GA-6 Legal - Kabatas Model United Nations Conference

Chair Report
GA 6th
kmun2015
KabatasMUN
kmun2015
MUNKabatas
kabatasmun
Kabatas MUN
[email protected]
Letter from the Secretary-General
Dear Representatives of the Distinguished Nations,
I, in lieu of the Secretariat, am thrilled to welcome you to the third annual session of Kabataş Model
United Nations Conference). I, Orçun DOĞMAZER, have been studying at Kabataş Erkek Lisesi for
four years and am receiving the privilege to serve as the third Secretary-General of this society.
KMUN Conference is the biggest student initiated organization in the illustrious 107 years old history
of this community. How Buckingham Palace was used by King George III to host diverse reputed
bureaucrats and royal families, likewise Kabataş High School was utilized to serve for those certain
purposes at the times of Ottoman Empire. KMUN 2013 and KMUN 2014 have the distinctive honor
to comprise more than 350 national and international participants. As it was planned and
announced a year ago, the conference will be hosting more than 500 participants coming from
various countries in 10 different committees this year.
Academic and organization teams of the conference have been challenging themselves to set a
different level of understanding in MUN for KMUN’s participants. Experiencing both of the previous
editions of KMUN, this year`s KMUN will differ from its previous editions by not only mixing the
interesting sides of the Model UN examples in Turkey, but will also try its best to combine the
understanding of the international Model UN.
All the research reports of the conference are written by the directors of the respective committees
with the guidance of the academic team of the conference. I do thank the Student Officers namely
Berke Giray and Ece Varol for writing this very guide for the GA-6. Appreciating their efforts on this
research report, I do believe that this report will be a great start for our participant’s on their
researches to prepare themselves for the debates on the given agenda items.
In case you require any further instruction as to the academic content of the GA-6, you may always
contact your Committee Directors or me via [email protected].
After a year full of work and dedication, I do believe that KMUN 2015 will manage to create its
dreamed atmosphere by taking further steps on its previous editions.
Orçun DOĞMAZER
Secretary-General
1
Letter from the PGA
Dear Participants,
I consider it my greatest pleasure to join the student officers of the GA-6 in welcoming you
all to Kabatas Model UN 2015.
On the following pages of this document, there might be various challenges that await you,
assorted problems that the rest of the world has failed in addressing to a satisfactory extent
so far. I am not sure if the nature of my position permits me to say so, but I have to assert
there`s absolutely no denial that what is expected of you is abundantly demanding, so
much so that it is quite likely to end up being rather quixotic, just the opposite of what we all
have striven for.
Yet, this should not lead you to underestimate your skills, capabilities and the potential you
have to offer whether you attempt to recreate a momentous event in history and alter it or
cope with the contemporary obstacles on our way to stamp out the instability worldwide,
and I truly am confident that this report will manage to enlighten your way throughout the
journey that you have dared to go on.
If you feel the need to, you may contact the committee directors or me via
[email protected] to make any enquiries relating to academic matters.
Have it mind that the slightest change we manage to generate will grow into something
greater in time, and this May is meant to be the beginning of that change.
Regards,
Oya Gursoy
President of the General Assembly
2
Letter from the Student Officers
Esteemed delegates, ladies and gentlemen, we as your committee directors are delighted
to welcome you to KMUN 2015 on behalf of the Secretariat and the Organization Team. My
name is Berke Giray and I will be your President Committee Director for the GA-6 Legal
Committee. I am a junior year student in Antalya College High School. I have been taking
part in Model UN related activities since middle school and have been actively participating
since my freshman year. KMUN is the one conference that I have been continuously
attending ever since its debut, and at this point it has become a second home for me. With
a growing number of participants every year, KMUN has always pushed the boundaries
when redefining “innovation” in terms of what can be newly incorporated to Model UN that
can make it an even more memorable and enjoyable experience for all the participants. I
am more than happy to be chairing the Legal Committee, having had a growing affection for
the legal aspect of international affairs. I am looking forward to seeing you in Istanbul in the
nick of time!
Hello and welcome ladies and gentlemen, dear delegates. My name is Ece Varol and I am
going to be your Deputy President Committee Director for the GA-6 Legal Committee at
KMUN 2015. I am a sophomore year student in Açı High School. KMUN, with its creative
and professional approach to the concept of Model UN is one of the conferences that I am
looking forward to the most, and chairing for a committee as redeeming as the Legal
Committee will be more than a pleasure. I am expecting to see you all in Istanbul soon and
I hope you are already inspired for KMUN!
The topics that the Legal Committee will be dealing with are “Stabilizing the Legal
Standards for International Intervention with respect to the Responsibility to Protect” (Topic
I) and “The ongoing prevalent inhuman conditions and ill-treatment in Libyan prisons and
detention facilities with the lack of enforcement or criminal justice systems” (Topic II). Both
of the topics require the delegates to prepare extensively and familiarize with the legal
aspect of the UN, bearing in mind that the Legal Committee is the main contributor to the
international legislation process. Delegates are expected to write extensive and thorough
documents in order to bring a resolve to issues as crucial as these in a just and effective
manner. We have no doubt that you are going to be the committee that will make its voice
echo through the conference and will fill everyone pride upon witnessing your achievements
and creativity.
We are eagerly expecting to see you at KMUN in Istanbul with the light of anticipation and
joy gleaming in your eyes, so be sure to stay tuned and work hard!
Sincerely,
Berke Giray & Ece Varol
3
Topic A: Stabilizing the Legal Standards for International
Intervention with respect to the Responsibility to Protect
History of the Topic
The Responsibility to Protect (hereinafter referred to as R2P) is a policy regarding
international intervention and its implementation. The concept of R2P was adopted with the
passing of the outcome document of the 2005 World Summit. Ever since, acts of
international intervention that are regarded positively have been based on the motive of
R2P. The concept of R2P was formed when former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan
expressed his opinions on the UN not being able to prevent the genocide in Rwanda. Kofi
Annan stressed that although international intervention was considered to be invasive,
there were situations that deemed it necessary, and that a certain guideline needed to be
established to prevent unlawful usage of international intervention and to set motives and
clear outlines on how the violation of human rights can be remedied by the international
community via the usage of interventions.
In 2001, following the establishment of the International Commission on Intervention and
State Sovereignty (hereinafter referred to as ICISS) as an answer to the questions posed
by then Secretary General Kofi Annan, ICISS conducted meetings and tried to formulate
documents. Upon the proposal of naming protective acts of intervention “responsibility to
protect” the ICISS released a report titled “The Responsibility To Protect”. This report
outlined the prospect of the responsibility to protect, and also remarked that in cases where
a state is “incapable of or unwilling to defend its citizens” the responsibility would be
shouldered by the international community. The report established that alongside granting
rights, sovereignty grants responsibilities, including the responsibility of the states to protect
their citizens from ill occurrences –including but not limited to- genocide, ethnic cleansing,
war, and other situations that may cause imminent harm to the people. The report limited
the right to military interventions where such operations could not be conducted if they did
not fit a certain number of guidelines, mainly concerning ethical and legal constraints that
would protect the states getting help from wrongdoings.
The 2005 World Summit Outcome Document signified the unanimous adoption of the R2P,
albeit with some changes to the principles of the R2P. The UN Security Council was
appointed as the only body than can authorize international interventions and international
interventions were deemed necessary only for mass atrocity crimes (genocide, wars, ethnic
4
cleansing and crimes against humanity). The nature of the interventions that can be
authorized was not determined in this report, this being an issue that is still ongoing and
has caused much controversy over the implementation of the R2P.
On January 12th 2009 the current United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki-moon issued a
report titled “Implementing the Responsibility to Protect”. This report was aimed concisely at
determining the ways in which R2P would be implemented and under which international
legal guidelines it would function. The report was similar to that issued by the ICISS, but it
had a more constructive approach, where it was divided into three pillars. These pillars
backed the immediate implementation of R2P, the fulfillment of certain needs in all states to
enforce R2P on a wider scale and helping take precautions to protect the international
community from inhumane acts that deem R2P necessary.
Situations that require the implementation of R2P have been prevalent in the past as they
are currently. These occurrences stemmed from the inhumane acts committed against
residents of countries, causing collateral damage and irreparable harm to the wellbeing of
said states. An example of this would be the dictatorship formed by Muammar Gaddafi in
Libya, where the residents of the state of Libya were treated in inhumane ways and
violently oppressed by the dictatorship.
There is much controversy surrounding the idea of R2P as well. Whether it is a threat to the
national sovereignty and the ability of self-determination of a state is still a disputed issue
and it remains so until a further resolve. The main argument that defends the idea of R2P
being unlawful states that R2P interferes with the process of a state tackling its own issues
as it sees fit, through local measures applied by the state. R2P is sometimes regarded as a
means of some governments influencing others and sometimes prompting a “regime
change”. The main defendants of this idea were PR China and the Russian Federation
when the United States of America brought up the implementation of R2P in the United
Nations Security Council whilst debating over the issue of the humanitarian crisis in Syria.
The states of PR China and the Russian Federation stated that the United States wishing to
implement R2P was but another way of re-establishing order in a disputed area in ways
they deemed fit, “much like the US-prompted regime change in Libya” added the states of
PR China and the Russian Federation.
Despite these arguments against R2P there are many more that support the widespread
implementation of R2P, mainly the wish of the UN Secretary General, who regards R2P as
5
a method that is the apt resolve for the issues of international interventions and setting a
legislative guideline to them. The R2P is –in its core ideals- is a peace-centered method of
preventing disorder in the nations of the world by implementing friendly and utilitarian help
from the international community, with no malicious intent. Since legal borders defining the
implementation of R2P are yet to be set, this will be the primary focus of the committee;
discerning the shortcomings and hollow points of the legal aspect -which is the most vital
aspect of the issue- and bringing an effective resolve to them.
Current Situation
The R2P is widely regarded as a credible solution that allows the international community
and Non-Governmental Organizations (hereinafter referred to as NGOs) to help and
prevent the situations caused by inhumane atrocities that are committed by terrorist
organizations, faulty government actions, dictatorships and any outside effect that harbors
malicious intent.
Recently, a project labeled the Will to Intervene (hereinafter referred to as W2I) was
initiated by Liutenant General Roméo Dallaire and his colleague Dr. Frank Chalk in order to
help broaden the horizon of the R2P concept. This project aims to spread the idea that
nations, bodies or organizations may act accordingly to a “will” that prompts them to
intervene with inhumane situations that are taking place in the world. The supporters of this
project argue that the initiative that can be taken by nations, bodies or organizations can be
more swift at times, and prevent further catastrophes from happening. This is a measure
that aims to halt profoundly harmful occurrences, and is regarded as a last resort measure
that has to be implemented in the concept of R2P. This project also aims to provide for the
implementation of R2P by national governments, to help address imminent issues faster.
As a support to this, the Obama Administration in the US has accepted and integrated three
of the main goals of the W2I Project, as of 2010.
The humanitarian crisis in Syria is also one of the major issues that is closely tied with the
issue of the implementation of the R2P. The United States, as an example, argues that
humanitarian intervention in Syria is necessary due to the escalating situation and the new
threat posed by the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (hereinafter referred to as ISIS). The
implementation of R2P in Syria is a topic of controversial nature, due to the fact that there is
6
no clear decision on which side of the ongoing civil war in Syria will be of primary concern,
and humanitarian intervention in the region may lead to more turmoil and separation on a
larger scale. There is no consensus on which states or which bodies or organizations will
supply the aid for the aforementioned possible intervention or what operations will be
executed in the region. The nature of the proposed humanitarian intervention is unclear and
remains so until further notion. There is no hindsight on what the reaction to the
implementation of an intervention may be, especially since there is a multitude of threats in
the region and the order of priority is vital to the re-establishment of peace and order.
There is yet to be a full-scale intervention regarding the issue of the ISIS advancement as
well, and seeing how it is a growing and persistent issue, there have been many proposals
to directly intervene with the situation. Although such situations were backed by a multitude
of states, an equally large number of states refused the implementation of an intervention,
their concerns being the reactions of the governments in the region, especially their
chances of perceiving a peaceful intervention as an attack on their sovereignty and an
implication towards their inability to tackle the issue. Amongst their other concerns were the
resources and time that would be needed for such an operation, and the legitimacy of such
an idea.
The ongoing situation in the Central African Republic (hereinafter referred to as CAR) is
also a concern for the R2P to address. The conflict in the region started when a rebel group
that call themselves Séléka accused the government of CAR of negligence and moved to
seize certain areas through armed attacks. The government of Chad along with the
Economic Community of African States hastily prompted CAR and the rebels to come to an
agreement, although later the agreement was deemed unlawful, neglected and not
followed, and as a result of this the Séléka rebel coalition continued its acts of terror.
The situation in CAR rapidly deteriorated afterwards where the Séléka militants moved to
raid and seize more land, attacking mainly the Christian population in the land, being a
mainly Muslim coalition themselves. In response to this the Christian folk of CAR formed
anti-balaka or anti-machete coalitions and clashed with the Séléka coalition. This is a point
where the situation may be labeled as a civil war.
Conditions have only worsened ever since, as violence spread to the capital and the
western provinence of CAR, along with mass killings conducted by the Séléka, anti-balaka
coalitions and the loyalists of the previous president Francois Bozizé. Inhumane acts have
7
taken place in the region as the severity of the situation progressed and the United Nations
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs reported an estimate of 400.000
displaced and around 47.000 deceased individuals were affected by the conflict, along with
numerous refugees that fled to neighboring states, as of 2013. The fact that 2.3 million
citizens of CAR were in need of humanitarian aid was also mentioned.
The conflict is yet ongoing, although measures have been taken to halt and terminate it.
These measures are far from fully effective but they are regarded as a start and a pillar that
supports the idea of R2P in the region. The African Union launched a mission specifically to
address the situation in CAR and help bring a resolve to it after containing it. Soon after it
was realized that the necessary resources for such progress were not available and the
Republic of France demanded to intervene and help the mission launched by the African
Union. France changed its stance to military contribution upon realizing that the mission of
the African Union was not fully fit to tackle the issue. On December 5th 2013 upon receiving
authorization from the United Nations Security Council, France started deploying troops in
the region to help restrain the ongoing conflict.
The progress that has been achieved is a vital improvement to the widespread appreciation
of the R2P, seeing how both states and bodies/organizations have aimed to contribute to
the process of resolving the issues caused by the ongoing conflict in CAR. The
implementation of R2P without major international problems and complaints from the state
receiving assistance are elements that potentially prove the R2P to be the most effective
type of resolve in such cases, where certain legislations may be adopted to more efficiently
determine the use of R2P in cases are of similar nature.
Today, there are numerous NGOs working to enforce the implementation of the R2P
principle, some of the most important of these NGOs being the International Coalition for
the Responsibility to Protect (hereinafter referred to as the ICRtoP) and the Global Centre
for the Responsibility to Protect (hereinafter referred to as the GCR2P). These NGOs have
connections with the United Nations and provide assistance for the missions authorized by
the United Nations along with conducting their own missions for humanitarian aid and
raising awareness.
8
These NGOs are key in terms of spreading the idea of R2P in a positive manner to help
gather social and international interest concerning the widespread implementation of the
R2P. Organizations such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) may be
prompted to continue their humanitarian intervention activities, along with numerous other
projects that may be launched in order to gather support for the implementation of R2P to
make it easier to bring a resolve to the situations that may be assessed in a different light
after the appreciation for R2P grows and R2P becomes a globally accepted means of aid.
The aspect of the issue that the General Assembly Sixth Committee (Legal) is concerned
with is the legitimacy of the R2P method. Determining legal guidelines and borders
regarding the extensiveness of the R2P and how it will be implemented, and how it will
comply with a global policy in order to not disrupt international peace are amongst the
primary questions that require to be addressed. How the implementation of the R2P will
comply with both local and international law and not violate human rights is one of the main
concerns as well, seeing how R2P aims to relieve the stress inflicted upon the civilians, who
suffer the most from a crisis situation or an internal conflict that is ongoing in the state that
said citizens are residents of. Creating new legislations and bearing in mind the ones
fabricated in the past, the Legal Committee must work to achieve an effective and straightto-the-point approach to the issue, maintaining integrity and bearing in mind the progress
already made to resolve the issue. International legislation and its effects on the actions
conducted by the states of the world is a sensitive subject and the Legal Committee must
approach these issues with the required attentiveness and regard the important details.
9
Case Study #1: 2011 Military Intervention in
Libya
The military intervention against the dictatorship
led by Muammar Gaddafi began on 19th of March
2011 and NATO’s military action was halted by the
United Nations Security Council on 31st of October.
The main aim of the coalition that was formed was to overthrow the dictator Muammar
Gaddafi and to restore peaceful and democratic order in Libya, supporting the United
Nations Security Council Resolution 1973, through any means necessary. The coalition
was initially formed by Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Italy, Norway, Qatar, Spain,
United Kingdom and the United States, then expanded up to nineteen states including –but
not limited to- Turkey, Sweden, Bulgaria and many other states.
Later on 23rd of March the operation was handed over to NATO and on March 24th NATO
agreed to take control of the no-fly zone formed by the coalition. NATO conducted back to
back military advances, backed by the anti-dictatorship public in order to force Muammar
Gaddafi into submission.
The heated military activity came to an end when Muammar Gaddafi was captured and
executed by the Libyan People on the 20th of October; NATO remained in the region to
ensure a stable short-term recovery and then proceeded to withdraw on the 31st of October
complying with the decision of the Security Council.
The liberation of Libya from a dictatorship is a solid example of R2P being used effectively
in the international field and leading to positive outcomes desired by the majority. The
results of this operation triggered a major increase of awareness regarding R2P and its
outcomes and implementation. It also demonstrated the usage of R2P by states and
organizations both.
The operation had its drawbacks due to the implications of “forceful regime change to fit the
benefits of other states” and due to the collateral damage caused by the military advances.
These factors caused criticism regarding R2P and its implementation, questioning whether
it was in the best interest of all the parties involved, whether it is ever lawful and not
invasive and most importantly whether it can ever be truly implemented on a wider scale as
10
desired. The outcome and the aftermath along with the ideas regarding the R2P are a
disputed argument to this day.
11
Case Study #2: NATO Intervention in
Yugoslavia
The bombing operation conducted by
NATO in
Yugoslavia (March 24th 1999 – June 10th
1999)
was an act of international intervention that NATO stated was conducted in order to halt
human rights abuses that were taking place during the Kosovo War. It was the first act of
the use of military force without authorization from the United Nations Security Council. The
bombings killed an estimate of 2000 to 4000 civilians, destroyed many military
establishments, bridges, civilian buildings, public buildings and industrial establishments.
Upon the Yugoslavian refusal of willing introduction of military forces on the 23rd of March
1999 to help prevent the inhumane acts and state regulated oppression that was prevalent
in Kosovo, NATO decided that military intervention had to be conducted by force and
commenced its military activities on the 24th of March 1999.
The bombings, albeit being destructive to the state of Kosovo helped NATO achieve their
goal and call for international attention to be directed to the situation in Kosovo in order to
halt all inhumane and military actions in Kosovo and to re-elect a just and democratic
government that would not jeopardize its own citizens.
The international feeback was mixed, while the then-Secretary General of the United
Nations, Kofi Annan said that there were times when the use of force was deemed
necessary but he had doubts about joint the action NATO had taken. Kofi Annan stressed
that the United Nations Security Council was the only body that had the ability to authorize
the usage of military force.
Russia called on the Security Council condemning the acts
committed by NATO and tabled a resolution to withdraw all NATO
military forces from Kosovo, which had only three voters in favor,
these being Russia, Belarus and India, with twelve votes against,
failing the resolution. States like Russia, Iran, Iraq, India and PR
CHina condemned NATOs acts in Kosovo, questioning their legality.
The R2P was displayed in its more urgent nature in this case, and it was a demonstration of
what would happen in the most extreme, “exceptional situation”, acting as a template that
12
portrays what the typical series of events that unfold would be like in case the situations
comes to something similar. It was an effective display of R2P in action and although it
gathered much criticism, the main concern is the legality of these acts and what is
considered “unlawful” in such cases. This operation displayed the dire need for a legal
outline to define the authorizations that the R2P grants in case of an intervention and how it
needs to relate to the aftermath.
Questions That Should Be Answered & Points A Resolution Should Cover:
Questions That Should Be Answered
What authorizations does the R2P initially grant to states, organizations and bodies
respectively?
Is the R2P –as a concept- lawful, especially in terms of not being invasive, not being
harmful, and being ethical? If not, why and what can be done to maket he R2P a
lawful method for international aid and intervention?
How will the R2P be integrated into the worldwide agenda?
Who will undertake the observation of the R2P’s implementation on an international
scale?
To what extent does the R2P allow an international intervention to intervene with the
situation in a state?
What types of international intervention are to be permitted under the name of the
R2P? (Military, legal, economical, et cetera.)
How will the NGOs be able to benefit from the R2P and conduct operations under
the R2P agenda?
To what extension can international legislation define general domestic stance
towards international humanitarian interventions?
Which organizations will hold authority over authorizing further interventions under
the agenda of R2P?
In which cases will the actions of a party conducting an international intevention be
deemed unlawful and what types of judiciary will decide upon this?
How will the lawful application of R2P be enforced?
How will international awareness be raised regarding R2P (mainly social support)
and how will international appreciation be gathered for it?
13
What set of actions will be followed in case the legislations formed regarding
international intervention do not agree with the domestic policies or legislations of a
state?
Will there be an idea of a joint force that may be proposed to the bodies that hold
authority to form a force, to help conduct interventions more centrally and
unanimously?
How will the ongoing crisis situations and conflicts be adressed and what will be the
legislative guidelines and the judiciary outcome regarding the parties involved, how
will these be determined with which aspects of the respective issues prioritized?
Points a Resolution Should Cover:
The method of monitoring for the R2P’s widespread usage and how this method
will be financed made useful and lawful.
How the aftermath of an international intervention be dealt with in legal terms.
Discerning which legislations will be proposed in order to set concrete outlines to
the interventions that may be conducted under the idea of R2P.
Determining which judiciary organ will assess and come to a judgment on the
topics that the committee and the documents fabricated by it are concerned with.
Determining which punishments the party whose actions are found unlawful will
be subject to.
Deciding on which members of the international community will be able to take
part in international interventions under the prospect of R2P.
Fabricating methods to deem the R2P idea plausible to every international body
and obtaining help from those bodies, aiming to push for the addition of R2P to
be included in all the international agendas that are related to it.
Determining whether R2P as a whole is lawful and compatible with international
legislation.
Formulating legislations to widen the authorization granted by the R2P to a
sensible extent in a lawful manner.
The formulation of a possible legal charter regarding the application of
international interventions.
14
Proposing to define a set of legislations that will serve to determine a code of
conduct for acts of international intervention -dissected to its components(military, economic, political, et cetera.), acts of humanitarian intervention and
acts of international and humanitarian aid, concretely defining the outline and
ethical code of these acts.
Delegates are expected to be productive and original during the resolution writing
process, and are highly encouraged to fabricate their own ideas and solutions to be
able to debate and modify them further on while also paying attention to the points
mentioned here. Delegates are also expected to focus on the legal aspect of the
issue as that is the main concern of the committee, so every aspect of the issue
must be assessed by finally reflecting it on the legal aspect and bearing in mind that
the first and foremost concern is addressing the legal components of the agenda
item at hand and formulating necessary resolutions and legislative documents.
Bibliography
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Responsibility_to_protect#CAR_and_the_R2P
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/W2I
http://migs.concordia.ca/W2I/home.htm
http://migs.concordia.ca/W2I/about_w2i.htm
http://migs.concordia.ca/W2I/current_initiatives.htm
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Humanitarian_intervention#Legal_grounds
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1999_NATO_bombing_of_the_Federal_Republic_of_Yugoslavia
#
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2011_military_intervention_in_Libya#
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Legitimacy_of_NATO_bombing_of_Yugoslavia
http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/implementing%20the%20rtop.pdf
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intervention_(international_law)
http://www.e-ir.info/2013/01/20/international-intervention-as-a-failing-concept/
http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/
http://www.globalr2p.org/
http://www.globalr2p.org/our_work/united_nations_engagement
15
http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICISS%20Report.pdf
http://r2pcoalition.org/content/view/73/93/
http://r2pcoalition.org/content/view/22/48/
http://www.palgrave.com/page/detail/the-responsibility-to-protect-aidanhehir/?K=9780230289178
http://www.ushmm.org/confront-genocide/how-to-prevent-genocide/responsibility-to-protect
Hakimi, Monica, Toward a Legal Theory on the Responsibility to Protect (2014). Yale
Journal of International Law 39, no. 2 (2014): 247-80; U of Michigan Public Law Research
Paper. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2490643
http://www.gmu.edu/programs/icar/ijps/vol6_2/Conteh-Morgan.htm
http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/23387/lessons_from_libya.html
http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2011/06/in-c-te-divoire-a-model-ofsuccessful-intervention/240164/
http://theglobalobservatory.org/2014/10/legality-legitimacy-human-protection-internationalintervention-isis-syria-r2p/
http://www.merip.org/mer/mer187/can-military-intervention-be-humanitarian
16
Topic B: The ongoing prevalent inhuman conditions and illtreatment in Libyan prisons and detention facilities with the
lack of enforcement of criminal justice systems
History of the Topic
The UN has drawn attention to Libyan prisons as they warned, “there is a danger that
torture will become institutionalized within the new Libya.” Before being able to discuss the
situation of Libyan prisons and detention facilities, a brief background about the history of
Libya under the rule of Muammar Gaddafi, should be established. On September 1, 1969,
the 27-year-old Muammar al-Quaddafi deposed the king in a coup, abolished the monarchy
and established the new Libyan African Republic, with the motto of “freedom, socialism and
unity.” The roots of his political philosophy were Islam, Arab-nationalism, socialism, which
he combined in The Green Book (his personal manifesto) He led The Libyan Revolutionary
Command Council, a governing body that ruled Libya from 1969 to1977. By the time he
was assassinated; he turned Libya into Africa’s richest nation.
Libya had laws; forbidding group activities supporting a political ideology opposing
Gaddafi’s, and the media remained strictly under the government’s control. The regime
imprisoned hundreds of people for violating the law, and torture and disappearances were
reported. He was known to be backing several militant groups including Irish Republican
Army and The Palestine Liberation Organization. Libyan cash was also thought to be used
to support terrorist acts by extremist Palestinian groups.
In 2011, a civil war broke out in context to The Arab Spring and a multinational coalition led
by NATO forces intervened in Libya with the aim of protecting the civilians, marking the end
of Libyan Arab Jamahiriya with the assassination of Gaddafi. Since then, the Libyan
government is struggling to maintain order, caused mainly by the presence of rebel militias,
approximately 1700 armed groups. The government is fractures with different militias
searching for power in the western and eastern parts of the country. Torture is used by the
rebel forces, which have established unofficial detention facilities. The rebels have used
torture devices such as ropes and sticks against suspected Gaddafi supporters. The former
rebels extracted revenge on Gaddafi loyalists who were being held in makeshift jails which
sometimes even consisted of jails. Majid Alfituri, who was among the first to take up arms
17
against the regime of Gaddafi has said that the reason for the seeking for vengeance
reflected the civilian’s instant judgments of the regime under which they grew up. The
revolution was primarily a reaction against the human rights conditions and in the process
many institutions such as the police, judiciary and prison services collapsed and the armed
brigades who defeated Gaddafi’s forces formed local military councils, taking over the law
of enforcement. Since they were not related to the government, there was no way of
monitoring or limiting their actions.
The Prisons in Libya do not abide the United Nations Basic Principles on the Use of Force
and Firearms by Law Enforcement officials. The Basic Principles are:
“Principle 15: Law enforcement officials, in their relations with persons in custody or
detention, shall not use force, except when strictly necessary for the maintenance of
security and order within the institution, or when personal safety is threatened.
Principle 16: Law enforcement officials, in their relations with persons in custody or
detention, shall not use firearms, except in self-defense or in the defense of others against
the immediate threat of death or serious injury, or when strictly necessary to prevent the
escape of a person in custody or detention presenting the danger referred to in principle 9.”
However this is not the case in Libyan prisons. According to Human Rights watch some
guards use tear gas, smoke bombs; water cannons fired rubber bullets on detainees’ heads
to “scare them”.
Current Situation
After overthrowing the leader Gaddafi, torture and brutality are still rife in Libyan prisons.
Around 8,000 prisoners are held in government jails on suspicion of having fought for
Gaddafi, and are held without trial. Countless others are detained by freelance militias.
United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) has recorded 27 cases of death, since
Gaddafi was captured and killed. They were almost certainly cause by torture and eleven of
those were in prisons controlled by militias. According to the report by Office of the United
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR) and UNSMIL, many arrests are
arbitrary and motivated by personal reasons. The papers detailed the cases of men who
18
were hauled off the street without explanation and were beaten and raped with bottles or
large bullets. They have told that they were beaten on the soles of their feet, hanged upside
dpwn and beaten for hours, burned with cigarettes, had hot liquids poured on them. It also
stated that detainees were held without access to lawyers.
The ones who were arrested were taken from their homes. Workplaces or streets, and were
moved frequently from makeshift detention places to others. They are usually held without
access to lawyers and families may not know the whereabouts of their relatives. In some
cases the whereabouts of detainees remain unknown. Some of them have been detained
solely because of their belonging to ethnic groups including Warfalla, Tawergha and
Mashashia and the reason is that these ethnic groups are believed to be supporting the
former Gaddafi regime.
UN representatives were able to visit regulated prisons controlled by the government and
there appeared to be no or little signs of abuse. It is the unregistered prisoners held outside
these facilities under the control of militias, are of international humanitarian concern. Under
Libyan International Law, torture remains a crime and those who have ordered or carried
out torture must be held accountable. The lack of security mechanisms impacts the
performance of the court. The judicial personnel are insufficient and there is a need for the
establishment of an independent Supreme Constitutional Court. The priority should be to
fight the corruption on the judiciary system.
The condition of the prisons is also a very important problem after the torture and ill
treatment. The detention facilities are overcrowded and the detainees are kept in
unsaniterial conditions. The International Committee of the Red Cross, Human Rights
Watch, and Doctors Without Boders authorities, which have direct access to detention
facilities, brought the lack of food and medical supplies to attention. The aid group Doctors
Without Borders (MSF) has suspended their work because it said detainees were being
tortured. MSF General Director has stated that: "Patients were brought to us in the middle
of interrogation for medical care, in order to make them fit for further interrogation. This is
unacceptable; our role is to provide medical care to war casualties and sick detainees, not
to repeatedly treat the same patients between torture sessions."
19
There has been a revolution in order to bring democracy and ameliorate the human rights
however the current situation of Libyan prisons do not cover the expectations of the
revolution.
Case Study Abu Salim Prison (Gaddafi Regime)
Abu Salim Prison was notorious during the rule of Muammar Gaddafi for its human right
abuses, which included a massacre in 1996, which Human Rights Watch estimated that
1270 prisoners were killed however the Libyan government rejected the allegations. The
prisoners protested the evening of June 28 over the harsh conditions and captured two
guards, which one died later. Guards opened fire causing the death of six prisoners and
wounding about twenty. The government sent senior officials to negotiate and five prisoners
met Abdullah Sannusi, a Libyan national who was the intelligence chief and brother-in-law
of Muammar Gaddafi. They agreed to release the captured guard, but demanded clean
clothes, outside recreation, better medical care and the right to have their cases heard
before court. The prisoners agreed and the sick prisoners were taken away for “medical
care” where instead they were shot. The next morning hundreds of prisoners from different
cellblocks were brought to the courtyard and the gunmen on rooftops opened fire with
automatic weapons. The bodies of the killed prisoners were thought to be buried in the
prison but removed after a few years. The location of the bodies remains unknown. This
wasn’t known until 2001 and 2002 when Libyan authorities began to inform families that
their relatives who were prisoners had died, but didn’t provide cause of death and 238
families claim that they have lost contact with a relative who was a prisoner. The Abu Salim
massacre was a spark for the uprising in 2011, which overthrew Gaddafi. In 2009, the
government stated that the killings were the result of a confrontation between the
government and rebels from the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group.
Case Study 2 (2013)
Ali Mas’ud Ahmad al-Etri,I a 51 tyear old-man dies in custody in the Mitiga detention facility.
The victim was arrested while drinking alcohol with his friends because drinking is illegal in
Libya. The forensic report said “the death is caused by a cerebral bleeding and cardiac
arrest; the corpse had several traumatic bruises. The death was caused by beatings and
torture”.
20
Past Resolutions
Safeguards provided for by the Code of Criminal Procedure;
The requirement for security officers to hold a warrant from the competent authority
when arresting or detaining a suspect (Article 30);
The requirement to detain suspects only in “prisons designed for that purpose”
(Article 31);
The right of detainees to challenge the legality of their detention (Article 33);
The right to have a lawyer present during interrogation in criminal cases (Article106);
and the right to be assigned a lawyer if none was appointed by the defendant
(Article321).
The limit for referring suspects to the General Prosecution is 48 hours, extending to
seven days for certain offence including those “against the State” (Article 26).
The National Transitional Council in May 2012 passed Law 38 of 2012 requiring the
Ministries of Interior and Defense to take custody of all detainees held by armed groups and
to refer cases to the prosecution or allow for their release by 12 July 2012.
Libya is a state party to the 1966 UN International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
causing them to have an obligation to prevent arbitrary arrest.
The 2002 Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture aimed to allow for
inspections of all detention centers by an international body, as well as requiring Libya to
provide access to detention centers to independent Libyan bodies however was not ratified.
Measures Already Taken To Solve the Issue
United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL): UNSMIL is a political mission led by the
Department of Political Affairs, aiming to help rebuild the State of Law after the Libyan Civil
War. ANSMIL has frequently visited detention centers, documented abuses and intervened
with authorities to improve the treatment of prisoners. They aim to prevent further abuses
against detainees, ensuring they are given a chance for trial. However UNSMIL does not
have an executive mandate causing them to not be able to carry out criminal investigations.
These are the responsibility of the necessary judicial authorities however they support their
effort through policy advice and technical assistance. UNSNIL and prison directors have
come together on a roundtable discussing in order to discuss how to improve Libyan
21
prisons however during the discussion there were complaints about how the efforts were
much theoretical and too little practical.
Handing detention facilities over to experienced and trained officers of the Judicial Police
resulted in improved conditions and better treatment of detainees. For example UNSMIL
visited al-Wahda 7 and al-Huda Correction and Rehabilitation Institutions in Misrata several
times and has saw significant improvement after the Judicial and Military Police took over.
Since 2002, the government has sought to bring armed brigades involved in detentions
under the official authority of the state. They have done this by affiliating them to the
Ministries of Justice, even though the brigades have retained the actual control of detention
facilities in many cases.
Questions To Consider
What kind of punishments do the torturers get?
How can The Libyan authorities ensure that all detainees are promptly brought
before a judge or judicial body?
How can the unregistered prisoners be tracked?
Where are the unregistered prisoners held?
Is torture a way of seeking vengeance against the former regime? If it is, then what
should be changed in the mentality and worldview of Libyans?
Points A Resolution Should Cover
The lack of access to lawyers
The lack of communication between the detainees and their relatives
The unofficial prisons controlled by militias, and how they can be located and
monitored.
How the citizens can help the government locate such unofficial prisons and
unregistered prisoners.
Establishing a law for punishments which should be given to those who use torture
and violence against prisoners?
How can the public trust in judiciary be restored after the Gaddafi regime?
22
A prosecutorial strategy to deal with crimes under the former regime should be
adopted. The priority of the crimes should be decided (for example case study #2)
How to ameliorate the physical conditions in prisons (hygiene, the capacity of
prisoner, clean clothing, toilets etc.)
Establishing a stable and clear policy for Libya’s treatment of detainees, influenced
by the previous passed resolution which Libya is a member state (or amending the
resolutions which they have not agreed upon)
Bringing the facilities under the control of Judicial Police and other government
agencies.
Bibliography
"History of Libya under Muammar Gaddafi." Wikipedia. Accessed April 6, 2015.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Libya_under_Muammar_Gaddafi#Libyan_Arab_Rep
ublic_.281969.E2.80.931977.29.
Evans, Robert. "Torture Rife in Libya's Jails Two Years after Gaddafi - UN." Yahoo! News.
Accessed April 6, 2015. http://news.yahoo.com/torture-rife-libyas-jails-two-years-gaddafiun-071055577.html.
"Libya: Abu Salim Prison Massacre Remembered." Libya: Abu Salim Prison Massacre
Remembered. Accessed April 1, 2015. http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/06/27/libya-abusalim-prison-massacre-remembered.
"Libya: Violent Response to Tripoli Prison Mutiny." Libya: Violent Response to Tripoli Prison
Mutiny.
Accessed
April
6,
2015.
http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/09/03/libya-violent-
response-tripoli-prison-mutiny.
"TORTURE AND DEATHS IN DETENTION IN LIBYA." Accessed April 6, 2015.
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/LY/TortureDeathsDetentionLibya.pdf.
23
Council on Foreign Relations. Accessed April 6, 2015. http://www.cfr.org/global/globalconflict-tracker/p32137#!/?marker=14.
"In Libya Prisons, Former Rebels Exact Revenge on Gaddafi Loyalists." GlobalPost.
February
16,
2012.
Accessed
April
6,
2015.
http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/africa/120216/libya-prisons-abusetorture-rebels-revolution-muammar-gaddafi.
"Human
Rights
in
Libya."
Wikipedia.
Accessed
April
6,
2015.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Human_rights_in_Libya#Libya_under_Gaddafi.
"Justice
&
Corrections
Update."
Accessed
April
6,
2015.
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/publications/cljas/DPKO-Justice-Corrections-Update2014.pdf.
"Aid Group Quits Libyan Prisons over Torture." CBSNews. Accessed April 6, 2015.
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/aid-group-quits-libyan-prisons-over-torture/.
"Country Information and Guidance Libya: Prison Conditions." Accessed April 6, 2015.
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/351357/CIG_
-_Libya_-_Prison_Conditions_-_v1.pdf.
24