A Comparison of Rejuvenation Hazards & Compatibility Glen J. Bertini & Richard K. Brinton Novinium, Inc. Abstract: Over two decades have elapsed since the commercial introduction of the first solid dielectric enhancement technology or chemical rejuvenation. During those years, silane injection has proven itself as an important tool to enhance the reliability of aging infrastructure. There are some risks associated with rejuvenation. Some of those risks are shared with replacement. Some risks are unique to injection. This document examines the risks of chemical rejuvenation utilizing the two most widespread commercial injection methods and materials for URD cables. INTRODUCTION From 1984 through 2010, approximately 100 million feet of medium voltage underground power cable were treated with available injection technologies as shown in Figure 1. As demonstrated by [5], injection is typically a fraction of the cost of replacement, and the economics are almost always in favor of rejuvenation. Undoubtedly, the favorable economics of rejuvenation fueled the rapid growth depicted in Figure 1. The first five years of commercial injections utilized a continuous feed of acetophenone. While no cables treated with acetophenone ever failed in service, this technical success was not matched by commercial acceptance, largely because of the fugitive nature of acetophenone and the safety and economic penalties imposed by the need for an ongoing maintenance requirement to re-supply fluid to an energized cable. In 1989, a silicone fluid phenylmethyldimethoxysilane (PMDMS) invented by Vincent [6] and referred to as “CC1” in Figure 1 was introduced. Along with this new fluid a new way of injecting fluid referred to as UPR in Figure 1 or unsustained pressure rejuvenation was also introduced. Because of its water reactivity and propensity to condense to a larger molecule, the new CC1 fluid largely eliminated the need for a continual supply of fluid, at least for about 10 years at lower temperatures. The unsustained pressure rejuvenation (UPR) process provide for an injection period and postinjection soak period. The soak period mitigated the undersupply of fluid to URD (URD cables are underground residential distribution cables and are generally less than 4/0 AWG in size) cables by providing additional fluid to the strand interstices over a 60 to 120 period. About 5 years later in 1994, Bertini, Vincent, et al, improved on the CC1 technology when they introduced an additive called trimethylmethoxysilane (TMMS) in [7]. The CC2 advancement solved an uneven radial fluid distribution issue suffered by CC1 as shown by [7]. It was also demonstrated in [7] that 30%w of the TMMS was preferred in the formulation together with 70%w of the CC1 fluid (i.e. PMDMS) to achieve optimum fluid distribution and dielectric performance. This reformulation together with the approval by the FERC (Federal Energy Regulatory Commission) and the RUS (Rural Utility Service) of the capital treatment of fluid injection were the foundation for the rapid growth of injection at the turn of the century. This growth faltered after 2002 when it came to light in [3] and [16] that the CC2 technology could cause methanolic corrosion of aluminum strands. In 2005, CC3 was introduced and the concentration of the TMMS was reduced by a factor of 6 to about 5%w, ostensibly to reduce the likelihood of corrosion of aluminum strands outlined in [15] experienced by the CC2 chemistry discussed in [3] and [16]. However, this would also lead to less uniform radial diffusion and slow the post-treatment increase in dielectric performance. 14 Estimated Annual Injection Rates 12 P011 U733 Improved UPR U732 & SPR 10 CC3 8 FERC/RUS 6 4 Acetophenone CC2 CC1 & UPR A second commercially significant technology, referred to as U732 and described in [22], includes the field-proven short and medium term technology similar to CC, and includes completely new materials, which are designed to be safer to use and provide much longer life extension. The U732 technology was injected for the first time in February 2006. Along with the fluid, a new injection paradigm, sustained pressure rejuvenation (SPR), was also introduced. SPR eliminated the soak period and provided a more rapid increase in post-injection dielectric performance. 2 0 Figure 1. Annual injection (millions of cable feet) compiled from dozens of industry sources including [1], [2], [3] and [4] demonstrate the growing importance of cable rejuvenation technology. Novinium Engineering Document January 19, 2011 The P011 technology was first offered in 2007. P011 utilizes the same PMDMS material as the CC family of fluids, but uses acetophenone in place of the flammable TMMS and introduced an improved catalyst package. These two improvements to the older CC fluid provide superior postinjection reliability, longer life, and a higher flash point (less flammable). A complete history down to the chemical component level for all rejuvenation formulations is in [23]. contact with accessories like terminations and splices. Fluids applied with UPR unavoidably make intimate contact with these components, because of the injection method. 3. CC3 fluid has a flash point lower than jet fuel A. U732 and P011 fluids have much higher flash points making them substantially less prone to ignition. Flash point measurement conditions are not necessarily reflective of normal job site operating conditions. 4. U732 fluids have no known carcinogens or reproductive toxins present in the fluid. P011 fluid includes a small amount of benzene – a known carcinogen and reproductive toxin. 5. With SPR injection, fluid is typically introduced at 100300 psig (6.8-20.4 bar). This pressure quickly decays as fluid diffuses from the strands. There are no reservoirs of flammable or combustible fluid left attached to the cable. UPR with soak sometimes utilizes initial injection pressures up to 500 psig, but is more typically injected at about 15 psig. A reservoir of pressurized (typically about 12 psig) fluid is left attached to the cable for 60 or more days. UPR without soak avoids the multi-month soak period. Table 1. Four fluids and three injection paradigms define the universe (12 boxes) of rejuvenation options for medium voltage cables. Warranties between 20 and 40 years supplied by the technology suppliers provide guidance on the long term performance of each choice. Technology combinations with asterisks (boxes 1, 4, 5 & 6) should only be applied in non-demanding applications. Blackened combinations in the CC3 column (boxes 2 & 3) are not available for commercial reasons. Blackened combinations in the U733 column (boxes 10 & 11) are not available for technical reasons. The dark orange squares (boxes 4 & 7) are typically used only in special circumstances. The six combinations with light-colored backgrounds (boxes 1, 5, 6, 8, 9, and 12) represent commercially significant alternatives. Fluid Cable Injection Paradigm CC3 P011 UPR with soak 1 UPR without soak 2 5 SPR (soakless) 3 6 20* 4 20* 20* 25* U732 7 8 9 40 25 40 U733 10 11 12 40 In 2008, an improved method of performing unsustained pressure rejuvenation was introduced that eliminated the need for soak periods. In 2009, an improved fluid designated U733, for use in high temperature feeder cable applications, was introduced. The matrix of four fluids and three injection paradigms is shown in Table 1. ASSESEMENT METHOD There are two types of risk, which are considered in this analysis. They are: Risk to equipment and risk to human beings. Risk to equipment is the product of the probability of an event occurring and an assessment of the consequences, should the event occur. This equipment risk is defined by Equation 1. The balance of this paper examines the operational risks of the four most commercially important fluid/paradigm combinations, namely … Requipment = Pevent x Cequipment Table 1, box 1: CC3 fluid and “UPR with soak” injection paradigm (hereinafter UPR/CC3), Table 1, box 5: P011 fluid and “UPR without soak” injection paradigm (hereinafter UPR/P011) Table 1, box 9: U732 fluid and “SPR” injection paradigm (hereinafter SPR/U732), and Table 1, box 8: U732 fluid and “UPR without soak” injection paradigm (hereinafter UPR/U732) … (1) Personnel risk is the product of the probability of an event occurring, the probability that people will be present within an event perimeter when the event occurs, and an assessment of the consequences, should the event occur while people are within the event perimeter. The personnel risk is defined by Equation 2. Rpersonnel = Pevent x Ppersonnel x Cpersonnel … technologies as commonly applied to URD cables with 19 or fewer strands, excluding uncompressed 4/0 conductors. The P011 fluid choice shares most of the same risks as the U732 fluid. In fact the composition of both CC3 fluid and P011 fluid are between 90 and 95% phenylmethyldimethoxysilane. (2) It is often not possible to determine values for equations (1) and (2) with a great deal of precision. Accordingly, ranges for each value are chosen by the risk assessment engineer to provide a semi-quantitative perspective. This exercise is useful, not because the absolute values of risks calculated by equations (1) and (2) have any specific meaning, but rather because the relative values of two or more risks can be compared, so that risk mitigation resources can be applied to the greatest risks first. There are five primary differences between the four approaches, which will be examined in detail. 1. SPR technology is applied with a single visit to the cable, compared to 3 or more visits for the “UPR with soak” approach and 2 or more visits with the “UPR without soak approach.” 2. SPR technology is delivered with injection hardware specifically designed to prevent fluid from coming in Tables 2, 3, 4, and 5 provide the values for equipment consequence, personnel consequence, event probability, and personnel-present probability utilized in this analysis. The values in Table 2 and 3 are typical casualty losses in U.S. dollars. While dollars may not adequately represent the 2 human loss for catastrophic risks, they do provide a somewhat objective measure that society places on such incidents and allows a comparison between dissimilar risks. The probability values in Table 4 and Table 5 employed by this paper were first used by the author in the 1990s while employed by UTILX Corporation. The factual data for the UPR/CC3 technology are found in [8]. The principal author of [8] is also a co-author of this work. Risk scenarios are arranged in a taxonomy in Addendum A. A summary compilation of all risk assessments is provided in Addendum B. The Addendum B summary includes a table that compares risks for boxes 1, 5, 8, and 9 of Table 1, and a graph which compares boxes 1 and 9 of Table 1. Addendum C is a compilation of the following items for each identified risk scenario: a. b. c. d. Table 2. Equipment Consequence Value 0 103 2x103 5x103 Qualitative None Low Medium High 104 Very High Examples No outages Blow fuse or trip breaker Destroy components and fuse Destroy transformer Destroy circuit owner/customer property e. f. g. h. Table 3. Personnel Consequence Value Qualitative Examples 0 None No injuries 103 Low Cuts, bruises, scrapes Sprains, 1st degree burns, MeOH 4 10 Medium exposure, chemical fumes/irritation Broken bones, 2nd degree burns, 5 10 High flashes to eye Life 3rd degree burns, electric shock, 6 10 threatening toxic exposure Scenario name and scope Discussion of circumstances that give rise to the risk Experience anecdotes Probability that the event will occur and that personnel will be present within the event horizon, if event occurs. Consequences to equipment and people, if they suffer an event, in U.S. Dollars. Probability mitigation tactics to lower the probability that an event will occur. Consequence mitigation tactics to reduce damage to property or people when an event does occur. Risk assessment is the multiplication of the values in Equation (1) and Equation (2) to calculate semiquantitative risk values in U.S. Dollars for both equipment and personnel. All anecdotal experiences recounted in the UPR/CC3 column are understood to be as of the publication date of [8], which is August 2001, unless specifically indicated otherwise. All other anecdotal experiences recounted by the authors of this work are understood to be as of the publication date on page 1 of this document unless noted otherwise. DIFFERENCES When UPR/CC3 technology is applied to 7-strand or 19-strand URD cables, at least three visits (items 2, 4 and 5 below) are required to manipulate energized or potentially energized high voltage equipment. Depending upon the circumstances, more visits such as items 1, 3, and 6 below may be required. Table 4. Event Probability Value Qualitative Examples 0.00% Not possible Does not occur 0.05% Ultra-low Less than 0.1% 0.50% Very low More than 0.1%, less than 1% 5% Low More than 1.0%, less than 10% 50% Medium More than 10%, less than 100% 100% High Virtually every injected cable 1. Utilities sometimes pre-install special injection elbows. 2. Air flow testing and injection set up. 3. If blocked splices are to be replaced, a visit is required on another day to change the splice. 4. Vacuum tank removal, typically a day or two after the injection is initialized. If the fluid takes longer to transit the cable, the vacuum tank is checked on multiple occasions. 5. Soak tank removal and injection cap or plug removal, 60 to 120 days after the vacuum tank removal (if remembered). 6. For many 35kV large interface elbow installations, another outage must be taken to remove the injection plugs from both cable ends. Table 5. Personnel Present Probability Value Qualitative Examples 0% Not possible Personnel not present 5% Unlikely Less than 10% 35% Quite likely More than 10%, less than 50% 75% Likely More than 50%, less than 80% 90% Very Likely More than 80%, but not certain 100% Certain 100% probability Potentially energized bottles are left connected to terminations for a 60 to 120 day soak period. During that soak period, 3 20 years. In fact a large subset of the cables injected with the UPR/CC3 paradigm has been and continue to be injected at moderate pressure. See for example [26] and [27], which demonstrate that pressures as high as 400 to 500 psig have been routinely utilized. utility trouble-workers and line-workers may encounter unusual and potentially dangerous situations. Unfortunately, each encounter with high voltage runs the risk of accidental electrical contact. SPR/U732 and SPR/P011 technologies require a single visit and a single switching operation. There is no potentially energized equipment left near terminations. The difference between the two paradigms is whether or not the injection pressure, once introduced, is bled to a soak pressure as in unsustained pressure rejuvenation, or sustained and allowed to decay to zero through permeation in the sustained pressure rejuvenation paradigm. The UPR with soak paradigm leaves the cable under a soak pressure for at least 60 days, and in some cases 120 days or more. The soak pressure is typically about 10 to 20 psig, plus head pressure, plus vapor pressure. The vapor pressure can exceed 50 psig as suggested in [27] for cables operating at emergency overload conditions. Figure 2 provides experimental measurements of typical decay rates for the SPR paradigm. In contrast to CC3 fluid, the vapor pressure of U732 fluid is less than 2 psig even at 130°C. The UPR/CC3 technology utilizes injection elbows with ports described in [9], [10], and [11]. These ports create momentary openings to an energized conductor, as permanent shielded caps are substituted for injection caps on energized components. These open ports have been known to flash over and create hazards to employees. Fire and explosion hazards are described in [12] and [13]. There are mitigating technologies described by [12] and [13], which remain unimplemented to date. The open port flashover problem is so acute on 35kV circuits that the ports are no longer operated while the cable is energized. Instead as indicated in visit 6 above, another outage is taken to remove the caps. With SPR/U732 technology, injection is typically completed in minutes on de-energized cable and components. There is no open port to energized components. With UPR/U732 and UPR/P011 technology the soak period is eliminated and the elbow flashover issue is solved with a reticular flash preventer (RFP) described in [31]. In [32] the open port flashover voltage is demonstrated to be 39% higher with an RFP present than the identical injection elbow without an RFP present. 500 Pressure Decay (1/0 cable at 25°C) 30 psig 450 240 psig 400 480 psig Pressure (psig) 350 Fire and explosion requires three components: fuel, oxygen, and a source of ignition. Unfortunately, in the out-of-soil portion of a medium voltage distribution environment, both oxygen and ignition sources are ubiquitous. Not all fuels are equal when it comes to the ease of ignition. The ease of ignition is measured as a flash point. Flash point measurement conditions are not necessarily reflective of normal job site operating conditions. However, the higher the flash point, the less likely the fluid will ignite. According to the current material safety data sheet (MSDS) of the CC fluid [33], its flash point is 13°C (55°F), well below the flash point of jet fuel A. Materials with these low flash points are rated by the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) as flammable. U732 fluids have flash points in excess of 61°C (142°F) and are not rated as flammable by the U.S. DOT {49 CFR 173.115-120} or the U.S. OSHA {29 CFR 1910.1200(c)}. 300 250 200 150 100 50 Elapsed Time (days) 0 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 Figure 2. Measured pressure decay in 1/0 cable at 25°C. Typical tailored injection pressures utilized by the SPR paradigm typically lie between 100 and 300 psig. SUMMARY Circuit owners have the option of choosing from three very different injection paradigms. Even the riskiest injection paradigm is inherently less risky than replacement. This fact, together with the inherently lower cost of injection compared to replacement, makes injection a safe and capital efficient choice. Choosing between injection paradigms is not a simple subject. This paper considers 40 distinct risks summarized in a hierarchal structure in Addendum A. On average, each risk requires over a page of analysis to make a thorough comparison. P011 fluid (from [34]) includes small amounts of the carcinogen, developmental toxin, and male reproductive toxin benzene. Since August 2008, [14] no longer lists benzene as a contaminant in CC3 fluid. U732 and U733 technologies include no known carcinogens, developmental toxins, or reproductive toxins from [35] and [36] respectively. The 31 non-trivial risks of Addendum A are tabulated and plotted in Addendum B, so that the relative ranking of the risks and the comparisons between the three paradigms can be quickly compared. Trivial risks are 9 of the 40 identified risks where both the equipment risk values and the personnel risk Many of the risk eliminations and reductions enjoyed by the sustained pressure rejuvenation (SPR) paradigm stem from the consistent use of moderate pressures to inject cables. The use of moderate pressures to inject cables has been in use for over 4 8. Bertini, “Injection Hazard Analysis”, updated August 13, 2001. Downloaded from www.utilx.com web site on December 30, 2002. 9. Borgstrom & Stevens, “Separable Connector Access Port and Fittings”, U.S. Patent 4,946,393. 10. Borgstrom, Bertini & Meyer, “Removable Media Injection Fitting”, U.S. Patent 5,082,449. 11. Muench, et al, “High Voltage Electrical Connector with Access Cavity and Inserts for Use Therewith”, U.S. Patent 6,332,785. 12. Bertini & Stagi, “Method and Apparatus of Blocking Pathways Between a Power Cable and the Environment”, U.S. Patent 6,517,366. 13. Bertini & Stagi, “Method and Apparatus of Blocking Pathways Between a Power Cable and the Environment”, U.S. Patent 6,929,492. 14. CableCURE/XL MSDS dated 05/14/2005, downloaded by author 01/12/2006 & available from the authors on request. The most current MSDS is available from the supplier’s web site at www.utilx.com/pdfs/MSDS_XL_08_06_08.pdf. 15. Stagi, “The Evolution of Cable Injection Technology”, 2004 Fall ICC, Subcommittee A. 16. Brüggemann et al, “Influence of Electrochemical Effects on Vented Tree Initiation in Accelerated Tests”, Jicable 2003 International Conference on Insulated Power Cables, 2003. 17. Bertini & Vincent, “Cable Rejuvenation Mechanisms”, ICC, Sub. A, March 14, 2006. 18. Bertini, “Improving Post-treatment Reliability: Eliminating Fluid-Component compatibility Issues”, ICC DG C26D, Nov. 1, 2005. 19. Bertini & Vincent, “Rejuvenation Reformulated”, ICC SubA, May 8, 2007. 20. Bertini & Theimer, “High Pressure Power Cable Connector”, U.S. Patent 7,195,504, Mar. 27, 2007. 21. Bertini & Theimer, “High Pressure Power Cable Connector”, U.S. Patent App. 2007-0169954, July 26, 2007. 22. Bertini, “New Developments in Solid Dielectric Life Extension Technology”, IEEE ISEI, Sept. 2004. 23. Bertini & Vincent, “History and Status of Silicone Injection Technology”, ECNE 2007 Fall Engineering & Operations Conference, October 4, 2007. 24. Cook, Goudie, et al, “Electrical Cable Restoration Fluid”, International PCT Application WO 2006/119196 A1. 25. Bertini & Richardson, “Silicone Strand-Fill: A New Material and Process”, ICC, spring 1990, Appendix III-B. 26. Jenkins, “Submarine Cable Rescued with Silicone-Based Fluid,” spring 2000, ICC, p.336-353. 27. Van Horn, personal correspondence to author, dated November 7, 2005, “UTILX has for years treated power cables with pressures … sometimes even exceeding 500 psi.” The full text of the letter is available from the authors upon request. 28. Logsdan v. Indiana Michigan Power Company (AEP), Court of Appeal of Indiana, Dec. 5, 2006. values are less than one dollar. There are at least two significant conclusions from the Addendum B summary. First, utilizing the SPR paradigm and U732 fluid together eliminates entire classes of risks. The 31 non-trivial risks of the “unsustained pressure; flammable fluid” paradigm are reduced to 19. Utilizing U732 fluid or P011 fluid and the UPR no soak paradigm together also eliminates entire classes of risks, but not as many as are possible with SPR. Second, the 19 remaining non-trivial risks of the SPR/U732 paradigm are reduced by substantial factors over the earlier approach in all but four cases. For those remaining four cases the risks are essentially identical. Using U732 or P011 fluids with the UPR no-soak-paradigm also mitigate risks, but not to the same extent as the SPR/U732 approach. Risk managers now have a tool to make objective assessments of risk, since all comparisons were written by proponents of the respective paradigms utilizing largely the same methods, and in fact, share a common author. The continual reduction of risks of all types remains the goal of the authors. Further improvements in methods and materials will continue to be forthcoming. This analysis facilitates the focusing of engineering and research efforts on those risks, which are greatest, and minimizing expenditure of resources on risks, which are of lesser significance. Addendum D includes a revision history to this Rejuvenation Hazard Analysis. Additional information is available from [39] including a comprehensive bibliography of almost all publically available test data. REFERENCES 1. Tarpey, "Cost Effective Solution to URD Reliability: Cable Rehabilitation”, Pennsylvania Electric Association T&D Committee Meeting, May 8, 1990. 2. Bertini & Chatterton, “Dielectric Enhancement Technology”, IEEE Electrical Insulation Magazine, March/April 1994-Vol.10, No.2, pp 17-22. 3. Bertini, "Failures in Silicone-Treated German Cables Due to an unusual Methanol-Aluminum Reaction", ICC meeting minutes, October, 29 2002, p. 1104. 4. Bertini, "Injection Supersaturation in Underground Electrical Cables", U.S. Patent 6,162,491. 5. Bertini, “Advancements in Cable Rejuvenation Technology”, IEEE/PES 1999 Summer Meeting, Reliability Centered Maintenance, July 21, 1999. 6. Vincent & Meyer, “Restoring Stranded Conductor Electrical Cable”, U.S. Patent 4,766,011. 7. Bertini, Vincent et al, "Method for enhancing the dielectrical strength of a cable using a fluid mixture", U.S. Patent 5,372,841. 5 29. CableCURE/SD MSDS dated 01/12/2006, downloaded by author 11/21/2007 & available online at www.utilx.com. 30. Bertini, Keitges, & Vincent, “Considerations for Injecting Cables with High Conductor Temperature”, ICC SubA, Nov. 11, 2009. 31. Bertini & Brinton, “Rehabilitation: The 3R’s”, ICC SubA, October 28, 2008. 32. CTL Test Report 09-143, Electrical Tests on Novinium 200 A Load Break Injection Elbows, August 26, 2009. This test report is available at: http://www.novinium.com/pdf/papers/CTL09-143.pdf . 33. CableCURE/XL fluid MSDS dated 08/06/2008, downloaded by author & available online at www.utilx.com. 34. Perficio™ 011 fluid MSDS dated 09/11/2009, at www.novinium.com/pdfs/MSDS/MSDS_Perficio_011.pdf. 35. Ultrinium™ 732 fluid MSDS dated 10/21/2009, at www.novinium.com/pdfs/MSDS/MSDS_Ultrinium_732.pdf. 36. Ultrinium™ 733 fluid MSDS dated 09/11/2009, at www.novinium.com/pdfs/MSDS/MSDS_Ultrinium_733.pdf. 37. Bertini & Vincent, “Advances in Chemical Rejuvenation: Extending Medium Voltage Cable Life 40 Years,” Jicable ‘07, pp. 615-617. 38. Bertini & Vincent, “Acid-Catalyzed Dielectric Enhancement Fluid and Cable Restoration Method Employing Same,” U.S. Patent Application Publication 2008/0173467, Jul. 24, 2008. 39. Bertini & Vincent, “History and Status of Silicone Injection Technology with Bibliography,” WEI Spring 2008 Underground/Overhead Electric Distribution Meeting, April 3, 2008. Authors Glen J. Bertini is the President, CEO and Chairman of Novinium, Inc. He has spent over two decades working with cable rejuvenation technol-ogy beginning with its development at Dow Corning in 1985 and continuing through its comercialization and growth to over 100 million feet of cable rejuvenated so far. Mr. Bertini was employed by Dow Corning, a silicon chemical manufacturer, as a development engineer, where he focused on the thermodynamics of multi-component systems and was part of a small team that developed and commercialized the first cable rejuvenation products. With over 40 articles published on the subject of cable rejuvenation technology including the very first Injection Hazard Analysis, reference [8], which provides much of the foundation for this updated analysis. Mr. Bertini holds a total of 25 patents on cable rejuvenation and related technologies and has 6 more patents pending. In 1992, he was co-recipient of the prestigious R&D 100 award for cable rejuvenation. In 2006 Mr. Bertini and Novinium won the $100,000 Zino Zillionaire Investment Forum award for the best investment opportunity in the Pacific Northwest. In 2010 Mr. Bertini was awarded the Puget Sound Engineering Council, Engineer of the Year Award. Mr. Bertini holds a B.S. in Chemical Engineering from Michigan Technological University, is a Senior Member of the AIChE, an IEEE Fellow, a voting member of the ICC, and a licensed professional engineer. Richard K. Brinton is the Vice President of Business Development of Novinium. He has been responsible for introducing cable rejuvenation to utilities around the world. Brinton has over 30 years experience in business development in the Americas, Europe, Asia, and Australia. He has focused his career on the worldwide introduction of new technologies and has gained worldwide experience in industrial processes, machine tools, robotics, and construction. Mr. Brinton holds a B.S. in Industrial Engineering and a B.A. Liberal Arts from the Pennsylvania State University, is a Senior Member of the IEEE, a voting member of the ICC, and is a licensed professional engineer. 6 7 8 Addendum B. Injection Hazard Ranking $100 UPR - CC3 SPR - U732 1.3 3.4.2 1.1 Equipment Risk 2.3.3.2.1 1.1 2.4.2 $10 2.3.3.1.3.1.2 2.3.3.1.3.2 2.4.5.6 2.3.3.1.2.2 2.2.3 2.2.4 3.3 2.2.4 2.4.1 3.3 $1 2.3.3.2.2(A) 1.4 2.3.3.2.4 2.3.3.1.3.1.1 2.3.3.2.1 2.3.3.1.1.3 2.3.3.1.4 2.3.3.1.2.2 2.3.3.1.1.2 2.4.5.6 $1 2.3.3.2.3 3.1 3 1 3.1 2.4.4 2.4.1 241 2.3.3.1.1.2 2 33112 2.3.3.1.2.1 $10 2.2.1 2.3.3.1.1.3 2.3.3.1.4 2.3.3.1.3.1.1 1.2 3.2.1 2.4.5.2 $100 2.2.1 3.2.1 3.2.2 3.2.2 $1,000 Personnel Risk Where a hazard exists for both injection paradigms within the plotted space, identical risks are circled and nonidentical risks are linked by a curved line. Those risks associated with the “UPR – CC3” paradigm, which lack associated circles i l or curved d arrows, do d not have h corresponding non-trivial risks within the “SPR – U732” paradigm. Risks that fall on or near the x-axis or the y-axis have values less than or equal to $1. Where data values overlap, data points are arbitrarily “nudged” to facilitate readability. Only conventional inside-out injection is plotted. 2.2.3 $10,000 $100,000 Addendum B. Injection Hazard Ranking Hazard 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 2.1 2.2.1 2.2.2 2.2.3 2.2.4 2.3.1 2.3.2 2.3.3.1.1.1 2.3.3.1.1.2 2.3.3.1.1.3 2.3.3.1.2.1 2.3.3.1.2.2 2.3.3.1.3.1.1 2.3.3.1.3.1.2 2.3.3.1.3.2 2.3.3.1.4 2.3.3.2.1 2.3.3.2.2(A) 2.3.3.2.3 2.3.3.2.4 2.4.1 2.4.2 2.4.3 2.4.4 2.4.5.1 2.4.5.2 2.4.5.3 2.4.5.4 2.4.5.5 2.4.5.6 3.1 3.2.1 3.2.2 3.3 3.4.1 3.4.2 Electrical contact Vacuum tank contact/flash Feed tank contact/flash Injection port flashover HVFI flashover Environmental Toxicological - Inhalation Chemical, Oral Chemical, Skin Chemical, Eyes Storage Transport Fire/Explosion, inject, cable, DB Fire/Explosion, inject, cable, duct Fire/Explosion, inject, cable, manhole Fire/Explosion, inject, splice, DB Fire/Explosion, inject, splice, manhole Fire/Explosion, inject, term (enclosed), press., monitored Fire/Explosion, inject, term (enclosed), press., low P Fire/Explosion, inject, term (enclosed), press., soak Fire/Explosion, inject, term (riser) Fire/Explosion, inject, feed tank, mechanical Fire/Explosion, inject, feed tank, electrical Fire/Explosion, inject, feed tank, procedural Fire/Explosion, inject, feed tank, thermal Chemical compatibility, termination (riser) Chemical compatibility, cold-shrink splice Chemical compatibility, dielectric gloves Chemical compatibility, EPDM/EPR components Chemical compatibility, cable connectivity/ampacity Chemical compatibility, cable insulation Chemical compatibility, conductor shield Chemical compatibility, insulation shield Chemical compatibility, jacket Chemical compatibility, conductor Dig-in Driving accidents (job site) Driving accidents (non-job site) Mechanical injuries (sprains, strains, etc.) Hydraulic failure, cable Hydraulic failure, component UPR with soak - CC3 Equipment Personnel Risk Risk UPR without soak P011 Equipment Personnel Risk Risk UPR without soak U732 Equipment Personnel Risk Risk SPR - U732 Equipment Personnel Risk Risk $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ 50 1 50 3 1 1 1 5 3 5 2 2 2 1 3 25 3 6 3 5 11 6 1 1 1 3 5 1 1 1 1 50 $ 50,000 $ 175 $ 25 $ 500 $ $ $ 375 $ $ 5,000 $ 1 $ $ $ $ 1 $ 25 $ 1 $ 25 $ 375 $ 2 $ 2 $ 25 $ 250 $ 175 $ 500 $ 175 $ 25 $ 1 $ $ 25 $ $ 25 $ $ 25 $ 25 $ 1 $ 450 $ 500 $ 500 $ 5 $ 1 $ 1 33 1 5 1 1 1 1 3 1 5 1 1 1 13 1 1 1 10 4 1 1 1 5 1 1 1 5 $ 33,333 $ 175 $ 3 $ $ 1 $ $ 375 $ $ 500 $ 1 $ $ $ $ 1 $ 13 $ 1 $ 5 $ $ 1 $ $ 13 $ 125 $ 9 $ 5 $ $ 3 $ 1 $ $ 1 $ $ $ $ 25 $ 13 $ 1 $ 450 $ 333 $ 500 $ 5 $ $ 1 33 1 5 1 1 1 1 3 1 5 1 1 1 13 1 1 1 10 4 1 1 1 5 1 1 1 5 $ 33,333 $ 175 $ 3 $ $ 1 $ $ 188 $ $ 5 $ 1 $ $ $ $ 1 $ 13 $ 1 $ 5 $ $ 1 $ $ 13 $ 125 $ 88 $ 5 $ $ 3 $ 1 $ $ 18 $ $ $ $ 25 $ 13 $ 1 $ 450 $ 333 $ 500 $ 5 $ $ 1 17 1 1 1 1 3 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 5 1 1 1 1 - $ 16,667 $ $ $ $ 1 $ $ 168 $ $ 5 $ 1 $ $ $ $ 1 $ 13 $ 1 $ 3 $ 41 $ $ $ 13 $ 175 $ $ $ $ 2 $ $ $ $ $ $ $ 13 $ 13 $ 1 $ 450 $ 167 $ 500 $ 5 $ 1 $ - Addendum C. Analysis of Risk Scenarios Abbreviations used in this Addendum C. CB CC CPM FOSH HVFI IHA IPA MSDS NRI P011 PMDMS PE PPE psi RCRA RF SCBA SD SPR TIPT TDR TMMS U732 U733 UPR ® CableCURE /CB fluid is a platinum-cure dimethylsiloxane gel. CableCURE is a registered trademark of UTILX Corporation. CableCURE fluid based upon PMDMS. CC1 (A.k.a. 2-2614) is PMDMS plus about 0.2% TIPT catalyst. CC2 and CC3 are also known as CableCURE/XL are about 70% PMDMS & 30% TMMS and 95% PMDMS & 5% TMMS respectively, in each case, with about 0.2% TIPT catalyst. CableCURE Procedures Manual promulgated by UTILX Corporation. Field Operations Safety Handbook promulgated by UTILX Corporation. High Voltage Fluidic Interface – a proprietary device designed to allow fluid flow between energized and grounded devices. Injection Hazard Analysis (Reference [8]) Isopropyl alcohol Material Safety Data Sheet Novinium Rejuvenation Instructions available at www.novinium.com/instructions.aspx. Fluid composed of about 92%w PMDMS, 5%w iso-octanol, 2.5%w Tinuvin™ 123, 0.2%w ferrocene, and 0.1%w dodecylbenzenesulfonic acid (DDBSA). Phenylmethyldimethoxysilane Polyethylene (whether or not cross-linked) Personal Protective Equipment Unit of pressure: pounds force per square inch. “psia” are absolute pressures and “psig” are gauge pressures. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act Radio Frequency (cable and splice locating equipment) Self Contained Breathing Apparatus Strand desiccant utilized as part of the CableCURE process. SD is approximately 95%w IPA and 5%w TMMS. SD is sometimes referred to as CableCURE/SD. Sustained Pressure Rejuvenation is a patent pending process where injection fluid retains significant residual pressure at the end of the injection to improve reliability. The pressure decays asymptotically to zero. Titanium(IV) isopropoxide or tetraisopropyltitanate, a catalyst used at 0.2%w in all CC formulations. Time Domain Reflectometer (Radar) Trimethylmethoxysilane, a fast diffuse and flammable component of CC2 and CC3 fluid. Fluid composed of about <60%w tolylethylmethyldimethoxysilane, <70%w cyanobutylmethyldimethoxysilane, <12%w isolauryl alcohol, <5%w Tinuvin® 123, <3%w Tinuvin® 1130, <3%w ferrocene, <3%w geranylacetone, <4%w Irgastab® Cable KV10, and ~0.1%w dodecylbenzenesulfonic acid (DDBSA). Fluid composition same as U732, except that methoxysilanes are 2-ethylhexoxy analogs. Unsustained pressure rejuvenation releases pressure to close to zero when injection is complete. UPR is performed with a soak period when CC fluids are used and is generally performed without a soak when U732 fluid is used. The primary source for the observations in the “UPR with soak – CC3” column is [8]. 11 Code UPR with soak – CC3 UPR without soak – P011 UPR without soak – U732 SPR – U732 1 Electrical Electrical Electrical Electrical 1.1 Electrical, Accidental contact Electrical, Accidental contact Electrical, Accidental contact Electrical, Accidental contact 1.1a As in [8], the injection equipment causes or contributes to an electrical contact. Injection equipment causes or contributes to an electrical contact. Injection equipment causes or contributes to an electrical contact. The injection equipment causes or contributes to an electrical contact. 1.1b As per [8], the injection equipment interferes with the operations of authorized line personnel, causing equipment such as TDR or RF equipment to come in contact with energized equipment. Line workers error in routine switching or blanketing Injection equipment interferes with the operations of authorized line personnel, causing equipment such as TDR or RF equipment to come in contact with energized equipment. Line workers error in routine switching or blanketing Injection equipment interferes with the operations of authorized line personnel, causing equipment such as TDR or RF equipment to come in contact with energized equipment. Line workers error in routine switching or blanketing There are no injection devices to obstruct line workers during TDR or RF testing. No conductive injection equipment ever comes in the vicinity of energized devices; TDR or RF location equipment is connected to energized equipment; line workers error in routine switching or blanketing. Because of the single-visit single switch injection paradigm the total number of visits to energized equipment is reduced at least 3-fold for 15/25kV and 4-fold for 35kV compared to the other paradigms. 1.1c Five incidents were referenced by the service supplier in [8] through 2001. There have been multiple incidents since 2001, including a fatality in 2002 documented in [28]. The incidents are: (1) A flinging vacuum cord which contacted a live-front primary voltage termination. Blankets were not installed over the energized equipment. The technician was injured. (2) In 1993, the alligator clip that connected a TDR to a grounded live-front connection swung into an exposed, energized, and uncovered primary bus when it was removed by a non-journeyman-lineman technician. Circuit protection operated and there was no other damage or injury as a result of the incident. (3) A journeymanlineman injector placed a probe wrench onto an energized elbow probe with apparent disregard for established grounding No such incidences have ever been experienced as of the date of this document’s publication. No such incidences have ever been experienced as of the date of this document’s publication. No such incidences have ever been experienced as of the date of this document’s publication. The primary source for the observations in the “UPR with soak – CC3” column is [8]. 12 Code UPR with soak – CC3 UPR without soak – P011 UPR without soak – U732 SPR – U732 procedures. As a consequence, the injector suffered burns to a hand and a foot. (4) A subcontractor journeymanlineman slipped on wet leaves while attempting to reach for his hot gloves. He made contact with a transformer. (5) A journeyman-lineman injector was injured when one of his teammates reenergized a deenergized line without alerting the victim or anyone else on the crew. 1.1d From [8], “ultra-low” – based upon past experience the probability is 1 in 10,000 cable sections treated. It is “certain” that personnel will be present when the event occurs. A minimum of 1/3 fewer visits than the UPR with soak, because only one visit is made to the transformer compared to 3 to 6. A minimum of 1/3 fewer visits than the UPR with soak, because only one visit is made to the transformer compared to 3 to 6. A minimum of 3 times less than UPR with soak, because only one visit is made to the transformer compared to 3 to 6 visits. 1.1e From [8], equipment consequences are “low”. Personnel consequences are “life threatening”. Equipment consequences are “low”. Personnel consequences are “life threatening”. Equipment consequences are “low”. Personnel consequences are “life threatening”. Equipment consequences are “low”. Personnel consequences are “life threatening”. 1.1f According to [8], the FOSH was changed to exclude nonjourneyman line worker from inside a 4-foot radius of any exposed energized equipment. Other safety improvements implemented after the second incident described above include: Additional training for journeymen line worker, required installation of blankets on exposed energized equipment, and a requirement that all new injection personnel are journeymen line workers. Further, training is centralized under the leadership of a journeyman line worker and all qualifications are confirmed with appropriate due diligence. Routine field auditing is used to enforce switching and other safety procedures. Finally, a warning tag was developed, which warns line personnel of the Elimination of the soak reduces the exposure by 1/3. Elimination of the soak reduces the exposure by 1/3. All injection is performed on deenergized equipment. Novinium procedures, including safety procedures, are available for review on-line. There is no need to warn other utility personnel of special or unusual dangers, because injection equipment is not left on energized cables. The primary source for the observations in the “UPR with soak – CC3” column is [8]. 13 Code UPR with soak – CC3 UPR without soak – P011 UPR without soak – U732 SPR – U732 presence of potentially energized injection equipment. 1.1g From [8], enforce the use of PPE and safe work practices. Novinium uses rigorous field verification procedures to change unsafe behaviors before they lead to an incident. This behaviorbased safety program is sometimes referred to as a “below-zero” safety culture. Novinium uses rigorous field verification procedures to change unsafe behaviors before they lead to an incident. This behaviorbased safety program is sometimes referred to as a “below-zero” safety culture. Novinium uses rigorous field verification procedures to change unsafe behaviors before they lead to an incident. This behavior-based safety program is sometimes referred to as a “below-zero” safety culture. 1.1h Risk (50,50000) Requipment=0.05●103=50 Rpersonnel=0.05●1●106=50k Risk (33,33333) Requipment=0.05●2/3●103=33 Rpersonnel=0.05●2/3●1.0●106=33k Risk (33,33333) Requipment=0.05●2/3●103=33 Rpersonnel=0.05●2/3●1.0●106=33k Risk (17,16667) Requipment=0.05/3●103=17 Rpersonnel=0.05/3●1.0●106=17k 1.2 Electrical, Vacuum tank contact/flash Electrical, Vacuum tank contact/flash Electrical, Vacuum tank contact/flash Electrical, Vacuum tank contact/flash 1.2a As described in [8], vacuum receiving vessels collect water along with ionic contaminants, organic impurities, and solids such as aluminum oxide and carbon black, which are flushed from the cable interstices. The vacuum vessel and attached tubing also accept vapors and gasses from the energized cable. From Paschen’s Law, the dielectric strength of low pressure gasses is less than it would be for atmospheric or higher pressure gasses. The gas may become ionized and glows like a florescent light bulb. The vacuum tank, associated tubing, and fittings are potentially energized and represent an electrical contact risk. Additionally, the vacuum tank is necessarily in direct contact, or in close proximity to the ground wires, and hence a flash is possible to ground. Vacuum receiving vessels collect water along with ionic contaminants, organic impurities, and solids such as aluminum oxide and carbon black, which are flushed from the cable interstices. The vacuum vessel and attached tubing also accept vapors and gasses from the energized cable. From Paschen’s Law, the dielectric strength of low pressure gasses is less than it would be for atmospheric or higher pressure gasses. The gas may become ionized and glows like a florescent light bulb. The vacuum tank, associated tubing, and fittings are potentially energized and represent an electrical contact risk. Additionally, the vacuum tank is necessarily in direct contact, or in close proximity to the ground wires, and hence a flash is possible to ground. Vacuum receiving vessels collect water along with ionic contaminants, organic impurities, and solids such as aluminum oxide and carbon black, which are flushed from the cable interstices. The vacuum vessel and attached tubing also accept vapors and gasses from the energized cable. From Paschen’s Law, the dielectric strength of low pressure gasses is less than it would be for atmospheric or higher pressure gasses. The gas may become ionized and glows like a florescent light bulb. The vacuum tank, associated tubing, and fittings are potentially energized and represent an electrical contact risk. Additionally, the vacuum tank is necessarily in direct contact, or in close proximity to the ground wires, and hence a flash is possible to ground. Vacuum tanks are not connected to energized devices. 1.2b As described in [8], there are two ways that current may be conducted to ground. Initially, there is some capacitive flow when the vacuum tank is in proximity to a ground, such as the soil, a ground conductor, or a human hand. Over time, tracking, dielectric degradation, There are two ways that current may be conducted to ground. Initially, there is some capacitive flow when the vacuum tank is in proximity to a ground, such as the soil, a ground conductor, or a human hand. Over time, tracking, dielectric degradation, or a physical defect may open a There are two ways that current may be conducted to ground. Initially, there is some capacitive flow when the vacuum tank is in proximity to a ground, such as the soil, a ground conductor, or a human hand. Over time, tracking, dielectric degradation, or a physical defect may open a The primary source for the observations in the “UPR with soak – CC3” column is [8]. 14 Code 1.2c 1.2d UPR with soak – CC3 UPR without soak – P011 UPR without soak – U732 or a physical defect may open a direct path to the interior and allow current to flow directly from the energized conductor and to the ground nearest the breach. Such an arc may damage the eyes of line personnel, or initiate a cascade of failures including fires and/or, in unusual circumstances, an explosion. As described in [8], there are sometimes “light displays” observed in the dielectric tubing. This is caused by the ionization of the vapors and gasses inside the vessel and the flow of capacitive current from the energized conductor to the nearest ground plane. There have been documented cases of tubing failure where the tubing is in intimate contact with a ground wire. In [8], it was also reported that at least 5 failures occurred at Energy’s New Orleans unit when vacuum tanks were submerged in water. Two similar failures occurred at PG&E. Finally, [8] indicated that a gloveless subcontractor employee touched a vacuum tank and received a high impedance discharge through his body. direct path to the interior and allow current to flow directly from the energized conductor and to the ground nearest the breach. Such an arc may damage the eyes of line personnel, or initiate a cascade of failures including fires and/or, in very unusual circumstances, an explosion. direct path to the interior and allow current to flow directly from the energized conductor and to the ground nearest the breach. Such an arc may damage the eyes of line personnel, or initiate a cascade of failures including fires and/or, in very unusual circumstances, an explosion. There have been no observed incidents. There have been no observed incidents. Less than 10% of URD cables have conductive water in the strands. The probability of dielectric or mechanical failure is thus “ultra-low”. The probability that personnel will be present when conductive fluid in the tubing is “quite likely”. Typically the injection time is 18 hours. This time increases, 1) when the run is long, 2) where there is significant water in the strands, 3) where strands are corroded, or 4) where strands are compressed or compact. Injection personnel typically check the vacuum tank 18-24 hours after the initiation of Less than 10% of URD cables have conductive water in the strands. The probability of dielectric or mechanical failure is thus “ultra-low”. The probability that personnel will be present when conductive fluid in the tubing is “quite likely”. Typically the injection time is 18 hours. This time increases, 1) when the run is long, 2) where there is significant water in the strands, 3) where strands are corroded, or 4) where strands are compressed or compact. Injection personnel typically check the vacuum tank 18-24 hours after the initiation of As described in [8], less than 10% of URD cables have conductive water in the strands. Modern vacuum tanks have predominantly plastic fittings which lower the probability of a direct pathway to ground. The probability of dielectric or mechanical failure is thus “ultralow”. The probability that personnel will be present when conductive fluid in the tubing is “quite likely”. Typically the injection time is 18 hours. This time increases, 1) when the run is long, 2) where there is significant water in the strands, The primary source for the observations in the “UPR with soak – CC3” column is [8]. 15 SPR – U732 Code UPR with soak – CC3 UPR without soak – P011 UPR without soak – U732 3) where strand desiccant is not used, 4) where strands are corroded, or 5) where strands are compressed or compact. Injection personnel typically check the vacuum tank 18-24 hours after the initiation of fluid flow. fluid flow. fluid flow. 1.2e As described in [8], the typical outcome from a catastrophic failure of a vacuum tank and its associated tubing is a tripped system protection devices and destroyed injection equipment. The equipment consequence is “medium”. The consequences of line personnel coming into contact with energized devices is “life threatening”. The typical outcome from a catastrophic failure of a vacuum tank and its associated tubing would be a tripped system protection devices and it can destroy injection equipment. The equipment consequence is “medium”. The consequences of line personnel coming into contact with energized devices is “life threatening”. The typical outcome from a catastrophic failure of a vacuum tank and its associated tubing would be a tripped system protection devices and it can destroy injection equipment. The equipment consequence is “medium”. The consequences of line personnel coming into contact with energized devices is “life threatening”. 1.2f According to [8], the following two steps have been implemented to reduce the probability that current flow as a result of contact with a vacuum tank or its associated tubing will be significant: • A layer of dielectric plastic separates the effluent fluids (liquids, gasses, and vapors) from line personnel to prevent any significant electrical current from flowing. Equipment is designed to tolerate full system voltage for at least 24 hours. • A strand desiccant, composed of anhydrous isopropyl alcohol (IPA) and water reactive low viscosity silanes (along with titanium(IV) isopropoxide catalyst to facilitate the reaction with water), is used to reduce the conductivity of effluent fluids. These materials solubilize water into the organo-silane phase, where the water, in the presence of the titanium catalyst, rapidly reacts with the silanes. The silanes oligomerize to an alcohol soluble dielectric fluid. Ionic The following steps have been implemented to reduce the probability that current flow as a result of contact with a vacuum tank or its associated tubing will be significant: • A layer of dielectric plastic separates the effluent fluids (liquids, gasses, and vapors) from line personnel to prevent any significant electrical current from flowing. Equipment is designed to tolerate full system voltage for at least 24 hours. • The magnitude of the maximum current flow is limited by the small inside diameter of the tubing. • A warning tag is used to alert utility line personnel of the presence of potentially energized injection equipment. The tag provides brief safety instructions. Line personnel should avoid touching injection equipment. The following steps have been implemented to reduce the probability that current flow as a result of contact with a vacuum tank or its associated tubing will be significant: • A layer of dielectric plastic separates the effluent fluids (liquids, gasses, and vapors) from line personnel to prevent any significant electrical current from flowing. Equipment is designed to tolerate full system voltage for at least 24 hours. • The magnitude of the maximum current flow is limited by the small inside diameter of the tubing. • A warning tag is used to alert utility line personnel of the presence of potentially energized injection equipment. The tag provides brief safety instructions. Line personnel should avoid touching injection equipment. The primary source for the observations in the “UPR with soak – CC3” column is [8]. 16 SPR – U732 Code UPR with soak – CC3 UPR without soak – P011 UPR without soak – U732 SPR – U732 contaminates have a lower solubility in IPA than in the water and thus precipitate. The precipitated ionic contaminates originally present in the water are unable to carry current or transmit electrical potential. The magnitude of the maximum current flow is limited by the small inside diameter of the tubing. Finally, a warning tag is used to alert utility line personnel of the presence of potentially energized injection equipment. The tag provides brief safety instructions. Line personnel should avoid touching injection equipment. 1.2g According to [8], the maximum current flow is limited by the small diameter of the tubing and the use of strand desiccant. It is imperative that line personnel are made aware that all vacuum equipment may be energized up to line potential. Further, they must be trained to use the following tools and PPE when handling vacuum tanks: Hot stick, dielectric gloves rated for system voltage, flame retardant clothing, and tinted safety glasses. The maximum current flow is limited by the small diameter of the tubing. It is imperative that line personnel are made aware that all vacuum equipment may be energized up to line potential. Further, they must be trained to use the following tools and PPE when handling vacuum tanks: Hot stick, dielectric gloves rated for system voltage, flame retardant clothing, and tinted safety glasses. The maximum current flow is limited by the small diameter of the tubing. It is imperative that line personnel are made aware that all vacuum equipment may be energized up to line potential. Further, they must be trained to use the following tools and PPE when handling vacuum tanks: Hot stick, dielectric gloves rated for system voltage, flame retardant clothing, and tinted safety glasses. 1.2h Risk (1,175) Requipment=0.0005●2x103=1 Rpersonnel=0.0005●0.35●106=175 Risk (1,175) Requipment=0.0005●2x103=1 Rpersonnel=0.0005●0.35●106=175 Risk (1,175) Requipment=0.0005●2x103=1 Rpersonnel = 0.0005●0.35x106=175 1.3 Electrical, Feed tank contact/flash Electrical, Feed tank contact/flash Electrical, Feed tank contact/flash Electrical, Feed tank contact/flash 1.3a As described in [8], backward flow or diffusion occurs in the tubing from the feed tank used to supply fluid to energized terminations during the soak period. Injection equipment may therefore become energized and create an electrical hazard. A backward flow or diffusion may occur within the tubing and the feed tank used to supply fluid to the energized terminations. Injection equipment may therefore become energized and create an electrical hazard. A backward flow or diffusion may occur within the tubing and the feed tank used to supply fluid to the energized terminations. Injection equipment may therefore become energized and create an electrical hazard. No feed tanks are connected to energized devices. A feed tank and its associated As explained by [8], a feed tank tubing are utilized to deliver U732 and its associated tubing are fluid to energized terminations. utilized to deliver PMDMS/TMMS The primary source for the observations in the “UPR with soak – CC3” column is [8]. 1.3b 17 A feed tank and its associated tubing are utilized to deliver U732 fluid to energized terminations. Code UPR with soak – CC3 UPR without soak – P011 UPR without soak – U732 and SD to energized terminations. While flow is proceeding rapidly, the dielectric properties of the fluids make the probability of injection equipment becoming energized, low. However, when 1) the flow rate decreases on very long runs, 2) on runs with slow-flowing splices, 3) on runs with excessive water in the strands, and 4) on all runs when the cable is placed into soak mode by the installation of a plug at the outlet of the cable, the flow can come to a virtual halt, or even reverse, as the cable temperature cycles and the feed tank temperature cycles. Such temperature cycles cause fluid pressure changes as the fluids expand and contract and the cable or feed tank physically expand and contract. While flow is proceeding rapidly, the dielectric properties of the fluids make the probability of injection equipment becoming energized, low. However, when 1) the flow rate decreases on very long runs, 2) on runs with slow-flowing splices, and 3) on runs with excessive water in the strands, the flow can come to a virtual halt, or even reverse, as the cable temperature cycles and the feed tank temperature cycles. Such temperature cycles cause fluid pressure changes as the fluids expand and contract and the cable or feed tank physically expand and contract. While flow is proceeding rapidly, the dielectric properties of the fluids make the probability of injection equipment becoming energized, low. However, when 1) the flow rate decreases on very long runs, 2) on runs with slow-flowing splices, and 3) on runs with excessive water in the strands, the flow can come to a virtual halt, or even reverse, as the cable temperature cycles and the feed tank temperature cycles. Such temperature cycles cause fluid pressure changes as the fluids expand and contract and the cable or feed tank physically expand and contract. 1.3c According to [8], feed fittings have failed in about seven cases where submerged transformers flooded after major rainfalls. Approximately 10% of feed tanks failed in these conditions until the injection service supplier introduced improved container dielectrics to separate fluids from the surrounding ground planes. In one case, a failure occurred as a result, when an injection cap was removed and a small amount of contaminated fluid dripped from an unplugged Elastimold injection port. No feed tank failures have occurred. No feed tank failures have occurred. 1.3d According to [8], flooded transformers are encountered on less than 1% of injected cables during the injection or soak phase. The event probability is “very low”. The probability that personnel will be present when the failure occurs and be exposed to an underwater flash is “unlikely”. Flooded transformers are encountered on less than 0.1% of injected cables during injection. The event probability is “ultra low”. The probability that personnel will be present when the failure occurs and be exposed to an underwater flash is “unlikely”. Flooded transformers are encountered on less than 0.1% of injected cables during injection. The event probability is “ultra low”. The probability that personnel will be present when the failure occurs and be exposed to an underwater flash is “unlikely”. The primary source for the observations in the “UPR with soak – CC3” column is [8]. 18 SPR – U732 Code UPR with soak – CC3 UPR without soak – P011 UPR without soak – U732 1.3e According to [8], the consequences to the equipment are “low” as circuit protection prevents consequential damage. Because the fault occurs submerged in the water and much of the fault energy is absorbed, the consequences to personnel are ranked as “medium”. The consequences to the equipment are “low” as circuit protection prevents consequential damage. Because the fault occurs submerged in the water and much of the fault energy is absorbed, the consequences to personnel are ranked as “medium”. The consequences to the equipment are “low” as circuit protection prevents consequential damage. Because the fault occurs submerged in the water and much of the fault energy is absorbed, the consequences to personnel are ranked as “medium”. 1.3f According to [8], a warning tag was deployed in 1998 to warn utility line personnel of the presence of potentially energized injection equipment and to provide safety instructions. Line personnel are discouraged from touching injection equipment. A warning tag is attached to warn utility line personnel of the presence of potentially energized injection equipment and to provide safety instructions. Line personnel are discouraged from touching injection equipment. A warning tag is attached to warn utility line personnel of the presence of potentially energized injection equipment and to provide safety instructions. Line personnel are discouraged from touching injection equipment. 1.3g According to [8], line personnel are required to use hot sticks, rubber gloves, and other appropriate PPE when handling potentially energized injection equipment. Additionally to protect from arc flash and possible chemical fires or explosions, line personnel must wear flame retardant clothing and tinted glasses. Line personnel are required to use hot sticks, rubber gloves, and other appropriate PPE when handling potentially energized injection equipment. Additionally to protect from arc flash and possible chemical fires or explosions, line personnel must wear flame retar-dant clothing and tinted glasses. Line personnel are required to use hot sticks, rubber gloves, and other appropriate PPE when handling potentially energized injection equipment. Additionally to protect from arc flash and possible chemical fires or explosions, line personnel must wear flame retar-dant clothing and tinted glasses. 1.3h Risk (50,25) Requipment=0.05●103=50 Rpersonnel=0.05●0.05●104=25 Risk (5,2.5) Requipment=0.005●103=5 Rpersonnel=0.005●0.05●104=2.5 Risk (5,2.5) Requipment=0.005●103=5 Rpersonnel=0.005●0.05●104=2.5 1.4 Electrical, Injection port flashover Electrical, Injection port flashover Electrical, Injection port flashover Electrical, Injection port flashover 1.4a An injection cap (see [9] and [10]) or plug (see [11]) is removed from a dead-front device such as an elbow, while the cable is energized and the conductor flashes to ground as described in [12] and [13]. (Author: While the IHA identified this risk, there was no discussion provided in the 2001 document. Excerpts of patent document [13] are pasted directly into the discussion where appropriate.) A Reticular Flash Preventer (RFP) is installed in the injection port to prevent flashover. See [31] for a complete description of the RFP and [32] for test results. A Reticular Flash Preventer (RFP) is installed in the injection port to prevent flashover. See [31] for a complete description of the RFP and [32] for test results. This scenario is not possible with this injection paradigm. 1.4b Directly from patent [13] at column 1, line 45: The primary source for the observations in the “UPR with soak – CC3” column is [8]. 19 SPR – U732 Code UPR with soak – CC3 UPR without soak – P011 “After injection of the remediation fluid is complete, the injection plug is withdrawn from the injection port and is 40 replaced with a sealing plug. Between the time that the injection plug is removed, and the sealing plug is installed, the injection port is open, and the energized conductor of the cable is exposed. Because of the remediation fluid's low viscosity it is likely to empty out of the open injection port. Although there is no direct electrical connection between the conductor and the grounded exterior of the cable elbow, there is the danger of an indirect electrical connection being established between the conductor and the grounded exterior of the elbow. One such indirect pathway may be formed by contaminants that have become entrained in the remediation fluid. Contaminated fluid can be drawn from the injection port as the injection plug is withdrawn or may simply flow out under the force of gravity, thereby creating partial discharging or even a complete conductive pathway to the ground plane. A second indirect pathway is created by source molecules such as those found in low viscosity remediation fluid, water or other contaminants which may be present in the conductor. Source molecules, also referred to as particles, can ionize or form an aerosol, which may become charged in the high-voltage field. These ionized or charged particles may then accelerate towards the ground plane creating a dynamic and conductive aerial pathway. These two known conductive pathways, as well as any other The primary source for the observations in the “UPR with soak – CC3” column is [8]. 20 UPR without soak – U732 SPR – U732 Code UPR with soak – CC3 UPR without soak – P011 conductive pathway established between the conductor and the ground plane, can degrade or destroy the injection elbow. Therefore, a need exists to create a barrier to block the conductive pathway between the conductive portion of the cable and the ground plane to increase the life expectancy of the injection elbow.” 1.4c The authors are aware of numerous cases where flash-over has occurred. These cases drove the development of the U.S. Patents 6,517,366 and 6,929,492. The interested reader should contact the injection service supplier for a full accounting of actual incidents. 1.4d The event probability is unacceptably high on 35kV systems, so these systems are no longer operated energized. The event probability on 15 and 25 kV systems is “ultra-low.” The probability that any personnel will be present when the failure occurs and exposed to a flash is “certain.” 1.4e The consequences to the equipment are “high” as transformers and bushing may be damaged or destroyed, and the event could precipitate a fire or explosion. The consequences to personnel are ranked “life threatening.” 1.4f Energized switching of 35kV systems has been suspended. To the author’s knowledge, the inventions of U.S. Patents 6,517,366 and 6,929,492 remain unimplemented by the injection service supplier. The interested reader should inquire with the injection service supplier to determine, if any mitigation steps have been implemented. The primary source for the observations in the “UPR with soak – CC3” column is [8]. 21 UPR without soak – U732 SPR – U732 Code UPR with soak – CC3 1.4g Line personnel are required to use hot sticks, rubber gloves, and other appropriate PPE when handling injection caps and plugs. Additionally to protect from arc flash, line personnel must wear flame retardant clothing and tinted glasses. The interested reader should inquire with the injection service supplier to determine, if any other consequence mitigation steps have been implemented. 1.4h Risk (2.5,500) Requipment= 0.0005●5x103=2.5 Rpersonnel=0.0005●1●106=500 1.5 1.5a 1.5b UPR without soak – P011 UPR without soak – U732 SPR – U732 HVFI flashover HVFI flashover HVFI flashover HVFI flashover HVFI are proprietary devices unavailable to users of CC3 fluid HVFI are proprietary devices available to for use whenever live-front devices are to be connected to feed or vacuum tanks for extended periods. Since the late 1980s it has been standard practice in fluid rejuvenation to connect dielectric tubing, typically nylon or polyethylene, to energized cables with the unsustained pressure rejuvenation (UPR) paradigm. In fact, over 100 million feet have been injected in this way. In typical underground residential distribution UPR applications, tubing is connected to a feed end of a cable and an outlet end. These two tubes are connected to a feed bottle and receiving bottle respectively. Both bottles are primarily plastic dielectric with some metal fittings. The tubing and connected bottles are termed “potentially energized,” as it is at least theoretically possible that they are not at ground potential. In practice they would almost always be very close to ground potential. On the inlet side, dielectric fluid flows into a dielectric tube and the possibility that the tubing/fluid system will conduct electricity is generally small. The exception is when a feed bottle is left connected for a long period of time in what is called a “soak period.” During the soak period the flow of fluid into the cable is very close to zero and may flow backwards as the connected cable cycles in temperature from a cycling load. More problematic is the outlet side that begins the injection process as a course vacuum. Typically within 24 hours the vacuum decays and the gas phase transitions to a liquid. In the worst case the liquid could be water displaced from the strand interstices, but is more likely dielectric enhancement fluid or a desiccant fluid. The outlet fluids also transport conductive particles such as carbon black and ions. The tubing and the connected tanks are allowed to float electrically and for the sake of safety are handled by line personnel as though they are energized. Occasionally it is desirable to operate injection equipment over extended time periods and the HVFI was introduced to add an additional layer of safety. The illustration nearby shows a typical arrangement of an HVFI on a pole excluding mechanical support hardware. The top portion of the HVFI is connected by a conductive metal tube to the cable injection adapter and is at system voltage. The bottom portion of the HVFI is connected to the system ground and to a feed or receiving tank located within a metallic enclosure. The enclosure is bonded to the system neutral. External stress control on the HVFI is analogous to that of a live-front termination. A high voltage fluidic interface or HVFI is a component which electrically isolates the necessarily high voltage injection devices utilized with live-front terminations such as an injection adaptor, which must be in contact with the conductor, from those injection tanks and tubes which must be hydraulically connected. In other words the HVFI allows hydraulic communication, but interrupts electrical The primary source for the observations in the “UPR with soak – CC3” column is [8]. 22 Code UPR with soak – CC3 UPR without soak – P011 UPR without soak – U732 SPR – U732 communication between the cable’s injection interface and the bottles to which they are connected. Up-to-date instructions for the installation and operation of HVFI devices are available online at: NRI 69. The Figure 2 provides HVFI design details. The external design is a 35kV life-front cable termination (3M QT-III-7686-S-8 skirted termination), which meets or exceeds the IEEE 48-2009 standards. The internal components begin with 6.7 meters (22 ft) of 1/8” OD nylon tubing and a 0.073” ID with a total volume of about 18.1 ml. The tubing enters the top of the HVFI, is wound in a descending outer helix, then an ascending inner helix, and finally down the axis to the bottom where it exits. The tubing is positioned on a polyethylene board with over 120 tube positioning cutouts alternating between the inner helix and the outer helix. The board is secured to the two aluminum end pieces and within a high density polyethylene tube. The volume outside of the 1/8” tubing and inside of the 2.5” body tube is filled with degassed dimethyl silicone RTV liquid, which sets to a permanent non-flowing gel. The aluminum end caps include dedicated electrical connections to the system voltage at the top and to the system ground at the bottom. The end caps include securing hardware so that the HVFI may be installed in a manner similar to a post insulator. Unlike a post insulator, the hardware needs only to support the HVFI. Hydraulic-pneumatic swage-type connections are also on each end cap and mate with ¼” aluminum or copper tubing. The tube at the top of the HVFI is connected to the The primary source for the observations in the “UPR with soak – CC3” column is [8]. 23 Code UPR with soak – CC3 UPR without soak – P011 UPR without soak – U732 SPR – U732 injection adaptor. The tube at the bottom of the HVFI is attached to a feed bottle on the inlet cable end and to a receiving bottle on the outlet cable end. On the outlet cable end a three-way ball valve is attached to the top of the HVFI as shown in the Typical Installation Arrangement, so that a side stream of fluid can be introduced into the HVFI. During operation on the inlet cable end the fluid flow is initiated prior to the cable being re-energized. On the inlet side the tubing is filled with dielectric fluid 100% of the time. On the outlet cable end there are two stages of operation with the cable energized. Prior to the cable being energized a course vacuum (about 25 in Hg) is applied to the receiving tank, which is connected to the HVFI, associated tubing, and the cable. The majority of the air is removed from the system. At least 50 ml of low volatility, low viscosity, low surface energy, dielectric fluid (Ultrinium™ 732 fluid) is introduced into the top of the HVFI at the three-way valve. The fluid flushes through the 6.7 meters of tubing. The majority of the 50 ml of fluid introduced flushes through the entire HVFI as the total volume within the tubing is about 18 ml. The HVFI traps several ml of the fluid in the tubing coils with two mechanisms. First, because of the low surface energy of the fluid it coats the tubing walls. Second, in the ascending inner coil fluid is drawn upward by weak shear forces as the low pressure air slowly flows toward the vacuum source, but gravity exerts a downward force on the fluid. An equilibrium is established where fluid flows upward in the coil near the tube axis, but flows downward in the coil near the inside diameter of the tube. The perpetual presence of the dielectric fluid blocks the path of any electrical field resisting ionization and repairs any microscopic damage that might occur if there were partial discharges. The shear length of tubing and thickness of the insulation layers including both the thickness of the nylon tubing and the surrounding dimethyl silicone gel make the HVFI tolerant of partial discharge. The cable can now be energized and Stage I begins. In this stage the tubing is filled with a mixture of air at 25 in Hg vacuum and dielectric fluid. Stage II begins when dielectric fluid reaches the HVFI and the tubing becomes filled with dielectric fluid. Standards There are no industry standards for high voltage fluidic interfaces. Some guidance on qualification testing can be found by reviewing appropriate standards for devices that include similar functions as the HVFI. Appropriate engineering judgment is required for the application of these other standards as many dimensions of those standards will not be relevant to the design and operation of a HVFI. IEEE 48 – IEEE Standard for Test procedures and Requirements for Alternating-Current Cable Terminations Used on Shielded Cables Having … Extruded Insulation Rated 2.5kV through 500 kV As implied by the title, the scope of IEEE 48 includes only cable terminations and hence does not apply to an HVFI, which does not terminate a cable. However, the performance of the exterior of the HVFI is analogous to the exterior of a termination. In fact, the exterior of the HVFI is an IEEE 48 complaint terminator. It is a 3M QT-III-7686-S-8 and has passed all of the IEEE 48 requirements as per 3M’s product data sheet, “3M™ Cold Shrink Silicone Rubber Termination Kit QT-III, 7620-S, 7680-S and 7690-S Series 5 - 34.5 kV. Test requirements include dielectric (7.1.1) and pressure leak tests (7.1.2). The primary source for the observations in the “UPR with soak – CC3” column is [8]. 24 Code UPR with soak – CC3 UPR without soak – P011 UPR without soak – U732 SPR – U732 Testing In addition to the design testing performed for IEEE 48 of the HVFI external components, additional testing was undertaken at Powertech Laboratories by John Vandermaar (Manger, High Voltage Laboratory) and Kal Abdolall (Senior Research Physicist) at the behest of BC Hydro and in cooperation with Novinium on the HVFI assembly. The researchers concluded (Oct. 12, 2007), “In our opinion this unit is suitable for this application.” The measurements and tests undertaken were done in accordance with the requirements of IEEE Std. 48-1996 for 25 kV insulation class equipment are outlined below: The HVFI passed the AC dry withstand test at 65 kV for one minute. The HVFI passed the AC wet withstand test at 60 kV for 10 seconds. The HVFI passed the impulse withstand test at 150 kV (3 positive and 3 negative impulse waveforms). The HVFI was energized at 14.4 kV for 6.75 hours. There was no measurable increase in temperature above ambient on the surface of the HVFI. The HVFI tan delta is 3.75 and does not seem to affect the performance of the unit, as reflected by the low leakage current (see figure nearby) and no measurable rise of temperature after 6.75 hrs at 14.4 kV was observed. 1.5c Two HVFI units were placed in service on a crossing of Desolation Sound in British Columbia on October 15, 2007. Both terminations are within 100 meters of an ocean sound subject to high winds and salt spray. The “Pollution Severity Level” is “Heavy.” (i.e. Areas generally close to the coast and exposed to coastal spray or to strong winds carrying sand and salt, and subjected to regular condensation.) It took approximately 100 days for fluid to flow from the inlet side HVFI to the outlet side HVFI. The HVFI units have remained in continuous use to the day of this writing, January 19, 2011, which is over three years with perfect performance. The Desolation Sound crossing is a worst case scenario in that typical deployments of the HVFI would be of much shorter duration. 1.5d The event probability is “ultra-low.” The probability that any personnel will be present if a HVFI were to fail is “unlikely.” 1.5e The consequences to the equipment are “low” as circuit protection will likely operate if a flashover were to occur. The consequences to personnel if present are ranked “low” as the HVFI is at the pole top and fully grounded. 1.5f The HVFI is a probability mitigation device which is designed to reduce the risk of flashover. 1.5g The HVFI is a consequence mitigation device which is designed to carry all fault current to ground so that normal circuit protection will operate in the event of a flashover. 1.5h Risk (2.5,500) Requipment= 0.0005●103=0.5 Rpersonnel=0.0005●0.05●103=0.025 2 Chemical Chemical Chemical Chemical 2a The scope of 2 is limited to the incremental risks associated with injection of cables to restore The scope of 2 is limited to the incremental risks associated with injection of cables to restore The scope of 2 is limited to the incremental risks associated with injection of cables to restore The scope of 2 is limited to the incremental risks associated with injection of cables to restore The primary source for the observations in the “UPR with soak – CC3” column is [8]. 25 Code UPR with soak – CC3 UPR without soak – P011 UPR without soak – U732 dielectric performance. dielectric performance. dielectric performance. dielectric performance. 2.1 Chemical, Environmental Chemical, Environmental Chemical, Environmental Chemical, Environmental 2.1a Fluid is spilled into the environment. Fluid is spilled into the environment. Fluid is spilled into the environment. Fluid is spilled into the environment. 2.1b While fluid can be spilled in shipment, such spills are beyond the scope of 2.1. This section 2.1 focuses upon the case where fluid is spilled from fluid delivery equipment. Fluid spills can be further classified as uncontaminated and contaminated. The former, being the case for unused fluid and the later being the case where the fluid has passed through the cable where it may have picked up a wide variety of substances. Effluent samples have been analyzed by Dow Corning and Phillips Environmental and may be classified RCRA hazardous wastes. The injection supplier has always cleaned up spills of fluid whether or not they include contamination. While fluid can be spilled in shipment, such spills are beyond the scope of 2.1. This section 2.1 considers the case where fluid is spilled from fluid delivery equipment. Fluid spills can be further classified as uncontaminated and contaminated. The former, being the case for unused fluid and the later being the case where the fluid has passed through the cable where it may have picked up a wide variety of substances. Injection equipment utilized by this paradigm is generally not left unattended. Both the probability of a leak and the magnitude of a leak are mitigated in comparison to unattended operation. By policy, any fluid spill is cleaned up and the contaminated soil and cleanup materials are disposed of as required by local and national law. While fluid can be spilled in shipment, such spills are beyond the scope of 2.1. This section 2.1 considers the case where fluid is spilled from fluid delivery equipment. Fluid spills can be further classified as uncontaminated and contaminated. The former, being the case for unused fluid and the later being the case where the fluid has passed through the cable where it may have picked up a wide variety of substances. Injection equipment utilized by this paradigm is generally not left unattended. Both the probability of a leak and the magnitude of a leak are mitigated in comparison to unattended operation. By policy, any fluid spill is cleaned up and the contaminated soil and cleanup materials are disposed of as required by local and national law. While fluid can be spilled in shipment, such spills are beyond the scope of 2.1. This section 2.1 considers the case where fluid is spilled from fluid delivery equipment. Fluid spills can be further classified as uncontaminated and contaminated. The former, being the case for unused fluid and the later being the case where the fluid has passed through the cable where it may have picked up a wide variety of substances. Injection equipment utilized by this paradigm is generally not left unattended. Both the probability of a leak and the magnitude of a leak are mitigated in comparison to unattended operation. By policy, any fluid spill is cleaned up and the contaminated soil and cleanup materials are disposed of as required by local and national law. 2.1c As described in [8], the maximum size of a fluid spill is limited to the size of the feed tank. For 7-strand and 19-strand URD applications, less than 1 gallon is available. Drop size spills are not unusual during dayto-day injection operations. Spills involving the entire contents of a feed tank have not been reported, except when a catastrophic failure of an injection device occurs. See 2.3.3.1. The maximum fluid spill is the size of the feed tank. For 7strand and 19-strand URD applications, less than 1 gallon is generally available. Drop size spills are possible occurrences in the day-to-day operations of injection. A spill of a large portion of fluid in a feed tank occurred on a single occasion when a hydraulic fitting failed. The maximum fluid spill is the size of the feed tank. For 7strand and 19-strand URD applications, less than 1 gallon is generally available. Drop size spills are possible occurrences in the day-to-day operations of injection. A spill of a large portion of fluid in a feed tank occurred on a single occasion when a hydraulic fitting failed. The maximum fluid spill is the size of the feed tank. For 7strand and 19-strand URD applications, less than 1 gallon is generally available. Drop size spills are possible occurrences in the day-to-day operations of injection. A spill of a large portion of fluid in a feed tank occurred on a single occasion when a hydraulic fitting failed. 2.1d As outlined in [8], small, dropsize spills occur frequently. Spills of up to one gallon occur several times each year. The event probability is “medium”. Typically, injection personnel are The event probability overall is “very low”. Typically, injection personnel are “quite likely” to be present when a spill occurs. The event probability overall is “very low”. Typically, injection personnel are “quite likely” to be present when a spill occurs. The event probability overall is “very low”. Typically, injection personnel are “likely” to be present when a spill occurs. The primary source for the observations in the “UPR with soak – CC3” column is [8]. 26 SPR – U732 Code UPR with soak – CC3 UPR without soak – P011 UPR without soak – U732 SPR – U732 “likely” to be present when a spill occurs. 2.1e As explained in [8], there are not substantive environmental consequences (as defined by RCRA) of spills of one gallon or less of uncontaminated PMDMS and TMMS, or of IPA with silanes. From [8], “Worst case simulated spills were made by Dow Corning and the samples were submitted to an environmental laboratory. The spills were not RCRA reportable. State and local laws may be different than the Federal RCRA statute.” Spills of contaminated fluid onto soil are cleaned up and disposed of properly. There are no significant environmental consequences (as defined by RCRA) of spills of one gallon or less of pure Ultrinium™ fluid. Worst case simulated spills of similar materials were made by Dow Corning and the samples were submitted to an independent environmental laboratory. The spills were not RCRA reportable. State and local laws may be different than the Federal RCRA statute. As a matter of Novinium policy, spills of Ultrinium fluids onto soil are cleaned up There are no significant environmental consequences (as defined by RCRA) of spills of one gallon or less of pure Ultrinium™ fluid. Worst case simulated spills of similar materials were made by Dow Corning and the samples were submitted to an independent environmental laboratory. The spills were not RCRA reportable. State and local laws may be different than the Federal RCRA statute. As a matter of Novinium policy, spills of Ultrinium fluids onto soil are cleaned up There are no significant environmental consequences (as defined by RCRA) of spills of one gallon or less of pure Ultrinium™ fluid. Worst case simulated spills of similar materials were made by Dow Corning and the samples were submitted to an independent environmental laboratory. The spills were not RCRA reportable. State and local laws may be different than the Federal RCRA statute. As a matter of Novinium policy, spills of Ultrinium fluids onto soil are cleaned up and disposed of properly. 2.1f As described in [8], the quick disconnect fitting with automatic shut-off valves were introduced to reduce drop-size spills. The service supplier's CPM requires injection personnel to excavate, properly dispose of, and replace any contaminated soil, even though there is no Federal requirement to do so. Even at low concentrations, the silane mixture and the methyl alcohol by-product of its reaction with water have objectionable odors. The service supplier’s hazard communication program, including the on-site availability of MSDS sheets along with the easily recognized odor, results in recognition by the people likely to be exposed to the vapors. Novinium rejuvenation instructions require injection personnel to excavate, properly dispose of, and replace any contaminated soil, even though there is no Federal requirement to do so. Ultrinium fluid and the methyl alcohol by-product of its reaction with water have distinctive odors even at low vapor concentrations. Novinium’s hazard communication program, including the availability of the MSDS sheets both online and on the job site, and the distinctive sweet odor of the Novinium fluids, result in cognizance by the people likely to be exposed to the vapors. Novinium rejuvenation instructions require injection personnel to excavate, properly dispose of, and replace any contaminated soil, even though there is no Federal requirement to do so. Ultrinium fluid and the methyl alcohol by-product of its reaction with water have distinctive odors even at low vapor concentrations. Novinium’s hazard communication program, including the availability of the MSDS sheets both online and on the job site, and the distinctive sweet odor of the Novinium fluids, result in cognizance by the people likely to be exposed to the vapors. Novinium rejuvenation instructions require injection personnel to excavate, properly dispose of, and replace any contaminated soil, even though there is no Federal requirement to do so. Ultrinium fluid and the methyl alcohol by-product of its reaction with water have distinctive odors even at low vapor concentrations. Novinium’s hazard communication program, including the availability of the MSDS sheets both online and on the job site, and the distinctive sweet odor of the Novinium fluids, result in cognizance by the people likely to be exposed to the vapors. 2.1g According to [8], bacteria in the soil metabolize mixtures of PMDMS and TMMS to water, carbon dioxide, and silicon dioxide (sand). Contaminated fluid and soil with contaminated fluid must be disposed of at RCRA permitted facilities. Novinium fluids are metabolized by bacteria in the soil or decompose abiotically to water, carbon dioxide, silicon dioxide (sand), iron oxide, and other harmless compounds. Soil contaminated with fluid and contaminated fluid must be disposed of at RCRA permitted Novinium fluids are metabolized by bacteria in the soil or decompose abiotically to water, carbon dioxide, silicon dioxide (sand), iron oxide, and other harmless compounds. Soil contaminated with fluid and contaminated fluid must be disposed of at RCRA permitted Novinium fluids are metabolized by bacteria in the soil or decompose abiotically to water, carbon dioxide, silicon dioxide (sand), iron oxide, and other harmless compounds. Soil contaminated with fluid and contaminated fluid must be disposed of at RCRA permitted The primary source for the observations in the “UPR with soak – CC3” column is [8]. 27 Code UPR with soak – CC3 UPR without soak – P011 UPR without soak – U732 facilities as per Novinium policy. facilities as per Novinium policy. SPR – U732 facilities as per Novinium policy. Risk (0, 0) (Note: The risks of environmental contamination are very close to zero when the Novinium Rejuvenation Instructions are followed.) 2.1h Risk (0, 0) (Note: Following CPM procedures, the risks of environmental contamination are virtually zero. As discussed in (b), there are potential environmental consequences, if contaminated fluids spills are not cleaned up. Risk (0, 0) (Note: The risks of environmental contamination are very close to zero when the Novinium Rejuvenation Instructions are followed.) Risk (0, 0) (Note: The risks of environmental contamination are very close to zero when the Novinium Rejuvenation Instructions are followed.) 2.2 Chemical, Toxicological Chemical, Toxicological Chemical, Toxicological Chemical, Toxicological 2.2a Accidental contact with CC3 fluid. Accidental contact with P011 fluids. Accidental contact with U732 fluids. Accidental contact with U732 fluid. 2.2b It would be unusual for injectors or line personnel to have other than incidental contact with rejuvenation fluids. This section identifies the risks where contact is made for any reason. It would be unusual for injectors or line personnel to have other than incidental contact with rejuvenation fluids. This section identifies the risks where contact is made for any reason. It would be unusual for injectors or line personnel to have other than incidental contact with rejuvenation fluids. This section identifies the risks where contact is made for any reason. It would be unusual for injectors or line personnel to have other than incidental contact with rejuvenation fluids. This section identifies the risks where contact is made for any reason. 2.2c There are no carcinogens listed in the most current version of the CC3 fluid MSDS. P011 includes less than 0.01%w of the carcinogen and male reproductive toxin benzene [34]. Long term exposure to benzene by inhalation or skin contact may cause cancer, damage male reproductive organs, or be a developmental toxin to a developing fetus. There are no known carcinogens, male reproductive toxins, or developmental toxins in U732 fluids. There are no known carcinogens, male reproductive toxins, or developmental toxins in U732 fluids. 2.2.1 Chemical, Inhalation Chemical, Inhalation Chemical, Inhalation Chemical, Inhalation 2.2.1a During a spill of fluid into a confined or unconfined space an injector may breathe some of the vapors from the CC3 mixture composed primarily of PMDMS and TMMS. During a spill of fluid into a confined or unconfined space an injector may breathe some of the vapors from the P011 mixture composed primarily of PMDMS and isolauryl alcohol. During a spill of fluid into a confined or unconfined space an injector may breathe some of the vapors from U732 fluid. During a spill of fluid into a confined or unconfined space an injector may breathe some of the vapors from U732 fluid. 2.2.1b In [8], it is explained that delivery equipment is designed to keep the fluid and its vapors inside the container. If an accidental spill were to occur, the fluid reacts with moisture in the environment and liberates methyl alcohol. (A.k.a. wood alcohol or methanol. Methyl alcohol is a common component of oxygenated gasoline and windshield washer solvent.) Like ethyl alcohol, which can cause intoxication, methyl alcohol has a Fluid delivery equipment is designed to keep the fluid, and its vapors, within the container. If an accidental spill does occur, the fluid will react with moisture in the environment. The result of that reaction is the formation of methyl alcohol. (A.k.a. wood alcohol or methanol. Methyl alcohol is a common component of oxygenated gasoline and windshield washer solvent.) Like ethyl alcohol, which can cause intoxication, methyl alcohol has a Fluid delivery equipment is designed to keep the fluid, and its vapors, within the container. If an accidental spill does occur, the fluid will react with moisture in the environment. The result of that reaction is the formation of methyl alcohol. (A.k.a. wood alcohol or methanol. Methyl alcohol is a common component of oxygenated gasoline and windshield washer solvent.) Like ethyl alcohol, which can cause intoxication, methyl alcohol has a Fluid delivery equipment is designed to keep the fluid, and its vapors, within the container. If an accidental spill does occur, the fluid will react with moisture in the environment. The result of that reaction is the formation of methyl alcohol. (A.k.a. wood alcohol or methanol. Methyl alcohol is a common component of oxygenated gasoline and windshield washer solvent.) Like ethyl alcohol, which can cause intoxication, methyl alcohol has The primary source for the observations in the “UPR with soak – CC3” column is [8]. 28 Code UPR with soak – CC3 UPR without soak – P011 UPR without soak – U732 SPR – U732 similar effect. Large doses of approximately 1 ounce or more of methyl alcohol may lead to blindness or death. Inhalation of 1 ounce of methyl alcohol would require prolonged exposure. similar effect. Large doses of approximately 1 ounce of methyl alcohol may lead to blindness or death. Inhalation of 1 ounce of methyl alcohol would require prolonged exposure. similar effect. Large doses of approximately 1 ounce of methyl alcohol may lead to blindness or death. Inhalation of 1 ounce of methyl alcohol would require a prolonged exposure. a similar effect. Large doses of approximately 1 ounce of methyl alcohol may lead to blindness or death. Inhalation of 1 ounce of methyl alcohol would require a prolonged exposure. 2.2.1c As described in [8], methyl alcohol concentrations were measured in a confined space in a mock spill. The experiment demonstrated SCBA is required for clean up. On a unit weight basis, P011 fluids produce about 5% less methanol than PMDMS/TMMS mixtures. From [34], PMDMS includes less than 0.01%w of the carcinogen and male reproductive toxin benzene. Long term exposure to benzene by inhalation or skin contact may cause cancer or damage male reproductive organs. The vapor pressure of P011 fluid is lower than PMDMS/TMMS mixtures. SCBA is required for spill cleanup in confined spaces. On a unit weight basis, U732 fluids produce about 30% less methanol than PMDMS/TMMS mixtures. No known carcinogens or male reproductive toxins are present. The vapor pressure of U732 fluid is at least an order of magnitude less than PMDMS/TMMS mixtures. SCBA is required for spill cleanup in confined spaces. On a unit weight basis, U732 fluids produce about 30% less methanol than PMDMS/TMMS mixtures. No known carcinogens or male reproductive toxins are present. The vapor pressure of U732 fluid is at least an order of magnitude less than PMDMS/TMMS mixtures. SCBA is required for spill cleanup in confined spaces. 2.2.1d As outlined in [8], spills greater than a few drops have been uncommon. Two instances were reported in confined spaces and SCBA was required. The event ranking is “ultra-low” and the personnel present ranking is “likely”. Spills of any size have been uncommon at Novinium. The event ranking is “ultra-low” and the personnel present ranking is “likely”. Spills of any size have been uncommon at Novinium. The event ranking is “ultra-low” and the personnel present ranking is “likely”. Spills of any size have been uncommon at Novinium. The event ranking is “ultra-low” and the personnel present ranking is “likely”. 2.2.1e As recounted in [8], no damage to equipment or injury to personnel has been experienced. Prolonged exposure to methyl alcohol vapors may cause blindness or death. The equipment ranking is “not possible”, the personnel ranking is “life threatening”. No damage to equipment or injury to personnel has been experienced. Prolonged exposure to methanol vapors may cause blindness or death. The equipment ranking is “not possible”. From [34], prolonged exposure to benzene by inhalation may cause cancer or damage to male reproductive organs. The equipment ranking is “not possible”, the personnel ranking is “life threatening”. No damage to equipment or injury to personnel has been experienced. Prolonged exposure to methanol vapors may cause blindness or death. The equipment ranking is “not possible”. Because there is 30% less methanol, the vapor pressure is lower and there is no known carcinogen or male reproductive toxins present. The personnel ranking is ½ that of the other paradigm. No damage to equipment or injury to personnel has been experienced. Prolonged exposure to methanol vapors may cause blindness or death. The equipment ranking is “not possible”. Because there is 30% less methanol, the vapor pressure is lower and there is no known carcinogen or male reproductive toxins present. The personnel ranking is ½ that of the other paradigm. 2.2.1f From [8], equipment is designed to limit the maximum flow rate of fluid. This reduces the size of spills during attended portions of operations. Flow-restricting orifices and very small diameter tubing restrict fluid flow. All Novinium injection equipment is designed with flow rate restricting features. Injection adaptors and injection tools are typically operated at one-third of their design pressures. All injection adaptors seal fluid inside All Novinium injection equipment is designed with flow rate restricting features. Injection adaptors and injection tools are typically operated at one-third of their design pressures. All injection adaptors seal fluid inside All Novinium injection equipment is designed with flow rate restricting features. Injection adaptors and injection tools are typically operated at one-third of their design pressures. All injection adaptors seal fluid The primary source for the observations in the “UPR with soak – CC3” column is [8]. 29 Code UPR with soak – CC3 UPR without soak – P011 UPR without soak – U732 SPR – U732 Injection tanks are over-designed to make leaks less likely. of the cable and are inspected for leaks before replacing elbows or splices. of the cable and are inspected for leaks before replacing elbows or splices. inside of the cable and are inspected for leaks before replacing elbows or splices. 2.2.1g Use SCBA and aggressive ventilation in confined spaces. Use SCBA and ample ventilation in confined spaces. Use SCBA and ample ventilation in confined spaces. Use SCBA and ample ventilation in confined spaces. 2.2.1h Risk (0,375) Requipment=0.0005●0=0 Rpersonnel=0.0005●0.75●106=375 Risk (0,375) Requipment=0.0005●0=0 Rpersonnel=0.0005●0.75●106= 375 Risk (0,188) Requipment=0.0005●0=0 Rpersonnel=0.0005●0.75●106/2=188 Risk (0,188) Requipment=0.0005●0=0 Rpersonnel=.0005●0.75●106/2=188 2.2.2 Chemical, Oral Chemical, Oral Chemical, Oral Chemical, Oral 2.2.2a Ingestion or CC3 fluid (PMDMSTMMS mixture). While the IHA [8] identified this risk, there was no discussion provided in the 2001 document. Ingestion of P011 fluid. Ingestion of U732 fluid. Ingestion of U732 fluid. 2.2.2b If CC3 fluid is consumed, the fluid will react with water in the stomach and generate methyl alcohol. (Also known as wood alcohol or methanol. Methyl alcohol is a common component of oxygenated gasoline and windshield washer solvent.) Methyl alcohol imparts symptoms similar to intoxication with ethyl alcohol. Large doses of methyl alcohol may cause blindness or death. For a typical man, a large dose would require ingestion of about 3 ounces of the PMDMS/TMMS mixture, which upon reaction with water yields about an ounce of methyl alcohol. If P011 fluid is consumed, the fluid will react with water in the stomach and generate methyl alcohol. (Also known as wood alcohol or methanol. Methyl alcohol is a common component of oxygenated gasoline and windshield washer solvent.) Methyl alcohol imparts symptoms similar to intoxication with ethyl alcohol. Large doses of methyl alcohol may cause blindness or death. For a typical man, a large dose would require ingestion of about 3 ounces of Perficio fluid, which upon reaction with water yields about an ounce of methyl alcohol. If U732 fluid is consumed, the fluid will react with water in the stomach and generate methyl alcohol. (Also known as wood alcohol or methanol. Methyl alcohol is a common component of oxygenated gasoline and windshield washer solvent.) Methyl alcohol imparts symptoms similar to intoxication with ethyl alcohol. Large doses of methyl alcohol may cause blindness or death. For a typical man, a large dose would require ingestion of about 4 ounces of Ultrinium fluid, which upon reaction with water yields about an ounce of methyl alcohol. If U732 fluid is consumed, the fluid will react with water in the stomach and generate methyl alcohol. (Also known as wood alcohol or methanol. Methyl alcohol is a common component of oxygenated gasoline and windshield washer solvent.) Methyl alcohol imparts symptoms similar to intoxication with ethyl alcohol. Large doses of methyl alcohol may cause blindness or death. For a typical man, a large dose would require ingestion of about 4 ounces of Ultrinium fluid, which upon reaction with water yields about an ounce of methyl alcohol. 2.2.2c There has very likely never been an incident of ingestion as the fluid has an extremely bitter taste. There has never been an incident of ingestion, because the fluid has an extremely bitter taste. There has never been an incident of ingestion, because the fluid has an extremely bitter taste. There has never been an incident of ingestion, because the fluid has an extremely bitter taste. 2.2.2d The event ranking is “not possible” with personnel present being “not possible”. The event ranking is “not possible” with personnel present being “not possible”. The event ranking is “not possible” with personnel present being “not possible”. The event ranking is “not possible” with personnel present being “not possible”. 2.2.2e Ingestion of approximately 3 ounces of PMDMS/TMMS mixture may cause blindness or death. The equipment ranking is “not possible”, the personnel ranking is “life threatening”. Ingestion of approximately 3 ounces of Perficio fluid may cause blindness or death. The equipment ranking is “not possible”, the personnel ranking is “life threatening”. Ingestion of approximately 4 ounces of Ultrinium fluid may cause blindness or death. The equipment ranking is “not possible”, the personnel ranking is “life threatening”. Ingestion of approximately 4 ounces of Ultrinium fluid may cause blindness or death. The equipment ranking is “not possible”, the personnel ranking is “life threatening”. Because of the extremely bitter taste of Ultrinium fluid, one would have to be suicidal and Because of the extremely bitter taste of Ultrinium fluid, one would have to be suicidal and Because of the extremely bitter Because of the extremely bitter taste of Ultrinium fluid, one would taste of silanes, one would have have to be suicidal and to be suicidal and masochistic to The primary source for the observations in the “UPR with soak – CC3” column is [8]. 2.2.2f 30 Code UPR with soak – CC3 UPR without soak – P011 UPR without soak – U732 SPR – U732 choose this method of ending one’s life. Methanol, which tastes just like ethanol, is easily available in windshield washer fluid and when mixed with orange juice would be a more palatable option. masochistic to choose this method of ending one’s life. Methanol, which tastes just like ethanol, is easily available in windshield washer fluid and when mixed with orange juice would be a more palatable option. masochistic to choose this method of ending one’s life. Methanol, which tastes just like ethanol, is easily available in windshield washer fluid and when mixed with orange juice would be a more palatable option. masochistic to choose this method of ending one’s life. Methanol, which tastes just like ethanol, is easily available in windshield washer fluid and when mixed with orange juice would be a more palatable option. 2.2.2g If ingested, rush to doctor, do not induce vomiting. Treat with ethanol and copious amounts of water. If ingested, rush to doctor, do not induce vomiting. Treat with ethanol and copious amounts of water. If ingested, rush to doctor, do not induce vomiting. Treat with ethanol and copious amounts of water. If ingested, rush to doctor, do not induce vomiting. Treat with ethanol and copious amounts of water. 2.2.2h Risk (0,0) Requipment=0.0●0=0 Rpersonnel=0.0●0.0●106=0 Risk (0,0) Requipment=0.0●0=0 Rpersonnel=0.0●0.0●106=0 Risk (0,0) Requipment=0.0●0=0 Rpersonnel=0.0●0.0●106=0 Risk (0,0) Requipment=0.0●0=0 Rpersonnel=0.0●0.0●106=0 2.2.3 Chemical, Skin Chemical, Skin Chemical, Skin Chemical, Skin 2.2.3a Contact of CC3 fluid (PMDMS/TMMS mixture) with skin. While the IHA [8] identified this risk, there was no discussion provided in the 2001 document. Contact of P011 fluid with skin. Contact of U732 fluid with skin. Contact of U732 fluid with skin. 2.2.3b If PMDMS/TMMS mixture is in contact with skin the fluid will remove water and extract natural oils from the skin, which may cause irritation and some redness. If PMDMS mixture is in contact with skin, some small amount of benzene will diffuse into the body. Benzene is a carcinogen and male reproductive toxin. The fluid will also remove water and extract natural oils from the skin, which may cause irritation and some redness. All injection equipment is of low drip design to minimize the possibility of contact. If U732 fluid is in contact with skin, water and natural oils will be extracted from the skin, which will likely cause irritation and some redness. All injection equipment is of low drip design to minimize the possibility of contact. If U732 fluid is in contact with skin, water and natural oils will be extracted from the skin, which will likely cause irritation and some redness. All injection equipment is of low drip design to minimize the possibility of contact. 2.2.3c The author is not aware of any documented cases of cancer or male infertility, which have been directly linked to dermal exposure of PMDMS/TMMS. To the author’s knowledge, all cases of skin irritation have been temporary. The interested reader should inquire directly with the injection service supplier. The author is not aware of any documented cases of cancer or male infertility, which have been directly linked to dermal exposure of PMDMS. There have not been any incidences of irritated skin. There have not been any incidences of irritated skin. There have not been any incidences of irritated skin. 2.2.3d The event ranking is “very low” with personnel present being “certain”. The event ranking is “ultra-low” because of the elimination of the soak period; personnel present being “certain”. The event ranking is “ultra-low” because of the elimination of the soak period; personnel present being “certain”. The event ranking is “ultra-low” with personnel present being “certain”. 2.2.3e Consequences range from minor Consequences range from minor Minor skin irritation is possible. Minor skin irritation is possible. The primary source for the observations in the “UPR with soak – CC3” column is [8]. 31 Code UPR with soak – CC3 UPR without soak – P011 UPR without soak – U732 SPR – U732 skin irritation to male infertility to contributory death by cancer. The equipment ranking is “not possible”, the personnel ranking is “life threatening”. skin irritation to male infertility to contributory death by cancer. The equipment ranking is “not possible”, the personnel ranking is “life threatening”. The equipment ranking is “not possible”, the personnel ranking is “low”. The equipment ranking is “not possible”, the personnel ranking is “low”. 2.2.3f Plastic or elastomeric gloves should be worn when there is a chance of contact with fluid. Plastic or elastomeric gloves should be worn when there is a chance of contact with fluid. Plastic or elastomeric gloves should be worn when there is a chance of contact with fluid. Plastic or elastomeric gloves should be worn when there is a chance of contact with fluid. 2.2.3g When dermal contact does occur, wash with soap and warm water. Apply moisturizing lotion to prevent redness due to drying. When dermal contact does occur, wash with soap and warm water. Apply moisturizing lotion to prevent redness due to drying. When dermal contact does occur, wash with soap and warm water. Apply moisturizing lotion to prevent redness due to drying. When dermal contact does occur, wash with soap and warm water. Apply moisturizing lotion to prevent redness due to drying. 2.2.3h Risk (0,5000) Requipment=0.005●0=0 Rpersonnel=0.005●1.0●106=5000 Risk (0,500) Requipment=0.0005●0=0 Rpersonnel=0.0005●1.0●106=500 Risk (0,5) Requipment=0.0005●0=0 Rpersonnel=0.0005●1.0●103=5 Risk (0,5) Requipment=0.0005●0=0 Rpersonnel=0.0005●1.0●103=5 2.2.4 Chemical, Eyes Chemical, Eyes Chemical, Eyes Chemical, Eyes 2.2.4a Contact of CC3 fluid with the eyes. While the IHA [8] identified this risk, there was no discussion provided in the 2001 document. Contact of P011 fluid with the eyes. Contact of U732 fluid with the eyes. Contact of U732 fluid with the eyes. 2.2.4b When CC3 fluid gets into the eyes of personnel, it displaces tears and creates an unpleasant, dry feeling. When P011 fluid gets into the eyes of personnel it displaces tears and creates an unpleasant, dry feeling. When U732 fluid gets into the eyes of personnel it displaces tears and creates an unpleasant, dry feeling. When U732 fluid gets into the eyes of personnel it displaces tears and creates an unpleasant, dry feeling. 2.2.4c The author is not aware of any cases where fluid contact injured the eyes of injection personnel. The interested reader should inquire directly with the injection service supplier. There have not been any incidences of fluid in eyes. There have not been any incidences of fluid in eyes. There have not been any incidences of fluid in eyes. 2.2.4d The event ranking is “ultra-low” with personnel present being “certain”. The event ranking is “ultra-low” with personnel present being “certain”. The event ranking is “ultra-low” with personnel present being “certain”. The event ranking is “ultra-low” with personnel present being “certain”. 2.2.4e Eyes can become very irritated. The equipment ranking is “not possible”, the personnel ranking is “low”. Eyes can become very irritated. The equipment ranking is “not possible”, the personnel ranking is “low”. Eyes can become very irritated. The equipment ranking is “not possible”, the personnel ranking is “low”. Eyes can become very irritated. The equipment ranking is “not possible”, the personnel ranking is “low”. 2.2.4f Safety glasses with side shields should be worn at all times around pressurized fluid. Safety glasses with side shields should be worn at all times around pressurized fluid. Safety glasses with side shields should be worn at all times around pressurized fluid. Safety glasses with side shields should be worn at all times around pressurized fluid. 2.2.4g A portable eye wash should be nearby when working with pressurized fluids. Rinse eyes thoroughly if exposure occurs. A portable eye wash should be nearby when working with pressurized fluids. Rinse eyes thoroughly if exposure occurs. A portable eye wash should be nearby when working with pressurized fluids. Rinse eyes thoroughly if exposure occurs. A portable eye wash should be nearby when working with pressurized fluids. Rinse eyes thoroughly if exposure occurs. 2.2.4h Risk (0,0.5) Risk (0,0.5) Risk (0,0.5) Risk (0,0.5) The primary source for the observations in the “UPR with soak – CC3” column is [8]. 32 Code UPR with soak – CC3 UPR without soak – P011 UPR without soak – U732 SPR – U732 Requipment=0.0005●0=0 Rpersonnel=0.0005●1.0●103 =0.5 Requipment=0.0005●0=0 Rpersonnel=0.0005●1.0●103 =0.5 Requipment=0.0005●0=0 Rpersonnel=0.0005●1.0●103 =0.5 Requipment=0.0005●0=0 Rpersonnel=0.0005●1.0●103 =0.5 2.3 Chemical, Fire/Explosion Chemical, Fire/Explosion Chemical, Fire/Explosion Chemical, Fire/Explosion 2.3a Incremental fire/explosion hazards associated with cable injection. Incremental fire/explosion hazards associated with cable injection. Incremental fire/explosion hazards associated with cable injection. Incremental fire/explosion hazards associated with cable injection. 2.3b There are three ingredients required to experience fire or explosion. They are a source of ignition, fuel, and oxygen (a component of air). Sources of ignition abound in medium voltage electrical environments. Injection technology introduces a fuel. There is a fourth requirement to create an explosion. Either the fuel and air must be mixed in a sufficiently large quantity that the flame front has time to accelerate to the speed of sound, or the flammable mixture of fuel and air must be confined. The ease with which a fluid ignites is measured by its flash point. The flash point is the temperature of the fluid where the vapor pressure of the fluid is sufficiently high to provide enough vapor to exceed the lower flammability limit in air with an ASTM prescribed geometry and rate of temperature rise. The lower the flash point the easier it is to ignite and the more dangerous the fluid. As described in [8], PMDMS/TMMS mixtures may be a source of fuel. Injection equipment is pressurized with helium, so there is no oxygen present. Injected cables are flushed with nitrogen, so there is no oxygen present. For a fire to be possible, either air must leak into the injection devices or fluid must leak out. Flash points from referenced MSDSs of several materials are listed in the table below: There are three ingredients required to experience fire or explosion. They are a source of ignition, fuel, and oxygen (a component of air). Sources of ignition abound in medium voltage electrical environments. Injection technology introduces a fuel. There is a fourth requirement to create an explosion. Either the fuel and air must be mixed in a sufficiently large quantity that the flame front has time to accelerate to the speed of sound, or the flammable mixture of fuel and air must be confined. The ease with which a fluid ignites is measured by its flash point. The flash point is the temperature of the fluid where the vapor pressure of the fluid is sufficiently high to provide enough vapor to exceed the lower flammability limit in air with an ASTM prescribed geometry and rate of temperature rise. The lower the flash point the easier it is to ignite and the more dangerous the fluid. P011 fluids may be a source of fuel. Within the injection equipment and cables being injected there is only carbon dioxide. Carbon dioxide is inert and does not support combustion. Either air must leak into the injection devices or fluid must leak out to create a potentially flammable mixture. After the injection is complete, the fluid is sealed inside the cable in an equipotential zone and no electrical discharge is possible. If fluid leaks from an injected cable, the spilled There are three ingredients required to experience fire or explosion. They are a source of ignition, fuel, and oxygen (a component of air). Sources of ignition abound in medium voltage electrical environments. Injection technology introduces a fuel. There is a fourth requirement to create an explosion. Either the fuel and air must be mixed in a sufficiently large quantity that the flame front has time to accelerate to the speed of sound, or the flammable mixture of fuel and air must be confined. The ease with which a fluid ignites is measured by its flash point. The flash point is the temperature of the fluid where the vapor pressure of the fluid is sufficiently high to provide enough vapor to exceed the lower flammability limit in air with an ASTM prescribed geometry and rate of temperature rise. The lower the flash point the easier it is to ignite and the more dangerous the fluid. U732 fluids may be a source of fuel. Within the injection equipment and cables being injected there is only carbon dioxide. Carbon dioxide is inert and does not support combustion. Either air must leak into the injection devices or fluid must leak out to create a potentially flammable mixture. After the injection is complete, the fluid is sealed inside the cable in an equipotential zone and no electrical discharge is possible. If fluid leaks from an injected cable, the spilled There are three ingredients required to experience fire or explosion. They are a source of ignition, fuel, and oxygen (a component of air). Sources of ignition abound in medium voltage electrical environments. Injection technology introduces a fuel. There is a fourth requirement to create an explosion. Either the fuel and air must be mixed in a sufficiently large quantity that the flame front has time to accelerate to the speed of sound, or the flammable mixture of fuel and air must be confined. The ease with which a fluid ignites is measured by its flash point. The flash point is the temperature of the fluid where the vapor pressure of the fluid is sufficiently high to provide enough vapor to exceed the lower flammability limit in air with an ASTM prescribed geometry and rate of temperature rise. The lower the flash point the easier it is to ignite and the more dangerous the fluid. U732 fluids may be a source of fuel. Within the injection equipment and cables being injected there is only carbon dioxide. Carbon dioxide is inert and does not support combustion. Either air must leak into the injection devices or fluid must leak out to create a potentially flammable mixture. The Novinium SPR process is applied to deenergized devices The primary source for the observations in the “UPR with soak – CC3” column is [8]. 33 Code UPR with soak – CC3 Material Flash Unleaded Gasoline -49°F (-45°C) CC/SD 32°F (0°C) CC3 55°F (13°C) Jet Fuel A 100°F (38°C) P011 fluid >142°F (61°C) PMDMS 142°F (61°C) U732 fluids >144°F (62°C) Hydrolyzed U732 fluids >212°F (100°C) CC3 hydrolyzate >212°F (100°C) U733 fluid >248°F (120°C) CC/SD (strand desiccant) does not have a significant impact on the potential post-failure scenarios discussed in this section, since it is flushed from the cable during the injection phase of the process. The CC3 fluid is made up primarily of two components, PMDMS and TMMS. TMMS is more volatile and causes the initially low flash point of CC3 fluid. PMDMS has a flash point of 142°F. The more volatile TMMS fluid diffuses quickly into the insulation. The flash point of the mixture in the strand interstices increases to about the flash point of PMDMS after a year or two within typical cables. After the TMMS has essentially exuded from the cable, the flash point continues to increase and approaches 212°F as the PMDMS monomer oligomerizes (reacts with water and condenses in the presence of a catalyst). In the flash point table nearby, the material, which is the end result of this condensation process, is referred to as “CC3 hydrolyzate. In cables, both PMDMS and UPR without soak – P011 UPR without soak – U732 SPR – U732 fluid may be exposed to sources of fluid may be exposed to sources of and hence there is generally not ignition. ignition. a source of ignition. After the injection is complete, the fluid is sealed inside the cable in an Flash points of various materials Flash points of various materials equipotential zone and no are listed in the table below: are listed in the table below: electrical discharge is possible. Material Flash Material Flash If fluid leaks from an injected Unleaded -49°F (-45°C) Unleaded -49°F (-45°C) cable, the spilled fluid may be Gasoline Gasoline exposed to sources of ignition. CC/SD 32°F (0°C) CC/SD 32°F (0°C) CC3 55°F (13°C) CC3 55°F (13°C) Jet Fuel A 100°F (38°C) Jet Fuel A 100°F (38°C) P011 fluid >142°F (61°C) P011 fluid >142°F (61°C) PMDMS 142°F (61°C) PMDMS 142°F (61°C) U732 fluids >144°F (62°C) U732 fluids >144°F (62°C) Hydrolyzed U732 fluids >212°F (100°C) Hydrolyzed U732 fluids >212°F (100°C) CC3 hydrolyzate >212°F (100°C) CC3 hydrolyzate U733 fluid >248°F (120°C) U733 fluid The flash point of Perficio fluid increases toward that of CC3 hydrolyzate as the silane monomer oligomerize in power cables. Flash points of various materials are listed in the table below: Material Flash Unleaded Gasoline -49°F (-45°C) CC/SD 32°F (0°C) CC3 55°F (13°C) >212°F (100°C) Jet Fuel A 100°F (38°C) P011 fluid >142°F (61°C) >248°F (120°C) PMDMS 142°F (61°C) U732 fluids >144°F (62°C) Hydrolyzed U732 fluids >212°F (100°C) CC3 hydrolyzate >212°F (100°C) U733 fluid >248°F (120°C) The flash point of Ultrinium fluids increases toward that of hydrolyzed Ultrinium fluids as the silane monomers oligomerize in power cables. The flash point of Ultrinium fluids increases toward that of hydrolyzed Ultrinium fluids as the silane monomers oligomerize in power cables. The primary source for the observations in the “UPR with soak – CC3” column is [8]. 34 Code UPR with soak – CC3 UPR without soak – P011 UPR without soak – U732 SPR – U732 mixtures of PMDMS and TMMS end up as the same mixture of condensed PMDMS oligomers. The resulting mixture of PMDMS oligomers is realized about five to twelve years after treatment. The actual time depends upon the cable geometry, the operating temperature of the cable, and the amount of water available inside the cable. 2.3.1 Chemical, Fire/Explosion, Storage Chemical, Fire/Explosion, Storage Chemical, Fire/Explosion, Storage Chemical, Fire/Explosion, Storage 2.3.1a All storage of fluids is at service supplier facilities. All storage of fluids is at service supplier facilities. All storage of fluids is at service supplier facilities. All storage of fluids is at service supplier facilities. 2.3.2 Chemical, Fire/Explosion, Transportation Chemical, Fire/Explosion, Transportation Chemical, Fire/Explosion, Transportation Chemical, Fire/Explosion, Transportation 2.3.2a All transfer and transport of fluids to and from the job site is the responsibility of the service supplier. All transfer and transport of fluids to and from the job site is the responsibility of the service supplier. All transfer and transport of fluids to and from the job site is the responsibility of the service supplier. All transfer and transport of fluids to and from the job site is the responsibility of the service supplier. 2.3.2a According to [8], cables or cable accessories may fail during the injection, soak, or post-soak. URD circuits are typically injected at 20 psig or less and soaked at about 10 psig. After a soak period of 60-90 days, the delivery pressure is zero. The quantity of fluid, which can leak and the flow rate at which it leaks, is related to 1) the feed or soak pressure, 2) head pressure from a change in elevation, 3) the distance from a pressurized feed tank, and 4) the vapor pressure of the fluid in the strands. Head pressure due to elevation changes could be a problem because of the pressure limits on the elbow seal and the splice seal. The distance from the feed tank has a large impact, because significant sustained flow is unlikely on the vacuum end of typical cable lengths. This slow flow is a result of the resistance to flow through the cable. The total fluid available also varies depending on the injection status Cables or cable accessories may fail during the injection or postinjection periods. URD circuits are typically injected at 20 psig or less. The quantity of fluid, which can leak and the flow rate at which it leaks, is related to 1) the feed pressure, 2) head pressure from a change in elevation, 3) the distance from a pressurized feed tank, and 4) the vapor pressure of the fluid in the strands. Head pressure due to elevation changes could be a problem because of the pressure limits on elbow and splice seals. The distance from the feed tank has a large impact, because significant sustained flow is unlikely on the vacuum end of typical cable lengths. This slow flow is a result of the resistance to flow through the cable. The total fluid available also varies depending on the injection status and the length and geometry of the cable. During the injection, a reservoir of up to one-gallon of Cables or cable accessories may fail during the injection or postinjection periods. URD circuits are typically injected at 20 psig or less. The quantity of fluid, which can leak and the flow rate at which it leaks, is related to 1) the feed pressure, 2) head pressure from a change in elevation, 3) the distance from a pressurized feed tank, and 4) the vapor pressure of the fluid in the strands. Head pressure due to elevation changes could be a problem because of the pressure limits on elbow and splice seals. The distance from the feed tank has a large impact, because significant sustained flow is unlikely on the vacuum end of typical cable lengths. This slow flow is a result of the resistance to flow through the cable. The total fluid available also varies depending on the injection status and the length and geometry of the cable. During the injection, a reservoir of up to one-gallon of With the SPR injection paradigm, fluid is not injected into energized cables and hence the injection, soak, and post-soak periods do not apply. Fluid is sealed inside the cable with metallic pins. All pins are inspected for leaks before replacing elbows and splices. Any head pressure due to elevation will be contained by the injection adaptors. Pressure in the post injection period decays exponentially as generally suggested by the graph below. The actual decay rate is faster at higher temperatures. The maximum leak size is a fraction of the injected fluid. NRI 99 available at www.novinium.com provides guidance on maximum spill sizes. The primary source for the observations in the “UPR with soak – CC3” column is [8]. 35 UPR with soak – CC3 UPR without soak – P011 UPR without soak – U732 and the length and geometry of the cable. During the injection and soak phases, a reservoir of up to one-gallon of fluid (more typically half that amount) can provide fluid for a leak. After the feed or soak bottle is removed (post-injection), there is typically less than 1 gallon in the strand interstices for every 1000 feet of cable. The fluid reservoir in the strands decreases continuously after the injection soak bottles are removed. In addition to the injection pressure and head pressure, the other source of pressure is the fluid vapor pressure. All materials exhibit vapor pressure. As an example, water has a vapor pressure, which increases to 14.7 psia (1 atmosphere of pressure) at its boiling point of 100°C (212°F). According to [8], CC3 fluid has a vapor pressure of 6.4 psia at 30°C, 9.5 psia at 60°C, and about 21.7 psia at 90°C. The TMMS component of CC3, however, diffuses quite rapidly out of the cable strands, and once it is gone (6 to 30 months depending upon temperature and geometry); the vapor pressure of the remaining fluid is less than that of water. Note that all pressures are in psia (pounds per square inch, absolute) and hence in the closed environment inside a cable, there is effectively no pressure until the vapor pressure exceeds 14.7 psia, which is typical atmospheric pressure at sea level. fluid (more typically half that amount) can provide fluid for a leak. After the feed bottle is removed (post-injection), there is typically less than 1 gallon in the strand interstices for every 1000 feet of cable. The fluid reservoir in the strands decreases continuously after the injection bottles are removed. In addition to the injection pressure and head pressure, the other source of pressure is the fluid vapor pressure. All materials exhibit vapor pressure. As an example, water has a vapor pressure, which increases to 14.7 psia (1 atmosphere of pressure) at its boiling point of 100°C (212°F). P011 fluid has a vapor pressure below 2 psia at 130°C. fluid (more typically half that amount) can provide fluid for a leak. After the feed bottle is removed (post-injection), there is typically less than 1 gallon in the strand interstices for every 1000 feet of cable. The fluid reservoir in the strands decreases continuously after the injection bottles are removed. In addition to the injection pressure and head pressure, the other source of pressure is the fluid vapor pressure. All materials exhibit vapor pressure. As an example, water has a vapor pressure, which increases to 14.7 psia (1 atmosphere of pressure) at its boiling point of 100°C (212°F). U732 fluid has a vapor pressure below 2 psia at 130°C. 2.3.3 Chemical, Fire/Explosion, Injection, Soak, Post-Soak, or Post-Injection Chemical, Fire/Explosion, Injection, Soak, Post-Soak, or Post-Injection Chemical, Fire/Explosion, Injection, Soak, Post-Soak, or Post-Injection Chemical, Fire/Explosion, Injection, Soak, Post-Soak, or Post-Injection 2.3.3a Ignition of leaking fluid from injected distribution component failure or fluid delivery systems. Ignition of leaking fluid from injected distribution component failure or fluid delivery systems. Ignition of leaking fluid from injected distribution component failure or fluid delivery systems. Ignition of leaking fluid from injected distribution component failure or fluid delivery systems. The primary source for the observations in the “UPR with soak – CC3” column is [8]. 36 SPR – U732 500 Pressure Decay (1/0 cable at 25°C) 30 psig 450 240 psig 400 480 psig 350 300 P re s s u re (p s ig ) Code 250 200 150 100 50 Elapsed Time (days) 0 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 Besides the injection pressure and pressure from hydrostatic head changes, there is one other source of pressure, which affects the leak rate and leak characteristics. Every liquid has a characteristic vapor pressure. Water, for example, has a vapor pressure, which increases to 14.7 psia (1 bar or 1 atmosphere of pressure) at its boiling point of 100°C (212°F). U732 fluid has a vapor pressure below 2 psia at 130°C. Code UPR with soak – CC3 UPR without soak – P011 UPR without soak – U732 SPR – U732 2.3.3.1 Chemical, Fire/Explosion, Injection, Soak, Post-Soak, or Post-Injection, Catastrophic electrical failure Chemical, Fire/Explosion, Injection, Soak, Post-Soak, or Post-Injection, Catastrophic electrical failure Chemical, Fire/Explosion, Injection, Soak, Post-Soak, or Post-Injection, Catastrophic electrical failure Chemical, Fire/Explosion, Injection, Soak, Post-Soak, or Post-Injection, Catastrophic electrical failure 2.3.3.1a When a cable or component fails, a hole is blow in its side. If fluid remains present in the cable or cable component, some will leak. When a cable fails, a hole is blow in its side. If fluid is present in the cable, some will leak. When a cable fails, a hole is blow in its side. If fluid is present in the cable, some will leak. When a cable fails, a hole is blow in its side. If fluid is present in the cable, some will leak. 2.3.3.1.1 Chemical, Fire/Explosion, Injection, Soak, Post-Soak, or Post-Injection, Catastrophic Electrical Failure, Cable Chemical, Fire/Explosion, Injection, Soak, Post-Soak, or Post-Injection, Catastrophic Electrical Failure, Cable Chemical, Fire/Explosion, Injection, Soak, Post-Soak, or Post-Injection, Catastrophic Electrical Failure, Cable Chemical, Fire/Explosion, Injection, Soak, Post-Soak, or Post-Injection, Catastrophic Electrical Failure, Cable 2.3.3.1.1a When a cable fails, a hole is blown in its side. If fluid remains in the strands, some may leak. When a cable fails, a hole is blown in its side. If fluid remains in the strands, some may leak. When a cable fails, a hole is blown in its side. If fluid remains in the strands, some may leak. When a cable fails, a hole is blown in its side. If fluid remains in the strands, some may leak. 2.3.3.1.1b If the leak occurs in a direct buried cable, a lack of oxygen will preclude a fire. If the failure and leak occur within a transformer, fluid may leak within a confined space. (See 2.3.3.1.3) If a failure and an accompanying leak occur on a riser pole, the fluid will be released into an unconfined space. (See 2.3.3.1.4) If the leak occurs in a direct buried cable, a lack of oxygen will preclude a fire. If the failure and leak occur within a transformer, fluid may leak within a confined space. (See 2.3.3.1.3) If a failure and its accompanying leak occur on a riser pole, the fluid will be released into an unconfined space. (See 2.3.3.1.4) If the leak occurs in a direct buried cable, a lack of oxygen will preclude a fire. If the failure and leak occur within a transformer, fluid may leak within a confined space. (See 2.3.3.1.3) If a failure and its accompanying leak occur on a riser pole, the fluid will be released into an unconfined space. (See 2.3.3.1.4) If the leak occurs in a direct buried cable, a lack of oxygen will preclude a fire. If the failure and leak occur within a transformer, fluid may leak within a confined space. (See 2.3.3.1.3) If a failure and its accompanying leak occur on a riser pole, the fluid will be released into an unconfined space. (See 2.3.3.1.4) 2.3.3.1.1c There have been no reported failures of cable, which have resulted in chemical fires. There have been no reported failures of cable, which have resulted in chemical fires. There have been no reported failures of cable, which have resulted in chemical fires. There have been no reported failures of cable, which have resulted in chemical fires. 2.3.3.1.1d During the period encompassing 1985 to 2000, approximately 0.6% of over 7 million feet of cables treated have failed for any reason. Approximately 0.4% (2/3 of the total failures) are cable failures. The failure rate for this paradigm is currently zero. It is anticipated that the cable failure rate will be superior to UPR with soak – CC3. The failure rate for this paradigm is currently zero. It is anticipated that the cable failure rate will be superior to UPR with soak – CC3. The total SPR – U732 failure rate is about half that for UPR – CC3. 2.3.3.1.1e See subcategory detail below. See subcategory detail below. See subcategory detail below. See subcategory detail below. 2.3.3.1.1f CC3 imparts more rapid improvement in dielectric performance than PMDMS alone reducing the possibility of dielectric failure. (Author: TMMS, which imparted the more rapid improvement, was reduced in 2005 by a factor of 6 as per the supplier’s MSDS [14] and [24]. Current PMDMS/TMMS P011 fluids delivered with UPR should enjoy superior postinjection reliability because of improvements to the catalysis. U732 fluids delivered with UPR should enjoy superior postinjection reliability because of improvements to the catalysis and the presence of organic functionality to add voltage, UV and PD stabilizers. U732 fluids delivered with SPR increase dielectric strength 87 times faster than the pre-2005 PMDMS/TMMS mixture that is no longer in use, greatly reducing the possibility of dielectric failure. The primary source for the observations in the “UPR with soak – CC3” column is [8]. 37 Code UPR with soak – CC3 UPR without soak – P011 UPR without soak – U732 SPR – U732 Chemical, Fire/Explosion, Injection, Soak, Post-Soak, or Post-Injection, Catastrophic electrical failure, Cable, Direct buried mixture will not enjoy the same rate of dielectric improvement as its predecessor fluid.) 2.3.3.1.1.1 Chemical, Fire/Explosion, Injection, Soak, Post-Soak, or Post-Injection, Catastrophic electrical failure, Cable, Direct buried Chemical, Fire/Explosion, Injection, Soak, Post-Soak, or Post-Injection, Catastrophic electrical failure, Cable, Direct buried Chemical, Fire/Explosion, Injection, Soak, Post-Soak, or Post-Injection, Catastrophic electrical failure, Cable, Direct buried 2.3.3.1.1.1a Treated direct buried cable fails. Treated direct buried cable fails. Treated direct buried cable fails. Treated direct buried cable fails. 2.3.3.1.1.1b Lack of oxygen precludes fire or explosion. Lack of oxygen precludes fire or explosion. Lack of oxygen precludes fire or explosion. Lack of oxygen precludes fire or explosion. 2.3.3.1.1.1c N/A N/A N/A N/A 2.3.3.1.1.1d Approximately 60 cables failed during the period from 1985 to 2000. The probability that a cable failure occurs in the direct buried portion of the cable is approximately 340/350 or 97% as only 3% is typically exposed at transformers or splice boxes. The event ranking is “very low”; the personnel present ranking is “not possible”. The probability that a cable failure occurs in the direct buried portion of the cable is approximately 340/350 or 97% as only 3% is typically exposed at transformers or splice boxes. The event ranking is “very low”; the personnel present ranking is “not possible”. The probability that a cable failure occurs in the direct buried portion of the cable is approximately 340/350 or 97% as only 3% is typically exposed at transformers or splice boxes. The event ranking is “very low”; the personnel present ranking is “not possible”. The probability that a cable failure occurs in the direct buried portion of the cable is approximately 340/350 or 97% as only 3% is typically exposed at transformers or splice boxes. The event ranking is “very low”; the personnel present ranking is “not possible”. 2.3.3.1.1.1e System protection will trip when a cable faults. System protection will trip when a cable faults. System protection will trip when a cable faults. System protection will trip when a cable faults. 2.3.3.1.1.1f CC2 (PMDMS/TMMS) fluid provides a more rapid improvement in dielectric performance than PMDMS alone, reducing the possibility of dielectric failure. (Author: The TMMS ingredient, which imparted the more rapid improvement, was reduced in 2005 by a factor of 6 as per [14] and [24]. Post-2005 PMDMS/TMMS fluid will suffer a slower rate of dielectric improvement.) P011 fluid provides a rapid improvement in dielectric performance, reducing the possibility of dielectric failure. U732 fluid provides a rapid improvement in dielectric performance, reducing the possibility of dielectric failure. U732 fluids delivered by SPR increase dielectric strength 87 times faster than the CC2 fluid that is no longer in use, greatly reducing the possibility of dielectric failure. 2.3.3.1.1.1g No data available on repeat failures. The interested reader should inquire directly with the injection service supplier. There have been zero occurrences of second faults with this technology. There have been zero occurrences of second faults with this technology. There have been zero occurrences of second faults with this technology. 2.3.3.1.1.1h Risk (0,0) Requipment=0.0●103=0 Rpersonnel=0.0●0.0●0=0 Risk (0,0) Requipment=0.0●103=0 Rpersonnel=0.0●0.0●0=0 Risk (0,0) Requipment=0.0●103=0 Rpersonnel=0.0●0.0●0=0 Risk (0,0) Requipment=0.0●103=0 Rpersonnel=0.0●0.0●0=0 The primary source for the observations in the “UPR with soak – CC3” column is [8]. 38 Code UPR with soak – CC3 UPR without soak – P011 UPR without soak – U732 SPR – U732 2.3.3.1.1.2 Chemical, Fire/Explosion, Injection, Soak, Post-Soak, or Post-Injection, Catastrophic electrical failure, Cable, Duct Chemical, Fire/Explosion, Injection, Soak, Post-Soak, or Post-Injection, Catastrophic electrical failure, Cable, Duct Chemical, Fire/Explosion, Injection, Soak, Post-Soak, or Post-Injection, Catastrophic electrical failure, Cable, Duct Chemical, Fire/Explosion, Injection, Soak, Post-Soak, or Post-Injection, Catastrophic electrical failure, Cable, Duct 2.3.3.1.1.2a Treated cable in duct fails. Treated cable in duct fails. Treated cable in duct fails. Treated cable in duct fails. 2.3.3.1.1.2b A small fire at the failure site is possible, but the fire should extinguish itself as it will be starved for oxygen. Fluid may flow down the duct and accumulate in a manhole or hand hole. (See 2.3.3.1.3) A small fire at the failure site is possible, but the fire should extinguish itself as it will be starved for oxygen. Fluid may flow down the duct and accumulate in a manhole or hand hole. The higher flashpoints of P011 fluid reduce the probability of ignition. (See 2.3.3.1.3) A small fire at the failure site is possible, but the fire should extinguish itself as it will be starved for oxygen. Fluid may flow down the duct and accumulate in a manhole or hand hole. The higher flashpoints of U732 fluids reduce the probability of ignition. (See 2.3.3.1.3) A small fire at the failure site is possible, but the fire should extinguish itself as it will be starved for oxygen. Fluid may flow down the duct and accumulate in a manhole or hand hole. The higher flashpoints of U732 fluids reduce the probability of ignition. (See 2.3.3.1.3) 2.3.3.1.1.2c There are no known failures with this scenario. There have been no failures with this scenario. There have been no failures with this scenario. There have been no failures with this scenario. 2.3.3.1.1.2d The probability is assumed the same as in the direct buried case. (See 2.3.3.1.1(d).) The event ranking is “very low”; the personnel present ranking is “not possible”. The probability is assumed the same as in the direct buried case. (See 2.3.3.1.1(d).) The event ranking is “very low” divided by 2; the personnel present ranking is “not possible”. The probability is assumed the same as in the direct buried case. (See 2.3.3.1.1(d).) The event ranking is “very low” divided by 2; the personnel present ranking is “not possible”. The probability is assumed the same as in the direct buried case. (See 2.3.3.1.1(d).) The event ranking is “very low” divided by 2; the personnel present ranking is “not possible”. 2.3.3.1.1.2e System protection will trip when cable fails. Damage to the duct is unlikely, but possible. The equipment ranking is “medium”. The personnel ranking is “none”. System protection will trip when cable fails. Damage to the duct is unlikely, but possible. The equipment ranking is “medium”. The personnel ranking is “none”. System protection will trip when cable fails. Damage to the duct is unlikely, but possible. The equipment ranking is “medium”. The personnel ranking is “none”. System protection will trip when cable fails. Damage to the duct is unlikely, but possible. The equipment ranking is “medium”. The personnel ranking is “none”. 2.3.3.1.1.2f PMDMS/TMMS mixtures impart more rapid improvement in dielectric performance than PMDMS alone, reducing the possibility of dielectric failure. (Author: The TMMS ingredient in PMDMS/TMMS mixture, which imparted the more rapid improvement, was reduced in 2005 by a factor of 6 as per the supplier’s MSDS.) P011 fluid has performance advantages over the CC3 fluid. Higher reliability reduces the likelihood of a fluid leak. U732 fluid has many performance advantages over the CC3 fluid. Higher reliability reduces the likelihood of a fluid leak. U732 fluids delivered with SPR increase dielectric strength 87 times faster than the pre-2005 CC2 fluid that is no longer in use. Current CC3 fluid will suffer a slower rate of dielectric improvement. 2.3.3.1.1.2g The cable must be replaced. Fluid is compatible with common duct materials and common cable jackets, so ducts do not have to be replaced or cleaned. The cable must be replaced. Fluid is compatible with common duct materials and common cable jackets, so ducts do not have to be replaced or cleaned. The cable must be replaced. Fluid is compatible with common duct materials and common cable jackets, so ducts do not have to be replaced or cleaned. The cable must be replaced. Fluid is compatible with common duct materials and common cable jackets, so ducts do not have to be replaced or cleaned. 2.3.3.1.1.2h Risk (5,0) Requipment=0.005●103=5 Rpersonnel=0.005●0.0●0=0 Risk (2.5,0) Requipment=0.005/2●103=5 Rpersonnel=0.005/2●0.0●0=0 Risk (2.5,0) Requipment=0.005/2●103=5 Rpersonnel=0.005/2●0.0●0=0 Risk (2.5,0) Requipment=0.005/2●103=5 Rpersonnel=0.005/2●0.0●0=0 The primary source for the observations in the “UPR with soak – CC3” column is [8]. 39 Code UPR with soak – CC3 UPR without soak – P011 UPR without soak – U732 SPR – U732 2.3.3.1.1.3 Chemical, Fire/Explosion, Injection, Soak, Post-Soak, or Post-Injection, Catastrophic electrical failure, Cable, Manhole Chemical, Fire/Explosion, Injection, Soak, Post-Soak, or Post-Injection, Catastrophic electrical failure, Cable, Manhole Chemical, Fire/Explosion, Injection, Soak, Post-Soak, or Post-Injection, Catastrophic electrical failure, Cable, Manhole Chemical, Fire/Explosion, Injection, Soak, Post-Soak, or Post-Injection, Catastrophic electrical failure, Cable, Manhole 2.3.3.1.1.3a Treated cable within manholes/handholes or near duct ends fails. Treated cable within manholes/handholes or near duct ends fails. Treated cable within manholes/handholes or near duct ends fails. Treated cable within manholes/handholes or near duct ends fails. 2.3.3.1.1.3b A small fire at the failure site is possible. Fluid may spill onto the floor and may be ignited by the failure or another source of ignition. For URD cables, the amount of fluid, which can spill, is typically less than 1 gallon (3.8 liters). For feeder cables, the spill size may be up to five gallons (18.9 liters). A small fire at the failure site is possible. Fluid may spill onto the floor and may be ignited by the failure or another source of ignition. For URD cables, the amount of fluid, which can spill, is typically less than 1 gallon (3.8 liters). For feeder cables, the spill size may be up to five gallons (8.9 liters). The high flash point of P011 fluid makes ignition less likely than with CC3 fluid mixtures. A small fire at the failure site is possible. Fluid may spill onto the floor and may be ignited by the failure or another source of ignition. For URD cables, the amount of fluid, which can spill, is typically less than 1 gallon (3.8 liters). For feeder cables, the spill size may be up to five gallons (8.9 liters). The high flash point of U732 fluids makes ignition less likely than with CC3 fluid mixtures. A small fire at the failure site is possible. Fluid may spill onto the floor and may be ignited by the failure or another source of ignition. For URD cables, the amount of fluid, which can spill, is typically less than 1 gallon (3.8 liters). For feeder cables, the spill size may be up to five gallons (8.9 liters). The high flash point of U732 fluids makes ignition less likely than with CC3 fluid mixtures. 2.3.3.1.1.3c There are no known failures with this scenario. There are no known failures with this scenario. There are no known failures with this scenario. There are no known failures with this scenario. 2.3.3.1.1.3d The event ranking is “ultra-low”; the personnel present ranking is “unlikely”. Because of the higher flash points the event ranking is at least 2times lower than that of flammable fluid. The personnel present ranking is “unlikely”. Because of the higher flash points the event ranking is at least 2times lower than that of flammable fluid. The personnel present ranking is “unlikely”. Because of the higher flash points the event ranking is at least 2-times lower than that of flammable fluid. The personnel present ranking is “unlikely”. 2.3.3.1.1.3e System protection will trip when circuit fails. Damage to the manhole and to other equipment in the manhole is likely, if a fire develops. The equipment ranking is “high”. The personnel ranking is “life threatening”. System protection will trip when circuit fails. Damage to the manhole and to other equipment in the manhole is likely, if a fire develops. The equipment ranking is “high”. The personnel ranking is “life threatening”. System protection will trip when circuit fails. Damage to the manhole and to other equipment in the manhole is likely, if a fire develops. The equipment ranking is “high”. The personnel ranking is “life threatening”. System protection will trip when circuit fails. Damage to the manhole and to other equipment in the manhole is likely, if a fire develops. The equipment ranking is “high”. The personnel ranking is “life threatening”. 2.3.3.1.1.3f PMDMS/TMMS mixtures provide a faster increase in dielectric performance than PMDMS alone reducing the possibility of dielectric failure. (Author: The TMMS ingredient in PMDMS/TMMS mixture, which imparts the more rapid improvement, was reduced in 2005 by a factor of 6 per the supplier’s MSDS.) Ultrinium fluid provides a rapid increase in dielectric performance, reducing the possibility of dielectric failure. Ultrinium fluid provides a rapid increase in dielectric performance, reducing the possibility of dielectric failure. Ultrinium fluids increase dielectric strength 87 times faster than CC2 fluid that is no longer in use. The current PMDMS/TMMS mixture, CC3, has a slower rate of dielectric improvement. 2.3.3.1.1.3g None. None. None. None. The primary source for the observations in the “UPR with soak – CC3” column is [8]. 40 Code UPR with soak – CC3 UPR without soak – P011 UPR without soak – U732 SPR – U732 2.3.3.1.1.3h Risk (2.5,25) Requipment=0.0005●5x103=2.5 Rpersonnel=0.0005●0.05●106=25 Risk (1.2,12.5) Requipment=0.0005/2●5x103=1.2 Rpersonnel=.0005/2●.05●106=12.5 Risk (1.2,12.5) Requipment=0.0005/2●5x103=1.2 Rpersonnel=.0005/2●.05●106=12.5 Risk (1.2,12.5) Requipment=0.0005/2●5x103=1.2 Rpersonnel=.0005/2●.05●106=12.5 2.3.3.1.2 Chemical, Fire/Explosion, Injection, Soak, Post-Soak, or Post-Injection, Catastrophic electrical failure, Splice Chemical, Fire/Explosion, Injection, Soak, Post-Soak, or Post-Injection, Catastrophic electrical failure, Splice Chemical, Fire/Explosion, Injection, Soak, Post-Soak, or Post-Injection, Catastrophic electrical failure, Splice Chemical, Fire/Explosion, Injection, Soak, Post-Soak, or Post-Injection, Catastrophic electrical failure, Splice 2.3.3.1.2a When a splice fails a hole is blown in its side or along an interface. If fluid is present in the strands and if no damming compound was used, some may leak. Damming compound is a cure-in-place silicone gel, which is sometimes used to block the strands and keep the PMDMS/TMMS fluid from coming in contact with splices, particularly on larger conductor sizes. This practice was largely suspended in the late 1990’s. When a splice fails a hole is blown in its side or along an interface. If fluid is present in the strands and if the compression connector and injection adaptor assembly are also breached, fluid may leak. When a splice fails a hole is blown in its side or along an interface. If fluid is present in the strands and if the compression connector and injection adaptor assembly are also breached, fluid may leak. When a splice fails a hole is blown in its side or along an interface. If fluid is present in the strands and if the compression connector and injection adaptor assembly are also breached, fluid may leak. 2.3.3.1.2b If the leak occurs in a direct buried splice, the lack of oxygen will preclude a fire. If a failure and a leak occur within an enclosure, the fluid may leak within a confined space. (See 2.2.2.1.3) If a failure and an accompanying leak occur on a riser pole, the fluid will be released into an unconfined space. (See 2.2.2.1.4) If the leak occurs in a direct buried splice, the lack of oxygen will preclude a fire. If a failure and a leak occur within an enclosure, the fluid may leak within a confined space. (See 2.2.2.1.3) If a failure and an accompanying leak occur on a riser pole, the fluid will be released into an unconfined space. (See 2.2.2.1.4) If the leak occurs in a direct buried splice, the lack of oxygen will preclude a fire. If a failure and a leak occur within an enclosure, the fluid may leak within a confined space. (See 2.2.2.1.3) If a failure and an accompanying leak occur on a riser pole, the fluid will be released into an unconfined space. (See 2.2.2.1.4) For a leak to occur, the splice, the steel injection adaptor, and aluminum or copper compression connector must be breached. If such a breach occurs in a direct buried splice, the lack of oxygen will preclude a fire. If a breach occurs within an enclosure, fluid may leak within a confined space. (See 2.2.2.1.3) If a breach occurs on a riser pole fluid may be released into an unconfined space. (See 2.2.2.1.4) 2.3.3.1.2c There have been no reported failures of splices, which have led directly to a fire. There have been no failures or breaches with this scenario. There have been no failures or breaches with this scenario. There have been no failures or breaches with this scenario. 2.3.3.1.2d During the period encompassing 1985 to 2000, approximately 0.6% of over 7 million feet of cables treated have failed for any reason. Approximately 0.1% (or 1/6 of the total failures) represent splice failures. (Author: The service supplier in March 2008 claimed that 80 million feet of cables have been treated.) Because of the higher flash points the event ranking is at least 2times lower than that of flammable CC3 fluid. The personnel present ranking is “unlikely”. Because of the higher flash points the event ranking is at least 2times lower than that of flammable CC3 fluid. The personnel present ranking is “unlikely”. Because of the higher flash points the event ranking is at least 2-times lower than that of flammable CC3 fluid. The personnel present ranking is “unlikely”. The primary source for the observations in the “UPR with soak – CC3” column is [8]. 41 Code UPR with soak – CC3 UPR without soak – P011 UPR without soak – U732 2.3.3.1.2e See below. See below. See below. SPR – U732 See below. 2.3.3.1.2f Pressure testing procedures promulgated in the CPM reduce the possibility of the contamination of splice interfaces. Note: FPL and the provider of UPR—CC3 to FPL employed a practice, which intentionally contaminated splice/cable interface and directly contradicted the CPM. This practice was terminated in the fall of 1997. (Author: Some users of this injection paradigm report 50% splice failure rates.) Pressure testing procedures promulgated in the NRIs reduce the possibility of the contamination of splice interfaces. Pressure testing procedures promulgated in the NRIs reduce the possibility of the contamination of splice interfaces. SPR utilizes resilient, robust, and redundant seals designed for pressures up to 1000 psig (69 bars) to assure that fluid in the cable interstices never come in contact with the splice body. 2.3.3.1.2.1 Chemical, Fire/Explosion, Injection, Soak, Post-Soak, or Post-Injection, Catastrophic electrical failure, Splice, Direct buried Chemical, Fire/Explosion, Injection, Soak, Post-Soak, or Post-Injection, Catastrophic electrical failure, Splice, Direct buried Chemical, Fire/Explosion, Injection, Soak, Post-Soak, or Post-Injection, Catastrophic electrical failure, Splice, Direct buried Chemical, Fire/Explosion, Injection, Soak, Post-Soak, or Post-Injection, Catastrophic electrical failure, Splice, Direct buried 2.3.3.1.2.1a Direct buried, treated splice fails with no damming compound. Direct buried, treated splice fails. Direct buried, treated splice fails. Direct buried, treated splice fails and injection adapter is breached. 2.3.3.1.2.1b Because there is no oxygen, a fire or explosion is not possible. Because there is no oxygen, a fire or explosion is not possible. Because there is no oxygen, a fire or explosion is not possible. Because there is no oxygen, a fire or explosion is not possible. 2.3.3.1.2.1c N/A N/A N/A N/A 2.3.3.1.2.1d The probability that the failure occurs in the direct buried portion of the cable is approximately 340/350 or 97% as only 3% is typically exposed at transformers or splice boxes. The event ranking is “very low”; the personnel present ranking is “not possible”. The probability that the failure occurs in the direct buried portion of the cable is approximately 340/350 or 97% as only 3% is typically exposed at transformers or splice boxes. The event ranking is “very low”; the personnel present ranking is “not possible”. The probability that the failure occurs in the direct buried portion of the cable is approximately 340/350 or 97% as only 3% is typically exposed at transformers or splice boxes. The event ranking is “very low”; the personnel present ranking is “not possible”. Because both the splice and injection adaptor must fail, the event ranking is “ultra-low”; the personnel present ranking is “not possible”. 2.3.3.1.2.1e System protection should trip when a cable fails. System protection should trip when a cable fails. System protection should trip when a cable fails. System protection should trip when a cable fails. 2.3.3.1.2.1f Pressure testing procedures promulgated in the CPM reduce the possibility of the contamination of splice interfaces. (Author: Some users of this injection paradigm report 50% splice failure rates.) Pressure testing procedures reduce the possibility of the contamination of splice interfaces. Pressure testing procedures reduce the possibility of the contamination of splice interfaces. The sustained pressure paradigm utilizes resilient, robust, and redundant seals designed for pressures up to 1000 psig to assure that fluid in the cable interstices never comes in contact with the splice body. NRIs provide multiple quality assurance checks to minimize the chance of craft error. The primary source for the observations in the “UPR with soak – CC3” column is [8]. 42 Code UPR with soak – CC3 UPR without soak – P011 UPR without soak – U732 2.3.3.1.2.1g A failed splice must be replaced. A failed splice must be replaced. A failed splice must be replaced. A failed splice must be replaced. 2.3.3.1.2.1h Risk (5,0) Requipment=0.005●103=5 Rpersonnel=0.005●X0.0●0=0 Risk (5,0) Requipment=0.005●103=5 Rpersonnel=0.005●X0.0●0=0 Risk (5,0) Requipment=0.005●103=5 Rpersonnel=0.005●X0.0●0=0 Risk (5,0) Requipment=0.005●103=5 Rpersonnel=0.005●X0.0●0=0 2.3.3.1.2.2 Chemical, Fire/Explosion, Injection, Soak, Post-Soak, or Post-Injection, Catastrophic electrical failure, Splice, Manhole Chemical, Fire/Explosion, Injection, Soak, Post-Soak, or Post-Injection, Catastrophic electrical failure, Splice, Manhole Chemical, Fire/Explosion, Injection, Soak, Post-Soak, or Post-Injection, Catastrophic electrical failure, Splice, Manhole Chemical, Fire/Explosion, Injection, Soak, Post-Soak, or Post-Injection, Catastrophic electrical failure, Splice, Manhole 2.3.3.1.2.2a A splice in manhole or hand hole on a treated cable fails. No damming compound was used, or the dam failed and fluid flows to the failed splice. A splice in manhole or hand hole on a treated cable fails. A splice in manhole or hand hole on a treated cable fails. A splice in manhole or hand hole on a treated cable fails. 2.3.3.1.2.2b A fire at the failure site is possible. Fluid may spill onto the floor and may be ignited by the arc from the failure, arcs from subsequent thumping, or from some other source of ignition. For URD cables, the amount of fluid, which can spill is typically less than 1 gallon (3.8 liters). For feeder cables, the spill size may be up to five gallons (18.9 liters). A fire at the failure site is possible. Fluid may spill onto the floor and may be ignited by the arc from the failure, arcs from subsequent thumping, or from some other source of ignition. For URD cables, the amount of fluid, which can spill is typically less than 1 gallon (3.8 liters). For feeder cables, the spill size may be up to five gallons (18.9 liters). A fire at the failure site is possible. Fluid may spill onto the floor and may be ignited by the arc from the failure, arcs from subsequent thumping, or from some other source of ignition. For URD cables, the amount of fluid, which can spill is typically less than 1 gallon (3.8 liters). For feeder cables, the spill size may be up to five gallons (18.9 liters). A fire at the failure site is possible. Fluid may spill onto the floor and may be ignited by the arc from the failure, arcs from subsequent thumping, or from some other source of ignition. For URD cables, the amount of fluid, which can spill is typically less than 1 gallon (3.8 liters). For feeder cables, the spill size may be up to five gallons (18.9 liters). There have been no incidents. Two failures have been reported NRIs provide multiple quality with this scenario through 2000. assurance checks to minimize the In no case were there fires chance of craft error. P011 fluid created directly by the failure. In has a flashpoint above the range the first case at AEP’s of materials defined by the U.S. Appalachian Power (circa 1993) DOT as flammable. unit in Charleston, West Virginia, no fire initiated. Line personnel used appropriate ventilation and did not introduce spurious ignition sources until after the fluid spill was terminated and the spill was eliminated. In the second case, at Detroit Edison (summer 1997), Detroit Edison line personnel cut out a failed splice and two adjacent splices in a three phase feeder circuit. Fluid spilled from all open ends onto the floor of the manhole. To arrest the fluid flow, the DTE line personnel applied heat shrink end caps to the severed cables with a The primary source for the observations in the “UPR with soak – CC3” column is [8]. There have been no incidents. NRIs provide multiple quality assurance checks to minimize the chance of craft error. U732 fluids have flashpoints above the range of materials defined by the U.S. DOT as flammable. There have been no incidents. The sustained pressure paradigm utilizes resilient, robust, and redundant seals designed for pressures up to 1000 psig (69 bars) to assure that fluid in the cable interstices never come in contact with the splice body. NRIs provide multiple quality assurance checks to minimize the chance of craft error. U732 fluids have flashpoints above the range of materials defined by the U.S. DOT as flammable. 2.3.3.1.2.2c 43 SPR – U732 Code UPR with soak – CC3 UPR without soak – P011 UPR without soak – U732 SPR – U732 propane torch. The torch ignited the dripping fluid, which then ignited the fluid on the floor. 2.3.3.1.2.2d The probability is assumed the same as in the direct buried case. (See 2.3.3.1.1.1(d).) The event ranking is “ultra-low”; the personnel present ranking is “unlikely”. Because of the leak-resistant design and non-flammable fluid, the event ranking is 5X lower than with the UPR—CC3 paradigm. The personnel present ranking is “unlikely”. Because of the leak-resistant design and non-flammable fluid, the event ranking is 5X lower than with the UPR—CC3 paradigm. The personnel present ranking is “unlikely”. Because of the leak-resistant design and non-flammable fluid, the event ranking is 10X lower than with the UPR-CC3 paradigm. The personnel present ranking is “unlikely”. 2.3.3.1.2.2e System protection will trip when circuit fails. Damage to the manhole and to other equipment in the manhole is likely, if a fire develops. The equipment ranking is “high”. The personnel ranking is “life threatening”. System protection will trip when circuit fails. Damage to the manhole and to other equipment in the manhole is likely, if a fire develops. The equipment ranking is “high”. The personnel ranking is “life threatening”. System protection will trip when circuit fails. Damage to the manhole and to other equipment in the manhole is likely, if a fire develops. The equipment ranking is “high”. The personnel ranking is “life threatening”. System protection will trip when circuit fails. Damage to the manhole and to other equipment in the manhole is likely if a fire develops. The equipment ranking is “high”. The personnel ranking is “life threatening”. 2.3.3.1.2.2f Heat-shrink polyethylene sleeves are utilized to make a leak-proof injectable splice. According to [8], “The injection technique (injection with no damming) used at Detroit Edison was an experimental approach, which was used only once and will never be used again. Utility line personnel require training in the proper methods associated with cable injection.” The service supplier may provide a procedure, which covers the circumstances where a spill occurs in a confined space. Provisions should be made to prevent fluid from dripping to the floor when a circuit owner must cut into a treated cable in a vault. Reference [8] suggests that “the fluid, which pours from such a cut, should be collected by a vacuum funnel, which is placed below the cut. The vacuum immediately removes the dripping fluid through a tube out to the surface.” P011 fluid and the delivery devices and methods were designed from the beginning to minimize potential fires. A Novinium Rejuvenation Instruction (NRI-99) provides detailed instructions to mitigate the risk of fluid leakage and fire. U732 fluids and the delivery devices and methods were designed from the beginning to minimize potential fires. A Novinium Rejuvenation Instruction (NRI-99) provides detailed instructions to mitigate the risk of fluid leakage and fire. U732 fluid and the delivery devices and methods were designed from the beginning to minimize potential fires. A Novinium Rejuvenation Instruction (NRI-99) provides detailed instructions to mitigate the risk of fluid leakage and fire. 2.3.3.1.2.2g All line personnel should wear flame-retardant clothing and other PPE. All line personnel should wear flame-retardant clothing and other PPE. All line personnel should wear flame-retardant clothing and other PPE. All line personnel should wear flame-retardant clothing and other PPE. The primary source for the observations in the “UPR with soak – CC3” column is [8]. 44 Code UPR with soak – CC3 UPR without soak – P011 UPR without soak – U732 SPR – U732 2.3.3.1.2.2h Risk (2.5,25) Requipment=0.0005●5x103=2.5 Rpersonnel =0.0005●0.05●106=25 Risk (0.5,5) Requipment=0.0005/5●5x103=0.5 Rpersonnel=0.0005/5●0.05●106=5 Risk (0.5,5) Requipment=0.0005/5●5x103=0.5 Rpersonnel=0.0005/5●0.05●106=5 Risk (0.25,2.5) Requipment=.0005/5●5x103=0.25 Rpersonnel=.0005/5●.05●106=2.5 2.3.3.1.3 Chemical, Fire/Explosion, Injection, Soak, Post-Soak, or Post-Injection, Catastrophic electrical failure, Termination (enclosed space) Chemical, Fire/Explosion, Injection, Soak, Post-Soak, or Post-Injection, Catastrophic electrical failure, Termination (enclosed space) Chemical, Fire/Explosion, Injection, Soak, Post-Soak, or Post-Injection, Catastrophic electrical failure, Termination (enclosed space) Chemical, Fire/Explosion, Injection, Soak, Post-Soak, or Post-Injection, Catastrophic electrical failure, Termination (enclosed space) 2.3.3.1.3a A failure of a termination in a transformer, switchgear or other enclosure results in the spill of injection fluid into an enclosed space. A failure of a termination in a transformer, switchgear or other enclosure results in the spill of injection fluid into an enclosed space. A failure of a termination in a transformer, switchgear or other enclosure results in the spill of injection fluid into an enclosed space. A failure of a termination in a transformer, switchgear or other enclosure results in the spill of injection fluid into an enclosed space. 2.3.3.1.3b Because there is oxygen and very often a source of ignition within equipment enclosures, the chances of ignition are quite high. As described in [8], the most important variables, which will affect whether or not there is a fire or explosion, are the amount of fluid spilled, the flow rate and spray characteristics of the leak, and the nature of the floor below the leak. For example, slow leaks onto dirt floors are unlikely to lead to conditions, which support combustion. High pressure, high flow rate leaks, which spray fluid into the air creating a good fuelair mixture are more likely to ignite and may even explode. According to [8], with over 7 million feet of injection experience at this paradigms service supplier through about 1998, there had been only a single incident of fire and explosion on a live-front transformer at FPL. A leak developed in an Elastimold livefront adapter and fluid was sprayed into the enclosure. An unapproved injection tank without a flow restricting orifice and without an automatic shut-off valve contributed to fluid being sprayed into the pad-mount While there is oxygen and very often a source of ignition within transformers and switchgear the chances of ignition are quite low, because the flash point of the fluid is above the temperature typically found in a transformer or similar enclosure. There have been no incidents of fire and explosion on a live-front transformer. While there is oxygen and very often a source of ignition within transformers and switchgear the chances of ignition are quite low, because the flash point of the fluid is above the temperature typically found in a transformer or similar enclosure. There have been no incidents of fire and explosion on a live-front transformer. While there is oxygen and very often a source of ignition within transformers and switchgear the chances of ignition are quite low, because the flash point of the fluid is above the temperature typically found in a transformer or similar enclosure. Furthermore, because the injection is performed on deenergized cables the enclosure is generally open during the injection process, which largely eliminates the buildup of flammable vapors and temperatures above 40°C. Novinium injection adapters are specifically designed to operate leak-free in even the most demanding of circumstances. Injection adapters typically operate at one-third or less of their design pressure. The primary source for the observations in the “UPR with soak – CC3” column is [8]. 45 Code UPR with soak – CC3 UPR without soak – P011 UPR without soak – U732 SPR – U732 transformer. service supplier approved designs would have a lower fluid flow rate. (Author: The author is aware of at least several other fire and explosion incidents, since the last update of 2.2.2.1.3b. See for example the images below from a Midwestern U.S. circuit owner in 2007.) A 35kV Cooper elbow failed … … and resulted in the loss of the transformer. 2.3.3.1.3.1 Chemical, Fire/Explosion, Injection, Soak, Post-Soak, or Post-Injection, Catastrophic electrical failure, Termination (enclosed space), Pressurized Chemical, Fire/Explosion, Injection, Soak, Post-Soak, or Post-Injection, Catastrophic electrical failure, Termination (enclosed space), Pressurized Chemical, Fire/Explosion, Injection, Soak, Post-Soak, or Post-Injection, Catastrophic electrical failure, Termination (enclosed space), Pressurized Chemical, Fire/Explosion, Injection, Soak, Post-Soak, or Post-Injection, Catastrophic electrical failure, Termination (enclosed space), Pressurized 2.2.2.1.3.1a Leaks in a termination with feed or soak pressure still applied. Leaks in a termination with feed pressure still applied. Leaks in a termination with feed pressure still applied. Leaks in a termination while injection is proceeding. 2.2.2.1.3.1b The pressure impacts the characteristics of a leak and the resulting consequences. The pressure impacts the characteristics of a leak and the resulting consequences. The pressure impacts the characteristics of a leak and the resulting consequences. Leaks are unlikely, but are generally mitigated by an attending injection technician. 2.3.3.1.3.1.1 Chemical, Fire/Explosion, Injection, Soak, Post-Soak, or Post-Injection, Catastrophic Chemical, Fire/Explosion, Injection, Soak, Post-Soak, or Post-Injection, Catastrophic Chemical, Fire/Explosion, Injection, Soak, Post-Soak, or Post-Injection, Catastrophic Chemical, Fire/Explosion, Injection, Soak, Post-Soak, or Post-Injection, The primary source for the observations in the “UPR with soak – CC3” column is [8]. 46 Code UPR with soak – CC3 UPR without soak – P011 UPR without soak – U732 SPR – U732 electrical failure, Termination (enclosed space), Pressurized, Monitored electrical failure, Termination (enclosed space), Pressurized, Monitored electrical failure, Termination (enclosed space), Pressurized, Monitored Catastrophic electrical failure, Termination (enclosed space), Pressurized, Monitored 2.3.3.1.3.1.1a Leaks in a termination during injection at moderate to medium pressure (i.e. in excess of 30 psig). These cables are typically not energized. This risk is not applicable to this injection paradigm. This risk is not applicable to this injection paradigm. Leaks in a termination during injection with moderate sustained pressure in excess of 100 psig. These cables are typically not energized. 2.3.3.1.3.1.1b For some applications, pressure in excess of that used for lowpressure injection is utilized by injection crews. These procedures are normally performed with the cable de-energized and monitored by injection personnel. In the event or a leak, the injection pressure can be reduced to zero by the injection crew to minimize the size and consequences of a leak. Monitored sustained pressure injection is the design norm for this paradigm. If a leak develops, the injection pressure can be reduced to zero by the injection team to minimize the size of a leak and any consequences. 2.3.3.1.3.1.1c At least through 2002 the service supplier of this injection paradigm had had no experience where leaks that developed during moderate or medium pressure injections resulted in a fire or explosion. There have been no examples where leaks that developed during moderate pressure injections resulted in a fire. This paradigm is utilized, because it has been demonstrably safer. 2.3.3.1.3.1.1d Since there are no energized components that can ignite a leak, the probability of a fire is “ultra-low” and the probability that personnel will be present is “likely”. Because of the higher flash point, the probability that a leak will ignite is half that of the flammable fluid. Because the injection equipment is all designed to operate at moderate pressure, the probability of developing a leak is half that of the unsustained pressure paradigm. The probability that personnel will be present is “likely”. 2.3.3.1.3.1.1e Because of the flow rates possible at these pressures a resulting fire would do a “high” amount of damage to equipment and would create a “life threatening” threat to personnel. Flow rates are limited in feed equipment by 1/8” (1.25 mm) tubing vs. ¼” (2.5 mm) tubing utilized by the older paradigm. This reduces the flow rate about 4-fold over the methods employed by the other paradigm. The equipment and personnel threat are half or less The primary source for the observations in the “UPR with soak – CC3” column is [8]. 47 Code UPR with soak – CC3 UPR without soak – P011 UPR without soak – U732 SPR – U732 that of the other injection paradigm, because of the nonflammable fluids, monitored injection, and flow restrictions. 2.3.3.1.3.1.1f As per the CPM, all fittings are pressure checked. The injection is generally monitored and pressure is removed at first sign of leak. Check all fittings as per the NRIs. Monitor injection and vent CO2 pressure at first sign of leak. 2.3.3.1.3.1.1g Injection crews should wear flame retardant clothing, safety glasses, and other PPE. Injection crews should wear flame retardant clothing, safety glasses, and other PPE. 2.3.3.1.3.1.1h Risk (2.5,375) Requipment=0.0005●5x103=2.5 Rpersonnel=0.0005●0.75●106=375 Risk (0.3,47) Requipment=.0005/4●5x103/2=0.3 Rpersonnel=.0005/4●.75●106/2=47 2.3.3.1.3.1.2 Chemical, Fire/Explosion, Injection, Soak, Post-Soak, or Post-Injection, Catastrophic electrical failure, Termination (enclosed space), Pressurized, Low pressure injection Chemical, Fire/Explosion, Injection, Soak, Post-Soak, or Post-Injection, Catastrophic electrical failure, Termination (enclosed space), Pressurized, Low pressure injection Chemical, Fire/Explosion, Injection, Soak, Post-Soak, or Post-Injection, Catastrophic electrical failure, Termination (enclosed space), Pressurized, Low pressure injection Chemical, Fire/Explosion, Injection, Soak, Post-Soak, or Post-Injection, Catastrophic electrical failure, Termination (enclosed space), Pressurized, Low pressure injection 2.3.3.1.3.1.2a Leaks in a termination during the injection phase while utilizing the unsustained pressure injection paradigm. (Typically, less than 30 psig.) Leaks in a termination during injection while utilizing the unsustained pressure injection paradigm. (Typically, less than 30 psig.) Leaks in a termination during injection while utilizing the unsustained pressure injection paradigm. (Typically, less than 30 psig.) This risk is not applicable to this injection paradigm. 2.3.3.1.3.1.2b Injection at low-pressure is accomplished with a specially designed PVC feed tank that includes the following safety features: (1) The PVC tank has a 35 psig pressure relief valve. (2) The PVC tank has a flowrestricting orifice to limit the maximum flow rate in the event of a leak. (3) The PVC tank has an automatic shut-off valve to prevent two-phase helium-fluid mixture from being vented from a leak. Two-phase flow may result in atomization of the fluid and may create a condition ideal for vapor cloud explosions. Injection at low-pressure is accomplished with a specially designed metallic feed tank that includes the following safety features: (1) The tank has a 35 psig pressure relief valve. (2) The tank has flow-restricting features to limit the maximum flow rate in the event of a leak. (3) The tank has dielectric shielding. Injection at low-pressure is accomplished with a specially designed metallic feed tank that includes the following safety features: (1) The tank has a 35 psig pressure relief valve. (2) The tank has flow-restricting features to limit the maximum flow rate in the event of a leak. (3) The tank has dielectric shielding. 2.3.3.1.3.1.2c Where approved low-pressure feed tanks have been in use, there have been no explosions. According to [8], there was a Where low-pressure feed tanks have been in use, there have been no fires or explosions. Where low-pressure feed tanks have been in use, there have been no fires or explosions. The primary source for the observations in the “UPR with soak – CC3” column is [8]. 48 Code UPR with soak – CC3 UPR without soak – P011 UPR without soak – U732 The event probability is “ultralow”. Elbows are more likely to fail while they are being operated; the probability that personnel may be present during this failure is “likely”. The same is not true for live front devices. The probability is “unlikely” for these devices. A middle-ground probability of “quite likely” is used below. The event probability is “ultralow”. Elbows are more likely to fail while they are being operated; the probability that personnel may be present during this failure is “likely”. The same is not true for live front devices. The probability is “unlikely” for these devices. A middle-ground probability of “quite likely” is used below. single explosion at FPL when a subcontractor used a tank, which lacked the three previously described safety features. Also according to [8], a fire at a Detroit Edison pad mounted, URD, dead-front transformer occurred when an Elastimold 168AELR injection elbow failed. According to [8], the elbow failed as a result of improper installation by Detroit Edison line personnel. The elbow failed catastrophically during a close on a fault. The resulting fluid stream was ignited by the unavoidable arc. The feed tank emptied its entire contents slowly through the flow restricting orifice and the hole in the elbow. The feed tank shut-off valve operated when the fluid was near the bottom of the tank, avoiding the formation of an atomized mist, and the fire self-extinguished. There were black smoke stains on the transformer, but no substantive damage. Another potential source of leaks is a failing o-ring on an elbow probe. Groove tolerances, o-ring design, and faulty manufacturing at Elastimold have been identified as the primary causes for such leaks. 2.3.3.1.3.1.2d According to [8], two such cases have been documented and two or three others have been described anecdotally before 2000. This represents an “ultralow” event probability. Elbows are more likely to fail while they are being operated; the probability that personnel may be present during this failure is “likely”. The same is not true for live front devices. The probability is “unlikely” for these devices. A middle-ground probability of “quite likely” is used below. The primary source for the observations in the “UPR with soak – CC3” column is [8]. 49 SPR – U732 Code UPR with soak – CC3 UPR without soak – P011 UPR without soak – U732 2.3.3.1.3.1.2e A fire fed by a low flammable fluid flow rate at low pressures through a flow restricting orifice would likely do a “medium” amount of damage to equipment and would create a “medium” threat to personnel. A fire fed by a low non-flammable fluid flow rate at low pressures through flow restricting tubing would likely do a “medium” amount of damage to equipment and would create a “medium” threat to personnel. A fire fed by a low non-flammable fluid flow rate at low pressures through flow restricting tubing would likely do a “medium” amount of damage to equipment and would create a “medium” threat to personnel. 2.3.3.1.3.1.2f According to [8], “Work is underway to improve the leak resistance of all injection fittings. In addition to the traditionally available Elastimold injection devices, new live-front injection devices are available from Raychem and new injection elbows are available from Cooper. These new designs have improved leak resistance features. Use of all of the equipment and procedures of the CPM are a must to prevent the circumstances where an explosion can occur.” Injection teams should monitor the injection where possible and cutoff pressure at the first sign of leak. Interested readers should check with the service supplier on the status of the design changes suggested above. P011 is not flammable and is less likely to ignite, by at least a factor of 2 compared to CC3. U732 is not flammable and is less likely to ignite, by at least a factor of 2 compared to CC3. 2.3.3.1.3.1.2g Injection crews should wear flame retardant clothing, safety glasses, and other PPE. Injection crews should wear flame retardant clothing, safety glasses, and other PPE. Injection crews should wear flame retardant clothing, safety glasses, and other PPE. 2.3.3.1.3.1.2h Risk (0.5,1.8) Requipment=0.0005●103=0.5 Rpersonnel=0.0005●0.35●104=1.8 Risk (0.25,0.9) Requipment=.0005/2●103=0.025 Rpersonnel=.0005÷2● 0.35●104=0.9 Risk (0.25,0.9) Requipment=.0005/2●103=0.025 Rpersonnel=.0005÷2● 0.35●104=0.9 2.3.3.1.3.2 Chemical, Fire/Explosion, Injection, Soak, Post-Soak, or Post-Injection, Catastrophic electrical failure, Termination (enclosed space), Pressurized, Soak Period Chemical, Fire/Explosion, Injection, Soak, Post-Soak, or Post-Injection, Catastrophic electrical failure, Termination (enclosed space), Pressurized, Soak Period Chemical, Fire/Explosion, Injection, Soak, Post-Soak, or Post-Injection, Catastrophic electrical failure, Termination (enclosed space), Pressurized, Soak Period Chemical, Fire/Explosion, Injection, Soak, Post-Soak, or Post-Injection, Catastrophic electrical failure, Termination (enclosed space), Pressurized, Soak Period 2.3.3.1.3.2a Leaks in a termination during the soak phase of a low-pressure injection. (Typically 5-10 psig at the feed tank, plus head pressure and vapor pressure.) This risk is not applicable to this injection paradigm. This risk is not applicable to this injection paradigm. This risk is not applicable to this injection paradigm. The primary source for the observations in the “UPR with soak – CC3” column is [8]. 50 SPR – U732 Code UPR with soak – CC3 2.3.3.1.3.2b The pressure used to soak is generally less than the pressure used to inject. This reduces the possibility of a leak. However, the soak time is typically 60-120+ days compared to the 1-3 days typical of injection times. 2.3.3.1.3.2c At least as of 2000, the service supplier has not experienced any fires or explosions during the soak period from a termination leak. Interested readers should check with the service supplier for post-2000 performance as there may have been such incidents. 2.3.3.1.3.2d Same as 2.3.3.1.3.1.1d 2.3.3.1.3.2e Same as 2.3.3.1.3.1.1e. UPR without soak – P011 UPR without soak – U732 SPR – U732 2.3.3.1.3.2f Same as 2.3.3.1.3.1.1f. 2.3.3.1.3.2g Same as 2.3.3.1.3.1.1g. 2.3.3.1.3.2h Risk (1,1.8) Requipment=0.0005●2x103=1 Rpersonnel=0.0005●0.35●104=1.8 2.3.3.1.4 Chemical, Fire/Explosion, Injection, Soak, Post-Soak, or Post-Injection, Catastrophic electrical failure, Termination (riser) Chemical, Fire/Explosion, Injection, Soak, Post-Soak, or Post-Injection, Catastrophic electrical failure, Termination (riser) Chemical, Fire/Explosion, Injection, Soak, Post-Soak, or Post-Injection, Catastrophic electrical failure, Termination (riser) Chemical, Fire/Explosion, Injection, Soak, Post-Soak, or Post-Injection, Catastrophic electrical failure, Termination (riser) 2.3.3.1.4a A failure of an injection termination in an unenclosed environment such as a substation or riser pole results in the spill of injection fluid. A failure of an injection termination in an unenclosed environment such as a substation or riser pole results in the spill of injection fluid. A failure of an injection termination in an unenclosed environment such as a substation or riser pole results in the spill of injection fluid. A failure of an injection termination and an injection adaptor in an unenclosed environment such as a substation or riser pole results in the spill of injection fluid. 2.3.3.1.4b Oxygen and a source of ignition are generally present and hence the possibility of a fire exists. Because leaking fluid has little time to vaporize before it impacts the ground, unless the fluid is sprayed directly onto a source of ignition, a flame is unlikely. Unconfined vapor cloud explosions are unlikely due to the small quantity of fluid available versus the quantity required to Oxygen and a source of ignition are generally present and hence the possibility of a fire exists. Because leaking fluid has little time to vaporize before it impacts the ground, unless the fluid is sprayed directly onto a source of ignition, a flame is unlikely. The higher flash point of P011 fluid reduces the probability of ignition. Unconfined vapor cloud explosions are virtually Oxygen and a source of ignition are generally present and hence the possibility of a fire exists. Because leaking fluid has little time to vaporize before it impacts the ground, unless the fluid is sprayed directly onto a source of ignition, a flame is unlikely. The higher flash point of U732 fluids reduces the probability of ignition. Unconfined vapor cloud explosions are virtually Oxygen and a source of ignition are generally present and hence the possibility of a fire exists. Because leaking fluid has little time to vap-orize before it impacts the ground, unless the fluid is sprayed directly onto a source of ignition, a flame is unlikely. The higher flash point of U732 fluids used in this paradigm reduces the probability of ignition. Unconfined vapor The primary source for the observations in the “UPR with soak – CC3” column is [8]. 51 Code UPR with soak – CC3 UPR without soak – P011 UPR without soak – U732 SPR – U732 create a flame front, which propagates faster than the speed of sound. impossible due to: (1) the small quantity of fluid available versus the quantity required to create a flame front, which propagates faster than the speed of sound, and (2) the high flash point. impossible due to: (1) the small quantity of fluid available versus the quantity required to create a flame front, which propagates faster than the speed of sound, and (2) the high flash point. cloud explosions are virtually impossible due to (1) the small quantity of fluid available versus the quantity required to create a flame front, which propagates faster than the speed of sound, (2) the high flash point, and (3) the lack of an ignition source during injection into a deenergized cable. 2.3.3.1.4c With over 25 million feet and 15 years of injection experience with this paradigm as of 2000, there has not been a single incident of fire or explosion in unconfined environments. This injection paradigm has not suffered any incidents in this category. This injection paradigm has not suffered any incidents in this category. This injection paradigm has not suffered any incidents in this category. 2.3.3.1.4d The probability that conditions required for starting a fire on a riser pole is “ultra-low”. The probability that personnel will be present during the event is “unlikely”. The probability that conditions required for starting a fire on a riser pole is “ultra-low”. The probability that personnel will be present during the event is “unlikely”. The probability that conditions required for starting a fire on a riser pole is “ultra-low”. The probability that personnel will be present during the event is “unlikely”. Because the lower flammability and injection devices designed to sustain moderate pressures, the probability of events to equipment or personnel is 2 times lower with this paradigm. 2.3.3.1.4e A fire on a pole top may damage the pole. The equipment consequence rating is “high”. The consequence to a line worker in close proximity to the fault and flame could be “high”. A fire on a pole top may damage the pole. The equipment consequence rating is “high”. The consequence to a line worker in close proximity to the fault and flame could be “high”. A fire on a pole top may damage the pole. The equipment consequence rating is “high”. The consequence to a line worker in close proximity to the fault and flame could be “high”. A fire on a pole top may damage the pole. The equipment consequence rating is “high”. The consequence to a line worker in close proximity to the fault and flame could be “high”. 2.3.3.1.4f Same as 2.3.3.1.3.1.1f. Same as 2.3.3.1.3.1.1f. Same as 2.3.3.1.3.1.1f. Same as 2.3.3.1.3.1.1f. 2.3.3.1.4g Same as 2.3.3.1.3.1.1g. Same as 2.3.3.1.3.1.1g. Same as 2.3.3.1.3.1.1g. Same as 2.3.3.1.3.1.1g. 2.3.3.1.4h Risk (2.5,25) Requipment=0.0005●5x103=2.5 Rpersonnel=0.0005●0.05●106=25 Risk (1.2,12) Requipment=0.0005/2●5x103=1.2 Rpersonnel=0.0005/2●0.05●106=12 Risk (1.2,12) Requipment=0.0005/2●5x103=1.2 Rpersonnel=0.0005/2●0.05●106=12 Risk (1.2,12) Requipment=0.0005/2●5x103=1.2 Rpersonnel=0.0005/2●0.05●106=12 2.3.3.2 Chemical, Fire/Explosion, Injection, Soak, Post-Soak, or Post-Injection, Delivery System Leak Chemical, Fire/Explosion, Injection, Soak, Post-Soak, or Post-Injection, Delivery System Leak Chemical, Fire/Explosion, Injection, Soak, Post-Soak, or Post-Injection, Delivery System Leak Chemical, Fire/Explosion, Injection, Soak, Post-Soak, or Post-Injection, Delivery System Leak A fitting, a tank, or the tubing, A fitting, a feed or vacuum tank, which deliver injection fluid to the or tubing used to connect feed or cable fails mechanically and vacuum tanks to a cable end, allows fluid to be spilled or which deliver injection fluid or atomized. allow contaminated excess fluid to exit the cable fails either mechanically or electrically (leading to a coincident mechanical failure) and allows fluid to be spilled. 2.3.3.2b Fluid delivery equipment is overFluid delivery equipment is overThe primary source for the observations in the “UPR with soak – CC3” column is [8]. A fitting, a tank, or the tubing, which deliver injection fluid to the cable fails mechanically and allows fluid to be spilled or atomized. A fitting, a tank, or the tubing, which deliver injection fluid to the cable fails mechanically and allows fluid to be spilled or atomized. Fluid delivery equipment is over- The equipment, which delivers 2.3.3.2a 52 Code UPR with soak – CC3 UPR without soak – P011 UPR without soak – U732 SPR – U732 designed to prevent leaky conditions. For example, the tubing used to transport fluid from the feed tank to the termination has a burst pressure greater than 1000 psig, quickconnect fittings operate at up to 120 psi. A feed tank includes a 35 psig pressure relief valve; assuring attached components do not reach their design constraints. Current generation injection elbows and their caps operate at up to 40 psig, so there is little margin of error with these devices. In addition to outright injection equipment failure caused by a design or a manufacturing, catastrophic electrical failures of components (discussed in 2.3.3.1) or operationally induced mechanical damage are examples of incidents that might create leaks. designed to prevent leaky conditions. For example, the tubing used to transport fluid from the feed tank to the termination has a burst pressure greater than 1000 psig, quickconnect fittings are operate at up to 120 psi. A feed tank includes a 35 psig pressure relief valve; assuring attached components do not reach their design constraints. Advanced injection elbow seals and their caps operate at up to 50 psig providing a greater margin of error than first generation UPR separable connectors. In addition to outright injection equipment failure caused by a design or a manufacturing, catastrophic electrical failures of components (discussed in 2.3.3.1) or operationally induced mechanical damage are examples of incidents that might create leaks. designed to prevent leaky conditions. For example, the tubing used to transport fluid from the feed tank to the termination has a burst pressure greater than 1000 psig, quickconnect fittings are operate at up to 120 psi. A feed tank includes a 35 psig pressure relief valve; assuring attached components do not reach their design constraints. Advanced injection elbow seals and their caps operate at up to 50 psig providing a greater margin of error than first generation UPR separable connectors. In addition to outright injection equipment failure caused by a design or a manufacturing, catastrophic electrical failures of components (discussed in 2.3.3.1) or operationally induced mechanical damage are examples of incidents that might create leaks. fluid to cables, is significantly over-designed to prevent leaks. For example, the tubing burst pressure is in excess of 2600 psi (179 bars) and the fittings are designed to operate up to 1000 psi (69 bars). The feed tanks have pressure relief valves, which operates at about 33% of burst pressure. 2.3.3.2.1 Chemical, Fire/Explosion, Injection, Soak, Post-Soak, or Post-Injection, Delivery System Leak, Mechanical Cause Chemical, Fire/Explosion, Injection, Soak, Post-Soak, or Post-Injection, Delivery System Leak, Mechanical Cause Chemical, Fire/Explosion, Injection, Soak, Post-Soak, or Post-Injection, Delivery System Leak, Mechanical Cause Chemical, Fire/Explosion, Injection, Soak, Post-Soak, or Post-Injection, Delivery System Leak, Mechanical Cause 2.3.3.2.1a A mechanical failure of injection equipment releases fluid. A mechanical failure of injection equipment releases fluid. A mechanical failure of injection equipment releases fluid. A mechanical failure of injection equipment releases fluid. 2.3.3.2.1b According to [8] and at least through 2000, Elastimold injection fittings have been the primary source of injection equipment leaks. Mechanical failures in the delivery system and electrical failures elsewhere in the enclosure are other potential leak sources. An arc or explosive percussion resulting from such failures may damage injection equipment. Elastimold injection fittings have been the primary source of injection equipment leaks with UPR with soak paradigm. Improvements in the elbow sealing system mitigate this risk. Mechanical failures in the delivery system and electrical failures elsewhere in the enclosure are other potential leak sources. An arc or explosive percussion resulting from such failures may damage injection equipment. Elastimold injection fittings have been the primary source of injection equipment leaks with UPR with soak paradigm. Improvements in the elbow sealing system mitigate this risk. Mechanical failures in the delivery system and electrical failures elsewhere in the enclosure are other potential leak sources. An arc or explosive percussion resulting from such failures may damage injection equipment. The plumbing, which connects the feed tank to the injection adaptors, may leak if improperly installed, or may be pulled off by improper handling. Injection generally is monitored, so a leak can be observed and a shut-off valve closed to arrest leaking. The connected equipment is deenergized and the fluid is nonflammable, so the probability of ignition in the event of a leak is extremely low. 2.3.3.2.1c According to [8] and through 2000, no service supplierapproved fluid delivery devices have ever contributed to a fire. This injection paradigm has enjoyed a fire-free history. Cooper 35kV large interface injection elbows have a more This injection paradigm has enjoyed a fire-free history. Cooper 35kV large interface injection elbows have a more This injection paradigm has enjoyed a fire-free history. The primary source for the observations in the “UPR with soak – CC3” column is [8]. 53 Code UPR with soak – CC3 UPR without soak – P011 UPR without soak – U732 Elastimold elbows utilized and approved by the service supplier have been known to leak, particularly at the o-ring probe seal. Elastimold TFIC-FX live-front injection adapters have leaked due to manufacturing defects and installation mistakes. (Author: The author is aware of at least several other fire and explosion incidents, since the last update of 2.3.3.2.1c.) robust probe seal design than the Elastimold design and are used without modification. High performance injection adapters are utilized for live-front terminations. robust probe seal design than the Elastimold design and are used without modification. High performance injection adapters are utilized for live-front terminations. 2.3.3.2.1d Currently available designs exhibit a “very low” probability of leaks. The probability that personnel will be present when a leak occurs is “unlikely”. Currently available designs exhibit a “very low” probability of leaks. The probability that personnel will be present when a leak occurs is “unlikely”. Currently available designs exhibit a “very low” probability of leaks. The probability that personnel will be present when a leak occurs is “unlikely”. There is an “ultra-low” probability of leaks and subsequent ignition. The probability that personnel will be present when a leak occurs is “quite likely”. 2.3.3.2.1e A fire or explosion may have “high” consequences to the equipment and may be “life threatening” to any nearby personnel. A fire or explosion may have “high” consequences to the equipment and may be “life threatening” to any nearby personnel. A fire or explosion may have “high” consequences to the equipment and may be “life threatening” to any nearby personnel. A fire or explosion may have “high” consequences to the equipment and may be “life threatening” to any nearby personnel. 2.3.3.2.1f According to [8], “An alternate heat-shrink design for live-front adapters is in development at Raychem and [at the service supplier]. Elastimold is performing 100% quality testing on all of TFIC-LX devices. The service supplier has informed Elastimold of a series of manufacturing defects, which can lead to leaks at the o-ring seal of the injection elbow probe. Cooper Power Systems has developed an alternate elbow with an improved seal. An injection device specification was written to include a leak-proof requirement. This specification has been integrated into all service supplier injection equipment purchases.” (Author: design changes have been implemented to improve the leak resistance of these injection devices. The Elastimold design, utilizes a rigid probe support ring, which is subject to flashing For live-front terminations, special metallic injection adaptors are utilized, so that fluid does not come in contact with component parts. For separable connectors, the Elastimold seals are utilized. Cooper injection elbows for 35kV large interface are utilized without improvement, because they use a double-D-ring design seated in a brass probes support, which does not suffer the flashing problems of the Elastimold design. P011 fluid is not flammable reducing the chance of ignition by at least a factor of 2. For live-front terminations, special metallic injection adaptors are utilized, so that fluid does not come in contact with component parts. For separable connectors, the Elastimold seals are utilized. Cooper injection elbows for 35kV large interface are utilized without improvement, because they use a double-D-ring design seated in a brass probes support, which does not suffer the flashing problems of the Elastimold design. U732 fluid is not flammable reducing the chance of ignition by at least a factor of 2. Special metallic injection adaptors are utilized, so that fluid does not come in contact with component parts. The primary source for the observations in the “UPR with soak – CC3” column is [8]. 54 SPR – U732 Code UPR with soak – CC3 UPR without soak – P011 UPR without soak – U732 SPR – U732 contamination during molding. To find and correct these manufacturing defects, Elastimold applies an air test to 100% of its injection elbow production. Flashing discovered in this way is corrected and the seal is retested.) 2.3.3.2.1g Injection equipment includes a flow restricting orifice to reduce the maximum flow rate of any leak. This reduced flow rate limits the potential fire size and prevents explosive spraying of fluid into an enclosed space. Use appropriate PPE. Injection equipment includes flow restricting features to reduce the maximum flow rate of any leak. This reduced flow rate limits the potential fire size and prevents explosive spraying of fluid into an enclosed space. Use appropriate PPE. Injection equipment includes flow restricting features to reduce the maximum flow rate of any leak. This reduced flow rate limits the potential fire size and prevents explosive spraying of fluid into an enclosed space. Use appropriate PPE. Special injection adaptors are rated at over three times the maximum operating pressure. Always wear appropriate PPE. 2.3.3.2.1h Risk (25,250) Requipment=0.005●5x103=25 Rpersonnel=0.005●0.05●106=250 Risk (12.5,125) Requipment=0.005/2●5x103=12.5 Rpersonnel=0.005/2●0.05● 106=125 Risk (12.5,125) Requipment=0.005/2●5x103=12.5 Rpersonnel=0.005/2●0.05● 106=125 Risk (2.5,175) Requipment=0.0005●5x103=2.5 Rpersonnel=0.0005●0.35●106=175 2.3.3.2.2 Chemical, Fire/Explosion, Injection, Soak, Post-Soak, or Post-Injection, Delivery System Leak, Electrical Cause Chemical, Fire/Explosion, Injection, Soak, Post-Soak, or Post-Injection, Delivery System Leak, Electrical Cause Chemical, Fire/Explosion, Injection, Soak, Post-Soak, or Post-Injection, Delivery System Leak, Electrical Cause Chemical, Fire/Explosion, Injection, Soak, Post-Soak, or Post-Injection, Delivery System Leak, Electrical Cause 2.3.3.2.2a An electrical failure of the injection equipment tied to an energized circuit may puncture delivery devices and may release fluid. An electrical failure of the injection equipment tied to an energized circuit may puncture delivery devices and may release fluid. An electrical failure of the injection equipment tied to an energized circuit may puncture delivery devices and may release fluid. This risk is not applicable to this injection paradigm. 2.3.3.2.2b The electrical failure is not within the scope of 2.3.3.2.2b as these risks were described in 1.2 and 1.3. This section assesses the additional risks associated with leaking fluid, which results from the electrical fault. Whenever there is an arc-flash, a flammable fluid, and air, there is a possibility of fire and/or explosion. The electrical failure is not within the scope of 2.3.3.2.2b as these risks were described in 1.2 and 1.3. This section assesses the additional risks associated with leaking fluid, which results from the electrical fault. Whenever there is an arc-flash, a combustible fluid, and air, there is a possibility of fire and/or explosion. The electrical failure is not within the scope of 2.3.3.2.2b as these risks were described in 1.2 and 1.3. This section assesses the additional risks associated with leaking fluid, which results from the electrical fault. Whenever there is an arc-flash, a combustible fluid, and air, there is a possibility of fire and/or explosion. 2.3.3.2.2c According to [8], the design goal of the service supplier was to isolate potentially energized fluids at the vacuum and feed sides of cable. This approach enjoyed a perfect record at least through 2000. FPL, a customer of the service supplier, desired to ignore this goal and create an electrical Potentially energized fluids are electrically isolated from grounds. This approach has enjoyed a perfect safety record. Potentially energized fluids are electrically isolated from grounds. This approach has enjoyed a perfect safety record. The primary source for the observations in the “UPR with soak – CC3” column is [8]. 55 Code UPR with soak – CC3 UPR without soak – P011 UPR without soak – U732 failure point. FPL had proposed two different methods to provide a ground to the fluid or fluid delivery devices. To address these two divergent approaches and the two FPL proposed methods, each is discussed below and labeled as “Isolate” (Case A), “Hard Ground” (Case B), and “Soft Ground” (Case C). 2.3.3.2.2d The event probability with the “Isolate” approach is “ultra-low”. The probability that personnel will be present is “quite likely”. The event probability with the “Hard Ground” approach is “low” and the personnel ranking is the same as the “Isolate” approach. The event probability with the “Soft Ground” approach is “very low” and the personnel ranking is the same as the “Isolate” approach. P011 fluid is not flammable. The event probability is “ultra-low” divided by 2. The probability that personnel will be present is “quite likely”. U732 fluid is not flammable. The event probability is “ultra-low” divided by 2. The probability that personnel will be present is “quite likely”. 2.3.3.2.2e A fire or explosion may have “high” consequences to the equipment and may be “life threatening” to any nearby personnel. A fire or explosion may have “high” consequences to the equipment and may be “life threatening” to any nearby personnel. A fire or explosion may have “high” consequences to the equipment and may be “life threatening” to any nearby personnel. 2.3.3.2.2f Strand desiccant use decreases the conductivity of fluid exiting the cable mitigating the probability of an electrical failure. Thick-walled ¼” PE tubing with a smaller inside diameter than offthe-shelf ¼” tubing. The smaller cross sectional area reduces the maximum current flow, if conductive fluid is in the tubing (See the discussion under 1.2(f)). Improved vacuum tanks, improved tubing, and an improved feed tank were implemented to improve withstand voltages. There is no plan to mitigate the probability of incidents with the “Ground” approach and this approach has not been implemented. P011 fluid is not flammable. Thick-walled 1/4” PE tubing with a smaller inside diameter is used. The smaller cross section area reduced the maximum current flow, if conductive fluid is in the tubing (See the discussion under 1.2(f)). U732 fluid is not flammable. Thick-walled 1/4” PE tubing with a smaller inside diameter is used. The smaller cross section area reduced the maximum current flow, if conductive fluid is in the tubing (See the discussion under 1.2(f)). 2.3.3.2.2g The flow restricting orifice of the injection equipment reduces the Flow restricting system design elements reduce the maximum Flow restricting system design elements reduce the maximum The primary source for the observations in the “UPR with soak – CC3” column is [8]. 56 SPR – U732 Code UPR with soak – CC3 UPR without soak – P011 UPR without soak – U732 maximum flow rate for any leak. Lower flow rates limit the potential fire size and reduced the probability of explosive spraying of fluid into an enclosed space. Use PPE. flow rate for any leak. Lower flow rates and higher flash point limit the potential fire size and reduced the probability of explosive spraying of fluid into an enclosed space. Use PPE. flow rate for any leak. Lower flow rates and higher flash point limit the potential fire size and reduced the probability of explosive spraying of fluid into an enclosed space. Use PPE. 2.3.3.2.2h Case A: Base case--Isolation Approach (2.5,175) Requipment= 0.0005●5x103=2.5 Rpersonnel=0.0005●0.35●106=175 Case B: Hard Grounding Approach (250,17500) Requipment=0.05●5x103=250 Rpersonnel=0.05●0.35●106=17500 Case C: Soft Grounding Approach (25,1750) Requipment=0.005●5x103=25 Rpersonnel=0.005●0.35●106=1750 Risk (1.25,175) Requipment=0.0005/2●5x103=1.25 Rpersonnel=0.0005/2●0.35●106=87 Risk (1.25,175) Requipment=0.0005/2●5x103=1.25 Rpersonnel=0.0005/2●0.35●106=87 2.3.3.2.3 Chemical, Fire/Explosion, Injection, Soak, Post-Soak, or Post-Injection, Delivery System Leak, Procedural Error Chemical, Fire/Explosion, Injection, Soak, Post-Soak, or Post-Injection, Delivery System Leak, Procedural Error Chemical, Fire/Explosion, Injection, Soak, Post-Soak, or Post-Injection, Delivery System Leak, Procedural Error Chemical, Fire/Explosion, Injection, Soak, Post-Soak, or Post-Injection, Delivery System Leak, Procedural Error 2.3.3.2.3a A utility line-person or an injector may open a valve or damage injection equipment allowing fluid to leak. A utility line-person or an injector may open a valve or damage injection equipment allowing fluid to leak. A utility line-person or an injector may open a valve or damage injection equipment allowing fluid to leak. This risk is not applicable to this injection paradigm. 2.3.3.2.3b An injector is likely to immediately shut off fluid flow to minimize such a leak. If a noninjection utility line person mistakenly opens a valve or cuts a tube, the individual may not know immediately how to halt the flow of fluid. An injector is likely to immediately shut off fluid flow to minimize such a leak. If a noninjection utility line person mistakenly opens a valve or cuts a tube, the individual may not know immediately how to halt the flow of fluid. An injector is likely to immediately shut off fluid flow to minimize such a leak. If a noninjection utility line person mistakenly opens a valve or cuts a tube, the individual may not know immediately how to halt the flow of fluid. 2.3.3.2.3c According to [8] and at least through 2000, there have not been any fires or explosions from this scenario. Flow rates are limited to low rates by a flow restricting orifice in the feed tank. All ports with valves are required to be plugged, so that two actions (i.e. remove the plug and open the valve) are required to initiate such a leak. There have not been any fires or explosions from this scenario. Flow rates are limited to low rates by flow restricting design elements in the feed system. All ports with valves are required to be plugged, so that two actions (i.e. remove the plug and open the valve) are required to initiate such a leak. The fluid is noncombustible. Because there is no soak period the likelihood that There have not been any fires or explosions from this scenario. Flow rates are limited to low rates by flow restricting design elements in the feed system. All ports with valves are required to be plugged, so that two actions (i.e. remove the plug and open the valve) are required to initiate such a leak. The fluid is noncombustible. Because there is no soak period the likelihood that The primary source for the observations in the “UPR with soak – CC3” column is [8]. 57 SPR – U732 Code UPR with soak – CC3 UPR without soak – P011 UPR without soak – U732 non-injection personnel will inadvertently operate a feed tank is 60-100 times less likely than when a soak period is employed. non-injection personnel will inadvertently operate a feed tank is 60-100 times less likely than when a soak period is employed. SPR – U732 2.3.3.2.3d According to [8], the probability that a leak and a source of ignition occur concurrently is “ultra-low”. The probability that personnel will be present is “certain”. The probability that a leak and a source of ignition occur concurrently is “ultra-low”. Because of high P011 flash point the probability of ignition is decreased, by at least a factor of 2. The probability that personnel will be present is “certain”. The probability that a leak and a source of ignition occur concurrently is “ultra-low”. Because of high U732 flash point the probability of ignition is decreased, by at least a factor of 2. The probability that personnel will be present is “certain”. 2.3.3.2.3e The equipment damage consequences may be “very high” and the personnel consequences are “life threatening”. The equipment damage consequences may be “very high” and the personnel consequences are “life threatening”. The equipment damage consequences may be “very high” and the personnel consequences are “life threatening”. 2.3.3.2.3f The aforementioned use of automatically closing disconnect devices (i.e. quick disconnect connections), flow restricting orifices, and providing plugs for all open ports reduces the chance and magnitude of procedural spills. 2.3.3.2.3g Injection employees should utilize PPE, including safety glasses and flame-retardant clothing. The aforementioned use of automatically closing disconnect devices (i.e. quick disconnect connections), flow restricting design elements, and providing plugs for all open ports reduces the chance and magnitude of procedural spills. Taken together, the reduced flash point and the elimination of the soak period reduce the probability by a factor of 100. Injection employees should utilize PPE, including safety glasses and flame-retardant clothing. The aforementioned use of automatically closing disconnect devices (i.e. quick disconnect connections), flow restricting design elements, and providing plugs for all open ports reduces the chance and magnitude of procedural spills. Taken together, the reduced flash point and the elimination of the soak period reduce the probability by a factor of 100. Injection employees should utilize PPE, including safety glasses and flame-retardant clothing. 2.3.3.2.3h Risk (5,500) Requipment = 0.0005 x 104 = 5 Rpersonnel = 0.0005 x 1 x 106 = 500 Risk (0.05,5) Requipment=0.0005/100●104=0.05 Rpersonnel=0.0005/100●1●106=5 Risk (0.05,5) Requipment=0.0005/100●104=0.05 Rpersonnel=0.0005/100●1●106=5 2.3.3.2.4 Chemical, Fire/Explosion, Injection, Soak, Post-Soak, or Post-Injection, Delivery System Leak, Thermal Cause Chemical, Fire/Explosion, Injection, Soak, Post-Soak, or Post-Injection, Delivery System Leak, Thermal Cause Chemical, Fire/Explosion, Injection, Soak, Post-Soak, or Post-Injection, Delivery System Leak, Thermal Cause Chemical, Fire/Explosion, Injection, Soak, Post-Soak, or Post-Injection, Delivery System Leak, Thermal Cause 2.3.3.2.4a High temperatures, especially in an enclosure such as a transformer, weaken the mechanical properties of the plastic (PVC) bottles through which fluid is delivered to the cable. This risk is not applicable to this injection paradigm, because aluminum feed vessels are utilized and there are no soak periods. This risk is not applicable to this injection paradigm, because aluminum feed vessels are utilized and there are no soak periods. This risk is not applicable to this injection paradigm. 2.3.3.2.4b Clear PVC, which forms the body of injection tanks, is rated for use up to 140°F. Testing at the Aluminum and high temperature plastic feed vessels will not deform from thermal exposure Aluminum and high temperature plastic feed vessels will not deform from thermal exposure The primary source for the observations in the “UPR with soak – CC3” column is [8]. 58 Code UPR with soak – CC3 UPR without soak – P011 UPR without soak – U732 service supplier indicates that deformation of the vessels begins at 167°F. Temperatures inside transformers may exceed 167°F. found in transformers. found in transformers. 2.3.3.2.4c At least in one case in a hypothermic region of North America, a vacuum tank deformed at the peak of summer temperatures from overheating. No risk. No risk. 2.3.3.2.4d According to [8], at least through about 2000 a single instance suggests that the event probability is “ultra-low” overall, but can obviously be higher during the summer season in hot climates or where cables are heavily loaded. The probability that personnel will be present when this occurs is “quite likely”. The event probability is “not possible”. The probability that personnel would be present if the event where to occur is “quite likely”. The event probability is “not possible”. The probability that personnel would be present if the event where to occur is “quite likely”. 2.3.3.2.4e A collapsing or a ballooning tank may leak fluid into an enclosure. Corona discharges or other sources of ignition are a likely source of ignition. Fluid spills onto soil are not likely to create a fire. A spray of fluid is possible. The consequences to the equipment are “high” and the consequences to personnel are “life threatening”. Not possible. Not possible. 2.3.3.2.4f According to [8], the “[service supplier] Engineering service bulletin issued 8/7/95 provides for installation of external cabinets with ventilation in hot environments to house injection/vacuum tanks.” No probability mitigation is required as feed equipment is designed to operate above any conceivable operating temperature. No probability mitigation is required as feed equipment is designed to operate above any conceivable operating temperature. 2.3.3.2.4g Fire retardant clothing and safety glasses. Fire retardant clothing and safety glasses. Fire retardant clothing and safety glasses. 2.3.3.2.4h Risk (2.5,175) Requipment=0.0005●5x103=2.5 Rpersonnel=0.0005●0.35●106=175 Risk (0,0) Requipment=0.0●5x103=0 Rpersonnel=0.0●0.35●106=0 Risk (0,0) Requipment=0.0●5x103=0 Rpersonnel=0.0●0.35●106=0 2.4 Chemical, Compatibility Chemical, Compatibility Chemical, Compatibility Chemical, Compatibility 2.4a Injection fluids may damage materials or devices. Injection fluids may damage materials or devices. Injection fluids may damage materials or devices. Injection fluids may damage materials or devices. 2.4b The injection fluid comes in direct contact with the inside of the cable, splice interiors, live-front The injection fluid comes in direct contact with the inside of the cable, splice interiors, and The injection fluid comes in direct contact with the inside of the cable, splice interiors, and The injection fluid comes in direct contact with the inside of the cable. The fluid is compatible The primary source for the observations in the “UPR with soak – CC3” column is [8]. 59 SPR – U732 Code 2.4c UPR with soak – CC3 UPR without soak – P011 UPR without soak – U732 SPR – U732 termination seals (not the terminations themselves), and elbows. The fluid is compatible with all cable materials and most rubbers used to make splices and elbows at modest temperatures. The exceptions are worthy of note. 1. Silicone rubber utilized in cold shrink devices including coldshrink terminations and coldshrink splices swells substantially in contact with PMDMS/TMMS. There are cold shrink devices, which are not made of silicone including EPDM and EPR components. (Author: The question of fluid compatibility with EPR and EPDM components is more complicated than thought when the author first penned 2.4b. A thorough discussion of the issues is presented in [18]. In short, (1) 5% to 15% or more of the treatment fluid is lost on all cable injections, because PMDMS is several times more soluble in EPDM and EPR rubbers than in PE, and (2) at conductor temperatures above about 50°C, some component damage may occur from excessive swelling.) 2. Buna-rubber seal used in many porcelain potheads, 3. Hand-taped splices, and 4. Dielectric gloves. elbows. The fluid is compatible with all cable materials and most rubbers used to make splices and elbows at modest temperatures. The exceptions are worthy of note. 1. Silicone rubber utilized in cold shrink devices including coldshrink terminations and coldshrink splices swells substantially in contact with P011 fluid. There are cold shrink devices, which are not made of silicone including EPDM and EPR components. Fluid compatibility with EPR and EPDM components is discussed in [18] and applies to P011 in the same way as it applies to CC3. In short, (1) 5% to 15% or more of the treatment fluid is lost on all cable injections, because P011 fluid is several times more soluble in EPDM and EPR rubbers than in PE, and (2) at conductor temperatures above about 50°C, some component damage may occur from excessive swelling. 2. Buna-rubber seal used in many porcelain potheads, 3. Hand-taped splices, and 4. Dielectric gloves. elbows. The fluid is compatible with all cable materials and most rubbers used to make splices and elbows at modest temperatures. The exceptions are worthy of note. 1. Silicone rubber utilized in cold shrink devices including coldshrink terminations and coldshrink splices swells substantially in contact with U732 fluid. There are cold shrink devices, which are not made of silicone including EPDM and EPR components. Fluid compatibility with EPR and EPDM components is discussed in [18] and applies to U732 in the same way as it applies to CC3. In short, (1) 5% to 15% or more of the treatment fluid is lost on all cable injections, because U732 fluid is several times more soluble in EPDM and EPR rubbers than in PE, and (2) at conductor temperatures above about 50°C, some component damage may occur from excessive swelling. 2. Buna-rubber seal used in many porcelain potheads, 3. Hand-taped splices, and 4. Dielectric gloves. with all cable materials. The silanes uses for injection cause the swelling of dielectric gloves. The procedures promulgated by the service supplier preclude contact of the fluid from potheads or terminators and anything other than the insides of cables, splices, and dead-front terminations. According to [8], “Contact of the fluid as prescribed by the CPM with the conductor and insulation systems of soliddielectric cables does not …” (Author: The original text simply ends with the word “not”. There There have been no known issues with this paradigm to date. The paradigm should only be applied when the temperature is modest. There have been no known issues with this paradigm to date. The paradigm should only be applied when the temperature is modest. This injection paradigm does not put fluid into contact with anything other than the strands of the cables. The primary source for the observations in the “UPR with soak – CC3” column is [8]. 60 Code UPR with soak – CC3 UPR without soak – P011 UPR without soak – U732 SPR – U732 are dozens of cases documented in [18] and elsewhere of fluid compatibility issues with splices and elbows. The interested reader should request a complete accounting of all of the incidents from the service supplier.) 2.4.1 Chemical, Compatibility, Termination (riser) Chemical, Compatibility, Termination (riser) Chemical, Compatibility, Termination (riser) Chemical, Compatibility, Termination (riser) 2.4.1a A live-front adapter leaks onto a pothead. A live-front adapter leaks onto a pothead. A live-front adapter leaks onto a pothead. An injection adapter leaks on a live-front termination. 2.4.1b When PMDMS/TMMS fluid contacts a silicone cold-shrink pothead, the silicone rubber swells and loses much of its mechanical strength. When Perficio™ fluid contacts a silicone cold-shrink pothead, the silicone rubber swells and loses much of its mechanical strength. When Ultrinium™ fluid contacts a silicone cold-shrink pothead, the silicone rubber swells and loses much of its mechanical strength. When silane fluids contact a silicone cold-shrink termination, the silicone rubber swells and loses much of its mechanical strength. 2.4.1c According to [8], such potheads typically do not fail. Rather they are observed by injection crews at the end of the injection or soak period and may be replaced. Modest quantities of spillage appear not to have an adverse impact. With no soak period, such spills cause no damage to the potheads, because the spill can be wiped from the surface before the silicone termination suffers a multi-day exposure. Injection adaptors are inspected for leaks before reinstallation of terminations. No such incident has ever occurred. With no soak period, such spills cause no damage to the potheads, because the spill can be wiped from the surface before the silicone termination suffers a multi-day exposure. Injection adaptors are inspected for leaks before reinstallation of terminations. No such incident has ever occurred. With monitored injection, such spills cause no damage to the potheads, because the spill can be wiped from the surface before the silicone termination is reinstalled. All injection adaptors are inspected for leaks before reinstallation of terminations. No such incident has ever occurred. 2.4.1d According to [8], the probability of this happening with the obsolete Elastimold design (TFIC) is “very low”. The TFIC live-front injection adaptor has been replaced with a heat-shrink livefront design (service supplier p/n 11030-1), which has over four times the pressure withstand capability of the TFIC device and a new Elastimold molded device. There is an “unlikely” possibility that any of the devices could fail catastrophically when line personnel are nearby. If the linepersonnel were nearby, they would most likely be eight feet away in a bucket. Injection adaptor design pressures are generally greater than 30-times the injection pressure. There is an “ultra-low” probability that such a leak would occur. It is “unlikely” that personnel will be in the immediate vicinity. Injection adaptor design pressures are generally greater than 30-times the injection pressure. There is an “ultra-low” probability that such a leak would occur. It is “unlikely” that personnel will be in the immediate vicinity. Injection adaptor design pressures are generally greater than 3-times the injection pressure. There is an “ultra-low” probability that such a leak would occur. It is “unlikely” that personnel will be in the immediate vicinity. 2.4.1e The equipment impact is “low” and the personnel ranking is “high”. The equipment impact is “low” and the personnel ranking is “high”. The equipment impact is “low” and the personnel ranking is “high”. The equipment impact is “low” and the personnel ranking is “high”. 2.4.1f See 2.3.3.2.1f. See 2.3.3.2.1f. See 2.3.3.2.1f. See 2.3.3.2.1f. The primary source for the observations in the “UPR with soak – CC3” column is [8]. 61 Code UPR with soak – CC3 UPR without soak – P011 UPR without soak – U732 SPR – U732 2.4.1g Avoid the use of silicone rubber components. Use molded-rubber or heat-shrink potheads. Use appropriate PPE. Use appropriate PPE. Use appropriate PPE. Utilize appropriate PPE. 2.4.1h Risk (5,25) Requipment=0.005●103=5 Rpersonnel=0.005●0.05●5x105=25 Risk (0.5,2.5) Requipment=.0005●103=0.5 Rpersonnel=.0005●0.05●5x105=2.5 Risk (0.5,2.5) Requipment=.0005●103=0.5 Rpersonnel=.0005●0.05●5x105=2.5 Risk (0.5,2.5) Requipment=.0005●103=0.5 Rpersonnel=.0005●0.05●5x105=2.5 2.4.2 Chemical, Compatibility, Coldshrink Splices Chemical, Compatibility, Coldshrink Splices Chemical, Compatibility, Coldshrink Splices Chemical, Compatibility, Cold-shrink Splices 2.4.2a A 3M silicone cold-shrink splice is inadvertently injected with PMDMS/TMMS fluid. A 3M silicone cold-shrink splice is inadvertently injected with U732 fluid. A 3M silicone cold-shrink splice is inadvertently injected with U732 fluid. 2.4.2b When PMDMS/TMMS fluid contacts a silicone splice, the silicone rubber swells, it may lose its mechanical strength, and because the geometry is distorted may lose its electrical integrity. When P011 fluid contacts a silicone splice, the silicone rubber swells, it may lose its mechanical strength, and because the geometry is distorted may lose its electrical integrity. When U732 fluid contacts a silicone splice, the silicone rubber swells, it may lose its mechanical strength, and because the geometry is distorted may lose its electrical integrity. This risk is not applicable to this injection paradigm, because no injection fluid ever comes in contact with any splice. 2.4.2c According to [8] and at least through 2000, while actual testing has not occurred, it is the service supplier’s belief that the 3M silicone cold-shrink splice or equivalents from other manufacturers are not compatible with PMDMS/TMMS fluid. 3M silicone cold-shrink splice or equivalents from other manufacturers are not compatible with direct contact of P011 fluid. 3M silicone cold-shrink splice or equivalents from other manufacturers are not compatible with direct contact of U732 fluid. 2.4.2d The probability that this will occur depends on the prevalence of cold-shrink splices used to repair cable failures. The probability that this will occur depends on the prevalence of cold-shrink splices used to repair cable failures. The probability that this will occur depends on the prevalence of cold-shrink splices used to repair cable failures. 2.4.2e The splice will fail and a fault will occur. The splice will fail and a fault will occur. The splice will fail and a fault will occur. 2.4.2f Do not use silicone splices on cables which may be treated with UPR. Do not use silicone splices on cables, which may be treated with UPR. Do not use silicone splices on cables, which may be treated with UPR. 2.4.2g The service has a kit, which intersperses a heat-shrink polyethylene layer to separate fluid from 3M cold-shrink splice. Circuit owners are advised to use molded rubber splices or injectable heat-shrink splices from the service or Raychem. A flow-through injection kit is available for use with any splice. The kit uses two metallic injection adaptors to eliminate fluid interaction with the splice. A flow-through injection kit is available for use with any splice. The kit uses two metallic injection adaptors to eliminate fluid interaction with the splice. 2.4.2h (Author: Clearly there is a risk that silicone splices will be inadvertently treated, because there is no way to identify the Risk (10,0) Requipment=0.005●2x103=10 Rpersonnel=0.005●0.0●104=0 Risk (10,0) Requipment=0.005●2x103=10 Rpersonnel=0.005●0.0●104=0 The primary source for the observations in the “UPR with soak – CC3” column is [8]. 62 Code UPR with soak – CC3 UPR without soak – P011 UPR without soak – U732 SPR – U732 elastomeric material in an existing direct buried splice. Such exposed splices will likely fail. See [18] for a complete explanation.) Risk (10,0) Requipment=0.005●2x103=10 Rpersonnel=0.005●0.0●104=0 2.4.3 Chemical, Compatibility, Dielectric Gloves Chemical, Compatibility, Dielectric Gloves Chemical, Compatibility, Dielectric Gloves Chemical, Compatibility, Dielectric Gloves 2.4.3a CC3 fluid causes swelling of dielectric gloves when fluid is spilled on the gloves. P011 fluids cause swelling of dielectric gloves upon contact. U732 fluids cause swelling of dielectric gloves upon contact. U732 fluids cause swelling of dielectric gloves upon contact. 2.4.3b The silicone fluids used for rejuvenation are highly soluble in the rubber of dielectric gloves. Visible swelling is apparent after fluid contacts a glove. The silicone fluids used for rejuvenation are highly soluble in the rubber of dielectric gloves. Visible swelling is apparent after fluid contacts a glove. The silicone fluids used for rejuvenation are highly soluble in the rubber of dielectric gloves. Visible swelling is apparent after fluid contacts a glove. The silicone fluids used for rejuvenation are highly soluble in the rubber of dielectric gloves. Visible swelling is apparent after fluid contacts a glove. 2.4.3c According to [8], FPL has tested the performance of gloves after contact with PMDMS/TMMS fluid. Even in worst-case scenarios (i.e. 24 hours of exposure to droplets of fluid), the gloves performance met the gloves voltage withstand requirement. The same PMDMS monomer is utilized for over 90% of CC3 and P011 fluids (i.e. meet a 24 hour exposure to droplets of fluid and then have the gloves meet the glove voltage withstand requirement). Alkoxysilanes of the type utilized for injection would be expected to perform similarly as described in UPR with soak – CC3 (i.e. meet a 24 hour exposure to droplets of fluid and then have the gloves meet the glove voltage withstand requirement). Alkoxysilanes of the type utilized for injection would be expected to perform similarly as described in the other injection paradigm (i.e. meet a 24 hour exposure to droplets of fluid and then have the gloves meet the glove voltage withstand requirement). 2.4.3d Injection equipment and tools are designed to minimize leaks. Leather glove protectors are required to protect dielectric gloves from incidental fluid contact. The probability of getting fluid on the dielectric gloves is “ultra-low”. If the gloves do come in contact with the fluid, they will “very likely” be worn at the time. Injection equipment and injection tools are designed to minimize the probability of leaks. Leather glove protectors are required to protect dielectric gloves. The probability of getting fluid on the dielectric gloves is “ultra-low”. If the gloves do come in contact with the fluid, they will “very likely” be worn at the time. Injection equipment and injection tools are designed to minimize the probability of leaks. Leather glove protectors are required to protect dielectric gloves. The probability of getting fluid on the dielectric gloves is “ultra-low”. If the gloves do come in contact with the fluid, they will “very likely” be worn at the time. Injection equipment and injection tools are designed to minimize the probability of leaks. Leather glove protectors are required to protect dielectric gloves. The probability of getting fluid on the dielectric gloves is “ultra-low”. If the gloves do come in contact with the fluid, they will “very likely” be worn at the time. 2.4.3e It is unlikely that there is any adverse dielectric effect upon the gloves. The impact is “none” for equipment and “none” for personnel. It is unlikely that there is any adverse dielectric effect upon the gloves. The impact is “none” for equipment and “none” for personnel. It is unlikely that there is any adverse dielectric effect upon the gloves. The impact is “none” for equipment and “none” for personnel. It is unlikely that there is any adverse dielectric effect upon the gloves. The impact is “none” for equipment and “none” for personnel. 2.4.3f Quick disconnect fittings reduce the likelihood and quantity of accidental spills during handling when dielectric gloves are required. Equipment is designed to minimize the chance of fluid leaks. Equipment is designed to minimize the chance of fluid leaks. Injection is done deenergized, there is no reason that fluid should ever be near dielectric gloves. The primary source for the observations in the “UPR with soak – CC3” column is [8]. 63 Code UPR with soak – CC3 UPR without soak – P011 UPR without soak – U732 SPR – U732 2.4.3g Except for aesthetics, there does not appear to be any adverse consequence. Except for aesthetics, there does not appear to be any adverse consequence. Except for aesthetics, there does not appear to be any adverse consequence. Except for aesthetics, there does not appear to be any adverse consequence. 2.4.3h Risk (0,0) Requipment=0.0005●0=0 Rpersonnel=0.0005●0.90●0=0 Risk (0,0) Requipment=0.0005●0=0 Rpersonnel=0.0005●0.90●0=0 Risk (0,0) Requipment=0.0005●0=0 Rpersonnel=0.0005●0.90●0=0 Risk (0,0) Requipment=0.0005●0=0 Rpersonnel=0.0005●0.90●0=0 2.4.4 Chemical, Compatibility, EPDM Components Chemical, Compatibility, EPDM Components Chemical, Compatibility, EPDM Components Chemical, Compatibility, EPDM Components 2.4.4a PMDMS/TMMS fluids are more soluble in EDPM and EPR rubbers than they are in PE. The introduction of PMDMS/TMMS fluids into components such as splices and elbow terminations will lead to changes in the physical and electrical properties of component materials. P011 fluid components are more soluble in EDPM and EPR rubbers than they are in PE. The introduction of P011 fluids into components such as splices and elbow terminations will lead to changes in the physical and electrical properties of component materials. U732 fluids are more soluble in EDPM and EPR rubbers than they are in PE. The introduction of U732 fluids into components such as splices and elbow terminations will lead to changes in the physical and electrical properties of component materials. This risk is not applicable to this injection paradigm, because the injection fluid never comes in contact with EDPM components. 2.4.4b According to [8], silicone fluids used for rejuvenation are very soluble in EPDM and EPR. Measurements made by component manufactures indicate the solubility at room temperature is from 5% to 10% by volume. At higher temperatures the solubility increases to as high as 40%. (Author: More recent measurements in [18] show even higher swell.) P011 fluid is very soluble in EPDM and EPR. Measurements made by component manufactures indicate the solubility at room temperature is from 5% to 10% by volume. At higher temperatures the solubility increases to 50% or more. U732 fluids are very soluble in EPDM and EPR. Measurements made by component manufactures indicate the solubility at room temperature is from 5% to 10% by volume. At higher temperatures the solubility increases to 50% or more. In excess of 24 million feet of The experience is expected to be cable had been injected during slightly better than with the UPR the period spanning 1986 to with soak – CC3 paradigm 2000. During that period, because the soak period has been approximately 121,200 injectable eliminated. EPDM elbows and 57,100 splices have come in direct contact with PMDMS/TMMS fluids. Over that time period 0.1% had failed. (Author: Apparently there is at least a 0.1% probability that EPDM elbows or splices would fail. See “Improving Posttreatment Reliability: Eliminating Fluid-Component compatibility Issues”, Bertini, ICC DG C26D, Nov. 1, 2005 available at http://www.novinium.com/pdf/pa pers/ICCThe primary source for the observations in the “UPR with soak – CC3” column is [8]. The experience is expected to be slightly better than with the UPR with soak – CC3 paradigm because the soak period has been eliminated. 2.4.4c 64 Code UPR with soak – CC3 UPR without soak – P011 UPR without soak – U732 SPR – U732 Fluid%20Component%20Interacti ons.pdf and 2.3.3.1.3b for documented cases. It has also been reported that in hotter soils, splices become soft and spongy. Some utilities report much higher splice failure rates.) 2.4.4d According to [8], there is an “ultra-low” probability of failure based upon 14 years of field experience. It is “unlikely” that there would be any personnel present, if a splice or an elbow where to fail due to a compatibility problem as the time it would take for the material to swell significantly would be measured in days. (Author: My earlier assessment in [8] was too optimistic. The “ultra-low” probability has been adjusted to “very low”.) Approximately 30% less than the UPR with Soak – CC3 paradigm. Approximately 30% less than the UPR with Soak – CC3 paradigm. 2.4.4e The equipment consequences are “low” for direct buried splices and “high” for elbows. The equipment consequences are “low” for direct buried splices and “high” for elbows. The equipment consequences are “low” for direct buried splices and “high” for elbows. 2.4.4f Where operating temperatures may escalate well above the ambient soil temperature, injectable splices with metallic or PE layers should be installed to prevent fluid from coming in direct contact with the component. Where operating temperatures may escalate well above the ambient soil temperature, injectable splices with metallic or PE layers should be installed to prevent fluid from coming in direct contact with the component. Where operating temperatures may escalate well above the ambient soil temperature, injectable splices with metallic or PE layers should be installed to prevent fluid from coming in direct contact with the component. 2.4.4g Eye protection and flame retardant clothing should be worn near all energized rubber components. A hot stick should be utilized to operate energized components to provide separation between the component and the operator. Eye protection and flame retardant clothing should be worn near all energized rubber components. A hot stick should be utilized to operate energized components to provide separation between the component and the operator. Eye protection and flame retardant clothing should be worn near all energized rubber components. A hot stick should be utilized to operate energized components to provide separation between the component and the operator. 2.4.4h Risk (5,25) Requipment=0.005●103=5 Rpersonnel=0.005●0.05●105=25 Risk (3.5,18) Requipment=.005●70%●103=3.5 Rpersonnel=.005●70%●.05●105=18 Risk (3.5,18) Requipment=.005●70%●103=3.5 Rpersonnel=.005●70%●.05●105=18 2.4.5 Chemical, Compatibility, Cable Chemical, Compatibility, Cable Chemical, Compatibility, Cable Chemical, Compatibility, Cable 2.4.5a By design, PMDMS/TMMS fluids come into direct contact with By design, P011 fluids come into direct contact with cable By design, U732 fluids come into direct contact with cable By design, fluids utilized by this paradigm come into intimate The primary source for the observations in the “UPR with soak – CC3” column is [8]. 65 Code UPR with soak – CC3 UPR without soak – P011 UPR without soak – U732 SPR – U732 cable conductors and conductor shields or screens. PMDMS/TMMS fluid diffuses into the insulation, the insulation shield, and jackets (if present). (Author: The IHA did not include an analysis of the compatibility of fluids with conductors. New analysis is included as 2.4.5.6) conductors and conductor shields or screens. P011 fluid diffuses into the insulation, the insulation shield, and jackets (if present). conductors and conductor shields or screens. U732 fluid diffuses into the insulation, the insulation shield, and jackets (if present). contact with cable conductors and conductor shields or screens, and conductor strands. Fluid diffuses into the insulation and, at low concentrations, into insulation shields and jackets (if present). 2.4.5b PMDMS/TMMS fluid is soluble in all polymeric insulations and polymeric shields. The solubility varies from 0.5% at ambient temperatures to as high as 10% for some materials. As the silicone fluid components diffuse into polymeric materials, they change the electrical and physical properties of the polymer. As the temperature rises, the solubility increases too. Silicone fluids flow through the cable strands interstices and make intimate contact with electrical-mechanical compression connectors in splices and terminations. When applied as required by the CPM, there are no significant adverse effects. P011 fluid is soluble in all polymeric insulations and polymeric shields. The solubility varies from 0.5% at ambient temperatures to as high as 10% for some materials. As the silicone fluid components diffuse into polymeric materials, they change the electrical and physical properties of the polymer. As the temperature rises, the solubility increases too. Silicone fluids flow through the cable strands interstices and make intimate contact with electrical-mechanical compression connectors in splices and terminations. When applied as required by the NRIs, there are no significant adverse effects. U732 fluids are soluble in all polymeric insulations and polymeric shields. The solubility varies from 0.5% at ambient temperatures to as high as 10% for some materials. As the silicone fluid components diffuse into polymeric materials, they change the electrical and physical properties of the polymer. As the temperature rises, the solubility increases too. Silicone fluids flow through the cable strands interstices and make intimate contact with electrical-mechanical compression connectors in splices and terminations. When applied as required by the NRIs, there are no significant adverse effects. The silicone dielectric enhancement fluids used for rejuvenation are soluble in polymeric insulations and polymeric shields. The solubility at ambient temperatures varies from 0.5% to as high as 10% for some materials. As the silicone enhancement fluid components diffuse into polymeric materials, they change the electrical and physical properties of the polymer. As the temperature rises, the solubility increases too. Silicone and organic fluids flow through the cable strand interstices and make intimate contact with electricalmechanical compression connectors in splices and terminations. When applied as required by the NRIs, there are no significant adverse effects. 2.4.5c According to [8], over 25 million feet of cable had been injected during the period spanning 1986 to 2000. There had been no failures or performance deratings of cable except for a single case at Arizona Public Service described in section 2.4.5.4 during that time period. (Author: Circa 2001 a series of failures in Germany occurred as a result of the incompatibility of the injection fluid and aluminum conductors. For a partial discussion of the issues see [2.4.5.6]. There have been no compatibility issues. There have been no compatibility issues. There have been no compatibility issues. The primary source for the observations in the “UPR with soak – CC3” column is [8]. 66 Code UPR with soak – CC3 UPR without soak – P011 UPR without soak – U732 SPR – U732 2.4.5.1 Chemical, Compatibility, Cable, Connectivity & Ampacity Chemical, Compatibility, Cable, Connectivity & Ampacity Chemical, Compatibility, Cable, Connectivity & Ampacity Chemical, Compatibility, Cable, Connectivity & Ampacity 2.4.5.1a Fluid in the conductor interstices or in electrical-mechanical connectors interferes with heat transfer or conductivity at an electrical-mechanical interface. Fluid in the conductor interstices or in electrical-mechanical connectors interferes with heat transfer or conductivity at an electrical-mechanical interface. Fluid in the conductor interstices or in electrical-mechanical connectors interferes with heat transfer or conductivity at an electrical-mechanical interface. Fluid in the conductor interstices or in electrical-mechanical connectors interferes with heat transfer or conductivity at an electrical-mechanical interface. 2.4.5.1b PMDMS/TMMS fluid flows through cable interstices and comes in direct contact with electricalmechanical connectors in terminations and splices. There are no known adverse effects when applied as required by the CPM. The thermal conductivity of PMDMS/TMMS fluid is much greater than the air, which it displaces. The heat dissipation from the conductor is slightly improved. According to [8], in a test (ANSI C119.4-1986) performed by Hendrix Wire and Cable and reported in [25], the temperature of the conductor of an injected cable was measurably less than the temperature of an otherwise identical unfilled conductor. P011 fluid flows through cable interstices and comes in direct contact with electrical-mechanical connectors in terminations and splices. There are no known adverse effects when applied as required by the NRIs. The thermal conductivity of P011 fluid is much greater than the air, which it displaces. The heat dissipation from the conductor is slightly improved. U732 fluids flow through cable interstices and comes in direct contact with electrical-mechanical connectors in terminations and splices. There are no known adverse effects when applied as required by the NRIs. The thermal conductivity of U732 fluid is much greater than the air, which it displaces. The heat dissipation from the conductor is slightly improved. The silicone and organic fluids flow through the interstices of cable strands and come in direct contact with electricalmechanical connectors in splices and terminations. When applied as required by the Novinium rejuvenation instructions, there are no known adverse consequences. Terminations and joints enjoy improved ampacity utilizing a patented injection adaptor and a 360° circumferential swage. Testing at NEETRAC (utilizing ANSI C119.4-2004) demonstrated a connection superior to conventional compression techniques. 2.4.5.1c According to [8], over 25 million feet of cable were injected between 1986 and 2000. There are no known performance deratings of treated cables. There are no known performance deratings of treated cables. There are no known performance deratings of treated cables. The ampacity of a treated cable is greater than before treatment, because of superior compression connections. 2.4.5.1d It is “not possible” that the presence of fluid in the strands of a cable will adversely affect the ampacity of a cable or compression connector. In fact, the opposite effects have been measured. It is “not possible” that there would be any adverse impact on personnel. It is “not possible” that the presence of fluid in the strands of a cable will adversely affect the ampacity of a cable or compression connector. In fact, the opposite effects have been measured. It is “not possible” that there would be any adverse impact on personnel. It is “not possible” that the presence of fluid in the strands of a cable will adversely affect the ampacity of a cable or compression connector. In fact, the opposite effects have been measured. It is “not possible” that there would be any adverse impact on personnel. It is “not possible” that the presence of fluid in the strands of a cable will adversely affect the ampacity of a cable or compression connector. In fact, the opposite effects have been measured. It is “Not possible” that there would be any adverse impact on personnel. 2.4.5.1e The equipment and personnel consequence are “none”. The equipment and personnel consequence are “none”. The equipment and personnel consequence are “none”. The equipment and personnel consequence are “none”. Explicit rejuvenation instructions provide assurance that installed components do not compromise Explicit rejuvenation instructions provide assurance that installed components do not compromise Explicit rejuvenation instructions The service supplier has a set of proprietary craft standards, which provide assurance that installed components do not compromise provides assurance that an installed component enjoys its The primary source for the observations in the “UPR with soak – CC3” column is [8]. 2.4.5.1f 67 Code UPR with soak – CC3 UPR without soak – P011 UPR without soak – U732 design ampacity. connectivity or circuit ampacity. connectivity or circuit ampacity. connectivity or circuit ampacity. 2.4.5.1g Not applicable. Not applicable. Not applicable. Not applicable. 2.4.5.1h Risk (0,0) Requipment=0.0●0.000=0 Rpersonnel=0.0●0.000●0=0 Risk (0,0) Requipment=0.0●0.000=0 Rpersonnel=0.0●0.000●0=0 Risk (0,0) Requipment=0.0●0.000=0 Rpersonnel=0.0●0.000●0=0 Risk (0,0) Requipment=0.0●0.000=0 Rpersonnel=0.0●0.000●0=0 2.4.5.2 Chemical, Compatibility, Cable, Insulation Chemical, Compatibility, Cable, Insulation Chemical, Compatibility, Cable, Insulation Chemical, Compatibility, Cable, Insulation 2.4.5.2a PMDMS/TMMS fluid diffuses into polymeric solid-dielectric insulations and alters the electrical and mechanical properties. As long as the fluid persists in the insulation in meaningful quantities dielectric reliability remains high. Persistence is determined by the combination of stoichiometric efficiency, catalytic efficiency, and in some cases the presence of persistent co-products. See [30]. Dielectric enhancements fluids diffuse into polymeric soliddielectric insulations and alter the electrical and mechanical properties. As long as the fluid persists in the insulation in meaningful quantities dielectric reliability remains high. Persistence is determined by the combination of stoichiometric efficiency, catalytic efficiency, and in some cases the presence of persistent co-products. See [30]. Dielectric enhancements fluids diffuse into polymeric soliddielectric insulations and alter the electrical and mechanical properties. As long as the fluid persists in the insulation in meaningful quantities dielectric reliability remains high. Persistence is determined by the combination of stoichiometric efficiency, catalytic efficiency, and in some cases the presence of persistent co-products. See [30]. Dielectric enhancements fluids diffuse into polymeric soliddielectric insulations and alter the electrical and mechanical properties. As long as the fluid persists in the insulation in meaningful quantities dielectric reliability remains high. Persistence is determined by the combination of stoichiometric efficiency, catalytic efficiency, and in some cases the presence of persistent co-products. See [30]. The formulation of fluids used by this paradigm is tailored to the anticipated temperature profile of the cable to be treated. For a complete discussion of the mechanisms of dielectric enhancement, please see [17]. To view the instructions for the fluid selection process see NRI-20 available online at: The formulation of fluids used by this paradigm is tailored to the anticipated temperature profile of the cable to be treated. For a complete discussion of the mechanisms of dielectric enhancement, please see [17]. To view the instructions for the fluid selection process see NRI20 available online at: P011 PMDMS fluid is designed to PMDMS/TMMS fluid is designed to diffuse through conductor shields diffuse through conductor shields and into PE solid-dielectric and into PE solid-dielectric insulation systems. While the insulation systems. While the fluid was not designed to treat fluid was not designed to treat EPR cables there are some results EPR cables there are some results which demonstrate reasonable which demonstrate reasonable efficacy without any observed efficacy without any observed adverse consequences. PMDMS adverse consequences. fluid reacts (hydrolyzes) with PMDMS/TMMS fluid reacts water that is in the insulation, (hydrolyzes) with water that is in particularly the water associated the insulation, particularly the with water trees. The hydrolysis water associated with water reaction together with a trees. The hydrolysis reaction subsequent condensation reaction together with a subsequent in the presence of a DDBSA condensation reaction in the catalyst yields a short chain linear presence of a titanium catalyst oligomer, which has an average yields a short chain linear degree of polymerization (dp) of oligomer, which has an average six. This typical reaction is degree of polymerization (dp) of illustrated below. As the six. This typical reaction is condensation proceeds, the illustrated below. As the solubility values of the larger condensation proceeds, the oligomers are lower than the solubility values of the larger monomer and smaller oligomers. oligomers are lower than the Put another way, the solubility of monomer and smaller oligomers. the monomer is greater than the Put another way, the solubility of solubility of the dimer, which is the monomer is greater than the The primary source for the observations in the “UPR with soak – CC3” column is [8]. 2.4.5.2b 68 www.novinium.com/instructions.aspx The table below summarizes and compares the stoichiometric efficiency (Stoich.), catalytic efficiency (Cat.) and the overall efficiency from [37] and [38] of U732 DDBSA catalyzed and PMDMS (CC3) TIPT catalyzed silane rejuvenation technology. Efficiency U732 DDBSA PMDMS TIPT Stoich. 72% 68% Cat. 98% 61% Overall 71% 41% SPR – U732 www.novinium.com/instructions.aspx The table below summarizes and compares the stoichiometric efficiency (Stoich.), catalytic efficiency (Cat.) and the overall efficiency from [37] and [38] of U732 DDBSA catalyzed and PMDMS (CC3) TIPT catalyzed silane rejuvenation technology. Efficiency U732 DDBSA PMDMS TIPT Stoich. 72% 68% Cat. 98% 61% Overall 71% 41% Code UPR with soak – CC3 UPR without soak – P011 solubility of the dimer, which is greater than the solubility of the trimer, which is greater than the solubility of the tetramer, which is greater than the solubility of the pentamer, which is greater than the solubility of the hexamer. As the condensation reactions proceed and the average solubility of the mixture decreases, fluid accumulates in the micro-voids characteristic of water trees and other dielectric defects. The net effect is an increase in dielectric breakdown strength. greater than the solubility of the trimer, which is greater than the solubility of the tetramer, which is greater than the solubility of the pentamer, which is greater than the solubility of the hexamer. As the condensation reactions proceed and the average solubility of the mixture decreases, fluid accumulates in the micro-voids characteristic of water trees and other dielectric defects. The net effect is an increase in dielectric breakdown strength. 6 phenylmethyldimethoxysilane + 7 water Hydroxyendblocked phenylmethylsiloxane (dp=6) + 7 methanol According to [8], “Injection in field and laboratory environments have taken place with a wide variety of solid dielectric insulating materials including high-molecular weight polyethylene (HMWPE), crosslinked polyethylene (XLPE), various polyethylene copolymer blends, various (both pink and black) ethylene propylene-rubber (EPR) formulations, and butylrubber.” In one experiment performed by CTL for Orange & Rockland Utilities, a polyethylene insulated URD cable was provided with a reservoir of PMDMS fluid and the temperature was cycled from ambient (~25°C) to 90°C. The solubility of all materials is temperature dependent. The severe thermal cycling together with the reservoir of fluid created supersaturation. In extreme cases of supersaturation such as the O&R experiment, the insulation may swell to 6 phenylmethyldimethoxysilane + 7 water Hydroxyendblocked phenylmethylsiloxane (dp=6) + 7 methanol According to [8], “Injection in field and laboratory environments have taken place with a wide variety of solid dielectric insulating materials including high-molecular weight polyethylene (HMWPE), crosslinked polyethylene (XLPE), various polyethylene copolymer blends, various (both pink and black) ethylene propylene-rubber (EPR) formulations, and butylrubber.” In one experiment performed by CTL for Orange & Rockland Utilities, a polyethylene insulated URD cable was provided with a reservoir of PMDMS fluid and the temperature was cycled from ambient (~25°C) to 90°C. The solubility of all materials is temperature dependent. The severe thermal cycling together with the reservoir of fluid created supersaturation. In extreme cases of supersaturation such as the O&R experiment, the insulation may swell to mechanical burst. The primary source for the observations in the “UPR with soak – CC3” column is [8]. 69 UPR without soak – U732 SPR – U732 Code UPR with soak – CC3 UPR without soak – P011 mechanical burst. The table below summarizes and compares the stoichiometric efficiency (Stoich.), catalytic efficiency (Cat.) and the overall efficiency from [37] and [38] of U732 DDBSA catalyzed and PMDMS (CC3) TIPT catalyzed silane rejuvenation technology. The table below summarizes and compares the stoichiometric efficiency (Stoich.), catalytic efficiency (Cat.) and the overall efficiency from [37] and [38] of P011 DDBSA catalyzed and PMDMS (CC3) TIPT catalyzed silane rejuvenation technology. Efficiency 2.4.5.2c 2.4.5.2d Efficien- PMDMS cy DDBSA UPR without soak – U732 SPR – U732 There have been no incidents with this paradigm as the fluid formulation is tailored for each application to avoid such a result. A fluid reservoir is not attached to the cable for a soak period. The overall failure rate with this paradigm since becoming commercially available in 2008 is 0%, but is likely to be marginally poorer than the when the same fluid is applied with SPR and substantially better than PMDMSbased CC3 and P011 fluids. The failure rate is expected to be between 0.5% and 1%. There have been no incidents with this paradigm as the fluid formulation is tailored for each application to avoid such a result. The overall failure rate with this paradigm since becoming commercially available in 2006 is less than 0.5%. The tailoring process inherently minimizes this risk without the introduction of diluting compounds. All fluids injected are designed to add reliable life to the treated cable. There is an “ultra-low” probability that the presence of fluid in the strands of a cable will create a condition where failure due to over saturation might occur. The probability that personnel might be adjacent to a fault, if such a The tailoring process inherently minimizes this risk without the introduction of diluting compounds. All fluids injected are designed to add reliable life to the treated cable. There is an “ultra-low” probability that the presence of fluid in the strands of a cable will create a condition where failure due to over saturation might occur. The probability that personnel might be adjacent to a fault, if such a PMDMS TIPT U732 DDBSA PMDMS TIPT Stoich. 68% 68% Stoich. 72% 68% Cat. 98% 61% Cat. 98% 61% Overall 67% 41% Overall 71% 41% According to [8], over 25 million feet of cable have been injected during the period spanning 1986 to 2000. During that time period, there was a single documented case of supersaturation. There were no other known problems with insulation compatibility. The single failure was a feeder circuit in West Texas. The treated cable belonged to Texas Utilities, now Oncor. In [8], it was observed, “A combination of unusually high temperatures over a long period of time along with excess fluid in the strands was identified as the cause of supersaturation and a subsequent failure.” The overall failure rate with this paradigm is reported by the supplier is “less than 1%.” There have been no incidents with this paradigm as a fluid reservoir is not attached to the cable for a soak period. Procedural changes adopted after the TU failure yield an “ultra-low” probability that the presence of fluid in the strands of a cable will create a condition where failure due to supersaturation may occur. The probability that personnel might be present when such failures were to occur is “unlikely”. Having no connected reservoir during a soak period yields an “ultra-low” probability that the presence of fluid in the strands of a cable will create a condition where failure due to supersaturation may occur. The probability that personnel might be present when such failures were to occur is “unlikely”. The overall failure rate with this paradigm since becoming commercially available in 2008 is 0%, but is likely to be only slightly better than that experienced by UPR with soak – CC3 paradigm. The primary source for the observations in the “UPR with soak – CC3” column is [8]. 70 Code UPR with soak – CC3 UPR without soak – P011 UPR without soak – U732 SPR – U732 failure were to occur, is “not possible” failure were to occur, is “not possible” 2.4.5.2e The equipment consequence is “low” as a failure will likely blow a fuse or trip a breaker. The person-nel consequence rating is “life threatening”, if the failure occurs while a person is next to the failure. The equipment consequence is “low” as a failure will blow a fuse or trip a breaker. The personnel consequence rating is “life threatening”, if the failure occurs while a person is next to the failure. The equipment consequence is “low” as a failure will blow a fuse or trip a breaker. The personnel consequence rating is “life threatening”, if the failure occurs while a person is next to the failure. The equipment consequence is “low” as a failure will blow a fuse or trip a breaker. The personnel consequence rating is “life threatening”, if the failure occurs while a person is next to the failure site. 2.4.5.2f The injection service supplier filed [4], U.S. patent 6,162,491, and foreign equivalents on a method to reduce the probability of supersaturation. There are low solubility non-functional materials, which when added to the PMDMS/TMMS fluid, dilute the fugacity of the mixture to a point where damaging supersaturation is less likely. This fugacity suppression material is a dimethyl siloxane mixture, which cross-links in situ, or CB fluid. CB fluid has been in commercial use since 1998 on cables where the volume of the fluid in the cable’s interstices might provide a sufficient volume of PMDMS/TMMS fluid to lead to supersaturation with severe temperature cycling. When followed, NRIs eliminate the possibility of over-saturation without any dilution. When followed, NRIs eliminate the possibility of over-saturation without any dilution. When followed, NRIs eliminate the possibility of over-saturation without any dilution. 2.4.5.2g N/A N/A N/A N/A 2.4.5.2h Risk (0.5,25) Requipment=0.0005●103=0.5 Rpersonnel=0.0005●0.05●106=25 Risk (0,0) Requipment=0.0●103=0 Rpersonnel=0.0●0.05●106=0 Risk (0,0) Requipment=0.0●103=0 Rpersonnel=0.0●0.05●106=0 Risk (0,0) Requipment=0.0●103=0 Rpersonnel=0.0●0.05●106=0 2.4.5.3 Chemical, Compatibility, Cable, Conductor Shield Chemical, Compatibility, Cable, Conductor Shield Chemical, Compatibility, Cable, Conductor Shield Chemical, Compatibility, Cable, Conductor Shield 2.4.5.3a PMDMS/TMMS fluid diffuses into polymeric conductor shields and may alter its electrical and mechanical properties. Dielectric enhancements fluids diffuse into polymeric conductor shields and may alter its electrical and mechanical properties. Dielectric enhancements fluids diffuse into polymeric conductor shields and may alter its electrical and mechanical properties. Dielectric enhancements fluids diffuse into polymeric conductor shields and may alter its electrical and mechanical properties. 2.4.5.3b PMDMS/TMMS fluid was designed to diffuse through conductor shields and into solid-dielectric insulation systems. The monomers hydrolyze with water in the conductor shield. The Dielectric enhancement fluids are designed to diffuse through conductor shields and into soliddielectric insulation systems. The silane portion of the fluid reacts with water that is present in the Dielectric enhancement fluids are designed to diffuse through conductor shields and into soliddielectric insulation systems. The silane portion of the fluid reacts with water that is present in the Dielectric enhancement fluids are designed to diffuse through conductor shields and into soliddielectric insulation systems. The silane portion of the fluid reacts with water that is present in the The primary source for the observations in the “UPR with soak – CC3” column is [8]. 71 Code UPR with soak – CC3 UPR without soak – P011 UPR without soak – U732 SPR – U732 resistivity of the conductor shield is typically increased as the semiconductive carbon black is coated with the dielectric silane. conductor shield. The resistivity of the conductor shield may increase slightly as the semiconductive carbon black is coated with the dielectric materials in the formulation. conductor shield. The resistivity of the conductor shield may increase slightly as the semiconductive carbon black is coated with the dielectric materials in the formulation. conductor shield. The resistivity of the conductor shield may increase slightly as the semiconductive carbon black is coated with the dielectric materials in the formulation. 2.4.5.3c According to [8], over 25 million feet of cable have been injected during the period spanning 1986 to 2001. During that period there were no know failures caused by alteration of the physical or electrical properties of the conductor shield. In laboratory experiments, an increase in conductor shield resistivity is noted, but in no case has the resistivity exceeded the value allowed by the AEIC specification. The increase in volume resistivity is likely caused by the adsorption of the PMDMS/TMMS fluid onto the surfaces of the carbon black agglomerates. Over 90% of the P011 fluid used in this injection paradigm is identical to the monomer used by the UPR with soak – CC3 paradigm. There have been no failures attributable to a conductor shield. Fluids used in this injection paradigm are similar to those used by the UPR with soak – CC3 paradigm. There have been no failures attributable to a conductor shield. Fluids used in this injection paradigm are similar to those used by the UPR with soak – CC3 paradigm. There have been no failures attributable to a conductor shield. 2.4.5.3d It is “not possible” to have a materially negative impact on the cable performance as PMDMS/TMMS fluid diffuses through the conductor shield. According to [8], an experiment undertaken for Entergy’s New Orleans Metro unit, demonstrated the AC breakdown performance of a cable increased by 30% after just 7 days. After 7 days, the affect of the fluid on the conductor shield is greatest and the affect of the fluid on the adjacent insulation has just begun. It is “unlikely” that there would be any personnel present adjacent to a failure site. It is “not possible” to have a materially negative impact on cable performance as rejuvenation fluids permeate through the conductor shield. It is “unlikely” that there would be any personnel present adjacent to a failure site. It is “not possible” to have a materially negative impact on cable performance as rejuvenation fluids permeate through the conductor shield. It is “unlikely” that there would be any personnel present adjacent to a failure site. It is “not possible” to have a materially negative impact on cable performance as rejuvenation fluids permeate through the conductor shield. It is “unlikely” that there would be any personnel present adjacent to a failure site. As shown in [22], AC breakdown strength after 7 days is greater than 16 kV/mm (400 v/mil). 2.4.5.3e The equipment consequence is “low” as a failure will likely blow a fuse or trip a breaker. The personnel consequence rating is “life threatening”, if the failure occurs while a person is next to the failure site. The equipment consequence is “low” as a failure will likely blow a fuse or trip a breaker. The personnel consequence rating is “life threatening”, if the failure occurs while a person is next to the failure site. The equipment consequence is “low” as a failure will likely blow a fuse or trip a breaker. The personnel consequence rating is “life threatening”, if the failure occurs while a person is next to the failure site. The equipment consequence is “low” as a failure will likely blow a fuse or trip a breaker. The personnel consequence rating is “life threatening”, if the failure occurs while a person is next to the failure site. The primary source for the observations in the “UPR with soak – CC3” column is [8]. 72 Code UPR with soak – CC3 UPR without soak – P011 UPR without soak – U732 2.4.5.3f None required. None required. None required. None required. 2.4.5.3g N/A N/A N/A N/A 2.4.5.3h Risk (0,0) Requipment=0.0●103=0 Rpersonnel=0.0●0.05●106=0 Risk (0,0) Requipment=0.0●103=0 Rpersonnel=0.0●0.05●106=0 Risk (0,0) Requipment=0.0●103=0 Rpersonnel=0.0●0.05●106=0 Risk (0,0) Requipment=0.0●103=0 Rpersonnel=0.0●0.05●106=0 2.4.5.4 Chemical, Compatibility, Cable, Insulation Shield Chemical, Compatibility, Cable, Insulation Shield Chemical, Compatibility, Cable, Insulation Shield Chemical, Compatibility, Cable, Insulation Shield 2.4.5.4a PMDMS/TMMS fluid diffuse through conductor shields, insulation, and finally to the insulation shield. PMDMS/TMMS fluid may change the electrical and mechanical properties of the shield. For out-side in injections sometimes used on jacketed cables, which have solid conductors, or on jacketed transmission cables, the PMDMS/TMMS fluid will come in direct contact with the insulation shield. PMDMS diffuses through polymeric conductor shields, insulation, and finally to the insulation shield. The fluid may change the electrical and mechanical properties of the shield. For outside-in injections sometimes used on jacketed cables, which have solid conductors, or on jacketed transmission cables, the fluid(s) will come in direct contact with the insulation shield. Dielectric enhancements fluids diffuse through polymeric conductor shields, insulation, and finally to the insulation shield. The fluid may change the electrical and mechanical properties of the shield. For outside-in injections sometimes used on jacketed cables, which have solid conductors, or on jacketed transmission cables, the fluid(s) will come in direct contact with the insulation shield. Dielectric enhancements fluids diffuse through polymeric conductor shields, insulation, and finally to the insulation shield. The fluid may change the electrical and mechanical properties of the shield. For outside-in injections sometimes used on jacketed cables, which have solid conductors, or on jacketed transmission cables, the fluid(s) will come in direct contact with the insulation shield. 2.4.5.4b PMDMS/TMMS fluid was designed to diffuse through the conductor shield and through the insulation. Normally, a very low concentration of fluid will reach the insulation shield where it may hydrolyze with water present in the insulation shield, if any alkoxy functionality survives. The resistivity of the insulation shield may increase slightly. This section 2.4.5.4 does not cover any risks associated with this normal case (99.99% of all injections), but rather deals with the unusual cases where PMDMS/TMMS fluid comes into direct contact with the insulation shield, whether intentionally or unintentionally. Most insulation shield formulations in which PMDMS/TMMS fluid has come in direct contact behave similarly to the conductor shields described in 2.4.5.3. Dielectric enhancement fluids are designed to diffuse through conductor shields and through insulation. A very small concentration of fluid will reach the insulation shield where it may hydrolyze with water present in the insulation shield, if any alkoxysilane functionality remains. The resistivity of the insulation shield may increase slightly. This section 2.4.5.4 does not cover any risks associated with this normal case (99.99% of all injections), but rather deals with the unusual cases where fluid comes into direct contact with the insulation shield whether intentionally or unintentionally. Most insulation shield formulations in which fluid has come in direct contact behave similarly to the conductor shields described in 2.4.5.3. Dielectric enhancement fluids are designed to diffuse through conductor shields and through insulation. A very small concentration of fluid will reach the insulation shield where it may hydrolyze with water present in the insulation shield, if any alkoxysilane functionality remains. The resistivity of the insulation shield may increase slightly. This section 2.4.5.4 does not cover any risks associated with this normal case (99.99% of all injections), but rather deals with the unusual cases where fluid comes into direct contact with the insulation shield whether intentionally or unintentionally. Most insulation shield formulations in which fluid has come in direct contact behave similarly to the conductor shields described in 2.4.5.3. Dielectric enhancement fluids are designed to diffuse through conductor shields and through insulation. A very small concentration of fluid will reach the insulation shield where it may hydrolyze with water present in the insulation shield, if any alkoxysilane functionality remains. The resistivity of the insulation shield may increase slightly. This section 2.4.5.4 does not cover any risks associated with this normal case (99.99% of all injections), but rather deals with the unusual cases where fluid comes into direct contact with the insulation shield whether intentionally or unintentionally. Most insulation shield formulations in which fluid has come in direct contact behave similarly to the conductor shields described in 2.4.5.3. 2.4.5.4c According to [8] and at least through 2000, there had been No such cases have occurred. No such cases have occurred. This paradigm does not inject through splices, nor does the The primary source for the observations in the “UPR with soak – CC3” column is [8]. 73 SPR – U732 Code UPR with soak – CC3 UPR without soak – P011 UPR without soak – U732 SPR – U732 fluid come in contact with elbows or terminations. The probability that dielectric enhancement fluid will come in direct contact with the insulation shield during inside-out injection is very close to zero. No such cases have occurred. only a single documented set of case of damage to the insulation shield. The incident occurred at Arizona Public Service (APS) when fluid inadvertently leaked through a 750 kcm molded splice interface and came into direct contact with the insulation shield. The insulation shield swelled, and in several cases puckered up and separated from the insulation. Such a condition is unacceptable and lead to rapid failure as partial discharges undoubtedly occurred in the bubbles under the shield. 2.4.5.4d According to [8], there is an “ultra-low” possibility that fluid will come in intimate contact with insulation shield material and that there will be an incompatibility between the fluid and the shield material. It is “unlikely” that there would be any personnel present adjacent to a failure site. There is an “ultra-low” possibility that fluid will come in intimate contact with insulation shield material and that there will be an incompatibility between the fluid and the shield material. It is “unlikely” that there would be any personnel present adjacent to a failure site. There is an “ultra-low” possibility that fluid will come in intimate contact with insulation shield material and that there will be an incompatibility between the fluid and the shield material. It is “unlikely” that there would be any personnel present adjacent to a failure site. Because of the injection paradigm, the scenario is at least two times less likely that fluid will come in intimate contact with insulation shield material and that there will be an incompatibility between the fluid and the shield material. 2.4.5.4e The equipment consequence is “low” as a failure will likely blow a fuse or trip a breaker. The personnel consequence rating is “life threatening”, if the failure occurs while a person is next to the failure site. The equipment consequence is “low” as a failure will likely blow a fuse or trip a breaker. The personnel consequence rating is “life threatening”, if the failure occurs while a person is next to the failure site. The equipment consequence is “low” as a failure will likely blow a fuse or trip a breaker. The personnel consequence rating is “life threatening”, if the failure occurs while a person is next to the failure site. The equipment consequence is “low” as a failure will likely blow a fuse or trip a breaker. The personnel consequence rating is “life threatening”, if the failure occurs while a person is next to the failure site. 2.4.5.4f For outside-in injections, where fluid is intentionally put into direct contact with the insulation shield, a fluid compatibility test must be run on a sample of the cable. Fluid is only injected under the jacket after successful completion of the compatibility test. As a result of the APS experience detailed in 2.4.5.4c, injectable splice and termination designs on feeder cables were improved to hold pressure in excess of the injection pressure or the vapor pressure at elevated temperatures. For conductors 4/0 and smaller (or smaller than 108 For outside-in injections, where fluid is intentionally put into direct contact with the insulation shield, a fluid compatibility test must be run on a sample of the cable. Fluid is only injected under the jacket after successful completion of the compatibility test. Injectable adaptors at splices and terminations are designed to hold pressure 5-10X in excess of the injection pressure. Vapor pressure is negligible with P011 fluid used, even at elevated temperatures. For outside-in injections, where fluid is intentionally put into direct contact with the insulation shield, a fluid compatibility test must be run on a sample of the cable. Fluid is only injected under the jacket after successful completion of the compatibility test. Injectable adaptors at splices and terminations are designed to hold pressure 5-10X in excess of the injection pressure. Vapor pressure is negligible with U732 fluids used, even at elevated temperatures. For outside-in injections, where fluid is intentionally put into direct contact with the insulation shield, a fluid compatibility test must be run on a sample of the cable. Fluid is only injected under the jacket after successful completion of the compatibility test. Injectable adaptors at splices and terminations are designed to hold pressure 5-10X in excess of the injection pressure. Vapor pressure is negligible with U732 fluids used, even at elevated temperatures. The primary source for the observations in the “UPR with soak – CC3” column is [8]. 74 Code UPR with soak – CC3 UPR without soak – P011 UPR without soak – U732 SPR – U732 mm2), procedures require that air pressure tests first confirm components can withstand pressures at least 10% higher than those pressure to which they will be subjected before being injected. 2.4.5.4g Not applicable. Not applicable. Not applicable. Not applicable. 2.4.5.4h Risk (0.5,25) Requipment=0.0005●103=0.5 Rpersonnel=0.0005●0.05●106=25 Risk (0.5,25) Requipment=0.0005●103=0.5 Rpersonnel=0.0005●0.05●106=25 Risk (0.5,25) Requipment=0.0005●103=0.5 Rpersonnel=0.0005●0.05●106=25 Risk (0.25,12.2) Requipment=0.0005/2●103=0.5 Rpersonnel=0.0005/2●0.05●106=25 2.4.5.5 Chemical, Compatibility, Cable, Jacket Chemical, Compatibility, Cable, Jacket Chemical, Compatibility, Cable, Jacket Chemical, Compatibility, Cable, Jacket 2.4.5.5a PMDMS/TMMS fluid diffuses through the conductor shields, through the insulation, and through the insulation shield. If a cable is jacketed, some small concentration of fluid will diffuse into the jacket and may alter its electrical and mechanical properties. For outside-in injections which are occasionally used on jacketed cables with solid conductors or on jacketed transmission cables, the PMDMS/TMMS and/or CB fluid(s) will come in direct contact with the jacket interior. Dielectric enhancement fluid diffuses through the conductor shields, through the insulation, and through the insulation shield. If a cable is jacketed, some small concentration of fluid will diffuse into the jacket and may alter its electrical and mechanical properties. For outside-in injections which are occasionally used on jacketed cables with solid conductors or on jacketed transmission cables, the enhancement fluids will come in direct contact with the jacket interior. Dielectric enhancement fluid diffuses through the conductor shields, through the insulation, and through the insulation shield. If a cable is jacketed, some small concentration of fluid will diffuse into the jacket and may alter its electrical and mechanical properties. For outside-in injections which are occasionally used on jacketed cables with solid conductors or on jacketed transmission cables, the enhancement fluids will come in direct contact with the jacket interior. Dielectric enhancement fluid diffuses through the conductor shields, through the insulation, and through the insulation shield. If a cable is jacketed, some small concentration of fluid will diffuse into the jacket and may alter its electrical and mechanical properties. For outside-in injections which are occasionally used on jacketed cables with solid conductors or on jacketed transmission cables, the enhancement fluids will come in direct contact with the jacket interior. Dielectric enhancement fluid diffuses through conductor shields, through the insulation, and through the insulation shield. The fluid then diffuse into the jacket annulus. If there is any alkoxy functionality remaining, there will be some additional hydrolysis with water in the jacket annulus and the jacket as it diffuses outward. 2.4.5.5 does not cover any risks associated with this normal case (encompassing 99.99% of all injections), but rather deals with the unusual case where fluids comes into intimate contact with the jacket, whether intentionally or unintentionally. Most PVC and PE jackets are compatible with Dielectric enhancement fluid diffuses through conductor shields, through the insulation, and through the insulation shield. The fluid then diffuse into the jacket annulus. If there is any alkoxy functionality surviving, there will be some additional hydrolysis with water in the jacket annulus and the jacket as it diffuses outward. 2.4.5.5 does not cover any risks associated with this normal case (encompassing 99.99% of all injections), but rather deals with the unusual case where fluids comes into intimate contact with the jacket, whether intentionally or unintentionally. Most PVC and PE jackets are compatible with PMDMS fluid diffuses through PMDMS/TMMS fluid diffuses conductor shields, through the through conductor shields, insulation, and through the through the insulation, and insulation shield. The fluid then through the insulation shield. The diffuse into the jacket annulus. If fluid then diffuse into the jacket there is any alkoxy functionality annulus. If there is any alkoxy remaining, there will be some functionality remaining, there will additional hydrolysis with water be some additional hydrolysis in the jacket annulus and the with water in the jacket annulus jacket as it diffuses outward. and the jacket as it diffuses 2.4.5.5 does not cover any risks outward. 2.4.5.5 does not cover associated with this normal case any risks associated with this (encompassing 99.99% of all normal case (encompassing injections), but rather deals with 99.99% of all injections), but the unusual case where PMDMS rather deals with the unusual fluid comes into intimate contact case where PMDMS/TMMS and/or with the jacket, whether CB fluid(s) comes into intimate intentionally or unintentionally. contact with the jacket, whether Most PVC and PE jackets are intentionally or unintentionally. compatible with dielectric Most PVC and PE jackets in which The primary source for the observations in the “UPR with soak – CC3” column is [8]. 2.4.5.5b 75 Code UPR with soak – CC3 UPR without soak – P011 UPR without soak – U732 SPR – U732 PMDMS/TMMS and/or CB fluid has come in direct contact have not had any material change to their performance. enhancements fluids utilized within this paradigm. dielectric enhancements fluids utilized within this paradigm. dielectric enhancements fluids utilized within this paradigm. 2.4.5.5c According to [8], a single case, at Kassel (Germany) where a transmission cable was treated from the outside-in by injecting the annular space between the insulation shield and the PVC jacket. Where the jacket was unconstrained by the surrounding soil, the jacket noticeably swelled and created concern for the postinjection performance of the jacket and cable. This injection occurred in 1998 and no failures have occurred at least through 2002. The cable had failed repeatedly prior to treatment. The issues would be the same as with the UPR soak – CC3 paradigm. No instances of jacket swelling have been reported. The issues would be the same as with the UPR soak – CC3 paradigm. No instances of jacket swelling have been reported. The issues would be the same as with the UPR soak – CC3 paradigm. No instances of jacket swelling have been reported. 2.4.5.5d According to [8], there is an “ultra-low” possibility that fluid will come in direct contact with jacket material, which has not previously been compatibility tested. It is “unlikely” that there would be any personnel present adjacent to a jacket breach site. There is an “ultra-low” possibility that fluid will come in direct contact with jacket material, which has not previously been compatibility tested. It is “unlikely” that there would be any personnel present adjacent to a jacket breach site. Because there is no soak period the probability is reduced by at least a factor of 2. There is an “ultra-low” possibility that fluid will come in direct contact with jacket material, which has not previously been compatibility tested. It is “unlikely” that there would be any personnel present adjacent to a jacket breach site. Because there is no soak period the probability is reduced by at least a factor of 2. There is an “ultra-low” possibility that fluid will come in direct contact with jacket material, which has not previously been compatibility tested. It is “unlikely” that there would be any personnel present adjacent to a jacket breach site. Because there is no soak period the probability is reduced by at least a factor of 2. 2.4.5.5e The equipment consequence is “low” as a failure will likely blow a fuse or trip a breaker. The personnel consequence rating is “life threatening” if the failure occurs while a person is next to the failure site. The equipment consequence is “low” as a failure will likely blow a fuse or trip a breaker. The personnel consequence rating is “life threatening” if the failure occurs while a person is next to the failure site. The equipment consequence is “low” as a failure will likely blow a fuse or trip a breaker. The personnel consequence rating is “life threatening” if the failure occurs while a person is next to the failure site. The equipment consequence is “low” as a failure will likely blow a fuse or trip a breaker. The personnel consequence rating is “life threatening” if the failure occurs while a person is next to the failure site. 2.4.5.5f Procedures require the performance of a fluid compatibility test on jacketing and insulation shield materials before fluid is placed in direct contact with those materials in field applications. Injectable splice and termination designs on feeder cables are intended to hold pressure in excess of the injection pressure or any fluid vapor pressure at Procedures require the performance of a fluid compatibility test on jacketing and insulation shield materials before fluid is placed in direct contact with those materials in field applications. Injectable splice and termination designs on feeder cables are designed to hold 5-10X of the injection pressure. Vapor pressure, even Procedures require the performance of a fluid compatibility test on jacketing and insulation shield materials before fluid is placed in direct contact with those materials in field applications. Injectable splice and termination designs on feeder cables are designed to hold 5-10X of the injection pressure. Vapor pressure, even Procedures require the performance of a fluid compatibility test on jacketing and insulation shield materials before fluid is placed in direct contact with those materials in field applications. Injectable splice and termination designs on feeder cables are designed to hold 5-10X of the injection pressure. Vapor pressure, even The primary source for the observations in the “UPR with soak – CC3” column is [8]. 76 Code UPR with soak – CC3 UPR without soak – P011 UPR without soak – U732 SPR – U732 temperatures above ambient. For cables with conductors 4/0 and smaller (or smaller than 108 mm2), air pressure tests confirm components can withstand pressures at least 10% higher than those pressure to which they will be subjected. at maximum cable design temperatures, is inconsequentially low. at maximum cable design temperatures, is inconsequentially low. at maximum cable design temperatures, is inconsequentially low. 2.4.5.5g Not applicable. Not applicable. Not applicable. Not applicable. 2.4.5.5h Risk (0.5,25) Requipment=0.0005●103=0.5 Rpersonnel=0.0005●0.05●106=25 Risk (0.25,12.25) Requipment=0.0005/2●103=0.25 Rpersonnel=0.0005/2●0.05●106=12 Risk (0.25,12.25) Requipment=0.0005/2●103=0.25 Rpersonnel=0.0005/2●0.05●106=12 Risk (0.25,12.25) Requipment=0.0005/2●103=0.25 Rpersonnel=0.0005/2●0.05●106=12 2.4.5.6 Chemical, Compatibility, Cable, Conductor Chemical, Compatibility, Cable, Conductor Chemical, Compatibility, Cable, Conductor Chemical, Compatibility, Cable, Conductor 2.4.5.6a (Author: The IHA did not include an analysis of the compatibility of fluids with conductors. The entirety of this section 2.4.5.6 is a new contribution and is in italics to designate it as such.) The PMDMS/TMMS fluid comes into direct contact with stranded conductors. In addition to the injected fluids, reaction products and by-products (esp. methanol) also come into direct contact with the aluminum or copper conductor strands. This section explores the compatibility of these chemicals with the conductor. P011 fluids come into direct contact with stranded conductors. In addition to the injected fluids, reaction products and byproducts (esp. methanol) also come into direct contact with the aluminum or copper conductor strands. This section explores the compatibility of these chemicals with the conductor. U732 fluids come into direct contact with stranded conductors. In addition to the injected fluids, reaction products and byproducts (esp. methanol) also come into direct contact with the aluminum or copper conductor strands. This section explores the compatibility of these chemicals with the conductor. U732 fluids come into direct contact with stranded conductors. In addition to the injected fluids, reaction products and by-products (esp. methanol) also come into direct contact with the aluminum or copper conductor strands. This section explores the compatibility of these chemicals with the conductor. U732 fluids utilized with this paradigm include methoxy-silanes. When these silanes mix with water dispersed in the strands, the strand shield, and insulation of a cable, they react (hydrolyze) with the water and liberate methanol as a by-product. Methanol is a known corrosive agent to aluminum. Copper does not suffer the same issue. The total methanol produced is 25% or less of the unit mass of dielectric enhancement fluid supplied to the strands compared to CC3. Methanol is a relatively small molecule and hence it diffuses quite rapidly from the cable interior into the U732 fluids utilized with this paradigm include methoxysilanes. When these silanes mix with water dispersed in the strands, the strand shield, and insulation of a cable, they react (hydrolyze) with the water and liberate methanol as a byproduct. Methanol is a known corrosive agent to aluminum. Copper does not suffer the same issue. The total methanol produced is 25% or less of the unit mass of dielectric enhancement fluid supplied to the strands compared to CC3. Methanol is a relatively small molecule and hence it diffuses The PMDMS component of P011 is PMDMS and TMMS are methoxya methoxy-silane. When this silane. When they mix with water silane mixes with water dispersed dispersed in the strands, the in the strands, the strand shield, strand shield, and insulation of a and insulation of a cable, they cable, the silanes react react (hydrolyze) with the water (hydrolyze) with the water and and liberate methanol as a byliberate methanol as a byproduct. Methanol is a known product. Methanol is a known corrosive agent to aluminum. corrosive agent to aluminum. Copper does not suffer the same Copper does not suffer the same issue. The total methanol issue. The total methanol produced is 7% or less of the unit produced is about 30% of the mass of dielectric enhancement unit mass of PMDMS/TMMS fluid supplied to the strands mixture supplied to the strands. compared to CC3. Methanol is a Methanol is a relatively small relatively small molecule and molecule and hence it diffuses hence it diffuses quite rapidly from quite rapidly from the cable the cable interior into the interior into the surrounding The primary source for the observations in the “UPR with soak – CC3” column is [8]. 2.4.5.6b 77 Code UPR with soak – CC3 UPR without soak – P011 UPR without soak – U732 SPR – U732 environment. Aluminum corrosion occurs whenever methanol and aluminum are together in an anhydrous (i.e. water-free) environment. PMDMS/TMMS create an anhydrous environment shortly after injection. This corrosion is accelerated by three factors: surrounding environment. Aluminum corrosion occurs whenever methanol and aluminum are together in an anhydrous (i.e. water-free) environment. The PMDMS of P011 creates an anhydrous environment shortly after injection. This corrosion is accelerated by two factors: surrounding environment. Aluminum corrosion occurs whenever methanol and aluminum are together in an anhydrous (i.e. water-free) environment. The methoxy silanes of U732 fluid create an anhydrous environment shortly after injection. This corrosion is accelerated by two factors: quite rapidly from the cable interior into the surrounding environment. Aluminum corrosion occurs whenever methanol and aluminum are together in an anhydrous (i.e. water-free) environment. The methoxy silanes of U732 fluid create an anhydrous environment shortly after injection. This corrosion is accelerated by two factors: 1. Higher concentrations of methanol in the strands 2. Higher temperatures 3. The presence of certain organometallic catalysts including titanium (IV) isopropoxide, which is the catalyst utilized in all variations of PMDMS/TMMS mixtures used for over two decades. Higher concentrations of methanol are possible when there is a lot of water near the conductor (in the conductor shield) or when there are characteristics of the cable design, which slow the exudation of methanol such as jackets. The existence of methanol in the cable interior is transient, since the methanol is ultimately fugitive, and the total quantity of methoxy ligand supplied by the fluid is finite. Higher temperatures have two accelerating effects. First, higher temperatures accelerate all chemical reactions. Second, volatile components can begin to boil. This boiling mechanically scours surfaces and may remove the protective patina (selfforming protective coating on aluminum surface of oxides and hydroxides). Both the TMMS component of the flammable silane mixture and the methanol by-product have boiling points 1. Higher concentrations of methanol in the strands 2. Higher temperatures Higher concentrations of methanol are possible when there is a lot of water near the conductor or when there are characteristics of the cable design, which slow the exudation of methanol such as jackets. The existence of methanol in the cable interior is transient, since the methanol is ultimately fugitive, and the total quantity of methoxy ligand supplied by the fluid is finite. Higher temperatures have two accelerating effects. First, higher temperature accelerates all chemical reactions. Second, the methanol by-product is volatile and can begin to boil. This boiling can mechanically scours surfaces and may remove the protective patina (self-forming protective coating on aluminum surface of oxides and hydroxides) if no steps are taken to stabilize the patina. The methanol byproduct has a boiling point well below the 90°C maximum operating temperature of most medium voltage power cables. The primary source for the observations in the “UPR with soak – CC3” column is [8]. 78 1. Higher concentrations of methanol in the strands 2. Higher temperatures Higher concentrations of methanol are possible when there is a lot of water near the conductor or when there are characteristics of the cable design, which slow the exudation of methanol such as jackets. The existence of methanol in the cable interior is transient, since the methanol is ultimately fugitive, and the total quantity of methoxy ligand supplied by the fluid is finite. Higher temperatures have two accelerating effects. First, higher temperature accelerates all chemical reactions. Second, the methanol by-product is volatile and can begin to boil. This boiling can mechanically scours surfaces and may remove the protective patina (self-forming protective coating on aluminum surface of oxides and hydroxides) if no steps are taken to stabilize the patina. The methanol byproduct has a boiling point well below the 90°C maximum operating temperature of most medium voltage power cables. 1. Higher concentrations of methanol in the strands 2. Higher temperatures Higher concentrations of methanol are possible when there is a lot of water near the conductor or when there are characteristics of the cable design, which slow the exudation of methanol such as jackets. The existence of methanol in the cable interior is transient, since the methanol is ultimately fugitive, and the total quantity of methoxy ligand supplied by the fluid is finite. Higher temperatures have two accelerating effects. First, higher temperature accelerates all chemical reactions. Second, the methanol by-product is volatile and can begin to boil. This boiling can mechanically scours surfaces and may remove the protective patina (selfforming protective coating on aluminum surface of oxides and hydroxides) if no steps are taken to stabilize the patina. The methanol by-product has a boiling point well below the 90°C maximum operating temperature of most medium voltage power cables. Code UPR with soak – CC3 UPR without soak – P011 UPR without soak – U732 SPR – U732 well below the 90°C maximum operating temperature of most medium voltage power cables. Titanium (IV) isopropoxide (a.k.a. tetraisopropyl-titanate or TIPT), even in catalytic quantities, accelerates this corrosion. 2.4.5.6c References [3] and [16] provide a public case history of significant cable failures due to methanolic corrosion of aluminum at the German utility E.On. There is no evidence of methanolic corrosion in treated cables. There is no evidence of methanolic corrosion in treated cables. There is no evidence of methanolic corrosion in treated cables. 2.4.5.6d There is an “ultra-low” possibility that the conditions for significant methanolic corrosion will occur. It is “unlikely” that there would be any personnel present adjacent to a fault. Due to the absence of corrosion catalyst, the lower concentration of methanol and the addition of corrosion inhibitors, the “ultralow” possibility that the conditions for significant methanolic corrosion will occur is at least half that of the CC3 fluid. It is “unlikely” that there would be any personnel present adjacent to a fault. Due to the absence of corrosion catalyst, the lower concentration of methanol, and the addition of corrosion inhibitors, the “ultralow” possibility that the conditions for significant methanolic corrosion will occur is at least half that of the CC3 fluid. It is “unlikely” that there would be any personnel present adjacent to a fault. Due to the absence of corrosion catalyst and the addition of corrosion inhibitors, the “ultralow” possibility that the conditions for significant methanolic corrosion will occur is at least half that of the flammable silane fluid. It is “unlikely” that there would be any personnel present adjacent to a fault. 2.4.5.6e The equipment consequence is “high” as a failure will destroy the cable. The personnel consequence rating is “none”. The equipment consequence is “high” as a failure will destroy the cable. The personnel consequence rating is “none”. The equipment consequence is “high” as a failure will destroy the cable. The personnel consequence rating is “none”. The equipment consequence is “high” as a failure will destroy the cable. The personnel consequence rating is “none”. 2.4.5.6f In 2005, the injection service supplier reduced the concentration of TMMS six-fold to reduce the boiling point of the fluid as described in [15] and [24]. Future publications from the authors will provide further insight. The interested reader may inquire with the author or with the service supplier. P011 fluids used in this paradigm have no organo-metallic catalysts which may contribute to methanolic corrosion and include specific corrosion inhibitors. U732 fluids used in this paradigm have no organo-metallic catalysts which may contribute to methanolic corrosion and include specific corrosion inhibitors. U732 fluids used in this paradigm have no organometallic catalysts which may contribute to methanolic corrosion and include specific corrosion inhibitors. 2.4.5.6g The service supplier provides a conditional money back guarantee. The service supplier provides an unconditional money back guarantee. The service supplier provides an unconditional money back guarantee. The service supplier provides an unconditional money back guarantee. 2.4.5.6h Risk (2.5,0) Requipment=0.0005/2●5x103=2.5 Rpersonnel=0.0005/2●0.05●0=0 Risk (1.2,0) Requipment=0.0005/2●5x103=1.2 Rpersonnel=0.0005/2●0.05●0=0 Risk (1.2,0) Requipment=0.0005/2●5x103=1.2 Rpersonnel=0.0005/2●0.05●0=0 Risk (1.2,0) Requipment=0.0005/2●5x103=1.2 Rpersonnel=0.0005/2●0.05●0=0 3 Operational Operational Operational Operational 3a Everyday hazards continue to be the most prevalent risks for injection crews. Operational risks include all non-electrical and non- Everyday hazards continue to be the most prevalent risks for injection crews. Operational risks include all non-electrical and non- Everyday hazards continue to be the most prevalent risks for injection crews. Operational risks include all non-electrical and non- Everyday hazards continue to be the most prevalent risks for injection crews. Operational risks include all non-electrical and The primary source for the observations in the “UPR with soak – CC3” column is [8]. 79 Code UPR with soak – CC3 UPR without soak – P011 UPR without soak – U732 chemical risks. chemical risks. chemical risks. non-chemical risks. 3.1 Operational, Dig-ins Operational, Dig-ins Operational, Dig-ins Operational, Dig-ins 3.1a Splice excavation with a backhoe or a shovel may damage another utility. Splice excavation with a backhoe or a shovel may damage another utility. Splice excavation with a backhoe or a shovel may damage another utility. Splice excavation with a backhoe or a shovel may damage another utility. 3.1b Injection has a much lower incidence of dig-ins than replacement utilizing trenching or guided tunneling. Injection has a much lower incidence of dig-ins than replacement utilizing trenching or guided tunneling. Injection has a much lower incidence of dig-ins than replacement utilizing trenching or guided tunneling. Injection has a much lower incidence of dig-ins than replacement utilizing trenching or guided tunneling. 3.1c According to [8] in a 12 month period in 1996-97, the service supplier experienced the following: mismarked hits were 0, unmarked hits were 3, and marked hits were 4. The following 9 month period included the following: mismarked hits were 0, unmarked hits were 1, and marked hits were 0. Hits of all types are zero after over 40 months of operation. Hits of all types are zero after over 40 months of operation. Hits of all types are zero after over 40 months of operation. 3.1d According to [8], the probability is “ultra-low” and the presence of personnel near the utility strike is “very likely”. This paradigm requires the same number of pits dug as UPR with soak – CC3. This paradigm requires the same number of pits dug as UPR with soak – CC3. This paradigm generally requires twice as many spices to be dug. The teams performing the work are more practiced at the art. It is believed that these two effects cancel each other out. The probability is “ultra-low” times 2, divided by 2, while the presence of personnel near the utility strike is “very likely”. 3.1e The equipment consequences are “very high” while the personnel ranking varies from “none” to “life-threatening” depending on the utility struck. The equipment consequences are “very high” while the personnel ranking varies from “none” to “life-threatening” depending on the utility struck. The equipment consequences are “very high” while the personnel ranking varies from “none” to “life-threatening” depending on the utility struck. The equipment consequences are “very high” while the personnel ranking varies from “none” to “life-threatening” depending on the utility struck. 3.1f Use a utility locating service, hand dig within 18” of known utilities. Dig slowly with mechanized equipment. Use a utility locating service, hand dig within 18” of known utilities. Dig slowly with mechanized equipment. Use vacuum excavation equipment or other soft-dig technology wherever possible. Maximize the use of SPR to minimize the use of UPR. Use a utility locating service, hand dig within 18” of known utilities. Dig slowly with mechanized equipment. Use vacuum excavation equipment or other soft-dig technology wherever possible. Maximize the use of SPR to minimize the use of UPR. Use a utility locating service, hand dig within 18” of known utilities. Dig slowly with mechanized equipment. Use vacuum excavation equipment or other soft-dig technology wherever possible. 3.1g Keep all unnecessary personnel and the public away from the excavation. Keep all unnecessary personnel and the public away from the excavation. Keep all unnecessary personnel and the public away from the excavation. Keep all unnecessary personnel and the public away from the excavation. Risk (5,450) Requipment=0.0005●104=5 Risk (5,450) (prob. adjust cancel) Requipment=0.0005●104=5 Risk (5,450) Risk (5,450) Requipment=0.0005●104=5 Requipment=0.0005●104=5 The primary source for the observations in the “UPR with soak – CC3” column is [8]. 3.1h 80 SPR – U732 Code UPR with soak – CC3 UPR without soak – P011 UPR without soak – U732 SPR – U732 Rpersonnel=0.0005●0.9●106=450 Rpersonnel=0.0005●0.9●106=450 Rpersonnel=0.0005●0.9●106=450 Rpersonnel=0.0005●0.9●106=450 3.2 Operational, Driving Accidents Operational, Driving Accidents Operational, Driving Accidents Operational, Driving Accidents 3.2a When driving trucks, cars and other fleet stock a traffic accident occurs. When driving trucks, cars and other fleet stock a traffic accident occurs. When driving trucks, cars and other fleet stock a traffic accident occurs. When driving trucks, cars and other fleet stock a traffic accident occurs. 3.2b Probably because of the smaller equipment sizes and typically better trained operators, injection crews have a much lower incidence of traffic accidents than conventional replacement crews or guided tunneling crews. Probably because of the smaller equipment sizes and typically better trained operators, injection crews have a much lower incidence of traffic accidents than conventional replacement crews or guided tunneling crews. Probably because of the smaller equipment sizes and typically better trained operators, injection crews have a much lower incidence of traffic accidents than conventional replacement crews or guided tunneling crews. Smaller vehicles, because of the elimination of 2 tanks for each segment and lightweight and portable equipment, reduce the likelihood of traffic accidents in this paradigm beyond the already low rate enjoyed by the other paradigm. 3.2.1 Operational, Driving Accidents, Job Site Operational, Driving Accidents, Job Site Operational, Driving Accidents, Job Site Operational, Driving Accidents, Job Site 3.2.1a When driving trucks, cars and other fleet stock to and from job sites a traffic accident occurs. When driving trucks, cars and other fleet stock to and from job sites a traffic accident occurs. When driving trucks, cars and other fleet stock to and from job sites a traffic accident occurs. When driving trucks, cars and other fleet stock to and from job sites a traffic accident occurs. 3.2.1b See 3.2b. See 3.2b. See 3.2b. See 3.2b. 3.2.1c According to [8], the service supplier experienced 2 nonpreventable vehicle accidents and 1 preventable vehicle accidents during the 12 months in 1996-97. During the next 9 months, there were 2 non-preventable and 0 preventable vehicle accidents. Zero traffic incidents after over 40 months of operation. Zero traffic incidents after over 40 months of operation. Zero traffic incidents after over 40 months of operation. 3.2.1d The probability is “ultra-low”, while the presence of personnel during a traffic accident is “certain”. The probability is “ultra-low”, while the presence of personnel during a traffic accident is “certain”. Because of the elimination of the soak period at least 1/3 of the site visits are eliminated, the total driving required is about 2/3-times the UPR with soak – CC3 injection paradigm. The probability is “ultra-low”, while the presence of personnel during a traffic accident is “certain”. Because of the elimination of the soak period at least 1/3 of the site visits are eliminated, the total driving required is about 2/3-times the UPR with soak – CC3 injection paradigm. Because of the single visit injection paradigm, the total driving required is about 3-times less than the UPR with soak – CC3 injection paradigm. 3.2.1e The equipment consequences to the utility are “none” while the personnel ranking is “life threatening”. The equipment consequences to the utility are “none” while the personnel ranking is “life threatening”. The equipment consequences to the utility are “none” while the personnel ranking is “life threatening”. The equipment consequences to the utility are “none” while the personnel ranking is “life threatening”. 3.2.1f Drive carefully. Value-based safety culture; “How’s my driving?” program; GPS exception monitoring for speeding; employee background checks; zero alcohol and drug Value-based safety culture; “How’s my driving?” program; GPS exception monitoring for speeding; employee background checks; zero alcohol and drug Value-based safety culture; “How’s my driving?” program; GPS exception monitoring for speeding; employee background checks; zero alcohol and drug The primary source for the observations in the “UPR with soak – CC3” column is [8]. 81 Code UPR with soak – CC3 UPR without soak – P011 UPR without soak – U732 policy. policy. SPR – U732 policy. 3.2.1g Drive carefully. Equipment and fluids in separate compartment from personnel; non-flammable fluids only. Equipment and fluids in separate compartment from personnel; non-flammable fluids only. Equipment and fluids in separate compartment from personnel; non-flammable fluids only. 3.2.1h Risk (0,500) Requipment = 0.0005 x 0 = 0 Rpersonnel = 0.0005 x 1 x 106 = 500 Risk (0,333) Requipment=0.0005●2/3●0=0 Rpersonnel=0.0005●2/3●1●106=333 Risk (0,333) Requipment=0.0005●2/3●0=0 Rpersonnel=0.0005●2/3●1●106=333 Risk (0,167) Requipment=0.0005/3●0=0 Rpersonnel=0.0005/3●1●106=167 3.2.2 Operational, Driving Accidents, Non-Job Site Operational, Driving Accidents, Non-Job Site Operational, Driving Accidents, Non-Job Site Operational, Driving Accidents, Non-Job Site 3.2.2a When driving trucks, cars and other fleet stock for purposed outside of work, a traffic accident occurs. When driving trucks, cars and other fleet stock for purposed outside of work, a traffic accident occurs. When driving trucks, cars and other fleet stock for purposed outside of work, a traffic accident occurs. When driving trucks, cars and other fleet stock for purposed outside of work, a traffic accident occurs. 3.2.2b See 3.2b. See 3.2b. See 3.2b. See 3.2b. 3.2.2c No data available. Novinium has suffered a single incident where an employee drove a company vehicle after hours and after consuming alcohol against company policy. The vehicle was totaled the driver and passenger were unhurt. Novinium has suffered a single incident where an employee drove a company vehicle after hours and after consuming alcohol against company policy. The vehicle was totaled the driver and passenger were unhurt. Novinium has suffered a single incident where an employee drove a company vehicle after hours and after consuming alcohol against company policy. The vehicle was totaled the driver and passenger were unhurt. 3.2.2d The probability is “ultra-low”, while the presence of personnel during a traffic accident is “certain”. The probability is “ultra-low”, while the presence of personnel during a traffic accident is “certain”. The probability is “ultra-low”, while the presence of personnel during a traffic accident is “certain”. The probability is “ultra-low”, while the presence of personnel during a traffic accident is “certain”. 3.2.2e The equipment consequences to the utility are “none” while the personnel ranking is “life threatening”. The equipment consequences to the utility are “none” while the personnel ranking is “life threatening”. The equipment consequences to the utility are “none” while the personnel ranking is “life threatening”. The equipment consequences to the utility are “none” while the personnel ranking is “life threatening”. 3.2.2f Drive carefully. Value-based safety culture; “How’s my driving?” program; GPS exception monitoring for speeding; employee background checks; zero alcohol and drug policy. Value-based safety culture; “How’s my driving?” program; GPS exception monitoring for speeding; employee background checks; zero alcohol and drug policy. Value-based safety culture; “How’s my driving?” program; GPS exception monitoring for speeding; employee background checks; zero alcohol and drug policy. 3.2.2g Drive carefully. Equipment and fluids in separate compartment from personnel; non-flammable fluids only. Equipment and fluids in separate compartment from personnel; non-flammable fluids only. Equipment and fluids in separate compartment from personnel; non-flammable fluids only. 3.2.2h Risk (0,500) Requipment=0.0005●0=0 Rpersonnel=0.0005●1●106=500 Risk (0,500) Requipment=0.0005●0=0 Rpersonnel=0.0005●1●106=500 Risk (0,500) Requipment=0.0005●0=0 Rpersonnel=0.0005●1●106=500 Risk (0,500) Requipment=0.0005●0=0 Rpersonnel=0.0005●1●106=500 3.3 Operational, Mechanical injuries (sprains, strains, cuts, bruises, etc.) Operational, Mechanical injuries (sprains, strains, cuts, bruises, etc.) Operational, Mechanical injuries (sprains, strains, cuts, bruises, etc.) Operational, Mechanical injuries (sprains, strains, cuts, bruises, etc.) 3.3a Miscellaneous. Miscellaneous. Miscellaneous. Miscellaneous. The primary source for the observations in the “UPR with soak – CC3” column is [8]. 82 Code UPR with soak – CC3 UPR without soak – P011 UPR without soak – U732 SPR – U732 3.3b Nothing specific. Nothing specific. Nothing specific. Nothing specific. 3.3c For 12 months in 1996-1998, the service supplier reported OSHA injuries/illnesses were 8. For the following 9 months ending 12/1997, there were 2. Zero incidents after over 40 months of operation. Zero incidents after over 40 months of operation. Zero incidents after over 40 months of operation. 3.3d The probability is “very low”, while the presence of personnel is “certain”. The probability is “very low”, while the presence of personnel is “certain”. The probability is “very low”, while the presence of personnel is “certain”. The probability is “very low”, while the presence of personnel is “certain”. 3.3e The equipment consequences to the utility are “none” and the personnel rankings are “low”. The equipment consequences to the utility are “none” and the personnel rankings are “low”. The equipment consequences to the utility are “none” and the personnel rankings are “low”. The equipment consequences to the utility are “none” and the personnel rankings are “low”. 3.3f Be careful. Below zero safety culture. Below zero safety culture. Below zero safety culture. 3.3g Be careful. Below zero safety culture. Below zero safety culture. Below zero safety culture. 3.3h Risk (0,5) Requipment=0.005●0=0 Rpersonnel=0.005●1●103=5 Risk (0,5) Requipment=0.005●0=0 Rpersonnel=0.005●1●103=5 Risk (0,5) Requipment=0.005●0=0 Rpersonnel=0.005●1●103=5 Risk (0,5) Requipment=0.005●0=0 Rpersonnel=0.005●1●103=5 3.4 Operational, Hydraulic failure Operational, Hydraulic failure Operational, Hydraulic failure Operational, Hydraulic failure 3.4a Pressures used to inject cable may exceed the hoop strength of a circuit component. Circuit components include the cable and attached accessories such as elbows and splices. (Author: The IHA did not identify this risk, there was no discussion provided in the 2001 document. Accordingly, the entirety of this section 3.4 is in italics to identify the source of the discussion as the work of the current author at the published date of this entire document.) This risk is not encountered with this injection paradigm, as moderate pressure injection is not practiced within this paradigm. This risk is not encountered with this injection paradigm, as moderate pressure injection is not practiced within this paradigm. Pressures used to inject cable may exceed the hoop strength of a cable. All cable accessories are separated from the fluid pressure by stainless steel injection adaptors. A pressure difference between two cable ends is used to provide the driving force for fluid to be injected into the tiny interstitial spaces between the strands. The greater the pressure difference, the faster the fluid will flow. There are two phases of the injection which are referred to as “feed” and “decay.” During the feed phase, fluid is injected at moderate pressures of 100 to 400 psig for XLPE cable. A vacuum of about 10 psig may be applied to the 3.4b A pressure difference between two cable ends is used to provide the driving force for fluid to be injected into the tiny interstitial spaces between the strands. The greater the pressure difference, the faster the fluid will flow. There are two phases of the injection, which are referred to as “feed” and “soak.” During the feed phase, fluid is injected at either medium pressures of 250 to 500 psig, as for example in [26] and [27], or at low pressure, which is typically about 18 psig. The primary source for the observations in the “UPR with soak – CC3” column is [8]. 83 Code UPR with soak – CC3 UPR without soak – P011 UPR without soak – U732 SPR – U732 outlet end for longer cable lengths. At the end of the feed phase, any vacuum, if used, is removed, the outlet end is sealed, and fluid is fed into the feed end of the cable until the cable is uniformly pressurized to the target injection pressure. The actual pressure at any point along a circuit’s length is determined by five factors. 1. The flow rate from the feed to the outlet. 2. The feed pressure. 3. The outlet pressure. 4. The change in height or head along the circuit length from the feed tank. 5. The vapor pressure of the fluid in the strands, which is a function of the temperature of the conductor and the concentrations of the feed ingredients and reactive by-products in the cable strands. The maximum pressure at any point along a circuit’s length is determined by items 2, 4, and 5 from the list above. In either case, a vacuum of about 10 psig is applied to the outlet end. At the end of the feed phase, the vacuum is removed and pressure at the feed end is reduced to the soak pressure, typically 10-12 psig. The actual pressure at any point along a circuit’s length is determined by five factors. 1. The flow rate from the feed to the outlet. 2. The feed pressure. 3. The outlet pressure. 4. The change in height or head along the circuit length from the feed tank. 5. The vapor pressure of the fluid in the strands, which is a function of the temperature of the conductor and the concentrations of the feed ingredients and reactive byproducts in the cable strands. The maximum pressure at any point along a circuit’s length is determined by items 2, 4, and 5 from the list above. Pure Component Vapor Pressure (volatile components) 100.00 Pure Component Vapor Pressure (volatile components) 100.00 1.00 10.00 Vapor Pressure (psig) Vapor Pressure (psig) 10.00 0.10 TMMS model TMMS data max operating temp Temperature °C 0.01 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110 120 1.00 0.10 130 The feed pressure (2) is set by the INJECTION SERVICE SUPPLIER... The density of flammable silane mixture is approximately 1 g/cm3 and hence the head pressure (4) at any point can be approximated: Head pressure is the product of height below (above) fluid supply (ft) and 0.4335 psi/fthead. The maximum vapor pressure as a The primary source for the observations in the “UPR with soak – CC3” column is [8]. acetophenone max operating temp Temperature °C 0.01 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110 120 130 The feed pressure (2) is set by Novinium to the tailored injection pressure plus 10%. The feed pressure decays when the injection is completed as described by 2.3.3b. The density of U732 is approximately 1 g/cm3 and hence the head pressure (4) at any point can be 84 Code UPR with soak – CC3 UPR without soak – P011 UPR without soak – U732 SPR – U732 approximated: Head pressure is the product of height below (above) fluid supply (ft) and 0.4335 psi/fthead. The maximum vapor pressure as a function of temperature can be approximated from the figure nearby. An fatty acid is the most volatile component in flammable silane mixture, so the maximum system vapor pressure will be less than the pure component value for the mixture. Less than 2 psig for any conductor temperature up to 130°C. function of temperature can be approximated from the figure nearby. TMMS is the most volatile component in the PMDMS/TMMS mixture, so the maximum system vapor pressure will be less than the pure component value for the mixture. The interested reader should seek more refined values from the supplier for PMDMS/TMMS. The yield point (the internal pressure where the cable irreversibly expands) for 7-strand and 19-strand cables is about 50 psig for EPR, 650 psig for HMWPE and about 650 psig for XLPE and TRXLPE cables at 25°C. The burp point (the internal pressure where a component (elbow or splice) expands and allows fluid to leak across an interface) varies from 20 to 120 psig at 25°C. Most EPDM molded splices and elbows are limited to 30 to 35 psig. The yield point (the internal pressure where the cable irreversibly expands) for 7strand and 19-strand cables is about 50 psig for EPR, 650 psig for HMWPE and about 650 psig for XLPE and TRXLPE cables at 25°C. 3.4.1 Operational, Hydraulic failure, Cable Operational, Hydraulic failure, Cable Operational, Hydraulic failure, Cable Operational, Hydraulic failure, Cable 3.4.1a Pressures used to inject cable may exceed the hoop strength of a circuit component. (Author: The IHA did not identify this risk, there was no discussion provided in the 2001 document. Accordingly, the entirety of this section 3.4.1 is in italics to identify the source of the discussion as the work of the current author at the published date of this entire document.) This risk is not possible with this paradigm. This risk is not possible with this paradigm. Pressures used to inject cable may exceed the hoop strength of a cable. 3.4.1b See 3.4b. See 3.4b. 3.4.1c The authors are unaware of any hydraulic failures of cables. The interested reader should inquire with the service supplier. On three occasions cables have burst adjacent to the feed point. In all cases, cable was repaired, injected, and put back in service. In all three cases, there were mechanical abnormalities to the cable associated with the burst The primary source for the observations in the “UPR with soak – CC3” column is [8]. 85 Code UPR with soak – CC3 UPR without soak – P011 UPR without soak – U732 SPR – U732 point. Abnormalities observed include non-concentric insulation and severe bending beyond the minimum bending radius. 3.4.1d The probability is “ultra-low” where medium pressure is used, while the presence of personnel is “likely”. Because medium pressure is used on a fraction of treated cables the probability is reduced by a factor of 10 compared to the SPR injection paradigm. The probability is “ultra-low”, while the presence of personnel is “likely”. 3.4.1e If pressure in a cable exceeds the yield point, the cable will likely fail hydraulically. The equipment consequences to the utility are “low” and the personnel consequences are “low”. If pressure in a cable exceeds the yield point, the cable will likely fail hydraulically. The equipment consequences to the utility are “low” and the personnel consequences are “low”. 3.4.1f Interested readers should inquire with service supplier to identify probability mitigation tactics. Execute NRI 20 and NRI-25 available at: www.novinium.com/instructions. aspx. See especially NRI 20 step 18. A tool to identify cables bent beyond their minimum bending radius is utilized. Either the portion of cables so identified is replaced or the entire cable is not injected. A tool to measure the circularity or eccentricity of insulation was implemented in 2008. 3.4.1g Interested readers should inquire with the injection service supplier to identify consequence mitigation tactics. Safety glasses with side shields are required to protect eyes from hydraulic failure. Hydraulic failures are a diagnostic for electrical-mechanical defects in the insulation. Such failures occur while the cable is not energized. Circuit owners may exercise their unconditional money-back warranty. 3.4.1h Risk (0.05,0.045) Requipmen=0.0005/10●103=0.05 Rpersonnel=0.0005/10●0.9●103=.05 Risk (0.5,0.45) Requipment=0.0005●103=0.5 Rpersonnel=0.0005●0.9●103=0.45 3.4.2 Operational, Hydraulic failure, Component Operational, Hydraulic failure, Component The primary source for the observations in the “UPR with soak – CC3” column is [8]. 86 Operational, Hydraulic failure, Component Operational, Hydraulic failure, Component Code UPR with soak – CC3 UPR without soak – P011 UPR without soak – U732 SPR – U732 3.4.2a Pressures used to inject cable exceed the hoop strength of a circuit component. (e.g. splices and terminations) (Author: The IHA did not identify this risk, there was no discussion provided in the 2001 document. Accordingly, the entirety of this section 3.4.1 is in italics to identify the source of the discussion as the work of the current author at the published date of this entire document.) Pressures used to inject cable exceed the hoop strength of a circuit component. Pressures used to inject cable exceed the hoop strength of a circuit component. This risk does not apply to this injection paradigm. 3.4.2b See 3.4b. See 3.4b. See 3.4b. 3.4.2c The author is aware of many (i.e. 100’s) component failures that are consistent with this risk. Without careful study of an individual failure these types of failures are easily confounded with failures discussed in section 2.4 of this document. The interested reader should inquire with service supplier. There have been no component failures with this paradigm. Operations commenced in the fall of 2008. There have been no component failures with this paradigm. Operations commenced in the fall of 2008. 3.4.2d The probability is “low”, while the presence of personnel is “not possible”. The probability is “low”, while the presence of personnel is “not possible”. The probability is “low”, while the presence of personnel is “not possible”. 3.4.2e If pressure in a component exceeds the burp point, fluid and contaminants will leak across the component interface. The component may fail immediately or the burp may deposit contaminants along the component-cable interface. Such contamination may contribute to future interfacial tracking. The equipment consequences to the utility are “medium” and the personnel ranking is “high”. If pressure in a component exceeds the burp point, fluid and contaminants will leak across the component interface. The component may fail immediately or the burp may deposit contaminants along the component-cable interface. Such contamination may contribute to future interfacial tracking. The equipment consequences to the utility are “medium” and the personnel ranking is “high”. If pressure in a component exceeds the burp point, fluid and contaminants will leak across the component interface. The component may fail immediately or the burp may deposit contaminants along the component-cable interface. Such contamination may contribute to future interfacial tracking. The equipment consequences to the utility are “medium” and the personnel ranking is “high”. 3.4.2f Interested readers should inquire with the injection service supplier to identify probability mitigation tactics. Air testing described in NRI 50 is used to confirm that splices can hold the required pressure. The elimination of the soak phase reduces the exposure of splices to transient over pressurizations by 60 to 100 times. UPR without soak is used as a backup to the more robust SPR paradigm Air testing described in NRI 50 is used to confirm that splices can hold the required pressure. The elimination of the soak phase reduces the exposure of splices to transient over pressurizations by 60 to 100 times. UPR without soak is used as a backup to the more robust SPR paradigm The primary source for the observations in the “UPR with soak – CC3” column is [8]. 87 Code UPR with soak – CC3 UPR without soak – P011 UPR without soak – U732 reducing the number of exposed splices by about a factor of 2-5 depending upon the circuit owner’s propensity to remove aged splices. Taken together, these probability mitigation techniques decrease the probability of occurrence by a factor of 10. reducing the number of exposed splices by about a factor of 2-5 depending upon the circuit owner’s propensity to remove aged splices. Taken together, these probability mitigation techniques decrease the probability of occurrence by a factor of 10. 3.4.2g Interested readers should inquire with the injection service supplier to identify consequence mitigation tactics. N/A N/A 3.4.2h Risk (50,0) Requipment=0.05●103=50 Rpersonnel=0.05●0●105=0 Risk (5,0) Requipment=0.05/10●103=5 Rpersonnel=0.05/10●0●105=0 Risk (5,0) Requipment=0.05/10●103=5 Rpersonnel=0.05/10●0●105=0 The primary source for the observations in the “UPR with soak – CC3” column is [8]. 88 SPR – U732 Addendum D. Revision History Rev Date Revision Notes 2011-01-19 Updated Figure 1 with 2010 data Added HVFI device (High Voltage Fluidic Interface) as Hazard 1.5. The primary source for the observations in the “UPR with soak – CC3” column is [8]. 89
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