STATE OF INDIANA MICHAEL R. PENCE, Governor PUBLIC ACCESS COUNSELOR LUKE H. BRITT Indiana Government Center South 402 West Washington Street, Room W470 Indianapolis, Indiana 46204-2745 Telephone: (317)233-9435 Fax: (317)233-3091 1-800-228-6013 www.lN.gov/pac April 1,2015 Mr. William R. Groth, Esq. C/o Energy and Policy Institute P.O. Box 15790 Washington, D.C. 20003 -andCitizens Action Coalition 603 East Washington Street Indianapolis, Indiana 46204 Re: Formal Complaint I5-FC-I07; Alleged Violation of the Access to Public Records Act by Indiana House Representative Eric Koch and the Indiana House Republican Caucus Dear Mr. Groth, This advisory opinion is in response to the formal complaint alleging Indiana House Representative Eric Koch and the Indiana House Republican Caucus ("Caucus"), violated the Access to Public Records Act ("APRA") Ind. Code § 5-14-3-1 et. seq. The Caucus responded to your complaint via Ms. Jill S. Carnell, Esq., Chief Counsel. Her response is enclosed for your review. I issue the following opinion to your formal complaint received by the Office of the Public Access Counselor on March 23, 2015. BACKGROUND The complaint dated March 23, 2015 alleges the Indiana House Republican Caucus violated the Access to Public Records Act by failing to produce information you requested. On or about March 9, 2015, a public records request was submitted to Representative Koch requesting the following information: Any and all emails, correspondence, or other documents that pertain to "net metering," "solar energy," "distributed generation," "electric fairness," or "fixed charges," and that were created from September 1, 2014 to the present, between Representative Eric Koch and [10 different named parties]." On March 16,2015, Chief Counsel for the Caucus acknowledged and denied your request arguing that the Indiana Access to Public Records Law was inapplicable to the Indiana General Assembly. Additionally, counsel cites Ind. Code § 5-14-3-4(b), alleging the conversations are work product of the legislature. Finally, counsel contends your request is not reasonably particular because it involves ten different parties and a time period of six months. ANALYSIS The public policy of the APRA states that "a (p)roviding person with information is an essential function of a representative government and an integral part of the routine duties of public officials and employees, whose duty it is to provide the information." See Ind. Code § 5-14-3-1. As it stated in Opinion of the Public Access Counselor 15-FC-69, the Indiana House Republican Caucus is a public agency for the purposes of the APRA. See Ind. Code § 5-14-3-2(n)(I). Any person has the right to inspect and copy the Caucus's public records during regular business hours unless the records are protected from disclosure as confidential or otherwise exempt under the APRA. See Ind. Code § 5-14- 33(a).! Although not defined in the APRA, the Indiana Court of Appeals addressed the issue of reasonable particularity in the APRA in Jent v. Fort Wayne Police Dept., 973 N.E.2d 30 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), and again in Anderson v. Huntington County Bd. ofCom'rs., 983 N.E.2d 613 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). The Court in Jent held: Whether a request identifies with reasonable particularity the record being requested turns, in part, on whether the person making the request provides the agency with information that enables the agency to search for, locate, and retrieve the records. Furthermore, in Opinion of the Public Access Counselor 14-1NF 30, I opined: Consider the definition of particularity in The New International Webster's Dictionary and Thesaurus, Encyclopedic Ed., 200: "exactitude in description; circumstantiality; strict or careful attention to detail; fastidiousness." I do believe voluminous records requests can meet that standard and agencies are required to satisfY voluminous requests, but to I The holdings in Masariu v. The Marion Superior Court No. 1,621 N.E.2d 1097 (Ind. 1993) and Berry et al. v. Crawford, et aI., 990 N.E.2d 410 (Ind. 2013), relied upon by the Caucus, exclusively address judicial enforceability ofintemallegislative procedures. The case does not address applicability of the Access to Public Records Act to the legislature. There is no authority in case law or statute exempting the Indiana General Assembly from the APRA. Judicial enforceability and applicability are mutually exclusive. This Office has traditionally been consistent in this holding. See also the Opinions of the Public Access Counselor 03-FC-62; and 03-Fe-3 J ("The House ofRepresentatives is clearly a public agency for the purposes of the APRA"). meet the reasonable particularity standard, they cannot be blanket requests. When it comes to email, I generally rely on the guidance provided by the Court in Anderson. The Court agreed with former Public Access Counselor Hoage that a reasonably particular request names a specific sender, recipient, and date frame. I would also contend a specific request would include one or more key words for a search parameter. In your amended request, you have seemingly satisfied the elements of specificity considered to be reasonably particular. Your request appears to meet the standard set forth by the APRA. Furthermore, buttressing the applicability argument, the General Assembly has carved itself out an exception for work product pursuant to Ind. Code § 5-l4-3-4(b)(14). The Caucus references this exception to disclosure in its denial. The disclosure or denial of the work product is at the discretion of the legislature. As discussed in the footnote above, this Office - charged with the responsibility of making recommendations to the General Assembly in regard to access issues - considers the legislature to be subject to the APRA. The intent of the APRA is to foster trust and good faith between the public and the government. It is a safeguard for accountability and stewardship for civil servants. I am confident the General Assembly strives to espouse those virtues. As Indiana Public Access Counselor, I humbly and respectfully request the Caucus reconsider its position on the blanket inapplicability of the Access to Public Records Act and treat public records requests in a manner consistent with the spirit of transparency and openness. That being said, this Office also recognizes the importance of maintaining the integrity of the legislative process. This includes legislator-constituent communication channels. Work product oflegislators is not defined in Indiana Code or case law. Although there is no explicit legislator-constituent privilege, the Masariu and Berry cases suggest the General Assembly has the discretion to define their own work product. To the extent the legislature may define work product to include the type of information you seek, I implore the General Assembly to be judicious in deciding what to withhold and what to release. It indeed requires a delicate balance, but the scales should favor transparency. Regards, Luke H. Britt Public Access Counselor Cc: Ms. Jill S. Carnell, Esq. (t.. l \:Ml;;t',r'$;i\'/ STATE OF INDIANA ",,~,,/ HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Statehouse, Room :}o8 200 West Washington Street Indianapolis, Indiana 46204 Jill S. Carnell Chief Counsel (317) 232-9631 jill. [email protected] March 26, 20 IS Mr. Luke H. Britt Public Access Counselor Indiana Government Center South 402 West Washington Street, Room W460 Indianapolis, Indiana 46204-2745 ,::. Dear Mr. Britt: This letter is in response to Complaint number IS-FC-107 (Priority), which alleges violations of the Access to Public Records Act on or about March 16,2015, by Representative Eric Koch and the Indiana House Republican Caucus because certain requests for constituent correspondence made by the Energy and Policy Institute were denied. The requests were made via email to Representative Eric Koch on March 9, 2015. The requests were as follows: :-.:. Any and all emails, correspondence, or other documents that pertain to "net metering," "solar energy," "distributed generation," "electric fairness'," or "fixed charge," and that were created from September 1,2014, to the present, between Representative Eric Koch and: i-· 1. Indiana Energy Association, including but not limited to Kimberly Reed, Mark Maassel, Edwin Simcox, 01' Timothy Rushenberg; 2. Duke Energy Corporation (including its parent company and subsidiaries), including but not limited to Stanley Pinegar, Douglas Esamann, Lynn Good, Lisa Kobe, 01' Laura Schenkel Johnson; 3. Indiana Michigan Power (including its parent company and subsidiaries), inclnding but not limited to Brian Bergsma, Paul Chodak, or Marc Lewis; 4. Indianapolis Power & Light Company (including its parent company and subsidiaries), including but not limited to Kelly Huntington, Frederic Mills, or Mark Flint; 5. Northern Indiana Public Service Company (inc1nding its parent company and subsidiaries), including but not limited to Mike Charbonneau, James Newland Jr., or Brandon Seitz; 6. Vectren Corporation (including its parent company and subsidiaries), including but not limited to Romad Christian, Carl Chapman, Robert Carmichael, Laurie Thornton, or Michael Roeder; ;,~- Mr. Luke Britt March 26, 2015 Page 2 7. Mahern & Associates, including but not limited to Ed Mahern; 8. Arland Communications, including but not limited to Dave Arland; 9. Taft Stettinius & Hollister LLP, including but not limited to Elizabeth Murphy, John Coldren, or Mark Palmer; or 10. Ice Miller LLP, including but not limited to Kay Pashos, Kelly Earls, and Melissa Proffitt Reese, Teni Czajka, Thomas Dimond. The Energy and Policy Institute previously made similar requests to Representative Koch on January 16 and February 2, 2015, which were denied. On February 24,2015, the Energy and Policy Institute and the Citizens Action Coalition filed a complaint with your office regarding those denials, and on March 6, 2015, you issued an advisory opinion. In that opinion, you concluded that the Indiana General Assembly is subject to the Access to Public Records Act but that the earlier requests made by the Energy and Policy Institute were not reasonably particular. In the March 16, 2015, response to the Energy and Policy Institute, I explained that the Access to Public Records Act does not apply to the Indiana House of Representatives ("House") under applicable constitutional provisions. Pursuant to Article 4, Section 10 of the Indiana Constitution, "each House shall choose its own officers ... determine the rules of its proceeding, and sit upon its own adjournment." In determining the rules of its proceeding, the House has a long history of treating all correspondence as confidential. This encourages constituents-and anyone else-to communicate all necessary information to their-or any- legislator without fearing that the information (which is often personal and private in nature) could be released to an outside party. The Indiana Supreme Comt has twice held that the legislative branch has the constitutional authority to determine its procedural rules. In Masariu v. The Marion Superior Court No.1, 621 N.E.2d 1097 (Ind. 1993), the Indiana Supreme Court determined that it would not intervene in the internal affairs of the legislative branch of government and that it is up to the legislative branch of government to decide its own internal procedural rules relating to the release of records. In Berry et al. v. CraWford, et al., 990 N.E.2d 410 (Ind. 2013), the Indiana Supreme Court held that "for courts to get involved in such a legislative function would amount to 'constitutionally impermissible judicial interference with the internal operations of the legislative branch. ", For all of these reasons, the Indiana Access to Public Records Law, located at I.C. 5-14-3, does not apply to the Indiana General Assembly. Even if the Access to Public Records Law applied to and could be judicially enforced against the General Assembly, lC. 5-14-3-4(b) also excludes from disclosure the work product of the Legislative Services Agency, as well as the work product of the individual members and partisan staffs of the General Assembly. The documents you have requested fall squarely within these exclusions and would not be available to you under the Access to Public Records Act. In addition, your request is not reasonably particular pursuant to the specificity requirements of I.C. 5-14-3-3 because your request covers over six months of time and numerous entities, names, and phrases. Finally, I disagree with your conclusion in Advisory Opinion 15-FC-69 (priority) that the Access to Public Records Law does apply to the Indiana General Assembly. It is clear from Mr. Luke Britt March 26, 2015 Page 3 both Masariu and Berry that the courts will not intervene with the internal policies of the Indiana General Assembly. In fact, in Masariu, the Indiana Supreme Court actually declined to order the Clerk of the House to release a copy of a roll call vote, a record of an action that was taken in public. In addition, the Public Access Counselor's opinion is just that-the nonbinding opinion of one lawyer. In Anderson v. Huntington County Board of Commissioners, 983 N.E.2d 613 (Ind. App. 2013), the court held that the Public Access Counselor's opinion is not binding on a court. In Purdue University v. Warteli, 5 N.E.3d 797 (Ind. App. 2014), the court held that the Public Access Counselor is not a finder of fact. If your opinion as Public Access Counselor is not binding on a court, nor is the Public Access Counselor a finder offact, a Public Access Counselor Advisory Opinion is certainly not binding on the duly-elected members of the Indiana General Assembly. Therefore, pursuant to the Indiana Constitution and two cases applying the Indiana Constitution decided by the Indiana Supreme Court, the Indiana House of Representatives is well within its authority to deny access to constituent correspondence. 1. Sincerely, ~S.0vWiQ Jill S. Carnell Chief COlUlsel House Republican Caucus cc: Speaker Brian Bosma Representative Eric Koch Lesley Crane, Esq.
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