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Qu,W, Ee,M, Liu,L, Wise,V and Carey,P 2015, Corporate governance and
quality of forward-looking information: evidence from the Chinese stock
market, Asian Review of Accounting, vol. 23, no. 1.
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Corporate governance and quality of forward‐looking information Evidence from the Chinese stock market Wen Qu and Mong Shan Ee Deakin Graduate School of Business, Deakin University, Burwood, Australia Li Liu School of Accounting, Economics and Finance, Deakin University, Burwood, Australia Victoria Wise Deakin Graduate School of Business, Deakin University, Burwood, Australia, and Peter Carey School of Accounting, Economics and Finance, Deakin University, Burwood, Australia Abstract Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to investigate the association between corporate governance mechanisms and quality of forward‐looking information in the Chinese stock market which presents a mandatory disclosure environment for forward‐looking information. Design/methodology/approach – Using sales forecasts to proxy forward‐looking information and using precision and accuracy to measure the quality of information disclosure, the authors investigate the impact of corporate governance attributes on the precision and accuracy of sales forecasts made by listed Chinese firms in their 2010 annual reports, using logistics and ordinary least squares regressions. Findings – The authors find good corporate governance has a positive and significant impact on the precision choice of sales forecasts disclosure. Firms with good corporate governance are more likely to disclose more precise sales forecasts than providing qualitative discussions on firms’ sales trend. In addition, good corporate governed firms are found more likely to provide precise non‐financial information. The authors also find that good corporate governance is positively associated with making more conservative sales forecasts disclosure. However, the authors find no significant relationship between good corporate governance and smaller forecast error. Research limitations/implications – The study makes significant contributions to corporate disclosure literature. The authors investigate the determinants of the quality of forward‐looking information in a mandatory disclosure regime while most forward‐looking information disclosure literature have been conducted in a voluntary‐based disclosure environment. The authors examine whether in a mandatory disclosure regime, corporate governance mechanisms can play a positive role in precision choices and accuracy of forward‐looking information. Further, the study is the first to examine corporate governance and the quality of non‐financial forward‐looking information (sales target and production goal). The research findings therefore extend forward‐looking information disclosure research from financial information to non‐financial information. Practical implications – The empirical findings will provide regulators with evidence on the quality of forward‐looking information in a mandatory disclosure regime and the influence of corporate governance on forward‐looking disclosure. The properties of forward‐looking information disclosure in China should be of interest to policy makers, investors and financial analysts in other international jurisdictions. Originality/value – The study investigates forward‐looking information in a mandatory disclosure regime while most extant forward‐looking information studies have been conducted in a voluntary disclosure environment. The study is the first to examine the quality of non‐financial forward‐looking information such as operational goals and plans, and to investigate the association between the quality of non‐financial forward‐looking information and corporate governance mechanisms. The research findings extend forward‐looking information disclosure research from quantitative financial information to quantitative non‐financial information. Keywords Corporate governance, Forward‐looking information Paper type Research paper 1. Introduction The importance of forward‐looking information to capital market efficiency has been acknowledged by market regulators worldwide (American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, 1994; Financial Accounting Standards Board, 2001; Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants, 2002). While prior research investigating forward‐ looking information is limited to the voluntary context, China provides an ideal research setting to investigate the quality of forward‐looking information as in China, it is mandatory for all listed firms to disclose forward‐looking information including sales forecasts, cost forecasts, capital investment plans in annual reports, with the exception of earnings forecast disclosure which is still voluntarily based. In this study, we investigate the impact of corporate governance on the quality of forward‐looking information disclosed by listed Chinese firms in their 2010 annual reports. Due to the availability of data, our investigation focuses on one type of forward‐looking information mandatorily required – sales forecasts. Sales forecasts made by listed Chinese firms are in three forms: general discussion of sale trend; sales forecasts through disclosing either point‐estimate, open‐interval (e.g. minimums and maximums) or close‐interval (e.g. ranges) dollar value in sales and sales forecasts through disclosing planned production volume or goals. Although planned production volume or goals are not exactly sales forecasts, they are closely related to sales. Thus we use “planned production volume or goals” as the proxy of non‐financial sales forecasts. In this paper, we define the general discussion of sale trend as qualitative sales forecasts disclosure; we define sales forecasts through dollar value (point estimate, open and close‐interval sales forecasts) as quantitative financial sales forecasts and; we define planned production volume or goals as quantitative non‐financial sales forecasts. In a disclosure environment where forward‐looking information is mandatorily required, the first decision managers have to make is the type of information they wish to provide to investors, via the precision of the forecast (Karamanou and Vafeas, 2005). Forecast precision ranges from first, point‐
estimate forecasts, second, close‐interval forecasts (e.g. ranges), third, open‐interval forecasts (e.g. minimums and maximums), to fourth, qualitative description or discussion on future trend. Prior studies regard the first three types of forecasts as more precise information disclosures (Baginski and Hassell, 1997; Bamber and Cheon, 1998; Karamanou and Vafeas, 2005). Prior studies also suggest that precise forecasting information is more value‐relevant than imprecise forecasting information, and precision choices yield insight into management disclosure behaviour in respect of what type of forecasting information management would like to disclose to investors (Baginski and Hassell, 1997; Bamber and Cheon, 1998; Karamanou and Vafeas, 2005). For those firms making precise sales forecasts, the accuracy of such forecasts is the other property examined by prior studies to assess disclosure quality. Prior studies adopt two methods measuring the accuracy of forward‐looking information: absolute forecast error and forecast bias. Absolute forecast error measures the magnitude of forecast error – how close the forecasted figure is to the actual result. The lower the error, the more accurate the forecast is (Firth and Smith, 1992; Jelic et al., 1998; Chen et al., 2001; Karamanou and Vafeas, 2005; Ajinkya et al., 2005). Forecast bias exhibits whether firms bring conservatism or optimism into their forecasting (Firth and Smith, 1992; Jelic et al., 1998; Karamanou and Vafeas, 2005; Ajinkya et al., 2005). We find corporate governance has a positive and significant impact on the precision choice of sales forecasts disclosure. Firms with effective corporate governance mechanisms are more likely to disclose more precise sales forecasts than providing qualitative discussions on firms’ sales trend. In addition, firms with effective corporate governance mechanisms are found more likely to provide precise non‐financial information. Although we find no significant relationship between corporate governance and smaller forecast error and more conservative sales forecasts when testing all the firms making precise financial sales forecasts, our additional test shows that when we focus on the firms with sales forecasts and actual results are not in the same direction (e.g. forecasts sales decreasing while actual sales increases; and forecasts sales increasing while actual sales decreasing), corporate governance is significantly and positively related to more conservative sales forecasts. Our study makes significant contributions to corporate disclosure literature. We investigate the determinants of the quality of forward‐looking information in a mandatory disclosure regime while most forward‐looking information disclosure literatures have been conducted in a voluntary‐based disclosure environment. We examine whether in a mandatory disclosure regime, corporate governance mechanisms can play a positive role in precision choices and accuracy of forward‐
looking information. Further, our study is the first study examining corporate governance and the quality of non‐financial forward‐ looking information (sales target and production goal). Our research findings therefore extend forward‐looking information disclosure research from financial information to non‐ financial information. Our research findings also possess practical implications for various participants of the Chinese stock market. Precision and accuracy are two important properties of forward‐looking information. Our empirical findings will provide regulators and professionals with evidence on the quality of forward‐looking information in a mandatory disclosure regime and the influence of corporate governance on forward‐ looking information disclosure. The quality of forward‐looking information disclosure in China should be of interest to policy makers, investors and financial analysts in other international jurisdictions. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The second section considers the institutional background of forward‐looking information disclosure and corporate governance in China. This is followed by a review of the extant literature of the forward‐looking information disclosure research. The hypotheses are then developed followed by a description of the research method, sample and data. Results are then discussed followed by concluding remarks. 2. Institutional background 2.1 Forward‐looking information disclosure in China The establishment of the Chinese stock market, as part of the economic reform launched by the Chinese government in the late 1970s, is the direct result of China’s state‐owned enterprise (SOE) reform. To facilitate the modernization of the operation and management of Chinese enterprises, from the early 1990s some of the SOEs were transformed into listed firms via privatization, raising capital funds from the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange. Aiming to improve disclosure transparency and information usefulness in the Chinese stock market, forward‐looking information disclosure has been part of the “Rules of Information Disclosure for Publicly Listed Firms – Content and Format of Annual Reports” since 1994. Listed firms are explicitly required to disclose management’s operating objectives and expectation of firms’ future operations. More specifically, they are required to disclose forward‐looking information including a general discussion of industrial trends, sales targets, cost controls, earnings forecasts, research and development (R&D) expenditure and capital investments as part of the “Board of Directors Report” in their annual reports. Although no specific requirements in terms of whether the forward‐looking information should be presented in a qualitative or quantitative scale, the Chinese Security Regulatory Commission (CSRC) (2001) states “when making disclosure of forward‐looking financial information, listed firms shall follow the internal audit procedures, issue risk warnings to investors stating the assumption basis for such forward‐looking information and any uncertainty involved and, in accordance with actual conditions and in a timely manner, modify the information previously disclosed”. 2.2 Corporate governance attributes in China As one of the important participants in the global economy, China has responded to the worldwide emphasis of corporate governance by establishing its own corporate governance mechanisms and principles for listed firms. Adopting two‐tiers of control, a listed firm has a Board of Directors (BOD) and a Supervisory Board. To further strengthen corporate governance in listed firms, CSRC issued the Guidelines for Establishing Independent Directors System for Listed Firms in 2001, followed by the Code of Corporate Governance for Listed Firms in China (the Code hereafter) in 2002. The former overhauled the insider‐controlled board structure problem by promulgating a requirement that the BOD is to have at least one‐third independent directors by June 2003. The latter addresses the rights of shareholders and stakeholders, the responsibilities the directors and management of listed firms should undertake, and the importance of information disclosure. Prior studies investigating the effectiveness of corporate governance and its impact on quality of information disclosure show that governance attributes such as a larger size BOD, higher proportion of independent directors and more frequent BOD meetings constitute effective governance mechanisms as they facilitate higher levels of monitoring strength over management. On the other hand, state ownership has been suggested by prior studies as one of main factors creating agency conflicts such as “insider control” in listed Chinese firms, and higher state ownership is found to be negatively associated with the quality of information disclosure (Xu and Wang, 1999; Xiao et al., 2004; Firth et al., 2006; Xiao and Yuan, 2007). In addition, CEO duality and highly concentrated ownership are also found to weaken the monitoring strength and diminish the effectiveness of corporate governance in listed Chinese firms (Xiao et al., 2004; Xiao and Yuan, 2007). 3. Literature review and hypotheses The following section reviews the relevant literature on corporate governance and management forecasts, aiming to develop testable hypotheses to predict the relationship between corporate governance attributes and the properties of forward‐ looking information in the Chinese stock market. 3.1 Corporate governance and forecast precision When making forecasting disclosure, firms need to make choices on the type of information they want to provide to investors via the precision of the forecast (Karamanou and Vafeas, 2005). Although listed Chinese firms are mandatorily required to disclose sales forecasts in their annual reports, there is no specific requirement about what type of sales forecast information should be disclosed. Management has discretion in respect of choosing between more precise disclosures which include point‐ estimate sales forecasts, closed‐interval forecasts (ranges) and open‐interval forecasts (minimums or maximums), and imprecise disclosures such as general discussion or description of firms’ future sales trends. More precise forecasts provide investors with more relevant information and signal less uncertainty about firms’ future profitability (Baginski et al., 1993; Hirst et al., 1999). Prior studies investigating the effect of earnings forecasts on equity pricing find that precise forecasts possess more information content than imprecise forecasting information (Pownall et al., 1993; Baginski et al., 1994). Hirst et al. (1999) point out that from the investors’ perspective, while more precise forward‐
looking information reveals management’s specific expectation of future performance, imprecise forecasts however signal management’s uncertainty on future earnings. Investors receiving more specific earnings forecasts are more confident in incorporating such information into their own earnings prediction (Hirst et al., 1999). The extant literature suggests that effective corporate governance mechanisms play a positive role in monitoring firms’ disclosure policy and in fostering a more transparent information environment (Healy and Palepu, 2001; Eng and Mak, 2003; Bushman and Smith, 2004). Karamanou and Vafeas (2005) provide empirical evidence that effective board and audit committees contribute to more precise management earnings forecasts as these governance mechanisms could guide managers to disclose better quality information to investors. Ajinkya et al. (2005) further document a positive association between institutional investors and more precise management earnings forecasts as a result of more stringent monitoring over management in information disclosure. Together, these studies show that effective corporate governance mechanisms provide incentives to managers to make more precise forward‐looking information disclosure in voluntary disclosure regimes. The disclosure environment of forward‐looking information in China is mandatorily required but with a relaxed legal environment. Potential litigation cost arising from inaccurate point‐estimate forecasts thus is not a major concern when firms choose to make more precise forward‐looking information disclosure. Studies investigating corporate governance and quality of information disclosure in China show that while larger BOD, more frequent BOD meetings and more independent boards are positively related to information transparency, state ownership, CEO duality and highly concentrated shareholdings are negatively associated with the quality of information disclosure (Xu and Wang, 1999; Xiao et al., 2004; Delios and Wu, 2005; Liu and Eddie, 2007; Xiao and Yuan, 2007). Forward‐looking information constitutes one of the important components of a firm’s information disclosure. More precise forward‐looking information will provide investors with better and value‐
relevant information which can assist investors to make more informed decisions. We therefore posit that effective corporate governance will strengthen monitoring over management in respect of what type of sales forecasts should be disclosed. It is therefore hypothesized that: H1. The precision of forward‐looking information disclosure is positively related to corporate governance. The listed Chinese firms making point‐estimate sales forecasts can be further divided into two groups, with one group expressing their sales forecasts specific to dollar value of sales revenue (financial information) while the other group expresses their sales forecasts through disclosing specific sales targets or production plans (non‐financial information). Through dollar value sales forecasts, investors would be able to predict future earnings and cash flow more accurately if firms also choose to disclose expected costs (Hirst et al., 1999). Financial information thus provides investors with more useful information than non‐financial information as it can assist them to predict firms’ profitability. Thus, in respect of precision choices, financial sales forecasts are more precise than non‐financial sales forecasts. Continuing the precedent arguments, it is hypothesized that: H1a. The choice of making financial forward‐looking information disclosure is positively related to corporate governance. 3.2 Corporate governance and forecast accuracy Whether managers are able to make more accurate forecasts reflects managers’ competence on assessing a firm’s future profits based on their experience and their analysis of the business environment the firm is operating in (Chan et al., 2008; Tan et al., 2002). Prior studies measure the accuracy of forward‐looking information via forecast bias and absolute forecast error. Forecast bias shows whether management optimistically (actual sales is lower than forecasted sales) or conservatively (actual sales is higher than forecasted sales) forecasts a firm’s future performance and absolute forecast error measures the magnitude of forecast error. The lower the error, the more accurate the forecast (Firth and Smith, 1992; Jelic et al., 1998; Karamanou and Vafeas, 2005; Ajinkya et al., 2005). The major concern associated with forward‐looking information disclosure is the optimism management brings into earnings forecasts (Kent and Ung, 2003; Schleicher and Walker, 2010). It should be noted that although both optimism and conservatism in forecasting bring bias, prior studies regard optimistic bias as an opportunistic management behaviour (Hutton et al., 2003; Karamanou and Vafeas, 2005) and explore the incentives of making optimistic forecasting. Hutton et al. (2003) suggest that optimistically biased earnings forecasts portray an overly positive picture of firms’ future earning capacity; management then could be benefited through increases in stock prices if they have stock‐based compensation. In addition, defending potential takeover and management evaluation based on performance of firms’ stock are the other incentives for optimistic forecasting (Verrecchia, 1983). Prior literature suggests that corporate governance mechanisms are effective in monitoring firms’ corporate financial accounting process and improving financial disclosure quality in general (Ruland et al., 1990; Forker, 1992; O’Sullivan et al., 2008). Corporate governance mechanisms can significantly reduce the likelihood of financial statement fraud, reduce the likelihood of earnings management, and increase the willingness to make voluntary forecasting disclosure (Chen and Jaggi, 2000; Ho and Wong, 2001; Chau and Gray, 2002; Karamanou and Vafeas, 2005; Ajinkya et al., 2005). Investigating the impact of corporate governance on the accuracy of voluntary management earnings forecasts, Ajinkya et al. (2005), Karamanou and Vafeas (2005) and Dunstan and Truong (2011) show that firms with an audit committee, greater institutional ownership, larger percentage of independent directors, and smaller board size are more likely to disclose more conservative and accurate earnings forecasts. Studies examining the quality of financial information and corporate governance in China suggest that effective corporate governance mechanisms in listed Chinese firms enable more effective monitoring of management behaviour, improve the quality of information disclosure and reduce financial fraud (Xu and Wang, 1999; Xiao et al., 2004; Delios and Wu, 2005; Liu and Eddie, 2007; Xiao and Yuan, 2007). Thus, in the process of making forward‐looking information disclosure, effective corporate governance mechanisms would monitor managers to make accurate forward‐looking information disclosure which is connected with smaller forecasting error and more conservatism. It is therefore hypothesized that: H2. The accuracy of forward‐looking information disclosure is positively related to corporate governance. H2a. The conservatism of forward‐looking information disclosure is positively related to corporate governance. 4. Methodology 4.1 Sample selection and classification The sample in this study is comprised of 1,327 non‐financial firms listed on the main board of the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges in 2010. Data on sales forecasts are hand collected from the BOD Report in firms’ 2010 annual reports while data on actual sales is extracted from the BOD Report in firms’ 2011 annual reports. Hand‐ collection of the actual sales from the BOD Report in firms’ 2011 annual reports is to ensure the actual sales data we collected are the corresponding item that firms making their sales forecasts in 2010. All annual reports are downloaded from the official web sites of the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges. After excluding 28 firms which did not make any forecast disclosure and 326 firms that had “forecast” section in their annual reports but did not mention of sales trend at all, the sample size is reduced to 973 firms. Following Bamber and Cheon (1998), Karamanou and Vafeas (2005) and Ajinkya et al. (2005), sales forecasts are classified as either precise forecasts or imprecise forecasts. Precise sales forecasts include point‐estimate, closed‐interval and open‐internal financial and non‐financial forecasts. Imprecise sales forecasts is management’s description of their 2011 forecast sales trend without the support of any precise forecasting information. Examples of different classifications of sales forecasts are exhibited in Table I. Furthermore, the data pertaining to board and ownership characteristics, firm characteristics and financial performance in the 2010 annual reports were collected from the Chinese Stock Market Accounting Research (CSMAR) database. 4.2 Variables definitions Table II presents the definitions of all independent variables used in this study. 4.2.1 Board and Ownership variables. Prior studies investigating corporate governance of listed Chinese firms show that larger BOD, more independent BOD and more frequent BOD meetings are effective corporate governance mechanisms which are positively associated with the quality of financial information (Qi et al., 2000; Firth et al., 2007). CEO duality is used to proxy the monitoring strength of the BOD; the separation of CEO and chairman of the BOD implies greater strength in monitoring of management. State ownership and changes in equity concentration within the top five shareholders are the two measures capturing the influence of state ownership and equity concentration on the quality of sales forecasts information (Xiao and Yuan, 2007; Karamanou and Vafeas, 2005; Ajinkya et al., 2005). 4.2.2 Control variables. We incorporate a series of other factors that are found by prior studies to be associated with the precision and accuracy of forward‐looking information as control variables. The firm and performance characteristics that we control for include firm size, leverage, a dummy variable indicating whether or not there was a new equity issue in 2011, return on asset (ROA), and Tobin’s Q. In addition, we use a dummy variable to control for the potential impact of the quality of external auditor on the precision and accuracy of sales forecasts. The dummy variable Auditor is equal to one if the auditor employed in 2010 was a Big 4 or national Top 10 audit firm, zero otherwise. Furthermore, we use the dummy variable Industrials to control for the potential relationship between the industry sector where a firm belongs and the precision and accuracy of sales forecasts. The dummy variable Industrials is equal to one if the firm belongs to the “Industrials” sector and zero otherwise. These control variables enable us to control for the effect of information environment for firms making sales forecasts disclosures. First, firm specific characteristics such as size and level of leverage are related to a firm’s decision to disclose information and quality of such disclosure. The larger the firm, the more resources can be used to improve level of disclosure and quality of disclosure (Zarzeski, 1996). Higher leveraged firms are more likely to disclose quality information to reduce investors’ and creditors’ perceptions of financial risk (Watson et al., 2002). Second, new equity issuance is a variable particularly relevant to making forward‐looking information disclosure. Cheng and Firth (2000) find that firms listed in the Hong Kong Stock Exchange, when having a plan to issue more shares, are more likely to disclose more accurate forward‐looking information. Third, firms with higher market value (measured by Tobin’s Q) and stronger profitability (measured by ROA) are more likely to make information disclosure. Information disclosure is adopted as a strategic means of sending positive signals to the capital market. Under‐performing firms confronting uncertain operating environments pose a great challenge for managers making forecasts (Watson et al., 2002). Fourth, audit quality has been found in developed and developing economies to play an effective role in constraining earnings management (Cheng and Firth, 2000; Hartnett and Romcke, 2000; Kato et al., 2009). We thus assume that firms audited by high quality external auditors have less ability to manage the actual figures to meet/beat forecasts released in the previous year therefore leading to less accurate forecasts. Finally, we include an industry effect to control for the potential sector impact on the quality of sales forecasts (Leventis and Weetman, 2004). 4.3 Research design We test our hypotheses using logit and ordinary least squares (OLS) regression models. Figure 1 exhibits the firm classifications across different sales forecast category. 4.3.1 Corporate governance and forecast precision. Using logit model, we investigate the association between corporate governance characteristics and the propensity to disclosure more precise sales forecasts, while controlling for firms’ characteristics, performance and other related factors. We classify the firms in our sample into two groups: precise sales forecasts disclosure and imprecise sales forecasts disclosure. Of 973 firms, 316 firms provided general discussion on their expectation of sales in 2011 while 657 firms provided precise sales forecasts, through either precise financial sales forecasts in dollar value (571 firms) or precise non‐financial sales forecasts in planned sales target or production goal to be achieved in 2011 (86 firms). where DISC equals one if the firm disclosed precise sales forecasts information in 2010 annual reports, and zero otherwise. BODVAR is a variable for either BOD_SIZE or INDEPENDENT. In consideration of the potential problems presented by multicollinearity, we insert this variable into the equation to prevent the inclusion of both BOD_SIZE and INDEPENDENT, which are shown to have a correlation greater than 0.75 in Section 5.1. CONTROLS refers to the control variables (firm characteristics, performance and other factors) listed in Table II. To test H1a, we investigate the relationship between corporate governance characteristics and the propensity to disclose precise financial sales forecasts information, while controlling for other related factors. Specifically, we estimate the following logit model for H1a: where FIN equals one if the firm issued precise financial sales forecasts in its 2010 annual report, zero otherwise. Precise financial sales forecasts includes point‐estimate, close‐ interval and open‐
interval sales forecasts in dollar value. 4.3.2 Corporate governance and forecast accuracy. We then concentrate on the 571 firms making point‐estimate financial sales forecasts to test H2 and H2a. To investigate the accuracy of the sales forecasts, we focus on the 571 firms which made point‐estimate, close‐interval and open‐
interval financial sales forecasts. Following Firth and Smith (1992) and Jelic et al. (1998), we define sales forecast error as the absolute value of the difference between the actual and forecasted sales divided by the forecasted sales. Then, we calculate the logarithm of the sales forecast error. To test H2, we use the following OLS regression model to link forecast accuracy to the corporate governance and other control variables: where LNFERROR is the logarithm of the sales forecast error. To test H2a, whether corporate governance has any impact on firms’ decisions on making conservative or optimistic forecasting, we categorize firms based on the following criterion. If the financial sales forecast for 2011 is less than the actual sales in 2011, the firm is categorized as conservative, otherwise as optimistic. Using the same sample as the one for H2 (571 firms), we have 313 firms making conservative sales forecasts and 258 firms making optimistic sales forecasts: where CONSERVATISM equals one if the firm issued a conservative financial sales forecast in 2010, zero otherwise. 5. Empirical results 5.1 Descriptive statistics Tables III‐V present the descriptive statistics for all independent variables of the sample used to test the hypotheses. We winsorised all continuous variables, except categorical variables (CEO_DUALITY, EQUITYCON, AUDITOR, INDUSTRIALS), at the 2 per cent and 98 per cent level to reduce the effect of extreme outliers. From Table III, we find that the median for the board size (BOD_SIZE), number of independent directors (INDEPENDENT) and number of board meetings (BOD_ MEETING) for the full sample (H1) are 9, 3 and 8, respectively. The majority of the value for CEO duality (CEO_DUALITY) is 1. In addition, the median state shareholdings (STATE_OWNERSHIP) and median equity concentration growth (EQUITYCON) are 11.4 and −1.1 per cent, respec vely. From Tables IV‐V, we find that the median value for the board size, number of independent directors and number of board meetings for the three reduced samples are the same as those of the full sample, while the median for state shareholdings and equity concentration growth are close to those of the full sample. In addition, the value of CEO duality in these three tables exhibit a very similar pattern as the full sample. We provide summary statistics in Tables III‐V. To examine the association between corporate governance characteristics and the propensity of making precise sales forecasts, we compare the characteristics of the firms which made precise sales forecasts against those which issued imprecise sales forecasts in firms’ 2010 annual reports. For interval or ratio type of independent variables we follow the methodology adopted by Karamanou and Vafeas (2005) to examine the differences of means and medians of the independent variables between these two groups of firms using both two‐sample t‐test and Wilcoxon z‐test. On the other hand, for nominal variables such as CEO_DUALITY, NEW_EQUITY, AUDITOR and INDUSTRIALS, we perform the χ2 test of homogeneity, which tests whether two population proportions are equal (Daniel, 2005). The results of the tests are presented in Tables VI‐VIII. From Table VI, we find that on average firms that issued precise sales forecasts information have a larger BOD size, higher number of independent directors, higher percentage of state ownership and larger firm size, but a lower Tobin’s Q. Both t‐test and Wilcoxon z‐test results for these variables are statistically significant at the 0.01 level and above. Furthermore, the χ2 test results demonstrate that there is a statistically significant difference in the proportion of CEO duality, auditors and Industrials sector between the firms making precise sales forecasts against those which are making imprecise sales forecasts. Table VII provides a comparison of the characteristics of the firms making precise financial sales forecasts against those which are making precise non‐financial sales forecasts. From Table VII we find that on average firms making precise financial forecast have a smaller BOD size, lower number of independent directors, lower BOD meetings frequency, lower percentage of state ownership, smaller firm size and lower level of leverage but a higher Tobin’s Q. Both t‐test and Wilcoxon z‐test results for these variables are statistically significant at the 0.01 level and above. Furthermore, the χ2 test results demonstrate that there is a statistically significant difference in the proportion of new equity issuance and auditors between these two groups of firms. Table VIII presents a comparison of the characteristics of the firms making conservative sales forecasts against those making optimistic financial sales forecasts. From this table, we observe that on average firms that making conservative sales forecasts have a lower BOD meeting frequency, lower level of leverage, and a higher percentage of state ownership, higher percentage of equity concentration, larger firm size and higher ROA. Either or both t‐test and Wilcoxon z‐test results for the aforementioned variables are statistically significant at the 0.05 level and above. Moreover, the χ2 test results demonstrate that there is a statistically significant difference in the proportion of new equity issuance and industrials sector between the firms which are making conservative sales forecasts against those which making optimistic sales forecasts. Before conducting the regressions we examine the correlations among the independent variables. The results of correlation analysis is displayed in Tables IX‐XI. In Tables IX to XI we present Pearson (above diagonal) and Spearman (below diagonal) correlations among the corporate governance and other variables for four tests. From the tables, we observed that the correlations among the independent variables are quite low (less than ±0.5), except the one between BOD_SIZE and INDEPENDENT (Pearson/Spearman correlation coefficient ⩾0.75, p‐value <0.01). For the pair of independent variables having a correlation coefficient greater than or equal to 0.5, they entered into the regressions separately to avoid multicollinearity. The final model selected for each of hypotheses H1, H1a, H2 and H2a satisfies two criteria: it has “χ2” used earlier for covariates that is statistically significant at the 0.01 level and has the lowest AIC value among the models tested. The final model selected for hypotheses H2 and H2a must have a p‐
value of F‐test statistically significant at the 0.01 level and the highest adjusted R2. 5.2 Regression results Table XII reports the results of logistics and OLS regressions that examine the impact of corporate governance characteristics and other control variables on the precision choices and the accuracy of sales forecasts. 5.2.1 Corporate governance and forecast precision. Column 2 presents the results examining the relationship between the precision choice of sales forecasts disclosure and corporate governance characteristics. The results suggest that the propensity to disclose more precise sales forecasts is positively associated with BOD_SIZE, CEO_DUALITY and STATE_OWNERSHIP. The respective coefficient of these corporate governance characteristics is statistically significant at the 0.05 and 0.01 level, respectively. The results that larger BOD size and non‐CEO duality are positively and significantly related to making more precise sales forecasts information are consistent with the findings of Karamanou and Vafeas (2005) and Ajinkya et al. (2005). In contrast to prior studies which show that higher state ownership is negatively associated with the quality of information disclosure (Xiao et al., 2004; Xiao and Yuan, 2007), our result suggests that state ownership has a positive and significant impact on making precise sales forecasts in 2010. The possible reason contributed to such a result could be extant studies’ testing periods are prior to 2005, the year the Share Split Scheme[1] was launched by the Chinese government. The effect of state ownership on information disclosure in listed Chinese firms could have changed. Hou and Lee (2012) and Cumming et al. (2012) provide empirical evidence showing that Share Split reform increases the incentive alignment between state and private shareholders, encouraging them to monitor and discipline managers against opportunistic behaviour that could reduce firms’ market value. Thus, the state ownership in the post Share Split reform could have a positive impact on the quality of information disclosure. Results for the control variables suggest that the propensity to disclose precise sales forecasts increases with a higher level of ROA, meaning that more profitable firms are more likely to make precise sales forecasts for 2011. This result is consistent with Watson et al. (2002) which suggest that profitable firms disclose more information to investors in order to send positive signals to capital markets. However, Tobin’s Q is negatively and significantly related to the precision choice of sales forecasts, meaning that firms with higher market value are less likely to make precise sales forecasts. The significant positive coefficient on INDUSTRIALS suggests that the propensity is higher for the firms belonging to the “Industrials” sector. The remaining control variables exhibit less explanatory power. Overall, the results for H1 suggest that firms are more likely to disclose precise sales forecasts when the number of directors or percentage of state‐owned shareholdings increases and when the CEO of the firm does not assume the role of both CEO and chairman of the board, after controlling for ROA, industrials and other related control variables. From the results in column 3, we find that the propensity to disclose precise financial sales forecasts is negatively related to BOD_MEETING. The significant negative coefficient on BOD_MEETING suggests that when the frequency of BOD meetings held in 2010 is high, firms are less likely to make precise financial sales forecasts disclosure. Hence, H1a is not supported. It seems that when firms need to make decisions on whether to make financial sales forecasts or non‐financial sales forecasts, well‐governed firms prefer to make non‐financial sales forecasts. In addition, the negative significant coefficient on FIRMSIZE and NEW_EQUITY suggests that the propensity to disclose precise financial sales forecasts is lower when the firm size is larger and when the firm plans to raise new equity in the following year. On the other hand, Tobin’s Q is positively and significantly related to the propensity to disclose precise financial sales forecasts, meaning that firms with higher market value are more likely to make precise financial sales forecasts. 5.2.2 Corporate governance and forecast accuracy. Columns 4 and 5 of Table XII show the results for the relation between forecast accuracy and corporate governance characteristics, controlling for other related factors. With respect to H2, the results in column 4 indicate a positive and significant association between the sales forecast errors and corporate governance characteristics (INDEPENDENT, BOD_MEETING, and EQUITYCON). This result implies that sales forecasts errors increase with increases in the number of independent directors, higher frequency of board meetings and growth in equity concentration ratio. Thus, H2 is rejected. These results are contradictory to Karamanou and Vafeas (2005) and Ajinkya et al. (2005). In addition, the results for the control variables suggest that sales forecasts errors increase with an increase in the leverage level and when the firm raised new equity in the following year. These results are contradictory to Cheng and Firth (2000). Sales forecasts errors are however found negatively related to firm size and ROA, meaning larger and profitable firms are more likely to make more accurate sales forecasts. These results are consistent with Chen et al. (2001) that large firm size and firm profitability are the factors contributing to more accurate earnings forecasts. Presented in column 5, our results show a negative association between the propensity of issuing more conservative sales forecasts and the frequency of BOD meetings and a positive association between the propensity of issuing more conservative sales forecasts and concentrated‐shareholding. Thus, H2a is not supported. This result is inconsistent with Karamanou and Vafeas (2005), Xiao and Yuan (2007) and Dunstan and Truong (2011) in respect of the enhancing role of BOD in improving the quality of information disclosure. In addition, the propensity of making conservative sales forecasts is higher when the firm raised new equity in the following year (NEW_EQUITY) and lower if the firm belongs to the “Industrials” sector (INDUSTRIALS), meaning firms planning to raise new equity in the following year are more likely to make more conservative sales forecasts, while firms in the “Industrials” sector are less likely to make conservative sales forecasts. 6. Further Test To further test the relationship between forecast bias and corporate governance attributes, following Bryan (1997), we select firms with a financial sales forecast trend that is not in the same direction as the actual sales (e.g. while sales forecast made in 2010 predicted an increase in sales in 2011 and the actual result shows a decrease; while sales forecast made in 2010 predicted a decrease in sales in 2011 and the actual result shows an increase). After removing firms with a sales forecast trend which is consistent with the actual trend, we have 289 firms in the sample. Next, we classify the firms into two groups: “conservatism” and “optimism”. The firms belonging to the first group are those firms that predicted a downward sales trend but the actual sales increased or remained the same from 2010 to 2011, or predicted no change in sales trend but the actual sales increased from 2010 to 2011. Those belonging to the second group predicted an upward sales trend but the actual sales decreased or remained unchanged from 2010 to 2011, or predicted no change in sales trend but the actual sales decreased from 2010 to 2011. Of 289 firms, we have 46 firms making conservative sales forecasts and 243 firms making optimistic sales forecasts. We test the relationship of corporate governance and forecast conservatism/optimism by estimating the following logit model: where CONSERVATISM equals one if the firm issued a conservative financial sales forecast in 2010, zero otherwise. Tables XIII and XIV present the descriptive statistics for all independent variables and the correlations among the independent variables for the sample used for further test. Columns 2 of Table XV showthe results for the relation between forecast bias and corporate governance characteristics, controlling for other related factors. Presented in column 2, our results show a positive association between the propensity of issuing more conservative sales forecasts and BOD_SIZE. The significant positive coefficient on this corporate governance characteristic implies that firms are more likely to make more conservative sales forecasts when BOD size is larger. This result is consistent with Karamanou and Vafeas (2005), Xiao and Yuan (2007) and Dunstan and Truong (2011) in respect of the enhancing role of BOD in improving the quality of information disclosure. Among the control variables, we find that the likelihood of making conservative sales forecasts decreases with firm size (FIRMSIZE). In addition, the propensity of making conservative sales forecasts is lower when the firm is in the “Industrials” sector (INDUSTRIAL) and is higher when the firm raised new equity in the following year (NEW_EQUITY), meaning larger firms and firms engaged in the “Industrials” sector are more likely to make optimistic sales forecasts while the plan to raise new equity in the following year pressures firms to make more conservative sales forecasts. 7. Conclusion This study investigates the impact of corporate governance mechanisms on the quality of forward‐
looking information disclosure in the Chinese stock market. Forward‐ looking information is proxied by sales forecasts made by listed firms in their 2010 annual reports and the quality of forward‐
looking information is measured by two properties of forward‐looking information: precision and accuracy. Based on 973 firms listed in the Chinese stock market in 2010, we find that the precision of sales forecasts disclosure is positively related to corporate governance. Firms with effective corporate governance mechanisms are more likely to disclose more precise sales forecasts. In respect of making precise financial forecasts or precise non‐financial forecasts, firms with effective corporate governance mechanisms are more likely to make precise non‐ financial forecasts such as sales target and production goals. Our results however, fail to show that corporate governance has a significant and positive impact on the smaller variation between forecasted sales and actual results. When we focus on firms with a financial sales forecast trend that is not in the same direction as the actual sales, we find that the conservatism of forward‐looking information is positively related to effective corporate governance mechanisms. Overall our findings are consistent with the argument that effective corporate governance mechanisms can play a significant role in improving the quality of information disclosure and reducing information asymmetry between firms and investors. The findings of this study are important because we provide regulators across international jurisdictions with evidence of the quality of forward‐looking information in a mandatory disclosure regime. Our findings, thus, provide a useful reference to countries that are currently debating the merits of mandatory disclosure of forward‐ looking information. Moreover, by investigating the relationship between forward‐ looking information disclosure and corporate governance, our study enhances the understanding of the role played by corporate governance in improving the quality of corporate information disclosure, especially forward‐looking information disclosure. Prior studies investigating the association between forward‐looking information and corporate governance have been conducted in developed economies. These studies have largely ignored the impact of corporate governance on the quality of forward‐ looking information in developing countries (Karamanou and Vafeas, 2005; Ajinkya et al., 2005). Our study accordingly contributes to the broader corporate governance literature by identifying the role of corporate governance in enhancing capital market efficiency in China. Our study is subject to two limitations. First, the testing period in our study is only one year. Future research might explore the relationship between corporate governance and quality of forward‐
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(2002), “Voluntary disclosure of accounting ratios in the UK”, British Accounting Review, Vol. 34 No. 4, pp. 289‐313. Xiao, H.F. and Yuan, J.G. (2007), “Ownership structure, board composition and corporate voluntary disclosure, evidence from listed companies in China”, Managerial Auditing Journal, Vol. 22 No. 6, pp. 604‐619. Xiao, J., Yang, Y. and Chow, C.W. (2004), “The determinants and characteristics of voluntary internet‐
based disclosures by listed Chinese companies”, Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, Vol. 23 No. 3, pp. 191‐225. Xu, X. and Wang, Y. (1999), “Ownership structure and corporate governance in Chinese stock companies”, China Economic Review, Vol. 10 No. 1, pp. 75‐98. Zarzeski, M.T. (1996), “Spontaneous harmonization effects of culture and market forces on accounting disclosure practices”, Accounting Horizons, Vol. 10 No. 1, pp. 18‐37. Further reading Clarkson, P.M., Kao, J.L. and Richardson, G.D. (1994), “The voluntary inclusion of forecasts in the MD&A section of annual reports”, Contemporary Accounting Research, Vol. 11 Nos 1‐II, pp. 423‐450. About the authors Dr Wen Qu is a Senior Lecturer at the Deakin University, Australia. Dr Qu teaches financial reporting analysis and her research interests are corporate disclosure and corporate governance. She has published papers in journals such as Journal of Contemporary Accounting and Economics and Managerial Auditing Journal. Dr Wen Qu is the corresponding author and can be contacted at: [email protected] Dr Mong Shan Ee is a Lecturer in Finance at the Deakin Graduate School of Business, Deakin University, Australia. Mong Shan’s primary teaching interests are finance and risk management. Her current research interests include optimal stopping problems, pricing optimization and data mining applications in finance and accounting. Her works has appeared in European Journal of Operational Research, Journal of the Operations Research Society of Japan and International Review of Financial Analysis. Dr Li Liu is a Lecturer at the Deakin University, Australia. Li Liu’s primary teaching interest is financial accounting and reporting. Her current research interests are in empirical auditing, financial reporting quality, and stock valuation. She has published in Journal of Accounting and Public Policy. Dr Victoria Wise is an Associate Professor at the Deakin University, Australia. Dr Wise teaches financial accounting and corporate reporting to postgraduate students. Her current research interests focus on corporate governance and regulatory issues. She has over 180 publications including scholarly books, chapters and journal articles. Dr Peter Carey is a Professor at the Deakin University, Australia. Dr Carey teaches financial accounting and auditing subjects to both undergraduate and postgraduate students. His research interests focus on financial reporting, corporate social responsibility and auditing. Dr Carey has publications in journals such as Accounting and Finance.