issue No. 1, 2015 - inter.culture.philosophy.

i s s u e No. 1, 2015
BOOK REVIEW
Johannes
Preusker:
Die
Gemeinsamkeit
der
Leiber.
Eine
sprachkritische
Interexistenzialanalyse der Leibphänomenologie von Hermann Schmitz und Thomas
Fuchs. Frankfurt a.M. 2014, 229 pages, ISBN 978-3-631-65581-8, € 52.95
In the last few decades the mind-body problem became central for philosophical
discourse again. Beginning with the entry in the decade of brain philosophical
movements started to discuss the question of how embodied cognition is. The term
Leiblichkeit is overloaded with many widely varying meanings. Unfortunately,
considering the relation of Self and Other the views on Leiblichkeit differ very widely
regarding the essential nature of this relation. The current discourse still diagnoses a
mistaken orientation on the solipsistic subject. It is still discussing the concept of
Descartes’ cogito and Husserl’s transcendental ego. So both Descartes and Husserl
are still the prominent philosophical figures which phenomenological discourse
generally converses with. One the one hand, Husserl’s endeavor to construe a
concept of intersubjectivity is generally considered to have failed. On the other
hand, present-day philosophy is still divided by Descartes’ Dualism and its
philosophical tradition. Since Sartre and Merleau-Ponty the subjective body is
overloaded with activity. Since Husserl’s Lebenswelt-Phänomenologie turns into
Heidegger’s Existentialphänomenologie the examination of the subject can’t be
discussed without the existential framework of Welt. Ever since Schütz and
Binswanger we are unable to unstick the subject from its sociological and
daseinsanalytischen correlations. In this light we have to ask if the phenomenological
approach is able to develop a true-to-life concept of Interexistentialität. As well we
have to ask if current concepts are creating true philosophical progression or just
remaining in the exchange of vocabulary. This criticism requires linguistic analyses.
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To what extent is this criticism justified? And to what extent do Hermann Schmitz
and Thomas Fuchs, two main figures in recent German Phenomenological
Anthropology, offer viable alternatives? This is exactly what Johannes Preusker sets
out to discuss in his book Die Gemeinsamkeit der Leiber. He offers both the
linguistic analysis and the criticism of Schmitz’ and Fuchs’ phenomenology.
Hermann Schmitz’ New Phenomenology and Thomas Fuchs Phenomenological
Anthropology are starting with the attempt to overcome dualism and to develop a
holistic concept of the mind-body problem. Existence means to exist with each
other and through each other. The philosophical movement of lived experience
assuming bodily togetherness implies the renunciation of the theoretical
concentration on the Einzelsubjekt. The rediscovery of the Leib turns into the
philosophical project to overcome the separation of mind and body as well as the
division of mind and matter. It suggests the attempt to bring together everyday life
and science in order to make Interexistentialität conceivable. Johannes Preusker
offers an exhaustive examination if Schmitz and Fuchs are able to fulfil this claim.
“Eine sprachkritische Interexistentialanalyse der Leibphänomenologie von Hermann
Schmitz und Thomas Fuchs geht der Frage nach, inwiefern die Konzepte von
Schmitz und Fuchs an die interexistentiale Verfasstheit der menschlichen Welt
heranreichen.” [Preusker 2014, 31] In short, the book is separated into three parts.
First, Preusker accounts for the critical reading of Schmitz’ Leibphänomenologie and
its implications for an intersubjectivity (chaps. 1–2). Then he goes on to discuss
Fuchs’ development of these concepts and the alternatives he is showing (chap. 3).
In the third section, Preusker presents his own interpretation of intersubjectivity
considering an Interexistentialität as it is fundamental for existence (chap. 4).
Preusker criticizes Schmitz blisteringly but well proved. He proposes that Schmitz
fails to decipher the isolation of the subjective body. Neither the reductionism nor
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the Cartesian Dualism is solved by Schmitz’ system. Preusker argues furthermore
that Schmitz’ approach fails to overcome Husserl’s hypostatized consciousness. After
all Schmitz is not able to give a holistic turn and remains in a means-end orientation.
“Schmitz verfehlt die holistische Beschreibung der menschlichen Welt von Grund
auf.” [Preusker 2014, 221] Preuskers critique is very keen but actual sharp-tongued
as well.
Thomas Fuchs is introduced as someone who is like-minded with Schmitz and is
fruitfully proceeding the phenomenological methodology. Even in Fuchs’ attitude
Interexistentialität stays underdetermined. Preusker sees that the great advance of
Fuchs’ phenomenological anthropology is the much more elaborated mind-body
problem. In his philosophical and medical approach to the isolated subjective body
Fuchs’ succeeds much more in the overcoming of it. Preusker honors Fuchs’ efforts
to set out for philosophical concepts without dichotomies, but the author makes an
objection to Fuchs’ attitude towards a substantial ontogenesis of the subject. After
all Fuchs’ approach missing the holistic turn which Preusker is looking for.
Preuskers concludes that both Schmitz and Fuchs are tilting against windmills.
He honors in his detailed analyses the endless fight of both against the boundaries
of language and argumentative lassitude of the philosophical tradition. The
definitely fruitful and pioneering approaches are missing nevertheless the searched
connection to the Lebenswelt. The required holistic turn and wanted philosophical
transformation is not achieved. Preusker sums up that both approaches fail to
connect the subjective body with a real Interexistentialität and persist in an
abstractive philosophical system.
This is exactly the attempt of Preuskers own intellectual approach. He endeavors
to think Interexistentialität consequently as “Sein zum Anderen” [Preusker 2014,
222] which culminates in a “das Körper habende Leibsein zu den Anderen“
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[Preusker 2014, 210]. This assumption ends in the neologism Intertransistenzialität.
“Der
Begriff
der
Interexistentialität
wird
zu
dem
Neologismus
der
Intertransistenzialität konfiguriert. Auf diese Weise sind Leiblichkeit, Sprachlichkeit
und alle weiteren Transistenziale direkt auf das Sein zu den Anderen festgeschrieben
[…] wir [sind] situativ je immer schon in das apriorisch-transzendente Geschehen zu
den Anderen eingebunden.“ [Preusker 2014, 218] Preusker develops a consistent
concept of Interexistentialität, beginning with a well proved idea of ambiguity, which
leads to an existence in a bodily interconnection with the Other. “Der Andere ist die
Voraussetzung meines Kommens zu mir selbst […].“ [Preusker 2014, 219]
In his studies, Preusker indicates that he starts from a linguistic analysis. So it is in
parts a rough pleasure to follow him through his detailed studies. This is especially
so when greater contexts are shown and arguments are implied. However, this does
not as such detract from the validity of Preusker’s analyses. It remains to be seen if
the dualistic heritage of Descartes and Husserl can really be overcome by these
assumptions. The two conflicting motives which pervade the whole history of the
phenomenological movement: the isolation of the subject (solipsism) and the
proceedings between Self and Other are well commented. It must be asked if the
problem can be solved by a neologism and a well done linguistic analysis. The
creation of Intertransistenzialität must be carefully reviewed. In his book the
conflicting motives of Self and Other are definitely discussed and inspirational nondualistic suggestions are given. His book does offer interesting reflections on certain
aspects of the phenomenology of Interexistentialität and it does make a good case
for the claim that social theory should take another look at Leiblichkeit. In this
respect Die Gemeinsamkeit der Leiber joins the list of books that extend the
interdisciplinary discourse of Leibphänomenologie.
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