1. sports
2. paintball

PIJPSM
21,2
Sources of crime guns in Los
Angeles, California
Julius Wachtel
220
Criminal investigator, US Treasury Department, California
Guns. Simply mention the word and by the time the conversation ends it will
have probably touched on many of the most pressing social, cultural, legal and
economic issues that attend to urban life. Firearms are a hot button topic that
has polarized many thoughtful people into two camps: for and against.
Opinions, anecdotes and a smattering of academic research have been used as
cannon fodder by both sides, each eager to best its opponent with some brave
new finding. Guns are our heritage. Guns save lives. Guns are killing our inner
cities. And so on.
Guns are not something that we can simply attribute to outsiders. A majority
of firearms that are in the USA were also made here (Zawitz, 1995). Between
1983 and 1995, more than 55 million firearms were introduced into the domestic
marketplace (ATF, 1994; ATF, 1996b). In 1995, American manufacturers
produced 3,808,805 firearms for domestic consumption, including 1,493,327
handguns. An additional 706,093 handguns and 397,311 long guns were
imported (ATF, 1996d).
It is difficult to assess – some would say, difficult to exaggerate – the number
of guns in circulation. Some estimates place the number of firearms as being
equal to the American population. In 1991, the number of handguns in the USA
was pegged at 85 million (Kleck, 1991). Given the known rates of manufacture
and transfer, such figures are bound to be quickly outdated. In California, more
than 600,000 gun transactions were recorded during 1993 alone (California
Department of Justice (DOJ), 1995)[1].
During a recent twelve-month period, 99,000 persons were treated for nonfatal firearm wounds in US hospital emergency rooms. More than half of these
injuries were due to a criminal act. Firearms caused an additional 37,776 deaths,
evenly split between suicide and homicide (Zawitz, 1996). A 1991 survey of
State prison inmates indicated that nearly 50 percent had been sentenced for a
violent offense. Forty-six percent had carried or used a weapon, predominantly
a firearm. One in six inmates said they committed an offense while armed with
a gun; half said they had fired it (Beck et al., 1993).
Policing: An International Journal of
Police Strategies & Management ,
Vol. 21 No. 2, 1998, pp. 220-239,
© MCB University Press, 1363-951X
Julius Wachtel has served as a criminal investigator with the US Treasury Department, Bureau
of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, for 23 years. He holds the PhD in Criminal Justice from the
University at Albany. The opinions and conclusions expressed in this paper do not necessarily
represent the views or policies of the United States Government. An earlier version was presented
at the 1996 Annual Meeting of the Academy of Criminal Justice Sciences. Please address
correspondance to [email protected]
Gun sources
America’s alarming rate of firearms misuse has given a sense of urgency to
research efforts that seek to determine how street criminals acquire guns. One
useful paradigm for exploring this topic is the concept of markets. These can be
categorized as “primary” and “secondary”. The primary gun market
encompasses all transactions that involve the licensed gun industry, ranging
from wholesale transfers of hundreds of guns to the retail sale of a single
firearm to a private consumer. Transfers where unlicensed persons act as both
buyer and seller are assigned to the secondary market (Cook et al., 1995).
Most new guns are conveyed to private consumers in three steps:
manufacture, wholesale distribution and retail sale. Firearms typically enter the
public domain at the lowest tier, which includes a mix of gun stores, sporting
goods outlets, pawn shops and licensed home businesses. Federal laws and
regulations require that gun businesses at each level be licensed, comply with
strict paperwork requirements and avoid making sales to prohibited persons.
Licensees must record the source and identifying properties of every firearm
they acquire and carefully chronicle their disposition. Private citizens who buy
guns from licensed dealers must present identification and certify in writing
that they are not prohibited by law from possessing a firearm. Compliance with
licensing and recordkeeping requirements helps prevent the acquisition of
firearms by legally unqualified persons. Should a gun be misused, records that
are faithfully kept can also help police trace the firearm to its first retail
consumer[2].
In States where no equivalent provisions exist, the Federal Brady law delays
handgun deliveries by licensed dealers to private persons for five days so that a
criminal records check can take place[3]. Other areas impose their own, stricter
mandates. California Penal Code sec. 12072(d), for example, requires that every
gun transfer – even when only ordinary citizens are involved – be conducted
through a licensee or law enforcement agency and include the same record
checks, waiting period and other restrictions that apply to new gun sales.
While there are differences in interpretation, there is general agreement
about two things: first, that there is a large secondary firearms market,
characterized by unregulated private transactions between unlicensed persons;
and second, that the covert, facilitative nature of these encounters makes them
the favored source of guns for criminals (Beck et al., 1993; Decker and Pennell,
1995; Rand, 1994; Sheley and Wright, 1993).
A review of the literature disclosed five efforts to collect data about gun
acquisition by criminals (see Table I). In four studies, incarcerated offenders
were asked to identify their source of guns. Many said they purchased firearms
through unregulated, informal transactions with friends, family members,
petty criminal entrepreneurs such as drug dealers and thieves, and elements of
a vague general category variously identified as the “black market” and “the
street”. But respondents also indicated that primary sources played a
substantial role. Twenty-seven percent of a sample of imprisoned felons said
they had bought a gun at a store (Beck et al., 1993). Nearly one-third of a sample
of incarcerated juveniles said they had asked an adult to buy a gun from a
dealer on their behalf (Sheley and Wright, 1993). One study even cited licensed
Guns in
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California
221
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Authors
Year
Research methods
Findings
Moore
1981
Analyzed results of a gun
trace project; examined case
files of street gun dealing
investigations
Predominant source for street
dealers are licensed dealers and
thefts
Wright et al.
1983
Interviewed imprisoned felons
52% – Borrowed or bought from
friends
32% – Theft
16% – Bought from store
Beck et al.
1993
Interviewed imprisoned felons
31% – “Family and friends”
28% – “Black market”, a drug
dealer or a fence
27% – Bought at store
9% – Theft
Sheley and
Wright
1993
Interviewed high school
students and incarcerated
juveniles
30% – Friends
22% – “The street”
21% – Drug dealer or addict
12% – Theft
6% – Family member
7% – Bought at store
32% – Asked adults to buy on
their behalf (included in
the above categories)
Decker and
Table I.
Literature on sources of Pennell
guns recovered by police
1995
Interviewed arrestees
(Preliminary findings)
45% – “Illegal firearms market”
13% – Theft
222
gun dealers who made quantity sales of firearms to illicit street vendors as
being an important channel of supply (Moore, 1981).
As of February, 1996, there were 170,332 Federally licensed firearms firms in
the USA. Of these, 138,213 were retailers (ATF, 1996a). Clearly, oversight of an
industry this large presents a regulatory dilemma, as the ready access to
quantities of new, inexpensive handguns that a license confers means that
wrongdoing by just a few can become a matter of grave concern (Pierce et al.,
1995).
Accounts of licensee misconduct have appeared with some frequency in the
popular media and in various Government reports. Troubling anecdotes accuse
certain retailers – primarily, corrupt home-based “kitchen table” gun dealers – of
making handsome profits by recklessly selling guns “out the back-door”,
keeping no records and asking no questions (ATF, 1990, 1992, 1993a, 1995a,
1995c, 1996e; Cook et al., 1995; Larson, 1993, 1994; National Alliance, 1994; Pierce
et al., 1995). Lesser instances of wrongdoing are undoubtedly more common.
During “Operation Snapshot”, a review of 400 randomly-selected licensed gun
dealers, ATF inspectors uncovered violations in 34 percent of their visits, with 7
percent being sufficiently serious to warrant further action (ATF, 1993b).
Licensee business practices are clearly a ripe topic for academic inquiry.
However, a dearth of empirical research has made it impossible to estimate the
role that dealers play in the acquisition of guns by criminals (Cook and Moore,
1995). Even so, firm assertions that offenders do not get guns from retail sources
appear throughout the literature (Kleck, 1991; Roth, 1994; Sheley and Wright,
1993). An inclination to downplay the salience of the primary market seems
evident. For example, after a lengthy analysis of prior works, one report
concluded that “according to the latest available data, those who use guns in
violent crimes rarely purchase them directly from licensed dealers; most guns
used in crime have been stolen or transferred between individuals after the
original purchase” (Roth, 1994, p. 1). Yet, the sources cited include Moore (1981),
who found that 29 percent of recovered guns came directly from a dealer
(qualified in the report as “only” 29 percent), and Wright et al. (1983), who
reported that 16 percent of inmates bought guns at a dealer (also qualified as
“only” 16 percent) (Roth, 1994, p. 3)[4].
After interviewing a large sample of incarcerated juveniles, the authors of
another study reported that nearly one-third had asked an adult to act as a
“straw purchaser”; that is, to buy a gun at a store on their behalf (Sheley and
Wright, 1993, p. 6). Their preliminary assessment was that “though by no
means the preferred method of acquisition, purchasing a gun through
legitimate channels was fairly common among respondents” (Sheley and
Wright, 1993, p. 6). But only one page later, this view was superseded with a
comment that “...turning to retail channels was possible but generally not
necessary” (Sheley and Wright, 1993, p. 7). Once the concluding remarks were
reached, the tacit assumption – that crime guns do not come directly from
dealers – returned in full force: “controls imposed at the point of retail sale
would be ineffective, at least by themselves, in preventing the acquisition of
guns by juveniles studied here because they rarely obtain their guns through
such customary outlets” (Sheley and Wright, 1993, p. 10).
Proxy transactions, such as those reported by Sheley and Wright, enable
persons who are unqualified by age or criminal record to acquire, in a relatively
discreet, simple and economical fashion, a new, unblemished gun of choice
(ATF, 1995b, 1995c, 1997b; Cook et al., 1995; Larson, 1994). Unfortunately,
explicit data about straw purchase is lacking. Although survey research is well
positioned to explore this practice, it has not been recognized as a discrete
category during offender interviews. Instead, responses that might fit the
surrogate pattern are usually deconstructed so as to fall into any class that
promises a good fit, such as “family and friends” or “the street”, thus potentially
obscuring the role of straw buyers in the marketplace (Kennedy et al., 1996).
Contemporary gun research efforts lack tools that are sensitive to the
interplay between primary and secondary markets. Self-reports are by
themselves inadequate, as they seldom take us beyond the most proximate
source. Possessors may know nothing beyond a seller’s nickname and physical
description. They cannot be expected to know how, and from whom, street gun
vendors acquire their wares. Incomplete depictions of gun pedigrees can lead to
the misattribution of sales that should be assigned, at least in part, to primary
sources.
Guns in
Los Angeles,
California
223
PIJPSM
21,2
224
What data collection techniques are available? An early effort to explore the
origin of crime guns took a unique, two-pronged approach. Researchers
reviewed Federal investigations of unlicensed gun sellers. They also analyzed
the redistributive history of a set of recovered firearms that had been traced to
their original retail source (Moore, 1981). In view of the commonplace
assumptions about gun redistribution, this work arrived at a conclusion that
even surprised its author: that licensed dealers “loom surprisingly large as a
source of supply” for unlicensed street vendors (Moore, 1981, p. 102).
Another finding reached by this study, that residential burglaries were also a
salient means of supply, seems more straightforward (Moore, 1981, p. 105).
Indeed, for contemporary students of gun markets, theft is often the
explanation of choice (Hutson et al., 1995; Kleck, 1991; Wright et al., 1983;
Zawitz, 1995).
Available data suggest that many guns are taken through theft and burglary.
A recent national survey reported that 300,000 firearms are stolen each year in
the USA (Zawitz, 1995). On the other hand, the police seem to recover many
more guns than can be accounted for through theft alone. For example, 16,507
guns were reportedly stolen in California in 1995. During the same period, more
than twice as many guns (at least 33,887) were booked into evidence by law
enforcement agencies in that State (California DOJ, 1995)[5]. Characteristics of
recovered guns are also inconsistent with the view that theft is the primary
source of supply. Criminals as well as law-abiding consumers have
demonstrated a preference for new, large caliber handguns, with .380 and 9mm
semi-automatic pistols becoming the weapon of choice ( Hutson et al., 1995;
Sheley and Wright, 1993; Zawitz, 1995). However, national theft statistics
indicate that pistols in these calibers account for a relatively modest fraction
(14.2 percent) of stolen guns (Zawitz, 1995).
Theft may be an incomplete explanation for other reasons. It cannot
conclusively settle the matter of a gun’s pedigree, as stolen guns often course
through layers of middlemen (Sheley and Wright, 1993; Zawitz, 1995). There are
also no data relating to the criminal misuse of stolen guns or their prevalence in
the secondary market. Accounts from self-reports do not support the
proposition that most guns acquired by criminals are stolen (see Table I).
Neither do the few Government studies that have addressed this issue. A 1991
survey of guns recovered from narcotics incidents in Kansas City pegged the
proportion of reportedly stolen guns at 14 percent (ATF, 1991). Of a set of 2,448
guns recovered by Detroit police in 1993, 7.5 percent were reportedly stolen
(ATF, 1993a). A 1995 study disclosed that 21 percent of 6,521 guns recovered by
Phoenix police officers had been listed as stolen (ATF, 1995b). Similar research
in the Los Angeles area indicated that only 4 percent of 1,764 guns recovered in
1994 had been stolen (ATF, 1995c).
Objectives and methodology
In a perfect study, teams of intrepid researchers would relentlessly track
recovered firearms to their original source. Considering the daunting obstacles
to doing just that, it is no surprise that most of what is known has been
gathered by interviewing incarcerated gun possessors. Although data from
self-reports have been enlightening, the quest to identify the origin of recovered
firearms usually concludes with a sketchily operationalized category such as
“from the street” and “family and friends”.
This study attempts to expand our knowledge of gun sources for criminals.
As suggested by Cook et al. (1995), particular attention is paid to the primary,
retail marketplace, whose role has been seldom examined in the literature.
Adapting the methodology employed by Moore (1981) to local circumstances,
we analyze paths to illicit gun possession in two ways: by reviewing the
transfer history of a set of guns recovered by police, and by systematically
examining gun trafficking investigations.
Firearms tracing underlies the initial approach. Our dataset comprises 5,002
guns recovered by law enforcement agencies in the Los Angeles area between
1988 and 1995. Eighty-two percent (4,079) were recovered by Los Angeles
police, while the remainder were seized by law enforcement agencies in nearby
communities. Analysis of this pool yielded data on the kinds of guns seized, the
circumstances of their recovery and the characteristics of their possessors.
Traces that were successfully completed also furnished information about gun
dealers and gun buyers and contributed insights into patterns of illicit purchase
and redistribution.
Our pool comprised all guns recovered within the Los Angeles metropolitan
area by agencies who participated in an ATF tracing project[6]. To minimize
selection bias, we set no criteria for inclusion, such as type of crime or
circumstance of recovery. Consequently, most of the firearms were associated
with a relatively petty offense such as carrying a concealed weapon or
possession of a loaded firearm in a public place. Since cases were aggregated
for analysis, our ability to explain the pedigree of guns used in violent crime
might be in question. However, the prevailing view holds that whether a gun is
recovered from someone’s back pocket, or from a violent incident that might
occur just a few moments later, its simple presence “on the street” is a powerful
predictor of misuse (Sherman et al., 1995; Wilson, 1994).
Our data do not purport to represent the types of guns, kinds of offenders or
circumstances of recovery that may be typical elsewhere. However,
comparisons between key characteristics of our sample and like statistics
drawn from other studies are made where appropriate.
As a second measure, we examined case files for each domestic gun
diversion investigation conducted by ATF agents in the Los Angeles
metropolitan area between 1992 and 1995. Naturally, decisions to investigate
are contingent on a host of extraneous legal and bureaucratic variables, so
casework must be viewed with caution. To help assure that the episodes cited
reflected actual offending, inclusion was limited to 28 instances that either led to
a conviction or, for matters still pending, had been accorded an interim judicial
endorsement in the form of a search warrant or criminal indictment.
Findings
Trace success
California law requires that all gun transactions, whether or not a dealer is
involved, be registered at time of sale. Approved handgun transfers are
Guns in
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California
225
PIJPSM
21,2
226
perpetually recorded in a State database that enables police to identify dealers
and buyers.
State records contained sales data for 47 percent (844) of the 1,782 recovered
handguns that were shipped to a California dealer. Obviously, buyers and
sellers often failed to register these transactions. Compliance with State law has
apparently increased over time. For example, a set of 340 handguns that were
recovered in 1995 yielded a somewhat higher registration rate of 58 percent.
Recent rates have occasionally reached values as high as 90 percent.
A partial explanation may lie in that State oversight of gun dealers has been
quite limited. During the period cited, California did not employ criminal
investigators who specialized in gun trafficking casework. Its dealer inspection
program, which began in 1994, comprises a small staff housed in Sacramento.
Moreover, all criminal penalties for State gun dealing violations are
misdemeanors. California’s problem with dealer compliance is not unique, as
similar concerns have been raised in other areas of the USA (ATF, 1993b; Cook
et al., 1995).
Through contacts with gun manufacturers and distributors, ATF’s National
Tracing Center identified the first retail dealer for 46 percent (1,918) of the 4,158
guns remaining in the pool. At this stage, traces failed for two major reasons:
incomplete or incorrect gun information in police reports, and guns that were
too old to trace by ATF standards. About 10 percent of the traces were
abandoned due to problems with manufacturer and distributor records[7].
More severe recordkeeping deficiencies were evident at the retailer level, as
dealers failed to supply sales or disposition information for 40 percent (765) of
the guns traced to their premises. Most problems were attributed to a small
group of suspect retailers who could not be located, were unresponsive, or had
apparently sold guns without completing required paperwork. When compared
to national statistics, these lapses seem relatively severe. In 1994, ATF reported
that about 12 percent of all traces failed at the dealer. National figures for
subsequent years range between 6 and 8 percent (ATF, 1997a, 1997c). Rates as
high as 20 percent have been reported in local trace studies (ATF, 1993a; ATF,
1995b; ATF, 1995c).
Gun types and calibers
Handguns accounted for 84 percent of the 4,990 recovered firearms whose type
was known, with twice as many pistols as revolvers (see Table II). Larger
calibers predominated. Approximately equal numbers of rifles and shotguns
were recovered. Less than 2 percent of the weapons were intrinsically illegal and
only one machinegun was seized. Although limitations of the report review
process probably led to an undercount of contraband firearms, it seems that
police officers in the study area seldom encountered illegal weapons other than
sawed-off shotguns.
These distributions are similar to national statistics. In a recent multisite
study, eight out of ten firearms recovered by police were handguns, with six out
of ten being semiautomatic pistols (ATF, 1997c). Of the two and one-half million
handguns produced in the USA in 1994, 77 percent were pistols, with 9mm
being the most popular caliber (ATF, 1996c). During that year, handguns
Handguns (84%)
Pistols
.45
9mm, .380
.22, .25
Unknown
Revolvers
.44
.38, .357
.22, .32
Unknown
Total
Long guns (16%)
Shotgunsa
12 gauge
16, 20 gauge
.410 gauge
Unknown
Riflesb
Larger
.308, 30.06
.22, .223
Unknown
Total
%
N
6
42
25
26
164
1,187
714
742
3
45
9
44
35
617
127
605
4,191
41
5
2
52
172
21
9
219
5
12
24
60
18
45
89
226
799
Notes: a Includes 59 short-barrel shotguns
b Includes 22 short-barrel rifles
Table does not include one machinegun and three silencers
accounted for 79 percent of all firearms traced by ATF; 68 percent were pistols,
with 9mm the predominant caliber (ATF, 1995a)[8]. In 1995, 9mm pistols
continued to be the handgun most frequently produced; pistols with calibers
larger than 9mm captured second place (ATF, 1996d). Preferences for new,
larger-caliber pistols have also been reflected in offender self-reports (Sheley
and Wright, 1993).
Stolen guns
Of the 5,002 guns in our sample, 6 percent (277) were reportedly stolen. This
seemingly low figure led us to undertake a special, more careful review of 1995
data. Still, guns reported as stolen remained under 10 percent. Proportions of
stolen guns encountered in other ATF studies range from 4 to 21 percent (ATF,
1991, 1993a, 1995b, 1995c).
Circumstances of recovery
Circumstances of recovery were reported for 65 percent (3,273) of the guns in
the pool (see Table III). Of these, a plurality (66 percent) had been seized for
Guns in
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California
227
Table II.
Distribution of guns by
type and caliber
(N = 4,990)
PIJPSM
21,2
228
Table III.
Circumstances of
recovery (N = 3,273)
Circumstances
Guns recovered
%
N
Illegal possessiona
Violent crime
Assault
Robbery
Murder/att.
Kidnapping
Sex offenses
Total
66
2,160
47
26
24
2
<1
16
245
137
126
11
3
522
Narcotics offense
Property crime
Non-criminalb
13
4
1
427
120
44
Notes:
a
Concealed weapons, loaded gun in public, underage possession, possession by
prohibited persons
b Includes found guns and those temporarily stored for safekeeping
unlawful possession. Sixteen percent were recovered in connection with a
violent crime such as robbery, assault with a gun and murder. Drug arrests
accounted for 13 percent. These proportions are similar to national statistics. In
1994, 73 percent of the 83,358 guns submitted to ATF for tracing had been
picked up for a miscellaneous weapons offense. An additional 12 percent were
used in a violent crime and another 12 percent were seized in connection with a
drug offense (ATF, 1995a).
Purchaser and possessor age
Computations were based on 3,710 guns where possessor age was known and
1,800 guns where purchaser age was known (see Table IV). Overall, possessors
were substantially younger than purchasers. Average age for possessors was
26, while the average age of purchasers was 34.
Purchaser and possessor gender
Gender was coded for 898 guns where purchaser gender was known and 2,455
guns where possessor gender was known. Males comprised 84 percent of
purchasers and 94 percent of possessors. Females were represented in nearly
three times as many instances of purchase (16 percent) as possession (6
percent).
Recoveries from purchasers
Purchasers and possessors were fully identified for 1,599 recovered guns. Of
these, 14 percent (223) had been seized from the original retail buyer. This figure
is somewhat lower than might be expected given the results of earlier studies. It
might have increased but for difficulties brought on by incomplete data.
Purchasers
(N = 1,800)
Possessors
(N = 3,710)
Age
%
N
%
N
50+
40-49
30-39
21-29
18-20
5-17
13
14
26
45
2
230
254
468
818
30a
0a
4
6
18
38
18
16
137
224
678
1416
661
594
Juvenile possessors
15-17
12-14
5-11
87
12
1
515
72
7b
Notes: a Federal minimum age to buy at a dealer is 18 for long guns, 21 for handguns
b Youngest possessor was 5 years old
Lag between sale and recovery
Guns possessed by criminals seem particularly vulnerable to recovery as they
are more likely to be misused or carried “on the street” (Sherman et al., 1995;
Wilson, 1994). Since criminals apparently prefer to acquire guns through
unregulated transactions, it is reasonable to suggest that brief lag times will be
associated with illicit sales (Pierce et al., 1995).
Lag times were computed for 2,053 guns whose dealer sale date was known
(see Table V). Many had been recovered within relatively brief periods. Pistols
seemed especially prone to quick turn-around: a third were seized within one
year and more than half within two years. National data paints a similar
picture. In 1995, the average lag for all weapons in ATF’s national tracing
database was 5.57 years, with an average lag for pistols of 3.7 years (Pierce et
al., 1995). In a more recent trace study, at least 25 percent of recovered firearms
were seized within three years of their initial sale (ATF, 1997c).
Source states
Arizona, Nevada and most States in the South have been known as “weak law”
States, as they impose few if any restrictions on gun sales. One consequence is
that they become gun suppliers to neighboring States where regulations are
more stringent (Larson, 1993; 1994). A substantial inflow of guns into
California, which strictly regulates gun sales, might therefore be expected.
The location of the first retail sale was known for 2,184 guns. Nineteen
percent (408) had been initially sold outside of California. The top five source
States were Arizona (66), Texas (35), Nevada (25), Louisiana (20), and Florida
(20). In a recent national study, 54 to 77 percent of successfully traced guns were
purchased by residents of the State where the recovery took place (ATF, 1997c).
Guns in
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229
Table IV.
Distribution of guns
by purchaser and
possessor age
PIJPSM
21,2
Pistols
%
N
Average lag (in days)
230
Recovered within:
30 days
6 monthsa
1 yeara
2 yearsa
Cases where lag was
calculated
Guns by category
Table V.
Lag between retail sale
and recovery (N = 2,053) Note: a Running total
Revolvers
%
N
1,236
3
17
32
52
Rifles
%
N
2,648
38
221
414
686
2
2
2
24
8
32
57
115
1,307 478
2,807 1,384
122
378
146
421
Shotguns
%
N
2,294
<1
7
18
32
1
9
22
39
2,089
3
16
23
32
4
23
33
46
Dealer type
Of the 300 California dealers identified through the trace project, 258 were
conventional gun stores and 40 were home businesses. The two remaining
outlets were “hybrid” commercial sites that did not cater to the general public
(e.g. an office in an industrial strip mall).
Large, commercial outlets exert an unmistakable influence, with the top ten
retailers accounting for 45 percent (613) of the 1,363 guns that were traced to a
California dealer. While lesser in number, hybrid and home-based licensees
seemed responsible for a somewhat disproportionate share of crime guns, as
they comprised 14 percent of retailers but were associated with 17 percent (235)
of recoveries.
National estimates indicate that nearly three out of four Federally-licensed
dealers are based in a private dwelling (ATF, 1993b). Many if not most home
businesses apparently keep a firearms license as a personal convenience and
engage in few transactions with the public (Larson, 1994; Cook et al., 1995).
Casework
Table VI provides information on 28 domestic gun diversion investigations
conducted by ATF agents in the Los Angeles area between 1992 and 1995.
Minimum criteria for inclusion required the issuance of either a search warrant
or an accusatory document (i.e. a criminal indictment). Case files were
systematically reviewed and missing data were supplanted through agent
interviews.
These cases charged the diversion of 19,145 guns[9]. Except where indicated,
all were new handguns, mostly inexpensive pistols in .380 and 9mm calibers.
Of the diverted guns, 75 percent (14,328) were purchased at wholesale from
a distributor. Corrupt licensees bought 92 percent (13,128), while the remaining
1,200 were purchased by unlicensed street vendors using a forged dealer
license. No instances of wholesaler misconduct were reported.
Of the diverted guns, 14 percent (2,641) were initially acquired from a retail
dealer. Of these, nearly half (1,100) were bought by straw purchasers from
Diversion
type
No. of
cases
Practices
Gun sources
I – Corrupt
licensed
dealer
selling to
end users
7
Kept no records – 7
Also falsified records – 1
Obliterated serial numbers – 1
Claimed guns were stolen – 1
In partnership with street dealers – 3
Sold at gun shows – 1
Also sold long guns – 1
Distributor
Distributors
Retailer & distributor
Corrupt home dealer
Distributors
Distributors
Corrupt com’l dealer
II – Corrupt
licensed
dealer
selling to
street
dealers
8
Also sold to end users – 3
Kept no records – 6
Falsified records – 2
False and no records – 1
Obliterated serial numbers –1
Claimed guns were stolen – 1
Used street dealers – 2
III – Street
dealer (no
license)
11
IV – Noncommercial
straw
purchase
2
No. of gunsa
divert
recov
Court
Dispo
90
120
140
150
200
300
319
38
1
4
30
25
25
unk
2F, 1M
1F, 1M
1F
2F
1F
1F, 1I
SW
Distributor
Distributor
Distributor
Distributor
Distributor
Distributor
Distributor
Distributor
500
700
900
1,200
1,300
1,700
3,000
3,048
200
1
200
110
200
80
200
300
1F
2F
1F
SW
3F
1F
SW
SW
Sold to end users – 9
Sold to other street
dealers – 2
Obliterated serial numbers – 1
Claimed guns were stolen – 1
Interstate (Arizona to
California) – 1
Corrupt home dealer
Insider thefts (dlr)
Insider thefts (dlr)
Corrupt com’l dealer
Commercial burglaries
Corrupt home dealer
Straw purchase
Corrupt home dealer
Straw purchases in AZ
Forged lic. at distr.
Insider thefts (mfr)
unk
unk
35
30
141
150
200
700
1,000
1,200
2,000
2
40
11
30
unk
30
30
14
200
15
300
SW
1F
1F
1F
7F
2F
1F
2F
10F
1F
3F
Bought gun for felon – 2
Also bought handgun for
minor – 1
Bought long guns only – 1
Retail gun store
Retail gun store
3
19
3
19
2M
1F
Notes: a Figures rounded to zero are minimum estimates based on invoices and state records; F = felony conviction; M = misd. conv.; I = indicted;
SW = search warrant executed
Guns in
Los Angeles,
California
231
Table VI.
Gun diversion casework
with judicial action,
ATF, Los Angeles,
1992-1995
PIJPSM
21,2
232
apparently innocent sources. Two corrupt storefront outlets and two corrupt
home dealers were also implicated.
Thefts from commercial outlets accounted for 11 percent (2,176) of the
diverted guns. No instances of residential theft were reported. Interestingly, two
licensees and one unlicensed street vendor tried to conceal illegal resales by
falsely reporting that their guns had been stolen. A home dealer went so far as
to report the theft of 900 guns to local police, who dutifully entered each gun
into a national database.
To facilitate analysis, a simple model was devised that assigned diversions to
one of four types.
Type I – Corrupt licensed dealer selling to end users. Seven licensed retailers
allegedly made unrecorded or misrecorded sales to private individuals. These
include four home dealers and two hybrids who failed to keep records, and a
retail store that had a mix of missing and false paperwork.
Three Type I dealers were allied with unlicensed street peddlers who
performed various tasks, including picking up guns at distributors, procuring
customers and making illicit deliveries.
Type II – Corrupt licensed dealer selling to street dealers. Eight licensed
dealers allegedly operated as self-styled wholesalers, making unrecorded or
misrecorded sales in bulk quantities to unlicensed street dealers and, on
occasion, to other corrupt licensees. As might be expected, their output was
quite prolific: the smallest episode involved 500 guns; the largest, more than
3,000.
Three Type II retailers supplanted their business by making direct sales to
end users, while two formed alliances with unlicensed street vendors.
Anecdotal concerns about home gun businesses were clearly borne out here,
as six of the Type II retailers operated from a residence.
Type III – Unlicensed street dealer. Eight cases charged unlicensed street
vendors with making direct sales of guns to end users.
Licensed dealers who kept no records or falsified records were the preferred
source of supply for street gun merchants. Corrupt licensees were favored
because of their ready access to guns and their willingness to forego or falsify
paperwork so as to shield customers from discovery.
In two instances, street vendors had straw buyers purchase guns at retail.
One episode involved four persons who took turns buying 200 pistols during a
four-month period, with as many as 40 guns being acquired on a single
occasion. (Three of these buyers used their own names while one, a convicted
felon, used false identification.) Multiple purchases seem relatively common in
California, where there has been no set limit to the number of guns that a
private person can purchase. During a nine-month period in 1994, private
individuals in Southern California acquired at least 13,181 handguns through
5,743 distinct instances of multiple sale (ATF, 1995c)[10].
In a notable diversion involving 1,200 guns, a savvy vendor bypassed retail
sources by using a forged Federal firearms license to buy guns directly from an
unwitting distributor. After obliterating most of the serial numbers, the
trafficker resold the guns to three other unlicensed peddlers in bulk quantities.
Four cases involved firearms thefts from licensed sources. A gun store clerk
was arrested after taking small quantities of guns from inventory and reselling
them to friends and acquaintances. Two employees of a gun manufacturer were
convicted for orchestrating the theft of 2,000 firearms from stock. One of the
street dealers whom they had supplied was also caught and imprisoned. In
addition, convictions were obtained against several gang members who
burglarized and attempted to burglarize numerous gun stores. (Fortunately,
most commercial retailers in the Los Angeles area had become such hardened
targets that the thieves only got away with 141 guns.)
Type IV – Non-commercial straw purchase. Two cases alleged casual, noncommercial acts of straw purchase at retail gun stores by proxies on behalf of a
felon or minor. In both instances, the vendors appeared innocent of wrongdoing.
Data in Table VI are presented as follows:
• Diversion type.
• Number of distinct investigations, each with discrete facts and
defendants.
• Sales strategies, including customer base, alliances with other vendors
and methods of concealment.
• Source of supply.
• Number of guns illegally sold. Agents documented gun sales to
investigative targets by reviewing records at known suppliers. Guns
illicitly sold to undercover agents, guns missing from premises and from
record books, and guns falsely claimed as sold or stolen are included.
• Number of guns recovered, including those purchased by undercover
agents or seized by police. Most recoveries were documented by
checking a statewide database that tracks gun confiscations by local law
enforcement agencies. Recovered guns were probably undercounted as
investigators ceased making inquiries once they had chronicled a
quantity deemed sufficient for prosecution.
• Current judicial status.
Table VI depicts a taxonomy of gun trafficking, comprising corrupt licensees,
unlicensed street dealers and straw buyers. Many instances involve
dependencies; for example, home dealers who sell their wares through street
dealers, and street dealers who acquire guns using straw purchasers.
As a final step, a comparison was drawn between the casework and the trace
project. Fourteen of the 15 corrupt licensees targeted in the casework received
12 percent (170) of the 1,363 recovered firearms that had been traced to a known
California retailer. Other licensed dealers suspected of wrongdoing but not
included in the casework accounted for an additional 107 recovered firearms (8
percent). This ersatz “clearance” rate, which attributes 12 to 20 percent of
recovered guns of California origin to a corrupt retailer, suggests that dealer
misconduct may have a substantial impact on the crime gun problem in the
study area.
Guns in
Los Angeles,
California
233
PIJPSM
21,2
234
Conclusion
In contrast to the exhaustive nature of the literature on drugs, gun trafficking
has received limited academic attention. Assumptions and conjecture aside, little
is known about the paths that firearms take between manufacture and misuse.
Research on gun sources has been sketchy, and where data are available its
interpretation is often tinged by unfamiliarity with patterns of transfer such as
straw purchase and licensee misconduct. Surveys of gun possessors have
afforded some insights, but accuracy seems lacking. Sources are collapsed into
imprecise categories such as “family and friends” and “on the street”, thus
begging elemental questions about the origins of firearms that are recovered by
police.
Licensed gun dealers have been mostly ignored. Whether for a lack of data,
the absence of a suitable theoretical construct, or a tendency to assume that all
transactions within the primary market are legitimate, inquiries have generally
overlooked the paradox of regulated though corrupt sales.
The present effort relied on two approaches that are relatively uncommon in
gun research: gun tracing and content analysis of investigative casework. Gun
recoveries by authorities in the Los Angeles area yielded data about the
characteristics of seized firearms and their possessors. Information pertaining to
the marketing and consumption of these weapons was obtained by tracing them
to the extent possible. Case files of successful gun diversion investigations were
also examined.
Our findings portray a considerably different model of gun redistribution
than the literature had led us to expect. Instead of a market predominantly
comprising of petty criminals selling stolen guns, we encountered a setting rich
with licensed and unlicensed entrepreneurs who bought guns directly from
licensed sources in order to satisfy their customers’ craving for new, large-caliber
pistols. Episodes of large scale, commercialized gun diversion seemed
commonplace, with eight instances involving more than 1,000 guns each.
Though much less precise, recovery statistics were equally striking, with eight
cases surpassing the 100-gun threshold.
Other methods of gun acquisition that have received little academic attention,
such as self-purchase and straw purchase, also seemed important. On the other
hand, theft was considerably less salient than conventional wisdom implies.
Notions of its prevalence were not supported by the trace study (6 percent of
recovered guns were stolen) or by the casework (11 percent of diverted guns were
stolen). Residential burglary was virtually ruled out as a major source for the
secondary market. While stolen firearms modestly contributed to the pool of
recoveries, none of the street dealers targeted in the casework peddled guns that
originated from a house theft.
Dealer corruption emerged as a surprisingly significant source of supply. Gun
tracing disclosed that some retailers had not only failed to account for incoming
guns but also ignored State registration requirements. Malfeasance by licensees
was particularly evident in the casework, as 71 percent (13,667) of the diverted
guns passed through 15 licensed dealers who made unrecorded or misrecorded
sales to individuals and unlicensed vendors.
Concerns that misconduct by just a few retailers can have a disproportionate
impact were advanced during a recent scholarly review of national trace data
(Pierce et al., 1995). Less than one-half of 1 percent of gun dealers were found to
account for nearly 50 percent of all guns traced by ATF (Pierce et al., 1995, p. 15).
Brief lag times (defined as two years or less between sale and recovery) were
associated with less than 3 percent of licensees; these sources, in turn, were
responsible for nearly 28 percent of all traced firearms (Pierce et al., 1995, p. 15).
Willie Sutton robbed banks because those are the places where the money is.
Corrupt licensees turned to wholesalers, and unlicensed dealers turned to
licensed retailers, because those are the places where the guns are. Where else
can a budding entrepreneur acquire the new, large-caliber pistols that are so
much in demand, in quantity and at minimal risk? Relying on the vagaries of
what a string of residential thefts might accomplish seems foolish in comparison
(Pierce et al., 1995).
Concerns about home dealers were well placed. Of the 15 retailers accused in
the casework, only two were commercial gun stores. Ten were home businesses,
while three operated from a hybrid location. It seems that the privacy and
flexibility enjoyed by gun dealers who are licensed to do business from a private
dwelling can make oversight a tough task, indeed (Cook et al., 1995; Larson,
1994).
Many persons who misuse or illegally possess firearms evidently do buy
them in stores. Of the fully traced, 14 percent of guns were recovered from their
first retail buyer. Estimates from offender surveys have pegged self-purchase at
16 to 27 percent (Beck et al., 1993; Wright et al., 1983).
Unlicensed street vendors were well represented in the casework, accounting
for 11 cases and 28 percent (5,456) of the diverted guns. Their preferred channel
of supply – a corrupt home dealer – parallels earlier findings by Moore (1981).
Some street dealers also used straw buyers to acquire guns at retail, while others
purchased firearms that had been stolen from commercial thefts.
Actually, unlicensed dealers may be a far more salient source of guns for
criminals than the casework implies. Misconduct by street vendors is difficult to
assess or detect, as without a license there is no requirement to maintain records
and no notice, opportunity or right for the Government to inspect.
Other than for its brief mention in a study of juvenile gun possession and a
few references elsewhere, the phenomenon of straw purchase has been
overlooked. Surely, buying guns on behalf of another person entails some risk.
But for the end user it offers a simple and relatively safe way to acquire a new
gun without declaring oneself “on paper” (and without, one may add, paying the
markup that a street dealer or corrupt licensee might impose for the privilege of
conducting a paperless transaction).
Age and gender data from the trace study indirectly support the straw
purchase hypothesis by suggesting that guns flow from older to younger
persons and from females to males. Indeed, ATF agents report that gun
acquisition by females on behalf of male friends and family members is
relatively common; many examples suggesting this practice were encountered
by the author while reviewing gun recovery data. But these minor, noncommercial instances of straw purchase were largely absent from the casework.
Guns in
Los Angeles,
California
235
PIJPSM
21,2
236
It may be that within the busy realm of gun merchandising, individual acts of
surrogacy either go undiscovered or provoke scant attention, particularly since a
simple denial or false claim of theft leaves little leverage for the authorities.
Consider, for example, the numerous instances of multiple purchase that take
place. Each could potentially be a straw transaction, yet it would require a legion
of investigators to examine more than a few. Perhaps issues of intrusiveness and
resource allocation render the investigation of minor transgressions impolitic or
uneconomic. Given the potential impact of straw purchase, more focused
inquiries are surely needed.
Interstate gun trafficking, with guns purchased in “weak law” States for
redistribution in “strong law” States, is reportedly a major problem in the
Eastern seaboard. In places such as New Jersey, where dealer licensing is strict
and handguns are closely regulated, as many as 90 percent of recoveries are
attributed to this pattern (ATF, 1997b; Cook et al., 1995).
Of the guns traced to a dealer, 19 percent were initially sold at retail in another
State, principally Arizona and Nevada. However, there was only one example of
interstate trafficking in the casework. It may be that interstate episodes are more
difficult to detect and interdict. They may also require a reallocation of resources
from the seemingly greater problem of intrastate diversion.
Gun shows are reportedly a safe and convenient place for those with an illicit
purpose to meet and barter firearms (Cook et al., 1995). However, they were
mentioned only once in the casework, as an outlet for a corrupt licensee. Perhaps
other factors are at work. In California, where firearms transfers must be
accomplished through a licensed dealer, police patrols and posted notices at gun
shows serve as reminders to obey the law[11]. These factors probably make
California gun shows a more problematic (but certainly not impossible) place for
criminals to covertly acquire guns.
Three examples of serial number obliteration were reported in the casework,
ranging from 140 to 1,200 guns. Obliterations hold special appeal for two classes
of persons who are most threatened by gun tracing: criminals who acquire guns
directly from gun stores, either through self-purchase or with the aid of a straw
buyer, and corrupt licensees who sell guns without keeping records. Since most
Southern California law enforcement agencies do not track or consistently
attempt to restore obliterated serial numbers, their local prevalence is unknown.
One recent national study estimated that as many as 20 percent of recovered
guns have defaced serial numbers (ATF, 1997c).
One street dealer acquired 1,200 guns by simply furnishing a forged firearms
license to a gun distributor. According to investigators, such episodes are
becoming more frequent. Additional safeguards to prevent the misuse of
licensing documents may be necessary.
At least 25 percent of the guns in the trace pool were more than five years old.
This sizeable proportion poses some intriguing questions, particularly since
there was no example of used gun marketing in the casework. Are older firearms
more likely to pass between friends, family members and acquaintances? Are
such guns equally at risk of being used in crimes?
While there were attempts to avoid introducing bias, our selection process
obviously left much to be desired. Additional trace projects and examinations of
casework should be conducted in a variety of urban and rural settings, with
efforts hopefully reaching a size that allows the use of an appropriate sampling
technique. Ideally, given the requisite Government and institutional support,
longitudinal studies such as a gun purchase cohort could avoid some of the
considerable problems associated with post hoc crime gun research. Valuable
data-gathering techniques such as offender surveys might also be enhanced by
employing more appropriate items and response categories.
Some final comments. Short of anointing licensees with psychic powers, there
is little to be done about buyers who commit crimes with guns they lawfully
acquire, or straw purchasers who deliver firearms to prohibited persons. It
seems, though, that a few corrupt dealers and unlicensed vendors – to repeat the
cliché, just a few rotten apples – are responsible for an abundant number of
recovered guns, both as a proximate source and as an conduit to others. Since
traffickers often acquire guns from distributors, monitoring suspicious
purchases at wholesalers – particularly, by home and hybrid dealers – may
prove helpful. Like techniques could be applied at the retailer level to counter the
use of straw buyers by street vendors. But whatever methods are ultimately
employed, there is no doubt that a concerted bid to root out the individuals and
firms who engage in commercialized gun diversion would have a salutary effect
on the gun marketplace.
Notes
1. California law requires that all gun transactions, including those between private parties,
be reported on a DROS (Dealer Record of Sale) form. 665,229 DROS forms were processed
in 1993, including 448,247 handguns and 216,982 long guns (rifles and shotguns). 6,509
proposed transfers were denied, mostly due to the applicant’s criminal record.
2. Federal gun control provisions are in Title 18, United States Code, secs. 921 et seq., and
Part 178 of the Code of Federal Regulations. While a firearms license is active, gun records
are kept at the business premises. Since there is no centralized Federal registry, gun tracing
entails a sequence of contacts, beginning with the manufacturer or importer and
continuing through the distributor and retailer. Each is asked to search their records and
identify the individual or business to whom a gun was delivered. To be traced, guns must
at a minimum be identified by make, model and serial number (obliterated serial numbers
must be restored before a trace can proceed). Systematically tracing recovered guns can
help identify licensed dealers and unlicensed vendors that are a non-trivial source for the
secondary market (Pierce et al., 1995).
3. Title 18, United States Code, section 922(s). Brady does not apply to transactions between
private persons. Its provision that compelled local authorities to check the criminal record
of prospective purchasers was nullified by the US Supreme Court (Printz v. United States,
decided June 27, 1997).
4. Qualifiers such as “only” can easily mislead. Even a figure as small as 16 percent might
seem compelling when calculated for, say, the 931,000 handgun crimes that took place in
the USA during 1992 (Rand, 1994).
5. Neither recovered nor stolen guns always find their way into official records. Many
California law enforcement agencies do not enter recovered guns, so the Statewide figure is
known to represent a significant undercount. Owners who do not keep track of gun serial
numbers may be stymied when trying to report a theft. This should present less of an
obstacle in California, where legal handgun transfers are perpetually registered in a State
database that is readily accessible by police.
6. 4,079 guns were seized by Los Angeles police officers, mostly within inner-city areas
patrolled by LAPD’s South and Central Bureaus. An additional 498 guns were seized in the
Guns in
Los Angeles,
California
237
PIJPSM
21,2
7.
238
8.
9.
10.
11.
city of Santa Ana, the principal community of Orange County. The remaining 425 firearms
were recovered in unincorporated areas of Los Angeles and Orange counties, the City of
Long Beach, and in several small nearby jurisdictions.
Approximately half the traces failed because, for trace projects, ATF does not routinely
seek to identify the dealer of guns manufactured more than five years prior to recovery.
Most other failures resulted from errors or omissions in police reports, including
incomplete descriptions, mistaken serial numbers and, for imported guns, no importer
name. Failures may be somewhat overstated as about 200 old trace requests were pending
when data were analyzed.
ATF traced 83,359 firearms, including 42,114 pistols, 1,125 derringers, 19,778 revolvers,
8,769 rifles, 7,665 shotguns, and 3,908 guns whose type was unknown. Its list of “top ten
calibers” was led by 9mm (14,761), an exclusive pistol caliber. Second in line was .22
(12,460), a mixed handgun-long gun caliber. Another pistol caliber, .380, was third (10,884).
A revolver caliber, .38, was fourth (9,025), and another pistol caliber, .25 (8,769), was fifth.
As used here, “diversion” means the transfer of a firearm in an illicit manner or for an illicit
purpose. This term is borrowed from the drug lexicon, where it is used to connote the
clandestine redirection of legal chemicals. Gun trafficking would be the commercialized
(repetitive, for profit) aspect of diversion. Concepts such as diversion and trafficking are
particularly useful as they are unaffected by distinctions between markets. (Unregulated
transfers are not necessarily diversions, as many States do not impose reporting
requirements on firearms transactions between private parties.)
Section 178.126(a), Code of Federal Regulations, requires licensed gun dealers to mail
reports of multiple sale of handguns to the Federal government and local authorities.
“Multiple sale” means the purchase by an unlicensed person of more than one handgun
from the same dealer within a five-day period. Reporting is accomplished on a pre-printed
card bearing spaces for the dealer stamp; the buyer name, birth date and address; the
transaction date; and the number of handguns bought.
In California, licensees rent booths at gun shows to service transfers between unlicensed
persons. For a fee, they accept custody of private firearms, complete all required forms and
deliver guns to buyers once the waiting period has lapsed.
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