1. business and industrial
2. energy
3. nuclear power

MIT CANES Zero-Carbon Energy Economy Workshop
May 26-27, 2015 – Cambridge MA (USA)
DRAFT
Challenges and Issues Associated with the Nuclear Fuel Cycle
for Sustainable Growth of Nuclear Power
Frank Carre
Scientific Director of CEA - Nuclear Energy Division (France)
[email protected]
1 – Outlook on nuclear growth today
The world nuclear fleet in 2015 counts 439 operating power plants (>85% LWRs) that generate about
377 GWe. New builds (70 currently worldwide) are essentially driven by Asian countries (25 in China,
9 in Russian Federation, 6 in India, 5 in South Korea) and a few Westerns countries (5 in the USA, 6 in
the European Union).
Most of the nuclear growth in the coming decades will happen in mature nuclear countries that
conduct R&D programs:
• On spent fuel reprocessing and recycling, and
• On Fast Neutron Reactors for managing Actinides (TRU) and achieving durable nuclear
power when Uranium becomes scarce and expensive.
However countries with projects of new builds of nuclear power plants are not all members of the
“Non Proliferation Treaty” (NPT).
In this context, the safe and peaceful development of nuclear power will benefit from the continued
support from International Agencies (IAEA & NEA) and Atomic Energy Communities (Euratom,
ABACC…) that includes:
• Information exchange on good practices and R&D issues
• Safeguarding nuclear materials and facilities (IAEA, Euratom, ABACC…)
• WNA, WANO, INRA, WENRA…
International Agencies also provide accompanying measures to nuclear newcomer countries to
implement the Framework and Infrastructures necessary for the safe and efficient development of
nuclear energy, such as:
• IAEA Integrated Nuclear Infrastructure Review (INIR) [1]
• Other initiatives including some about securing nuclear materials.
2 – Prospects for the deployment of Gen-III LWRs in the medium term
Even though the severe nuclear accident caused by a tsunami at Fukushima Daiichi severely hit the
nuclear renaissance, main drivers for nuclear growth remain energy security and mitigating the
threat of climate change.
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MIT CANES Zero-Carbon Energy Economy Workshop
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2.1 – Brief nuclear energy global outlook
Studies of international Agencies recently reevaluated at 700-1000 GWe the anticipated nuclear
installed power in 2050:
• The 2°C scenario of the joint IAE-NEA 2014 Technology Roadmap for Nuclear Energy [2]
anticipates an installed power of 930 GWe in the world by 2050, thus raising the current
share of nuclear power from 13% currently to about 20%. This would call for building an
additional capacity of ~12 GWe/y when including the replacement of nuclear plants
decommissioned
• The central scenario of the IAE 2014 World Energy Oulook [3] estimates at 620 GWe the
nuclear installed power in 2040 (+359 GWe - 150 GWe decommissioned), leading to about
~700 GWe in 2050.
This global vision is the result of contrasted national nuclear plans:
• China, India, Korea, Russia experience the most dynamic nuclear growth, whereas
• The Western World just experiences a recovery from the 2011 March accident, damped in
some countries by cheap fossil fuels (shale gas in the USA), and with a few countries
confirming their decision to phase out of nuclear power (Germany, Switzerland and Italy)
The reactor market for the coming decades will be dominated by advanced light water reactors
(LWRs) that all account for the lessons from past severe accidents (Three Mile Island (1979),
Chernobyl (1986) and Fukushima Daiichi (2011)). Even though these reactors aim at improving the
safety and the economics of operating reactors (Gen-II), they represent a wide set of projects that
vary in the way they prioritize lessons from the accidents. This set of Gen III/Gen III+ reactors
includes ABWR, ESBWR, AP1000, EPR, AES2006, VVER1200, APR1400, APWR, ATMEA1, ACR1000,
CANDU6, CAP1000... In a general manner, US/Japanese reactor projects emphasize the safe
management of cooling accidents (because of Three Mile Island), the quest of passive safety, and
simplifications for containing the investment cost whereas European designs put a greater emphasis
on the reinforcement of the containment building (because of Chernobyl) with a rather moderate
effort so far in simplification and cost reduction.
In this global context, what will the market place be for small or medium reactors (SMRs)? Are the
following projects potential game changers: NuScale, mPower, Westinghouse, SMART, Floating NPP,
Holtec…?
Besides, what are the technologies that will enable these advanced light water reactors to comply
with an increasing share of variable power from renewables? What are the technologies that will
enable them to displace fossil fuels in their most current utilizations: residential district heating,
industrial process heat, transportation fuels, multipurpose hydrogen and hydrocarbon fuels as
energy carrier and/or energy storage means…?
2.2 – Conditions for a successful deployment of Gen-III/Gen-III+ LWRs
Safety, security, economic competitiveness and sustainability are essential conditions for current
Gen-III/Gen-III+ reactors being a commercial success.
In terms of reliability and safety, reactors on sale ought to prove that they comply with “Fukushima
accident-proof” designs. Furthermore, owing to the wide variety of reactor designs and codification
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MIT CANES Zero-Carbon Energy Economy Workshop
May 26-27, 2015 – Cambridge MA (USA)
standards (ASME, RCC-M, JSME…), the commercialization of advanced light water reactors would
benefit from progress towards internationally harmonized design codes and safety standards.
In terms of security (proliferation resistance and physical protection), new builds will benefit from
continued safeguarding services (nuclear plant and materials) by the IAEA and the Euratom.
Moreover, they should always be subject to export control regulations for sensitive technologies.
In terms of economics they should be competitive with other energy sources in spite of rising costs
for Gen III reactors and adapted / customized funding schemes are required for facilitating the large
investments required for nuclear power plants in a liberalized energy market. Last, the nuclear
industry is bound to be reliable in terms of time and cost before operating the nuclear plant.
In terms of sustainability, the upcoming generation of LWRs should minimize their environmental
impact and go together with clear solutions for a safe management of high level radioactive waste. In
France, such as in most nuclear European country, this calls for the implementation of a deep
geological repository.
All four goals of safety, security, economic competitiveness and sustainability are features for an
integrated vision of sustainability that is an essential requirement for public acceptance and
government support.
2.3 – Nuclear security
Among above requirements, security, like safety, is crucial. “Nuclear power indeed will be unable to
gain the support it needs for large-scale growth unless nuclear facilities and nuclear stockpiles are
seen to be safe and secure. Indeed effective security is a key enabling factor for nuclear energy, just
as safety. Nuclear nonproliferation cannot be reliably achieved if states or terrorists groups might
gain the means to a nuclear weapon or nuclear weapon material” [4].
Therefore, collaboration and trade in the sector of nuclear energy is subject to compliance of parties
to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. This Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)
aims at:
• Preventing the spread of nuclear weapons and weapons technology
• Promoting cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy
• Furthering the goal of achieving nuclear disarmament.
This treaty entered into force in 1970 and covers 900 facilities in 64 countries today. It underpins a
balanced “three-pillar” system:
• Non-proliferation
• Disarmament
• The right to peacefully use nuclear technology.
The 3rd pillar represents a central bargain: "the NPT non-nuclear-weapon states agree never to
acquire nuclear weapons and the NPT nuclear-weapon states in exchange agree to share the
benefits of peaceful nuclear technology and to pursue nuclear disarmament aimed at the ultimate
elimination of their nuclear arsenals"
Provisions for monitoring compliance with the treaty's 3rd pillar aim at preventing risks of
proliferation such as:
• Diversion and misuse of nuclear materials
• Violation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)
• Implementation of a clandestine facility.
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MIT CANES Zero-Carbon Energy Economy Workshop
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Prevention includes intrinsic and extrinsic measures. The former relate to physical properties of
nuclear materials (neutron and gamma emissions, decay heat, critical mass…) and technical design
features of nuclear power and fuel cycle plants. The latter relate to institutional arrangements such
as safeguarding facilities and nuclear materials.
Provisions for physical protection include measures against theft of nuclear materials and sabotage
of facilities.
2.4 – Parallel Bush and Putine initiatives in 2006
In 2006, Presidents of the United States George W. Bush and President of the Russian Federation
Vladimir Putine, proposed parallel paths framed by intergovernmental agreements for creating a
global and secure framework for the operation of nuclear power plants and the associated
circulation of nuclear fresh and spent fuel:
•
Putine Initiative aims at creating a global infrastructure for nuclear energy that would
address non-proliferation issues at the level of States and that would guarantee services for
the nuclear fuel cycle in dedicated international Centers (enrichment, supply of Uranium fuel,
retrieval of spent fuel…)
•
Bush initiative aims at creating a Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP) that would
control proliferation risks through leasing fresh nuclear fuel and retrieval of spent fuel by
countries that have experience in the nuclear fuel cycle. The initiative also makes provision
for reprocessing LWR fuel and recycling Actinides in fast neutron burners operated by the
leaser country. GNEP was converted into the International Framework for Nuclear Energy
Cooperation (IFNEC) in 2009.
Both initiatives aim at expanding nuclear energy while preventing spread of sensitive fuel cycle
technologies. They assume a reliable fuel service model based on safeguarded “International Centers
for Fuel Cycle Services” where:
• “Fuel Cycle Nations” would operate both nuclear power plants and fuel cycle facilities, and
• “Reactor nations” would operate only reactors, lease and return nuclear fuel.
Fresh fuel would exclusively be Uranium based.
The principle of retrieving spent fuel triggered active debates as it was against some countries’ laws
and was to remain theoretical until appropriate technologies are effectively implemented at
industrial scale (especially spent nuclear fuel separations, transuranics (TRU) fuel fabrication and
separation, and sodium fast reactors).
In particular, should spent exported nuclear fuel be retrieved by the leaser country, or should it
stored on national or regional site for an indefinite period of time? Pros and cons arguments are
summarized in table-1 hereafter.
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MIT CANES Zero-Carbon Energy Economy Workshop
May 26-27, 2015 – Cambridge MA (USA)
Retrieval in an International Centre for Fuel
Cycle Services
Storage on National/Regional site
for an indefinite period of time
National regulations generally prohibit
retrieving nuclear waste (incl. spent nuclear
fuel) from other countries on the national
ground leasing nuclear fuel (EU…)
•
Need to create a national or a regional
interim storage of spent nuclear fuel
•
Need to plan for an end point for the spent
nuclear fuel
•
Some national or regional regulations
prohibit leasing nuclear fuel from other
countries (EU directive…)
•
•
Countries hosting an International Centre for
Fuel Cycle Services tend to restrict leasing
offers of nuclear fuel for reasons of public
acceptance
•
Issues associated with the transport of
nuclear materials
•
Risk of creating a « mine » of TRU materials
that could progressively escape the contol of
user nations
Effectiveness of instrumentation to monitor
the site ? Calls for long term monitoring measures
Table-1: Options of management for spent exported nuclear fuel: local storage or retrieval by the
leaser country?
The debate stressed the needs for internationally harmonized rules and for an intergovernmental
framework for securing the circulation and use of nuclear materials worldwide through appropriate
safeguarding measures. Other issues and impediments would have to be resolved to achieve this
goal, such as:
• Overcoming the variety of national legislative frameworks
- International agreements / national laws for managing nuclear materials
- Transfer of responsibilities
- Transboundary shipments
• Accounting for public perception / acceptance
• Combating the sense of lack of urgency to implement end points for spent nuclear fuel (SNF)
or high level waste (HLW)
• Negotiating with newcomer countries that tend to favor leasing nuclear fuels or regional
interim storage facilities.
Questions that need to be addressed in this respect also include:
• Will it be possible to transfer to another State, the responsibility of spent nuclear fuel
management?
• Would the exporting country retain an obligation to assure that the SNF is managed
responsibly regardless of the terms of any specific arrangement?
• Does the exporting country need to be prepared to accept the return of SNF in case of
changes in national laws of the receiving country?
In addition, new forms of contract such as that of the type “Build Own Operate” that will apply to the
project of Akkuyu nuclear power plant in Turkey will raise the issue of potentially controversial
relations between a national Nuclear Safety Authority and a foreign private owner and operator of a
nuclear power plant.
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MIT CANES Zero-Carbon Energy Economy Workshop
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2.5 – Summary of initiatives needed to support Gen-III builds worldwide
In summary, varied initiatives are needed to make the worldwide commercialization of advanced
LWRs a success over the coming decades. These initiatives include:
• Giving evidence of fully learning lessons from Fukushima tsunami
• Progressing towards harmonized safety regulations through such initiatives as those of the IAEA,
MDEP & Cordel, WENRA…
• Implementing safeguarded international fuel cycle services for nuclear fuel supply and
management of spent fuels
• Implementing national strategies for high level radioactive waste geological repository (with a
country-dependent timeline)
• Integrating nuclear, renewable and other low carbon energies in symbiotic fleets for electricity
generation with appropriate energy storage capacities and smart technologies
Developing non-electricity LWR applications for maximizing displacing fossil fuels in other usages
than electricity generation (District heating, Hydrogen, Hydrocarbon fuels, Chemical products…)
• Further evaluating the commercial viability of small or medium reactors (SMRs).
3 – Goals for Gen-IV nuclear systems and sustainability of nuclear power
Besides LWRs that will remain the main type of reactors over the 21st century, a set of six systems has
been identified by the Generation-IV International Forum as nuclear technologies likely to play a
significant role over the same period of time.
Among those, the deployment and export of thermal neutron reactors such as the Very/High
Temperature Reactor (V/HTR), the SuperCritical Water Reactor (SCWR) and moderated versions of
the Molten Salt Reactor (MSR) can a priori be considered under the same conditions as for LWRs
above.
3.1 – Fast Neutron Reactors with a closed fuel cycle
The situation is different for fast neutron reactors with a closed fuel cycle that are under
development in nuclear countries already using reprocessing technologies or aiming at doing so.
Indeed, spent nuclear fuel separations, TRU fuel fabrication and separations, as well as fast neutron
reactors are sensitive technologies that must remain operated and under the control of “fuel cycle
countries”.
In these countries these technologies benefit from an institutional support mainly for two missions:
1 - The durability of nuclear power as fast reactors can use more than 80% of natural
Uranium while converting 238U into fissile fuel (Plutonium) as opposed to LWRs that use
only 0.5% of natural Uranium energy content (as thermal neutrons mainly fission 235U
that represent only 0.7% of natural Uranium with 238U representing 99.3%). Generating 1
GWe during one year requires 1 tonne of 238U as make-up fuel to be converted into
Plutonium, whereas it requires ~200 tonnes of mined natural Uranium to fuel LWRs with
20 tonnes of 5% enriched Uranium for the same energy output. As a consequence,
depleted Uranium that is generated by the operation of a LWR over a 50-year lifetime is
worth more than 5000 years of the same power output with fast reactors. For these
reasons mature nuclear countries consider fast reactors with a closed fuel cycle as an
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MIT CANES Zero-Carbon Energy Economy Workshop
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2
enabling technology for durable nuclear power and conduct R&D to progress towards
safe, secure and commercially viable nuclear systems ((i.e. reactor & fuel cycle plants)
- Managing Actinides as fast reactors are as efficient for breeding as they are for burning
Actinides, thus making it possible to almost completely eliminate TRU from ultimate
waste forms. Multiple recycle of TRU results in vitrified high level waste containing
fission products and only 2-3% of TRU. In comparison with the once through fuel cycle,
this allows for decreasing the amount of waste by ~5 in volume, ~10 in long term decay
heat, and ~100 in radiotoxicity. This capability of fast reactors to burn Actinides leads to
consider them either in national fleets or in International Centers of Fuel Cycle Services
for recycling TRU from LWR spent fuel, thus optimizing LWR ultimate high level waste to
be disposed of. In national reactor fleets, fast burner reactors can be converted into
breakeven-breeding reactors when Uranium becomes scarce and expensive.
Limited recycle of plutonium as MOX fuel in LWRs that is an industrial practice in France since the
1970s is a first step and a stepping stone towards full recycle of TRU in future fast neutron system.
Full recycle of TRU calls for more advanced and proliferation resistant separation processes with comanagement of at least Uranium and Plutonium (UPu), possibly with some minor actinides. It also
calls for developing appropriate instrumentation for tracking nuclear materials during the separation
process as well as for safeguarding spent LWR fuel upstream from the process, and refabricated fuel
for recycle in fast reactors downstream the stage of separation.
The potential benefit of fast Actinide burner reactors on the amount of high level waste is shown in
figure-1 below.
Figure-1: Options for management of domestic spent nuclear fuel in the USA (presented at the AAAS1
annual meeting of February 14-18, 2008 in Boston)
1
AAAS : American Association for Advancing Science
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MIT CANES Zero-Carbon Energy Economy Workshop
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The reduction of ultimate waste burden achieved by multiple recycle in fast reactor is acknowledged
in France as an important progress likely to favor public acceptance for durable nuclear power.
Furthermore, the experience of France in spent fuel reprocessing and recycling contributes to
international reflections on the subject and may help go beyond just the commercial dimension.
3.2 – Summary of path for the future of fast reactors
Fast reactors with a closed fuel cycle are today’s vision of sustainable nuclear power and an
institutional R&D priority for Uranium-poor nuclear countries. Indeed, they can achieve effective
utilization of 238U as Pu and minimization of HLW radwaste. In addition, they may be considered for
Actinide management and LWR high level waste optimization in the medium term, before they
operate with breakeven breeding when Uranium becomes scarce and expensive.
This capability for Actinide management leads them to be considered as TRU burners for HLW
minimization in Uranium rich countries.
Their deployment will be limited to mature NPT member countries in their own nuclear generating
fleet and also in the international fuel cycle service centers they may host.
In the medium term, fast reactors will make use of today’s best available technology, sodium-cooled
fast reactors, but best benefit should be taken from international collaboration to advance other
types of fast reactor technologies (Gas-FR, Lead-FR, others…) to possibly achieve breakthroughs in
the longer term.
4 – Challenges and issues associated with the nuclear fuel cycle
The sensitive nature of separation technologies as well as TRU fuel fabrication and separation
currently lead to varied positions about whether or not they can be safely and securely implemented
on the national ground for domestic use and/or in hosted International Fuel Cycle Service Centers.
4.1 – Brief status of fuel cycle back-end technologies
Figure-2 shows the past and current development status of fast reactor and closed fuel cycle
technologies in the world. This may give insights into where safeguarded International Centers for
Fuel Cycle Services may be implemented. Table-3 summarizes current arguments in favor or against
burning TRU from LWR spent fuel in fast reactors for optimizing the ultimate high level waste form to
be disposed of, both for the national nuclear fleet and for hosted International Centers for Fuel Cycle
Services. For the latter, one has to decide to either keep the waste from exported fuel on the
national ground (which is illegal in most countries today) or to return the vitrified waste to the
nuclear user country for disposition in a national or regional interim storage first, and ultimately in a
deep geological repository. In return, making no use of the drastic waste reduction enabled by fast
reactors leads to leave spent national and exported fuels in interim storages for an indefinite period
of time with the likelihood that they be finally buried in more demanding storage conditions due to
their greater volume, decay heat and radiotoxicity. Ultimately such repositories could become mines
of concentrated TRU materials with a decreasing self-protection provided by radiation.
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MIT CANES Zero-Carbon Energy Economy Workshop
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Figure-2: Past and current world experience in sodium fast reactors and closed fuel cycle
Recycle & Burn
in safeguarded facilities
of mature NTP member countries
or International Fuel Cycle Centres
Drastic reduction of HLW in volume,
radiotoxicity & decay heat
• Additional cost associated with
reprocessing and recycle?
<10% of generating cost in France
•
•
Risks associated with SNF partitioning and
recycle & long term control?
Co-management of UPu or TRU
Instrumentation to detect diversion of nuclear mat.
•
Burry in National or Regional
local geological repositories
•
More demanding storage conditions for
SNF than for vitrified HLW in terms of
volume (x5), decay heat (x10) and
radiotoxicity (x100)
•
Creating potential mines of concentrated
TRU materials with decreasing self
protection provided by radiation
Returning vitrified high level waste to
nuclear user countries?
Table-3: Options for the management of spent national or exported nuclear fuel: burn in fast
reactors or bury in national or regional geological repositories?
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MIT CANES Zero-Carbon Energy Economy Workshop
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Table-4 below compares once through fuel cycle in LWR or fast reactor with full recycle in fast
reactors in terms of utilization of Uranium, sensitive issues and technologies, and possible measures
for mitigating risks of proliferation.
Utilization
of
Uranium
Once-Through
Cycle in LWRs
Once-Through
Cycle in FNRs
(TWR)
Full Recycle
in FNRs
0.5%
Sensitive
Technologies
~40t Unat
/GWe/y
> 80%
~1t Unat/dep
/GWe/y
Possible
counter
measures
Comments
• Little sustainable in the
long term
• Enrichment
LEU
• Large amount
of SNF
• SNF storage
= Potential
mine of TRU
• Safeguards
• Enrichment
LEU
• Future of SNF?
Mine of TRU?
• Safeguards
~200t Unat
/GWe/y
~2%
Sensitive
Issues
• Instrumentation
• Instrumentation
• SNF
Processing &
Separation
technologies
• Safeguards
• TRU Fuel fab.
• On reactor-site
SNF processing?
• Instrumentation
• Grouped mgt
of Actinides
Sustainable
in the long
term
Table-4: Comparison of once-through versus full recycle fuel cycles in terms of Uranium
consumption, sensitive technologies at stake, and possible measures to enhance non-proliferation.
This table shows in particular that:
• In terms of performance, very logically fast neutron reactors make a much more efficient use
of natural Uranium than LWRs operated in once-through cycle mode: 1 vs 200 tonnes Unat for
generating 1 GWe over one year. In comparison, fast reactors fuelled with LEU and designed
for a long lifetime (60y such as the Travelling Wave Reactor) need 40 tonnes Unat for
generating the same energy, due to the large amount of Unat needed to constitute the initial
core load in LEU (in place of readily available UPu from LWR SNF). As a result, such type of
reactor may be considered for deploying a limited number of fast reactors in Uranium rich
countries with no need for an industrial experience in spent fuel reprocessing. However, it
does not meet the needs of Uranium poor countries like France, Japan, China, india… that
favor an operating mode of fast reactors that achieve savings by two orders of magnitude on
Uranium demand rather than a mere factor 5. Furthermore, the deployment of such reactors
would demand great amounts of Uranium to constitute LEU fuelled first cores
• In terms of sensitive technologies, once through cycles require Uranium enrichment,
whereas TRU fuelled fast reactors require separation technologies and TRU fuel fabrication
• In terms of sensitive issues, the direct disposition of spent nuclear fuel is more demanding
than that of high level vitrified waste in terms of amount, decay heat and radiotoxicity to be
managed. It may also create future mines of concentrated TRU materials that will be
progressively less protected by neutron and gamma radiations.
• In terms of protective measures, appropriate safeguards measures supported by advanced
measurement techniques are needed to track nuclear materials at all steps of their transport,
processing and interim storage apply to all types of nuclear fuel cycles. A grouped
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MIT CANES Zero-Carbon Energy Economy Workshop
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•
management of some actinides (UPu at least, possibly blended with some minor actinides)
may provide a greater detectability and less attractive physical properties for proliferating
activities. Nuclear systems with on-site spent fuel reprocessing and recycling facilities (such
as the Integral Fast Reactor or possibly fast molten salts reactors in the long term) may be
game changers as they integrate on-site the processing of spent fuel and re-fabrication, thus
avoiding costly, lengthy and sensitive transports of TRU fuels. At the same time, export
control would probably preclude exporting compact separation technologies even if they are
integrated into a global nuclear system on the same site.
In terms of health hazards, doses to personnel associated to the operation of the reactor
and the fuel cycle back-end are low compared to those affecting Uranium miners who
remain essential for all types of LEU fuelled reactors (thermal or fast neutron spectrum).
Provided they can be made sufficiently proliferation resistant, fast reactors with a closed fuel cycle
are rated “sustainable” according to the understanding of integrated sustainability that prevails in
France, as they achieve an efficient utilization of natural Uranium and minimize the burden of high
level waste. In return, thermal neutron reactors are not believed to be sustainable on their own as
they need external fuel make-up. They can contribute though to symbiotic mixed nuclear fleets that
are globally sustainable.
4.2 – Path for the future of nuclear fuel cycle technologies
In a context where most LWRs are operated with a once-through fuel cycle today with very few
exceptions of partial recycling UPu as MOX fuels (i.e. Gen-II technologies for reactors and fuel cycle),
and fast reactors with a closed fuel cycle are the vision of durable power (i.e. Gen-IV technologies for
nuclear systems), what will the next step be (i.e. Gen-III) around 2030? The question is all the more
open that “fuel cycle countries” are in diverse situations:
• Very few like France have developed or will develop an industrial experience of today’s best
available partial recycle technologies and can build upon this experience to develop more
efficient and economical processes along the same line
• Others have no industrial experience of separation but conduct active researches on diverse
processes (hydrometallurgy, pyro-processing…) that potentially offer opportunities for
breakthroughs
• Some have the legacy of large amounts of LWR spent fuel from which UPu fuel that is
ultimately needed for fast reactors can be recovered, whereas others who developed
nuclear power more recently do not have this amount of nuclear materials available and
seek for high breeding ratios to achieve a dynamic development of fast neutron reactors.
In summary, the transition from LWRs to fast reactors with a closed fuel cycle will be countrydependent and the diversity of situations lets believe that there will be no unique ideal separation
technologies in use in the coming decades. However, cautious international collaboration among
“fuel cycle countries” that are NTP members on research and closed fuel cycle demonstrations are
worth to be encouraged to build consensus on advisable options for future nuclear fuel cycles in
terms of non-proliferation, waste forms and utilization of Uranium. The Global Actinide Cycle
International Demonstration (GACID) that is a joint project of the USA, Japan and France within the
Generation-IV International Forum, is a step in that direction. This is all the more important as, in the
same way safety standards and codification progress towards international harmonization, this will
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MIT CANES Zero-Carbon Energy Economy Workshop
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probably come true also for non-proliferation standards and physical protection (i.e. security issues
as a whole).
5 – Future prospects
Nuclear energy is and will remain a vital component of the world energy mix. Most of the growth is
anticipated in mature nuclear countries pursuing research in fast reactors and closed fuel cycles, but
not all are NTP members. In this context, the continued action of international agencies (IAEA,
Euratom…) is vital to perform safeguards and other security measures together with exchanges of
good practices and accompanying newcomer countries to assure their safe and peaceful use of
nuclear power.
One of the first challenges ahead is to make the commercialization of Gen-III LWRs a success, which
requires to progress towards harmonized safety regulations and secured services for nuclear fuel
supply and management of used fuels. Decision making between spent fuel retrieval or local storage
is still an issue both from technical and legal points of view.
A longer term challenge will be the development of sustainable Gen-IV fast reactors with a closed
fuel cycle designed to make an efficient use of Uranium resource, to minimize the burden of high
level radioactive waste and to be as proliferation-resistant as economically achievable. The latter
objective calls for a grouped management of actinides, UPu at the minimum, possibly also grouped
with minor actinides, which may also contribute to minimizing waste decay heat and radiotoxicity.
Their deployment will be limited to NPT member countries that possess the complete nuclear fuel
cycle for use in their own reactor fleet or in hosted International Fuel Cycle Centers.
A third challenge consists in advancing R&D and demonstrations on safe and secure spent fuel
recycle technologies while taking best benefit from today’s best available technologies and spurring
collaboration among “fuel cycle countries” that are NTP members. In particular, international
demonstrations will help building consensus on advisable options for future nuclear fuel cycles,
especially regarding non-proliferation requirements.
International collaboration (IAEA, Inter-governmental Agreements, Collaborative R&D…) is vital for all
steps described above that aim at finally assuring a safe, secure and peaceful use of nuclear power
worldwide, and in particular for sharing costs of R&D and large demonstrations (recycling,
cogeneration…), for progressing towards harmonized international standards (safety, security…), and
ultimately for establishing an intergovernmental and secured framework for the circulation and use
of nuclear materials worldwide through appropriate safeguarding measures.
6 - References
[1] – Milestones in the Development of a National Infrastructure for Nuclear Power, IAEA Nuclear
Energy Series No. NG-G-3.1
[2] – Technology Roadmap: Nuclear Energy, 2015 edition jointly prepared by the International Energy
Agency (IEA) and the Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA)
[3] – World Energy Outlook 2014, International Energy Agency (NEA)
[4] – Nuclear Security is the Foundation for the Three Pillars of the Nonproliferation Treaty, Matthew
Bunn, Belfer Center March 17, 2014
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