1. No category

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
JAMES A. DENNIS,
)
)
)
Petitioner,
)
v.
)
)
JOHN E. WETZEL, Acting Secretary,
)
Pennsylvania Department of Corrections;
)
LOUIS S. FOLINO, Superintendent of the
)
State Correctional Institute at Greene;
)
MARIROSA LAMAS, Superintendent of
)
The State Correctional Institute at Rockview, )
)
Respondents.
)
)
)
CIVIL ACTION
No. 11-1660
THIS IS A CAPITAL CASE
ANITA B. BRODY, USDJ
BRIEF FOR AMICI CURIAE
THE PENNSYLVANIA INNOCENCE PROJECT, PROFESSOR EDITH GREENE,
PROFESSOR ELIZABETH LOFTUS, AND THE INNOCENCE NETWORK
IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER JAMES DENNIS
Marissa Boyers Bluestine (Pa. Bar No. 75973)
The Pennsylvania Innocence Project
1719 N. Broad Street
Philadelphia, PA 19122
(215) 204-4255
[email protected]
Counsel for Amici Curiae
The Pennsylvania Innocence Project
Professor Edith Greene
Professor Elizabeth Loftus and
The Innocence Network
February 20, 2013
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
I.
MISTAKEN EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATIONS THWART JUSTICE BY
IMPRISONING INNOCENTS AND ALLOWING THE GUILTY TO ESCAPE
PUNISHMENT. ..................................................................................................................... 5
II.
MANY FACTORS KNOWN TO CONTRIBUTE TO DEMONSTRABLY FALSE
IDENTIFICATIONS ARE PRESENT IN MR. DENNIS’S CASE ...................................... 7
A.
B.
A Combination of Estimator Variables Are Present in Mr. Dennis’s Case ............... 8
1.
The Violence of the Event and the Presence of a Weapon Make
Misidentification More Likely .................................................................... 8
2.
Witnesses Viewed the Perpetrator for a Matter of Seconds ..................... 10
The Presence of Several Problematic System Variables in Mr. Dennis’s
Case Make Misidentification Likely........................................................................ 11
1.
Time Lapse Between the Event and the Identification Impacts
Recall 12
2.
Post-Identification Suggestion May Impact Certainty .............................. 13
3.
The Influence of Non-Blind Administrator May Have Affected
Certainty.................................................................................................... 15
4.
Simultaneous Photo Arrays and Live Lineups Affect Reliability ............ 16
5.
Mugshot Exposure Effect Impacts the Reliability of Identifications........ 19
C.
Non-Identifications by Two Witnesses are Probative of Mr. Dennis’
Innocence ................................................................................................................. 20
D.
The Substantial Mismatch in the Witnesses’ Description of the Perpetrator
and Mr. Dennis’ Appearance Strongly Suggest that He Was Misidentified ........... 22
ii
INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE
The Innocence Network (“the Network”) is an association of organizations dedicated to
providing pro bono legal and/or investigative services to prisoners for whom evidence
discovered post conviction can provide conclusive proof of innocence. The 65 current members
of the Network represent hundreds of prisoners with innocence claims in all 50 states and the
District of Columbia, as well as Australia, Canada, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and
New Zealand.1 The Network and its members are also dedicated to improving the accuracy and
reliability of the criminal justice system in future cases. Drawing on the lessons learned from
cases in which the system convicted innocent persons, the Network advocates for reforms
designed to enhance the truth-seeking functions of the criminal justice system and thereby
prevent future wrongful convictions.
The Pennsylvania Innocence Project (the “Project”) is a nonprofit legal clinic and
resource center founded in 2008, housed at Temple University’s Beasley School of Law, and a
member of the Innocence Network. The Project’s board of directors and advisory committee
include practicing lawyers, law professors, former United States Attorneys, former state court
1
The member organizations include the Alaska Innocence Project, Association in Defense of the Wrongly
Convicted (Canada), California Innocence Project, Center on Wrongful Convictions, Connecticut Innocence Project,
Illinois Innocence Project, Duke Center for Criminal Justice and Professional Responsibility, The Exoneration
Initiative, Georgia Innocence Project, Hawaii Innocence Project, Idaho Innocence Project, Innocence Network UK,
Innocence Project, Innocence Project Arkansas, Innocence Project at UVA School of Law, Innocence Project New
Orleans, Innocence Project New Zealand, Innocence Project Northwest Clinic, Innocence Project of Florida,
Innocence Project of Iowa, Innocence Project of Minnesota, Innocence Project of South Dakota, Innocence Project
of Texas, Justice Project, Inc., Kentucky Innocence Project, Maryland Innocence Project, Michigan Innocence
Clinic, Mid-Atlantic Innocence Project, Midwestern Innocence Project, Mississippi Innocence Project, Montana
Innocence Project, Nebraska Innocence Project, New England Innocence Project, Northern Arizona Justice Project,
Northern California Innocence Project, Office of the Public Defender (State of Delaware), Office of the Ohio Public
Defender, Wrongful Conviction Project, Ohio Innocence Project, Osgoode Hall Innocence Project (Canada), Pace
Post-Conviction Project, Palmetto Innocence Project, Pennsylvania Innocence Project, Reinvestigation Project
(Office of the Appellate Defender), Rocky Mountain Innocence Center, Sellenger Centre Criminal Justice Review
Project (Australia), Texas Center for Actual Innocence, Texas Innocence Network, Thomas M. Cooley Law School
Innocence Project, Thurgood Marshall School of Law Innocence Project, University of British Columbia Law
Innocence Project (Canada), Wake Forest University Law School Innocence and Justice Clinic, Wesleyan Innocence
Project, Wisconsin Innocence Project, and Wrongful Conviction Clinic.
1
prosecutors, and the deans of the law schools of Temple University, Villanova University,
Drexel University, the University of Pennsylvania, and Rutgers-Camden. The Project provides
pro bono investigative and legal services to indigent prisoners throughout the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania whose claims of actual innocence are supported by the results of DNA testing or
other, powerfully exculpatory evidence or whose claims, after a preliminary investigation, evince
a substantial potential for the discovery of such evidence. In addition, the Project works to
remedy the underlying causes of wrongful convictions to better ensure that no one will be
convicted and imprisoned for a crime they did not commit and to lessen the risk that a wrongdoer
will escape justice because an innocent person was convicted in their stead.
The Network and the Project work to ensure that criminal trials arrive at accurate
determinations of guilt and promote justice. Inasmuch as mistaken eyewitness identifications are
the principal cause of wrongful convictions, amici have a compelling interest in ensuring that
courts reviewing convictions based upon eyewitness identifications have access to the most up to
date scientific information available.
Professors Edith Greene2 and Elizabeth Loftus3 are academics who conduct research
regarding eyewitness testimony. Their research, some of which is cited in this Brief, addresses
2
Edith Greene is Professor of Psychology at the University of Colorado-Colorado Springs (UCCS),
Director of the Graduate Concentration in Psychology and Law, and Director of the Psychology Honors Program.
She received a BA in psychology from Stanford University, an MA in experimental psychology from the University
of Colorado-Boulder, and a Ph.D. in psychology and law from the University of Washington. She has served as
Fellow in Law and Psychology at Harvard Law School, faculty member of the National Judicial College, and
Visiting Scholar at John Jay College of Criminal Justice, City University of New York. The co-author of a leading
textbook in psychology and law (Psychology and the Legal System, 7th edition, published by
Thomson/Wadsworth), Professor Greene teaches a survey course and an advanced undergraduate seminar in
psychology and law, as well as a graduate proseminar in psychology and law. Dr. Greene’s research focuses
generally on the application of cognitive and social psychology to legal issues, and specifically on the behavior of
various decision makers including juries, judges, attorneys, and witnesses. She has written about the factors that
influence the reliability of eyewitnesses to accidents and crimes.
3
Elizabeth Loftus is Distinguished Professor at the University of California - Irvine. She holds faculty
positions in three departments (Psychology & Social Behavior; Criminology, Law & Society; and Cognitive
(continued...)
2
the factors that influence the reliability of eyewitness testimony. Amici seek to provide the Court
with an accurate summary of findings from eyewitness identification research and particularly to
highlight scientific research which bears directly on Mr. Dennis’s case.
The reliability of eyewitness testimony is a critical issue in Mr. Dennis’s case. Both Mr.
Dennis and the Commonwealth reference the reliability of eyewitness testimony in their briefs,
and the Commonwealth even calls Mr. Dennis’s references to the unreliability of eyewitness
testimony “dubious.”4 Amici submit this brief to assist the Court in understanding the science
behind eyewitness testimony and the circumstances—many of which are present in Mr. Dennis’s
case—that may render it unreliable. This brief identifies the factors which may cause a factfinder
or court to incorrectly believe, as the Pennsylvania Supreme Court did, that positive eyewitness
identifications in the absence of any corroborating evidence constitutes “overwhelming”
evidence of guilt.5 Indeed, in thirty-six percent of the Innocence Network’s DNA-based
exonerations, multiple witnesses misidentified the same innocent person. In those cases, the
wrongly convicted were fortunate enough that post-conviction DNA testing could establish their
________________________
(continued...)
Sciences), and in the School of Law, and is also a Fellow of the Center for the Neurobiology of Learning and
Memory. She received her Ph.D. in Psychology from Stanford University. Since then, she has published 22 books
(including the award winning Eyewitness Testimony) and close to 500 scientific articles. Loftus’s research has
focused on the malleability of human memory, eyewitness testimony, and also on courtroom procedure. She has
been recognized for this research with six honorary doctorates (from universities in the U.S., Norway, the
Netherlands, Israel, and Britain). She was elected to the Royal Society of Edinburgh, the American Philosophical
Society, and the National Academy of Sciences. She is past president of the Association for Psychological Science,
the Western Psychological Association, and the American Psychology-Law Society. Perhaps one of the most
unusual signs of recognition of the impact of Loftus’s research came in a study published by the Review of General
Psychology. The study identified the 100 most eminent psychologists of the 20 th century, and not surprisingly Freud,
Skinner, and Piaget are at the top of that list. Loftus was #58, and the top ranked woman on the list.
4
See, e.g., Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Dennis v. Wetzel, No. 11-1660 (E.D. Pa) at 96 n.27;
Response to the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Dennis v. Wetzel, No. 11-1660 (E.D. Pa) at 49 n.21, 198.
5
See Commonwealth v. Dennis, 715 A.2d 404, 412 (Pa. 1998) (stating that “evidence of [Mr. Dennis’s]
guilt was, by any estimate, quite overwhelming”).
3
innocence. Mr. Dennis is not so lucky. In light of the wealth of scientific evidence, corroborated
by the experiences of nearly 200 individuals known to have been wrongly convicted based on
eyewitness misidentifications, this Court should carefully consider Mr. Dennis’s argument that
evidence in his case was not “overwhelming.”
INTRODUCTION
Studies of DNA-based exonerations demonstrate that eyewitness error is the leading
contributor to convictions of innocent people. Eyewitness identification testimony is fallible,
susceptible to inaccuracies, and yet so convincing that, when it is wrong, it poses a serious risk of
convicting an innocent person that cannot be ameliorated by traditional adversarial tools.6 While
the full extent of the problem of eyewitness misidentification is unknown, it is known that
erroneous eyewitness identifications contributed to approximately three-quarters of the wrongful
convictions ultimately overturned by DNA evidence—a troubling statistic by any measure. For
over thirty years, cognitive scientists have studied human memory and recall and developed a
significant body of convincing evidence that eyewitness testimony is fraught with reliability
concerns and susceptible to irreversible contamination.
We know from this great body of research that eyewitness testimony can be rendered
unreliable by factors that occur during the incident, such as the presence of a weapon or covering
of a face, or by factors that occur subsequently, such as suggestive lineups or confirming
feedback by law enforcement. Many of those factors are present in Mr. Dennis’s case. The
research also offers lessons about additional factors present in Mr. Dennis’s case that undermine
6
Jules Epstein, The Great Engine That Couldn’t: Science, Mistaken Identifications, and the Limits of
Cross-Examination, 36 Stetson Law Review 727 (2007).
4
the reliability of an identification—to wit, a distinct mismatch between eyewitness’s description
of the perpetrator and Mr. Dennis’s appearance and the non-identification of Mr. Dennis by some
eyewitnesses. The presence of all of these factors together in Mr. Dennis’s case raises very
substantial concerns that the wrong man was convicted of a capital crime.
Indeed, the scientific research has established that once a witness’ memory becomes
improperly tainted, there is no remedy. The memory is forever changed, incapable of being
‘fixed,’ and the witness wholly believes the inaccuracy. It is because of the seeming strength of
eyewitness testimony – the power of seeing a witness point to a defendant and declare him “the
one” – that courts are coming to recognize that cases which hinge on such evidence may not be
as “overwhelming” as believed.
ARGUMENT
I.
MISTAKEN EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATIONS THWART JUSTICE BY
IMPRISONING INNOCENTS AND ALLOWING THE GUILTY TO ESCAPE
PUNISHMENT.
No interest is served by imprisoning the wrong person for a crime, except perhaps the
interest of the real perpetrator. Thus, while the presumption of innocence has historically been
spoken of as a trade-off between wrongly convicting and wrongly acquitting,7 a wrongful
conviction is also a de facto wrongful acquittal.8
7
See, e.g., Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 454-56 (1895).
8 As Justice Marshall writes in his dissent to Manson v. Brathwaite: “For if the police and the public
erroneously conclude . . .that the right man has been caught and convicted, the real outlaw must still remain at large.
Law enforcement has failed in its primary function and has left society unprotected from the depredations of an
active criminal.” 432 U.S. 98, 127 (1977) (Marshall J., dissenting).
5
Erroneous eyewitness identifications are the primary culprit in convictions of innocent
people.9 In a study of 250 cases in which defendants were exonerated after conviction, Professor
Brandon L. Garrett found that the “role of mistaken eyewitness identifications in these wrongful
convictions is now well known. Eyewitnesses misidentified 76% of the exonerees (190 of 250
cases).”10 A 2009 Innocence Project study of over 200 cases in which convicted defendants were
exonerated by DNA evidence found that mistaken eyewitness identifications accounted in whole
or in part for 75% of the wrongful convictions.11 Specifically, the Innocence Project found that
“[o]ver 175 people have been wrongfully convicted based, in part, on eyewitness
misidentification and later proven innocent through DNA testing.”12 Similarly, a 1999
Department of Justice report studying 28 felony convictions subsequently overturned on the
basis of DNA evidence concluded that eight-five percent of the convictions resulted primarily
from erroneous eyewitness identifications.13 Attorney General Janet Reno explained:
Recent cases in which DNA evidence has been used to exonerate
individuals convicted primarily on the basis of eyewitness
testimony have shown us that eyewitness evidence is not infallible.
Even the most honest and objective people can make mistakes in
9
“[M]istaken eyewitness identifications are responsible for more wrongful convictions than all other causes
combined. . . . [E]yewitness evidence presented from well-meaning and confident citizens is highly persuasive but,
at the same time, is among the least reliable forms of evidence.” United States v. Brownlee, 454 F.3d 131, 141-42
(3d Cir. 2006) (quoting A. Daniel Yarmey, Expert Testimony: Does Eyewitness Memory Research Have Probative
Value for the Courts?, 42 Canadian Psychology 92, 93 (May 2001)).
10
2011).
Brandon L. Garrett, Convicting The Innocent: Where Criminal Prosecutions Go Wrong 48 (Harvard
11
Gary L. Wells & Deah S. Quinlivan, Suggestive Eyewitness Identification Procedures and the Supreme
Court’s Reliability Test in Light of Eyewitness Science: 30 Years Later, 33 LAW & HUM. BEHAVIOR NO. 1 1, 1
(2009). See generally E. Connors et al., Convicted By Juries, Exonerated By Science: Case Studies In The Use Of
DNA Evidence To Establish Innocence After Trial (2009), available at www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/dnaevid.pdf.
12
Innocence Project, Reevaluating Lineups: Why Witnesses Make Mistakes And How To Reduce The
Chance Of A Misidentification 3 (2009), available at www.innocenceproject.org/docs/Eyewitness_ID_Report.pdf.
13
Nat’l Inst. of Justice, Eyewitness Evidence: A Guide for Law Enforcement iii (1999), available at
http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/178240.pdf.
6
recalling and interpreting a witnessed event; it is the nature of
human memory.14
These findings are consistent with other studies of wrongful convictions.15
II.
MANY FACTORS KNOWN TO CONTRIBUTE TO DEMONSTRABLY FALSE
IDENTIFICATIONS ARE PRESENT IN MR. DENNIS’S CASE
The causes of mistaken identifications are both well-studied and well-understood.
Researchers have identified a host of factors that directly affect the reliability of eyewitness
identification. These factors are often divided into two categories: (1) estimator variables—those
characteristics of the witness, perpetrator, or the conditions in which a crime occurred; and (2)
system variables—those aspects of the criminal justice system over which the state can or should
have control.
Many of the estimator and system factors researchers have identified as compromising
the reliability of an identification are present in Mr. Dennis’s case and make misidentification in
this case more likely. Estimator variables include the presence of a weapon, the duration time of
the incident, and the level of stress of the incident. All of these variables are present in Mr.
Dennis’s case.16
14
Id.
15
See, e.g., Roy S. Malpass et al., The Need for Expert Psychological Testimony on Eyewitness
Identification, in Expert Testimony On The Psychology Of Eyewitness Identification 3 (Brian L. Cutler ed.,
2009), available at http://works.bepress.com/christian_meissner/50/ (reviewing half a dozen studies of
wrongful convictions that found erroneous eyewitness identification to be the primary (or in one case, one
of two primary) bases for the wrongful convictions); Convicted by Juries, Exonerated by Science, supra n.
11, at 12-15 & Ex. 3 (reviewing 28 exonerations and finding that in all 22 of the non-homicide cases the
victims identified the exoneree both prior to and at trial; many cases also had additional eye-witness
identification); see also Epstein, supra note 6 at 331 (citing to Yale law professor Edwin Borchard’s book
CONVICTING THE INNOCENT published in 1932, which documented 65 cases of wrongful conviction and
concluded “Perhaps the major source of these tragic errors is an identification of the accused by the victim
of a crime of violence . . . Juries seem disposed more readily to credit the veracity and reliability of the
victims of an outrage than any amount of contrary evidence by or on behalf of the accused . . . .”).
16
Pennsylvania law seemed to prohibit eyewitness expert testimony at the time of Mr. Dennis’s trial and
the jury did not have the benefit of expert testimony about these variables at Mr. Dennis’s trial. A case addressing
(continued...)
7
Similarly, the passage of time between an event and a later identification procedure, the
presentation of suspects simultaneously rather than one at a time (sequentially), the use of a nonblind administrator, and repeated exposure to a suspect are all known system variables which can
impact the reliability of an identification. To varying degrees, each of these system variable
elements is present in Mr. Dennis’s case. The combination of these estimator and system
variables may well have had an impact on the ultimate reliability of each witness’ identification.
A.
A Combination of Estimator Variables Are Present in Mr. Dennis’s Case
1.
The Violence of the Event and the Presence of a Weapon Make
Misidentification More Likely
Human memory can be greatly impacted by events as they are occurring; when the
witness’ attention may be diverted, peripheral images may not be properly encoded. For
example, eyewitness experiments “have consistently shown that the presence of a weapon, e.g., a
gun or knife in the hand of the culprit, leads to a reduced ability to recognize the face of the
culprit later.”17 In this case, all of the witnesses who testified at trial saw a gun, and two of those
people saw the assailant fire the weapon.18 The presence of the gun during the time the
eyewitnesses saw the assailants creates “weapon focus” effect—the “concentration of some
witness’s attention on a weapon … during a crime, leaving less attention available for viewing
________________________
(continued...)
whether to reserve this precedent is pending before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. See Commonwealth v. Walker,
610 Pa. 8, 17 A.3d 921 (2011).
17
Wells & Quinlivan, Suggestive Procedures, supra n. 11 at 11.
18
NT 10/5/1992 at 8 (Howard testifies that she saw a silver gun); NT 10/5/92 at 81 (Bertha testifies that the
assailant “had a revolver”); NT 10/8/92 at 57 (Cameron testifies that the assailant had a silver revolver).
8
other items”19—applicable to this case. This finding has been accepted by courts as a wellestablished principle of eyewitness memory.20
In addition, scientific research has also shown that highly stressful or violent events
increase the likelihood that the witness will misidentify the perpetrator. Witnesses to very violent
crimes and victims of highly emotional, traumatic events are less able to recall details of those
events correctly than are those who view nonviolent and less emotional events.21 Research shows
that highly stressful situations increase the risk of “false-positive” identifications. For example,
in a study of military trainees subjected to either highly stressful or non-stressful interrogations,
false-positive identifications occurred among the high-stress group more than twice as often as
those subjected to non-stressful interrogations.22 The researchers concluded that “contrary to the
popular conception that most people would never forget the face of a clearly seen individual who
had physically confronted them and threatened them for more than 30 minutes, a large number of
subjects in this study were unable to correctly identify their perpetrator.”23
Here, stress played a role in Mr. Dennis’s case given the violent close-range shooting
death of Williams. All three witnesses who testified at trial observed a portion of the incident at
the time they saw the assailant.24 Testifying witness Zahra Howard initially viewed the shooter
19
Elizabeth F. Loftus et al., Some Facts About “Weapon Focus,” 11 Law & Hum. Behav. 55 (1987).
20
See, e.g., State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d 872, 905 (N.J. 2011) (noting “when the interaction is brief, the
presence of a visible weapon can affect the reliability of an identification and the accuracy of a witness' description
of the perpetrator”).
21
Elizabeth F. Loftus & James M. Doyle, Eyewitness Testimony, Civil and Criminal § 2-8 (3d ed. 1997).
22
Charles Morgan III et al., Accuracy of Eyewitness Memory for Persons Encountered During Exposure to
Highly Intense Stress, 27 Int’l J.L. & Psychiatry 265, 272 tbl. 1 (2004).
23
Id. at 274.
24
Statement of Zahra Howard (Oct. 22, 1991); Statement of James Cameron (Oct. 22, 1991); Statement of
Thomas Bertha (Oct. 22, 1991).
9
when she and the victim, Chedell Williams, were confronted by the two assailants who yelled,
“[g]ive me your fucking earrings!” Subsequently Howard hid behind a nearby vendor stand, and
remained there during the shooting.25 Similarly, testifying witness James Cameron observed both
the shooting and a portion of the struggle leading up to the shooting.26 In addition, testifying
witness Thomas Bertha observed the assailant right after the shooting, as the man ran to the
getaway car.27 Bertha described how the assailant “looked at” him and began to raise the gun
when Bertha stepped out into the street to try to stop the assailant.28 These are common situations
in which eyewitness’ experiences of stress and arousal would reduce their ability to form
accurate memories, and which have led to faulty identifications.29
2.
Witnesses Viewed the Perpetrator for a Matter of Seconds
Not surprisingly, the amount of time that an eyewitness observes a perpetrator impacts
the accuracy of his identification. For example, in a study of 640 witnesses who attempted to
identify suspects in 314 lineups, researchers found that witnesses who viewed the suspect for
more than a minute were more likely to correctly identify the suspect than those who viewed the
suspect for less time.30 Subsequent researchers have called one minute the “critical value” for
25
NT 10/5/92 at 9-10, 24-25.
26
NT 10/8/92 at 56.
27
NT 10/5/92 at 80-81.
28
NT 10/5/92 at 81.
29
Morgan, Accuracy of Eyewitness Memory,supra n. 22, at 265, 272 tbl. 1.
30
Tim Valentine, Alan Pickering, & Stephen Darling, Characteristics of eyewitness identification that
predict the outcome of real lineups, 17 Applied Cognitive Psychology 969-993 (2003).
10
viewing suspects.31 Scientific research further demonstrates that the dilatory effects on memory
of the presence of weapon and high stress, discussed supra, are most pronounced when the event
is of short duration, as it was here.
All of the witnesses who testified at Mr. Dennis’s trial viewed the perpetrator for only a
few chaotic seconds.32 As such, their ability to form a good memory and then accurately identify
the true perpetrator—even had they viewed him under less stressful circumstances—was
considerably reduced.
B.
The Presence of Several Problematic System Variables in Mr. Dennis’s Case
Make Misidentification Likely
Much of the research on eyewitness identifications has focused on the identification
process itself. While the research in this area is expansive, this brief focuses on the areas relevant
to the circumstances of the various identifications in this case: (1) the time that lapsed between
the crime and the identification; (2) the effect of post-identification suggestion on a witness’
certainty; (3) the potential influence of a non-blind administrator; (4) the presentation of the
photo arrays and live lineups to the witnesses that were shown simultaneously rather than
sequentially, and (5) the presentation of a live lineup after witnesses made an identification of
Mr. Dennis from a photo array where Mr. Dennis was the only person in both the photo array
and the live lineup. Each is addressed in turn.
31
Kenneth. A. Deffenbacher et al., Forgetting the Once–Seen Face: Estimating the Strength of an
Eyewitness's Memory Representation, 14 J. Experimental Psychol.: Applied 139,147–48 (2008) (citing Valentine,
supra n. 30).
32
Howard testified that she saw the shooter for five seconds, ten seconds, and twenty seconds. NT
12/23/91 at 27, 37; NT 10/5/92 at 24-25. Bertha testified that he saw the shooter for a second, and later testified he
saw the shooter for 3-4 seconds. NT 12/23/91 at 66, 85. Cameron testified that he saw the shooter for twenty
seconds and later testified he saw the shooter for 30-40 seconds. NT 12/23/91 at 49, 69.
11
1.
Time Lapse Between the Event and the Identification Impacts Recall
Scientific research has shown a witness’ ability to identify a perpetrator correctly
decreases rapidly over time. Scientific literature terms this the “forgetting curve.”33 The rapid
decrease in the ability of a witness to remember details as time passes has major implications for
the reliability of eyewitness testimony. This includes the fact that human memory necessarily
degrades over time; it does not improve. Thus, the more time that elapses between an incident
and an identification procedure, the less reliable and accurate a subsequent identification may be.
If months, weeks, or even days pass between the crime and the lineup, the eyewitness’s ability to
identify the perpetrator correctly is significantly reduced.34
In this case, none of the eyewitnesses was shown a photo array until three days after the
crime.35 Even at this relatively close time to the event, two of the eyewitnesses, Howard and
Cameron, were unsure whether Mr. Dennis was the assailant.36 Neither positively identified Mr.
Dennis until two months later, when a live lineup was conducted.37 When the third witness,
33
See Loftus & Doyle, Eyewitness Testimony, supra n. 21, at 49-52 (discussing the classic “forgetting
curve” and memory for faces); David B. Fishman & Elizabeth F. Loftus, Expert Psychology Testimony on
Eyewitness Identifications, 4 Law & Psychol. Rev. 87, 90-92 (1978) (citing a study using a staged crime to test
eyewitness identification after seven weeks).
34
See Fishman & Loftus, Expert Psychology Testimony, supra n. 33, at 90-92 (citing a study using a staged
crime to test eyewitness identification after seven weeks).
35
Statement of Zahra Howard (Oct. 25, 1991) (“10/25/91 Howard Stmt.”); Statement of James Cameron
(Oct. 25, 1991) (“10/25/91 Cameron Stmt.”); Statement of Thomas Bertha (Oct. 25, 1991) (“10/25/91 Bertha
Stmt.”).
36
NT 10/5/92 at 33-34, 41 (Howard admitting on cross examination that she said Mr. Dennis, “[l]ooks like
the guy, but I can’t be sure” when she viewed the photo array); NT 10/8/92 at 74 (Cameron admitting on cross
examination that he said Mr. Dennis “looked familiar, but I can’t be sure” when he viewed the photo array).
37
See NT 10/5/92 at 14, 34-35 (Howard); NT 10/8/92 at 60 (Cameron); NT 10/5/92 at 119 (testimony of
line-up administrator Detective William Wynn that the line-up was conducted on December 19, 1991 - two months
after the crime).
12
Bertha, was initially shown the photo array, he was unable to positively identify Mr. Dennis.38
However, Bertha later indicated he was sure Mr. Dennis was the assailant.39
In each case, at the time the witness’s memory was strongest (i.e., closest in time to the
incident), she or he was unable to make an affirmative, certain identification. Only after the
passage of time—which scientific research shows substantially degrades memory—was the
witness able to make a positive identification of Mr. Dennis. This, of course, runs counter to
known facts about human memory, particularly the well-documented forgetting curve.40 Because
human memory degrades over time, one would expect a witness who was unsure closer in time
to the incident to have an even weaker memory later. As explained below, scientific research
provides explanations for this otherwise impossible “improvement” in witness memory. Such
improvement frequently occurs when witnesses are exposed to multiple identification procedures
in which the police suspect is the only person to appear repeatedly. In light of the wellestablished research on the forgetting curve and the effect of multiple viewings on both
identifying and non-identifying witnesses, it is clear that the ultimate identifications made by
these three witness were likely a product of memory contamination and not, in fact, an
expression of a reliable, independent memory.
2.
Post-Identification Suggestion May Impact Certainty
Scientific research confirms that an eyewitness’ identification can be corrupted or
distorted by suggestive identification procedures; suggestive procedures can affect witnesses’
curve”).
38
See 10/25/91 Bertha Stmt. (initially stating that Mr. Dennis “looks like the one running with the gun”).
39
See id.; NT 10/5/92 at 87.
40
See Loftus & Doyle, Eyewitness Testimony, supra n. 21, at 49-52 (discussing the classic “forgetting
13
retrospective assessment of their opportunity to view the perpetrator,41 witnesses’ retrospective
assessment of the attention they paid to the perpetrator during the witnessed event,42 and
witnesses’ retrospective assessment of certainty.43 Three examples of common events that can
falsely inflate confidence are: post-identification briefing,44 identification by co-witnesses,45 and
41
Wells and Quinlivan describe the research as follows:
In a series of published experiments across a variety of psychological laboratories,
witnesses to simulated crimes were shown lineups that did not include the culprit and
made mistaken identifications. After their mistaken identification, a suggestive remark
was made by the lineup administrator that seemed to confirm their selection (“Good, you
identified the suspect in the case”) or no suggestive remark was made by the lineup
administrator. Later, all of the witnesses were asked, “How good was the view that you
had of the culprit?” and “How well could you make out details of the culprit’s face while
witnessing the crime?” Of course, all these witnesses had the same (quite poor) view of
the culprit. And, those who were not given the confirmatory suggestive remark seemed
to understand rather well that their view was very poor. In the original experiment by
Wells and Bradfield (1998), for instance, none reported that their view was good or
excellent. Among those who were given the confirmatory suggestive remark, however,
27% said that their view was good or excellent. Similarly, among those who were not
given the confirmatory suggestive remark, none reported that they could easily make out
details of the face. Among those given the suggestive remark, in contrast, 20% reported
that they could easily make out details of the face. Hence, the suggestive remark
managed to lead a fairly large portion of mistaken eyewitnesses who had very poor views
and little or no ability to make out face details to self-report that they had a good view
and could easily make out details of the face.
Wells & Quinlivan, Suggestive Procedures, supra n. 11, at 10.
42
Id. at 11 (“[N]umerous experiments show that confirmatory suggestive remarks following a mistaken
identification (e.g., ‘Good, you identified the suspect’) lead witnesses to inflate their estimates of how much
attention they paid to the culprit during the witnessed event.”).
43
Id. at 12 (“[A]s with view and attention, we know that confirmatory suggestive remarks from the lineup
administrator consistently inflate eyewitness certainty for eyewitnesses who are in fact mistaken”).
44
Eyewitnesses first made the identification and then a select few witnesses were briefed on how to
respond to cross-examination at trial; those who were briefed reported increased confidence in their identification,
without regard to the accuracy of their selection. Michael R. Leippe and Donna Eisenstadt, Eyewitness Confidence
and the Confidence-Accuracy Relationship in Memory for People, in 2 The Handbook Of Eyewitness Psychology,
377, 407 (R.C.L. Lindsay et al., eds. 2007).
45
Test subjects made identifications, and then were told that a co-witness had also made an identification of
the culprit. When the co-witness selected the same target, the test subject’s confidence in her choice increased by
two points on a ten point scale, yet decreased by two points if the co-witness picked someone else. Id. at 408.
14
feedback from the test administrator.46
In this case, Howard and Cameron only tentatively identified Mr. Dennis in the photo
array yet positively identified him two months later and again at the trial. As human memory
necessarily degrades over time and cannot be improved, this sequence of events is not only
impossible but indicative of improper post-identification suggestion. This inflation of confidence
is commonly found where a witness has received some form of post-identification confirmation.
Uncertainty of a witness’s initial identification was a factor in most of the DNA
exonerations involving eyewitness misidentification. Indeed, fully seventy-seven percent of
witnesses in known misidentification cases initially indicated some level of uncertainty in their
identifications while going on to testify to relative certainty of that identification at trial.47
3.
The Influence of a Non-Blind Administrator May Have Affected
Certainty
The detective who conducted the photo arrays in this case knew the identity of the prime,
or suspect—James Dennis. Indeed, when Bertha viewed the photo array, he initially said Mr.
Dennis’s photo “looked like” the shooter. Only after the array administrator—who knew Mr.
Dennis was the suspect—asked whether he was “sure” did Bertha positively identify Mr. Dennis.
Similarly, other witnesses who viewed the array may have only identified Mr. Dennis because of
the influence of the administrator—which cannot now be known because the procedures were
not video recorded.
46
Researchers Leippe and Eisenstadt report that where investigators gave “confirming” feedback to
witnesses post-identification, not only was the confidence of the witness inflated, but also, quite disturbingly, the
feedback influenced the witnesses’ “retrospective reports on the formation and quality of their memories.” Id. at
409.
47
Garrett, supra, n. 10 at 64 (showing that in 91 of 161 trials involving mistaken identification testimony,
witnesses “had not been certain at all” at initial identification, and in an additional 34 of those trials, witnesses
admitted to prior uncertainty at trial).
15
This involvement by a non-blind administrator occurs frequently may have falsely
inflated the witnesses’ confidence in their identifications. This influence need not be overt;
simply having an administrator with knowledge of the suspect’s identity is problematic.
Researchers have shown that lineup administrators familiar with the suspect may leak the ‘right’
answer “by consciously or unconsciously communicating to witnesses which lineup member is
the suspect.”48 Psychologists refer to that phenomenon as the “expectancy effect”: “the tendency
for experimenters to obtain results they expect. . . because they have helped to shape that
response.”49 The fact that the witnesses were initially tentative in their identifications while later
expressed ‘certainty’ raises the important question of potential lineup administrator influence. No
accusation is here made that any influence was intentional, or even overt. Rather, known
scientific principles teach us that just having an administrator who knows the identity of the
suspect can be problematic in terms of accurate identifications.50
4.
Simultaneous Photo Arrays and Live Lineups Affect Reliability
The great weight of empirical research has demonstrated that lineups and photo arrays
yield more reliable identifications when the individual lineup members or photographs are
presented to the witness sequentially rather than simultaneously.51 This disparity is linked to the
phenomenon known as “relative judgment”—in essence the tendency to pick the “best choice”
among those available when all options are presented at the same time (i.e., simultaneously). In
48
See Sarah M. Greathouse & Margaret Bull Kovera, Instruction Bias and Lineup Presentation Moderate
the Effects of Administrator Knowledge on Eyewitness Identification, 33 Law & Hum. Behav. 70, 71 (2009).
49
Robert Rosenthal & Donald B. Rubin, Interpersonal Expectancy Effects: The First 345 Studies, 3 Behav.
& Brain Sci. 377, 377 (1978).
50
Id.
51
See id.
16
effect, the witness says, “relative to the other lineup members (or photographs), this person looks
the most like the perpetrator.”52 By contrast, when lineup members or photographs are shown
sequentially, the witness determines whether each matches the characteristics of the perpetrator.
Furthermore, once a witness has made an identification, whether the identification is correct or
not, the witness’ memory of the identification can then “replace” the person’s memory of the
event.
In this case, the participants at the lineup and photos in the photo arrays were presented to
the witnesses simultaneously. In the photo array shown to the eyewitnesses, Mr. Dennis’s photo
was placed in the first position of six photos.53 When Mr. Dennis was placed in the lineup, he
was standing alongside multiple individuals.54 This procedure encouraged witnesses to ask which
of the participants looked most like the perpetrator rather than which participant actually was the
perpetrator. The equivocal responses of the witnesses demonstrate that they made exactly this
type of relative judgment. Indeed, none of the witnesses immediately or emphatically identified
Mr. Dennis, which would indicate an accurate identification. Rather, each appeared to engage in
a deliberative process before informing police they were ready to make a choice. The delay in
identification is problematic given studies which have shown that those who made their decision
52
See Gary L. Wells, Nancy K. Steblay, and Jennifer E. Dysart, A test of the simultaneous vs. sequential
lineup methods: An initial report of the AJS national eyewitness identification field studies. Des Moines, IA:
American Judicature Society 2, available at http://www.ajs.org/wc/pdfs/EWID_PrintFriendly.pdf (“[I]f the actual
perpetrator is removed from a lineup and replaced with no one, a large share of eyewitnesses who would have
picked the perpetrator tend to shift to another lineup member and identify that person rather than make no
identification.”).
53
10/25/91 Howard Stmt.; 10/25/91 Cameron Stmt.; 10/25/91 Bertha Stmt.
54
NT 10/5/92 at 120-21.
17
in fewer than ten to twelve seconds were nearly ninety percent accurate in their identification
from a lineup whereas those taking longer were approximately fifty percent correct.55
James Cameron told police Mr. Dennis “looks familiar” but that he wasn’t “sure.”56
Zahra Howard similarly said Mr. Dennis’s photo “looks like the guy” but she could not “be
sure.”57 Thomas Bertha said that Mr. Dennis’s photo “looks like the one running with the gun.”58
Anthony Overstreet, who later identified an uninvolved filler at the live lineup, told police Mr.
Dennis’s photo “looks like the male who shot the girl.”59 The process of deliberation, rather than
recognition, is most apparent in Clarence Verdell’s statement at the time of the photo array when
he said:
The best I can say is its either #1, #5, or #8. I concentrated more on the male that was
directly behind Chedell & I believe him to be the accomplice… It looks more like #5, but
#3 couldn’t be rulled [sic] out.60
Not one eyewitness “recognized” Mr. Dennis’s photo. Rather, each one offered an
equivocal statement of identification and appeared to engage in a deliberative process before
informing police they were ready to make a choice.61 The delay in identification further calls the
55
David Dunning & Scott Perretta, Automaticity and Eyewitness Accuracy: A 10-to-12 Second Rule for
Distinguishing Accurate From Inaccurate Positive Identifications, 5 J. Appl. Psychol. 87, 961-62 (2002).
56
10/25/91 Cameron Stmt; NT 10/8/92 at 60.
57
10/25/91 Howard Stmt; NT 10/5/92 at 14, 34-35.
58
10/25/91 Bertha Stmt.
59
Statement of Anthony Overstreet (Oct. 27, 1991).
60
Statement of Clarence Verdell (Oct. 29, 1991).
61
10/25/91 Howard Stmt.; 10/25/91 Cameron Stmt.; 10/25/91 Bertha Stmt.; 10/27/91 Overstreet Stmt.;
Activity Sheet (Oct. 28, 1991) (noting that witness David Leroy did not identify anyone in the photo array);
Statement of Joseph DiRienzo Jr. (Nov. 4, 1991).
18
accuracy of the identifications into question, making an identification essentially a matter of
probability rather than recognition.62
5.
Mugshot Exposure Effect Impacts the Reliability of Identifications
When a witness makes an incorrect identification, the witness’ memory of the actual
event is often changed; the memory of the photo replaces the memory of the perpetrator’s face.63
In addition, researchers have identified a more general problem with photo arrays; exposure to a
mugshot decreases accuracy at a subsequent lineup as it increases “false alarms.”64 Researchers
have found that exposure to a suspect’s mugshot decreases the accuracy of subsequent
identifications at a live line-up, a phenomenon well documented in incorrect identifications.65
That some (but notably not all) of the witnesses went on to identify Mr. Dennis in a live
lineup two months after providing only tentative photo array identifications indicates that their
memories of the photo array may have “replaced” their memories of the actual event. Or, more
simply, that Mr. Dennis was familiar to them because they had seen his photo previously, and
had no prior exposure to the other members of the lineup. When Howard and Cameron initially
viewed the photo arrays, both said they were unsure if Mr. Dennis was the assailant.66 Cameron
did not positively identify Mr. Dennis until two months later, when a live lineup was
62
curve”).
See Loftus & Doyle, Eyewitness Testimony, supra n. 21, at 49-52 (discussing the classic “forgetting
63
See Jennifer Dysart et al., Mugshot Exposure Prior to Lineup Identification: Interference, Transference,
and Commitment Effects, 86 J. Appl. Psychol. 1280 (2001).
64
Kenneth A. Deffenbacher et al., Mugshot Exposure Effects: Retroactive Interference, Mugshot
Commitment, Source Confusion, and Unconscious Transference,” 30 Law & Hum. Behav. 287, 306 (2006).
65
Id.
66
10/25/91 Howard Stmt.; 10/25/91 Cameron Stmt.
19
conducted.67 Howard did not affirmatively identify Mr. Dennis until even later, at the
preliminary hearing.68 Cameron and Howard’s initial uncertainty, followed by a later positive
identification, indicates that they may have identified Mr. Dennis based on their exposure to his
photo rather than their memories of the crime.
C.
Non-Identifications by Two Witnesses are Probative of Mr. Dennis’
Innocence
Counsel in this case failed to investigate two non-identifying witnesses. One, George
Ritchie, who indicated he got a “good look” at the shooter and would “recognize” him again, 69
was shown photos that included Mr. Dennis’ picture. He did not identify Mr. Dennis despite
police pressure to identify someone as the shooter.70 In addition, Anthony Overstreet claimed he
“recognized” the shooter.71 Yet when he attended a live lineup including Mr. Dennis, Overstreet
identified a filler as the shooter.72 Counsel failed to investigate either Ritchie or Overstreet, and
neither man testified before the jury despite being eyewitnesses to the crime.
This failure to investigate two non-identifying witnesses was particularly critical because
scientific research has shown that non-identifications of a suspect provide important evidence of
innocence and of misidentification by other witnesses who do make a positive identification of a
suspect. Indeed, as early as 1967 – and without the scientific research on the topic first
published in 1980 – the Supreme Court recognized the importance of a witness’s prior non67
NT 10/8/92 at 94-95.
68
NT 10/5/92 at 33-35.
69
1991 Ritchie Stmt.
70
PCRA Evid. Hrg. NT 5/6/05 at 35-39.
71
10/22/91 Overstreet Stmt. at 5.
72
NT 9/21/92 at 84.
20
identification.73 Despite this precedent, courts have not regularly applied this logic to witnesses
who fail to identify a suspect (“non-identifying witnesses”).74 Scientific researchers have
questioned this failure, particularly in light of the system’s treatment of eyewitness
identifications of suspects as highly probative of guilt.75 In the 1980 study by Wells and Clark,
non-identifications were shown to be more probative of innocence than suspect identifications
were of guilt.76 Moreover, the study showed that as between the two possible non-suspect
selections (a foil selection and a “none of the above” responses), the “none of the above”
response was more predictive of innocence.77 In addition, a 2002 study found that no choice
responses, filler identifications, and “don’t know” responses, all have probative value with
respect to the suspect’s innocence; sometimes no choice and filler identifications have more
probative value for innocence than positive identifications of the suspect have for guilt.78
A recent meta-analysis of ninety-four comparisons showed that suspect identifications
were more diagnostic regarding a suspect’s guilt or innocence than other responses, but that nonidentifications were also diagnostic of the suspect’s innocence. Importantly, given the facts of
this case, the researchers found that a suspect identification is less informative if the lineup is
73
United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 241 (1967).
74
A non-identification may take the form of a witness making no choice or of a witness choosing an
innocent filler.
75
Wells &Lindsay, On Estimating the Diagnosticity of Eyewitness Nonidentifications, 88 PSYCH. BULLETIN
776 (1980).
78
76
Id.
77
Id.
Wells and Olson, Eyewitness Identification: Information Gain from Incriminating and Exonerating Behaviors, 8 J.
(2002).
OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: APPLIED 155
21
biased and that the probative value of a suspect identification is undermined if suggestive lineup
instructions increase the willingness of witnesses to make an identification.79 They note:
Non-identifications also are straightforward. They are diagnostic of the suspect’s
innocence. We reiterate the point made by Wells and Lindsay (1980) that nonidentifications are not merely “failures” to identify the suspect, but rather carry important
information whose value should not be overlooked.80
They further note that foil identifications appear to be diagnostic of innocence when foils are
selected based on their match to the description of the perpetrator given by a witness, but not
when foils are selected on their match to the suspect.
The scientific research concerning the diagnosticity of non-identifications as applied to
the facts of this case leads to the conclusion that the non-identifications by Overstreet and
Ritchie are more probative of Mr. Dennis’ innocence than the alleged identifications of Mr.
Dennis by the other witnesses—whose identifications were initially uncertain and only amounted
to positive identifications after engaging in a second identification procedure and potentially
after receiving suggestive feedback from non-blind administrators.
D.
The Substantial Mismatch in the Witnesses’ Description of the Perpetrator
and Mr. Dennis’ Appearance Strongly Suggest He Was Misidentified
In Professor Garrett’s study of the first 250 DNA-based exonerations, he found there was
a substantial mismatch between the description provided by witnesses and the actual appearance
of the innocent defendant in a full 62 percent of wrongful conviction cases based in part on
misidentification (100 out of 161 cases).81 This finding is not merely coincidence; scientific
79
Clark et al., Regularities in Eyewitness Identification, 32 LAW AND HUM. BEHAV. 187 (2008).
80
Id. at 211.
81
Garrett, supra, n. 10 at 68-69.
22
research has established that there is a correlation between the presence of incorrect descriptors
and inaccurate identifications.82
In this case, there are significant differences between eyewitnesses’ descriptions of the
shooter and Mr. Dennis’s appearance. Eyewitnesses consistently described the shooter as 5’ 9”
or 5’ 10”, considerably taller than Mr. Dennis, who is 5’4.83 Eyewitnesses described someone 50
pounds heavier than Mr. Dennis, who at the time of the shooting weighed 125 pounds.84
Eyewitnesses also described the shooter as dark completed, when Mr. Dennis is medium
complected.85 The clear mismatch between Mr. Dennis’s appearance and eyewitnesses’
descriptions of the shooter suggests the eyewitnesses may have misidentified Mr. Dennis.
82
Christian A. Meissner et al., A Theoretical Review and MetaAnalysis of the Description-Identification
Relationship in Memory for Faces, 20 Eur. J. Cognitive Psychol. 414, 431, 435 (2008) (as the number of incorrect
descriptors of a suspect increases, identification accuracy decreases).
83
See 10/22/91 Howard Stmt. at 4; NT 10/5/92 at 31 (Howard estimating shooter’s height at 5’ 9” or 5’
10”); 1991 Leroy Stmt. at 3 (estimating shooter’s height at 5’ 10”); DiRienzo Jr. Stmt. at 3 (estimating shooter’s
height at 5’ 9”); NT 10/5/92 at 99-101 (Bertha estimating shooter’s height as 5’ 9”); 1991 Ritchie Stmt. at 6
(describing shooter as 5’ 9”); NT 10/14/92 at 74-75 (demonstrating that Mr. Dennis was 5-5 with a one inch heel).
84
1991 Ritchie Stmt. at 3 (describing shooter as 170 pounds); NT 10/5/92 at 101 (Bertha describing
shooter as 180 pounds); NT 10/14/1992 at 75 (Mr. Dennis testifying he weighed between 125-132 pounds at the
time of the shooting).
85
NT 10/5/92 at 101 (Bertha testifying the shooter was “dark skinned”); NT 10/8/92 at 67, 82 (Cameron
describing shooter as darker than himself); NT 10/14/92 at 75 (Mr. Dennis testifying that he has a “brown skin”
complexion).
23
CONCLUSION
As the United States Department of Justice has explained in relation to wrongful
convictions,
In the majority of the cases, given the absence of DNA evidence at the trial, eyewitness
testimony was the most compelling evidence. Clearly, however, those eyewitness
identifications were wrong.86
The lesson learned from the DNA cases is that eyewitness testimony is frequently flawed
and must be subject to exacting scrutiny because of its power on a jury. Because DNA evidence
is not available in most cases, a lack of DNA evidence does not excuse wrongful incarceration
based upon mistaken identifications. Indeed the opposite is true. As the United States Supreme
Court has pointed out, in the absence of physical evidence, “the identification of strangers is
proverbially untrustworthy.”87
There is no physical evidence linking Mr. Dennis to this crime. As detailed above, there
are numerous reasons to question the “proverbially untrustworthy” identifications of Mr. Dennis
in this case. Incongruities between the police procedures and known scientific principles –
through no outright fault of police – lead to true questions as to the strength of the evidence
presented against Mr. Dennis to establish his guilt.
In light of the overwhelming empirical and scientific consensus demonstrating the
fallibility of eyewitness testimony, this Court should pause before adopting the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court’s mischaracterization of the eyewitness testimony as “overwhelming” evidence
of Mr. Dennis’s guilt. To the contrary, as described above, scientific research calls the reliability
of the eyewitness identifications of Mr. Dennis sharply into question and raises a very real
86
Convicted by Juries, Exonerated by Science, supra n. 11, at 24.
87
Wade, 388 U.S. at 228 (citing Felix Frankfurter, The Case of Sacco & Vanzetti: A Critical Analysis for
Lawyers and Laymen (1927)).
24
possibility that Mr. Dennis is among the large and growing number of people wrongfully
convicted based on eyewitness testimony.
Dated: February 20, 2013
Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Marissa Boyers Bluestine
Marissa Boyers Bluestine (Pa. Bar No. 75973)
THE PENNSYLVANIA INNOCENCE
PROJECT
1719 N. Broad Street
Philadelphia, PA 19122
(215) 204-4255
Professor Edith Greene
University of Colorado, Colorado Springs
1420 Austin Bluffs Parkway
Colorado Springs, CO 80918
Professor Elizabeth Loftus
University of California-Irvine
2393 Social Ecology II
Irvine, CA 92697
On Behalf of Amicus Curiae
THE INNOCENCE NETWORK
Keith Findley, President
University of Wisconsin Law School
Clinical Professor of Law
975 Bascom Mall, Room 4318H
Madison, WI 53706
Amici Curiae
25
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
Pursuant to Local Rule 5.1.2(8) of this Court, the BRIEF OF THE PENNSYLVANIA
INNOCENCE PROJECT, PROFESSOR EDITH GREENE, PROFESSOR ELIZABETH LOFTUS,
AND THE INNOCENCE NETWORK AS AMICI CURIAE SUPPORTING PETITIONER has been
filed electronically and is available for viewing and downloading from the ECF system. Service will
be accomplished on all parties through the Notice of Electronic Case Filing.
/s/ Marissa Boyers Bluestine