12 COMMENTARY THE AUSTRALIAN, MONDAY, APRIL 20, 2015 theaustralian.com.au/opinion AUSE01Z50MA - V1 TAX SYSTEM ISN’T BROKEN, AND ‘FIXING’ IT MAY NOT PAY OFF Multinationals make a convenient target but closing loopholes could backfire HENRY ERGAS The trouble, it seems, is not that we spend too much: it’s that we tax too little. And the Senate inquiry into corporate tax avoidance, chaired by Labor senator Sam Dastyari, is unlikely to leave much uncertainty about the culprits: those taxdodging, revenue-shifting multinationals. Now, conversions to virtue should always be celebrated. Bells will therefore have pealed in heaven when Dastyari, who was secretary of the NSW ALP during Eddie Obeid’s final years, emerged as a poster boy for fiscal probity. And the fact the Abbott government has leapt on to his inquiry’s bandwagon, foreshadowing drastic action against tax avoidance by multinationals, only underscores Dastyari’s achievement. After all, in these polarised times, it would take a heart of stone not be moved by the prospect of Joe Hockey, Bill Shorten and Christine Milne linking arms on a frosty Canberra morning as they chant “Tax the Fortune 500!” But awkward questions remain. If company tax is purely voluntary, as Milne suggests, why are ruthless bean counters signing cheques worth nearly $70 billion to the tax commissioner? Surely the chief financial officers of the 10 companies that shell out a third of that total should be transported, pre- sumably by private plane, to the Cayman Islands where, the inquiry was told, money slides into tax-free hideaways as smoothly as aged rum? As for BHP Billiton and Rio — who in 2011-12 donated close to $12bn to the taxman, so contributing more than the 230,000 businesses in Australia’s four largest industry sectors — what explains their folly? Was it merely that the rush to dig ore out of the ground left them no time to doctor their tax returns? And while we’re on to puzzles, why are our corporates becoming increasingly tenderhearted, with the ratio of company tax “voluntarily’’ paid to the market sector’s net capital stock some 50 per cent higher in recent years than it was in earlier decades? Perhaps love is in the air. But there is an alternative hypothesis: that as David Bradbury, then assistant treasurer in the Gillard government, said in September 2013, “our company tax system is far from broken”. And plenty of reasons suggest Bradbury’s assessment is the more plausible. Company tax revenue/net capital stock % 2.0 1.8 Average ratio, 1997-2012 = 1.4% 1.6 1.4 1.2 Average ratio, 1980-96 = 0.9% 1.0 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.2 0 1980 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 To begin with, our laws give the tax commissioner a general antiavoidance power that, compared with the other advanced economies, stands out for its breadth and depth. Nor do our laws leave many tools in the tax avoider’s armoury: we have stringent controls on transfer pricing, tight limitations on intra-company interest payments and sweeping restrictions on financial transfers between related entities. Yes, the “double Irish Dutch 96 98 00 02 04 06 08 10 12 Source: ABS, ATO sandwich”, that complex tax minimisation ploy which endlessly titillates the Fairfax press, may or may not have been legal in the US; what is certain, however, is that our “controlled foreign company” rules proscribe it. The result is that avoiding, much less evading, company tax is costly, complex and risky. Dastyari’s inquiry can therefore “roar its terrible roars and gnash its terrible teeth and roll its terrible eyes and show its terrible claws”: the notion that billions of dollars are escaping the tax net will still make no sense. That is not to deny some profit shifting occurs; as Cervantes’ Don Quixote put it centuries ago, “what errant knight ever paid taxes?” But truckloads of doctoral theses give us a reasonable idea about the magnitudes involved. And not only are those magnitudes small, but the evidence suggests they have become smaller. In the 1990s, for example, the textbook consensus was that the “semi-elasticity” of multinationals’ pre-tax income to the company tax rate was about 0.8. Translated into English, that means a 10 percentage point difference between the Australian company tax rate and the average rate overseas would reduce multinationals’ reported pre-tax income by about 8 per cent. However, as tax laws have become more restrictive, the “semielasticity” has fallen to between 0.2 and 0.4. On those estimates, even if multinationals paid half of all Australian company tax, profit shifting would reduce the com- pany tax take by one-half of 1 per cent, which is less than one-tenth of 1 per cent of Commonwealth revenues. There are, of course, many uncertainties around those estimates. But even were the revenue losses larger, it is by no means obvious they make us worse off. On the contrary, as the Henry report argued, and recent Treasury studies have confirmed, our high tax rates on globally mobile capital reduce investment and productivity, lowering Australian wages. By lessening that impact, profit shifting presumably creates benefits that Australian workers capture as higher incomes in the longer term. And for the same reason, closing any remaining loopholes will ultimately reduce our wellbeing, not that of foreign shareholders, especially as the mining boom subsides. Would outcomes be better were the clampdown co-ordinated internationally, eliminating the bolt-holes into which capital could flee? The experience of the 1920s and 30s, when the first great wave of double tax treaties occurred, suggests the opposite. With each country convinced it could fleece the sheep without skinning it, tax rates climbed, magnifying investment risk. Rather, the best way to boost revenues is to increase productivity, not reduce it. Lifting our gross domestic product by 1 per cent through higher productivity and labour force participation would, Treasury’s modelling finds, raise tax receipts by nearly $4bn in its first year alone, 10 times any plausible gains from curbing profit shifting. Unfortunately, that requires reforming industrial relations, as well as tackling wasteful programs such as the renewable energy targets: all of which would be anything but “dull and boring”. And while Dastyari may have found virtue, sainthood is still some distance away. Far easier then, to bash the multinationals. And if investment, productivity and living standards suffer, who’s to know? BANKING ON A THE BOLD MEN WHO WROTE THE LEGEND OF THE ANZACS FORCE FOR GOOD War correspondents Australia must ask tough questions about the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank were much closer to the action in 1915 than they are today EMIL BOLONGAITA TROY BRAMSTON Last Friday, Joe Hockey announced the appointment of Iain Watt, former head of the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, to lead the government’s negotiating team with respect to the founding of the China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. The Treasurer made it clear Australia wants to participate in the AIIB’s mission to address Asia’s massive infrastructure deficit, estimated to be as high as $US8 trillion ($10.2 trillion) over the next decade. At the same time, he acknowledged there were concerns about the AIIB that would be tackled by Watt and his team in their negotiations with the Chinese government. These concerns were expressed by Tony Abbott when he announced Australia would join the AIIB even as his government would conduct consultations with China on “the bank’s design, governance and transparency”. At the core of these concerns is the question of fiduciary responsibility. How can Australia be assured the funds it contributes to the AIIB will be spent as intended? Can the AIIB be structured, organised and managed so its infrastructure projects will be true public goods and produce developmental benefits that are good for the bank — and good for Australia? For the US government, which opposes the AIIB, this is a question the new bank will be hard pressed to answer. The White House issued a statement that AIIB should follow “the high standards of the World Bank and the regional development banks”. But these standards do not guarantee the AIIB will be immune to problems that plague infrastructure projects funded by multilateral development banks, chiefly corruption. Take Bangladesh’s Padma Bridge project. In June 2012, the World Bank cancelled its $US1.2 billion loan to Bangladesh for the project. The Asian Development Bank, which had committed to provide a $US610 million loan, followed suit. The corruption, waste and poor impacts that undermine infrastructure projects stem from both government and market failures in the various countries. But they are also failures by MDBs to effectively translate their high standards into operation to respond to the complexities of the political economy of developing countries. To be effective, the AIIB needs to be designed differently and learn from problems faced by the MBDs. Australia should negotiate the adoption not just of high standards and best practices, but of better approaches that build on lessons from the MDBs’ experiences. These approaches should address the central question: how will the AIIB ensure that its lending does go to produce public — not private — goods? This question deals with the three serious risks faced by AIIB. The first is controlling corruption. Infrastructure is inherently high-risk because of its big budgets. The funds flow attracts unscrupulous elements like bees to honey, especially if the projects are undertaken in poor governance environments with insufficient safeguards. Will AIIB be prepared to cancel or suspend financing if there are credible reports of corruption? Will the AIIB join other MDBs in the cross-debarment of problematic firms? Will the AIIB have agreements with member governments for co-operation in investigation and prosecution for corruption? The second is tackling moral hazard. MDBs are different from commercial banks because they lend mainly to its member governments, which rarely go bankrupt. Sovereign guarantees are prized by MDBs because governments are bound to pay, and pay them first ahead of other creditors in the event of disputes. This limited risk of default leads to weak incentives for rigorous due diligence. The moral hazard in MDBs is matched by moral hazard in borrowing governments, whose accountability for corrupted infrastructure can be left to succeeding governments to handle. How can the AIIB be structured so that the organisation and staff are disciplined for its mistakes? What incentives can the AIIB provide to ensure its staff conduct rigorous due diligence — and that governments borrow only for what is needed and spend as intended? The third is addressing disbursement bias. MDBs face built-in pressures to lend quickly and lend hugely. To be viable, MDBs establish lending targets, and these targets are distributed across regional departments that in turn are allocated to countries. Staff performance in MDBs is associated in meeting these targets; hence, the drive to disburse can trump the call for careful design and delivery. How can the AIIB be managed so that it lends prudently and effectively? Similarly, how can the AIIB ensure that it can also act quickly to cancel or suspend? Also, how can AIIB staff be managed to ensure that they properly design projects, less focused on speedy project approval and more on project effectiveness? As Australia seeks to firm up the terms of its engagement with the AIIB, its negotiators need to make the most of the opportunity to establish a multilateral development bank that can help tackle Asia’s massive infrastructure deficits and produce the public goods that will contribute to greater growth opportunities in the region. Australia must ask the tough questions to ensure that the infrastructure projects of the AIIB will resolve infrastructure problems, not create them. AIIB must not just be about best practices and high standards. It must be about solving these problems and producing public goods. Emil Bolongaita is executive director of Carnegie Mellon University Australia. He was formerly a staff member of the Asian Development Bank. This week sees the most important public commemoration of a historical event since the Bicentennial of British settlement in 1988. The 100th anniversary of the Gallipoli campaign during World War I, which gave birth to the Anzac legend, continues to shape the Australian story more than anything else. No other event — social, economic or political — continues to infuse the public consciousness and inspire a greater emotional connection to the past than the landing of Australian troops on the shores of Gallipoli in the predawn of April 25, 1915, and the illfated eight-month conflict that followed. In remembering the struggle of these soldiers, and those who made the ultimate sacrifice, no words have been more important than those penned by the war correspondents who kept Australians informed about what was happening on the front lines of battle. Australia’s official war correspondent and historian, Charles (CEW) Bean, did more than any other to create the Anzac legend and sustain it in the years after WWI by helping to establish the Australian War Memorial. Among the plethora of new books about the war, none are more important than those chronicling the extraordinary contribution Bean made to our understanding of the conflict and the cultivation of the Anzac story. Two excellent biographies — Ross Coulthart’s Charles Bean (HarperCollins) and Peter Rees’s Bearing Witness (Allen & Unwin) — provide a fresh look at his life and legacy. They each offer a balanced portrait that recognises the flaws and strengths of his writings. Bean’s diaries, republished in Phillip Bradley’s Charles Bean’s Gallipoli (Allen & Unwin), make a magnificent companion volume. A new miniseries, Deadline Gallipoli, began on Foxtel’s Showcase channel last night and continues tonight. It powerfully dramatises the story of Gallipoli through the eyes of war correspondents Ellis Ashmead-Bartlett, Keith Murdoch, Phillip Schuler and Bean. Their writings are chronicled in Mark Dapin’s terrific collection, From The Trenches (Viking). I found the miniseries to be utterly compelling viewing, although not entirely accurate. It is as much a personal portrayal of these extraordinary men as it is about the war they witnessed and reported. They faced incredible dangers, waged battles with censors and military chiefs, and were not always welcomed by the troops they wrote about. Deadline Gallipoli opens with Bean embedded with the Australian troops wading ashore at Galli- poli under Turkish fire. Bean became the official war correspondent in late 1914, after narrowly winning a ballot run by the Australian Journalists’ Association. He remained at Gallipoli until the evacuation in December 1915 and later reported the war on the Western Front. Our understanding of Gallipoli is owed in large part to Bean’s voluminous newspaper dispatches, diaries and notebooks, six volumes of official history he wrote and six more that he edited. These writings are rendered with his belief in Australian courage, mateship and egalitarianism. Some of his writings were exaggerated, he made omissions and his conclusions have been questioned. His reports often contradict his diary entries. But nobody saw more of Gallipoli or wrote more about it. We remain in his debt for his contribution to history. Last year, I met Bean’s grand- daughter, Anne Carroll. Last week, I spoke to his grandson, Ted (Edward Bean) Le Couteur. They remember a modest, kind and gentle man who rarely spoke about the war at home but was immensely proud of his writings and the role he played in creating the Australian War Memorial. “I picture him as erect, tall and slim and remember him as kind and gentle in manner and word, and as having a gentle sense of humour,” Anne recalled. “I remember his moderate and measured way of speaking and his looking you straight in the eye.” Ted said he occasionally asked his grandfather to reflect on his wartime experiences. “I used to go walking with him while I was a university student studying history. I would ask him to talk about the war but he would always say he preferred to talk about something else.” No contemporary war correspondents are given the access Bean and others had at Gallipoli. As Richard Trembath writes in Bridget Griffen-Foley’s splendid edited collection, A Companion to the Australian Media (Scholarly), today’s correspondents are bombarded with information from governments but rarely get access to the battlefield, and if they do, their reporting is constrained. “Australian governments of all persuasions have been quite happy for the media to be sidelined in our Middle Eastern engagements,” Trembath writes. There are Australian journalists abroad who file valuable reports from war zones. But new technology, the rise of “citizen journalists” and the closure of foreign bureaus may suggest the days of “traditional” war correspondents are numbered. Coulthart, who has reported from East Timor, Iraq and Afghanistan, is envious of Bean’s “access and relative journalistic freedom”. He notes Australia’s re- cent military engagements “have often been inadequately reported” as “the military only helps the press tell the story it wants the public to hear”. A century ago, Australians knew more about what was happening during WWI than this generation has known about wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Perhaps if the government allowed correspondents greater access to the frontline for immediate reporting, or allowed them to keep detailed accounts for history, our understanding of modern conflicts would be greater than it is. It goes a long way to explain why Gallipoli, and the larger commemoration of WWI, continues to provoke a strong emotional response from Australians. The work of war correspondents provides an enduring link to a conflict that took place long ago and helps us to understand why a modern nation continues to draw so much from it. MURDOCH’S GALLIPOLI LETTER A PREAMBLE TO SOVEREIGNTY The journalist’s scathing dispatch prompted Australia to act as an independent nation CARL BRIDGE After the failure of the August offensive at Gallipoli, the Australian prime minster, Andrew Fisher, sent his friend and fellow West Melbourne Presbyterian parishioner, the 30-year-old journalist Keith Murdoch, to the peninsula on a fact-finding mission. Murdoch was shocked by what he found. Murdoch interviewed all the Australian generals and some of the British general staff. He also saw things with his own eyes. Journeying on to London, he was entrusted with a letter for the British prime minister, Herbert Asquith, by the British Gallipoli correspondent, Ellis AshmeadBartlett, which argued strongly for an end to the futile campaign. But a rival British journalist tipped off the military censors in Marseilles, the letter was con- fiscated, and Ashmead-Bartlett lost his accreditation. Undaunted, Murdoch took it upon himself to make the case for withdrawal to the authorities. On September 22 and 23, in The Times’ offices in London, he typed an excoriating 8000-word philippic addressed to Fisher. He told the PM his “fears had been justified” and the “slender perch on the cliffs” was an unwarranted risk at the price that was being paid. “You would have wept ... if you had gone with us over the ground [at the Nek] where two of our finest Light Horse regiments were wiped out in ten minutes in a brave attempt to advance a few yards to Dead Man’s Ridge. We lost 500 men, squatters’ sons and farmers’ sons, on that terrible spot. Such is the cost of so much as looking out over the top of our trenches.” He went on: “The spirit at Suvla (where the British had more-orless stayed put on the plain below) is simply deplorable ... Our men have found it impossible to form a high opinion of the British K(itchener) men and territorials. They are merely a lot of child-like youths ... Sedition is talked around every tin of bully beef on the peninsula ... and it is only loyalty that holds the forces together. “It is not for me to judge (Sir Ian) Hamilton (the commanderin-chief), but it is plain when an army has lost complete faith in its general ... He has very seldom been at Anzac. He lives at (the offshore island of) Imbros. The French call him the General who lives on an Island ... This unfortunate expedition has never been given a chance.” The letter, partisan and highly coloured as it was — and gratuitously omitting the achievements of the regular British soldiers at Helles — contained irrefutable evidence about the plummeting morale of the Australians, among others. Geoffrey Dawson, editor of The Times, encouraged Murdoch to make his views known to the British cabinet. He suggested Murdoch, with Fisher’s permission, give a copy in confidence to David Lloyd George, then munitions minister, who in turn handed it on to Asquith. The wily Asquith, sensing its explosive nature, muzzled it somewhat by having it printed as a confidential British cabinet document. Hamilton was dismissed barely a fortnight later and the decision to evacuate recommended by his successor soon afterwards. Murdoch’s letter, along with a report from the South Australia-born Maurice Hankey, the British cabinet secretary, who visited Gallipoli at the same time, and other evidence, was instrumental in the British cabinet’s decision. Most important, however, was that Kitchener, then British defence supremo, was already casting his eyes irrevocably to the Western Front. In February 1917, crossexamined before the British Parliament’s Dardanelles Commission, Murdoch was accused by the British of flouting censorship rules and courting treason. Andrew Fisher, by now high commissioner in London and a member of the inquiry, defended his man. Fisher: “You ... considered yourself in a privileged position as carrying a mandate from one selfgoverning dominion (Australia) which was directly concerned with the operation of their forces in Gallipoli and elsewhere, to give your best impression of what you saw?” Murdoch: “I considered that I was charged with a duty of reporting to my government in Australia to the best of my ability.” Fisher: “And you naturally felt that you would like to do the best not only for your country but for the empire’s forces now and always?” Murdoch: “I think I risked my whole career. I am always prepared to offer everything I have to Australia.” And so he had. Fisher had sensed that the Gallipoli campaign was a strategic disaster and felt responsible to the Australian people for committing the AIF there. Murdoch, perhaps the most distinguished journalist of his generation, was sent there as Fisher’s ‘‘eyes and ears’’ and his incendiary report found its mark in the governing seat of empire. This was not a case of Australia tugging its forelock to the dominant imperial power, as some today believe. Rather Fisher’s Australia acted as an independent nation stating its terms for participating in an alliance. Both Fisher and Murdoch were convinced the war had to be won, but that this would only happen on the Western Front. Prime minister Billy Hughes’s much-trumpeted assertions of Australian sovereignty at Versailles in 1919 were made on the back of Fisher’s and Murdoch’s behind-the-scenes hard work three years earlier. Carl Bridge is Professor of Australian History at the Menzies Centre for Australian Studies, King’s College London, and coeditor of Australia and Britain in War and Peace, 1914-1919, the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade’s First World War Centenary documentary volume.
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