Riksbank inflation target not credible in the beginning but eventually achieved Inflation expectations: The Swedish experience Target announced Target applies Credibility achieved 12 10 Lars E.O. Svensson 8 Stockholm School of Economics and IMF 6 4 Web: larseosvensson.se 2 Inflation Expectations Symposium Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, March 30, 2015 The views expressed in this presentation are those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of the IMF or IMF policy. ! 0 -2 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 CPI inflation, Y/Y, percent Unemployment 1996 1997 1998 Inflation next 2 years Repo rate 1999 2000 Inflation next 5 years Source: Aragon Fondkommission, Statistics Sweden. 1 3 Inflation expectations well anchored to target 1997-2011 Outline ! Inflation expectations anchored at the target: Good or bad? ! Anchored inflation expectations: Consequences of undershooting a credible inflation target 12 CPI inflation, Y/Y 1yr inflation expectations 2yr inflation expectations Unemployment 10 • Increased unemployment • Unanticipated increase in real debt 8 ! Do Swedes have “near rational” expectations (Akerlof, Dickens, and Perry 2000)? 6 • Moderate undershooting of target (< 1 pp) doesn’t seem to shift expectations much • Large undershooting the last few years and debate seems to shift expectations 4 2 ! Problems if credibility of inflation target lost? ! How to restore credibility? 0 -2 96 2 97 98 99 00 Source: Statistics Sweden. 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 4 5-year moving averages: CPI inflation expectations close to 2 %, CPI inflation below 2 % 1996: Inflation target gradually becomes credible 4.0 A 3.5 CPI inflation, Y/Y, 5yr moving average 1yr inflation expectations, 5yr moving average 2yr inflation expectations, 5yr moving average 3.0 π e =π = π *=2 2.5 C B 2.0 1.5 1.0 0.5 u=u* 0.0 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 Source: Statistics Sweden. 5 From 1997: Inflation expectations stuck at 2 %, but monetary policy still tight: Inflation too low, and unemployment too high Before 1996: Inflation target not credible, tight monetary policy, and high unemployment πe A π − π e = −γ (u − u*) A B π = π *= 2 u* 7 π e = π *=2 π = 1.4 u C B D u* u 6 8 8 Money-market participants’ expectations have also drifted down. Credibility loss? CPI inflation and unemployment 1976-2012, and benchmark long-run Phillips curve 1997-2011 16 CPI inflation, Y/Y, percent 12 π t = 6.8 − 2.70 (ut − ut −1 ) − 0.75 ut −1 + ε t 1976Q2 ( 0.73) 8 ( 0.18) π = 6.8 − 0.75 u 1991Q4 1993Q4 2011Q3 4 2 1.4 0 0.6 p.p. 1998Q1 0.8 p.p. -4 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 Unemployment, percent Source: Svensson (2015), “The Possible Unemployment Cost of Average Inflation below a Credible Target,” American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics 7(1), 258-296. 9 Recently, household inflation expectations have shifted down, after large undershoot and much debate and criticism of the Riksbank 6 Inflation and household inflation expectations 5 4 4 3 3 2 2 1 1 0 0 -2 -3 11 Riksbank inflation-forecast credibility eroded? 6 5 -1 Percent. Source: TNS Sifo Prospera. Percent. Source: TNS Sifo Prospera. -1 CPI inflation Hhold 1-yr expectations Hhold 1-yr expectations excl extreme values -2 -3 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 10 12 Percent increase to February 2015 in the real value of a given loan, compared to if inflation had been 2 percent (depending on when the loan was taken out) Inflation below household’s expectations increases household real debt burden (Fisher deflation) 5 4 Nov 2011 5 CPI inflation Hhold 1-yr exp's, lagged 1 yr, excl extr vls 4 3 3 2 2 1 1 Inflation surprise 0 0 -1 -1 -2 -2 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 Note: Dashed lines are 5-year trailing moving averages 13 The real value of an SEK 1 million loan taken out in Nov 2011, actual and for 2 percent inflation 15 Sum up 6.5 % higher real debt ! A credible inflation target in principle good: Allows monetary policy to stabilize real economy more ! Persistent undershooting a credible inflation target increases unemployment and household real debt burden ! Large undershooting erodes credibility of inflation target: Inflation expectations shift down ! “Near rational” inflation expectations? ! Overshooting low inflation expectations reduces unemployment and household debt burden ! But difficult to increase inflation with ELB (not ZLB) and low inflation expectations ! How difficult to meet the target and restore its credibility if credibility is lost? 14 16 The leaning: Policy rates in Sweden, UK, and US; Eonia rate in euro area Extra slides 17 19 The leaning: Inflation in Sweden, euro area, UK, and US Prospera and firms inflation expectations 18 20 The leaning: Real policy rate in Sweden, UK, and US, real Eonia rate in euro area 21 Ex post evaluation: Riksbank policy-rate increases from summer of 2010 have led to inflation below target and higher unemployment (and probably a higher debt ratio) 85% LTV cap Source: Svensson (2013), “Unemployment and monetary policy – update for the year 2013,” Svensson (2013), “Leaning against the wind increase (not reduces) the household debt-to-GDP ratio”, posts on larseosvensson.se. 22
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