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Ambivalence and Weaponless
Deterrence
The intricate story how centrifuges spin the world
Matthias Englert, Öko-Institut e.V.
Anne Harrington, ETH Zürich
NURIS
Vienna, 16.04.2015
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The NPT
Article I+II
Article III+IV
Article VI
No transfer of nuclear weapons by the 5 nuclear
weapon states Non nuclear weapon states abandon
nuclear weapons
Deterrence and
Abstinence
Non nuclear weapon states accept IAEA safeguards.
Transfer of Material and technology only under
safeguards
Obligation for full international exchange of technology,
material and scientific information (“inalienable rights”)
Distribution and
Control
Obligation for full nuclear disarmament of nuclear
weapon states
Disarmament
2
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NPT
managed system of
deterrence
managed system of
abstinence
?
undermined by ambivalence (battleground of interpretation)
3
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Ambivalence
„The ambivalence of nuclear technologies has several effects
1) Classic Dual-Use
Ambivalence allows to use a technology for either military or civil purposes (classic dual-use)
and undermines a distinction.
2) Latent Proliferation
Ambivalence is fundamentally irreducible as long as all potentials are not actualized. The use
in actus can be monitored but distinction is only possible de poste factum.
3) Access to power via participation in deterrence system
Ambivalence undermines the NPT’s managed system of drawing a firm line between
deterrence and abstinence. Non Nuclear Weapon states can gain access to the deterrence
game.
4) Domestic use
Ambivalence allows a heterogeneous set of actors to simultaneously fulfill even contradictory
missions and thereby calming domestic disputes.
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Deterrence
5
Slide adapted from J.
Acton
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Deterrence
6
Slide adapted from J.
Acton
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Nuclear weapons as currency in
a system of deterrence to balance power
7
Slide adapted from J.
Acton
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(Access to) fissile material as
currency in a system of power
8
Slide adapted from J.
Acton
A. Harrington,
M. Englert(Eds.),
How much
is enough?
The politics
ofGlobal
technology
andofweaponless
deterrence,
M. Mayer,
M.
Carpes, R. Knoblich
International
Relations
and the
Politics
Science andnuclear
Technology
Vol. II.In:
Springer
2014.
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(Access to) fissile material as
currency in a system of power
9
Slide adapted from J.
Acton
A. Harrington,
M. Englert
How
much is enough?
The
politics
of technology
and
weaponless
nuclear deterrence,
In: M. Mayer,
Carpes,
R. Knoblich
(Eds.),
International
Relations
and
the Global
Politics of
Science
and Technology
Vol. II. Springer
2014. M.
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Weaponless Deterrence
●
Term coined by T. Schelling (~ 1980 subsequent literature)
●
Originally deterrence context – virtual nuclear arsenals
(Survival 1998)
●
Became important again for Global Zero in terms of
reconstitution and stability at low numbers
●
El Baradei changed context – „Virtual Nuclear Weapon States“
with sensitive technology in nuclear fuel cycle
●
Says something about the latent characteristics of nuclear
technology
●
Politics based on potential of nuclear technology
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The Centrifuge
Presentation Mohammed Saeidi http://www.world-nuclear.org/
www.ipfm.org
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Some Centrifuges
Name
Material
D [cm][
L [m]
V [m/s[
δU
[kg-SWU/y]
Zippe
Aluminum
7.4
0.3
350
0.44
Early Urenco
Aluminum
10
2
350
2-3
G2
Steel
15
1
450
5-6
TC-10
Carbon
15
3.2
500
21
TC12
Carbon
20
3
620
40
Whitley ,Physics in Technology 1978
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Importance of cascade forms
One centrifuge not enough
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Cascades I
Cascade can be operated with several identical sub-cascades
Cascades
Batch recycling
Cascades I
Batch recycling
%
1
2
3
4
Product
3.4
16
59
99
Feed
0.7
3.4
16
59
Waste
0.37
1.8
9.8
17
F/P
8.7
76
667
5835
4000 centrifuges, q=1.3, with slight reconfiguration
Batch recycling is very
inefficient without reusing
waste
Cascades I
Batch recycling
%
1
2
3
4
Product
3.4
16
59
99
Feed
0.7
3.4
16
59
Waste
0.37
1.8
9.8
17
F/P
8.7
76
667
5835
4000 centrifuges, q=1.3, with slight reconfiguration
Batch recycling is very
inefficient without reusing
waste
Cascades
Batch recycling
%
1
2
3
4
Product
3.4
16
59
99
Feed
0.7
3.4
16
59
Waste
0.37
1.8
9.8
17
F/P
8.7
76
667
5835
4000 centrifuges, q=1.3, with slight reconfiguration
Cascades
Interconnection
reconfiguration of sub-cascade or
use of clandestine cascade
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Cascade Form Important
Importance of cascade form
Change of cascade form reduces
- source material requirement
- time for enrichment
- number of batches
Decisive for timely detection
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Small Facility
Examples for first generation centrifuges in small facility (Iran) 5000 kgSWU/y
Feed
Centrifuges
Scenario
Production per y
12 t nat. U
6000
Break-Out (Batch)
15 kg HEU (1/2 bomb)
9 t nat. U
6000
Clandestine
(interconnect)
30 kg HEU (1 bombs)
1.2 t Reactor Fuel
600
Break-Out (Batch)
15 kg HEU (1/2 bomb)
0.9 t Reactor Fuel
2000
Clandestine
(interconnect)
30 kg HEU (1 bombs)
Batch: 3 batches calculated without any reconfiguration of the sub-cascade, but with different sep. factor in batch 3 due to higher feed rate.
Interconnect: Typical scheme below.
24 ∗164 to 3.5% 8∗164 to 20% 456 to 60% 128 to 90%
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Scenarios for Fissile Material Acquisition
Declared
Break Out
Facility as designed
Clandestine
Diversion
unoptimized
direct
Facility modified
optimized
optimized
pre-production
latent capabilities
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Iran
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P1 Estimates
Wide Range
of estimates
δU [kg-SWU/y]
H. Wood
2.02
Pakistan
2.0
Iranian Pilot Plant
0.92-1.36
Iranian Full Plant
1.54-2.27
Urenco Expert th. Max
3.0
With 30% eff. 360 m/s
2.26
With 30% eff. 350 m/s
2.03
With 30% eff. 330 m/s
1.60
FAS
0.8
Albright
0.81 (0.6 recently)
Myself based on IAEA
~0.8 (depends on position)
Data IAEA, Albright
Albright 2010
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Inventory Iran
UF6 Feb 10 2015
160 t natural feed
8 t 3.5% product
3.4 t 3.5% feed
0.6 kg 20% product
Centrifuges
Natanz:
15420 IR1 (9156 enriching)
~1000 IR-2m installed (3000 planned)
IR4, IR5 tested in cascades
IR6s tests
Tandem cascade for 20%
Fordow
3000 installed (696 enriching)
2 tandem sets IR1 for 20%
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Iran Breakout
UF6 Feb 10 2015
160 t natural feed - 11.4t 3.5% - 0.6 kg 20%
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Inventory Iran and a new Iranian Deal
UF6 Feb 10 2015
160 t natural feed
8 t 3.5% product
3.4 t 3.5% feed
0.6 kg 20% product
New Iranian Deal (US State Department)
no enrichment beyond 3.67%
reduce from 10t stock to 300 kg 3.67%
Centrifuges
Natanz:
15420 IR1 (9156 enriching)
~1000 IR-2m installed (3000 planned)
IR4, IR5 tested in cascades
IR6s tests
Tandem cascade for 20%
6104 installed 5060 enriching all IR1
No research on centrifuges
Only IR1 allowed to enrich
Fordow
3000 installed (696 enriching)
2 tandem sets IR1 for 20%
No enrichment in Fordow
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Ambivalence and Iran
The assumption that one could draw a line between
civil and military use allows states to legitimately
acquire technological potentials and reduce time
and costs for a latent military option.
This is the situation in Iran.
Therefore the question is not:
Does Iran want a nuclear weapon and why?
The question is: what is the calculus of Iran as
rising/threshold power and how can influence on
his multiple interests be successful, that she is not
crossing the threshold.
The question is “How much is enough”?
And who is “the Iran”?
Albright 2010
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Conclusions
●
States engage in weaponless deterrence
●
Nuclear energy will be an asset with increasing importance in a
world going for Zero.
●
To acieve a world free of nuclear weapons one has to
disconnect nuclear weapons from the power described to them
(reframing, devaluing weapons as currency, new world order?)
●
How to accomplish it as long as nuclear energy can be used s
proxy?
One does not go without the other
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Safety and Security beyond technical connect
What bridges are between safety and security beyond technologies used
in civil and military use of nuclear energy?
Risk assessment methodologies
Indeterminacy
Technoscientific dimension or future
Safety and Security, Civil-Military
Epistemological assumptions
Deterrence and Disarmament
Ethics
Agency and Empowerment
New military technologies vs. nuclear weapons
Threat/risk perception
Small doses
Religion
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Managerial Paradigm
Handling
Maintenance
Fabrication of safety
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The four horsemen
How come?
Fear of loosing control of boundaries.
(distribution – control, deterrence – abstinence)
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Four riders of the
apocalypse
Pale rider: apocalypse, medieval carpets in Angers,
France
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The Catastrophe
Apocalypse
20th century apocalypse carpets in Angers, France (Jean Lurcat)
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Return of Ethics
“Humanitarian Consequences”
Oslo, Nayarit, Vienna
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Nuclear philosophy brings tools of critical analysis
to bear on problems of nuclear policy.
One goal is to recover space for human agency
within the debates about nuclear safety and
security
www.nuclearphilosophy.org
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