up a Task Force on Federally Sentenced Women, which is
appointed to formulate an overall strategy to deal with female
offenders. The Task Force Report, Creating Choices, will be
endorsed by the Federal Government in 1990. Based upon the
principles of enablement, judicious choice, respect and dignity,
mutual assistance and responsibility, this report draws attention to
and accelerates the CSC’s philosophical and practical
transformation.
The report proposes the construction of regional institutions for
women, the development of programs focused upon their needs
and the definition of a community strategy. A holistic conception of
correctional services is adopted. The integrated design and planning
of regional penitentiaries for women is in response to this
conception. Within a fenced-off and guarded perimeter, housing
units are grouped together behind a main building that houses staff
offices, rooms for programs, a visiting area and the isolation cells.
Each home contains a living room, a kitchen, a dining room, a
laundry/linen room and bathrooms. It accommodates from six to
ten women. This community-oriented living arrangement is
structured around daily chores. The correctional officer's role is
considerably different from the role that is assigned to them in
penitentiaries for men. Correctional officers become "front line
service workers". Constantly interacting with the offenders, their
functions involve case management and program support
activities36.
36
CSC, 1989.
Towards a Policy for Canada’s Penitentiaries
40
The Creation of Choice differs from previous reports in degree and
not really in its fundamental nature. It fits into the framework of the
CSC's Mission and the hierarchical pluralism that gives precedence
to normalization and dynamic security.
In 1996, the Arbour Report, (Commission of Inquiry into Certain
Events at the Kingston Prison for Women) reiterates several
recommendations and follows in the spirit of the 1989 Task Force
Report on Federally Sentenced Women. As Guy Lemire stresses,
this document too is a part of “a longstanding tradition of
investigations and texts that seek to normalize the relationships
between management and staff, on the one hand, and the inmates,
on the other”37. It is not a radical break with the earlier bureaucratic
and scientific approach; but rather an attempt to crown this
bureaucratic and scientific approach with a new legal order (the
rule of law and respect for the individual), as this new legal order
ultimately appears to “put the finishing touches to a new
institutionalization of the social relationships”38.
The new legal order had moreover been codified, at least partially,
in the 1992 Corrections and Conditional Release Act. This important
law provides increased protection of the offender’s rights. It has
numerous implications. It recognizes that the level of security
ascribed to an inmate must be determined primarily by his/her
prison behaviour and not by the seriousness of their crime. On the
other hand, it places considerable restrictions upon the use of force
when dealing with inmates (searches, cell extractions, etc.).
However, it still allows prison management to impose stern
disciplinary measures upon inmates who commit serious offences,
up to solitary confinement for a thirty day period.
But this measure will be substantially curtailed in 1999, when the
Supreme Court of Canada rules that inmates condemned to solitary
confinement retain their right to petition the courts and that the
sanction cannot be executed prior to judgment. Henceforth,
rehabilitation is dissociated from punishment, the latter being
reduced to all intents and purposes to imprisonment, to the
deprivation of liberty.
37
38
LEMIRE, 2000, p. 7.
LEMIRE, 2000, p. 8.
Towards a Policy for Canada’s Penitentiaries
g)
41
Pluralism and Risk Management
During the 1990s, and especially over the past five years, a new
penology has developed across North America, namely, “actuarial
justice”. Actuarial justice defines the offender as a simple statistical
probability39. Risk and its corollary, the protection of society,
become the primary concern of the prison system. Before being
considered a person, the offender is deemed a statistic, and
actuarial justice is less interested in transforming him/her than in
controlling him/her40. In this approach, priority is thus given to the
rational management of dangerous populations (the classification
of inmates becomes ever more complex). The objective of
rehabilitation gives way to that of neutralization, and neutralization
bears a striking resemblance to the warehouse objective that is
typical of traditional coercive institutions 41.
In point of fact, actuarial justice is merely elaborating and
reinforcing an approach that is already deeply entrenched. It is
borne out in the 1960s with the construction of institutions with
distinct levels of security and it is reinforced towards the end of the
1970s with the implementation of the case management process.
The classification and selection of inmates harks back to the
beginning of the XX century. With the distinction that the
classification of offenders and the modification of their status is
based upon clinical assessments by case management officers,
who are unavoidably subjective, and upon the notion of
dangerousness that is not easily defined or measurable. In the
1980s, the notion of dangerousness is replaced by that of risk, which
is easier to measure (statistically); and the parole officer’s clinical
assessment is “is governed by a management model that is
simultaneously bureaucratic and scientific”42. This marks the arrival
of scientific-bureaucratic risk management in the prison milieu.
From the 1990s onwards, this approach prospers significantly with
the application of computer technology.
The Correctional Service of Canada has made risk management
one of the centrepieces of its correctional strategy 43. However, the
CSC has not applied the actuarial justice model to the letter, as the
39
FEELY, SIMON, 1992, 1994.
CLEAR, 1994; VACHERET, DOZOIS, LEMIRE, 1998.
41
VACHERET, DOZOIS, LEMIRE, 1998
42
LEMIRE, 2000, p. 7.
43
DOZOIS, LEMIRE, VACHERET, 1996.
40
Towards a Policy for Canada’s Penitentiaries
42
provisions in Canadian legislation do not stipulate the use of
actuarial valuations and allow for clinical assessments of
dangerousness. The Service has rather developed a blended
management model, which combines risk and rehabilitation, all the
while focusing its concerns upon the inmate’s treatment. As Moffat
and Shaw underline in their study on risk and correctional services
in Canada, the CSC’s risk management model “helps reaffirm the
importance of rehabilitation”44. In actual fact, it helps reaffirm the
importance of rehabilitation as a neutralization mechanism.
Actuarial risk measurements and forecasting come from studies of
large population samples. They are simply not concerned with
individual situations nor the causes, but seek to identify the specific
factors associated with risk. Likewise, whether they are compatible
with the operational and bureaucratic requirements of security.
Generally speaking, the blended management model involves
associating levels of risk, levels of security and levels of treatment,
on the basis of definitions and statistical measures that reflect the
characteristics of prison populations. More precisely, it initially
involves identifying and classifying dangerous inmates by different
levels of security, as a function of criminogenic variables (dropping
out of school, untimely death of a parent, placement in a foster
home, living in the street, prostitution, drug abuse, attempted
suicide, previous offences; adaptation to the prison milieu,
participation in incidents, etc.), as these variables most often imply
certain unfulfilled needs; secondly, to formulate a series of actions
designed to prevent, or at least to reduce the risk represented by the
various classifications of offenders (the risk to society, to staff, to
other inmates, to the offenders themselves and to the institution);
and, thirdly, to evaluate the risk of repeat offences as a measure of
the efficiency of the rehabilitation programs. Three scales in the
CSC’s process correspond to these three components: the custody
rating Scale, the needs in the community and risk assessment Scale,
and, the repeat offence statistical data Scale.
Actuarial techniques completely ignore variables related to the
social fabric (age groups, social classes, gender, race), as well as
the institutional facts of life (systems and procedures, access to
programs, power relationships within the institution, the
discretionary enforcement of rules and regulations, etc.). What
might appear at first sight as a rational calculation of risk is, in truth,
44
MOFFAT, SHAW, 2001, p. 50.
Towards a Policy for Canada’s Penitentiaries
43
biased, subjective and smacks of a moralistic approach. According
to Moffat and Shaw, there are no unbiased statistical realities. Risk is
a social construct that does not take into account the “more global
structural inequalities and systemic differences”45.
Risk management in a prison milieu rests upon the hypothesis that
it is possible to forecast violence. However, a majority of
criminologists are sceptical about the correctional services’ capacity
to accurately and reliably measure and forecast the risk represented
by any given offender. The CSC itself acknowledges that research
has shown that it is extremely difficult to forecast violent behaviour
and that “Although actuarial forecasting methods have provided the
means to get more accurate results, the error rate is not any lower
on account of the foregoing”46. Which does not prevent the Service
from proclaiming that:
“The Service's ability to evaluate risk and the offender’s
needs in a systematic, complete, and integrated fashion is
(...) a major advance that testifies to the Service’s staunch
commitment to increasing the public's security and to
reducing criminal behaviour”47.
Several authors, including McHugh, believe that it is far more
productive to act upon the environment and the support systems in
order to reduce risk than to count upon computer programs that
scarcely improve our forecasting abilities 48.
h)
Towards a Polarized and Conflictual Pluralism
From the middle of the 1990s onwards, the various conceptions of
the penitentiary, advocated by a variety of pressure groups, become
increasingly polarized and the struggle between them intensifies.
The liberal and neo-conservative penological theories square off.
The liberal penological theory sees the criminal as a victim of
society, who is not at all or only partially responsible for his/her acts.
Social, economic and psychological conditions explain the
offender’s behaviour, as he or she is likely a victim of poverty,
45
MOFFAT and SHAW, 2001, p. 67.
CSC, High risk violent offenders in Canada, 1991, p. ?
47
CSC, Interactive corrections, 1997, p. 7.
48
Cited by MOFFAT and SHAW, 2001, p. 59.
46
Towards a Policy for Canada’s Penitentiaries
44
racism, abuse and dependence on all kinds of substances.
Offenders most often come from underprivileged classes and social
groups (the unemployed, undereducated youth, women, ethnic
minorities, etc.). They have serious behaviour problems and have
developed a dependence on drugs and/or alcohol in more than 70%
of the cases. Emphasis is placed upon treatment and rehabilitation,
as well as upon the offender becoming aware of his/her
shortcomings and needs. Attention is entirely focused upon the
individual as a person suffering from psycho-emotional deprivation
and/or social discrimination.
The neo-conservative penological theory is the counterpart to the
liberal theory. The responsibility for criminal acts does not fall upon
society but upon the individual. The offender must acknowledge
his/her crime and take responsibility for the consequences of their
acts. Emphasis is placed upon punishment and upon the
demonstration that the offender is actively, consciously and
responsibly participating in his/her own rehabilitation. The offender
must pay his/her debt to society.
These two rival currents are represented, on the one hand, by the
Correctional Service of Canada and, on the other, by Ontario
Correctional Services.
Over the past few years, the Government of Ontario has undertaken
a wide-ranging reform of its correctional system. The Government’s
primary goal has been to ensure public security by transforming
Ontario’s prisons into a more secure, more effective, more
responsible and more transparent system. In order to get better
results in controlling and treating criminality, the Ontario
Government plans to “establish a better balance between the
principles of detention, correction and the obligation to be
accountable”. And in order to accomplish this, it plans to use strict
discipline that holds inmates responsible for their acts49.
The Ontario Government’s reform includes several elements, of
which the most significant are:
49
SAMPSON Rod, Minister of Correctional Services, May 2000.
Towards a Policy for Canada’s Penitentiaries
•
45
A Stricter Parole Policy50
Automatic sentence reductions have been abolished. Parole is
no longer considered a right, but rather a privilege. To be
entitled to a sentence reduction, the offender must actively
participate in the institution’s programs (work, training,
treatment, rehabilitation, community services) and behave
properly (compliance with the regulations and norms, submit to
anti-drug and anti-alcohol testing51). The refusal to participate in
the institution’s programs or to comply with the regulations
makes parole impossible and can even lead to previously
earned sentence reductions being taken away 52.
•
A Zero Tolerance Policy Towards Violent Acts Against
Correctional Services Staff
The safety of Ontario Correctional Services staff has become one
of the Service’s priorities. The inmates are held responsible for
their acts and will be subject to internal disciplinary measures in
the event of an attack, even though a criminal charge has been
made against them. In order that inmates show more respect
towards prison staff, the Minister of Correctional Services is
planning a return to the hierarchical classification of jobs. This
hierarchical classification and the use of official titles will
provide the means to more easily identify the chain of
command, the different levels of employee authority, and would
contribute to giving a feeling of pride back to the Service’s
employees.
•
The Establishment of a Separate and Secure System for
Young Offenders
Prior to the reform, 60% of Ontario’s young offenders committed
another offence. The existing infrastructures, namely, certain
reserved units in adult prisons, no longer met the needs of an
increasingly high-risk young offender population. In the
50
Prior to the reform, 70% to 80% of the offenders committed another offence.
In Ontario, 83% of the inmates have a drug or alcohol dependence problem (Government of Ontario,
Department of Correctional Services, 2001).
52
In 2000, only 28% of the applications for parole were granted, compared to 59% in the record year of
1993-1994.
51
Towards a Policy for Canada’s Penitentiaries
46
Government’s opinion, the creation of a separate system for
young offenders would provide the means to better meet their
needs in terms of the programs provided to them and thereby
achieve more success in correcting their behaviour.
•
A Strategy to Modernize Correctional Institutions
The Government of Ontario seeks to transform the Province’s
correctional institutions into a more secure, ultramodern and
super-cost-effective system by implementing a far-reaching
program to close renovate and build new prisons. Its strategy is
based upon a new conception of the correctional institution and
the use of the most modern technology: modular design, video
court-appearances, systematic video camera surveillance, duty
rooms with a far-reaching line of sight, a double door entry
system, etc.
The automated Maplehurst “superprison”, located in Milton,
west of Toronto and inaugurated in early March 2001, is the
archetypal prison that embodies the neo-conservative
penological school of thought. The Mike Harris government
portrays it as a modern, safe, efficient, cost-effective prison that
is focused upon the essentials. Maplehurst will accommodate up
to 1,500 offenders, divided into six autonomous units, in a
Spartan environment. Each unit includes premises for
dispensing programs and an outdoor exercise area. But the
programs offered are fewer in number and standardized. The
prisoners spend their day in their unit. Octagonal in form, this
design provides the means for all of the inmates' activities to be
monitored from a central bubble. Surveillance is done
electronically (static surveillance), thereby reducing the contact
between guards and inmates to a bare minimum. The
superprisons are direct descendants of the American “robo-jail”
concept, where technology replaces prison guards. Entrances
and exits, doors to the cells, lights, and even the temperature of
the showers are controlled from the central bubble. Two other
superprisons are to be built in Ontario (Lindsay and
Penetangguishan); while several older prisons will be
overhauled and automated and 18 outdated prisons will be
closed. Once the reorganization has been completed, between
1,400 and 1,600 out of a total of 3,100 guards will have lost their
jobs. According to several criminologists, this kind of prison is
likely to become, notwithstanding the claims of its defenders, a
Towards a Policy for Canada’s Penitentiaries
47
genuine incubator of hardened criminals, as rehabilitation and
educational programs are largely ineffective in institutions
housing more than 500 inmates. Furthermore, the electronic
surveillance of the inmates will increase the stress linked to the
constraints of confinement, thereby making the Maplehurst
prison a potential breeding ground for riots.
Amongst the other significant measures
Government of Ontario, let us mention:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
adopted
by
the
the creation of hygiene and clothing norms for the inmates;
the surveillance and interception of inmate telephone calls in
order to prevent criminal activities from being planned and to
reduce smuggling in the prison;
the creation of a provincial squad to arrest fugitives;
closer surveillance of offenders in the community, through the
use of new electronic and computer technologies (remote
monitoring of the offender’s movements);
the reinforcement of the ties between correctional institutions
and the community via the creation of local surveillance boards;
a better recognition of the victim’s rights, by encouraging their
participation at parole hearings;
the awarding of service contracts to the private sector and the
opening up of competitions with the public sector.
The Government of Ontario claims to be giving priority to the
public's security and the safety of its staff over the rights of the
inmate. It remains to be seen, obviously, what is the best way to
ensure the security of society and the safety of the staff in the
country’s penal institutions.
The second current is represented by the Correctional Service of
Canada. The Report of the Task Force on Security, released in 1999,
is the archetypal report that embodies the neo-liberal theory. This
report attempts to integrate the different approaches being
advocated by a variety of social groups, all the while pointing the
CSC's policy in the direction of a greater normalization.
The Task Force was mandated moreover to elaborate a security
framework that would provide the means to normalize relations
between the prison staff and offenders, while still ensuring the
safety and security of both parties and encouraging reintegration
into the community and the respect of inmate rights.
Towards a Policy for Canada’s Penitentiaries
48
The Task Force recommends a new orientation for the CSC, a vision
of the future that, in their opinion, transcends the prevailing prison
paradigm.
This vision expands upon and goes into more detail regarding the
correctional model defined in the 1990s for women. Having noted
the excessive attention paid to legislation and policies, it advocates
a cultural approach to the security problem. The Task Force insists
upon the link between culture and security, and recommends
reforming the correctional culture in order to improve security.
At the heart of their approach, the authors place the notion of
dynamic security, defined as “the entire range of actions that
contribute to the development and growth of professional, positive
relationships between prison staff and offenders”53. The culture in
each institution is what determines the nature and frequency of
interaction between staff and offenders, and each positive
interaction enriches the institutional culture.
Inspired by the facilities developed for white women and
aboriginals serving a federal sentence, the Group proposes a new
institutional model. The Task Force suggests creating institutions
with several levels of security –maximum, medium and minimum
(multilevel security)– limited to 500 inmates and made up of semiautonomous units (100 inmates), having areas for housing,
recreation, dispensing programs and administrative support,
grouped together within a security perimeter. The housing area
would be divided into small residential units accommodating ten or
fewer inmates. The whole arrangement would be geared towards
fostering group-oriented living, making inmates accountable and
multiplying interactions (dynamic security), thereby providing the
means to reduce the needs of surveillance and control of the
facilities and the offenders to a bare minimum. The necessary
surveillance and control would be ensured unobtrusively by new
state of the art technology, technology solutions that under no
circumstances would replace prison staff. The units would be
represented within inmate committees and consulted when
decisions had to be made.
On the other hand, the Task Force proposes designating two
institutions as integrated control penitentiaries, in order to
53
Report of the Task Force on Security, p. 20.
Towards a Policy for Canada’s Penitentiaries
49
accommodate the small number of dangerous offenders who
would be incapable of adapting to the multilevel security
institutions, one in Eastern Canada and the other in Western
Canada. These institutions would make use of the methods
currently employed in maximum security institutions (enclosed duty
rooms, control of entrances, exits and movement, scrupulous
surveillance powers and restrictions applied to inmate gatherings).
The Task Force also acknowledges the importance of open-air
custody facilities, which would operate according to the
cooperative management model. It suggests amalgamating
minimum security institutions and community correctional centres
together into one stream of non-containment facilities.
The Task Force proposals have their roots in the new “remedial
justice” paradigm, which is built upon the basic principle of respect
for victims, offenders and the people who work in a prison milieu.
According to the Task Force, the ideal penitentiary security
framework is based upon the development of a “culture of respect”,
respect for the dignity of individuals (for their potential for personal
growth) and for their rights. Human relations are the cornerstone of
security. Each positive interaction has a profound effect upon the
entire institution and thereby contributes to making the workplace
and the place of confinement healthier and safer for all concerned.
This is the perspective from which the Task Force redefines the
correctional officer’s role: “the correctional officer must be
recognized as a professional with respect to security procedures,
managing people and dispute settlement” 54. The correctional officer
is a front line expert, vital to having the institution function properly
and more specifically, to successfully reintegrating offenders into
the community. Security comes from the proper management of
people, their problems and their disagreements.
The Task Force claims that it is creating a better balance between
detention and rehabilitation, between security (the protection of
society and the prison staff) and inmate rights. But, by seeing things
only in terms of dynamic security, the importance of tangible
security measures and the reality of the power relationships –which
are inescapable– in a penitentiary are thereby minimized. It is not
only the inmates' criminal culture and the prison staff's bureaucratic
culture that fuel the power struggle, as the Task Force argues, but
also the objective role of a penitentiary in our society and the no
54
Report of the Task Force on Security, 1999, p. 65.
Towards a Policy for Canada’s Penitentiaries
50
less objective roles of both inmates and prison staff. The cultural
approach, when all is said and done, is an idealistic approach.
The liberal and neo-conservative penological theories have this in
common in that neither of them challenges the society that turns an
individual into an offender, a citizen who manifests anti-social
behaviour. The problem is not so much to determine whether the
offender is a victim or someone who is answerable for his/her
actions, but to determine whether it is possible to resolve the prison
dilemma without changing society. A progressive penological theory
would argue that society has to be transformed in order to eradicate
the phenomenon of delinquent behaviour, and that it is not up to
the penitentiary to succeed precisely where society itself has failed.
The rehabilitation of offenders individually, deliberately and with
total sincerity, or opportunistically, is doomed to mitigated success
to the extent that the offenders, who are processed through the
normalization procedures, find themselves, after their release,
trapped in social relationships that have not evolved, in other words,
in the very same conditions that gave rise to their delinquent
behaviour in the first place and that will likely cause them to
commit another offence; and in the same underlying conditions that
are a factor in producing new offenders.
The liberal and neo-conservative penological theories also have
something else in common in that they both claim to strike a
balance between static security and dynamic security, on the one
hand, and between detention and reintegration into the community,
on the other, while still giving precedence to measures that favour
static security and detention in the case of the latter and to
measures that favour dynamic security and reintegration into the
community, in the case of the former.
The partisans of the liberal and the neo-conservative theories avoid
asking the following question: what kind of penitentiary is most
compatible with a society that is based upon inequality? We will try
our best to answer these questions in the following sections.
Towards a Policy for Canada’s Penitentiaries
51
II- The Problem of Security in the Penitentiary
In the second part of our study, we shall explore the problem of security in
the penitentiary and more specifically that of violence. The objective in this
second part is to demonstrate that our knowledge about violence in the
penitentiary and about the impact of the various reforms regarding security
are embryonic, both quantitatively and qualitatively and that, accordingly,
considerable circumspection must be exercised. This caution must be
translated into a prison policy that is based upon striking a balance between
opposing approaches: coercive and persuasive, static security and dynamic
security. We will soon see, in the light of concrete examples, that such a
balance tends to materialize as circumstances dictate, but also partially in
reaction to events, under the pressure being exercised by various actors.
In order to accomplish this, we will sketch a portrait of the situation, analyze
and critique the Bottoms model (the prevailing explanatory paradigm),
make the case for the principle of exercising caution, define what a
penitentiary is and go back over the architectural and functional evolution of
Canada’s penal institutions, by examining in depth the case of the special
handling units and the regional institutions for female offenders.
1- Portrait of the Situation
Over the past few decades, few studies have been conducted on
violence in the penitentiary and even fewer on inmate violence against
prison staff. Most of the studies undertaken have been done on the basis
of narrow investigations, case studies or even compilations of anecdotal
evidence, using incomplete and at times more or less reliable data and
statistical series, as well as more or less subjective evaluations of what is
being observed.
The statistical data pertaining to major incidents, published by the CSC,
over the past ten years, namely, from 1992-1993 to 2001-2002, indicates
that there is no falling trend to be observed with regards to violence in
Canada’s penitentiaries 55.
The number of incidents by category (inmates murdered, hostage
takings, grievous attacks against prison staff, assaults amongst inmates,
inmate suicides, riots, escapes and brawls (severe)) vary from one year
to the next, without it being possible to detect any underlying trends, nor
55
The data covers the period from April to March. For the years 2001-2002, the data goes from April 2001
to February 2002.
Towards a Policy for Canada’s Penitentiaries
52
any correlation between the various incidents. At first glance, the
phenomena that have been recorded are either cyclical in nature, or
quite random56.
Contrary to what the CSC implies in its March 2001 Performance Report,
federal penitentiaries have not become less violent over the last few
years. Indeed, quite the opposite is true, as the following charts
demonstrate, violence can break out at any time, from one year to the
next, more or less out of the blue depending upon the kind of incident at
issue.
a) Inmates Murdered
In 1997-1998, two inmates were murdered in Canada’s penitentiaries, while
the following year there were seven. In 1999-2000, there were eight, the
following year, none, and in 2001-2002, only one! If we examine the whole
chart, no trends can be discerned. At first glance, we are dealing here more
with a cyclical phenomenon, whose amplitude is quite striking. But only a
considerably longer statistical series would enable us to confirm or reject the
cyclical character of the phenomenon and to calculate its relative frequency.
Chart 1 Inmates murdered (1992-1993 - 2001-2002)
10
8
6
4
2
0
9293
9394
9495
9596
9697
9798
9899
9900
0001
0102
Source: CSC, Institutional Security Incidents, Monthly Summary, 2002, p. 5.
b) Guards Murdered
A guard has not been murdered in Canada since 1984, while six
guards were murdered between 1967 and 1981. This decline in
homicides dates back to the period where the traditional penitentiary
56
To some extent, we are paraphrasing Glenn Reed’s analysis here, A Review of Major Institutional
Security Incidents. Is Fenbrook Due?, while at the same time completing and qualifying it.
Towards a Policy for Canada’s Penitentiaries
53
still overwhelming prevailed and where the normalization process
was just taking its first steps.
c) Hostage Takings
No falling trends in violence can be discerned in the second chart. On the
contrary, from 1997-1998 to 2000-2001, the number of hostage takings has
been relatively high and constant (higher than what was recorded over the
previous three years). Even though it fell sharply over the first eleven months
of 2001-2002 (from April to February), this does not yet constitute a break in
the overall trend. Several years must still go by before one can genuinely
proclaim that the trend has reversed itself. At first glance, the hostage
takings likewise look like a cyclical phenomenon.
Chart 2 Hostage takings (1992-1993 - 2001-2002)
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
9293
9394
9495
9596
9697
9798
9899
9900
0001
0102
Source: CSC, Institutional Security Incidents, Monthly Summary, 2002, p. 5.
d) Grievous Attacks Against Prison Staff
In its 2001 Performance Report, the CSC claims that there exists a causal
relationship between its new prison philosophy based upon the quality of
interactions between inmates and prison staff, on the one hand, and the
levelling off in the number of grievous attacks against the Service’s staff
between 1997-1998 and 2000-2001 (“no increase over the past five years”57).
This statement is not well-founded. First of all, because the number of
grievous attacks against prison staff did increase during 2000-2001,
compared to the two previous years, and we might just as well witness a
reversal in this trend. Secondly, because even if there has been a levelling
off, the causal relationship between the latter and the CSC's policy has not
yet been demonstrated scientifically. The following chart confirms that
57
CSC, 2001 Performance Report, p. 19.
Towards a Policy for Canada’s Penitentiaries
54
grievous attacks against prison staff occur more precisely as random
phenomenon. And regardless of their number, one single attack against a
member of the prison staff is one attack too many.
Chart 3 Grievous attacks against prison staff (1992-1993 - 2001-2002)
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
9293
9394
9495
9596
9697
9798
9899
9900
0001
0102
Source : SCC, Institutional Security Incidents, Monthly Summary, 2002, p. 5.
e) Grievous Attacks Amongst Inmates
On average, during the 1992-1993 to 2001-2002 period, there were 45.3
grievous attacks amongst inmates. The grievous assaults amongst inmates
look like a cyclical phenomenon that has a low amplitude. Depending upon
the year, the number varies between 30 and 57. The projected figure for
2001-2002 is simply a low point, as was the case in 1998-1999.
Chart 4 Grievous attacks amongst inmates (1992-1993 - 2001-2002)
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
9293
9394
9495
9596
9697
9798
9899
9900
0001
0102
Source : SCC, Institutional Security Incidents, Monthly Summary, 2002, p. 5.
Towards a Policy for Canada’s Penitentiaries
55
f) Inmate Suicides
Inmate suicides also appear to be a cyclical phenomenon lacking any direct
connection with the CSC's policies. Notwithstanding the various programs that have
been implemented and notwithstanding all the efforts that have been made over the
past few years by the Service, the number of suicides has not stopped fluctuating over
the period under consideration, with a 2001-2002 figure that is projected to be higher
than that of the previous three years.
Chart 5 Inmate suicides (1992-1993 - 2001-2002)
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
9293
9394
9495
9596
9697
9798
9899
9900
0001
0102
Source: CSC, Institutional Security Incidents, Monthly Summary, 2002, p. 5.
g) Riots
As Chart 6 amply demonstrates, riots are a phenomenon that are far from
being held in check. Again, the randomness of the phenomenon stands out
quite clearly. The number of riots decreased from 1992-1993 to 1995-1996,
then bounced higher in 1996-1997 and 1997-1998, to fall back in 1998-1999
and rebound upwards once again from 1999-2000 to 2001-2002.
For a long time, criminologists, basing their claims upon data from the late
1980s and early 1990s, have been falsely arguing that inmates driven by their
individualism and strong feelings of solitude and powerlessness had less of
an inclination to rebel collectively against institutional rules and regulations58.
We now know that this was not a firmly entrenched trend.
58
LEMIRE, 1990, and VACHERET, 1998.
Towards a Policy for Canada’s Penitentiaries
56
Chart 6 Riots (1992-1993 - 2001-2002)
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
9293
9394
9495
9596
9697
9798
9899
9900
0001
0102
Source: CSC, Institutional Security Incidents, Monthly Summary, 2002, p. 5.
h) Escapes
From 1992-1993 to 2001-2002, there were only two escapes from maximum
security penitentiaries for men (one in 1995-1996 and the other in 19992000). However, medium security penitentiaries witnessed 42 escapes
(involving 59 absconding inmates), broken down in an ostensibly random
fashion, with a maximum of 12 (involving 18 absconding inmates) recorded
in 1994-1995. In the case of minimum security penitentiaries, there were 982
absconding inmates from 1991-1992 to 2000-2001. As of 1994-1995, the
number of absconding inmates fell sharply and then began to fluctuate in an
ostensibly cyclical fashion. In the regional institutions for women, there
were five escapes in 1996-1997; after which the phenomenon seems to have
levelled off. However, all of this data does not tell us much about the
number of attempted escapes and even less about the “desire to escape”
that are both phenomena that contribute to the deterioration of the prison
climate (we will return to this matter in Section 3).59
59
It should be noted here that the CSC does not consider escapes from minimum security institutions as
sufficiently “major” to be included in the “major security incidents” total. Indeed, escapes do not
necessarily imply violence. By the same token, escapes from medium and maximum security institutions
should not be tallied in this grand total either. An additional category “violent escapes” should preferably
be created, where violent acts related to escapes in other categories would be counted, if applicable. Which,
of course, just adds to the complexity of the problem.
Towards a Policy for Canada’s Penitentiaries
57
Chart 7 Escapes from medium security penitentiaries (1992-1993 - 2001-2002)
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
9293
9394
9495
9596
9697
9798
9899
9900
0001
0102
Source: CSC, Institutional Security Incidents, Monthly Summary, 2002, p. 25.
Chart 8 Absconding inmates from minimum security penitentiaries
(1992-1993 - 2001-2002)
250
200
150
100
50
0
9192
92- 9393 94
9495
95- 9696 97
9798
98- 9999 00
0001
CSC, Institutional Security Incidents, Monthly Summary, 2002, p. 24.
Source:
i) Brawls (Severe)
Brawls are likewise a random occurrence. But this phenomenon too is
difficult to describe quantitatively to the extent that any evaluation of the
seriousness of a given scuffle is in part subjective. Indeed, what might be
considered as severe at one point in time and in a particular context may be
perceived as less severe at another point in time and in another context,
such that from one year to the next the statistics might reflect incidents of
differing levels of severity.
Towards a Policy for Canada’s Penitentiaries
58
Chart 9 Brawls (severe) (1992-1993 - 2001-2002)
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
9293
9394
9495
9596
9697
9798
9899
9900
0001
0102
Source: CSC, Institutional Security Incidents, Monthly Summary, 2002, p. 5.
Subjectivity often plays a key role when it comes time to
categorize major incidents. In some cases, the criteria used by the
CSC to determine the seriousness of an incident could be judged
as too narrow, and the figures that result as arbitrarily low. For
example, a zero tolerance policy would only have to be adopted in
order to categorize tossing some possibly contaminated liquid at a
guard as a serious attack against prison staff.
One also has to take into account the fact that the portrait of the
situation varies to some extent depending upon which data series
is being used. When a given data series is extended or shifted, the
trends can sometimes disappear completely, as we observed in
the case of the data regarding riots 60.
But there is a far more difficult problem that needs to be resolved.
Each of the phenomena recorded points to the fact that there has
not been a genuine tendency for violence to decrease in Canada’s
penitentiaries. However, when one examines the evolution of the
total number of major incidents from 1991-1992 to 2000-2001, in
other words, the aggregate data, using the figures provided by the
CSC, one can see that there has effectively been a decrease in the
number of major incidents reported beginning in 1995-1996. As we
will see later on, from this period onwards, several new
penitentiaries opened their doors, in particular, the regional
institutions for women and the Fenbrook penitentiary for men,
60
In addition, sometimes, recurring trends become blurred, while relative frequencies (the number of
cycles in any given period) and amplitudes change.
Towards a Policy for Canada’s Penitentiaries
59
whose architecture and operating mode epitomize the CSC's new
philosophy. Parallel to the opening of these institutions, the CSC
also proceeded with its normalization policies in the older
penitentiaries. From then on, it is tempting to see a causal
relationship between the application of the CSC's new philosophy
and a decline in violence in the penitentiary. However, from 19951996 to 2000-2001, the number of major incidents has not
decreased, it has not broken through a new barrier as it should
have done if we were indeed truly witnessing a declining trend, as
Chart 10 clearly shows. The number of major incidents has rather
fluctuated moderately, between 89 and 71 61.
Chart 10 Major Incidents (1991-1992 -2000-2001)
120
100
80
60
40
20
0
91- 92- 93- 94- 95- 96- 97- 98- 99- 0092 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01
Source: CSC, Institutional Security Incidents, Monthly Summary, 2002, p. 19.
In fact, as we shall see later in Section II-4 and II-5, a number of
paradoxical events have occurred over the last few years. On the
one hand, while still strongly endorsing dynamic security, the CSC
has had to expand static security, as circumstances so dictated.
On the other hand, contrary to the CSC's expectations, the opening
of new penitentiaries for women has been accompanied by an
increase in violence that has forced the Service to review its
original policies. There has thus not been any correlation between
the opening of penitentiaries for women and a decrease in
violence. And the same is true for the normalization process
carried out in the older penitentiaries, a process that had begun
well before 1995-1996. In other words, there would seem to be a
simple coincidence between the decrease in violence in the
penitentiary and the introduction of the CSC’s new prison
61
Once 2001-2002 is over, the total will likely be near the level observed in 1998-1999.
Towards a Policy for Canada’s Penitentiaries
60
philosophy. Or then again, perhaps the decrease in violence can
be explained by the expansion of static security! Unless, of course,
this alleged trend is the result of incomplete or erroneous data, in
other words, data based upon the use of arbitrary criteria for the
evaluation and classification of major incidents.
The fact remains that violence in the penitentiary is a complex
phenomenon, with multiple underlying causes, which is poorly
understood, difficult to quantify accurately and objectively and,
tricky to subsequently associate with the adoption of specific
policies. We have a choice between several evaluation and
classification criteria, and between several explanatory
hypotheses, which are at times contradictory. For the moment,
these hypotheses have yet to be scientifically confirmed.
Some hypotheses are based upon facts that everyone agrees with
and should be deemed more likely to be valid than others are. For
example, it can be claimed, with a high degree of certainty that
from the second to the third phase in the evolution of Canada’s
penal institutions, the guards’ violence against inmates fell sharply,
while that of the offenders against the guards rose.
In the totalitarian context, the guard's violence against the inmate
was an instrument used for control. It translated the inequality of
the power relationship and the relative indifference of society
towards the abuse of power. Meanwhile, the inmate's violence
against the guard was non-existent, or just about. An inmate that
attacked a guard exposed himself/herself to extreme reprisals. In
the prison sub-culture, this type of violence was if truth be told
proscribed. As of the 1960s, the decrease in the violence inflicted
by the guards upon the inmates brought to light the growing
violence of the offenders62. The guards’ loss of power smashed the
earlier taboo into a thousand pieces.
Once this background reality is brought to light, several, if not the
majority of the prevailing notions, must be questioned, challenged
or at the very least profoundly qualified.
For example, it has long been claimed that inmate violence
against guards is sporadic and only represents a negligible
proportion of prison violence63. What data has been used to
62
63
LEMIRE, 1990
LEMIRE, 1990
Towards a Policy for Canada’s Penitentiaries
61
substantiate such a claim? And is such a claim still valid today, if it
ever was truly based upon incontrovertible evidence?
If we take a quick look at a partial list of incidents that occurred at
the maximum security unit for women in the Regional Reception
Centre, from January 2000 to August 2001 (Table 1), involving eight
female inmates (who are by and large considered to be less
violent than men), the answers are far from obvious.
- Table 1 A partial list of incidents that occurred at the maximum security unit for women in the RRC, involving
eight (8) female inmates, from January 2000 to August 2001
Inmate
Date
Event
1
2001
August 6
August 3
February 15
January 29
2000
October 23
October 22
August 28
August 13
2
3
4
July 24
July 21
June 26
June 23
June 22
June 4
May 23
May 20
January 31
January 14
2001
August 10
2000
September
16
September 6
May 9
2001
August 1st
March 23
March 22
2001
Damaged State property
Gave the finger
Insulted a guard
Assaulted three guards
Head blow given to a guard’s face
Threatened and assaulted a guard
Contaminated liquid (blood and spit) thrown at a guard and security
compromised
Death threat made to a guard (if I had a weapon, I’d kill you)
Threatened to hit the guards with a scoop
Destroyed State property: 2 TVs, a microwave, a sewing machine, a toaster and
a mixer valued at $2,000
Food thrown at guards
Insults made to guards
Blocked her toilet and flooded the cell range
Refused to obey an order
Assaulted a guard
Assaulted two prison staff (kicks and punches)
Refused to obey an order
Refused to obey an order
Threatened to assault and lunged at a guard with her fists
Refused to obey an order
Refused to obey an order
Food thrown on the bubble’s window
Refused to obey an order
Threw a chair and a tray on the guard’s bubble
Threatened the guards and made disrespectful comments
Assaulted other inmates
Threatened assault
Threatened assault
Assaulted a guard
Disrespectful comments made towards a guard
Disrespectful comments made towards a guard
Towards a Policy for Canada’s Penitentiaries
62
- Table 1 A partial list of incidents that occurred at the maximum security unit for women in the RRC, involving
eight (8) female inmates, from January 2000 to August 2001
Inmate
Date
Event
July 11
July 10
5
6
February 11
January 12
2000
December 4
November 28
2001
August 23
2000
June 6
October 16
2001
August 31
August 19
Broke objects
Disrespectful comments made towards a guard
Broke objects
Threw a chair against the bars of the bubble and threatened the guards who
came to intervene with a bat
Tried to hit a guard with a bat, succeeded in opening the window of her door
with a bat and spread soap and water on the ground, thereby making the
guards’ intervention very dangerous
Broke objects
In possession of 4 litres of contraband liquid (alcohol)
Threatened to assault the U.M. and used vulgar language
Assaulted another inmate
Broke objects and threatened guards with a kettle filled with boiling water
Assaulted a U.M.
Assaulted three guards, spit in the face of two guards and grabbed one by the
shirt
Refused to obey an order
Refused to obey an order
Threatened to assault a guard
Positive urine test
August 17
2000
November 28 Threatened to assault another inmate
Refused to obey an order
November 27 Possession of contraband
May 15
Disrespectful comments made towards a guard
April 27
Threw the tray through the window of her door towards the guards
7
2000
September
Refused to obey an order
16
July 6
Barricaded the door and set fire to the room
May 10
Broke objects
Refused to obey an order
8
2001
March 26
Disrespectful comments made towards a guard
2000
November 30 Refused to obey an order
November 24 Refused to obey an order
June 30
Positive urine test
June 9
Assaulted a guard
Source: UCCO-SACC-CSN, 2001
Due to the contradictions in their respective status in the
institution, correctional officers and inmates embody two poles of
the same reality. They are separated by a more or less impervious
boundary. The improvement in the conditions of confinement and
the multiplication of the officers’ duties have led to a certain
Towards a Policy for Canada’s Penitentiaries
63
rapprochement. Contact has become more frequent and more
“civilized”64.
This assertion is undoubtedly true, but it only describes part of the
reality. A trend in the opposite direction can also be observed,
namely, a deterioration of the climate in many penitentiaries, a
deterioration that is revealed by a higher level of stress within the
prison and by an increase in everyday violent acts and the risks of
violence (minor and somewhat serious incidents that do not
appear in the CSC's statistics, and perhaps even of a more serious
nature, all depending, of course, upon the evaluation and
classification criteria that are being used).
2- The Bottoms Model
If there exist few quantitative studies on violence in the penitentiary,
there are even fewer general analytical frameworks or proven models
that help us to explain the phenomenon.
To this day, the classic approach to the problem of security, and more
specifically, to that of violence in the penitentiary has been to explain
how order is fostered and maintained within a penal institution. If one
didn’t know how this process comes about, it was thought, it would be
impossible to propose adequate security measures.
Bottoms’ approach is one of the prime examples of this methodology.
In a recent groundbreaking text, entitled Interpersonal Violence and
Social Order in Prisons, Bottoms formulates a model that is geared
towards explaining the dynamic social equilibrium that exists in a
penitentiary, and, more precisely, towards explaining inmate violence
perpetrated against prison staff. But he himself acknowledges that it is a
theoretical model that has not been tested quantitatively and whose
value remains heuristic in scope65.
Bottoms makes a distinction between order and control in a penitentiary.
Order can be defined as a pattern of social relationships that are
relatively stable and that enables the different actors to shape their
mutual behaviour. Order and predictability provide inmates and prison
staff with a sort of “ontological security” (a security of self, according to
64
VACHERET, 1998; CHAUVENET, ORLIC, BENGUIGUI, 1994, 1993.
The author draws upon research conducted by Ahmad (1996); Sparks, Bottoms and Hay (1996);
Liebling et al. (1999); as well as, Liebling and Price (1999).
65
Towards a Policy for Canada’s Penitentiaries
64
Giddens) in their day-to-day existence. Meanwhile, control consists of all
the routine practices that ensure that order is maintained. Order and
control are the two elements that are commonly identified as “prison
peace”. Prison peace cannot be based exclusively upon control, upon the
sole measures that allow for order to be maintained, or then again, based
exclusively upon the existence of an enduring structure of social
relationships. Order can be defined negatively, more precisely, as the
absence of violence in the penitentiary, as the ability to avoid conflict and
the disintegration of social relationships. Indeed, order is the equivalent
of a dynamic social equilibrium, while control is an assortment of
strategies and tactics that are used to ensure order. In day-to-day reality,
prison administrators are more sensitive to the problem of control, while
prisoners are more attuned to that of order.
Borrowing from classic political philosophy (Locke, Hobbes and
Rousseau), Bottoms describes three major approaches to establishing a
dynamic social equilibrium to ensure order and the individual’s
allegiance towards society.
The first approach entails acting in the mutual interest of individuals,
whether it involves their economic or other kinds of interests. This
instrumental approach proves effective in a prison environment, a
context in which individuals are receptive to a reward/punishment
system.
The second approach to ensuring the individual’s allegiance towards
society is coercion, constraint. Constraint is either “structural” or
“physical”. Structural constraint relates to the weight of the existing
structures and power relationships. Physical constraint relates to the use
of force and to the material environment. In a penitentiary, structural
constraint is illustrated by the resignation of the inmates to the prevailing
order, whose weight dampens their impulse to challenge and guarantees
a certain stability. On the other hand, physical constraint tends to limit the
individual’s mobility (confinement) and his/her opportunities to commit
acts of violence.
The third approach to ensuring the individual’s allegiance towards
society is to seek out a consensus based upon previously established
norms and values, or then again, based upon rules and regulations
decreed by an authority, person or institution who is recognized as
legitimate.
Towards a Policy for Canada’s Penitentiaries
65
In a prison context, legitimacy plays a particularly important role in the
inmate’s allegiance towards the institution. Building upon Beetham’s
(1991) work, Bottoms defines three criteria that provide the means to
evaluate the legitimacy of the power relationships in a system: their
compatibility with the law, their compatibility with morality and their
compatibility with shared beliefs. Justice is one of the foundations of the
prison order to the extent that it reinforces the legitimacy of the entire
prison staff (from senior management to the guards) and the prison
system as a whole. It is often feelings of injustice that trigger disturbances
inside the penitentiary.
Incorporating the distinction between order and control, the three major
approaches to prison order and the criteria underlying legitimacy,
Bottoms formulates a theoretical model to explain the dynamic social
equilibrium that exists in a penitentiary. As Figure 1 indicates, the model
is built upon eight variables: legitimacy (justice), the structural
constraints, inmate involvement, the characteristics of the prison
population, the reward/punishment system, the physical constraints, the
incidents that have marked the penitentiary, the prison staff’s philosophy
and skills.
- Figure 1 The Bottoms Model
(1) Legitimacy
(a) Fairness of Staff
(b) Fairness of Regime
(c) Distributive Fairness
(Complaints and Discipline
System)
(1A)
Assent/Compliance
(Compliant Orientation)
(2)
Power and Routines as
Structural Constraints
(9)
Good Behaviour
Good Order
(8)
Staff Deployment,
Approaches and Skills
(3)
Normative Involvement of
Prisoners in Personal
Projects
(4)
Population
Characteristics (age, preprison experience, etc.)
(5)
Incentives and
Disincentives
(6)
Degree of Physical
Constraint/Surveillance
(Situational Control)
(7)
Specific Incidents and
their Consequences
(incl. unintentional)
Source: Anthony E. Bottoms, Interpersonal Violence and Social Order in Prisons, University of
Chicago, 1999, p. 258.
Towards a Policy for Canada’s Penitentiaries
66
But, as we stated above, Bottoms acknowledges that his proposed model
has not been tested quantitatively and its value remains heuristic in
scope. It is an instrument designed to foster research and understanding,
which he himself describes as a “speculative model” 66.
Bottoms also specifies that the eight factors that he identifies interact
upon one another, and that there exists a certain degree of tension
between them.
The example of factors 1 and 6 is particularly interesting. According to the
author, “real tension” exists between legitimacy and physical constraints.
A decrease in physical constraints is perceived positively by the prisoners
and contributes to reinforcing the legitimacy of the system. But, on the
other side of the coin, it also increases the risk of violence by multiplying
the places and times that elude the guards' surveillance. On the other
hand, an increase in physical constraints undermines the legitimacy of
the system, a destabilization that in the end can itself lead to an increase
in violence.
Even though they have not yet been categorically confirmed, such
mechanisms could, according to Bottoms, explain several phenomena
that have been described in the empirical studies that have examined the
prison milieu. Accordingly, the question then becomes finding out
whether it is possible to shape a prison system that is characterized by
both robust physical constraints and a high degree of legitimacy. The
author answers this question in the affirmative. The new generation of
penitentiaries based upon direct surveillance would provide the means
to attain such an end result. However, Bottoms acknowledges (in a
footnote) that it’s not always how it works in the real world, as has been
shown in other studies67.
Bottoms proceeds with an examination of the patterns of violent
behaviour against prison staff.
A study by Atlas (1983) indicates that a majority of the (recorded) violent
attacks against prison staff take place in sectors where the level of
surveillance is low. Studies by Kratcoski (1988), Light (1991), Sparks,
Bottoms and Hay (1996) reveal that violent attacks occur primarily in the
living units and special handling units.
66
67
BOTTOMS, 1999, p. 257, 261.
FARBSTEIN, LIEBERT and SIGURDSON (1996) and JAMES et al. (1997).
Towards a Policy for Canada’s Penitentiaries
67
Light’s study exposed six situations that were particularly conducive to
violence, in decreasing order: a situation involving authority (the inmate
reacts to an order from prison staff), a protest situation (the inmate reacts
to treatment that he/she judges to be unfair), searches (of an individual
or of a cell), brawls between inmates, when inmates move about, and
when an inmate is suspected of smuggling.
Sparks, Bottoms and Hay also demonstrated that violent incidents are
more likely to occur at four specific times of the day: in the morning
when the cells are unlocked, at the beginning of the day (the beginning
of the daily routine), in the afternoon when inmates go from their cells to
the workshops and in the evening when the cells are locked up.
Based upon all these studies, Bottoms concludes that violent attacks
against prison staff are not random events. Violent attacks occur primarily
when correctional officers exercise their authority (legal) and they occur
most often at the “rubbing-points of the prison’s social order”68. The
author concludes that the problem of violence against prison staff is
directly related to the problem of the daily routine and the prison
staff/inmate relationship.
Accordingly, Bottoms suggests that interactions between prison staff and
inmates are not necessarily and automatically a positive thing. At the
rubbing points of the penitentiary, interactions are more likely to be a
negative phenomenon. Therefore, we should be asking whether it is
sufficient to decrease the acknowledged rubbing points (the physical
locations and causes) in order to decrease the negative interactions. For
example, would it suffice to give inmates greater freedom of movement
and the key (or magnetic card) to their cell in order to significantly
decrease the violence against prison staff? Or then again, is it necessary
to decrease the authority (legal) of correctional officers, tolerate drug and
alcohol smuggling, amongst other illicit activities, in order to improve the
overall climate in the penitentiary? Or would the increased liberalization
of the penitentiary simply lead to displacing the rubbing points and
causes of the friction, positioning them elsewhere and creating new
ones, or perhaps would it cultivate violence in a more random fashion,
indeed, give rise to gratuitous violence?
It is difficult to answer these questions with any degree of certainty. As
we will see (later on in Section II-5b), the experience in the institutions
for women suggests that turning correctional officers into a sort of front
line social service provider and removing the principal acknowledged
68
BOTTOMS, 1999, p. 265.
Towards a Policy for Canada’s Penitentiaries
68
(physical) rubbing points does not necessarily and automatically lead to
the elimination of violence in the penitentiary.
In the Bottoms approach, the issue of the physical rubbing points in the
penitentiary is a fundamental one.
One of the principal strategies used until quite recently to prevent
violence in the penitentiary involved designing and structuring the
physical environment such that the mobility of potential aggressors was
limited and restricting access to offensive weapons and objects that
could be used as weapons; what the Anglo-Saxons call “situational crime
prevention”69.
It is well known that certain physical characteristics of a penitentiary can
increase or decrease the prospects of certain kinds of offences being
committed. The architectural characteristics of a penitentiary create
“opportunities”, the opportunity that makes the thief. A greater freedom
of movement provides inmates with opportunities to commit serious
crimes in the areas of the penitentiary where surveillance is low and
fosters the formation of gangs. In the English penitentiary system, the
number of violent attacks increased, then decreased, during the 1990s, as
a function of the rise and fall in the number of hours that inmates spent in
their cell.
However, these very same physical characteristics can affect the level of
violence in the exact opposite direction, depending upon the
penitentiary. A greater freedom of movement, for example, the absence
of barriers, does not automatically spawn violence. This leads us to infer
that there is no generalizable rule and that the identical cause may
conceivably produce opposite effects. The physical characteristics only
create more or less propitious circumstances. Indeed, numerous factors
have to be present for the violent act to materialize.
As we shall see in Sections II-4 and II-5, the new prison architecture
makes a deliberate effort to reduce the opportunities that are conducive
to violence by eliminating corridors as much as possible, by grouping
cells together around a central area, by isolating and designing living
units that are smaller and by designing open-air security posts. But it is
difficult to foresee the short, medium and long term consequences of
such transformations.
69
BOTTOMS, p. 241.
Towards a Policy for Canada’s Penitentiaries
69
There are no reliable empirical studies that enable us to conclude that
direct surveillance reduces violence in the penitentiary. Most of the
evidence submitted by partisans of this kind of surveillance is based upon
case studies and limited investigations (when it’s not just a string of
anecdotes), in which subjectivity plays an important role.
A research study conducted by Farbstein and Werner, in 1989, in five
American medium and minimum security penitentiaries indicated that
the level and quality of interaction between inmates and prison staff was
just as high in the institutions with direct surveillance as in those
institutions with indirect surveillance, even though “the officers
exercising direct surveillance appear to spend more time with the
inmates than the officers exercising indirect surveillance” 70. In both types
of institutions “correctional officers are posted where most of the
exchanges between prison staff and inmates take place, as well as where
members of the prison staff exchange amongst themselves” and “they
are more likely to remain at the guards’ post or nearby and, they spend
more time talking privately amongst themselves than with the inmates” 71.
The study also showed that staff in the institutions with direct
surveillance “felt less safe than the staff in the institutions with indirect
surveillance (...), that they felt less safe in the living units and that, in their
opinion, it was more difficult for an inmate to communicate with an
officer”72. Meanwhile, “the inmates under direct surveillance reported
having more contact with the officers and prison staff and found their
contact to be more pleasant and less hostile”. They were also “of the
opinion that the risk of attacks and brawls between officers and inmates
was lower and that the incidence of vandalism was low”. Administrators
were convinced that the incidence of violence “is lower in institutions
with direct surveillance than in institutions with indirect surveillance” 73.
They reported 13 violent incidents per year in the institutions with direct
surveillance, compared to 32 in the institutions with indirect
surveillance74. As one can easily observe, this research study is largely
based upon subjective evaluations and incomplete empirical data.
By emphasizing the distinction between order and control –defined as all
the routine practices that ensure that order is maintained–, Bottoms
attempts to explain the mechanisms that ensure peace within the penal
70
Cited by the CSC, 1991, p. 10.
CSC, 1991, p. 10-11.
72
CSC, 1991, p. 11.
73
CSC, 1991, p. 9.
74
CSC, 1991, p. 9-10.
71
Towards a Policy for Canada’s Penitentiaries
70
institution. The penitentiary is conceived as a dynamic system that is
relatively stable. Bottoms repeats Cressey’s comment that it’s astonishing
that penitentiaries even “work at all”, that they are not institutions
characterized by chaos and an absence of order. “The social system
which is a prison does not degenerate into a chaotic mess of social
relations, which have no order and make no sense”, writes Cressey 75.
However, if truth be told, penitentiaries are also characterized by
disorder, by a certain chaos. The penitentiary is a dynamic system that is
unstable, a system that is constantly threatened by disorder. Prison peace
(order and control) is not the most significant phenomenon, but rather
the clash between order and disorder, and the passage from one to the
other.
The penitentiary must be defined as a chaotic system, in as much as it is
spelled out that the chaos does have a certain inner stability, a structure
(order in the disorder)76. In the real world, penitentiaries are dynamic
systems that are unstable and, as we observed in the first part of our
study, that go through periods that are more or less characterized by
order and disorder, violence and prison peace. Order cannot exist
without its opposite, disorder. But there is no such thing as order and
disorder in the absolute. Even during periods of order, disorder rears its
head under various forms. Disorder is always present, underground,
ready to surface at any time. And order is always present, hovering over
the whole penitentiary, or buried in the subconscious and behaviour of
the people within its walls.
The Bottoms model can help us understand not only how order is
maintained in a penitentiary, but also how it is disrupted, how disorder
moves in. However, such a model is of no value to anybody seeking to
establish a prison system that guarantees that order is maintained. First of
all, because it has not been tested and is difficult to corroborate
empirically (we doubt, moreover, that it ever will be), and also because
the tensions that exist between the various factors are genuine
antagonisms, genuine contradictions.
The merit of this model is that it demonstrates that, depending upon the
situation, the same decision can produce opposite results. A decrease in
75
Cited by BOTTOMS, p. 250.
On the theory of chaos, See: KELLERT Stephen H., In the Wake of Chaos, University of Chicago Press,
1993; RUELLE David, Hasard et Chaos, Éditions Odile Jacob, 1991; MELENCHON Jean-Luc, À la
conquête du chaos, Pour un nouveau réalisme en politique ; and GLEICK James, La théorie du chaos. Vers
une nouvelle science, Albin Michel, 1989.
76
Towards a Policy for Canada’s Penitentiaries
71
the physical constraints may produce a decrease or an increase in
violence, as is the case should the interactions between guards and
inmates begin to proliferate. On the other hand, the Bottoms model
indicates that two opposite decisions may produce the same result: a
decrease or an increase in the physical constraints may both generate an
increase in violence. Indeed, what the Bottoms model really teaches us is
the necessity for exercising caution!
Dynamic systems are complex systems in which a great many factors
come into play. In such systems, it is difficult, indeed often impossible, to
predict which effect, positive or negative, will result from any given
decision.
On the other hand, dynamic systems that are unstable are systems in
which a trivial cause may give rise to profound consequences. In such
systems, the seriousness of an event relates to its future impact. Incidents
of nominal or moderate seriousness can potentially become major
incidents. But it is impossible to predict which of these incidents will
have a major impact (the system is deterministic, but not predictable). In
the complex and interconnected network of causes, the nominally or
moderately serious incident is the one that can ignite, feed and
“unleash”, in due course, all the other causes.
In a penitentiary, the number of nominally or moderately serious
incidents is very high. As a result of the ever increasing number of
movements and interactions, penitentiaries have become even more
unstable. The decline in physical constraints can generate a state of
prison peace that is abruptly disrupted by an outburst of violence.
Prison order is not absolute. There are two possible ways to ensure
relative prison order: by relying upon coercion (structural and physical
constraints) or upon persuasion (the inmate’s interests and respect for
the inmate, consensual values and norms, etc.). The problem stems from
the difficulty in empirically demonstrating incontrovertibly which of these
two methods is the most effective, which generates the least conflict,
violence and disintegration. Too many or too few advantages (material or
other), too many or too few structural and physical constraints, too much
or not enough of a consensus based upon the so-called agreed upon
norms and values often lead to the identical result: disorder!
It is impossible to build a perfect prison order, just like it is impossible to
completely avoid all disorder. Accordingly, the questions that need to be
asked are not so much about order or disorder, but rather about
Towards a Policy for Canada’s Penitentiaries
72
managing the clash between order and disorder and the passage from
one to the other. And the best way to manage this tension is to combine
and balance coercive and persuasive methods, static security and
dynamic security.
In the absence of adequate scientific knowledge regarding the
consequences of the physical design and organization of the penitentiary
and regarding the various surveillance models, and seeing as one and the
other model may give rise to consequences that are exactly opposite to
those being sought, a better balance has to be found between close
(direct) surveillance and indirect surveillance. Direct surveillance by
officers directly posted in the living unit must be combined with indirect
surveillance via sealed duty rooms (glass-enclosed). Open-air duty rooms
multiply the risks, as well as the speed at which disorder can spread. In
the event of an outbreak of violence, and particularly in the case of a riot,
the very safety of the prison staff is endangered, as well as the physical
integrity of the institution.
We have earnestly pointed towards the principle of caution, but precisely
what kind of caution must be exercised?
3- The Principle of Precaution
The Union-CSC joint committee, formed after the four day national strike
in March 1999 to study the working conditions of correctional officers,
acknowledges that these conditions are difficult and dangerous; and that
“The risks associated with the work, the consequences of an error that is
committed and the constant internal and external surveillance” add to
these already difficult conditions77. The work of correctional officers is
just as dangerous, if not more dangerous than that of police officers.
Correctional officers come face to face daily with violent and unexpected
situations, running the risk of injury and of catching infectious diseases.
Two notions clearly stand out in the committee's analysis: namely, risk
and danger. To properly understand the problem of the correctional
officer’s safety in the prison milieu, a distinction must be drawn between
these two notions.
Danger is a genuine threat to which a worker is directly exposed
(physically or psychologically), while risk translates a probability that a
dangerous event might occur. Risk is the calculation of the relative
frequency of a given danger. The word risk comes from the Italian word
77
Cited by Harris, 2002, p. 253.
Towards a Policy for Canada’s Penitentiaries
73
“risco”, which signifies the reef that threatens a merchant ship at sea.
The notion gradually spread to different areas of human activity, from
maritime insurance in the XIV century to the environment, to domestic
activities and to the handling of living organisms during the 1980s and
1990s, by way of the workplace at the end of the XIX century, with the
adoption of industrial work accident legislation and the development of a
compensation system. The notion of risk when applied to the workplace
led to attention being paid to prevention and protection, with the
adoption of a string of rules and regulations and the creation of
specialized agencies. The objective in prevention is to eliminate the
danger at the source; while that of protection is to guard the source of
danger. In fact, danger has two dimensions: its probability and its
seriousness. Prevention involves reducing its likelihood to occur, while
protection involves reducing its seriousness. Prevention and protection
constitute the domain of safety 78.
The recognition of risk in the workplace implies knowledge of the
dangers that may arise, the consequences of any given situation and, that
the probability associated with the foregoing can be calculated, as is the
case with industrial work accidents, in order to determine the cost of
keeping the risk in check and the safety objectives (the zone of
acceptable risk, as the risk can never be totally eliminated).
In a context of serious risk and scientific uncertainty, in other words, in
the absence of knowledge regarding the consequences that a situation
may produce in a given milieu (natural or social), the principle of
precaution takes over from the principle of prevention. Precaution is a
principle of action that compels us to prevent potentially serious danger,
without waiting to find out about the actual consequences that result
from a given situation, without dispelling the scientific uncertainty
pertaining to these effects. Prevention is concerned with risks that are
known and that have been experienced, risks whose possible effects and
probability are identifiable; while, precaution is concerned with risks of
which knowledge is poor and that are full of uncertainty, risks whose
effects are uncertain and whose probability is unknown. Furthermore,
the principle of precaution applies particularly to individual and
generalized deferred risks79, in other words, risks whose consequences
make take a relatively long time to occur or to be known 80.
78
ALLEMAND, 2002; KERVEN and RUBISE, 1991.
Risks are not all equally subject to a “probabilistic” analysis. Although we might know the relative
frequency of the occurrence of numerous kinds of accidents (work, highway, domestic, etc.), certain social
phenomena, such as outbreaks of violence (revolution, civil war, riots, etc.), as well as natural catastrophes
are more difficult to quantify. In addition, risk involves social and human dimensions that make it a
complex phenomenon that cannot be reduced to a probabilistic calculation. The perception of risk, as well
79
Towards a Policy for Canada’s Penitentiaries
74
The principle of precaution was elaborated during the 1970s to take into
account the uncertainty related to certain kinds of environmental
damage, seeing as the absence of precise scientific knowledge could not
be accepted as proper justification for postponing the adoption of
measures designed to prevent the risk of serious damages to the
environment, at an acceptable economic cost. It has since been
extended to risks involving food and hygiene, as well as those associated
with the handling of living organisms (particularly of a genetic nature).
The principle of precaution is both a logical and an ethical principle, and
although it has yet to be extended to social phenomena, there is no
reason why it need be confined to only one domain, in this instance, that
of technological risks, in as much as the two prerequisites for its
application are present. In our opinion, this principle can and should
apply to institutional reforms regarding public security, reforms whose
effects are unknown and uncertain and that risk causing major social and
institutional damages.
The principle of precaution seeks to reduce serious risk and not to
eliminate risk (zero risk). It seeks to eliminate the dangers,
notwithstanding the uncertainty of our knowledge. To this day, the major
reforms made to the prison system (enlightenment, warehouse,
rehabilitation) have been failures. None of the reforms has succeeded in
countering violence in society and in the penitentiary, nor that of the
phenomena of repeat offences. In the current state of our research
findings, it is impossible to identify the medium and long term effects of
an ultraliberal reform to Canada’s penitentiaries, as fantasized by certain
CSC ideologues, nor the medium and long term effects of a neoconservative reform as advocated by the Ontario Government. We thus
can’t help but to steer clear of the potentially serious dangers embodied
in one or the other of these reforms, and not wait to dispel the scientific
uncertainty surrounding these approaches.
Even though the Ontario reformers do not appear to want to go as far as
their American colleagues, the situation in the United States provides
solid grounds for us to exercise caution. Over the past few years, the
privatization of American prisons, combined with a clearly repressive
approach (imprison and punish, along with a reduction in rehabilitation
programs), has had the effect of releasing more than a half a million
as the proneness to risk (attitudes of denial or of daring) vary from one social group to the next and from
one individual to the next. Risk is also a subjective notion. (ALLEMAND, 2002; PERETTI-WATEL,
2002)
80
BOURG, 2002; KOURILSKY and VINEY, 2000.
Towards a Policy for Canada’s Penitentiaries
75
inmates back into the community, who were poorly prepared for their
return and, whose integration into the community therefore remains
problematic. Meanwhile, there is as much, if not more violence in the
new private penitentiaries as in the State penitentiaries. Guards must
equip themselves more and more forcefully in order to protect
themselves from the inmates. Although criminality has fallen by 16% in
the United States, from 1995 to 2000, the number of inmates has
increased by nearly one-third. And it is quite impossible to predict all the
medium and long term consequences of such a phenomenon upon
American society and upon its prison system 81. The relentless increase in
the rate of imprisonment82 and in the number of prisoners83, as well as
the proliferation of penitentiaries in several States 84 could have extremely
serious consequences upon American society 85.
On the other side of the coin, in a society based upon market
relationships and inequality, too great a liberalization of the penal system
(significant reductions in sentencing, earlier releases on parole, a
multiplication of day passes and temporary absences, the quasidisappearance of the penitentiary, a significant reduction in the level of
coercion, etc.) could also have extremely serious repercussions.
The principle of precaution requires that a continual balance be struck
between opposing and extreme tendencies, in order to minimize the
risks embodied in certain phenomena, whose more or less long term
effects are unknown. It necessitates that a balance be found between
coercion and persuasion, as well as between static security and dynamic
security.
We will see in Section II-5 that this balance tends to materialize as
circumstances dictate, in reaction to events and bit by bit, under the
pressure being exercised by various actors who defend opposing
interests and approaches. But this more or less spontaneous process
leads to confusion, inconsistencies, a waste of time, energy and money.
And, things will remain this way as long as the CSC does not carefully
think through and officially adopt a prison policy based upon achieving a
balance between the opposing approaches.
81
The causal relationship between the decline in criminality and the reform has not been established and
could be explained in part by the vigorous economic growth that took place during the 1995-2000 period.
82
476 out of 100,000 inhabitants in 1999, compared to 139 in 1939, at the time of Al Capone.
83
About 2 million people in 2000, namely, namely, four times as many as in 1980.
84
In Texas, since 1995, a new prison is inaugurated every week!
85
On the subject of the recent transformations in the American penal and prison system, See the book by
Joseph HALLINAN, Going up the River. Travel in a Prison Nation. Random House, 2001.
Towards a Policy for Canada’s Penitentiaries
76
Generally speaking, violence in the penitentiary remains a phenomenon
that is poorly understood, both quantitatively and qualitatively. In many
cases, the state of our knowledge does not enable us to directly and
confidently relate it to either past or current reforms. Our knowledge
about the impact of prison reforms upon society as a whole is also
embryonic. Most often, causal relationships are hypothesized, yet remain
unsubstantiated. There are still no explanatory models that have been
confirmed empirically.
Fortunately, we can refer to the principle of precaution to guide us in our
actions.
4- What is a Penitentiary?
Three images spontaneously come to mind when describing a
penitentiary. First of all, there is the traditional image of a daunting
physical structure where brick merges with a complex network of bars
and grates. Secondly, there is the image of a prison without walls, a
virtual prison, integrated into the community, where each inmate wears a
bracelet fastened to their ankle, which monitors them electronically. And,
finally, the in-between image of a university campus or perhaps a
compound of cell blocks.
Regardless of the form taken by a penitentiary, it is a zone that is
segregated, and that constitutes a sub-system within society.
Indeed, one cannot conceive of a penitentiary outside of its environment,
nor entirely interwoven and assimilated into society.
This segregated zone can be more or less physical, material. The
penitentiary can be more or less concentrated or spread out. The
penitentiary does not entirely and necessarily add up to its surrounding
walls. The more concentrated it is, the more the penitentiary corresponds
to a specific zone and/or building. The more it is spread out, the more it
signifies a state of being segregated.
Even in a virtual penitentiary, integrated into the community, there are
zones that are out of bounds to the offender. The latter’s movements are
monitored electronically by various systems (telephone checks, global
positioning system (GPS), etc.). The offender does the “box”, not only
because he/she is not entirely free to move about, but also because
he/she must always be wearing an electronic tracking device (the “box”)
Towards a Policy for Canada’s Penitentiaries
77
on his/her person that, at any time, might sound the alarm which would
return him/her behind bars, in the most traditional of penitentiaries.
Even if the rate and duration of imprisonment were to be reduced, the
penitentiary, as a zone for segregation would endure, whether it be real
or virtual. First of all, because social inequality, exclusion and
marginalization have shown a tendency to increase. Secondly, because
the rate of repeat offences, after the inmate’s release or during their
parole, is a function of the social environment and it could prove
necessary to monitor certain criminals throughout their entire life, which
would not come about without creating new forms of violence and
revolt. Thirdly, because electronic surveillance has its own limits in a
society where a significant proportion of criminals tend to become
increasingly dangerous and to commit serious crimes.
All things considered, society is called upon to develop different kinds of
penitentiaries, going from the traditional penitentiary to the virtual
penitentiary, by way of the in-between classes of penitentiaries that may
develop along the way, and in so doing, a balance must be sought
between coercion and persuasion, as well as between static security and
dynamic security, within each of the different types of penitentiaries.
5- Architectural and Functional Evolution of Canada’s Penitentiaries
The contemporary traditional penitentiary can be defined as a machine
designed to control offenders within which a micro physics system of
forces are arrayed. The role of this machine is to draw the tightest
boundaries around the inmate’s time, space and movements, to regulate
their activities and movement in order to better circumscribe their
attitudes and behaviours 86.
Contemporary traditional prison architecture can be characterized by the
three following elements:
86
•
a monolithic (single) octopus-like institution, where all movement is
within the institution itself;
•
an amalgam of functional spaces (cells, workshops, classrooms,
walk-around yards, etc.) each constituting a sort of micro-prison (a
prison within the prison), monitored from the outside. The
penitentiary duplicates itself at each level (the principle of scale
invariance);
FOUCAULT, 1975; DEMONCHY, 1996.
Towards a Policy for Canada’s Penitentiaries
•
78
a corridor-based architecture, that constitutes a network for moving
about, which links the micro-prisons one to the other and that
provides the means for the constant surveillance and strict control of
the inmate’s movements by the prison staff 87.
In the traditional penitentiary, spatial segregation and its corollary, the
fence, predominate. Order and discipline require separation and a fence
at each level of spatial and architectural organization. The penitentiary is
above all a place that is closed onto itself, heterogeneous and separate
from society. It thus constitutes a collective prison where offenders are
classified into the same level of security. These offenders are
meticulously separated from the others to avoid any form of
“contamination”. Finally, the penitentiary is a juxtaposition of individual
prisons, of cells that are extended by a series of adjacent premises, of
small communal prisons (workshops, common rooms, etc.). The
architectural segregation is combined with relationships that are
segregated: correctional officers do not share the same space as inmates,
they exercise their surveillance over the network of corridors and microprisons from the outside.
What the new penitentiary conception challenges is the “architectural
cleavage”, the principles of separation and a fence at each level of spatial
organization. Not only must the penitentiary open up to the outside, to
the community, but each of its functional spaces must be desegregated,
for the most part freed of obstacles and barriers. The penitentiary itself no
longer comes across as a monolithic and octopus-like institution, but
rather as an arrangement of cell blocks. Within these cell blocks, the
system of living units allows for a greater freedom of movement for the
various categories of inmates who live together and who go about their
private and domestic pursuits according to a new set of codes and new
networks of interaction. A central area is designed and created, as a new
space for socialization, which opens broadly towards the residential and
activity areas. The cell itself becomes a room where the door’s function
becomes one of protecting the inmate’s intimacy. Correctional officers
share the same space as the inmates, no longer monitoring the microprisons from the outside. Surveillance is tight, based upon direct and
sustained personal relationships with the inmates. If the fence does
remain, it is far more flexible, distant, and increasingly incorporated into
the penitentiary itself, and in some cases, into the community (parole).
Confinement within a cell tends to become blurred.
87
DEMONCHY, undated.
Towards a Policy for Canada’s Penitentiaries
79
The CSC defends a linear conception of the penitentiary's evolution,
going from the traditional institution to the penitentiary without walls, by
way of the cell block-style penitentiary, based upon direct surveillance
and the accountability of the inmates.
Indeed, the penitentiary's evolution is neither linear, nor constant, as will
see in subsequent sections of this paper. It swings between the opening
of traditional penitentiaries and the closing of new penitentiaries,
between dynamic security and static security, in other words, between
reforming activism and the objective requirements of the moment, with
assorted equilibrium points. This swinging back and forth should lead to
several types of penitentiaries, meeting various contradictory needs and
demands.
The first Canadian penitentiary, in Kingston, was conceived by borrowing
from the British and American architectural traditions.
In the XVIII century, the British philosopher Jeremy Bentham advocated a
new prison concept: the panoptic prison (from the words pan and optic),
in other words, a penitentiary designed in such a way that the guard
could see each of the inmates in his/her cell without being seen himself.
This is made possible by putting the cells on several different levels
around a central tower, each of the cells being positioned in such a
manner as to allow for constant, total and indirect surveillance 88.
Bentham’s prison model never saw the day. The prisons that were built
up until the middle of the XX century were variations, adaptations of the
panoptic model. These actual prisons are shaped like crosses or stars.
The central bubbles control the corridors; they are unable to see inside
the cells. Guards walk around in the corridors; they spend a part of their
day opening and closing doors and are in direct and permanent contact
with the inmates89.
In American prisons, built along the lines of the Bentham model, two
prison systems have been established. In the Pennsylvania system –
developed at the Eastern Penitentiary in Pennsylvania–, the inmates are
completely isolated from one another; they live and work alone, the cells
and other premises are designed in such a way that they have no visual
contact with one another. In the Auburn system –developed at the
Auburn prison in New York State–, the inmates eat and work together
during the day, but in silence, and are put into their own individual cells
88
89
CSC, 1991b, 2002a; DEMONCHY, 1996.
DEMONCHY, 1996.
Towards a Policy for Canada’s Penitentiaries
80
at night. In both cases, the dimensions of the cells are very small and
most of the time they are windowless 90.
The Kingston penitentiary was conceived by borrowing from three
different models. It replicates the panoptic model’s storied structure (the
nave), the cross-shape of the Eastern Penitentiary and the prison regime
of the Auburn prison. Up until the 1960s, it was the paradigm that inspired
the construction of Canada’s penitentiaries (Laval, 1873; Dorchester,
1880; Saskatchewan, 1911; British Columbia; Stony Mountain, 1920s and
1930s; Collina Bay, 1930s; Prisons for women, 1934) 91.
Over this long period, penitentiary reform primarily followed the path of
improvements to its mode of operation 92. The penitentiary transforms
itself gradually, although only partially, into a rehabilitation instrument by
way of meditation, prayer, work, learning and treatment programs 93.
At the beginning of the 1950s, the CSC adopts new architectural norms,
without in any way revolutionizing the layout of the penitentiary, and an
improvement in inmate living conditions ensues in the institution. The
penitentiaries built during this period provide the inmates with greater
intimacy. The cell ranges are not as long, the cells are larger, equipped
with a full-length door and a view to the outside. The layout of the
network for moving about expands and makes it easier to get about
outside. The penitentiaries are furnished with lunchrooms so that meals
can be eaten together by cell range, which are later transformed into
living rooms. Like the older institutions, the new penitentiaries are
medium in size (450 beds). Control is exercised “primarily by dynamic
security measures and by manually locking up the barriers”94. Three
penitentiaries were built during the 1950s: the Federal Training Centre,
the Leclerc Institution and the Joyceville Penitentiary.
Over the following decade, on the heels of the Fauteux Report, eight new
medium size penitentiaries are built (Springhill, Archambault,
Cowansville, Millhaven, Warkworth, Drumheller, Matsqui and the
Quebec Correctional Development Centre), which add 4,000 new places
to Canada’s correctional system.
90
CSC, 1991a, 1991b, 2002a.
CSC, 1991a, 1991b, 2002a.
92
The architecture and mode of operation of a penitentiary are intimately related to one another and must
evolve in tandem, since a discrepancy between the two of them will lead to dysfunction. Architectural
transformations shape new modes of operation and the evolution of operations guide the creation of new
architectural forms. Changes in the prison system are a product of this double evolution.
93
CSC, 1991b.
94
CSC, 1991a, p. 4.
91
Towards a Policy for Canada’s Penitentiaries
81
The maximum security penitentiaries are designed in such a way as to
limit the contact between inmates and prison staff. Static security
measures are reinforced by the design of glass-enclosed remote duty
rooms and corridors that are reserved for the exclusive use of prison
staff95.
However, the medium and minimum security institutions will be
modelled along the lines of the university campus design.
It’s not until the 1960s that the process of normalizing the prison milieu
(the opening up towards society) and, more specifically, the emphasis
that is placed upon rehabilitation sets a new architectural reform in
motion. The penitentiary as a distinct, heterogeneous place, closed onto
itself is challenged. With the movement towards campus style
institutions, the first genuine attempts to create a more “normal”
correctional milieu occur. Four institutions of this type are built:
Cowansville, in the Province of Quebec; Warkworth, in Ontario;
Drumheller, in the Prairies; and, Springhill, in the Atlantic Provinces.
The campus architecture style is characterized by smaller buildings, at
the residential level, arranged like the buildings on a university campus,
and by the use of shapes and materials that are typical of a residential
milieu. The single octopus-like building gives way to an assortment of
buildings. The cells are smaller than before, but the areas used for
common amenities are more numerous and bigger. The architectural
innovations, such as open-air duty rooms, the elimination of several
barriers and the spaces designed to cultivate exchanges will make it
easier to bring in the dynamic security model based upon close
interaction between prison staff and inmates 96.
However, notwithstanding these changes, the mode of prison operations
is not radically transformed. This period is characterized rather by a
certain balance between static security and dynamic security.
On the campus, the buildings are linked together by covered corridors
that restrict moving about. Generally speaking, (internal and external)
movements are limited and controlled by the presence of fences,
barriers, enclosures and glass doors at strategic locations. In the living
units, centralized remote control devices replace the manual locks,
95
96
CSC, 1991a.
CSC, 1991a, 2002b.
Towards a Policy for Canada’s Penitentiaries
82
thereby reducing the contact between prison staff and inmates 97. The
architectural innovations themselves are shaped by the necessity to
resort to cellular, residential, and perimetrical isolation, by the necessity
to take into consideration the mechanics of armed interventions (the
reduction of the distance between buildings and a network of tunnels to
transport weapons and for the safety of prison staff, especially in the
maximum security penitentiaries), as well as by the need for direct
surveillance over the entire living unit, from the duty rooms. In addition to
reducing the number of interactions between inmates and prison staff,
the centralized remote control duty rooms, whether open-air or
enclosed, diminish the inmates' intimacy and place limits on the shape
that the living unit is able to take. Indeed, during the 1960s, new static
security measures are applied in all the new penitentiaries, and the
campus-style institutions seek to genuinely improve the effectiveness and
efficiency of the penitentiary98.
It is only when the time comes for the CSC to draw conclusions regarding
this period, attached as it is to its linear conception of the penitentiary's
evolution, will it explain that all the measures listed above were only
remnants of the former mode of operation. The 1960s are marked by
“incomplete, divergent and sometimes contradictory messages”, writes
the CSC99. The static security measures are not regarded as objective
constraints stemming from the state of the prison system and the society
in which it exists.
Thus, what appears as a period of dynamic balance, of tensions between
opposing needs, is defined as a simple transition period towards a
superior penitentiary paradigm based upon dynamic security and respect
of the individual. This does not prevent the CSC from proclaiming at the
very same time that “operations must be organized in such a way as to
accommodate everyone’s needs” 100, surreptitiously reintroducing the
notion of an indispensable balance between static security and dynamic
security. By favouring dynamic security, the CSC erases the many
contradictions with a seeming magic wand, yet invariably dynamic
balance presupposes an ongoing tension between the two forms of
security.
97
Here, we stumble upon a fascinating paradox. Manual locks multiply the opportunities for contact
between prison staff and inmates. But these contacts are fleeting and can be tricky and dangerous; they thus
lead to negative interactions.
98
CSC, 1991a, 1991b, 2002b.
99
CSC, 1991b, p. 3.
100
CSC, 1991b, p. 5.
Towards a Policy for Canada’s Penitentiaries
83
The evolution of the closed institution towards a correctional milieu that
is more of an imitation of living in the community –the current trend
towards the normalization of prison architecture– is not, moreover, an
end in itself, but here again a simple transition phase towards the ideal
penitentiary. In the CSC’s own words, it aims to effect “an about turn in
correctional ideology”. It seeks to markedly decrease “the import of
imprisonment in correctional strategy”, seeing as the increase in the
construction and operating costs of penitentiaries constitute, again in
their own words, “the ultimate catalyst for change”. In the end, the CSC
aims to eliminate “the need to design, build and furnish centralized
institutions to accommodate inmates”, given that the prison without
walls and the community resources centre represent the ultimate ideal
penitentiary model101 in their minds.
During the 1970s, the tendency towards building smaller and less austere
penitentiaries takes shape. Although security still remains an important
concern, the creation of a more humane living environment and a more
relaxed atmosphere within the institution is also sought. Five
penitentiaries are built: the Regional Reception Centre (Province of
Quebec), the Regional Psychiatric Centre (Prairies), the Edmonton
Institution, the Kent Institution and the Mission Institution, while several
urban community centres will be opened to better deal with inmates on
parole102.
The emphasis placed upon static security and more specifically upon
indirect surveillance is challenged. In the minimum and medium security
penitentiaries, several security mechanisms are modified or simply
abandoned. However, the correctional officers still work in glassenclosed posts, in contrast to other prison staff who are now working
more often and more directly in the unit itself103.
During the 1980s, numerous penitentiaries are built: the Atlantic,
Drummond, Donnacona, Port-Cartier, Bowden and de la Macaza
Institutions, as well as the special handling units (that we will look at later
on).
Once again, this period is marked by tensions between static security and
dynamic security. The CSC increasingly advocates the living in the
community model and the inmate’s accountability. But a wave of
violence in the penitentiaries, including the murder of several employees,
101
CSC, 1991b, p. 6-7.
CSC, 1991a.
103
CSC, 1991a; 2002b.
102
Towards a Policy for Canada’s Penitentiaries
84
leads to the implementation of supplementary control measures in a
majority of the institutions (above all, the formulation of an armed
intervention plan)104.
The CSC nonetheless continues its architectural pursuit of a more
“harmonious” penitentiary.
The Bowden penitentiary, in Alberta, is the “first genuine attempt to
integrate all of the prison staff into the living unit”105. In fact, Bowden
constitutes “the first federal medium security institution in Canada that is
built in accordance with the requirements of the direct surveillance
model”106. This kind of surveillance is based simultaneously upon the
interaction of the prison staff with the inmates and upon being able “to
see all of the principal areas from a central vantage point” 107. The
Bowden penitentiary consists of five distinct living units. In order to
facilitate surveillance, the units are arranged in the shape of a cross, with
the duty room placed right in the centre. Each of the arms of the cross
includes a core of cells that give onto a “semi-private space for common
amenities”. The duty room is open and “serves as an information booth
at all times”. Inmates have free access to their rooms (except at night)
and the only material obstacle to their moving about are the controls that
remotely open the access doors to the units and the cells (during the
night). Bowden is a sort of national and international showcase for the
CSC.
During the 1990s, this role will be taken over by the William Head and
Fenbrook institutions for men and by the new regional institutions for
women.
Opened in 1959, the William Head minimum security penitentiary was
overhauled and turned into a medium security complex in 1992. William
Head is portrayed by the CSC as the very model of a “community
residence” and of “responsibility”. It consists of five sections each having
room for forty inmates, and each one made up of four ten-room
duplexes. In each building, the inmates are responsible for the
organization of domestic life. William Head is the architectural
expression of the values expressed in the CSC’s 1989 Mission 108.
104
CSC, 1991a, 2002b.
CSC, 2002b, p. 3.
106
CSC, 2002b, p. 3.
107
CSC, 2002b, p. 3.
108
CSC, 2002b, p. 3-4.
105
Towards a Policy for Canada’s Penitentiaries
85
The Fenbrook penitentiary, inaugurated in 1998, constitutes an amalgam
of the direct surveillance model and the accountability model, a hybrid
concept. But, according to the CSC, “it is above all inspired by the
accountability model”109. All the employees and all the day-to-day
functions are grouped together in the same building. The creation of a
“community” is supposed to promote the maintenance of order and
security. Since Fenbrook’s opening, no major incidents have taken place
there.
However, the CSC barely places any emphasis upon the static security
measures that it has had to adopt to help maintain order in the prison.
Like most medium security penitentiaries that do not have an enclosure
wall, Fenbrook is surrounded by a double razor-blade barbed wire fence
and equipped with a PIDS. But what makes for a significant difference is
its central bubble that is equipped with the most modern means of
communication and a veritable armoury. Forty surveillance screens
electronically connected to video cameras with zoom lenses provide the
means to monitor all the sectors of the penitentiary, while a Global
Positioning System provides the means to locate employees at any time,
and wherever they are. Accordingly, the inmates are under constant
surveillance and in the most static fashion imaginable! This undoubtedly
contributes to their good behaviour. Of course, such surveillance is
helpful, but it is not sufficient to shield the penitentiary from any and all
outbursts of violence, as we will see later on (or as we have already been
able to observe)110.
Fenbrook constitutes a nice showcase for the CSC, but only to the extent
that it does not rely too heavily upon the static security measures that
ensure the penitentiary’s internal discipline and that contravene its
official philosophy.
During the 1990s, the showcase that the CSC would have liked to have
flaunted, its prison castle in Spain if one may be so bold, were the
regional institutions for women (RIFW), the original version.
Unfortunately for the CSC, the responsibility model as applied to these
penitentiaries for women was a blatant failure, at least during its first few
years of operation.
But before examining the case of these penitentiaries for women, let us
consider the evolution of the special handling units (SHU) for men.
109
110
CSC, 2002b, p. 6.
CSC, 2002b; Harris, 2002.
Towards a Policy for Canada’s Penitentiaries
86
We will explore these last two types of penitentiaries in depth, because
the first one is an example of rebalancing in favour of static security,
while the second one is an example of rebalancing in favour of dynamic
security.
a) The Evolution of the Special Handling Units (SHU)
The evolution of the special handling units provides us with an
example of rebalancing in favour of dynamic security.
Subsequent to the wave of violence that shook Canada’s
penitentiaries in the middle of the 1970s, an investigative committee,
appointed to study the use of isolation in federal penitentiaries, was
created. Presided by Jim Vautour, the committee submitted its report
in 1976 and its principal recommendations were followed by the CSC.
At that time, the offenders who represented a serious and persistent
threat to the prison staff and to other inmates were put into
dissociation areas in the institution where they were being kept for
nearly 24 hours a day, without receiving any clinical treatment or
following any kind of rehabilitation program. A study conducted by
the investigative committee revealed that spatial segregation was not
doing anything to modify the behaviour of dangerous inmates, since
the latter continued to perpetrate violent acts after leaving isolation.
The committee came to the conclusion that special handling units,
namely, institutions specifically designed and built for guarding and
treating violent inmates were necessary, in order to maintain order in
the “ordinary” penitentiaries and to decrease the risks to which prison
staff were being exposed, as well as to reduce the harmful effects of
isolation over the long term by implementing programs that were
better adapted to the needs of dangerous offenders111.
In 1977 and 1978, two temporary units were set up within existing
penitentiaries (one at Millhaven and the other at the Quebec
Correctional Development Centre), while waiting for the opening of
the permanent SHUs in 1984 (Saskatchewan Penitentiary and the
Quebec Regional Reception Centre, at Sainte-Anne-des-Plaines).
After the creation
transformations.
111
CSC, 1991c.
of
the
SHUs,
they
underwent
several
Towards a Policy for Canada’s Penitentiaries
87
In 1980, the admission criteria were broadened to include inmates
who represented a “potential” danger and not only a real immediate
danger, and a minimum two year term was officially introduced.
However, this rule was revoked in 1985, enabling inmates to return to
the institution from which they were transferred in the first place, after
having completed the various phases of the reintegration program, at
their own rhythm 112.
In 1986, the number of security levels in Canada’s prison system went
from seven to four; where the special handling units were classified
as the highest level of security and were rebaptized “High Maximum
Security Unit”.
In 1990, the Correctional Service of Canada adopted a new policy
towards dangerous inmates. The operations of the SHUs, and more
specifically the control methods being used no longer corresponded
to the values set forth in the Service’s Mission. As soon as they were
opened, and this, contrary to how the project had been planned, a
regime centred on coercion materialized in the SHUs, undoubtedly as
a result of the extreme dangerousness of the first inmate cohorts who
were imprisoned there. This system had been reinforced following
the 1983 and 1984 wave of violence (11 murders and 60 violent
inmate attacks, of which two murders and seven violent attacks took
place in the SHUs, one murder of an employee, and 39 riots, hostage
takings and escapes). According to the CSC's analysis, the units were
essentially punitive penitentiaries, closed onto themselves, and where
the various phases of progressive reintegration were not being
followed. The intervention mechanisms used in the SHUs had not
succeeded in neutralizing the inmates’ violent behaviour: “more than
one-third of the inmates were sent (to the SHU) more than once” and
“the latter represented a far greater threat to society once they were
released from the SHU, than was the case for other inmates”. The
conclusion was as plain as the nose on your face. It had become
urgent to “introduce more effective treatment programs and strategies
into these units”113.
The special handling unit could no longer be defined as a high
maximum security level institution, but rather as “a special place
intended for special people”114. The Service thus goes back to its
112
CSC, 1991c.
CSC, 1991c, p. 98.
114
CSC, 1991c, p. 100.
113
Towards a Policy for Canada’s Penitentiaries
88
former designation, and eliminates the notion of high maximum
security.
Two fundamental principles were laid down as the foundation of the
new conception of the special handling units.
The first principle is that of the “limited control” of dangerous
inmates, namely, a control that is exercised “solely to the extent that
is necessary to prevent violent acts” 115. The CSC recognizes the
existence of three categories of dangerous inmate: inmates who
suffer from psychiatric disorders, inmates who have behavioural
disorders and inmates for whom violence is a functional act (a means
to an end). Dynamic security, the exercise of control by way of
positive interactions between prison staff and offenders, also has to
be applied in the special handling units, which implies the
refurbishment of the premises and the gradual elimination of the
restraining devices affecting inmates when they move about, in order
to “reduce the material barriers between prison staff and inmates” 116.
The second principle involves the reintegration of the offenders.
According to the CSC, “violent inmates also have the capacity to
modify their behaviour, if they are put in a suitable milieu and offered
appropriate programs” and if they are encouraged to “actively
participate in constructive activities” 117. The avowed objective of these
programs “is to provide the means for the inmate to return to a
maximum security institution, without risk, and as soon as
possible”118. In point of fact, the CSC's new philosophy will lead to a
substantial reduction in the SHU’s total population.
Since 1991, the situation in the SHUs does not appear to have evolved
significantly. In its 2000-2001 annual report, the Correctional
Investigator makes a list of the unresolved problems over the
preceding years. Amongst the various problems mentioned is “the
effectiveness of the policies governing the special handling units” and
“the chronically low level of inmate participation in the programs
offered in the special handling units”119.
115
CSC, 1991c, p. 100.
CSC, 1991c, p. 102.
117
CSC, 1991c, p. 102-103.
118
CSC, 1991c, p. 103.
119
Correctional Investigator’s Report, 2000-2001, 2001, p. 7.
116
Towards a Policy for Canada’s Penitentiaries
89
The Investigator expresses serious doubts about the effectiveness of
the Service's policy that involves putting all the so-called “dangerous”
inmates together in the same institution. In its opinion, this practice
leads to labelling these offenders as the “worst of the worst” and
creating a solidarity between them, which flies in the face of the
explicit objective of the SHUs, namely, to ensure the security of
society. And the Investigator explains the low level of inmate
participation in the treatment and training programs by these same
feelings of solidarity120. In conclusion, the Investigator asks the CSC to
go one step further towards normalization and dynamic security.
On the other hand, the Investigator is surprised that the CSC has not
yet set up programs specifically designed for SHU inmates,
notwithstanding the repeated recommendations to do so. Indeed,
there are compelling grounds to be astonished, if one examines the
SHU's evolution over the last 25 years and the evolution of the CSC’s
policy pronouncements. The absence of specific programs and the
low level of inmate participation can undoubtedly be explained, as
the Service has suggested, by the ever growing difficulty of
rehabilitating dangerous criminals, by the harsh reality that prevails in
the institutions and by the lack of unequivocal scientific knowledge in
the area of treating violent people. But the foregoing is especially
revealing about the tactics that are constantly employed by the
partisans of a liberal penology to explain the system's failures, tactics
that involve pleading the insufficiency and inadequacy of the
programs, thereby perpetually side stepping the real issues at stake.
This argument has been used on several occasions since the SHU’s
creation. And this is still the case, as the CSC is currently working on
the development of a plan to better meet the needs of the inmates in
the Sainte-Anne-des-Plaines SHU.
But the rebalancing of the special handling units must not be
achieved to the detriment of static security. In these units, only a
relative balance can be reached, where static security predominates
over dynamic security.
b) The Evolution of the Regional Institutions for Women (RIFW)
The evolution of the penitentiaries for women provides us with a
relevant example of rebalancing in favour of static security and the
spatial segregation of the different inmate categories.
120
Correctional Investigator’s Report, 2000-2001, 2001, p. 7.
Towards a Policy for Canada’s Penitentiaries
90
We will examine this example in depth, since the CSC is proposing to
apply the model underlying the institutions for women to the
penitentiaries for men.
When perusing the CSC's various texts, it is surprising to observe that
the latter does not describe prisons for women as penitentiaries, but
rather as institutions, without a doubt because the very notion of an
institution does not imply the notion of “penitence”. What is at issue
here, beyond the simple choice of a descriptive noun, is the very
nature of the penitentiary itself.
From Prisons to Institutions
Before 1995, Canada’s prison system counted only one penitentiary
for female offenders: the Prison for Women in Kingston.
In 1991, in response to rising violence, the Prison for Women was
equipped with a special unit where the most dangerous female
offenders, the inmates who disrupted the smooth operation of the
institution, were to be isolated.
The week that preceded its opening was marked by several major
incidents: five attempted suicides, an attempted escape and six
violent attacks set off by drug use121.
The launch of a special isolation unit for aggressive female inmates
was going to considerably improve the overall atmosphere in the
penitentiary. But violence was not eliminated within the special unit.
It reached its boiling point during the 1994 riot, which gave birth to the
Arbour Commission.
In 1990, the Government had already announced, pursuant to the
1989 Task Force Report on Federally Sentenced Women, that it would
close the Kingston Prison for Women towards the end of 1994 and
that it would replace it with five smaller institutions, in line with its
new philosophy.
The doctrinaire decision of 1990 and the more pragmatic one that
followed in 1991 were going in two opposing directions. The former
proposed dealing with the problem of dangerous female inmate
violence by creating a community-like milieu for them, while the
121
HARRIS 2002.
Towards a Policy for Canada’s Penitentiaries
91
second proposed isolating violent women from the other female
offenders. After the 1994 riot, notwithstanding the fact that the female
offenders who were placed in the special isolation units had been
difficult to control, and that they were even more so in a partially
normalized milieu (the ordinary units in the Prison for Women), the
Government steams straight ahead with its plans to construct open
and multilevel security institutions for women, as if there were no
lessons to be learned from the Kingston Prison for Women
experience122!
Between 1995 and 1997, the Government builds five low capacity
(between 28 and 81 inmates) regional institutions for women: the
Okimaw Ohci Healing Lodge at Maple Creek, Saskatchewan (August
1995), the Nova Institution in Truro, Nova Scotia (October 1995), the
Edmonton Institution for Women, in Alberta (November 1995), the
Grand Valley Institution in Kitchener, Ontario (January 1997) and the
Joliette Institution in the Province of Quebec (January 1997). These
penitentiaries are built in line with a new approach to security. This
approach, as we have previously seen, involves giving precedence to
dynamic security based upon the interaction between prison staff and
inmates. “Getting to really know the female inmate is the best of
protections”, writes the CSC on several occasions 123.
In the first regional institutions for women, static security was scarcely
developed. The traditional perimeter fence had been replaced by a
boundary fence and a bare bones lighting system. Control and
detection systems were non-existent124.
The new penitentiaries for women did not have a maximum security
unit. In fact, they had been conceived to accommodate low or
medium risk inmates. Dangerous female offenders125 were
nonetheless transferred into these penitentiaries 126. Many of them
spent most of their time in isolation cells for disciplinary reasons,
going from attempted escapes to drug abuse 127.
122
The Arbour Commission, appointed to investigate the 1994 riot at the Kingston Prison, consoled the
CSC with regards to its policies. According to the Commission, more than three quarters of the female
inmates had been victims of various kinds of abuse during their lives, and their rehabilitation required the
establishment of specialized treatment and training programs, dispensed in an environment that would be as
normal as possible, in other words, in a hospitable, calm and serene environment.
123
CSC, 1989, 1991, 1996, 1999, 2002.
124
CSC, 2002c.
125
Namely, inmates who have committed violent crimes (75% of the female inmates are classified as
maximum security) or who manifest marked anti-social behaviour that cannot be easily altered.
126
In 1997, only seventeen women in Kingston remained classified as maximum security risks.
127
HARRIS, 2002.
Towards a Policy for Canada’s Penitentiaries
92
Barely a few months after being opened128, violent incidents at the
Nova and Edmonton institutions lead the CSC to increase static
security measures, including measures concerning the security
perimeter. These security measures are reinforced in all existing
RIFW, as well as in those under construction, with the exception of
the Okimaw Ohci Healing Lodge.
Nevertheless, the CSC did not want to use the same security
perimeter measures in the penitentiaries for women as in the
penitentiaries for men, seeing as it considered the level of risk and
needs of women to be different than those of the male inmates.
Instead of the traditional fourteen foot high fence, it puts up an eight
foot high fence (topped with razor-blade barbed wire), coupled with a
detection system (infrared light, video camera, etc.), seeing as a more
imposing fence would be “contrary to the concept that had presided
over the creation and operation of institutions for women, which was
based upon the notion of dynamic security” 129.
Even though it “knew that this system would not necessarily prevent
women from escaping”, the CSC “judged that it would be a better
early warning system (detection and dissuasion), and that it was the
appropriate way to deal with the risk (...)”. It was, as a result, implicitly
recognizing that women had the same abilities to escape as men,
while still implementing conditions pertaining to escape that were
distinct! It was also conceding that it had poorly evaluated the risk
represented by women.
But, in attempting to resolve the security problem in the RIFW, the
CSC had to take even greater liberties with its basic philosophy.
In 1996, the CSC withdraws all female maximum security offenders
from the regional institutions and commits itself to making significant
changes to the architecture and mode of operation in the
penitentiaries for women. The four principal measures adopted are as
follows: the formulation of a normalized instrument to reassess the
level of security of female inmates, the creation of Secure Units, the
development of an intensive behaviour management program and
128
One inmate murdered and one riot at Nova; three attacks on prison staff, seven escapes and attempted
suicides in Edmonton.
129
According to the CSC, the current RIFW security perimeter is somewhere on a continuum between what
exists at minimum security institutions for men (no fences) and what exists at medium security institutions
for men (double fence and motorized patrols). CSC, 2002c, p. 2.
Towards a Policy for Canada’s Penitentiaries
93
the creation of Structured Living Environment houses, as well as the
development of an intensive treatment program 130.
The first measure involves elaborating a Scale to reassess the level of
security for women. With this first measure, the CSC implicitly
recognizes that the reassessment of the level of security of female
offenders drew too heavily upon subjectivity and was far too sensitive
to the resources that were available (the number of places and
employees in the Service’s institutions), and that in a context where
the number of inmates was growing, the Service was following a
policy that was more concerned with managing the available places
than with managing risk.
The second measure involves building special housing units in each
of the regional institutions to accommodate the female offenders who
are classified as maximum security risks, and whose return is planned
for 2002131. With this measure, the CSC implicitly recognizes that it had
gone too far in neglecting security in the institutions for women and
that to rehabilitate female offenders, it does not suffice to confine
them indiscriminately in a normalized environment while dispensing
treatment and training programs to them. The creation of the Secure
Units challenges the initial conception of multilevel security
institutions, based upon the non-segregation of inmates.
The Secure Unit implies an increase in the degree of confinement of
female maximum security offenders. In addition, the SU will be
designed in accordance with the scale invariance principle, prisons
within the prison: “The SU will have three levels of confinement: the
cells, the modules (consisting of five to six cells each) and the unit
itself”. Meanwhile, “the exercise yard will be surrounded by a
combination of walls and fences 3.7 metres high and equipped with a
detection capability”132; which boils down to the fact that it will be
surrounded by a fence that is just as imposing as what surrounds the
penitentiaries for men, while what surrounds the RIFW is only eight
feet high. Accordingly, no new changes to peripheral security
measures will be necessary and the CSC will be able to claim that it
has remained loyal to its initial concept!
130
The last three measures are part of an Intensive Intervention Strategy in the institutions for women made
public in 1999. CSC, 2002c.
131
The units for women currently located in the penitentiaries for men will then be closed down.
132
CSC, 2002c, p. 4.
Towards a Policy for Canada’s Penitentiaries
94
With this stunt, the CSC is seeking to rebalance static security and
dynamic security right within the SU: “female maximum security
offenders will be taken care of simultaneously thanks to increased
static security measures in the SU and thanks to dynamic security and
the supervision provided by qualified personnel assigned to the units”.
The CSC implicitly recognizes, for the first time, that the primacy of
dynamic security in the penitentiaries for women is a function of the
classification of female offenders and cannot be applied throughout
the whole institution. In fact, the CSC is seeking to perpetuate the
imbalance between the two types of security, on a global scale.
And the same is true for moving about. The CSC seeks to impose
restrictions on the inmate’s movements on the basis of the risk
represented by the latter:
“Moving about outside the unit will be controlled on the
basis of an evaluation of the risk that each inmate
represents (in other words, an evaluation will be made
whether the risk represented by an inmate moving about
outside of the SU can be taken), and the female inmates
who leave the unit will do so under the direct surveillance
of prison staff. Control will thus be increased when inmates
move about.”133
Finally, in the RIFW, the very nature of the correctional officer’s work
will have to be modified. The control and surveillance function and
the case management function will have to be better balanced. But
the CSC nonetheless emphasizes the second aspect, as we see in the
following passage:
“Prison staff will be assigned according to a schedule
established for the unit and they will receive adequate
training in order to be able to understand the mental health
problems and to intervene effectively. A proven form of
intensive intervention will be employed.” 134
In fact, everything unfolds as if, when circumstances dictate, by
necessity, the CSC partially recreates the traditional penitentiary right
inside the regional institutions for women.
133
134
CSC, 2002c, p. 4.
CSC, 2002c, p. 4.
Towards a Policy for Canada’s Penitentiaries
95
The third measure involves setting up a special ten place unit to
confine very high risk female offenders who have been associated
with major incidents and who cannot be kept in the SUs (in the
RIFW). These special units are the equivalent of the special handling
units (SHU) for men. With this measure, the CSC recognizes, even
more than in the case of the creation of the SUs that it was mistaken
about the non-violent nature of female offenders and that it had
neglected the high level security measures.
The fourth measure involves setting up Structured Living Environment
houses (SLEH) in each of the regional institutions in order to
accommodate female minimum and medium security inmates with
mental health problems. Ever since 1996, the CSC offers female
offenders with serious mental health problems an intensive treatment
program at the Regional Psychiatric Centre in the Prairies, a unit with
only twelve places. With the creation of the SLEH, the CSC implicitly
recognizes that mental health problems, specifically those related to
addiction (primarily drug abuse) and those related to suicidal
tendencies were far more important than it had previously claimed,
such that a “normal” environment did not really correspond to the
needs of one segment of the “clientele”.
The adoption of these four new measures is surprising, since, as the
CSC has written, “Putting aside the increase in the population, (...)
there have been few significant changes in the overall demographics
of the population (in the regional institutions) since 1997”, including
the profile of the maximum security population135. As was the case in
the past, “the majority of the women serving federal sentences have
been condemned for serious crimes” and, accordingly, still present a
“certain risk”. Why then did the CSC neglect security to this extent,
and more specifically, static security, and what could have possibly
motivated its (partial) about turn?
The CSC acknowledges “the increase in violent acts perpetrated by
female maximum security inmates against prison staff and other
inmates”. But, when the time comes to characterize this violence, it
persists with the notion that violent acts by women “tend to be
primarily relational in the sense that they are not directed against
strangers, but principally against people they know”. From this point
onwards, the Service gets lost in a series of contradictions that it is
unable to unravel nor solve. Since there is an increase in violent acts
against prison staff, employees must be considered as not being
135
CSC, 2002c, p. 3.
Towards a Policy for Canada’s Penitentiaries
96
“strangers”, in other words, as people the female offenders know and,
accordingly, as potential victims. However, this flatly contradicts the
principle that claims that “getting to really know the female inmate is
the best of protections” for prison staff. Contrary to what the CSC
claims, too close a relational intimacy might just be the fundamental
condition that leads to the increased violence against prison staff! Too
many interactions might indeed generate violence 136!
And when the time comes to explain and propose solutions to
counter this violence, the CSC doesn’t fare any better. In its opinion,
the reasons underlying the violence “are complex and interrelated”;
but one of the principal factors at issue is “the absence of
consequences associated with serious violent acts” 137. So be it! But
what solutions does it put forward? “The CSC works towards
correcting the situation with the help of interregional transfers and the
implementation of a management protocol, while continuing to
increase the level of training of prison staff and of dynamic security in
the co-located units”. Still more dynamic security, and interactions!
Which is precisely one of the very conditions giving rise to the
increased violence. Still more interregional transfers! While the
multilevel security institutions were expressly created to reduce the
risks and disruptions caused by transfers. Why doesn’t the CSC call a
spade a spade? Why does it refuse to acknowledge that sending a
female inmate to a SU and limiting their ability to move about
constitute in themselves punitive measures, and that several other
rebalancing initiatives could prove to be effective?
Since the 1990s, the CSC has treated women as if they could be
characterized by only moderate degrees of risk, security and needs,
as if it would suffice to confine them in a normalized environment
and provide them with more or less elaborate treatment and training
programs, in order to rehabilitate them. In other words, the CSC
deems women less dangerous, less violent, more malleable, easier to
rehabilitate, that is to say, after all is said and done, less “rebellious”
and more receptive to social engineering. At the very foundation of
136
In several texts, the CSC also argues that female inmate violence is mostly verbal and turned against
oneself (self-inflicted mutilation). This assertion is contradicted by the facts. From insult to physical attack
is not a great leap forward, and female inmates take the leap often. Let’s take a summary look at the
violence that women are capable of perpetrating. Here’s a brief synopsis of the serious incidents that
occurred in 2000-2001 at the RRC maximum security unit for women: an assault against two prison staff
members (June 2000), the complete destruction of the unit (August 2000), an assault against two service
providers (February 2001), the destruction of the unit (August 2001); several fights between female inmates
(See the summary of actions carried out by RRC maximum security unit female offenders in Section 2.1).
137
CSC, 2002c, p. 3.
Towards a Policy for Canada’s Penitentiaries
97
the CSC’s approach, there is an assumption that significant and
indomitable differences exist between the sexes, pertaining to
matters of risk, security and needs. From the foregoing to believing
that the CSC’s attitude smacks of paternalism and crypto-sexism does
not require a big leap.
Studies undertaken or commissioned by the CSC have nevertheless
shown that women are not different from men, or else that they’re on
their way to eliminating differences that might exist, due to ongoing
sociological changes.
By way of example, a study carried out in 2000, dealing with the
evolution of the rate of imprisonment of women in Canada, indicated
that the number of women found guilty of serious crimes increased
significantly since 1994-1995, going from 1,450 to nearly 2,150, that the
number of lengthy sentences being served (“two years or more”) had
tripled and that a certain convergence between the sentences handed
out to men and to women was occurring. Abandoning their judicial
paternalism, judges are increasingly inclined to treat men and women
on an equal footing, above and beyond the historical and sociological
distinctions that still support a somewhat differential treatment 138.
Another study dealing with female maximum security offenders
showed that, despite certain methodological limitations, “the risk was
just as high, and the needs just as vital, if not more so, amongst
female maximum security inmates as amongst their male
counterparts”139. Women experience more difficulties dealing with
addiction and functioning in group settings. On the other hand, “the
evaluation of the criminal risk revealed no differences between the
sexes with respect to the variables pertaining to criminal history,
except in the particular case of sex-related offences”140. Female
maximum security inmates are, in reality, a high risk group with great
needs, which clearly justifies the maximum security classification.
The CSC has had to adapt its practices to a reality that is undergoing
profound change, but it has not modified its policy pronouncements,
its ideology, accordingly. It remains convinced that dynamic security
must be given precedence, that the institutions for women, that it
dares not label penitentiaries, constitute a model to be followed, to
the point of duplicating it in the institutions for men. And this, at a time
138
BOE, OLAH, COUSINEAU, 2000.
CSC, 1999, p. 1.
140
CSC, 1999, p. 1.
139
Towards a Policy for Canada’s Penitentiaries
98
when the institutions for women are being pressed to become
increasingly closed penitentiaries and that a genuine balance
between static security and dynamic security is imperative.
At the very beginning, the RIFW was conceived as a low level security
penitentiary. The incidents that occurred at the Joliette institution for
women reveal a lot about the CSC’s negligence.
Barely six months after being opened, the absence of any genuine
static security measures led to a deterioration in the institution's
climate and to a proliferation of major and minor incidents (assaults,
harassment, the escape of four inmates, etc.), and by the control of
the premises just about being taken over by gangs of female inmates.
The mere transfer of a few particularly aggressive and violent female
inmates from the Regional Reception Centre was enough to
destabilize the whole penitentiary, to unhinge its dynamic balance
and send it down the steep slope of disorder and chaos.
In January 1998, the RRC closed its unit that was reserved for female
maximum security offenders, after having reclassified them as
medium security risks and transferring them to Joliette. The
investigative committee appointed to shed light on the incidents that
had occurred at the Joliette penitentiary criticized the reclassification
and transfer policy decisions made by the RRC. At least two of the
absconding inmates, who were judged dangerous, should never have
been reclassified as medium security risks and should not have left
the RRC’s unit for women. In the absence of elaborate static security
measures (including the possibility of locking the cell doors) and of
sufficient prison staff, the RRC's decision resulted in unacceptably
jeopardizing the security of the inmates, prison staff and the institution
itself141.
As insightful as it might be, the investigative committee’s analysis
does not take into account the fact that such incidents may also occur
where maximum security inmates are not involved. Not only are the
classification methods fallible, but female offenders classified as
medium or even low level security risks can suddenly behave, for
many complex reasons, as dangerous female offenders. The two
lower level security risk inmates who escaped had been influenced,
more or less unconsciously, by two inmates who were judged to be
dangerous. They would not have been capable of making
autonomous decisions and would have settled for following the
141
HARRIS, 2002, p. 127-132.
Towards a Policy for Canada’s Penitentiaries
99
leaders! If such a mechanism, which resembles a domino effect is
common, it must be clearly understood that low and medium security
female inmates are not necessarily and automatically the “passive
subjects” of other inmates142. On the other side of the coin, the
maximum security female inmates are not necessarily and
automatically affected by the influences of low and medium security
female inmates (assuming that the latter are not terribly violent) at all
times and in all possible settings.
The batch of violent incidents that occurred at the Joliette RIFW
challenged the CSC’s very philosophy to the effect that the creation of
a normal milieu and having different classifications of inmates
intermingle would have positive effects, quasi-miraculous effects
upon the most dangerous female inmates.
The New Security Norms in the RIFW
The investigative committee that was formed after a female inmate
escaped from the Edmonton RIFW in June 2001 recommended that
the CSC establish new technical norms regarding static security in the
institutions for women, in conjunction with the dynamic security
measures. A task force was formed and a document was produced
for consultation.
In the document, Security Norms in the Institutions for Women, the imbalance
between static security and dynamic security is obvious with regards to the
security requirements concerning prison staff and their placement, as can be
seen in Tables 2 and 3 that come from this document.
142
The proof, on August 2, 1997, four medium security female inmates attacked the institution’s open-air
duty room, and were guilty of grievous assault against two prison staff members. The female inmates
gained access to the keys, drugs, computers and devices that controlled the entrances and exits to the
penitentiary. UCCO-SACC-CSN, 2001.
Towards a Policy for Canada’s Penitentiaries
Minimum
Security
/Healing Lodge
Objectives
Create and
maintain a
safe work
environment
Medium
Security
Create and
maintain a
safe work
environment
Maximum
Security
Create and
maintain a
safe work
environment
- Table 2 Prison Staff Security
Dynamic Means
Interaction between
prison staff and inmates,
“Getting to really know
the female inmate is the
best of protections”,
information,
communication,
exchange of information
Interaction between
prison staff and inmates,
“Getting to really know
the female inmate is the
best of protections”,
information,
communication,
exchange of information
Interaction between
prison staff and inmates,
“Getting to really know
the female inmate is the
best of protections”,
information,
communication,
exchange of
information, limitations
on moving about; higher
prison staff /inmate ratio
100
Physical Means
Sensory irritant aerosols,
restraint equipment,
protective equipment
(different types of gloves),
communications
equipment and systems
Sensory irritant aerosols,
restraint equipment,
protective equipment
(different types of gloves),
IERT equipment (sticks,
shields, jackets, helmets,
etc.), communications
equipment and systems
Sensory irritant aerosols,
restraint equipment,
protective equipment
(different types of gloves),
self-contained breathing
apparatus (SCBA), duty
room with emergency
exit, Pro-straint prisoner
chair, IERT equipment
(sticks, shields, jackets,
helmets, etc.),
communications
equipment and systems
Source: CSC, 2002c, p. 11.
At each of the security levels (minimum, medium and maximum)
one can observe the imbalance between the dynamic means and
the physical means that are retained. The interaction between
prison staff and female inmates, namely, the dynamic security is
deemed in all three cases to offer the best protection (“Getting to
really know the female inmate is the best of protections” 143).
Static security is reduced to the simplest of physical means, to
protective equipment. The more complex physical solutions, the
architectural solutions, such as spatial segregation, are barely
143
CSC, 2002c, p. 11.
Towards a Policy for Canada’s Penitentiaries
101
mentioned (in fact, they are shifted over to the “prison staff
placement”144 section). The only physical security measure that
distinguishes the medium security level from the minimum
security level is the IERT equipment (sticks, shields, jackets,
helmets, etc.); and the only physical security measure that
distinguishes the maximum security level from the medium
security level are the self-contained breathing apparatus, the duty
rooms with an emergency exit and the Pro-straint prisoner chairs.
No static security measure differentiates the second level of
security from the first and the only security measures that
differentiate the third level from the second are the higher prison
staff/inmate ratios and the limitations on moving about. The
control and limitation of inmate movements may constitute a
static security measure (indirect surveillance) and/or a dynamic
security measure (direct surveillance). For there to be a genuine
balance between static security and dynamic security at each of
the security levels, the measures of control and limitations on
inmate movements must be applied progressively over the three
security levels.
- Table 3 Prison Staff Placement
Objectives
Dynamic Means
Minimum Security
/Healing Lodge
To promote the prison
staff’s availability for the
inmates
Medium Security
To promote the prison
staff’s availability for the
inmates, but with a
minimal number of
secured areas
To promote the prison
staff’s availability for the
inmates, but with areas
ensuring adequate
security for the prison
staff and the inmates
Maximum Security
Minimal number of static
posts; dynamic surveillance
in the institution – visibility
and accessibility of prison
staff
Minimal number of posts;
dynamic surveillance in the
institution – visibility and
accessibility of prison staff
Physical Means
Open-air posts; accessible
offices; windows on the
office doors
Open-air posts; accessible
offices, as required by the
institution’s routine;
windows on the office
doors
Minimal number of posts;
Enclosed posts; secured
visibility and accessibility of office areas; movement
prison staff on the floors,
controlled throughout the
but more restrictions than in unit. Group size
medium security institutions (maximum of 6 at any one
(time and placement)
time)
Source: CSC, 2002c, p. 12.
The objective being sought in the placement of prison staff is the
same regardless of the level of security, namely “to promote the
144
The two categories “prison staff security” and “prison staff placement” should not be completely
separate. The first category deals in fact with protective equipment, while the second category the
surveillance space (prison staff placement). Protective equipment and prison staff placement both belong to
a larger category, namely, the protection of the prison staff.
Towards a Policy for Canada’s Penitentiaries
102
prison staff’s availability for the inmates”145. But this broad
objective is spelled out according to the level of security. In the
case of the second and third levels of security, the objective is to
be pursued with the establishment of secured areas. The number
of secured areas is not defined. A “minimal number” is indicated
for the second level of security and “areas ensuring adequate
security” for the third.
This proposal constitutes a refocusing effort in favour of static
security. But it doesn’t go far enough.
At the first two levels of security, there is confusion and an
imbalance between dynamic security and static security. The
dynamic means are not clearly differentiated from the physical
means (more static) and vice versa. Hence, in the case of the
dynamic means proposed for the first level of security, there are a
“minimal number of static posts” (that by definition are indirect
surveillance posts, which are enclosed most of the time) coupled
with “dynamic surveillance in the institution” (visibility and
accessibility of prison staff); while in the physical means there are
“open-air posts” that constitute in fact more of a dynamic means
of surveillance. As a whole, the dynamic and static means
indicated in the table favour dynamic security. Direct surveillance,
visibility and accessibility predominate. And this is even more
apparent, if by “static posts”, the CSC means open-air posts, where
prison staff is not mobile (indirect surveillance). The same
reasoning and confusion are replicated at the second level of
security, which differs in no way from the first.
A significant difference appears only at the third level of security
where the inmate’s movements are controlled throughout the unit
and where enclosed posts and secured office areas are proposed
under the physical means heading; and where “more restrictions
than in medium security institutions (time and placement)” are
proposed in the dynamic means, but without it being too clear
what the CSC is referring to exactly. It is only within the SU that a
refocusing effort in favour of static security appears to have been
made, without going so far as to speak of a balance between the
two types of security, nor the primacy of static security, as the
proposal remains confusing and incomplete.
145
CSC, 2002c, p. 12.
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103
The CSC had not anticipated the impact that female maximum
security inmates would have upon the new penitentiaries for
women and, more generally speaking, the security problems that
arise with all female offenders.
But the construction of special units for the most dangerous
female offenders, in other words, the enhancement of static
security, combined with a better system to evaluate the risk
represented by female offenders, will not resolve all the problems.
The foregoing might perhaps prevent the eruption of riots even
more violent that what occurred at the Kingston penitentiary in
1994, but the stressful climate and violent incidents will not
disappear solely as a result of the foregoing. It does not suffice to
increase static security measures in only one section of the
institutions for women. Violence can erupt at any time; female
inmates, regardless of their level of security can turn into
aggressive and vindictive offenders. A balance between static
security and dynamic security has to be struck throughout the
entire penitentiary without delay.
The evolution of the penitentiaries for women is an example of
rebalancing in favour of static security. But only a partial
rebalancing has taken place. Notwithstanding the lessons from the
past (Kingston) and notwithstanding those that were drawn from
the first years of experimenting with the regional institutions for
women, the CSC adheres to a general philosophy regarding
security that no longer corresponds to the needs of our times. Even
though the CSC claims to be using “an integrated approach
consisting of both static and dynamic security measures”, the
institutions for women “are built upon the notion of dynamic
security”146. The CSC seems incapable of conceiving of a genuine
balance between static security and dynamic security. It persists in
giving precedence to dynamic security, which it believes superior
to static security, and where the latter must be “integrated into
dynamic security and surveillance”, while in reality, static security
and dynamic security should mutually complement and reinforce
one another, on an equal footing.
In a context of hierarchical pluralism, the discrepancy between the
CSC’s policy pronouncements and its practices are primarily the
result of an ideological barrier, of its incapacity to officially
acknowledge the error of its ways, of the authoritarian
146
CSC, 2002c, p. 5.
Towards a Policy for Canada’s Penitentiaries
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management style of its former commissioner (Ole Ingstrup) and
of its predilection to side with the pressure groups that are close to
the politicians in power (a kind of client-centred approach).
In February 2000, after the events that took place at the Edmonton
institution, Judge Chrumka of the Alberta Provincial Court
emphasized in his report that the existence of separate units for
violent female offenders is necessary for the protection of the
other inmates and the prison staff, in as much as segregation is not
seen as a punishment, in as much as the units are not places for
individual isolation.
This was a clear case of playing with semantics! And it was very
insufficient. A spade is a spade!
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III- PRISONIZATION AND THE CORRECTIONAL
OFFICER'S ROLE IN THIS PROCESS
In the third part of our study, we shall explore prisonization, the assimilation of
inmates into the penitentiary, and the correctional officer's role in this process.
The objective of this second part is to demonstrate that there is not only one
alternative, one single choice that is available to correctional officers: security
and/or reintegration into the community. Amongst the correctional officer's
primary formal and informal functions, we shall discover, identify and describe
the integration into the prison environment function. This function differs from
the reintegration into the community function and is likely to become the
fundamental issue in the technical division of labour within a penitentiary.
In order to fulfil the objective of this third part, we shall delve into four subjects:
the correctional officer's primary tasks, prisonization or the integration into the
prison environment function, prisonization and reintegration into the
community, the key prison integration routines and the correctional officer's job
description.
1-
The Correctional Officer's Four Tasks
The correctional officer is a civil servant underling who occupies the lowest
rung in the penitentiary hierarchy, just above the inmates. As an individual,
he/she does not participate in the formulation of prison policy or in that of the
tasks that he/she is required to perform, and this, in contrast to the professionals
who work in penal institutions (educators, social workers, doctors, etc.). The
correctional officer's tasks are proclaimed in legal texts or official regulations
and the officer must comply with them under threat of penalty. This is
undoubtedly why there is no vocational identity amongst correctional officers.
In a majority of the studies dealing with the prison milieu, three major tasks or
functions are attributed to guards, namely, a security function, a service function
and a reintegration into the community function. The accent is put upon the
contradictions between these different functions, as well as upon the internal
contradictions within each of them.
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The first task
The correctional officer's primary function is the security function: internal
security –watching over the inmates and the security of the institution– and
external security –protecting society from the offenders. This first function
permeates the very hierarchical structure of the penitentiary, which has
numerous paramilitary connotations. In point of fact, it is a structure designed to
control crises. Security requirements are more or less pronounced depending
upon the penitentiary category (maximum, medium or minimum security), but
it is ubiquitous.
The security function harbours two major contradictions. First of all, "the
external security of the prisons (to avoid escapes) and internal order are
mutually exclusive" (Chauvenet, Orlic, Benguigui, 1994, p. 32). Indeed, due to
the constraint of confinement, "if there is a sufficiently dissuasive security
perimeter, there will be riots" and "if there is no such peripheral security,
escapes will flourish" (Thomas, 1972, cited by Chauvenet, Orlic, Benguigui,
1994, p. 32). Secondly, the protection of society, which is more and more
ensured by increasing confinement and the length of sentences, is at odds with
the internal security of the institutions, to the extent that the penitentiary
becomes increasingly difficult for the inmate to endure.
The second task
The second task of a correctional officer is the service function, or looking after
inmate needs. The correctional officer must take care of satisfying the offender's
basic needs, as the latter is kept in a state of dependency ( 147). It is moreover
during the satisfaction of these needs that proximity relations are formed
between the two parties. The service task, often perceived as a somewhat
domestic chore (hotel valet, maid, nanny, etc.), is incompatible with the
security function that demands that the officer remain in a position of authority
and respect.
147
The service tasks performed by correctional officers are numerous. They range
from giving out meals to health care (prevention of suicide, delivering medication), by
way of morning wake-up calls, information, intake of new inmates, visits, etc.
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The third task
The third major function of a correctional officer are the tasks related to reintegration into
the community. This function is incompatible with the security function, at least in the
current state of affairs. Chauvenet. Orlic and Benguigui write:
"Currently the objectives of security and of reintegration are rooted in opposing
philosophies and entail the implementation of contradictory methods. These
contradictions and the double talk that accompanies them, to all intents and
purposes structure the very organization of the prison. They also have multiple
consequences upon the circumstances in which guards perform their work."
(Chauvenet. Orlic, Benguigui, 1994, p. 40)
The reintegration into the community function is a secondary function, one
might even say a residual one. It doesn't really have any status in the
organization of work and it is rarely mentioned in job descriptions. And when
these tasks are indeed included in job descriptions, no particular time is set
aside for these tasks to be actually carried out. More to the point, the
development of various reintegration activities, combined with the
improvement in the inmates' living conditions and the expansion of their rights,
drives up the volume of exchange and circulation of goods and people within
the prison, sending the guards back to their surveillance and security functions,
which accordingly reduces the time available to genuinely communicate with
offenders. Likewise, the hierarchical organization of the prison and its information network, the absence of professional bonds and exchanges between
guards and other service providers, as well as the size and even the architecture
of the institutions are at odds with the very philosophy that underpins the
reintegration mission. (Chauvenet, Orlic, Benguigui, 1994)
Several people believe that it would suffice to reverse the order of priority in
order to resolve all these contradictions. By making the tasks related to
reintegration into the community the primary function of a penitentiary, the
nature and components of the security function would be thoroughly transformed, as well as the guard's role. Security would no longer be coercive,
dissuasive and repressive, as it is now, but would be ensured by "a quasicontractual and therapeutic prison management model, which would hinge on
the inmates' common sense, reason and word of honour" (Chauvenet. Orlic,
Benguigui, 1994, p. 40). And, as a result, security needs would lose ground,
without jeopardizing the existence of the organization.
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108
Scepticism is however justified. The problem is far more complex, as we shall
see in the following sections. To begin with, we might ask what exactly is
reintegration into the community.
Guy Lemire aptly recalls that the humanitarian and remedial objectives that
penal institutions set out to achieve constitute "two very different orientations
even though, in some respects, they might be complementary" (Lemire, 1990, p.
110). Humanizing penitentiaries "involves implementing acceptable conditions
of detention and liberalizing the inmate's regimen" (Lemire, 1990, p. 110).
Rehabilitation, meanwhile, is conditional upon the normalization of the
penitentiary (a decentralization of power, the autonomy of the cell blocks,
group-oriented living) and the development and operation of rehabilitation
programs, especially school and socio-cultural activities (See the typology of
prison organizations). Humanization is thus "a prerequisite to rehabilitation
programs" (Lemire, 1990, p. 110).
But this confusion is not the only one that must be avoided. Can reintegration
into the community be reduced to rehabilitation? In our opinion, rehabilitation is
only one of the components of reintegration into the community. Reintegration
into the community is a far more elaborate penological model, based upon the
penitentiary's opening up to the community by means of numerous
mechanisms such as day passes, parole, the customization of prison sentences
and the inmate's accountability regarding his/her treatment with a view towards
his/her preparations for his/her release from the penitentiary. Indeed,
reintegration into the community is not only based upon addressing needs and
rights but also, and above all, upon the idea of an eventual release.
Although several attempts to transform the coercive institution into a normative
institution have met with failure, this was not only due to organizational
problems (resistance from the bureaucracy) or then again, due to fears of
correctional officers of having control of the institution slip through their fingers;
but also, and especially, due to the inmates who are not all capable of fitting
into the normative model, which arises out of "persuasive power encountering a
positive commitment from the members" (Lemire, 1990, p. 121). A majority of
specialists concur moreover that the normative institution must select its
inmates. Inmates must be classified "in such a way as to assemble within the
same institution inmates who share similar characteristics: criminal
background, sentence, motivation, etc." (Lemire, 1990, p. 122). In addition, "it is
pointless to put inmates into a maximum security institution, when all they need
is a minimum of guidance and support, in the same way that it is futile to
provide rehabilitation programs to inmates who do not want or who are
incapable of taking advantage of them" (Lemire, 1990, p. 122). The normative
penal institution must be very selective. Amongst the numerous eligibility
Towards a Policy for Canada’s Penitentiaries
109
criteria, the length of the inmate's sentence is particularly important. "Some
institutions, writes Lemire, only accept inmates whose release is anticipated
within the ensuing two or three years" (Lemire, 1990, p. 123).
Reintegration into the community is not suitable for inmates who are serving
intermediate to lengthy sentences (more than two years). Dangling the prospect
of an eventual release that is so far off in time prevents the offender from "living
for the moment and behind the walls", to cite an expression used by Lhuilier
and Aymard. It turns out that the inmate's gaze, attention and imagination were
being constantly turned outwards, towards society, and not inwards, towards
the institution. The penitentiary's greater permeability to the community and the
breaks in the barrier ultimately lead, if truth be told, to the offender's
psychological escape.
Should one take into consideration all the criteria that ought to guide the
selection of inmates (criminal history, length of their sentence, motivation,
degree of penitentiary security, level of education, capacity to learn, etc.), it is
difficult to imagine that the majority of inmates would qualify for normative
institutions. The opposite is more likely to be the case!
By way of example, in 1998-1999, only 18% of the male inmates in Canada's
penitentiaries were serving a sentence of less than three years; 31% were
serving sentences of three to six years, while 16% of the sentences were from
six to ten years, 15% were ten years or longer, and 20% of them were life or
indeterminate sentences (CSC, 1999). Accordingly, more than half of the
offenders were serving sentences of six years or longer, and 82% of them were
serving sentences of three years or longer. Should we look at the profile of the
entire inmate population (males and females), 32% of the offenders were
serving sentences of less than three years, 34% sentences of three to six years,
while 10% of the sentences were from six to ten years, 7% were ten years or
longer, and 17% of the sentences were for life or of indeterminate length (CSC,
1999). More than two-thirds of the inmates were serving sentences of more than
three years. On the other hand, 22% of the male inmates were serving their
sentences in maximum security penitentiaries, 60% in medium security
penitentiaries and only 12% in minimum security penitentiaries. In the case of
female inmates, these percentages were respectively 31%, 42% and 10% (CSC,
1999). During the same year, 67.7% of the inmates sentenced to life
imprisonment, 93.4% of the inmates serving an indeterminate sentence and
71.8% of the inmates serving sentences of 10 years or longer had a criminal
history (CCJA).
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110
What does one do then with the majority of offenders? Must we conclude, along
with Guy Lemire, that "Beyond ideologies, lip service and sentimentality, in the
last analysis, the prison organization offers only one choice: a warehouse or
rehabilitation" (in the sense of reintegration into the community) (Lemire, 1990,
p. 125; our emphasis). Must we conclude that correctional officers have to
choose between the security function and the reintegration into the community
function? Are there any other choices? And if so, what are they?
The only one of the correctional officer's three major tasks described above in
which a consensus genuinely exists at the moment is the public security task
(protection of society). The other tasks give rise to fierce controversy. The task
of internal security within the institution gives too much weight to the coercive
and repressive dimensions, and this, to the detriment of common sense,
reason, one's word of honour and virtue. Meanwhile, the service task
undermines the authority of correctional officers and increasingly reduces
his/her job to quasi-domestic chores. The reintegration into the community
function is utopian in a society where social relationships are dissolving and
where inequalities between individuals generate a vociferous demand for
security.
In our opinion, a fourth function exists that is never or at least is very rarely
explicitly defined. It is a structural function, intimately related to the question of
the control of the penitentiary, to the point where it is generally subsumed
within the latter and thus ignored. This function is rooted to some extent in the
three others, but it is easily identifiable when one examines the prison milieu by
keeping one's distance from the dominant discourse that prizes reintegration
into the community too highly. This function is one of integration into the prison
environment, in other words, the assimilation of inmates into the prison milieu.
This function was however at the centre of penological research from the 1940s
to the 1980s. Let us now turn to this matter.
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111
2- Prisonization or the Integration into the Prison Environment Function
The first major research studies dealing with penitentiaries were focused upon
the effects of imprisonment. The influences of the prison upon the inmate and
his/her assimilation by the system were frequently studied between the 1940s
and the 1980s (See in particular: Clemmer, 1940; Wheeler, 1961; Garabedian,
1963; Bowker, 1977). Since then, this area of study has fallen somewhat out of
fashion. Considering how much the prison milieu has evolved, one might
however wonder if it would not be appropriate to redo these studies and bring
them up to date, so as to better understand the current situation and to perhaps
find some satisfactory solutions to some of the problems experienced in
Canada's penitentiaries at the present time.
The concept of "prisonerization", or "prisonization", proposed by Clemmer,
signifies the phenomenon of the inmate's assimilation by the prison milieu (148).
By analogy with an immigrant, the inmate must fit into his/her new
surroundings, he/she must acquire new habits and new values. Assimilation
relates to the conformity of the inmate's values with the values of the prison staff
(149).
According to Clemmer, prisonization is fostered by several universal factors: the inmate
acquires a new status (anonymous, because he/she is now defined by a number) and a
new lifestyle; he/she discovers the general hostility of the environment in which he/she
must satisfy his/her needs and the importance of having a job (Lemire, 1990) (150). In
reality, an inmate succumbs to prisonization "in order to survive in a new milieu" and this
assimilation is even more necessary and significant because the prison milieu is founded
upon the separation of two opposing worlds, that of the guards and that of the inmates
(Lemire, 1990, p. 19). Not only are the inmates put under the guards’authority, but they
also have to depend upon the latter to have their needs fulfilled. And the greater the
dependency of the inmates, the greater the degree of prisonization.
148
We prefer the term "détentionnalisation (prisonization)" to the term
"prisonniérisation (prisonerization)", because it removes the confusion between prisons
and penitentiaries.
149
In a broader sense, assimilation is the conformity of the inmate's values and
behaviour with what is required by the institution.
150
With respect to the work carried out by Clemmer, Wheeler, Garabedian and
Bowker, we have liberally borrowed from the synopsis sketched by Guy Lemire, while
adapting it to our concerns
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112
However, the degree of prisonization varies from one offender to the next and
can also be explained by certain individual factors. Four key factors smooth the
way to a more successful assimilation of the inmate, namely, a long sentence,
an unstable personality (vulnerable to environmental influences), an absence of
relations with people on the outside (the inmate's universe is limited to just the
prison), the inmate's willingness and capacity to fit into the primary groups
within the institution.
Basing his work upon that of Clemmer, Wheeler (1961) showed that
prisonization was not "a continuous linear process, but a cyclical phenomenon
with a negative tendency", and that the prospect of returning back into the
community played an important role in explaining the stronger or weaker
assimilation of any given inmate into the prison milieu (Lemire, 1990, p. 25).
Prisonization takes the form of the letter U over time, depending upon the
various phases of imprisonment:
=the
=the
=the
initial phase : the first six months of imprisonment
middle phase
final phase: the last six months of imprisonment
Chart 4 Conformity of the inmate’s values with the values of the prison staff
versus the phase of imprisonment
Conformity
Phase of Imprisonement
Initial (%)
Middle (%)
Final (%)
High
47
21
43
Average
44
65
33
Low
9
14
25
Source : Lemire, 1990, p. 25.
As Guy Lemire explains, Chart 4 shows us that:
"The majority of inmates are assimilated by the prison milieu during what
one might call the "trough" period (or middle phase) of imprisonment,
but the prospect of the inmate's release appears to reverse this situation
and return prisonerization to its initial condition, which is characterized
more by the clash of two value systems than by specific choices."
(Lemire, 1990, p. 25)
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113
However, one must not infer that prisonization is a phenomenon with a strong
negative tendency. The clash is quite relative. If the high and average levels of
conformity are added together –the sum being synonymous with a suitable
assimilation–, an entirely different portrait emerges. Conformity remains strong
throughout the cycle, even though it decreases (91% during the initial phase,
86% during the middle phase and 76% during the final phase) and even though
the level of low conformity increases (9%, 14% and 25% depending upon the
phase). (151)
The problem here is that the transformations that have marked the prison
milieu over the past decades undermine prisonization and jeopardize
integration into the prison environment. Of all the changes that have occurred,
only two of them enhance the degree of prisonization: the increase in the
proportion of inmates serving lengthy sentences and perhaps the increase in the
number of inmates who have undergone inadequate socialization. All the other
changes work to reduce the degree of assimilation. Inmates are no longer
anonymous figures, but individuals who are recognized by the law. They no
longer depend exclusively upon the guards to satisfy their needs, and the prison
environment is less and less hostile to their needs (and more and more
sensitive to their rights). Discipline and constraints have been considerably
reduced: inmates enjoy greater freedom in how they spend their time and work
is no longer the principal manner whereby they do their time. Access to media
(newspapers, radio, television) and other means of communication
(telephone), visits in visiting rooms without partitions, conjugal visits, day passes
151
Prisonerization is a striking phenomenon in maximum security institutions. In
minimum security institutions, the U curve is less pronounced; while in open institutions,
geared towards rehabilitation, it does not exist at all; and in the medium security
institutions, it is "somewhere on the continuum between the two extremes" (Bowker,
1977; Lemire, 1990, p. 27). We should also note that there exist different prisonerization
models according to the type of inmate. This one applies particularly to the Square Johns
and Right Guys. (Inmate Typology. The Square John is an inadvertent criminal with no
experience in the prison milieu, who participates in rehabilitation programs and
establishes close contacts with the prison staff, all the while being distant from the other
inmates. The Right Guy is a career criminal who has vast experience in the prison milieu,
stands at the top of the social hierarchy, scarcely interested in rehabilitation and who
maintains utilitarian contacts with prison staff. The Politician is a sophisticated and
manipulative criminal who participates in programs and activities in order to improve
his/her well-being and who establishes numerous contacts with the prison staff and other
inmates. The Outlaw is a young inmate, unpredictable and impulsive, who has only
recently attained the status of an adult offender; he/she sees violence as a solution to all
his/her problems and he/she resists participating in rehabilitation programs. The Ding is
an atypical non-violent criminal, who has most often been convicted for a sexual offence,
and is ostracized by both prison staff and inmates. (Garabedian, 1963; Lemire, 1990)
Towards a Policy for Canada’s Penitentiaries
114
and the expansion of the canteen reduce the inmate's social isolation, such that
it is more and more difficult for an inmate to cut off all ties with the outside
world. Concerned about their material well being, offenders associate less and
less with their primary groups. And, finally, there are fewer Square Johns and
Right Guys, and more Outlaws and Dings than in the past.
Generally speaking, the greater permeability of the penitentiary to the
community (a process whereby totalitarianism fades away), the improvement
in the inmates' living conditions (humanization and liberalization) and the
transformation of the relationship of power between offenders and correctional
officers (a reduction in the latter's discretionary power) have played a major
role in complicating, indeed in neutralizing the process of the inmate's
assimilation by the penal institution.
In a such a context, the measure of assimilation used by Wheeler no longer
appears relevant. Wheeler was interested in the inmates' values. He measured
prisonization on the basis of a representative sample of inmates and employees
by using a questionnaire that described antagonistic situations between the two
groups, in order to assess the conformity of the inmates' values with the values
of the prison staff.
Nowadays, is it possible to believe that a majority of offenders will adhere to the
values of the prison staff; and, can we profess to change their values without
viewing inmates through rose-tinted glasses. What concerns us at this stage is
not so much the conformity of the inmate's values with those of the prison staff,
as the conformity of the offender's behaviour with what is required by the
institution, and more specifically, by the correctional officers. Assimilation
should no longer be measured by the conformity to values, but by the role
played in keeping the climate peaceful, respecting correctional officers and life
in the penitentiary surroundings (activities and programs). Inmates may very
well adopt a compliant behaviour for a multitude of reasons, without
necessarily adhering to the values of the prison staff and the institution. How
one might secure this behavioural compliance is a complex problem, to which
we will turn in Section III-4.
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3-
115
Prisonization and Reintegration into the Community
One of the main issues addressed by researchers from the 1940s to the 1980s
was the effect of prisonization upon the reintegration of offenders into the
community. Clemmer's assessment was pessimistic, claiming that people who
are incarcerated had little chance of being rehabilitated while they were in
prison, due to the fact that they lived in a universe characterized by rather
unique values.
But other research studies carried out in the 1970s, subsequent to Clemmer's
work, have shown that inmates who had been behind bars for a long period (10
years or more) achieved a very high rate of success with their parole and were
more likely to successfully reintegrate into the community (Lemire, 1990). As
Wheeler (1961) had shown and later Bowker (1977), assimilation by the prison
milieu is a transitory and situational phenomenon (Lemire, 1990). It doesn't
make irreversible changes to the values and behaviour of individuals.
Prisonization would be neither the cause of a failure to reintegrate into the
community nor that of a repeat offence. Much to the contrary, integration into
the prison environment would favour reintegration into the community to some
extent.
In reality, it all turns out that prisonization and reintegration into the community
are simultaneously complementary and contradictory. We hypothesize that
reintegration into the community and integration into the prison environment
are actually two aspects of the same process, socialization; and that these two
aspects clash when they are put into practice at the same time and in the same
place, while they complement one another when they are arranged sequentially
over time, in different physical locations. Integration into the prison environment
is a prerequisite to reintegration into the community. Reintegration into the
community is not at odds with integration into the prison environment to the
extent that the inmate's eventual release is only taken into account when it is
imminent, in the near future. Likewise, reintegration into the community and
integration into the prison environment cannot coexist fully in the same space.
The place for integration into the prison environment is the maximum or
medium security penitentiary, while the site for reintegration into the
community is the minimum security penitentiary or half-way house.
The disparity between reintegration into the community and integration into the
prison environment is not absolute, both are rooted in the same phenomenon.
Some measures that foster reintegration into the community may be combined
together with measures designed to integrate the inmate into the prison
environment and vice versa. What distinguishes the two types of measures is
their focus. Integration into the prison environment measures are focused upon
life within the prison walls, the here and now, while reintegration into the
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116
community measures are focused upon life in the community, elsewhere, at
some later date. Integration into the prison environment and reintegration into
the community can complement one another, dovetail together, but not
necessarily, nor automatically. These two aspects of socialization maintain a
certain autonomy, which explains why a particular measure might foster
reintegration into the community and yet undermine integration into the prison
environment or vice versa. For example, day passes for inmates have a positive
effect upon reintegration into the community and a negative effect upon the
offender's assimilation into the prison milieu. Likewise, this explains why one
and the same measure can simultaneously have a positive effect and a negative
effect upon integration into the prison environment or upon reintegration into
the community. For example, day passes may keep the climate peaceful within
the penitentiary, by appeasing inmates, all the while making them more
indifferent to the surroundings in which they are currently living.
Let us now look a little more concretely into the phenomenon of integration into
the prison environment.
4-
Prison Integration Routines
Drawing from their investigation, Chauvenet, Orlic and Benguigui studied the
methods used to control the prison population. They identified two major
methods: activities and programs, on the one hand, and the guards' authority,
on the other. In our opinion, these instruments of control are not only methods
capable of reducing tension and keeping the climate peaceful, but also means
of assimilating offenders into the prison milieu.
a)
Activities and Programs
The maintenance of order in a penitentiary is achieved by reducing tension to a
bare minimum. The goal of reducing tension is at the centre of prison routines.
On this matter, Chauvenet, Orlic and Benguigui write:
"The importance of this function in all prisons is such that many activities
or goals sought by the latter may be deemed secondary with respect to
the necessity of reducing tension, or may even be diverted to this end
from their initial goal: activities designed to train or reintegrate inmates
are also a way of "keeping them busy", and thus of harnessing tensions."
(Chauvenet, Orlic, Benguigui, 1994, p. 78)
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117
Keeping inmates busy is a reliable path to a peaceful climate. But the degree of the
offenders' activity may also be deemed a measure of their assimilation into the prison
milieu. The busier the inmates, the more they participate, the more they are living in the
here and now and becoming stakeholders in their institution. Integration into the prison
environment is conditional upon keeping busy.
In the beginning, the nature of the activity and its ultimate purpose are of little
significance. Doing something takes precedence over what is being done.
Participation in an activity is what is being sought, whether this participation is
voluntary or mandatory, chosen freely amongst a range of available activities or
imposed. Being busy gives rise to objective results, both physically and psychologically. It generates curiosity, aptitudes and a certain identification with the
activity and with the milieu. Participation in activities is one of the principal
means whereby inmates are integrated into the prison environment. (The
perspective that we are elaborating herein contrasts with that of Chauvenet,
Orlic and Benguigui.)
Afterwards, what is being done must be taken into account. The assimilation of
the inmates and the conformity of their behaviour with what is required by the
institution will not be achieved by simply keeping them busy. Whether it's a
matter of a sporting, cultural, educational, or other activity, whether it involves
work in the shop, or a training or educational program, each one of these
activities abounds with meaning.
But all of these activities do not necessarily and automatically foster the inmate's
assimilation into the prison milieu, as we have already suggested above. As just
pure activity, reintegration into the community programs contribute to
assimilating the offender into the penitentiary, but as a specific focused activity,
directed towards the inmate's eventual release, they are likely to contribute
more towards pulling him/her away and dissociating him/her from the
penitentiary. This severance or dissociation entails a form of alienation. It is thus
not surprising, as Chauvenet, Orlic and Benguigui have observed, that in
maximum security penitentiaries (where inmates are serving lengthy
sentences) the "goal of just "keeping busy" very clearly takes precedence over
the objectives associated with reintegration" (Chauvenet, Orlic, Benguigui, 1994,
p. 78). In these institutions, a dichotomy exists between the content of the
programs and the objective necessities of the milieu. While the milieu is in dire
need of activities focused upon integration into the prison environment,
programs are being offered to inmates whose much too long range objectives
end up leaving them indifferent.
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118
Programs being offered by the institutions may be focused upon reintegration
into the community and/or integration into the prison environment. Some of
them simultaneously foster integration into the prison environment and
reintegration into the community. While others will foster either one or the
other. But, overall, there is a flagrant lack of programs specifically focused upon
integration into the prison environment.
Of all the programs dispensed by the Correctional Service of Canada, not a
single one is focused solely upon integration into the prison environment. Even
the LifeLine program, intended for offenders who are serving life sentences,
seeks to help inmates "adapt to the institution with a view towards parole and
reintegration into the community at the appropriate time" (CSC, 1999, p. 28).
The programs dangle the prospect of an eventual release in front of the
offender, thereby cultivating either his/her indifference, or his/her frustration. In
maximum and medium security penitentiaries, the psychological counselling
programs, the cognitive learning and psychosocial skills acquisition programs,
as well as the programs against violence and against addiction could be more
clearly focused upon prison assimilation. Even the educational and vocational
training programs could be focused upon this objective, if the penitentiaries
were veritable workplaces.
How does assimilation through simply keeping busy become assimilation via
the intrinsic value of the activity? It is not up to us to answer this question. One
thing is certain though; the nature and purpose of an activity must be
compatible with the needs of the prison milieu and not only with those of
society in general. Reintegration into the community was imposed upon the
penitentiary system from the outside, by society, by the pronouncements and
practices of specialists coming from numerous fields. However, within the
institutions, it can generate perverse effects. This does not mean that
reintegration into the community programs should be completely abandoned,
but rather that they should be dispensed only when necessary and they should
be replaced, in a large number of cases, by better adapted programs, especially
when the rationale of keeping busy predominates. In maximum and medium
security penitentiaries, where inmates are serving lengthy sentences, the logic
underlying integration into the prison environment and reintegration into the
community are incompatible. In minimum security penitentiaries, where
inmates are serving shorter sentences, or then again when they are serving the
last two years of a longer sentence (after a transfer), the logic underlying
integration into the prison environment and reintegration into the community
can coexist. Meanwhile, in half-way houses, the logic underlying reintegration
into the community must take precedence over that of integration into the
prison environment, as reintegration into the community programs will for the
most part foster integration into the prison environment.
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119
But in all these situations, it is advisable to not totally blend the logic underlying
keeping busy with that of assimilation. Regardless of the level of security in the
penitentiary and the length of the inmate's sentence, activities and programs
that foster integration into the prison environment must be developed and
reassessed, in order that their outcomes take precedence over the simple logic
that underlies keeping busy.
In all penitentiaries, activities and programs must be more or less focused, as
the case may be, upon "living behind the walls" and upon the "here and now",
because learning how to live in a prison is also about learning how to live with
others. Accordingly, integration into the prison environment can contribute to a
better reintegration into the community (without this being wishful thinking).
However, activities and programs alone do not suffice to ensure the integration
of offenders into the prison environment. Correctional officers are the
cornerstones of the successful assimilation of inmates.
b) The Correctional Officer's Authority
The objective of reducing tension and keeping the climate peaceful in a
penitentiary is achieved primarily via the correctional officer's authority.
According to sociologists, there are five sources of authority: "expertise,
legitimate power, reward power, coercion and referent power (leadership
capacity and the ability to elicit identification)" (Chauvenet, Orlic, Benguigui,
1994, p. 82). Legitimate power, reward power, expertise and referent power
may be combined together into the category of moral authority, while coercion
belongs in the category of legal authority.
Moral Authority
The correctional officer's moral authority is informal in nature and involves the
inmate's cooperation. The penitentiary is an atypical universe in which the rules
of operation override the ordinary rules of law. As Chauvenet, Orlic and
Benguigui explain:
"In order to establish a peaceful climate, it is therefore necessary to
institute a minimum set of rules that create a society, in other words, a
principle of cooperation and of exchange that is compatible nonetheless
with the security requirements, the conventions of sociability, negotiation
and an ethic of coexistence." (Chauvenet, Orlic, Benguigui, 1994, p. 81)
Towards a Policy for Canada’s Penitentiaries
120
The real authority of correctional officers cannot be based solely upon the law
and coercion. A peaceful climate, pacific coexistence cannot be achieved
without the inmate's belief that "their interests will be better served by playing
by the rules of the system, rather than by challenging them" (Ditchfield, 1990;
cited by Chauvenet, Orlic, Benguigui, 1994, p. 82). But how is such a belief
instilled?
The correctional officer's legitimate authority is a construction that "is earned via
the relational process" (Chauvenet, Orlic, Benguigui, 1994, p. 83). The specific
bases of this process are communication, keeping one's distance, etiquette,
services rendered and professional principles.
Verbal communication
Verbal communication is one of the primary instruments of control and
assimilation of the prison population. Spontaneous exchanges are the
starting point for cooperation with the offenders. By getting to know the
inmates individually and by becoming necessary and beholden contacts,
correctional officers diminish their legal leverage and reproduce
somewhat normal living conditions. They thereby play a role in
preventing and reducing individual and group crises and ensuring control
over information, which is indispensable to security. (Chauvenet, Orlic,
Benguigui, 1994)
Unfortunately, this task of communicating with inmates is not a part, or is
not sufficiently deemed a part of the correctional officer's formal
functions. The size of the prisons, the workload, the security
requirements, the constantly growing number of inmates and the everincreasing frequency with which they are transferred amongst different
institutions tends to reduce the amount of communication.
Keeping one's distance
The position from which a correctional officer initiates his/her relations
with inmates’ impacts upon his/her ability to reduce tension and better
assimilates the offenders. In a milieu characterized by overcrowding,
keeping one's distance and the code of behaviour that is implicit in the
foregoing demarcate both the inmates and the correctional officers'
private space, thereby playing a greater role in fostering more
conventional relationships. Keeping one's distance involves a subtle
synthesis of proximity and remoteness, the former providing the means
to earn the inmate's respect and cooperation, while the latter implies the
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121
physical separation that is essential to the exercise of authority. On this
subject, Chauvenet, Orlic and Benguigui write: "The right distance with
respect to authority involves just as much finding a compromise between
tolerance and understanding on the one hand, as between firmness and
severity on the other, when enforcing regulations" (Chauvenet, Orlic,
Benguigui, 1994, p. 94).
Joking around
Joking around often characterizes relations between hostile groups with
conflicting interests, who are nonetheless frequently in close contact with
one another. Jokes fuse antagonism (distance) and proximity. The joke
can stabilize social relations, by defusing tensions, taking the edge off
emotions, relieving boredom, cooking up nonsense, making time fly by
faster and more smoothly, showing respect, creating a certain complicity,
reshaping sociability, all the while preserving a proper distance between
rival groups. (Chauvenet, Orlic, Benguigui, 1994)
Etiquette
Likewise, etiquette (primarily politeness and courtesy) "structures
antagonism and the unpredictability of relationships", and provides the
means to construct a "formal sociability" between groups with divergent
interests and who do not share any common goals (Chauvenet, Orlic,
Benguigui, 1994, p. 97).
Rendering services
But the instrument that correctional officers use most frequently to
secure the inmates' cooperation is rendering services to them. This
method must not be confused with the officer's service function (looking
after inmate needs), that is to say, the mandatory tasks meant to satisfy
the offenders' needs. The services referred to herein are rendered
"voluntarily" (as extras) by the correctional officer. On this subject
Chauvenet, Orlic and Benguigui write:
"The service that is rendered in this fashion plays the fundamental
role of overturning the guard's passive, reactive or static position
vis-à-vis the inmates, thereby giving them a certain initiative.
Thanks to their ability to take these initiatives, guards can build up
some room to manoeuvre, grab some discretionary power and put
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122
some money in the bank vis-à-vis the inmates, which they can
later make use of in a timely manner, to secure the inmates'
subsequent cooperation." (Chauvenet, Orlic, Benguigui, 1994, p.
98)
The services rendered can thus somewhat curb the material hardships of
the inmates and especially the frustrations inherent in these hardships. As
the foregoing is based upon exchange and reciprocity –the foundation of
normal social relationships–, the entire process contributes to the
normalization of the penitentiary.
But what must be strongly emphasized here is that rendering services
enables the correctional officer to acquire some space to exercise
discretionary power, to base his/her authority upon a legitimate
foundation, and to thereby ensure a better control of the prison
population. What must also be emphasized is that by rendering services,
the correctional officer contributes to modulating the asymmetrical
relations within the penitentiary and, indirectly, to assimilating the inmate
into his/her environment. Indeed, as Chauvenet, Orlic and Benguigui
have observed, rendering services is one of the bases of the informal
professionalism of the guard's vocation.
Principles linked to the correctional officer's professionalism
In closing, let us note that the principles linked to the correctional
officer's professionalism are the product of experience and that they
simultaneously rely upon ethics and expertise. A good correctional officer
is a fundamentally ethical person, who has the following qualities:
"honesty, courage, sociability, patience, loyalty, diplomacy, tolerance,
approachability, natural authority and self-control", to which one must
add a sense of justice and a word of honour that can be trusted
(Chauvenet, Orlic, Benguigui, 1994, p. 101). With respect to expertise, a
good correctional officer is one who "knows the inmates", who abides by
"the rule that one must deal with the inmates one by one, adapt to each
of them, modulate his/her behaviour on the basis of the anticipated
reactions of each inmate" and who knows how to keep his/her proper
distance (Chauvenet, Orlic, Benguigui, 1994, p. 102). Correctional officers
who have all these qualities, in other words, who are simultaneously
compassionate human beings and experts, are in a position to play a role
of referent vis-à-vis the inmates and, with such a head start, assimilate
them into the prison milieu, thanks to their leadership abilities and their
ability to elicit the inmates' identification with them.
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123
Legal Authority
The correctional officer does not have the power to punish inmates, but he/she
is able to "initiate procedures that may or may not culminate in a punishment"
(Chauvenet, Orlic, Benguigui, p. 107). Typically, the incident report is the
primary formal instrument available to the correctional officer for maintaining
order. However, officers seldom use it for several reasons. As we have
previously seen, the correctional officer's legitimate authority over the inmate is
built upon good interpersonal relations. Resorting too often to punishment
poses the risk of triggering the offender's hostility and putting an end to his/her
cooperation. Correctional officers make the distinction moreover between the
punishment and its dissuasive impact (the fear of punishment) and use the
latter to establish their authority, by evoking what the rules require and
simultaneously threatening the inmate with punishment. Thus, it is not so much
the capacity to punish that counts, but rather its dissuasive effect that is relied
upon by the officer.
The correctional officer's discretionary power extends to formal disciplinary
procedures. The correctional officer selects from amongst the offences he/she
may witness which ones to act upon. In addition to the serious offences, the
insults, threats and deliberate refusals to obey are what the correctional officer
will customarily punish, to the extent that they undermine an interpersonal
relationship or cooperation. They are experienced as a demonstration of a lack
of respect and as a form of psychological violence perpetrated by the inmate.
The second reason why correctional officers resort more or less often to writing
incident reports stems from the attitude of the higher-ups. The perpetual
recourse to incident reports is not viewed as a sign of competency (know-how);
and reports with no follow up, or that result in half-hearted punishment
undermine the correctional officer's authority. It should also be pointed out here
that the correctional officer is subject to close supervision and that he/she puts
up with a double constraint: enforce the rules to the letter and run the risk of
turmoil, or put aside a rule and run the risk of a disciplinary measure
(Chauvenet, Orlic, Benguigui, 1994; Lhuilier, Aymard, 1996).
Due to the limits of the incident report, correctional officers are more likely to
resort to informal punishments to gain the inmates' respect. For example, they
might refuse to render certain services or favours; or "forget" to follow certain
official procedures; they won't prevent an inmate from meeting someone, but
they might just see to it that the inmate is the last one to leave his/her cell for a
given outing; or they might misplace his/her order form, etc.).
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124
The system of cooperation empowers the correctional officer with a positive
and proactive authority. However, as Chauvenet, Orlic and Benguigui explain:
"An over reliance upon favours and too much liberalism, which is
adopted to answer the need to maintain a peaceful climate, or to avoid
tension and potential incidents, may at one point lead to the
establishment of vested and new rights that encroach upon the officer's
discretionary room to manoeuvre, upon which interpersonal relations are
at least partially built." (Chauvenet, Orlic, Benguigui, 1994, p. 144)
Too much liberalism leads to a situation where inmates no longer depend upon
correctional officers to satisfy their needs, to a situation where interpersonal
relations become pointless. By conceding too many rights to them and by using
privileges too systematically to buy peace, civil authorities and correctional
officers create a spiral at the end of which the inmates capture the dominant
position and the officers' discretionary power is thoroughly diluted. The
correctional officer's authority cannot only be positive and proactive; it must
also be negative and reactive. In order that his/her principal work instrument,
the discretionary room to manoeuvre in the concession of privileges and in the
enforcement of regulations, does not loose its clout, the correctional officer
must be able to maintain a relationship of power that is in his/her favour
(asymmetrical relations). In various situations, he/she must not give in. Officers
must impose themselves as the "dominant party", the "boss", the "master", as
the personification of legal authority. This is why the correctional officer is given
repressive powers, although they are prescribed, organized and regulated, they
are no less real and indispensable.
But society must once and for all stop constantly reducing the correctional
officer's discretionary room to manoeuvre. The most serious disorders that
occur in penitentiaries (loss of control of the prison population, riots, escapes,
etc.) often occur when the correctional officers' discretionary powers have been
considerably weakened and when the system of interpersonal relations has
broken down (Sykes, 1961; cited by Chauvenet, Orlic, Benguigui, 1994). Hence
the importance of maintaining a certain balance between the correctional
officer's discretionary powers and the rights of inmates, between positive
authority and negative authority, between formal authority (legal) and informal
authority. The erosion of the officers' discretionary powers must come to an
end, in order to keep the climate peaceful and to guarantee the assimilation of
inmates into Canada's penitentiaries.
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125
The correctional officer's expertise, upon which their moral and legal authority
is based, is most often informal and empirical in nature; in other words, it is
acquired over a long period of time, through trial and error. As we have just
observed, it extends over numerous areas of activity and skills; and although it is
essential for the proper functioning of the institution, it is largely denied or
ignored. When the rules and principles formulated over time by correctional
officers are not followed, not only will the officer pay the price, but the entire
penitentiary as well: the control and assimilation of inmates become
problematic and culminate in turmoil.
5 The Correctional Officer's Job Description
The Correctional Service of Canada proclaims its overall mission to be as
follows:
"The CSC, as a component of the penal justice system, contributes to the
protection of society by motivating and assisting offenders to become
citizens who abide by the laws of the land, all the while exercising a
reasonable, reliable, secure and humanitarian control over them." (CSC,
1989, 1999)
This statement is reflected in the job descriptions of correctional officers I and II
(152). The two job descriptions consist of security tasks and tasks related to
reintegration into the community (rehabilitation). The service tasks are not
clearly identified and when they are, they are usually subsumed in the security
tasks (for example: giving out meals and medication, running the canteen, etc.).
Indeed, some security tasks are also service tasks (for example: opening and
closing the doors). Meanwhile, the integration into the prison environment
function is likewise not clearly identified and is either subsumed into the
reintegration into the community function, or into the security function.
The differences between the tasks of a level I and a level II correctional officer
are both qualitative and quantitative. In the job description of a correctional
officer I, priority is given to security tasks, while in that of a correctional officer II,
priority is given to the tasks related to reintegration into the community and
implicitly to those of integration into the prison environment.
152
Correctional officers I and II have the status of law enforcement officers.
Towards a Policy for Canada’s Penitentiaries
126
a) The Security Tasks
The security tasks of a correctional officer I are combined into two major
categories: on the one hand, the surveillance and control of the inmates'
movements and activities inside and outside the unit or the institution,
and on the other hand, security checks (such as searches) and the
security of the physical facilities and the institution's perimeter. ( 153)
The security tasks of a correctional officer II are also divided into two
major categories: surveillance and security checks. But the accent is
placed upon the security tasks that are more directly related to
reintegration into the community and integration into the prison
environment. For example, correctional officers II monitor activities and
programs in order to make their delivery easier; they are continuously
communicating with the inmates, answering their questions, gathering
information about inmate morale, the milieu and what's going on; or then
again, thanks to their direct contacts, observations and analyses, they
spot the leaders, the suspected drug users and dealers, the victims and
the persecutors (Job Description, CSC).
b) The Tasks Related to Reintegration into the Community and Prison
Integration
The description of the tasks of a correctional officer I related to
reintegration into the community or integration into the prison
environment come after the description of the tasks linked to security.
These tasks are combined into two categories, namely, participation in
case management and participation in the development and
implementation of the unit's programs. Some of the tasks in the first
category are to some extent a matter of security (observe and make note
of behaviour, report deviant behaviour and intervene, etc.).
A correctional officer I plays the role of resource person with the inmates,
the role of "motivator", by encouraging and motivating inmates to
participate in personal development programs; he/she also fulfils an
information function and a role in problem management by answering
inmate questions (in the absence of a level II officer) and by making use
of problem solving and listening techniques. He/she also plays a role of
153
In fact, the division of labour and the organization of the work of correctional
officers centres around managing how the inmates spend their the time and how they
move about.
Towards a Policy for Canada’s Penitentiaries
127
"counsellor", by filling out activity records, observation reports,
confidential information reports, performance notices, etc. But this role is
primarily one of a "recorder" of information.
His/her participation in the development and implementation of
programs is quite limited. It merely involves providing necessary
information about the programs, discussing how existing programs are
progressing and recommending corrective measures. The level I
correctional officer does not really participate in defining the programs
offered.
The tasks of a level II correctional officer related to reintegration into the
community or integration into the prison environment are far more
complex. They are divided into four categories: case management,
participation in essential activities, influencing the inmate's behaviour
and participation in the development and implementation of programs.
With respect to case management, the key task of a correctional officer II
is one of information and guidance. A correctional officer II is "the first
point of contact for the inmate": the officer carries out orientation
interviews (information sessions about how the unit functions and about
the programs being offered). As in the case of a correctional officer I, a
correctional officer II plays the role of motivator with the offenders. But in
addition to these tasks, he/she directly participates in the development
and modification of the inmate's correctional plan, by helping the latter to
plan his/her day passes or parole plan; and he/she plays a genuine role of
counsellor by recommending inmates for various work and training
programs.
With respect to their participation in essential activities (recreational,
social, cultural and other), correctional officers II fulfil twin functions of
service delivery and of liaison officer. A correctional officer facilitates and
directly participates in these activities; he/she also acts as an escort to the
inmates. For some activities, he/she will play a role of liaison officer
between the offenders, the administration and the community.
The task of "influencing the inmate's behaviour in such a way as to
encourage the acquisition of psychosocial skills in a community milieu" is
the one that calls the most upon a correctional officer's moral authority.
Officers are able to influence inmates' behaviour through their frequent
contacts with them and by maintaining good relations with the offenders,
as well as via their visibility, advice and assistance, their position as
person in charge, their capacity to defuse dangerous situations or
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128
conflicts, their familiarity with the inmates (with their case), their active
participation in the development of the inmate's correctional plan and
their power to make recommendations regarding programs, transfers
and parole.
And finally, a correctional officer II plays a more important role than
his/her lower ranking colleague in the development and implementation
of programs. His/her role is not limited to providing basic information
about the programs, but he/she participates in their development by
taking into account inmate needs. He/she fulfils moreover a
complementary function of assisting inmates in the identification of their
own needs. Regarding programs, the other tasks of a correctional officer
II are the same as those of a correctional officer I.
On top of the security tasks, the tasks related to reintegration into the
community and integration into the prison environment of a correctional
officer II, he/she will also train level I correctional officers. A correctional
officer II orients new employees and assigns specific tasks to them;
he/she monitors and helps his/her subordinate colleagues to improve
their effectiveness on the job.
As can be readily observed, the tasks of correctional officers I and II are
numerous and complicated. They entail functions regarding security,
rendering services, reintegration into the community and integration into
the prison environment.
However, in the course of the performance of the correctional officers'
case management tasks, their reintegration into the community function
runs most afoul of their integration into the prison environment function.
When encouraging and motivating inmates to pursue programs geared
towards an eventual release, correctional officers are indirectly
encouraging them to desert the prison in their minds and to develop
needs and aspirations that undermine their assimilation into the prison
milieu. This contradiction is even more blatant when one looks at the
role of a correctional officer II in planning an inmate's day passes or
parole plan, or then again, when planning transfers that often short circuit
the assimilation process of offenders into their current institution. In due
course, inmates will end up detesting the penitentiary and the
correctional officers who work there. The correctional officer personifies
the outside, the extramural world, and he/she becomes the lightening
rod for the offender's contempt and hatred of the prison system.
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129
In Canada, the functions of security, reintegration into the community
and staff training are part of official policy and the tasks related to them
are documented in job descriptions. The functions of rendering services
and integration into the prison environment are not part of this policy, but
are included within the definition of the recognized tasks.
The functions of security, reintegration into the community and staff
training are explicit, while the tasks related to rendering services and
integration into the prison environment are implicit. But in the case of all
the job descriptions for these functions, no particular time is set aside for
the associated tasks to actually be carried out. The increase in the
number of tasks to be performed often sends correctional officers I and II
back to their role of guard.
A study carried out by Marion Vacheret in two Canadian penitentiaries
shows us that even though their tasks are being enriched, correctional
officers have the feeling that their work is not being properly recognized,
that they are losing power and that they are carrying out their tasks all on
their own. The multiplication of other service providers and decisionmaking committees dilutes their recommendations, when they are not
just simply ignored by the parole officer (case management officer) who
has become the key actor in the penal institution. The increasingly larger
place being taken up by the service function downgrades the correctional
officer in the eyes of inmates, who often view them as mere "hotel
valets". The recognition of inmate rights limits the possibilities of what
correctional officers can do. In addition, the direct communication,
without any intermediaries, of decisions made by prison administrators
to the inmates' committee likewise undermines the correctional officer's
authority. (Vacheret, 1998) (154)
Correctional officers respond to this new situation in two opposing
fashions: either they refuse to participate in case management (a loss of
motivation) and limit their activity to static surveillance, too often
neglected in periods of budgetary constraint and whose importance they
will emphasize in order to boost their image; or they struggle to have
154
The 1996 Survey of CSC employees indicates that correctional officers are the
least satisfied employees with respect to their workplace and their jobs. Their level of
support for rehabilitation programs, unit management and case management, as well as
their level of commitment towards the CSC and empathy for the offenders are very low
(around 50%); while their level of support for a less comfortable and more punitive
correctional milieu is very high (around 75%).
Towards a Policy for Canada’s Penitentiaries
130
management formally recognize the value of their involvement.
(Vacheret, 1998) (155)
Correctional officers' feelings of frustration will be correspondingly even
more profound when they work in large institutions where the hierarchy,
the isolation and the struggles over conflicting viewpoints are markedly
stronger between the various professional groups. On the other hand,
their feelings of solitude will be weaker, if they work in institutions where
the population is numerous and difficult, as their professional cohesion
and team solidarity will be stronger in such situations, due to the security
risk. (Vacheret, 1998)
155
1998).
"A certain abdication of their legal obligations" has also been observed (Vacheret,
Towards a Policy for Canada’s Penitentiaries
131
CONCLUSION:
TOWARDS A POLICY FOR CANADA'S PENITENTIARIES
The CSC's job descriptions differ from how correctional officers actually perform
their jobs. The official policy does not explicitly recognize the functions of
looking after inmate needs and integration into the prison environment. On the
other hand, correctional officers do not fulfil all the tasks listed in their job
description.
Correctional officers I and II have neither the time, nor the means, nor the
motivation to participate effectively in both reintegration into the community
and integration into the prison environment. But fundamentally, what is at issue
is not their attitude, but rather the official policies and routines adopted by the
Correctional Service of Canada, which are based upon the twin contradiction
between security objectives and the goal of reintegration into the community,
on the one hand, and between the goal of reintegration into the community and
integration into the prison environment, on the other. This twofold contradiction
is reflected not only in correctional officers' working conditions, but also in the
morale of the troops.
In order to change the situation in Canada's penitentiaries, it would not suffice,
as several people have suggested, to give priority to reintegration into the
community over security. The contradiction between reintegration into the
community and integration into the prison environment would not be any closer
to being resolved. This contradiction is the most significant of all. Focusing
penological routines upon the inmate's eventual release only increases his/her
frustration or indifference, one and the other undermining the inmate's
assimilation into the prison milieu.
A third path is necessary between the obsession with security and the illusion of
reintegration into the community. This alternative consists of finding a balance
between the security function and the integration into the prison environment
function. It means eschewing the penitentiary as a warehouse, on the one hand,
and as a convent for schoolgirls, on the other. The correctional officer has a key
role to play in both internal and external security (security in the institution and
the protection of society). He/she also has an essential role to play in the
process of integrating the inmate into the prison environment. What's more, the
status of the security function must be elevated, on the one hand, and the
integration into the prison environment function recognized and expanded, on
the other. A thorough rethinking of the penitentiary is imperative, on the basis of
Towards a Policy for Canada’s Penitentiaries
132
activities and programs designed to integrate the inmate into the prison
environment, under the correctional officer's moral and legal authority.
The correctional officer must be deemed a professional specializing in the areas
of security and integration into the prison environment and not just seen as a
simple civil servant underling. Due to his/her position in the technical division of
labour, he/she upholds a prison policy. The exercise proposed herein does not
consist of redefining the nature of his/her tasks from the outside, but of
deciphering, formulating and recognizing the inner objectives that are already a
part of the tasks that he/she is now performing daily.
In American and Ontario superprisons, which are guided by the norms of
actuarial justice, the correctional officer is a simple "observer of a screen", a
virtual security officer, when he/she is not in truth a would-be member of the
army of unemployed workers! In "democratic" penitentiaries, the correctional
officer function disappears or is strongly diluted. In the prison model proposed
by remedial justice advocates (the psycho-cultural model), the correctional
officer is a front line service provider assigned to an illusory role of assisting the
inmate to reintegrate into the community.
The correctional officers' prison policy proposal contrasts with the approach
taken by the machinery of government (of the administration), which is marked
by the incoherence of contradictory social demands. It is also at odds with that
of numerous specialists for whom idealism and political correctness take the
place of a policy program. The correctional officers' prison policy proposal is
rational, well rooted in their experience and indispensable. The solution that we
are proposing corresponds to the contemporary constraints and needs of the
prison milieu. The integration into the prison environment function is likely to
become the fundamental issue in the technical division of labour within a
penitentiary.
In order that they can rightfully participate in the development of a prison policy
that is truly their own and in its defence, both locally and nationally, on an equal
footing with educators, social workers, psychologists, criminologists and
doctors, the correctional officers' first objective must be the formal recognition
of their know-how, in other words, recognition as professionals. Currently,
correctional officers I and II are subordinate employees, simple underlings
(monitored monitors). They occupy the lowest level in the prison hierarchy.
Collectively, correctional officers must work towards creating sufficient room
for themselves to exercise professional autonomy. The very future of the penal
institution hangs in the balance.
Towards a Policy for Canada’s Penitentiaries
133
Indeed, the renewal of this institution is conditional upon the recognition of the
correctional officer's know-how, as well as by the crystallization, the condensation of this know-how on the institution's premises, where it can be shared,
discussed and dealt with exhaustively. The training of new correctional officers
must be improved by emphasizing prison integration routines, and more
specifically, the processes necessary to build up the officer's authority. As in the
case of police officers, correctional officers should receive college level training
and eventually university instruction, within the framework of work-study
programs, as well as continuing professional training. Obviously, on the one
hand, this implies that study programs be developed in close cooperation with
correctional officers, the custodians of prison know-how (156); and on the other
hand, that a significant and effective reform be carried out to Canada's prison
system, in order that the disparity between the officers' professional
expectations and their current working conditions doesn't grow any bigger. For
want of such a reform, correctional officers have every interest to target and
draw attention via their demands to the tasks in their job descriptions that
correspond to their prison policy proposal, namely, the security tasks and the
tasks related to integration into the prison environment. The recognition of
these latter tasks and the institution of fixed scheduled shifts would already
constitute a big leap forward.
As we have previously seen in section 2.4, the two primary methods that foster
the inmate's integration into the prison environment are activities and programs,
on the one hand, and the correctional officer's moral and legal authority, on the
other.
When the correctional officer can draw upon his/her moral authority, he/she is
able to significantly influence the inmate's behaviour in a way that facilitates the
latter's acquisition of the necessary psychosocial skills required for the proper
functioning of the penal institution. The conformity of the inmate's behaviour
with what is required by the penitentiary is achieved primarily via verbal
communications, keeping a proper distance, etiquette, rendering services and
the correctional officer's professional principles. It is thus essential to reinforce
the correctional officer's moral authority by allotting more time and importance
to communications and by consolidating his/her discretionary power, such that
they are able to deliver a more varied range of services to the inmates, in order
to ensure their cooperation.
156
In this context, the delinquency intervention techniques program offered at the
Collège de Maisonneuve in Montreal should be examined.
Towards a Policy for Canada’s Penitentiaries
134
But this also requires that the correctional officer's legal authority be elevated in
status and reinforced. By making punishments harsher, their dissuasive impact
(the fear of punishment) is increased. The latter can then be better exploited by
correctional officers to influence the inmate's behaviour. The recognition and
reinforcement of the correctional officer's discretionary power in the
enforcement of regulations are also necessary to better balance the services
rendered and hardship and thereby put an end to the inflationary spiral, and
avoid the situation where the recourse to informal punishment becomes the
only method of effective discipline.
The correctional officer's function of looking after inmate needs must also be
defined. The growth of inmate rights has increased the number of service tasks
assigned to the correctional officer. Due to their weight and the psychological
impact that they effect upon the inmate, these tasks conflict with the services
rendered voluntarily. Indeed, the boundary between the two types of services
tends to become increasingly blurred, as the inmate takes for granted a certain
number of favours that he/she subjectively appropriates as his/her rights.
Meanwhile, the correctional officer has every interest to perform the least
number of tasks related to looking after inmate needs as possible, except
obviously those that are intimately linked to security. But in this area too, these
tasks must be reduced as much as possible, by rethinking certain procedures.
Activities and programs are the second major method that fosters the
assimilation of inmates into the penitentiary. Due to the positive effects of
keeping the inmates busy, activities and programs should be mandatory,
without necessarily being spelled out. The correctional officer's role of
"motivator" is important here, but it is insufficient. In the contemporary context,
correctional officers do not really manage to convince inmates to participate in
activities and personal development programs. The obligation to participate in
activities and programs should be a part of the inmate's duties, and possibly
even a part of the sentence itself. The choice of activities and programs that
foster integration into the prison environment should be given to the
correctional officer, who would thus see their discretionary power enhanced.
The correctional officer could be given the responsibility to elaborate, with the
inmate's participation, a plan regarding his/her integration into the prison
environment, which would include activities and programs geared
predominantly towards assimilation. The correctional officer would no longer
simply be consulted about activities and programs, but would become the one
empowered to make the decisions regarding these matters.
In addition, correctional officers would be given an even more important role in
the development and implementation of programs, and in the definition of the
inmate's needs. Aided by specialists (inside and outside), they would define and
Towards a Policy for Canada’s Penitentiaries
135
elaborate programs on the basis of their knowledge of the prison milieu and
their know-how. What's more, correctional officers should use the role that they
are already playing in the development and implementation of programs to
propose programs that are more specifically geared towards integration into the
prison environment.
Obviously, all these recommendations imply changes to Canada's prison policy.
First of all, inmates would no longer be the number one person in charge of
their evolution in prison. Secondly, programs related to reintegration into the
community would only be implemented two years before the inmate's
prospective release. And, thirdly, the division of labour between correctional
officers and parole officers (case management officers) would be revised.
Correctional officers would be given tasks related to integration into the prison
environment, while parole officers would continue to perform those tasks
related to reintegration into the community.
A balance must be re-established within the penitentiary between the
responsibilities and power of correctional officers, case management officers
and educator-facilitators. The people in these last two occupations have too
many responsibilities and power compared to correctional officers. In the
system proposed herein, the roles of case management officers and educatorfacilitators, without becoming secondary, will lose some of their importance
and prestige.
More generally speaking, and as previously explained in the first part of our
study, the correctional officers' prison policy proposal cannot be implemented
without a twofold equilibrium being established between the coercive method
and the normative method, on the one hand, and between the needs of the
prison milieu and an opening up to the community, on the other.
The Fauteux, MacGuigan, Task Force on Federally Sentenced Women and
Arbour Reports span nearly half a century. Over this last half century, Canada's
correctional system has been marked by acute tension between two opposing
objectives, namely, the protection of society via coercive measures and the
protection of society via normative measures. From the mid 1950s to the end of
the 1970s, Canada's prison milieu has undergone intense pressure towards
normalization, in a context which nonetheless remained coercive overall. The
penitentiaries were humanized and somewhat normalized. From the mid 1970s
to the end of the 1980s, pursuant to a reversal in the trend, the milieu has been
marked by a more intense pressure towards coercion, in a context which
remained nonetheless favourable towards a certain normalization. During the
1990s and onwards, a stronger pressure towards normalization has been felt.
But, throughout the last twenty years, both tendencies have coexisted more or
Towards a Policy for Canada’s Penitentiaries
136
less coherently, taking several forms (punitive, dissuasive, neutralizing,
rehabilitation and democratic), in order to respond to a wide variety of social
demands.
With the institutionalization of a new legal order (Canadian Charter of Rights
and Freedoms), the tension between the opposing objectives of maintaining
order and security, on the one hand, and rehabilitation, on the other, has not
been reduced, at least not as a matter of fact (in the penitentiaries). But this
tension has been defused in the official discourse by presenting the objectives
of the coercive and normative methods as being identical, in pith and
substance, and by claiming that the employment of one method provides the
means to eliminate the other. Each partisan of a particular method acts as if
striving for his or her objective was a viable means to attain the objective of the
opposing method. Coercion becomes a means to reform and rehabilitation;
while, normalization becomes a means to maintain order and security.
Up until now, although reforms and counter-reforms have followed one another
in Canada's prison system, the "prison question" has still not been settled. The
constant oscillation between the coercive method and the normative method is
unavoidable, considering the nature and function of a penitentiary in our
society. The best security management model for a penal institution is one that
can avoid extremes and oscillations that are too drastic. The best model is one
that does not pass off its method for something it is not, that combines both
methods, the coercive and the normative, and that recognizes the necessity of
maintaining a certain tension within the penitentiary, as a tension that is
inherent to their proper functioning, in the final analysis.
The tension between coercion and normalization that is typical of a penal
institution is first and foremost experienced on the front lines. The correctional
officer has to deal with this tension. Here lies the uniqueness of his/her task in
the division of labour within a penitentiary. The correctional officer is neither an
educator, nor a facilitator, nor a simple guard. But all of these at once, and then
some: he/she personifies, on the front lines, the social and penal power. And it
is only if he/she is indeed invested with this power that he/she is able to manage
the tension that is typical of a penal institution, a tension that he/she endures
and reflects more than any other prison staff member.
In a penitentiary, inmates cannot self-manage their lives, nor simply be stored in
conditions that are more respectful of their human rights. Not all inmates can be
rehabilitated, or kept in security conditions that are overly restrictive. A balance
is necessary between the coercive method and the normative method –which
are simultaneously at odds and complementary. And different kinds of
Towards a Policy for Canada’s Penitentiaries
137
equilibrium must be found within each individual institution, whether it is a
maximum, medium or minimum security institution.
In this context, the normative and mulitlevel security prison model advocated by
the CSC Security Task Force, which is largely inspired by the institutions for
women, does not correspond to the new sociological realities that exist in
penitentiaries for men. One can easily imagine that the creation of semiautonomous living arrangements and the grouping together of inmates from
maximum, medium and minimum security penitentiaries would provide the
objective basis for the organization of criminal gangs who would live by their
own rules.
The penitentiary must remain pluralistic and polyfunctional, but it must also
reject all extremist practices (brutal and inhuman force, pure democracy, a too
ambitious normalization) as well as the practices that require the penal
institution to find acceptable answers to problems that are difficult to solve and
that have their roots in the very structure of society and its antagonisms and that
the outside world does not dare to come to grips with itself.
The penitentiary is neither a church, nor a psychologist's couch, nor a
warehouse of human goods, but a penitentiary, in other words, an institution
where inmates who have been deprived of their liberty have a sentence to
serve, where they do not lose their humanity, but are not able to enjoy all their
rights either, and where rights are accompanied by obligations. The inmates
have the duty to keep busy, to be active: to learn, to stay in physical and
psychological shape, etc. They have the obligation to take charge of themselves,
within the framework of authorized, selected and monitored activities and
programs. They have an obligation to do their time, but not in any old way. An
obligation to leave the institution somewhat changed from the way they came
in, better, more mature, should they not be rehabilitated. The logic of rewardpunishment must be duplicated and reinforced by the logic of rights-obligations,
to better ensure the assimilation of inmates and the conformity of their
behaviour with what is expected of them.
Since it is currently impossible to invent a new model, to move to a new phase
in the evolution of the penal institution, and this, as long as society itself will not
have changed, and that it is also impossible to go back to a totalitarian regime,
the polyfunctional penitentiary must be revitalized, and one must forsake wide
open pluralism, which leads to violence and confusion, to embrace a limited
and controlled pluralism.
Towards a Policy for Canada’s Penitentiaries
138
But this will require certain modifications to the relationship of power between
the penitentiary and society. Power, which has become diffuse, must be
refocused to some extent.
The penitentiary must have greater autonomy with respect to society, not an
absolute autonomy, which could result in unfortunate glitches, but an autonomy
that enables it to play its institutional role, a role that is no more no less than
managing the deprivation of liberty, in the best possible conditions for the
protection and well-being of society, the staff and the inmates. Each institution
has its own structures and laws. If the latter are disrupted too much by outside
forces, the institution is no longer able to fulfil its function and no longer able to
attain its objectives.
A balance is necessary between the particular needs of the prison milieu and an
opening up to the community.
The more the penitentiary is liberalized, the more the deprivation of liberty is felt
as an infringement upon human dignity and the more agonizing the experience.
The penitentiary's opening up to community is perceived by inmates as a
colossal window that stimulates their cravings. The more the penitentiary opens
up to what's outside, the more it closes down on what's inside, the cell then
becomes somewhere to withdraw, drop out and from which to escape
physically and mentally, while the penitentiary as a whole becomes an
immense warehouse of human beings!
Maintaining order and keeping the penitentiary secure, as well as assimilating
offenders does not come through reintegration into the community. The
normalization of inmates via rehabilitation programs has largely been a failure.
On the other hand, no normative measure can totally replace coercive
measures. As long as the penitentiary exists, in a society that is not egalitarian
and is based upon the primacy of the individual, commodities and private
property, the prison system will have to maintain a twofold approach, both
coercive and normative. And striving for the objective of one method will never
be adequate for attaining (by itself) the objectives of the opposing method. As a
normative method, integration into the prison environment is better adapted to
contemporary penitentiaries than reintegration into the community.
Inmates all too often live on the basis of the time that is left for them to serve.
They must learn not to "do their time" but to live their detention, to live in the
penitentiary, according to the institution's rules. The latter's prisonization has
become imperative!
And this for the most part is what correctional officers are there to do.
Towards a Policy for Canada’s Penitentiaries
139
Needless to say, the correctional officers' prison policy proposal will not resolve
all the contradictions that characterize Canada's prison system, but it will greatly
contribute to reducing them and making them a little more manageable.
Towards a Policy for Canada’s Penitentiaries
140
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