Evolution of Global Nuclear Capabilities: Impact on National

Evolution of Global Nuclear Capabilities:
Impact on National Security Strategies
S. Chandrashekar
Residential Workshop on
Global Nuclear Politics & Strategy
NIAS, Bangalore
May 5 2015
The First Nuclear Weapons Test changed the face of the
world - As Oppenheimer himself said of the H Bomb
design – technically sweet – Awesome consequences .
The World had changed for ever – for good or bad ?
Nuclear Weapons Tests How Much do You Tell
Your Adversary
Nuclear Warheads
Yields
How much do you keep
Concealed
Country- Geography - History
Vulnerabilities
Land & Sea
Air, Space, Cyber
Priorities
Land
Sea
Air, Space, Cyber
Complementary
Complete Clarity
Delivery Vehicles
Range
Targets
Use
Purpose
Complete Ambiguity
Real World Grey
What you reveal and
what you hide depends on who you
are and where you
stand
Deployment Nuclear & Conventional
Governed by the
Dynamics of
Complexity
Escalation – Risk of Nuclear War
Spectrum of Capabilities, Diversity, Nuance
Conflict - War - Complexity
Deterrence –
Nuclear War
Nuclear Weapon Tests P5 Countries
45
45
210
United States
Russia
Britain
1032
715
France
China
Total – 2047 Tests
Nuclear Weapon Tests P5 Countries %
2%
2%
10%
50%
35%
United States
Russia
Britain
France
China
Total – 2047 Tests
P5 – Timeline of Testing - Strategic Weapons
US 1945
US 1945
USSR 1949
US 1951
UK 1952
US 1952
USSR 1953
Timeline
USSR 1955
UK 1956
USSR 1955
UK 1957
UK 1958
France 1960
China 1964
China 1965 China 1965
France 1966 France 1966
China 1967
France 1968
Fission Test Air Drop
BF Test
TN Test
Test / Warhead Type
P5 – Timeline of Testing –Advanced Warheads
Initial Deployment – P 5 Countries
Nuclear Weapon Stockpile P5 – 2015
8000
No. of Weapons
7000
7200
7500
6000
5000
4000
3000
2000
1000
215
300
250
0
USA
Russia Britain France China
SLBM Capability & Stability –
Misconceptions regarding NW role
• The US and Soviet Union achieved Assured
Retaliation (Second Strike) capability by way of
SLBMs in 1959 (US) and 1960 (USSR).
• If Assured Retaliation is available – this capability
should have resulted in a stable situation – no
need to develop any more land or air or even
space based weapons
• Despite this, why did the build up of the
stockpiling continue? Why wasn’t a stability
achieved? Why was there an Arms Race?
Nuclear Weapons Ecosystems are
Behaviorally Complex
• There could be several reasons for such a situation.
– US and Soviet global powers & global ambitions;
wanted to respond to a range of conflict scenarios
without the possibility of an all-out nuclear war.
– Prestige and Power linked to Nuclear Weapons
– Vested Interests of National Security Bureaucracies.
• Technology Changes open up possibilities not
envisaged by the original decision makers – create
a momentum that cannot be easily stopped
• Complexity brings with it attendant risk
Spectrum of American Nuclear Capabilities & Delivery Platforms
B-52 Stratofortress Bomber
US Minuteman ICBM
US Trident II SLBM
US Atomic Cannon
Nuclear Warhead (W19)
US Castle Romeo H-Bomb Test
(1954-11 MT)
Left: US Atomic
Cannon 280mm
Spectrum of Russian/FSU Nuclear Capabilities & Delivery Platforms
Russian Bear Tu-95 Bomber
Russian Topol-M ICBM
Soviet Test -Tsar Bomba
Largest Test Ever (1961 | 50MT)
Soviet Akula (Typhoon) SSBN
Soviet Scud-A Missile
US / FSU SUBMARINE LAUNCHED BALLISTIC MISSILES (SLBM)
The World Nuclear Weapon Power Order - Later Cold War
India
Pakistan
Israel
N.Korea
China
USA
Battleground
the World
USSR
France
UK
Warsaw Pact
NATO
Battleground
Europe
The World Nuclear Weapon Power Order -Post 2000
Iran
Israel
Battleground
Middle East ?
Pakistan
India
US Allies
Asia Pacific
N.Korea
Battleground
Asia Pacific
USA
Battleground
South Asia
China
Battleground
the World?
France
Russia
UK
NATO
Battleground
Europe
Overview of Current Deployments – P5
• Delivery Vehicles
– US, Russia and China - maintain a Triad (Aircraft
delivery, Land based missiles and Sea based
SLBMs)
– France – maintains a dyad (Aircraft delivery and
Sea based SLBMs)
– Britain – maintains a unad with reliance only on
Sea based SLBMs for deterrence.