Evolution of Global Nuclear Capabilities: Impact on National
Evolution of Global Nuclear Capabilities: Impact on National Security Strategies S. Chandrashekar Residential Workshop on Global Nuclear Politics & Strategy NIAS, Bangalore May 5 2015 The First Nuclear Weapons Test changed the face of the world - As Oppenheimer himself said of the H Bomb design – technically sweet – Awesome consequences . The World had changed for ever – for good or bad ? Nuclear Weapons Tests How Much do You Tell Your Adversary Nuclear Warheads Yields How much do you keep Concealed Country- Geography - History Vulnerabilities Land & Sea Air, Space, Cyber Priorities Land Sea Air, Space, Cyber Complementary Complete Clarity Delivery Vehicles Range Targets Use Purpose Complete Ambiguity Real World Grey What you reveal and what you hide depends on who you are and where you stand Deployment Nuclear & Conventional Governed by the Dynamics of Complexity Escalation – Risk of Nuclear War Spectrum of Capabilities, Diversity, Nuance Conflict - War - Complexity Deterrence – Nuclear War Nuclear Weapon Tests P5 Countries 45 45 210 United States Russia Britain 1032 715 France China Total – 2047 Tests Nuclear Weapon Tests P5 Countries % 2% 2% 10% 50% 35% United States Russia Britain France China Total – 2047 Tests P5 – Timeline of Testing - Strategic Weapons US 1945 US 1945 USSR 1949 US 1951 UK 1952 US 1952 USSR 1953 Timeline USSR 1955 UK 1956 USSR 1955 UK 1957 UK 1958 France 1960 China 1964 China 1965 China 1965 France 1966 France 1966 China 1967 France 1968 Fission Test Air Drop BF Test TN Test Test / Warhead Type P5 – Timeline of Testing –Advanced Warheads Initial Deployment – P 5 Countries Nuclear Weapon Stockpile P5 – 2015 8000 No. of Weapons 7000 7200 7500 6000 5000 4000 3000 2000 1000 215 300 250 0 USA Russia Britain France China SLBM Capability & Stability – Misconceptions regarding NW role • The US and Soviet Union achieved Assured Retaliation (Second Strike) capability by way of SLBMs in 1959 (US) and 1960 (USSR). • If Assured Retaliation is available – this capability should have resulted in a stable situation – no need to develop any more land or air or even space based weapons • Despite this, why did the build up of the stockpiling continue? Why wasn’t a stability achieved? Why was there an Arms Race? Nuclear Weapons Ecosystems are Behaviorally Complex • There could be several reasons for such a situation. – US and Soviet global powers & global ambitions; wanted to respond to a range of conflict scenarios without the possibility of an all-out nuclear war. – Prestige and Power linked to Nuclear Weapons – Vested Interests of National Security Bureaucracies. • Technology Changes open up possibilities not envisaged by the original decision makers – create a momentum that cannot be easily stopped • Complexity brings with it attendant risk Spectrum of American Nuclear Capabilities & Delivery Platforms B-52 Stratofortress Bomber US Minuteman ICBM US Trident II SLBM US Atomic Cannon Nuclear Warhead (W19) US Castle Romeo H-Bomb Test (1954-11 MT) Left: US Atomic Cannon 280mm Spectrum of Russian/FSU Nuclear Capabilities & Delivery Platforms Russian Bear Tu-95 Bomber Russian Topol-M ICBM Soviet Test -Tsar Bomba Largest Test Ever (1961 | 50MT) Soviet Akula (Typhoon) SSBN Soviet Scud-A Missile US / FSU SUBMARINE LAUNCHED BALLISTIC MISSILES (SLBM) The World Nuclear Weapon Power Order - Later Cold War India Pakistan Israel N.Korea China USA Battleground the World USSR France UK Warsaw Pact NATO Battleground Europe The World Nuclear Weapon Power Order -Post 2000 Iran Israel Battleground Middle East ? Pakistan India US Allies Asia Pacific N.Korea Battleground Asia Pacific USA Battleground South Asia China Battleground the World? France Russia UK NATO Battleground Europe Overview of Current Deployments – P5 • Delivery Vehicles – US, Russia and China - maintain a Triad (Aircraft delivery, Land based missiles and Sea based SLBMs) – France – maintains a dyad (Aircraft delivery and Sea based SLBMs) – Britain – maintains a unad with reliance only on Sea based SLBMs for deterrence.
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