1. law, govt and politics
2. government

DEPARTMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
VIETNAM
VEAP
VIETNAM EMPOWERMENT AND ACCOUNTABILITY PROGRAMME
DECEMBER 2011
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Contents
Abbreviations and acronyms
Programme summary
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What support will the UK provide?
Why is UK support required?
What are the expected results?
BUSINESS CASE
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Strategic case
A. Context and need for DFID intervention
 Context and need for intervention
 Challenges to doing this in Vietnam
 Feasibility of success of intervention
 Evidence underpinning intervention
 Why is DFID’s intervention justified
 Limitation of intervention
 Consequences of not intervening
 Difference to poverty reduction
B. Impact and outcomes
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Appraisal case
A. Determining critical success criteria
B. Feasible options
C. Appraisal options
(a) Expected resource costs of intervention
(b) Expected benefits of the intervention
(c) Cost Benefit Analysis
(d) Optimal design of the intervention
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Commercial case
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Financial case
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A. How much will it cost
B. How it will be funded
C. How will funds be paid out
D. How expenditure will be monitored, reported and
accounted for
Management case
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A. Oversight
B. Management
C. Conditionality
D. Monitoring and evaluation
E. Risk Assessment
F. Results and Benefit Management
Annexes
Annex 1: Budgets for Options
Annex 2: Theory of Change
Annex 3: VEAP Log frame
Annex 4: VEAP Economic Appraisal
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Abbreviations and acronyms
CBF
Capacity Building Facility
CoST
Construction Sector Transparency Initiative
CSC
Critical Success Criteria
CSOs
Civil Society Organizations
DANIDA
Danish International Development Agency
DFID
Department for International Development
EC
European Commission
EITI
Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative
FCO
Foreign and Commonwealth Office/Foreign Office for short
GAPAP
Governance and Poverty Policy Analysis and Advice
GI
Government Inspectorate
GSDRC
Governance and Social Development Resource Centre
GOPA II
Good Governance and Public Administration Reform
IDS
Institute of Development Studies
INGOs
International Nongovernmental Organizations
ISOS
Institute for State Organizations Science
JIFF
Justice Initiatives Facilitation Fund
M&E
Monitoring and Evaluation
MOHA
Ministry of Home Affairs
MOJ
Ministry of Justice
MOU
Memorandum of Understanding
NA
National Assembly
NGOs
Non-governmental organizations
OJEU
Official Journal of the European Union
ONA
Office of National Assembly
RAPID
Research and Policy in Development
PARAFF
Public Participation and Accountability Facilitation Fund
SAV
State Audit of Vietnam
SC
Steering Committee
SDA
Social Development Adviser
SIDA
Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency
SRP
Structural Reform Plan
TA
Technical Assistance
VACI
Vietnam Anti-Corruption Initiative Programme
VASS
Vietnam Academy of Social Sciences
VEAP
Vietnam Empowerment and Accountability Programme
VNCLIP
Vietnam Climate Change Partnership
VUSTA
The Vietnam Union of Science &Technology Associations
UN
United Nations
UNDP
United Nations Development Programme
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Intervention Summary
Vietnam Empowerment and Accountability Programme (VEAP): Creating coalitions
for research, debate and participation in public policy making
What support will the UK provide?
DFID will help Vietnamese citizens engage with their Government by supporting two sets
of activities: (i) formation of coalitions to influence policy making and implementation (£4
million) and (ii) engagement of civil society with the legislative and oversight agenda of the
National Assembly (£1.5 million). Both components will run for four years from March 2012
to March 2016. These two components form a mutually supporting package of assistance
to civil society in Vietnam.
Why is UK support required?
Vietnam has seen rapid development – both economic and social – over the last quarter
century. By comparison, its institutional and political landscape has hardly changed, with
top–down decision making and limited space for genuine participation. This raises
questions about Vietnam’s ability to develop at its full potential, for which the ideas and
contributions of all parts of society are required.
The continuation of Vietnam’s development success story depends on the extent to which
it can transform its political, economic and social institutions over the next 5-10 years to
meet rising expectations. Tackling the challenge ahead calls for new ways of working.
First, there needs to be a new approach that brings together relevant stakeholders to
identify the most appropriate solutions to key reform agendas. Forming such coalitions is
likely to yield more innovative and lasting solutions than government-driven approaches.
At present, there is no support for such multi-stakeholder approaches. Where such
coalitions emerge, they tend to be coincidental and lessons are not systematically learned
for other policy arenas.
Second, the complex procedures guiding Vietnam’s law-making process make it difficult
for civil society and other external stakeholders to engage fully. This limits the possibility of
exerting pressure for change and offering solutions to problems that the state does not
have the capacity to address by itself. While a large number of national and international
civil society organisations operate in Vietnam, they tend to be confined to service delivery
activities and kept at arm’s length with regard to sensitive policy areas. Several
development partners have small-scale funds that support civil society, but these tend to
be isolated and unfocussed. Danida, one of Vietnam’s most active and long-standing
development partners, has now developed an innovative funding mechanism that works
under the auspices of the Office of the National Assembly and thereby links civil society
support directly to the law-making process. However, this vehicle is unlikely to reach its full
potential and operate at sufficient scale without additional financing.
What will the programme do to address this need?
VEAP will have two distinct components to address these gaps. The first component will
provide funding to NGOs, academia, think tanks, mass organisations and the media to
form groups or coalitions for change around themes of public concern. The specific
themes will be determined during the six-month inception phase of the programme. These
may include issues such as land reform, urban governance, environmental protection and
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natural resource management. An organisation will be directly contracted by DFID to
manage this coalition-building component.
The second component will provide funding to civil society through a competitive call for
proposals to engage in the law-making and oversight agenda of the National Assembly.
DFID will sign a Delegated Cooperation Agreement to transfer funds to Danida. A Fund
Manager will be contracted by Danida (also through competitive bidding) to manage the
fund and technical assistance.
The two components are designed to complement each other. The first is focussed on
being directive and supplying targeted support whilst the second responds to demand from
CSOs. This is a complex and difficult area to work in. The two components help spread
risk, provide flexibility to work with different stakeholders and respond to opportunities and
ensure that the whole of VEAP is more closely aligned to the legislative agenda of the
National Assembly.
What are the expected results?
By 2015 we expect to see a more vibrant, articulate and dynamic civil society and a
Government open and willing to engage with them as a result of this programme.
Furthermore we expect substantial improvements in policy and implementation in key
sectors where coalitions are active. The impact of the programme will be increased
opportunities for Vietnamese citizens to engage in decision-making processes affecting
their life and to hold decision makers to account.
The direct impact covers both strengthened policy making and the recognition of the
importance of non-state actors in that as well as deliver issue-based policy and
development impact. The indirect impacts include keeping inequality in check,
strengthened accountability and enhanced transparency. The outcomes will be key
stakeholders acting cooperatively to address the needs and aspirations of Vietnamese
people as reflected in media and legislation. In addition, there will be specific outcomes
relating to the policy agendas supported by the two components. These will be defined
during the inception phase, e.g. when identifying the themes of the coalition-building
component.
What are the planned outputs attributable to UK support?
There will be two main outputs. First, coalitions will be formed to engage effectively on key
policies of public concerns. Second, the engagement of civil society organisations in the
legislative and oversight agenda of the National Assembly will be enhanced through the
Civil Society Fund. The second output will be shared pro-rata with Danida.
How will we determine whether the expected results have been achieved?
We will develop a Monitoring and Evaluation framework during the programme inception
phase in the first six months to monitor progress and results. We will undertake a thorough
mid-term review in September 2013 and an independent evaluation on policy impact,
effectiveness and sustainability as well as a lesson-learning study at the end of the
programme.
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Vietnam Empowerment and Accountability Programme (VEAP)
Creating networks for research, debate and participation in public policy making
Business Case
1. Strategic Case
A. Context and need for DFID intervention
Vietnam is at a critical juncture and needs inputs from all parts of the society to sustain
economic growth and poverty reduction. There has been rapid economic and social
development over the last 20 years and Vietnam is, in many ways, a development success
story. By comparison, its institutional and political landscape has changed more slowly,
with top–down decision making the norm and limited space for genuine participation. This
raises questions about Vietnam’s ability to develop at its full potential, which requires
harnessing the ideas and contributions of all parts of society.
Indeed, new strains and stresses on the current development model are emerging as
Vietnam transitions into a middle-income country. These include a more complex public
policy context where solutions are less clear cut and Government of Vietnam (GoV) alone
is less able to provide all the answers and to monitor what works and what could work
better. Although Vietnam is a one party state dominated by the Communist Party of
Vietnam (CPV), there is an increasing recognition that accountability mechanisms such as
National Assembly (NA), State Audit of Vietnam (SAV) and decentralised decision making
bodies are emerging as important actors since 20001. The National Assembly in particular
is emerging as an important counter-balance to the power of the Executive, and plays a
more visible role in holding Government to account and in the legislative process.
However the development of accountability institutions is lagging behind rapid economic
growth. Increased devolution to sub-national levels of government means they are not able
to fully fulfil their oversight role. There is also acknowledgement that the social make-up of
Vietnam is shifting. New interest groups are emerging - such as the youth, internal migrant
workers, and salaried middle class. At the same time, other groups risk becoming
increasingly marginalised such as ethnic minority groups, small-holder farmers or landless
peasants.2 The search for a new development model goes hand in hand with the need to
identify new ways of working for the GoV.
A more intensive and effective collaboration with civil society provides a promising
solution. Whilst in some ways vibrant in Vietnam, civil society contributes below its full
potential to the socio-economic development of the country. It plays an important role in
people’s lives: whatever the terminology, organisations are widespread and diverse. It is
estimated that over 300 operate nationwide, over 2,000 at provincial levels, and tens of
thousands exist at lower levels. These include NGOs, community based organisations,
trade unions, consumer protection organisations, professional organisations, academia
and research based organisations and so forth. These are henceforth referred to broadly
as Civil Society Organisations (CSOs). There are also mass organisations which bring
together some aspects of civil society under an officially recognised umbrella, the Vietnam
1
2
Vietnam Development Report 2010
M. Gainsborough, Vietnam,: Rethinking the State 2010
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Fatherland Front (VFF), which forms an additional arm of the Party reaching down to local
levels.
Currently, CSOs engage the state and in the development process in four main ways with
different intensity (i) being involved in policy and law making; (ii) delivering services; (iii)
channelling citizens’ opinions to authorities and (iv) monitoring officials and holding them
accountable. Some forms are easier, more permissible and more effective than others.
Bridging the divide between the forms of engagement is critical. For example, the space
for CSOs to carry-out monitoring and accountability work has been limited so far and has
even become more restricted recently. One of the reasons is the insufficient trust between
the GoV and the CSOs that have no experience working together around a policy agenda.
Conversely, some parts of the state machinery are open and receptive to the collaboration
with CSOs and there are real opportunities which do arise where non-state actors can play
an important role.
The rapidly changing context shows that there is a need for Government to embrace the
intellectual, academic and grass-roots advice and evidence to ensure that public policy
making is more inclusive of the needs and wishes of the population. Government needs
support to open up on non-contentious issues to external input. CSOs need to be able to
engage. To enable this to happen requires two processes to occur: firstly mechanisms for
coalitions of individuals, groups, associations and institutions - including Government working on particular issues to come together to generate the evidence and political
momentum for better policy making. Secondly, a process of building trust, confidence and
acceptance that include multiple perspectives makes for better policy.
Most of the fundamentals for strong and supportive links between state and non-state
actors is already embedded in Vietnamese legislation and enshrined in institutions.3
However, moving from legislation to implementation is challenging. Citizen engagement
with the state in practice remains constrained. Equally, the Government and National
Assembly are open and receptive to expert advice, which is underpinned by facilitating
legislation. However, much of this remains ad hoc and time-specific - around the
production of a specific law, rather than a result of a sustained and sustainable inclusion of
interest groups in creating legislation, monitoring it and holding the duty bearers to
account.
Some recent examples of coalitions working on issues in Vietnam (see Box 1 below) show
there is potential for alliances between the state and civil society. There is a clear demand
for empowered citizens to be part of the public policy making process. This would
strengthen the links between citizens and the state and help ensure that the Government
of Vietnam is able to respond more effectively to current and future development
challenges. In the Vietnamese context we have seen signs that particular issues are
grabbing the attention of policy makers and the public alike and provide a useful prism
through which the linkages are being built. Three good but contrasting examples merit a
description to help explain what this means in the box below.
Box 1: Review of three emblematic examples of issues and coalitions in Vietnam
For example, citizens’ participation in preparation of bills (the Law on Promulgation of Legal Documents,
2008), participatory planning at local and provincial level (promoted by the Ministry of Planning and
Investment); mobilization of citizens to exercise their supervisory rights on government agencies (Law on
Vietnam Fatherland Front); citizens’ participation in fighting corruption (the Law on Anti-corruption, 2005);
role of professional associations in providing social commentary to government’s policies and programmes
(Decree 22 on VUSTA).
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Bauxite mining
In 2008 there was a public outcry over the extraction of bauxite in mines in Central Vietnam. Vietnam has the
third largest reserves of bauxite – the raw material for aluminum - in the world. These mines, managed and
run by Chinese companies with Chinese labour, came into the spotlight through concerns of the
environmental hazards. This has “provoked an unprecedented backlash from an unlikely assortment of
critics. They include a nonagenarian war-hero, Vo Nguyen Giap, a dissident monk, Thich Quang Do, and a
slew of leading scientists and environmental campaigners.” 4 There are environmental concerns, national
interest concerns, and concerns about corruption and a lack of transparency which all come together. This
issue has also been widely discussed in the press and in the National Assembly in an open and vigorous
manner. It has led Government to justify the investment and opened the area to expert advice. This shows
the importance of an issue of public concern to focus interest. However, there are downside risks to such a
political approach as the anti-bauxite movement has become associated, in the eyes of Government, with
‘anti-state propaganda’, especially as it touches on the sensitive issue of Vietnam’s relationship with China.
The bauxite movement remains a lively focus for discussions and there is a key website/blog commentating
on a wide number of political, social and developmental issues.
High Speed Rail
The second example is how the National Assembly can act as a focus for the discussions effecting
Vietnam’s development trajectory. In 2010 the issue of whether to start construction of a high speed rail link
between Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City (HCMC) was discussed in the National Assembly. For one of the first
times, the NA flexed their muscles and rejected the proposal. 5 Whilst the space for debate (and rejection)
was allowed by the Government, it has since opened up the public debate on the merits of public investment,
debt levels and development priorities for Vietnam. There are opportunities to help the NA fulfil its oversight
role by bringing in expert advice and setting out arguments in a clear, evidence-based manner.
Anti-Corruption challenge fund
The third example is from a donor-supported initiative which demonstrates that there is both demand from
Vietnamese civil society for support in piloting small-scale innovative approaches and openness of
Government to work directly with civil society. In 2009 the Government Inspectorate (GI) – which leads the
Government’s fight against corruption – undertook a competition for civil society to make proposal bids for
small grants to suggest ways to tackle corruption at a local level. The so-called Vietnam Innovation Day
(VID) on “More Transparency, Less Corruption” was the first time that donors could work closely with
Government and civil society simultaneously on such a mechanism and on such a sensitive issue. Already
some small-scale initiatives are being scaled up (such as citizen report cards in hospitals). This has led to a
repeat process which is led by the GI called the Vietnam Anti-Corruption Initiatives (VACI) in 2011. VACI
2011 attracted 160 proposals and awarded 34 small grants. Whilst the impact of the approach is too early to
assess, the fact that a ‘safe’ space for CSOs to engage with Government on anti-corruption is a major step
forward and points to real potential of this approach in creating a snowball effect.
These three very different examples indicate that in the Vietnamese context:
 There are issues of public concern that provide a rallying point across sections of
society which can promote change or shifts in policy.
 The National Assembly can act as a focal point for issues – both in initiating and
sustaining them.
 Parts of Government are willing to listen, learn and work with civil society and
other actors when it is seen to be beneficial.
 Different actors working together are more effective than working in isolation
as they have a stronger voice and can link back into the system.
An issues-based approach is the best entry-point for a DFID program to support civil
society in Vietnam. The key to success would be identifying issues of broad concern and
interest widely recognised as critical for the sustained socio-economic development of
Vietnam such as environmental degradation, urban planning, and ethnic
minority development. By focussing on particular issues of concern the intervention would
seek to build links, networks or coalitions between a range of stakeholders - both state and
4
5
See http://www.economist.com/node/13527969 for a good summary
See http://cachef.ft.com/cms/s/0/65255d72-7d6f-11df-a0f5-00144feabdc0.html for a good summary.
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non-state - to have longer-term, constructive and multi-faceted forms of engagement. An
issue-based approach has the vital advantage of working indirectly on issues of voice,
political space and civil society empowerment rather than taking a more direct
approach. This intervention could also include a renewed dialogue on the enabling
framework for civil society. The draft Law on Associations is in its 16 th draft and the
discussions between donors, civil society and the legislators were stopped some years
ago. There is a need to bring it back to the development agenda.
In spite of being a challenging approach in Vietnam, case studies show the feasibility of
success. There are some significant challenges associated with this type of innovative
intervention in the Vietnamese context. The first one is the acceptability of the project to
the Government, and the identification of a facilitating 'home' within the Government
machinery. The second is identifying issues where some real change can occur which do
not cross over into activities which would be unacceptable to the Government. The third is
correctly identifying the change agents and organisations that can, and want to, work
together. None of these potential risks are insurmountable, as the case studies show. The
risk section outlines mitigating measures. These include being open and transparent with
all parties, ensuring that Government is comfortable with the approach and undertaking
robust political economy analysis at the start of the intervention on particular issues to
identify the drivers of change and the likely obstacles. Below we set out for two issues of
broad concern and interest- namely environmental protection and urban planning as some
possible coalitions and how they would work in practice (See boxes 2 and 3).
Box 2: Engaging CSOs coalition for environmental protection
Environmental pollution (including Carbon emission) has been the most burning environmental issue in
Vietnam, given the increasing manufacturing and industry capacities. Back in 2002, nearly 4300 businesses
were found seriously polluting (official survey) while the actual number could be much higher. In 5 years from
2003-2007, only 338 seriously polluting businesses (out of planned 439) have been actioned on, but during
the same period, 548 businesses were newly found seriously polluting. One can find pollution cases
disclosed in the press almost every day. Notably, the most recent cases are the Sonadezi and Thai Tuan.
Ironically, Sonadezi is a waste treatment business, while the owner of the polluting Thai Tuan corporation
sits in the People’s Council of Ho Chi Minh City.
This presents to the authority a huge and cumbersome task to deal with polluting businesses. There are
many reasons, including, but not limited to, weak governance:
o
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The legal framework on pollution is weak. While the highest document for dealing with polluting
businesses is the Decision 64/2003 QD-TTg. providing for developing a more comprehensive legal
and policy framework, it indicates that the state budget could also be used to clear pollution by the
identified businesses. This passes the costs of addressing pollution to the public while they should
be borne by the businesses.
There are many stakeholders (state / government, enterprises, affected people, civil societies, mass
organisations, media, research community, etc.) in different stages: granting business permits,
monitoring, actioning etc. but unclear roles and responsibilities.
Law enforcement is weak and corruption could also prevent effective action.
Administrative measures (fines, temporary or permanent closure of businesses) are not strong
enough to incentivise businesses to install and run waste treatment facilities and prevent them from
polluting.
State enterprises are often overlooked.
While preventing and addressing pollution requires efforts from all parts of the society, civil society
organisations have a role to play. They could be more effective if they act together, if spaces are created for
them to do so. They could be involved in the revision of the Environmental Law, Water Resource Law and
Decision 64 through lobbying, doing background research (e.g. economics of pollution, or economics of
resources taking into account pollution, distributional costs and benefits of pollution control, etc) to help
justify a ‘fining’ framework to provide incentives for non-pollution businesses and prevent businesses from
violating law; providing critics and oversight, building capacity.
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VEAP is designed to create space to engage civil society organisations in helping the Vietnamese
Government to address various issues. Under VEAP, CSOs will build coalition around specific themes and
environmental protection could be one. A coalition will include not only NGOs, but also research institutes,
mass organisations, and even government agencies which advocate change. Contributions from coalition
members vary subject to their comparative advantages, but coherence is essentially important around the
issues rather than individual leadership.
Box 3: Supporting a coalition around inclusive urban planning
Vietnam is undergoing one of the fastest urban transitions in the world. In 2030, almost half of the
Vietnamese population will live in urban areas. While urbanisation is recognised as a driving force behind
economic growth, if left unchecked its consequences could be disastrous: health problems, social unrest,
environmental damage, pollution, and rural-urban tensions are all likely to worsen .The key urban centres in
Vietnam are growing rapidly: the population of Ho Chi Minh City (HCMC) now exceeds 7 million. Whilst cities
have master plans to 2025 which form the layout of spatial structure and guidelines for urban development,
development remains chaotic and short-termist. The 2009 Law on Urban Planning sets a general framework
for managing urban planning of Vietnam's cities. The Ministry of Construction is responsible for the regional
construction plans. The establishment and approval of urban planning are regulated as follows:

Urban renewal and development must be based on urban plans approved by competent state
authorities.

Urban plans must be set up by professional organizations recognized by the State, and subjected to
all standards and rules issued by the State. Approved urban plans are legal basis for managing
urban areas, implementing construction programs, preparing annual-short term-long term plans for
urban renewal and development.

The law also sets forth requirements of publicity and transparency in planning and designates
responsible agencies. Under the law, a new urban plan must be publicized for at least 30 days
following its official approval.
There are numerous challenges to effective planning and implementation including a lack of horizontal
coordination among agencies, high levels of centralization, and reliance on planning the settlement system
by fiat (command and control), rather than a performance based approach and high population densities in
the largest cities (80,000 per square kilometer in core Ho Chi Minh City) in conjunction with large numbers of
industrial firms (often high polluters) and inadequate environmental infrastructure. Donors and international
partners have tended to tackle technical issues, and often lack a citizen-perspective of seeing how the
different issues intermingle and reinforce each other.
Both the rapid growth of urban areas and the challenges present obvious areas for VEAP to engage on. In
urban areas, coalitions cutting across the spectrum of society are more feasible: between the business
elite, the rising middle-classes and Government officials, migrant workers who live in similar areas, the urban
youth and so forth. Indeed, the intransigent issues cannot be tackled without working together. The
Legislation provides the right basis for doing so, but implementation to date is weak. Coalitions can be
formed to tackle some of the main issues. The potential themes include: transport and congestion; land use
monitoring and green area protection; corruption and public resource management. Depending on the theme
which matters in the area, a coalition would form resident associations, NGOs, academia, professional
associations, the planning units in the city and mass organisations. It could be locality-specific or thematic –
but would probably be in one city. Coherence around a theme and strong local interest would be critical for
success.
Evidence underpinning intervention
Overall, evidence for these kinds of interventions is nascent, and is in the process of
being generated and systematised better. The proposed initiative, with robust M&E, will
add to the stock of knowledge and evidence for empowerment and accountability
interventions.
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Box 4: Definitions of key concepts
■ Civil Society Organisations include NGOs, community based organisations, trade unions, consumer
protection organisations, professional organisations, academia and research based organisations and in the
case of Vietnam mass organizations.
■ Empowerment means enabling people to have more control over their own development and supporting
them to have the power to make and act on their own choices.
■ Accountability means ensuring that officials in public, private and voluntary sector organisations are
answerable for their actions and that there is redress when duties and commitments are not met.
■ Empowerment and accountability interventions are those that enable people to have the resources and
capability to have greater choice and control over their own development and to hold decision-makers –
including governments and service providers – to account.
■ Coalitions we define from the literature as formal or informal alliances which form – often temporarily - to
press for a particular change or defend particular issues.
■ Coalitions for change is closely associated with DFID programs with the distinguishing feature of not
focusing upon providing support to or through a single organisation, but instead seeking to work with a
number of different partners (both state and non-state actors) in support of their collective efforts to shift
change around an issue or problem.
Source: DFID Emerging Guidance on empowerment and accountability, 2011
Evidence – Vietnam
There is limited evidence in Vietnam of external actors successfully working with civil
society to bring about change. However, there are examples of what is possible and what
can work, and what the pitfalls are. The 2008 study “Forms of Engagement between state
and civil society organisations in Vietnam”, funded by DFID and Finland, confirms that
there is growing engagement between civil society groups and state authorities in policy
and law making, monitoring officials and holding them accountable and conveying citizens’
voice. However, it argues that this is the hardest area for them to engage on.
Networks/coalitions that originated from an issue of genuine common concern and
interests would sustain a vibrant membership, creative activities and generate actions for
change. See examples in box 1.
The approach of providing capacity building, setting-up networks and then providing grants
to local NGOs to perform monitoring and accountability tasks has had mixed success in
country so far. The lessons learned have been that there was weak commitment to and
few incentives for an “imagined” network. For example, the Anti Poverty Policy Study
group (APPS) was established by Oxfam Great Britain as a network of local NGOs to work
on poverty policy and advocacy under the auspices of VUSTA (the Vietnam Union of
Sciences and Technology Associations). However, a lack of a common platform, weak
commitment and weak involvement of all members as they saw themselves as competitors
rather than representing mutual interest groups led to the gradual dropping out of APPS
members. By contrast, the example of Vietnam Anti-Corruption Initiative in box 1 indicate
that there is potential for small grants to local NGOs and civil society to work on particular
issues and a high level of demand in society for such support.
Evidence – International
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International evidence is mixed with regards to the role of civil society and nascent with
regard to the potential of coalitions to bring about change. There are numerous successful
examples of challenge funds for NGOs internationally, but much depends on context and
set up: there are also a lot of poorly designed and poorly implemented mechanisms.
Overall the evidence is limited.
Coalitions for better development
A Governance and Social Development Resource Centre (GSDRC) report6 shows that
programmes designed to support ‘coalitions for change’ or create constituencies for
reform are growing and diverse in scope. According to the report, this broad approach has
been applied to a range of multi-sectoral and sectoral programmes as well as multistakeholder initiatives7. The coalition approach developed by DFID has been applied in
Burma and in Nigeria. These programmes use political economy analysis to identify issues
that may cut across existing political, social and economic divisions and provide
opportunities for transforming existing relationships and institutions. Their distinguishing
feature is that they do not focus upon providing support to or through a single organisation,
but instead they seek to work with a number of different partners (both state and non-state
actors) in support of their collective efforts to shift change around an issue or problem.
Coalitions for change: some lessons learned
Experience from other coalition building initiatives shows that coalition building requires significant
investments of time and energy – but the returns are considerable. Coalitions can achieve what
one organisation cannot achieve alone, making those who would otherwise be weak more able to
defend their interests. Coalition Building – World Bank Communication for Governance &
Accountability Programme (CommGAP) 2010 defines coalitions as “self-conscious, freelyorganised, active and lasting alliances of elites, organisations and citizens sharing partially
overlapping political goals”. The CommGAP paper focuses on coalitions to influence policy
changes – one of several roles that coalitions in this programme could play. But it contains some
useful lessons for coalitions of all kinds, particularly on communication which has to have a clear
message and be well-targeted. Coalitions are more successful where there is a clear issue. In
Nigeria, organising a coalition round wetlands and water management in the North of the country
was particularly successful. It cut across different states, informal power structures and worked
with local communities and Federal Government to bring about change in water management
system and financing. This was possible due to having a concrete issue which affected directly the
livelihoods of the local population.
Transparency, accountability and citizen voice for better State
There is emerging evidence on the impact of initiatives to improve transparency,
accountability and citizen voice in a number of countries. For example, a recent Institute
of Development Studies synthesis report8 based on 10 years of research reviewed
evidence of impact of a range of initiatives9 designed to make information available to
citizens (transparency) and make government more accountable. By mapping over 800
observable effects of citizen participation, the authors concluded that each type of
6
GSDRC helpdesk report: coalitions for change
7
Such as the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) and the Construction Sector Transparency
Initiative (CoST).
8 Blurring the Boundaries: Citizen Action across States and Societies, IDS 2011
9
Initiatives included strategies to make service delivery more accountable (e.g. complaints mechanisms, public
information campaigns, citizen report cards and score cards, community monitoring and social audits; budget
transparency and accountability strategies (e.g. participatory budgeting), public expenditure monitoring, participatory
auditing, the Open Budget Index, etc; initiatives to secure freedom of information and transparency, including initiatives
focused on making revenues from natural resources more transparent.
12
initiative, in the right conditions, can contribute to a range of positive outcomes10. The
evidence identifies several critical success factors for all such initiatives.
 On the civil society side, these include the capabilities of citizens and organisations to
access and use information and to mobilise, and the extent to which interventions are
linked to broader forms of collective action and mobilisation.
 On the state side of the relationship, key factors include the degree of space for
demands to be made, the degree of ‘political will’ or support for accountability and
demands and initiatives; and the broader political economy, including the enabling legal
frameworks, incentives and sanctions which affect the behaviours of public officials.
However, the study was not unambiguous or rose-tinted about the benefits of increased
citizen participation. It pointed to a flip side of negative impacts of efforts to promote citizen
engagement such as dependency on intermediaries, lack of accountability in networks and
the risk of a violent or coercive state response. These all need to be factored into the
design. This is also reiterated in the findings of a multi-donor evaluation in 2008 from ODI
of Voice and Accountability programming.11 This evidence suggests that rather than
focusing on specific tools, programmes to promote accountability or responsiveness
should be based on an understanding of where there is scope for state and civil society
actors to work together in coalitions.
Working politically
There is emerging consensus that the evidence shows a need to work more politically and
bring political economy analysis to the forefront of development interventions. The DFIDsupported research An Upside-down View of Governance from the Centre for the Future
State (2010) draws together findings from a five-year research programme.12 It explores
how elements of public authority are being created through complex processes of
bargaining between state and society actors, and the interaction of formal and informal
institutions. The key message from the research is that coalitions can be powerful ways of
shifting the political debate and provides a range of examples to support this. However, it
also states that context is key and interventions need to be well-grounded in the local
realities and complexities.
Impact on poverty reduction
There is growing evidence that approaches based solely on building government capacity
and stimulating the private sector have failed to address real barriers to effective poverty
reduction13. Poverty persists and the benefits of growth and democracy have not always
been equitably distributed across society. Empowerment and accountability can deliver
improved results by strengthening poor people’s power and influence over their own lives
and the development process. It will change the relationship between the poor and the
powerful, target corruption, and build constituencies of support for broader processes of
change.
There is some evidence that broad coalitions that included powerful groups have
contributed to improvements in service delivery and transformational political change. A
10
For example increased state or institutional responsiveness, reduced corruption, better budget utilisation or delivery of
services
11
Rocha Menocal & Sharma, Joint Evaluation of Citizens’ Voice and Accountability, ODI, 2008.
12
The Centre for the Future State (2010) An Upside Down View of Governance, Brighton: IDS
13
Strengthening Empowerment &Accountability in International Development: Emerging Guidance
13
recent Research and Evidence Department mapping of the evidence on empowerment
and accountability tries to identify the impacts that empowerment and accountability have
made to both service delivery outcomes in health and education as well as impact on
governance outcomes. 14 It recognises that the line between fostering coalitions and
poverty reduction is not always clear or direct, and may result through gradual shifts over
generations. However, if coalitions are effective at influencing (and monitoring) pro-poor
policy, for example, the theory is that this will result in positive changes further down the
implementation chain (e.g. on school performance). Thus it is expected that empowerment
and accountability initiatives will have an indirect impact on poverty reduction by
strengthening the institutions necessary for citizen empowerment and sustainable poverty
reduction.
How does this fit with DFID priorities
Working with civil society is central to DFID’s priorities in Vietnam. DFID’s Country
Governance Analysis for Vietnam identifies accountability as the weakest aspect of
governance15 (compared to capability and responsiveness). Indeed, DFID has sought to
engage with civil society for some time but have not found suitable entry points. In 2009
we agreed a civil society strategy but we have struggled to articulate in programmatic form
what our support should look like. However, as part of our planning for the closure of the
DFID Vietnam programme in 2016, we have identified accountability strengthening as the
core of our governance agenda, and with the Government’s agreement, have included our
proposed work on civil society in our Development Partnership Agreement.
This is complementary to the support to strengthen state institutions such as the State
Audit of Vietnam and the Government Inspectorate, including our work on anti-corruption.
A key part of the DFID Vietnam Operational Plan and the Embassy’s Country Business
Plan is the proposed work to support public participation and accountability work to
empower poor people and to help make institutions more accountable to them.
This approach is designed specifically with DFID Vietnam’s legacy in mind as we move
towards programme closure. The intervention will increasingly serve as a cross-HMG
platform for engagement with a broad range of non-state actors on key issues which are
vital for Vietnam’s development. As part of the DFID exit strategy we will ensure that in
the final year of our intervention we are able to learn and disseminate lessons effectively
and ensure that supported organisations have plans in place for future financing.
This fits within broader DFID priorities which have placed an increased emphasis on
empowerment and accountability. The Development Policy Committee approved a new
approach in the ‘Strengthening Empowerment and Accountability in International
Development: Emerging Guidance’ in February 2011. This means that countries are
expected to place increased emphasis on accountability in particular depending on the
context. The strategic case put forward here is in line with the new guidance.
Consequences of not intervening
There is a strategic opportunity for DFID to leave a legacy in one of the most challenging
areas of development, and we are well-placed to play this role. Currently there are few
partners and projects that promote public participation and accountability work by CSOs
(Oxfam, CARE, The Asia Foundation, and Justice Initiative Facilitation Fund). These few
14
15
RED. A preliminary mapping of evidence base for Empowerment and Accountability
DFID Vietnam Country Governance Analysis, 2011.
14
mechanisms focus on grant allocations for proposals by CSOs that are fragmented both in
geographic areas as well as content. Support that is either project-based or limited to
training will not build the sorts of coalitions that might bring about real changes, or increase
the likelihood that changes that do happen will be pro-poor. Opportunities to reinforce the
state- society interface for genuine policy making would be missed. This aspect is explored
further under the counterfactual in the options set out in the appraisal case.
Working with others
Other donors such as Danida and the UN are designing interventions to promote the
monitoring and accountability role of CSOs. DFID will work closely with them to create
synergy in this important but sensitive area of work. The UN will be engaging on the
regulatory aspect.
B. Impact and Outcome
Impact and outcome –details
The impact of the programme will be increased opportunities for Vietnamese citizens
to engage in decision making processes affecting their lives and to hold the
decision makers to account.
The direct impact includes:
 Strengthened policy making: policy making and monitoring processes on key issues
identified is strengthened through better evidence, stronger participation in the
decision making processes, more robust development, and implementation and
monitoring of laws.
 Importance of non-state actors recognised and accepted: Multiple perspectives in
policy making are accepted by policy makers as important and valid in Vietnam
 Issue-based policy and development impacts: these will be identified in inception
phase and will be the focus of engagement for the coalition.
The indirect impact includes:
 Inequality kept in check
 Accountability strengthened and transparency enhanced
The outcomes will be key stakeholders acting cooperatively to address the needs and
aspirations of Vietnamese people. There are two outputs: (i) formation of coalitions which
can effectively engage on key policies of public concerns; (ii) enhanced engagement by
civil society organisations in the legislative and oversight agenda of the National
Assembly.
Monitoring and Evaluation
This is an innovative, national level approach which will require well-developed and
systematic M&E from the outset. The monitoring system will need to be designed in a
flexible manner to respond to programme development. This is a key part of the work to be
undertaken in the inception phase. Important for the programme will be the lessons
learned (from both successes and failures) of a relatively untested approach in a difficult
context, which will be disseminated. The M&E approach is laid out in more detail in
Section D, the Management Case.
15
2. Appraisal Case
Theory of change
Good governments respond to their citizens' demands in order to provide high quality
services and effective and legitimate government. Civil society organisations and
movements (campaign groups, mothers' unions, journalists, chambers of commerce,
unions etc) are effective vehicles to articulate citizen demand though of course they
represent the interests of different specific groups and vary in legitimacy and effectiveness.
DFID has sought to support civil society in Vietnam but has struggled in the past to find an
effective way of doing so. It is difficult to identify the most effective and legitimate
organisations to support and even when this is done, it is possible to strengthen an
individual organisation and their particular perspective without necessarily strengthening
overall citizen voice on a particular issue or effecting change. This is a particular challenge
in Vietnam where the government has only recently (and patchily) come to terms with civil
society organisations operating outside government and such organisations are therefore
often particularly weak or inexperienced.
As Vietnam progresses towards achievement of all the MDGs, the key development
challenges in the country are increasingly around equity, quality of services and access to
economic opportunities, all of which are issues that require strong citizen participation.
DFID has therefore chosen to work with coalitions of civil society organisations operating
on a particular issue, the theory being that change has been achieved historically when
a range of different interest groups campaign together on a particular issue - a broader
base of citizens' views are mobilised which increases the chance of achieving change and
it is harder for the government to argue that only one partial view is being represented.
These coalitions will engage and may include actors from within Government as
experience in Vietnam suggests that working together rather than in contestation is the
most effective way of getting things done and for change to happen.
Outcomes and outputs
The principle outcome for the programme will be the key stakeholders acting
cooperatively to address the needs and aspirations of Vietnamese people as reflected in
media and legislation. This will be achieved through the following three outputs: (i)
Formation of coalitions which can effectively engage on key policies of public concerns; (ii)
Enhanced CSOs' engagement in the legislative and oversight agenda of the National
Assembly though the Civil Society Fund with ONA; (iii) Regulatory framework
strengthened in monitoring and accountability work which allows a more permissive
approach to regulation and engagement of non-state actors. In the final option selected,
this will be delivered by the UN. The ToC considered all options at this stage.
Impacts
The intervention is expected to increase opportunities for Vietnamese citizens to
engage in decision making processes affecting their life and to hold decisionmakers to account in terms of impact. This is reflected directly in three areas: (i) Policy
making strengthened: Policy making and monitoring processes on key issues identified
is strengthened through better evidence, stronger participation in the decision making
processes, more robust development of laws and those laws and policies are implemented
more completely through more continuous and effective monitoring by citizens. (ii) Nonstate actors’ importance recognised: This impact is that multiple perspectives in policy
making are accepted as important and valid in Vietnam for their contributions to longer
16
term sustainability and development. (iii) Issue-based outcomes dependent on the
coalition focus: It is expected that the programme will have a limited number of focus
areas depending on where opportunities occur and political economy analysis points to
areas of potential successful coalitions. These could be in environmental protection,
corruption, urban planning or any other areas which are decided by criteria established by
the programme. A theory of change for each coalition would be built up with this being the
direct impact of that coalition. There will be direct impact on the issue as a result of the
coalition.
The indirect impacts which the intervention will help support are the following: Inequality
kept in check: Inequality has remained relatively low in spite of the rapid growth during
the last two decades. But there is a significant risk that inequality will start to grow over the
next decade as has been seen in other lower-middle income countries. This intervention
will open up the policy space to a wider array of perspectives which will bring a focus on
inequality. Accountability strengthened; transparency enhanced: The forms and
mechanisms for accountability have failed to keep pace with the rapid economic
development in Vietnam. Transparency remains an important first step along the path to
strengthen accountability. The programme will promote open, transparent approaches to
evidence building and policy making. As a by-product of the intervention the indirect
impact will be to enhance effective oversight of both formal (e.g. National Assembly) and
informal accountability mechanisms (e.g. Media, community oversight) which will depend
on more transparency.
Assumptions
There are a set of key assumptions that are implicit in the theory of change based on prior
programme experience and evidence of successful approaches.
 That coalitions are able to be built which cut across different interests (i.e. are
sufficiently broad) and adopt a productive engagement approach rather than a
confrontational approach which would be a sure path to failure in Vietnam.
 That Government is willing to engage – or rather not shut down the space for
engagement and that the issues chosen are not too sensitive or cross the invisible red
lines of policy discussion.
 That the National Assembly continues on its current reformist path.
 That there is a basic minimum of capacity already within civil society which is able to
bid and manage small grants of sufficient interest and impact that it can be taken to
scale.
 That the challenge fund acts as a springboard for broader based coalition.
 That better evidence and inputs from coalitions is communicated effectively enough to
influence the policy makers.
 And that DFID Vietnam has sufficient capacity to deliver all three outputs mentioned
above
There are also a set of assumptions at impact level which are important:
 That two or three coalitions gain sufficient momentum in 4 years to be self-sustaining
and/or impact real change on the ground.
 That the evolution of political change in Vietnam is positive and smooth.
 That working in coalitions – or collectively – is more effective than working individually
to promote policy change as suggested by the robust contextual experience and an
increasing international evidence base.
The VEAP Theory of Change is summarised in Diagram 4 below.
17
PROBLEM
The space for and
contribution of non-state
actors to debate, generate
evidence, influence policy
making and monitor its
implementation is limited.
The gap between (relatively
good) legislation and
implementation is
significant. Government
trust of non-state actors is
low and regulation restrictive
and unclear. Capacity of
non-state actors to engage
individually and collectively
is weak, and few suitable
platforms or coalitions
currently exist. Consensual
decision-making and
hierarchical structures in
Vietnam places additional
constraints on the
engagement of civil society.
INPUTS
Coalition
building (£4.0m)
Challenge fund
(£1.5m) for
CSOs
PROCESS
OUTCOMES
OUTPUTS
Stakeholder/
Political economy
analysis informs
issues and themes
choice; capacity
strengthened
Call for fund
mechanism
established based
on clear criteria;
capacity of local
NGOs enhanced.
All key
stakeholders acting
cooperatively to
address the needs
and aspirations of
Vietnamese people
as reflected in
media and
legislation.
Coalitions built to
deliver high quality
advice,
engagement and
challenge around
key issues
Small grants +
support results in
enhanced CSO
engagement in the
legislative and
oversight agenda of
the NA
Wide range of CSOs
more able to engage
on critical issues
Evidence generated
for policy making
and monitoring.
Evidence used
effectively
NOT INCLUDED IN VEAP OPTION – DONE BY THE UN
Regulatory
framework
strengthened (by
UN)
Redrafting of
regulatory framework
to facilitate CSOs’
monitoring and
accountability role
Review of and
dialogue on the
regulatory
framework
Assumptions: Broad based
coalitions are able to be formed in
the Vietnam context and that
Government remains open to
discussing with non-state actors.
Also, that the NA remains a force for
positive change in the country and
CSOs are capable of engaging on
key issues of public concern. Finally,
that there are issues of public
concern which cut across horizontal
and vertical levels.
Diagram 4: VEAP: Theory of change
18
Regulatory
framework
strengthened.
Assumptions: The key
assumption is that the limited
timeframe of the project will
enable robust, fully-fledged
coalitions to gain traction over
policy making. Also, the
political context matters as
there is a risk that there is
restricted space for CSOs to
operate. Finally, that policy
change leads to actual
impacts on inequality and
accountability.
IMPACTS
Increased opportunities
for Vietnamese citizens to
engage in decision making
processes affecting their
life and to hold decisionmakers to account.
Resulting directly from:
1.
Strengthened Policy
making
2.
Non-state actors
recognised and
accepted
3.
Issue based policy
and development
outcomes
Leading to indirect longer
term impacts:
1.
Inequality kept in
check
2.
Accountability
strengthened and
transparency
enhanced
B. Feasible options
DFID Vietnam has gone through a process of considering how best to support civil society,
and in our civil society strategy we considered numerous options. We have considered
and rejected at a first stage the following options:

Topping up other small funds, such as Finland’s Local Development Fund and the
EC’s Non State Actor Fund. Topping up existing small funds means we have limited
control over their design and scope. We also consider that the size of potential DFID
support would make these unwieldy. We would also lose strategic direction by joining
pre-existing and well-established funds.

Supplementing the FCO’s Strategic Programme Fund for Human Rights and
Democracy. The FCO’s Fund could be topped up but the Embassy would not have teh
staff to manage an enlarged fund. This would also reduce the scope of possible
applicants and not allow flexibility.

Providing separate resources to the UNDP directly for civil society engagement.
DFID’s support for the UN as a single entity in Vietnam means we cannot provide
project-level support. It would also diminish our direct influence over the programme,
and the UN does not have a comparative advantage working with CSOs in particular.
There are three feasible options for appraisal as follows. The counterfactual (no support
given) is included below.
Option 1: Single programme to support coalitions for change (cost: £4 million)
What it would involve
DFID would set up a new programme solely financed by the UK and contracted out to an
independent organisation capable of managing VEAP (INGO or private sector company).
The programme would consist of one component only: to foster, support and finance
coalitions which work in particular areas or on particular issues.
It would provide directive funding to NGOs, academia, think tanks, and mass organisations
and media to work around specific themes and develop coalitions over the course of the
programme. Only 3 or 4 themes would be adopted over the course of the programme. It
would also be able to work with Government and the NA. It is a supply-driven approach
which identifies opportunities and areas for engagement rather than demanding
proposals.
Diagram 1: Option 1
19
Independent Home
Issues-based coalitions Support Facility
(run by Managing Organisation, i.e. INGO, consortium or company
Issues based
Coalition
Example 1
Land reforms
Issues based
Coalition Example
2
Urban Planning
Issues based
Coalition 3
Environment Protection
Issues based
Coalition Example
4
EITI
The tentative budget for Option 1 is included in Annex 1
How it would work
The contracted Managing Organisation (MO) would have a six-month inception phase.
This would:
 Undertake a scoping study of active civil society in Vietnam as a starting point to
understand the issues/areas where organisations are engaged.
 Undertake political economy analysis (PEA) in key themes or issue areas (with
approximately 6-8 themes chosen for analysis). Initial themes to emerge during the
design could include land reforms, urban governance, environmental protection and
natural resources.
 Develop a set of prioritised issues based on the PEA in which there is (i) public
interest; (ii) policy reform possibility; (iii) range of stakeholders already engaged.
The criteria would include degree to which equity is central. The number of themes
selected will depend on the available resources of the programme.
 Outline a clear theory of change in selected themes and develop log frame for each
issue.
 Develop overall M&E framework for VEAP.
 Develop an overall communications strategy.
 Establish an independent advisory committee (outside the project) of people who
can provide comment, advice and suggestions.
Following approval from DFID of the outputs from inception phase, including the issues for
consideration, the MO would develop a rolling programme for each theme. This will
include:
 Identifying a coalition coordinator(s) who will act as focal point for all work in the
theme. The nature of the coalition depends on the theme but the proposal is that it
is informal, has clear objectives, has external dynamism and push and fits within the
overall objectives of VEAP. To be successful, coalitions must not be branded as
DFID-supported or VEAP-formed. However, at a policy level DFID would help push
and support the reform dialogue strategically.
 Sub-contracting parts of work to stakeholders identified, following due diligence.
This could be directed grants for research, advocacy, monitoring or piloting of
approaches to oversight/monitoring/advocacy. This can be at national, regional,
20



provincial or any other level deemed appropriate. Where local initiatives are
supported there should be a clear mechanism to ensure scale-up and replicability
from the outset.
Engaging with broader stakeholders: Develop working relations with parts of
Government, the CPV, National Assembly and mass organisations which support
reform or could block reform. This can be with research projects, joint programmes
to pilot, or provision of high quality technical assistance on key areas. This will
depend on the issue and need identified for supporting coalitions.
Selected elements of larger research (e.g. surveys) which strengthen the link
between Executive/Legislature and population can also be supported if they align to
the overall objectives of the programme. These can include public opinion surveys
on the performance of the National Assembly which would also feed into the M&E
of the programme. These will require pre-approval from DFID as part of M&E plan.
Ensure working with the media is supported in each of the coalitions. This is twofold in that coalitions have both media included as members as well as developing a
strong communications strategy as part of the approach of the coalition.
DFID would directly manage this project, using the advisory committee every six months to
provide expert comment, advice and critique. There would be no government agencies
involved in managing the project overall. However, the Managing Organisation would work
with the appropriate government counterpart for different initiatives and would obtain
authorisation as required by Vietnamese law. The Managing Organisation would suggest
appropriate internal governance arrangements.
Evidence for this option
There is limited evidence of issues based coalition work in Vietnam but there are examples
as set out in the strategic case. One of the most demonstrable one was the victory of the
campaign “to save the public Reunification Park”- known to be the “lungs” of Hanoi - from
being privatised to be turned into Disneyland by private companies in 2007. This grew into
a new campaign to reverse the subsequent decision by the Hanoi Authorities to give part
of the land of the Park to private companies to build a five star resort in 2009. A network
of outspoken professional individuals connected to government’s officials, journalists, the
Urban Planning Association, coordinated by the Canadian NGO HealthBridge, was
catalysed by a virtual public campaign by on line and print media. Four inter-related
factors brought about success: first, the people speaking out had sufficient and timely
access to information; second, they had personal connections to leaders at the appropriate
level and branch of government that makes decision, and are viewed as professional
experts who leaders will take seriously. Thirdly, success requires a support base in public
opinion that is in favour of the activists. Finally, the media is able to report and reflect
activists’ and the public’s views.16
There is a need to nurture and reinforce the checks and balances role of fragile and
nascent civil society outside the state. The home should be safe, where CSOs can get
support to develop “courageous” work as well as draw funds to implement them. The
institutional set up needs to be enabling, flexible, opportunistic and responsive to changing
circumstances, and persistent in keeping pushing for opening up space for policy dialogue.
An INGO with proven experience in policy and advocacy in Vietnam would be an ideal
option for such a “home”. This is because of the difficulties of external actors operating in
Vietnam without both a track record and a level of acceptance from Government.
16
Andrew Well-Dang. Informal Pathbreakers: civil society networks in China and Vietnam. A thesis
submitted to the University of Birmingham for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy. March 2011
21
Channelling funding through an INGO to support CSOs is a common modality for donors.
In the informal consultation on DFID’s Vietnamese Civil Society Strategy with government
agencies, all informants advised donors to channel the fund through an INGO which has a
proven record in this field. MPI’s official line is that it encourages donors to work through
INGOs. The advocacy–oriented INGOs (Oxfam, Action Aid, CARE, and The Asia
Foundation) have been pushing the boundaries and taking the “space” both for them and
to support local civil society to do policy and advocacy work. The common approach for
the INGOs’ policy/advocacy work in the last decade has been to fund research to provide
evidence to the relevant government institution in charge of the policy. Private companies
can also bring in international expertise and knowledge, and are increasingly being used
by donors in this area (e.g. JIFF).
International evidence set out in the strategic case shows that evidence of issues based
coalitions for change is limited, although the base is growing with some good country
examples of effective DFID programmes supporting coalitions. Thus we consider the
evidence supporting this case to be limited, but will use the experience to add to the
global knowledge and evidence bank. This option would be classified as an innovative
approach.
Impact on climate change and environment
This option involves issue-based advocacy. It therefore does not have direct negative
impact on the environment. Among the issues of public concern, environmental (e.g.
pollution, degradation of national resources) and climate issues could be an advocacy
agenda item. It is envisaged therefore that there will be an indirect positive impact on the
environment. There is a very small probability of more consultants/experts engaged in the
programme flying which increases carbon emission, and thus has a negative impact.
Categorisation: C (No / Low potential impact / Opportunity).
Option 2: Provide direct support to coalitions AND a NGO fund mechanism (cost:
£5.5 million)
What would Option 2 involve?
This option has two components, separately contracted. However, combined they make a
coherent package of support by addressing both supply/directive support and
demand/responsive support to CSOs and other stakeholders, working within and outside
Government.
 Component 1: A single £4 million programme to support coalitions for change,
exactly as described under option 1.
 Component 2: A £1.5 million support provided to a new NGOs Fund. This would be
co-financed with Danida, contracted out but with the Office of the National
Assembly acting as the Government counterpart.
Diagram 2 for Option 2
22
VEAP
DIAGRAM 2
Independent Home
ONA Home
Issues-based coalitions Support Facility
(run by Managing Organisation, i.e.
INGO, consortium or company)
Small grant scheme and TA to NGOs
(under auspices of ONA, co-funded with
Danida, run by the Fund and TA Manager)
Issues based
Coalition 1
Land
reforms
Issues based
Coalition 2
Urban
Planning
Issues based
Coalition 3
Environment
Protection
Issues based
Coalition 4
EITI
Grants Making to
NGOs through
Calls of funds
mechanism
TA and capacity
building to NGOs
The tentative budget for Option 2 is included in Annex 1.
How would Option 2 work?
Component 1:
This would be established and run exactly as described in above option 1. The only
addition would be a mechanism to coordinate and communicate between the two
components to ensure synergy as appropriate. We don’t propose an additional or
burdensome overarching management arrangement but a light-touch way by DFID staff to
share experience and harness benefits.
Component 2:
DFID would work with Danida to establish a civil society fund to provide small grants to
promote their engagement in law-making and policy development processes and
monitoring of law and policy implementation at national and sub-national levels. For
Danida this is part of a broader support, but DFID would only co-finance this component.17
The programme is at the final design stage and has the Government’s approval.
The objective of this component is to broaden the range of NGOs engaged in the policy
making process, creating space for small-scale initiatives which can work at local,
provincial and national levels. It is a demand-led fund and based on competition.
.
DFID would sign a delegated cooperation agreement with Danida, who would be
responsible for contracting and direct management of the funds. DFID would be engaged
by providing strategic oversight and direction and be represented on the selection panel.
17
DANIDA is in the process of designing phase two of the Good Governance and Public Administration
Reform (GOPA II), scheduled for 2011-2016. There are three components. The first two components of
GOPA II are going to focus on Public Administration Reform and Human Rights Education and Research
and housed at MOHA and VASS respectively which DFID will not support. The third component is on public
participation and accountability, with direct support to the NA and a NGOs fund. DFID will co fund the latter
one.
23
The Government home that has been identified and agreed for the fund is the Office of the
National Assembly, who will provide oversight and direct linkage into the policy and lawmaking processes. This component would be contracted out to a Fund Manager who will
control the funds and provide some targeted technical support and capacity building.
The total fund for this will be £3.1 million. Danida’s current budget for this subcomponent is
approximately £1.6 million (£1 million for the NGO fund and £600,000 for national and
international technical assistance). DFID would provide funding of up to £1.5 million, with
£1 million earmarked directly for the CSO fund.
The fund (currently called Public Participation and Accountability Facilitation FundPARAFF, but the name may change) will work in the following way:
 Maximum of two calls for proposals a year for 3 years based on a specific theme. In
the last year no more grants would be made.
 The maximum amount of each grant would be £25,000 with approximately 10-15
grants made in each round, depending on quality and size. This means the
proposed number of grants made is approximately 60-90 over the course of the
programme.
 The total (DFID+Danida) amount available for the grant mechanism itself is about
£2 million over the four years.
 Around £1,100,000 will be available for communications, M&E, technical
assistance, capacity building, important studies identified and cover the costs for a
professional fund manager.
 The themes for the call for proposals will focus on the legislative and oversight
agenda of the National Assembly for the next five years. This will be agreed upon
by the steering committee, but can be very broad or comparatively focussed.
The actual management arrangements for the fund are covered in more detail in the
management case.
Benefit of two components
The benefits of establishing a facility with an independent home forming coalitions through
a supply-led approach and a challenge fund responding to demand and innovation but with
the Government home are the following:
 Strategic oversight from DFID maximises synergies fro both sides. Formal
arrangements will be made to ensure cross-fertilisation.
 Best of both worlds: Depth, quality and independence from the coalitions
component; outreach, quantity and linkages to the Government and formal
institutions.
 Natural linkages of the programme back into the Government system, in particular
the legislature, with the ONA acting as a home for the NGOs fund.
 Recognition in the Strategic Case that working on supply and demand is imperative
to fostering trust and changing the relationship dynamic between society and the
state.
 Opportunities for harvesting the smaller engagements of the NGOs Fund into
broader-based coalitions. This would ensure that we can scale up good initiatives.
 Working with the National Assembly which is identified as one of the most
progressive and reforming elements of the Vietnamese state, with a clear mandate
and responsibility in this area.
 Opportunity to strengthen both horizontal and vertical accountability. Lesson
learning from working with different agencies would be cross fertilized.
24

Whilst these would be managed separately, built into the programme design would
be the opportunity for feedback, joint working and shared agendas and work plans.
Evidence (for component 2)
The NGO Fund was designed following the model of the Justice Initiatives Facilitation
Fund (JIFF), a component to support CSOs engagement in the Justice Partnership
Programme with the Ministry of Justice, supported by Danida, EC and SIDA. JIFF was the
first Challenge Fund for NGOs that was set up under the auspices of a government
ministry, approved by GoV. The purpose of JIFF is to enhance the capacity of NGOs to
contribute to awareness of rights and access to justice and judicial reforms. After a year in
operation, JIFF proved to be broadly working. The first call of proposals received 73
applications. 13 proposals have been awarded and projects are being implemented. For
the Vietnamese context, the fact that JIFF is up and running, making a call for funds,
receiving proposals able to reward the best based on transparent criteria, and winners are
implementing their projects is evidence of a success in itself. It is too early to measure the
impact the programme is having, which is why evidence is nascent. One lesson is the
need to be focussed in the call for proposals as scattered activities are not likely to
generate the critical mass needed for substantial change.
Significantly, the MoJ has been proven to be a good home for JIFF. Very nervous at first
with this perceived to be very politically sensitive component, MoJ started trusting in the
Fund Management Team and becoming a supportive host. Work plans, once approved by
the Steering Committee, were implemented smoothly.
The ONA has been home for many projects focusing on parliamentary reforms. However,
this NGOs Fund would be the first substantial project to facilitate CSOs’ engagement with
legislative and oversight functions of the National Assembly. The ONA would be the most
legitimate home. However, as development of civil society is still a sensitive issue, this
project cannot go beyond the legislative and oversight agenda of NA. Our consultations
with the ONA show they are willing for DFID to join.
As for option 1, the overall evidence of this approach in this context is considered as
limited. This is an innovative project and a difficult operating environment.
Impact on climate change and environment:
Similar to option 1, this does not involve construction or interventions that could potentially
pose direct risks to the environment and climate (again, very small likelihood of increased
emissions by more consultants/experts flying against business as usual). Also, civil
society would be provided space and capacity for better engagement in environmental
agenda. Categorisation: C (No / Low potential impact / Opportunity)
Option 3: Comprehensive approach: support to coalitions, CSO fund mechanism
AND strengthen the regulatory environment
What would Option 3 involve?
This option has three components which takes a comprehensive approach to the civil
society sector:
 Component 1: A single £4 million programme to support coalitions for change,
exactly as described under option 1.
 Component 2: A £1.5 million support provided to a new NGOs Fund, exactly as
described under option 2.
25
 Component 3: An accountable grant for small technical support of £0.5 million to
work with the Government to reform the legal and regulatory environment
governing civil society. This would be in coordination with the UK Charities
Commission working with the Ministry of Home Affairs.
Diagram 3 for Option 3
VEAP
DIAGRAM 3
ONA Home
Small grant scheme and TA to
NGOs
(under auspices of ONA, cofunded with Danida, run by the
Fund and TA Manager
Independent Home
Issues-based coalitions Support Facility
(run by Managing Organisation, i.e.
INGO, consortium or company
Issues based
Coalition 1
Land
reforms
Issues based
Coalition 2
Urban
Planning
Issues based
Coalition 3
Environment
Protection
Issues based
Coalition 4
EITI
Grants Making to
NGOs through
Calls of funds
mechanism
TA and
capacity
building to
NGOs
Accountable Grant
to Charities
Commission
Regulatory Framework
engagement
NGO sector
Review
Tools by
ISOS &
Charity
Commission
Follow up
Activities
With
ISOS/
MOHA
The tentative budget for Option 3 is included in Annex 1.
How would Option 3 work?
Components 1 and 2
These would be established and run exactly as described in above option 1 and 2.
Component 3:
In addition to the above components, DFID would agree an accountable grant with the
UK’s Charities Commission to work with the Ministry of Home Affairs to improve both the
legal framework and overall regulatory environment for domestic civil society.
The purpose would be to try to reopen the policy dialogue on the topic of regulatory
framework, which has been frozen in the last couple of years.
 DFID would agree an accountable grant with the UK’s Charities Commission to
open up engagement and to carry out the NGO Sector and Regulation Review Tool.
 It will work with the Institute for State Organisations Science (ISOS), a think tank
under the MOHA. They have indicated a willingness to engage.
 The NGO Sector and Regulation Review Tool is a tool to help countries undertake
an assessment of their NGO sectors. The Tool provides a methodology for
assessing the sector. Using it, the assessment team will be able to: (i) obtain
information on the NGO sector, its size, activities and diversity; (ii) map the
regulatory mechanisms in place; (iii) identify any gaps or weaknesses in the
regulatory coverage; (iv) assess the effectiveness of regulatory systems;
(v) identify strategic priorities.
26


This exercise would include a genuine consultation with the sector in order to
assess the effectiveness of the regulations and to recommend the improvements.
The component would also support the implementation of the strategy depending
on the political buy-in of MOHA. Following this review, we would assess whether
additional support was required.
Advantages of this additional component and a comprehensive approach:
This option provides the most complete support possible to strengthen both the demand
side of civil society and its regulatory environment. The critical advantage provided by
adding component 3 is opening up a dialogue channel with the Vietnamese authorities on
the sensitive issue of CSO regulation. It marks a higher level of ambition for DFID’s
support and would put us in the clear lead in this area across all development partners.
Evidence of component 3:
The UK Charities Commission has engaged successfully in a range of country contexts,
including in Asia. Most recently they have applied the tool to the NGO sector in the
Philippines and Indonesia and have had a positive outcome. It is a well developed tool
which can have success in bringing together stakeholders and mapping against externally
recognised normative standards for NGO/CSO regulation. 18
However, the applicability of the tool to a one party context depends very much on the
willingness of the Government to engage. Given the stalled dialogue on this issue it
remains unclear whether there is real political commitment within the Party or the
Government to allow external actors to really engage on this sensitive issue. There is no
evidence of other donors having had much success in this area to date. The UN is best
positioned as a more neutral partner to work on this area and is in the new One UN Plan
2012-2016.
Impact on climate change and environment:
The impact assessment is the same as under option 2, as the addition of the regulatory
component has no material difference to environmental/climate change risk.
Categorisation: C (No / Low potential impact / Opportunity)
Counterfactual: No DFID investment
The support by donors and INGOs to civil society is scattered and unfocused. If DFID
decides not to provide support to VEAP, it is likely that the expected benefits will not occur
and opportunities missed. In the absence of any other partners supporting coalitions on
key issues we will see a continuation of the status quo at best. By 2015, we would expect
trust between civil society and government to remain thin in the absence of opportunities
for them to work together. Policy making will remain top down and not take into account
the views and evidence of citizens. The economic case outlines in more detail what the
implications are of doing nothing. Below is the mapping of current support to civil society
by donors and INGOs. This suggests that some progress will be made but that it will be far
from optimal without DFID support.
UNDP supports a capacity building project with Vietnam Union of Sciences and
Technology Association ($1 million). The UNDP project objectives are to strengthen
VUSTA's capacity to represent its member organisations' interests in contributing to the
government's policy-making processes. UNDP is in the process of formulating specific
support in this area including engagement in regulatory framework.
18
For more detail see http://www.ngoregnet.org/
27
EU, Denmark and Sweden provide support, as mentioned above, to the Justice
Initiative Funding Dacility (JIFF) which was established in 2009 to provide grants to NGOs
within access to justice and related issues. JIFF has been assigned a total of Euro 3
million for 5.5 years, of which Euro 1.7 million are assigned for the grant scheme. Finland
operates a “Fund for Local Cooperation” on the themes of human rights and Governance,
Environmental Sustainability, Private Sector Partnerships. EUR 100,000 per year. Canada
operates a grant scheme on “Basic Needs” and “Participatory Governancne” for
Vietnamese NGOs at approximately 50,000 USD per grant. European Union provides
funding to European based NGOs for partnerships with Vietnamese NGOs on poverty
eradication and partnership building, EUR 7.7 million over 3-4 years. Irish Aid operates 4
grant programmes for NGOs in the period 2011-2015 directed towards disability, HIV/AID,
women, children, gender, trafficking, and transparency. The largest programme “Civil
Society Facility” will disburse Euro 1-1.5 milion per year for 4 years. The other
programmes are considerably smaller. The Asia Foundation, Oxfam and CARE proivide
a few small grants to local NGOs for policy and advocacy work
DFID, WB, SIDA Finland, Belgium, AUSAID provides support to the Vietnam AntiCorruption Initiative led by the Government Inspectorate by providing grants to the
winners local government agencies and CSOs to implement innovative projects to improve
transparency, accountability and fight against corruption. DFID has already committed
£750,000 over 6 years. In spite of this rather long list there is a real sense in the
consultations which we undertook as part of the preparation of VEAP is that there is a
clear gap in the current support provided. None of the existing funds, with the
exception of JIFF in the justice sector or VACI with the Government Inspectorate, try to
bridge the gap between governmmet and civil society. This is the critrical value added of
VEAP.
Summary table for rating evidence
In the table below we rate the evidence for each of the options.
Option
1
2
3
Evidence rating
Limited
Limited
Limited
Summary table for categorising climate change and environment risk and
opportunity
Option Climate change and environment risks Climate change and environment
and impacts, Category (A, B, C, D)
opportunities, Category (A, B, C, D)
1
2
3
C
C
C
C
C
C
C. Appraisal of options
Costs:
28
Option 1: Single programme to support coalitions for change
The costs of this option would be £4 million, which is funded solely by DFID.
Option 2: Provide direct support to coalitions AND a NGO fund mechanism.
The total costs of this option will be £7.1 million, of which DFID will pay £5.5 million.
Danida pays £1.6 million.
Option 3: Comprehensive approach: support to coalitions, NGO fund mechanism
AND strengthen the regulatory environment
The total costs of this option will be £7.6 million, of which DFID will pay £6 million. Danida
pays £1.6 million.
Counterfactual: Zero cost to DFID.
Benefits:
Option 1: Single programme to support coalitions for change
Social and Institutional/political
Coalitions will be formed to promote change in at least three areas of public concerns such
as land reforms, urban governance and environmental protection. Non-state actors such
as NGOs, research institutions, academia and media will have a chance to provide
evidence into developing and monitoring public policies that have potential big impacts on
poor/ordinary people’s lives. Policy making and monitoring processes on key issues
identified will be strengthened through better evidence and stronger participation in
decision- making processes. This will lead to more robust development of policies, which
in turn will be implemented more completely through continuous and effective monitoring
by citizens. The ultimate aim of this process will be to have public policies that are more
pro-poor, gender-sensitive, conducive to delivering better services, efficient and effective
in collection and use of resources (e.g. state budget, land, natural resources) that will
generate development outcomes for the poor.
Non-state actors’ importance will be recognised by showing that they can engage
positively. By ensuring coalitions have both state and non-state actors it is hoped that
multiple perspectives in policy making and monitoring will be gradually accepted as
important and necessary for Vietnam to ensure longer term sustainability and
development. Even though gender issues may not be picked up by the programme as key
issues of public concern, gender considerations will be mainstreamed into key issues
that the programme will focus on.
Economic:
Undertaking an economic appraisal of an empowerment and accountability programme
which is trying to influence change is widely recognised as challenging and merits several
caveats. Importantly, not all the benefits can be quantified and the economic appraisal
does not try to cover them all, but selects some particular benefits which may occur as a
result of the programme as a proxy. We look at the costs and benefits of the proposed
options for coalitions (land reforms, urban governance, environmental protection and
natural resources management) using available evidence to come up with the expected
changes/benefits and then available data to quantify these benefits. For details, please
see Annex 4 for the VEAP economic appraisal.
Based on the evidence outlined in the full Economic Appraisal, the expected benefits of
Option 1 would include:
29




more transparent, efficient and equitable use of land resources;
better access of the poor to more efficient public services such as housing;
transportation and water supply;
better governance in natural resource revenue;
reduced environmental pollution.
The quantified benefits using proxy indicators for Option 1 are:
 increase in land and natural resources tax revenue;
 efficiency gains in transportation, electricity and water expenditures for the poorest
10% in urban areas; and
 saving in private health cost for the poorest 20%.
The reason for using these proxy indicators are the likely areas of focus. There are
challenges quantifying benefits from the programme so the economic appraisal has set out
in a series of assumptions and likely areas of engagement what difference the programme
could make at impact level. It needs to be emphasised that VEAP would not make all the
contribution to the above results but a small fraction (the discount rate) of 0.1%. The
economic appraisal sets out in more detail the rationale underpinning this.
The Net Present Value of this option is £3.6 million the benefit cost ratio is 2.2.
Environmental: The issues will be identified by a political economy analysis during the
inception of the programme but it is likely to focus on environmental protection as one of
the key areas. Activities under environmental protection might focus on working with
environmental NGOs to increase citizens' participation in environmental monitoring from
water quality to Environmental Impacts Assessment and Strategic Environment
Assessment, improve citizen-government interface to address environment-related
grievances, promote better access to information related to the environment, support
policy research and advocacy efforts and linkages to the NA, and support sharing of
lessons learned and networking initiatives among environmental NGOs.
Option 2: Provide direct support to coalitions AND a NGO fund mechanism.
The costs for option 2 would be higher at £5.5 million, but these would associate with
additional benefits, in addition to the ones outlined in Option 1 as follows.
Social and Institutional/political:
Through the NGOs Fund mechanism, grants will be given to NGOs to carry out research
to provide evidence to the law- making and oversight agenda of the National Assembly in
the 13th tenure. The small grants mechanism will allow more NGOs to engage in much
more diverse thematic areas of the legislative and oversight agenda of the NA. As for the
NGOs’ engagement in the formulation of laws, research to contribute to preparation of bills
will be supported. With respect to the monitoring of public policies and the implementation
of laws, funds will be given to mobilise citizens to exercise their supervisory rights on
government agencies and citizens’ participation in fighting corruption. Likewise, this
mechanism will support initiatives that include strategies to make service delivery more
accountable. It will develop initiatives including complaints mechanisms, public information
campaigns, citizens’ report cards and score cards, community monitoring and social
audits, budget transparency and accountability strategies (public expenditure monitoring,
participatory auditing, the Open Budget Index etc.). In addition, the programme will
support initiatives to secure freedom of information and transparency, including initiatives
focused on making revenues from natural resources more transparent. The programme
30
will place emphasis on promoting public participation and accountability of ethnic
minorities.
The Gender Equality Law and the Law to Control and Prevent Domestic Violence are key
to the oversight agenda of the NA. The already strong and vocal gender NGOs would
continue to engage in monitoring of these important laws. Furthermore, the issues of
differential retirement age for women which is a key constraint to increase women’s
political participation will be a hot point of discussions at the NA in several upcoming laws:
revised Labour Code revised Social Insurance Law. So there will be venues for gender
activists to continue this long- standing fight. Also, MOHA is preparing a policy on quota
for women in representative bodies for the NA’s approval. Hence this is another important
issue for NGOs to engage in.
Training on key issues related to good governance, and in particular to public participation
and accountability, including budget analysis, as well as in programme management will
be delivered to NGOs. This training will help to strengthen NGOs’ capacity to engage.
The potential impacts of this successful NGOs Fund scheme are significant. The
importance of non state actors in policy making and monitoring would be officially
recognised by the NA, government and the Party. Spaces for CSOs would be more open.
Intensive NGOs’ engagement would lead to more evidenced-based, robust policy making
and monitoring.
The added value of having two components is that good small-scale initiatives may be
taken up within broader coalitions. Having a two- pronged approach is broadly recognised
during consultations as the most effective set up.
Economic:
In addition to the benefits outlined in Option 1, the additional issues likely to be covered by
Option 2 and the expected additional benefits are as follows.
 Improved access of the poor to education and health services;
 Efficiency gains in health and education expenditures for the 20% poorest;
 Efficiency gains in public investment;
 Increase in ethnic minority income;
 Improved opportunities for women to participate in economic, social and political
activities.
The additional quantified benefits using proxy indicators for Option 2 are:
 Efficiency gains in health and education expenditures for the 20% poorest;
 Increase in ethnic minority income.
We also note several benefits that we do not have data to value such as:
 Increase in wage employment for women;
 Strengthened voice and accountability, and democracy.
The net present value of Option 2 is £6.4 million. Even with a smaller chance (only 30%),
of success in tackling ethnic minority poverty, given the highly challenging nature of
reducing this stagnant poverty, the net present value of Option 2 is £6.1 million. The
benefit cost ratio of Option 2 is 2.48.
Environmental: The official legislative agenda of the NA is not yet available but it is likely
that it will target the following laws related to environment: revised Environment Law,
Water Law and Sea and Islands Law. Environmental protection is always included in
31
parliamentary oversight work, so it is highly likely that the already strong environmental
NGOs would not miss the opportunities to engage in this agenda.
Option 3: Comprehensive approach: support to coalitions, CSO fund mechanism
AND strengthen the regulatory environment
The costs for option 3 would be higher at £6 million, but these would associate with
additional benefits, on top of the ones outlined in Option 1 and Option 2 as follows.
A more facilitating regulatory framework for civil society actors to engage in policy
development and monitoring processes is expected after the implementation of the NGO
sector review tool. A better, more open and receptive environment for civil society
engagement in policy making and implementation can result in strengthened voice.
People, particularly the poor and marginalised sectors of the population can have more
voice and influence over decisions that affect their lives which would lead to:
 Enhanced transparency and accountability: The operations of governments and
development agencies are open up to public scrutiny and mechanisms are set up to
hold these agencies accountable for the implementation of policies
 Strengthened democracy: processes with civil society participation are often more
democratic and equitable, enabling citizens to share decision-making power with
elected representatives and other agencies.
There is no available evidence now for us to monetise these benefits. So we do not
quantify the benefits of a strengthened regulatory framework separately.
The net present value of Option 3 is £6 million. Including sensitivity on the limited chance
of success to reduce ethnic minorities’ stagnant poverty, the net present value of Option 3
is £5.7 million. The benefit cost ratio of Option 3 is lower than Option 2, given the
increased costs, at 2.27.
Sensitivity Analysis
In the EA we run sensitivity analysis around the key assumptions. These are captured in
summary below.
 Growth: if growth slows down we would expect revenue and sector expenditures,
and household expenditures to fall accordingly. A slow down to 4% would still mean
a strongly positive net present value, £5.4 million and a benefit cost ratio of 2.25 of
the preferred option, option 2.
 Ethnic minority situation: It has become very difficult to increase ethnic minority
welfare over the last five years. The chance of improving in this area is likely to be
smaller than in some other areas targeted by the programme. However reducing
the chance of success in this area does not affect much the benefit cost ratio or net
present value of all options.
 Targeted group of beneficiaries: the calculations involve health and education
expenditures that would benefit the 20% poorest of the general population,
transportation, electricity and water expenditures of the 10% poorest of the urban
population. Real poverty rates are lower, for example at 13% of the general
population and 4% for the urban population in 2010. If the gains are calculated for
smaller groups, e.g. 10% poorest of the general population and 5% poorest of
urban population, the net present value and benefit cost ratio are still £3.2 million
and 1.73 for option 2.
32
In case of growth slowing down to 4%, and targeted groups being halved, these figures
are still $2.49 million and 1.58 respectively.
Balance of costs and benefits:
The results of the cost-benefit analysis of all three options are outlined above. All options
have high positive net present values and benefit cost ratios bigger than 1. Option 2 has
the highest NPV at £6.4 million and BCR at 2.48. The relevant figures for option 3 are £6
million, and 2.27, and option 1 £3.6 million and 2.2. We do not quantify the benefits of
component 3, present only in option 3 only. So its figures are relatively underestimated
compared to those of the other options. All figures are likely to represent underestimated
total monetized amounts of benefits that the programme can help bring about. We use a
very modest rate of efficiency gains - only 0.1% of spending that the programme expects
to improve. However, attribution from the programme is very difficult to assess given the
nature of the intervention. We do not quantify several other benefits or benefits that could
continue well after the programme completes as changes take root.
It should be clear from the above description that while monetary values can be put on
some of the expected benefits, many of the most significant benefits cannot be monetised.
The true net benefit taking into account the non-valued elements is likely to be much
higher.
A comparison of the three options in purely economic cost-benefit terms showed that
Option 2 is the preferred Option. The economic appraisal shows that the benefit that can
be monetised will exceed the costs of the programme. The potential benefits are of a
sufficient magnitude that missing one or two of them would still justify the cost of the
programme. The likelihood of achieving these benefits is sufficiently greater for Option 2
to justify the additional costs. Option 2 is also likely to generate significant benefits, which
will also offset the increased cost of the option.
Identifying preferred option
Comparison of the costs and benefits above indicates that Option 2 not only offers a
greater likelihood of achieving the primary benefits (qualitative and quantitative), but also
offers the prospect of secondary benefits from project funding that would be likely to
outweigh the additional cost. By having these two components together there is a far
more powerful possibility created for synergy, outreach and real impact. Based on the
above analysis and the comparison of benefits to costs, Option 2 (Issues based
coalitions and NGO Fund though ONA home) is identified as the preferred option.
Decisive factors are:
 It offers the greatest potential for building the linkages that are key to the
programme impact and outcome.
 It helps to spread the risk by having two components. Including the ONA
component ensures safer official home to safeguard monitoring and accountability
work by CSOs and promotes Government and official buy-in to the process.
 It will also have flexibility to work with different stakeholders and respond to
opportunities.
 The advantage of having the option 2 with the ONA means it is more closely tied
into the legislative agenda of the Government.
 The NGO fund ensures the breath of coverage and the scale of outreach to NGOs
across the country. Having a greater number of engaged CSOs means that there is
a greater potential to link up between components.
 Finally, as DFID moves into the last five years of its presence in Vietnam, the
management capacity will diminish as we draw down staff. Whilst option 1 is the
33
most easily manageable with one fund, the addition of the NGO fund component 2
will be initially resource-intensive but by year 2 it will be smooth running with
delegated cooperation in place. We have built into this option strong management
from external contractors as fund managers to ensure that DFID’s input is at a
strategic rather than operational level.
Adding an accountable grant to work on the regulatory framework would significantly
increase the burden on DFID while the hard work may not be paid off in this politically
sensitive environment. This would mean that, looking across our portfolio, we would have
to leave this work for the UN and others. This effectively excludes option 3 from the
preferred option.
The likelihood that this programme will also increase the impact of other DFID
programmes in Vietnam such as the Anti- Corruption Strategic Fund, economic and
governance trust funds with the World Bank and the UN, and our climate change
programme provides an additional justification for investing in this programme rather than
using the money in other ways. There may also be synergies with MDG programmes as
DFID begins to phase out (e.g. HIV-AIDS financing coalition or services for ethnic
minorities). These will be explored during the inception phase.
E. Measures to be used or developed to assess value for money:
The economic appraisal looks at a number of measures to assess value for money, such
as net present value and benefit cost ratio. The appraisal uses a number of financial
proxies to value the expected benefits. We will ensure a baseline assessment is carried
out in each of the specific areas of engagement identified by the inception phase. We will
also monitor the outcomes and impacts, and analysis to verify the benefits and the value
for money indicators claimed in the economic appraisal.
We will adopt a number of other measures including:




Ensuring that technical assistance overheads are commensurate with the market
rates.
Require CSOs receiving grants from the programme to embed value for money
monitoring, for example reporting on unit costs.
Prioritise capacity building for CSOs in order to sustain results beyond the life of the
programme as part of the coalition and ‘learning by doing’.
Develop weights to attach to the more challenging but rewarding areas of
intervention, e.g. ethnic minority poverty/livelihoods, to adjust for the importance
DFID attaches to the pro-poor and gender agendas.
3. Commercial Case
A. Clearly state the procurement/commercial requirements for intervention
This project involves both direct and indirect procurement. We will provide support to
coalitions through a contract signed with a Managing Organisation selected from the
competitive bidding (direct) and support a civil society fund through a delegated
cooperation arrangement signed with Danida (indirect). Danida will contract a Fund and
TA Manager for this component.
34
B. How does the intervention design use competition to drive commercial
advantage for DFID?
Component 1.
The programme’s results are process oriented and specific objectives/outcomes will not be
available right at the start. Issues will be identified during the inception phase (in the first
six months). We will sign a two-phase output-based contract, of which the output of the
inception phase will be the political economy analysis and agreement on individual log
frames for coalitions/issues. Specific outcomes will be articulated in each of the policy
areas on which the programmes will work in Phase 2. Once the contract enters the main
phase, we will amend the TOR and contract, setting out results based project outcomes for
the supplier. The pricing model that pays by results on the quarterly basis will be applied.
Performance will be monitored by DFID.
We will work closely with PrG to ensure the development of a well thought through ToR
that sets out clear expectations of suppliers regarding:
• The application of DFID Standard Terms & Conditions of contract; and
• The application of DFID Policies and Standards (e.g. travel & living expenses for supplier
staff)
Component 2:
Although we will agree a delegated cooperation arrangement with Danida and rely on their
performance processes, we will ensure that DFID is part of the selection committee for the
Fund and TA Manager and sits on the Steering Committee.
C. How do we expect the market place will respond to this opportunity?
The market views these opportunities (both components 1 and 2) positively hence DFID’s
bargaining power is high. This type of work is attractive to International NGOs working in
Vietnam as well as private companies who may not be based in Vietnam but are interested
in this specific area.
There will be a relatively competitive supply base for the required services and there are
several suppliers with the skills, scale and capacity to do the work. The nature of VEAP
requires a specific set of skills including sensitivity to the political context. Likely bidders
may need to either form consortia with other bidders or subcontract a significant proportion
of the service provision.
The main supplier (Managing Organisation) plays an extremely important role and will add
value to the programme through (i) deep local knowledge, experiences and skills on nonstate actors’ engagement in policy making, (ii) deep knowledge about the policy making
and policy monitoring process in Vietnam, (iii) ability to grasp opportunities to influence the
process, (iv) ability to coordinate various components and (v) strong financial and human
resources. These will be fully reflected as the evaluation criteria in the Invitation to Tender.
D. What are the key underlying cost drivers? How is value added and how will we
measure and improve this?
VEAP will mainly procure services and spend only a small proportion of the budget on
buying equipment in the beginning to set up the Managing Organisation’ office. Therefore
two main cost drivers that can impact the total cost of this project are (i) possible double
management fee if subcontractors are selected to do various parts and (ii) goods inflation
35
(in addition to raising general living costs, goods inflation can affect the cost of services
such as consultancy and its related charges).
Although it is unavoidable to give work to some subcontractors given the diversified and
complex nature of this programme, the possible double management fee (main and sub
contractors) will be taken into account carefully, both at the Invitation to Tender stage and
at the contract negotiation stage to ensure DFID achieves value for money.
E. What is the intended Procurement Process to support contract award?
PrG confirmed that there is not a suitable Framework Agreement for this, so we decided to
run competitive bidding. The selected route is the Restricted Procedures under the EU
Procurement Directives. The minimum timeframe for this process is approximately four to
six months after the project is officially approved. We will work closely with PrG throughout
the process.
For component 2 Danida will follow the same procurement procedures using OJEU.
F. How will contract & supplier performance be managed through the life of the
intervention?
Component 1. The contract will clearly state the main contacts from the supplier and also
that supplier has clear points of contact in DFID for both contractual and technical issues.
This is to ensure a clear and smooth communication between both sides from the
beginning. The contract will specify the key elements of the way the project will be carried
out, including a plan, deliverables and expectations. There will be a risk register which
clearly defines who is responsible for which risks. The programme progress/Managing
Organisation’s performance will be reviewed on a quarterly basis. This ensures close and
smooth communication between DFID and the MO. The MO, through this formal channel,
will communicate with DFID at an early stage if they think that things are potentially going
wrong. Remedial action can be taken in a timely manner.
Component 2. Danida will be the primary contact point for management, with DFID
delegating authority to them. However, we will work with Danida to ensure similar
milestones and performance tranches are developed and included in the contract and over
the life of the programme.
4. Financial Case
A. How much it will cost
The total cost of the programme will be £5.5 million over 4 years. Below is the budget:
Option 2: medium
Components
Issues based coalitions
Management fee
M&E
Small grants scheme through
ONA
Management fee
Total
3,200,000
600,000
200,000
2012/13
400,000
112,500
37,500
2013/14
1,200,000
150,000
50,000
2014/15
1,000,000
150,000
50,000
2015/16
600,000
187,500
62,500
1,250,000
160,000
445,000
320,000
325,000
250,000
62,500
62,500
62,500
62,500
36
5,500,000
772,500
1,907,500
1,582,500
1,237,500
The financial costs are fixed as the programme is due to end in March 2016. There is no
scope for time or cost extension.
B. How it will be funded: capital/programme/admin
Funding will come from DFID Vietnam programme budget.
C. How funds will be paid out
Direct procurement: PrG will sign a contract with the selected Managing Organisation
and they will be reimbursed quarterly in arrears on satisfactory performance.
Indirect procurement: Donors, including DFID Vietnam will sign a joint MOU with ONA. In
addition to the joint MOU, DFID Vietnam will sign a delegated co-operation arrangement
with DANIDA and transfer contributions twice per year to an account created by DANIDA
for this project.
D. How expenditure will be monitored, reported, and accounted for
Direct procurement:
The Managing Organisation will submit a quarterly financial statement to DFID and a
forecast for the next quarter, which can be used for financial planning.
Any capital assets procured under this Intervention will be treated in accordance with DFID
procedures. Should assets remain at the end of the Intervention they will be returned to
DFID Vietnam.
Rigorous monitoring and accounting of expenditure will take place using the ARIES
system and DFID Vietnam procedures for inspecting invoices to ensure value for money
and compliance with agreed budgets.
Indirect procurement:
The expenditures will be closely monitored through four main reports submitted by Danida,
including: (i) the annual progress report; (ii) the annual financial statement, (iii) the audit
report of the preceding fiscal year and (iv) the work plan and budget for the subsequent
fiscal year.
5. Management Case
A. Oversight
The primary stakeholders for this programme, in addition to DFID and DANIDA and any
other donors are the Office of National Assembly (ONA), the state and non state actors
engaging in the coalitions for change, the NGOs benefiting from the NGOs Fund their
beneficiaries and constituents (indirectly), and the implementing partners (Fund Managers
and NGOs) .
Donor oversight
37
Component 1: Issues based coalitions
DFID will directly steer the Managing Organisation, using the advisory committee to
provide expert comment, advice and critique. DFID will have steering meetings with the
Managing Organisation initially at three month intervals, moving to six month intervals after
March 2013.
The key roles for the steering meetings will be:
 Review of overall strategy , the selection of Issue-based projects
 Reviewing and discussing periodic monitoring reports from the Managing
Organisation.
 Discussing implications for future strategy.
 Advising on any other strategic decisions.
Component 2: Support to NGOs Fund
DFID, DANIDA and ONA will be on the Steering Committee for Component 2: The
Steering Committee will initially meet at three month intervals, moving to six month
intervals after March 2013. Key roles for the Steering Committee for Component 2 will be:
 Approve the substantial criteria for applications eligible for PARAFF funding,
including procedures and changes to these.
 Approve the grant types eligible for PARAFF support (core support, project support,
and capacity development support).
 Approve the TA programme (developed by the Fund Manager)
 Approve members of the Grants Advisory Committee tasked with the responsibility
of review and approval of grant applications.
 Approve theme, scope and timing for Calls for Proposals.
 Approve annual work plans and budgets.
 Approve the reports from the Fund & TA Manager.
 Decide on recommendations made by programme reviews.
 Review, comment and/or adopt audit process and audit reports.
 Management of the Fund & TA Manager, including regular performance
assessments.
The Fund and TA Manager will brief the Steering Committee on issues and progress.
However, all decision making will remain with DFID and DANIDA and other possible
donors as agreed in the funding arrangements.
By steering both parts of the programme, DFID will ensure synergy and avoid overlaps.
B. Management
DFID management arrangements
The programme will be managed by DFID Vietnam. The Social Development Sector
Manager will be the Project Officer/lead advisor, with support from the Governance
Advisor. The Project Officer will lead the preparation and the implementation of the
programme with inputs from other advisors and Programme Support Officer as relevant
and appropriate in DFID Vietnam. The Project Officer will represent DFID on the Steering
Committees. The Embassy will also be closely involved in the implementation of the
programme and consulted and included at key points as part of DFID’s graduation plan.
Project Management for Component 1: coalition building
DFID will sign a contract with a Managing Organisation to oversee Component 1: issues
based coalitions through a restricted competitive bidding process. The Managing
Organisation will carry out the political economy analysis to identify issues and develop
38
projects on the identified issues. It will eventually sign sub contracts with the main
implementers of the issues based projects as required. Relevant DFID advisers will
provide technical inputs into the issues-based projects and areas of research.
The Managing Organisation will propose a programme team to DFID, as part of their
contract negotiations. Detailed management arrangements will be developed by the
Managing Organisation, and agreed by DFID. Work will be organised around issues. To
facilitate the development of informal coalitions, the Managing Organisation will appoint an
Issue Based Coordinator for each of the issues around which activities will be organised.
Where possible this will be local person with existing networks that are relevant for building
the coalition. The person will ideally also be technically respected in the area the coalition
will work on. To maintain synergy and linkages between different issues, the programme
team will need a Programme Coordinator with an overview of all sub components of the
programme.
Project Management for Component 2: Support to NGOs Fund housed at ONA
A Joint MoU between DANIDA, DFID and ONA will be signed. DFID will also sign a
Delegated Cooperation Agreement with DANIDA to channel the DFID’s funding though
DANIDA. The Steering Committee by DANIDA, DFID and ONA will recruit the Fund and
TA Manager through a competitive bidding process. DFID will only prioritise strategic
engagement in this component, leaving the day- to- day management to DANIDA and the
Fund and TA Manager.
Coordination mechanism
Coordination between the two components will be important to the overall success of the
programme. We will establish a coordination committee which will meet quarterly to make
sure we are maximising cross-learning and synergy from VEAP’s two components.
See Diagram 5 for the VEAP Management Structure.
39
VEAP MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE
DIAGRAM 5
DFID VEAP Management Team
(SDA, Governance adviser
FCO Political officer, PSO)
Steering Committee
(Danida, DFID, ONA)
Advisory Committee
Grants Advisory
Committee
Managing Organisation
Programme Management Team
IBC 1
Land
reforms
NGOs
Research
Orgs
Academia
Gov
Media
NA
IBC 2
Urban
Planning
NGOs
Research
Orgs
Academia
Gov
Media
NA
IBC 3
Envmt
Protection
NGOs
Research
Orgs
Academia
Gov
Media
NA
Fund & TA
Manager
IBC 4
EITI
NGOs
Research
Orgs
Academia
Gov
Media
NA
Grants
Making to
NGOs
through
Calls of
funds
mechanism
Capacity
building
to CSOs
C. Conditionality
There is no conditionality.
D. Monitoring and Evaluation:
Evidence weak or strong? VEAP uses both ‘inside track’ influencing approaches, working
closely with decision-makers and ‘outside track’ influencing approaches using evidence,
science-based advocacy for policy change, better service delivery and people
empowerment. Evidence on the proposed approaches at a relatively small scale tested by
similar support by UN agencies, research institutions and NGOs in Vietnam is medium.
The programme will gather better qualitative and quantitative evidence on the approach. It
will also test if the approach will be effective at a larger scale (on broad policy issues and
at national level).
What will be monitored and how? To address the challenge of monitoring and measuring
impact of this complex programme of policy influencing, a detailed Monitoring and
Evaluation Framework (the M&E framework) will be set up by an independent expert on
M&E during the first six months of the programme. It will be monitored by dedicated M&E
staff and used by the programme management to monitor progress and to evaluate
programme’s success in terms of its effectiveness, impact and sustainability. The Theory
of Change developed based on the evidence and the log frame will serve as a basis for
the development of this framework.
40
During the programme inception phase, the political economy analysis will identify the
themes for the Issues based Coalitions component to focus on. The M&E Framework will
then further fine tune the indicators in the current log frame, associated with quality of
media coverage and political debate, quality of coalitions, strengthening CSOs’
participation in policies and laws development; the ability of CSOs to hold public officials to
account; improvements in policies and laws development, and improved ability for civil
society advocacy. It will also fine tune the impact indicators such as the policy changes
and impacts on people’s lives. The log frame will be revised to incorporate the above
mentioned indicators, and to adjust baselines, targets and monitoring and evaluation tools.
A further review of the Monitoring and Evaluation Framework will be undertaken, in
consultation with DFID’s Evaluation Department.
The programme management will ensure that the Managing Organisation and the Fund
Manager measure the programme’s outputs by using programme’s reporting based on
various tools such as logs of activities and media log, users’ surveys, quality assessment
tool.
The programme is monitored at several levels through the following tools: (i) The
programme overall Log frame; (ii) Issues based projects log frames and sub log frame for
the NGOs Fund component; and (iii) Managing Organisation and Fund Manager’ quarterly,
annual reports and mid term review
Reporting: (i) Quarterly financial reporting; (ii) Initially quarterly and then six monthly
progress reports for both components; and (iii) Midterm review reports. Within DFID, we
will use ARs, PCRs, on top of the reports mentioned above.
Evaluation: The M&E system with the monitoring tools listed below will generate the data
(both quantitative and qualitative) and analysis that can then be used for a more formal
(external, episodic) evaluation of the programme and its outcome/impact. There will be a
thorough (possibly independent) mid-term review in September 2013 to assess progress
(using the log frame indicators) and to evaluate the programme results in terms of its
effectiveness and initial policy impact. Also, the programme will consider an independent
evaluation on policy impact, effectiveness, and sustainability and a lessons learning study
at the end of the project.
Data for monitoring and evaluation: Due to the complex nature of policy influencing and
the difficulty in attribution, a combination of specific methods designed for monitoring and
tracking policy impacts of VEAP will be used as follows:




Document logs, media tacking logs and media assessments of tangible products
.e.g. researches, media briefings, events supported by the programme. The
programme may establish a set of criteria against which the quality of the products
will be judged.
An uptake logs: a database where comments, anecdotes and examples of ‘uptake’
about the use of researches or advice or influence are recorded.
Users’ Surveys: small or medium-scale questionnaires and focus groups discussion
(e.g. NA deputies and staff) to ascertain how much and in what way, target
audiences use and value the outputs provided.
RAPID outcome assessment: drawing on the outcome mapping tool and the RAPID
group’s framework for understanding the influence of research on policy.
41

Quality assessment tools: will be developed within the first 6 months of the
programme by independent consultancy and used annually to assess the quality of
media coverage, political debates and quality of the coalitions.
Baseline data on all indicators of the log frame especially on quality and the level of
influence by CSOs on policy making and oversight will be collected at the beginning of the
programme, as part of the political economy analysis. The programme will use secondary
data sources from the National Assembly e.g. the Public Opinion Surveys on Images of
the National Assembly, the World Bank CPIA, and others, whenever relevant.
Resources for M&E: Sufficient capacity for M&E will be staffed and the programme will
reserve a budget of around £200,000 for M&E activities.
E. Risk Assessment
This project has shared risks between a relatively medium risk element (the NGO fund)
and the much higher risk element which is the coalition building. The overall risk of the
project is assessed as high.
 Political risks: That Government is not willing to engage – and may shut down the
space for engagement, which could be exacerbated if the issues chosen are too
sensitive or cross the invisible red lines of policy discussion. Also, both components
one and two rely on the fact that the National Assembly continues on its current
reformist path under a new Chairman. Our analysis currently suggests that whilst
difficult the programme remains feasible and that the space for engagement will not be
entirely closed down. Probability low, impact high. Mitigation: This risk will be
mitigated by sound political economy analysis built into the programme and political
engagement by the UK under the Strategic Partnership. If signs are that the political
space makes it impossible for the programme to function we will look for other avenues
to provide support to civil society. At a more macro level, the programme assumes that
the evolution of political change in Vietnam is positive and without shocks. If dramatic
change does occur we will need to adjust the direction of our support.
 Implementation risks: That coalitions which cut across different interests (i.e.
sufficiently broad) are not able to be built. This would subsequently result in a
confrontational rather than constructive engagement which would be a sure path to
failure in Vietnam. This risk relates to the theory of change in which evidence provided
would lead to positive policy outcomes. This is a risk due to the opaque link between
the evidence and the policy making process in Vietnam. Policy- making processes in
Vietnam have been more politically driven instead of being evidence – based. .
Probability low, Impact medium Mitigation: Identification of issues well founded on
evidence. Strong and well-connected programme management and Advisory Board.
The coalitions will work politically, formally and informally; with the relevant policies
drafting teams and other institutions and individuals to foster changes
 Operational risks: That there is not a basic minimum of capacity already within civil
society which is able to bid and manage small grants of sufficient interest and impact
that it can be taken to scale. There is also a risk that the complicated management
arrangements fail to ensure adequate synergy between different components.
Probability medium, Impact high. Mitigation: This is mitigated by establishing clear
mechanisms for reporting and information sharing, and by having a robust
management team which can ensure that discrete activities add up to more than the
42
sum of their parts. There will also be basic capacity building of CSOs to ensure
compliance and ability to manage funds.
 Financial (fraud and corruption) risks: There are substantial risks of corruption
occurring with the NGOs Fund (bribery of evaluation panel, influence over results etc)
which will be mitigated by strict criteria and independence of panel (see Danida
proposal for this). There are also risks for mismanagement of resources due to lack of
capacity in local NGOs. This is a serious risk which will need to be monitored on an ongoing basis with due diligence of the basic systems of the recipients built into the
management functions. Probability medium, Impact high Mitigation: We cannot
entirely mitigate this risk due to the nature of the programme but will ensure sound
systems are established to minimise exposure. Annual financial as well as performance
and VfM audits are built in.
 Sustainability risks: There is a serious risk that the programme is not sustained
beyond its closure. This programme will only last for four years. This provides only
limited time for three or four coalitions to gain sufficient momentum to be self-sustaining
and/or impact real change on the ground. Probability medium, Impact medium.
Mitigation: To mitigate this we will work closely with other development and political
actors, especially the FCO, to ensure longer term support to successful change actors
and groups. We are also working with the World Bank and the UN to ensure a strong
multilateral legacy in Vietnam able to work on these issues. Also, from the outset we
will build in sustainability as a key dimension of each coalition.
F. Results and Benefits Management:
The key to results for this programme will be documenting and monitoring a clear story of
change, of how the programme’s interventions are contributing (or not) to processes that
have the potential to lead to transformational change. The Log frame sets out in more
detail how we will monitor progress (attached in annex 3).
The measurable output targets – for example numbers of researches, workshops
conducted, trainings delivered to NGOs may not assist with monitoring of the all-important
processes such as role of CSOs being recognised, improved policy making and monitoring
process. So whilst these indicators have value as descriptors of the reach of the
programme, and its secondary impact, they are not the prime means to tell whether the
programme is on track. The section on monitoring and evaluation explains the plan for the
monitoring and evaluation framework that will be put in place to monitor these all-important
qualitative indicators of change at the outcome and impact levels.
The story of change will also include social and institutional changes that the programme
activities will have plausibly contributed to. This will feed into an office-wide monitoring
framework, developed alongside DFID Vietnam’s Operational Plan, which outlines the
sorts of wider change that DFID’s programmes will not directly deliver, but are designed to
influence.
Annexes:
Annex 1: Budgets for Options
Annex 2: VEAP Log frame
Annex 3: VEAP Economic Appraisal
43