1. society
2. unrest and war

Cover Photos (clockwise from top):
A helicopter lands at the US Army’s National Training Center (NTC) at Fort Irwin, California. It will carry a soldier “wounded” in
desert war games to get medical care. Troops must learn to minimize civilian as well as military casualties during their intense
training at NTC. Photo by Bonnie Docherty, 2005.
Soldiers stop their Humvee outside a mock village during a cordon-and-search exercise at NTC. They are securing the perimeter
while their fellow trainees search buildings for weapons caches. Over the past few years, NTC has constructed 15 small villages where
troops practice counterinsurgency operations in which insurgents blend in with the civilian population. Photo by Bonnie Docherty,
2005.
A sign welcomes trainees and visitors to NTC, a base the size of Rhode Island in the middle of the Mojave Desert. The vast majority
of the troops who train here will deploy to Iraq or Afghanistan, making training them to minimize civilian casualties essential. Photo
by Bonnie Docherty, 2005.
Four trainees establish a position outside the entrance to one of NTC’s buildings made out of a beige shipping container. While recent
modifications to its physical plant have enhanced NTC’s training, the center needs to build larger towns with more accurate and varied
structures in order better to challenge the troops. Photo by Bonnie Docherty, 2005.
“More Sweat . . . Less Blood”:
US Military Training and Minimizing Civilian Casualties
Bonnie Docherty
I. Summary and Recommendations .................................................................................... 1
II. The History and Operation of NTC ................................................................................ 7
III. International Humanitarian Law ................................................................................... 9
IV. Rules of Engagement .................................................................................................. 10
V. Realism of Environment ............................................................................................... 18
VI. Review of Training ..................................................................................................... 31
VII. Conclusion ................................................................................................................. 36
Appendix: The Operation of NTC in Detail...................................................................... 38
TABLE OF ACRONYMS
AAR
ACR
BCTP
BLUFOR
CMTC
CO/TM
COC
COIN
CTC
EOF
FRAGO
ICRC
IED
IHL
JMRC
JRTC
MNC-I
MILES
MOUT
NGO
NTC
O/C
O/H
OPORD
OIF
OPFOR
Ops Group
PFC
ROE
SASO
SOP
TCP
TRADOC
After-action review
Armored Cavalry Regiment
Battle Command Training Program
Blue Force, the trainees
Combat Maneuver Training Center
Company/team
Chain of command
Counterinsurgency
Combat training center
Escalation of force
Fragmentary order (change to OPORD)
International Committee of the Red Cross
Improvised explosive device
International humanitarian law
Joint Multinational Readiness Center
Joint Readiness Training Center
Multi-National Corps—Iraq
Multiple Integrated Laser Engagement System
Military operations in urban terrain
Nongovernmental organization
National Training Center
Observer/controller
On hand
Operations order
Operation Iraqi Freedom
Opposing Force
Operations Group
Private first class
Rules of engagement
Stability-and-support operations
Standard operating procedure
Traffic control point, or checkpoint
Training and Doctrine Command
VBIED
Vehicle-borne improvised explosive device
I. Summary and Recommendations1
Military training represents an essential starting point for preventing civilian casualties
during combat. If soldiers can learn necessary lessons before going into a conflict, they
can minimize civilian harm without having to wait for post-conflict analyses of real
deaths and injuries. Rules of engagement (ROE) must provide protections for civilians as
stipulated under international humanitarian law (IHL). Training on these rules must take
place in as realistic an environment as possible; realism should include accuracy of
setting, variety of scenarios, and exposure to cultural differences. Finally, to learn the
humanitarian lessons of realistic training, troops must receive reviews that consider not
only military success but also civilian casualties.
While these principles are applicable to all militaries, the US engagements in Iraq and
Afghanistan make an examination of its training particularly timely. In both countries,
the US military has diverged from its traditional strategic focus on large-scale
conventional warfare and been challenged to adapt its training to combating insurgencies
that have no regard for IHL. The United States relies heavily on its ground forces in
military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Especially in Iraq the conflict generally
occurs in populated areas, which puts non-combatants—local residents or bystanders, for
example—at great risk. For the United States to minimize causing civilian casualties,
relevant training must begin before deployment, be embedded in all aspects of combat
exercises, and be subject to more informed and systematic review. It must be rigorous
and repetitive to be effective. As Sfc. Scott Brown said, “The more sweat here, the less
blood over there.”2
1
Bonnie Docherty is a researcher at Human Rights Watch and clinical instructor and lecturer at the
International Human Rights Clinic at Harvard Law School’s Human Rights Program. She has also been an
active participant in the Carr Center for Human Rights Policy’s Project on the Means of Intervention.
Docherty has done battle damage assessment missions to Afghanistan (2002), Iraq (2003), Gaza (2005),
Israel (2006), and Lebanon (2006). In each case she has written or co-written a report that discusses how
and why civilians died during the military operations. This paper reflects the views of the author alone.
The author would like to thank the following people for their assistance with and comments on this paper:
Sarah Sewall, Tyler Moselle, Steve Goose, Ian Gorvin, Rachel Good, Carly Tubbs, Hal Brewster, Simon
Russel, Javier Stark, Michael Jones, and the personnel at the National Training Center.
2
Interview with Sfc. Scott Brown, OPFOR, Fort Irwin, California, July 28, 2005. This paper uses the ranks
and titles of interviewees at the time of their interview.
1
This paper, based on three research missions, looks at how the US military trains its
soldiers to protect civilians during ground war. It focuses specifically on the Army’s
National Training Center (NTC). The vast majority of NTC’s trainees deploy to Iraq, and
in 2006, about one-third of US troops in Iraq had trained there.3 NTC was founded to
prepare soldiers for tank-on-tank battles in the era when the United States and its NATO
allies faced the forces of the now-defunct Warsaw Pact. Over the past few years,
however, NTC has evolved to teach troops how to operate in urban environments with
civilians on the battlefield. This paper analyzes that training from an IHL perspective. It
concludes that improvements in training are needed to reduce civilian casualties in real
armed conflict.
Trainees from the Second Brigade, Fourth Infantry Division, patrol in a mock village at the National Training Center at Fort Irwin,
California. An observer/controller, who will review their performance, watches from the rear. Photo by Bonnie Docherty, 2005.
3
Interview with Col. Steven Salazar, commander, Operations Group, Fort Irwin, California, August 23,
2007; Dexter Filkins and John F. Burns, “Deep in a U.S. Desert, Practicing to Face the Iraq Insurgency,”
New York Times, May 1, 2006.
2
International humanitarian law informs this paper. Additional Protocol I of 1977 to the
Geneva Conventions of 1949 provides the most pertinent provisions. The United States
is not party to Protocol I but recognizes all the relevant articles as customary law.4
Protocol I’s basic rule is distinction, which requires all parties engaged in an armed
conflict to distinguish between civilians and combatants.5 Attacks that do not distinguish
between military objectives and civilians or civilian objects are considered indiscriminate
and are prohibited.6 One type of indiscriminate attack is a disproportionate one; the
proportionality test prohibits attacks where civilian harm outweighs military advantage.7
Protocol I also binds armed forces to take “all feasible precautions” to minimize civilian
harm.8 IHL governs the conduct of state and non-state actors during times of armed
conflict and thus should guide military training.
To minimize civilian casualties, a training program needs three components: rules of
engagement, realism of environment, and review of training. ROE, foundational to all
military training, reduce harm to civilians by guiding soldiers’ actions in military
operations; both the content of and training on them are crucial. Realistic training helps
troops prepare to abide by IHL by requiring them to practice with actual combat
pressures. Finally, review of training ensures that lessons, including those on protection
of civilians, are taught effectively.
NTC’s training needs improvement in all three areas. As a foundation for reducing
civilian casualties, NTC needs transparency of and emphasis on its ROE. NTC would not
declassify its complete ROE for scrutiny, but it did release an abridged ROE pocket card.
Even assuming, based on the latter, that they meet IHL requirements, the ROE with
regard to civilian protection have not been fully absorbed by the soldiers. Officers seem
to have confidence in ROE training, but enlisted men expressed dissatisfaction with its
quantity and skepticism about its effectiveness.
4
Mike O. Lacey and Brian J. Bill, eds., Operational Law Handbook (Charlottesville: Judge Advocate
General’s School, 2000), pp. 5-2, 5-3.
5
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of
Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), adopted June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3, entered into
force December 7, 1978, art. 48 [hereinafter Protocol I].
6
Ibid., art. 51 (4-5).
7
Ibid., art. 51(5)(b).
8
Ibid., art. 57(2)(a)(ii).
3
While it continues to improve steadily, NTC's realism is insufficient to train soldiers to
fight insurgents in an urban environment while minimizing civilian casualties. Soldiers
repeatedly complained that the simulated villages are too small and contain too few
people, including civilians. Cultural training exists but, according to participants and
experts, has been insufficient. Certain training scenarios, particularly related to
dangerous challenges such as vehicles and checkpoints, are limited.
When conducting training reviews, NTC has failed to identify and analyze patterns of
civilian casualties, a process that could help reduce real-life harm during military
operations. The training center has started to use expanded technology to track the
actions of individual soldiers but has not yet fully implemented it. Until September 2007,
battle damage assessments did not give systematic attention to either civilian casualties or
how and why they occurred. This information is vital for minimizing civilian casualties
in the future.
Without specifically raising the issue of protection of civilians, the US Army has
recognized the need for better, more relevant training. As early as 2004, a Center for
Army Lessons Learned report on the stability-and-support operations underway in Iraq
stated, “Soldiers are performing functions vastly different from those on which they have
trained; this continues to be a challenge.”9 Another 2004 report said that none of the
services have “altered their systems and training to accommodate, and even anticipate,
the dynamic conditions in which the services will continue to operate.”10 NTC has made
progress since 2004, but there is still room for improvement. The United States has a
legal and moral duty when waging war to factor in protection of civilians, and soldiers
must be trained in this area as well as in military tactics. While no environment can
completely replicate the learning curve of combat, what soldiers learn in training can
ultimately determine life or death.
9
Center for Army Lessons Learned, “Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) CAAT II Initial Impressions Report
(IIR),” May 2004, p. iii.
10
Center for Army Lessons Learned, “On Point: The United States Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom,”
May 2004, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/2004/onpoint/index.html (accessed
February 8, 2006), chap. 8. Other military experts have called for more training. See, e.g., Lloyd J.
Matthews, “Conference Report: Winning the War by Winning the Peace: Strategy for Conflict and PostConflict in the 21st Century,” Fifteenth Annual Strategy Conference, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania,
April 13-15, 2004, pp. 29-30 (quoting Bathsheba Crocker saying, “Some consensus [on post-conflict
reconstruction] seems to be emerging, with such deficiencies as the following having been identified: . . . (5)
lack of a targeted training capacity.”).
4
Methodology
This paper is based on three trips to the National Training Center. First, in February 2004,
the author visited NTC as part of a delegation from Harvard University’s Carr Center for
Human Rights Policy. She traveled with representatives of human rights and
humanitarian organizations, who came to learn about and critique NTC’s training from
their respective points of view. Her recommendations included creating a more realistic
enemy, increasing cultural training, providing more up-to-date information on Iraq,
offering more guidance on how to deal with certain scenarios such as protests, and
putting more emphasis on protection of civilians. The 2004 visit, which occurred during
a National Guard rotation, led to a second, more in-depth research mission in July 2005.
At that point, the author, with approval of the Department of the Army, investigated and
analyzed most aspects of NTC’s operations.
During this second mission, the author conducted interviews with all parties involved in
the training of soldiers heading to Iraq. She spoke with officers and enlisted men as well
as civilian contractors. She met with representatives of BLUFOR (Blue Force trainees
from the Second Brigade, Fourth Infantry Division, who deployed to Iraq in January
2006), OPFOR (NTC’s opposing force, then from the Nevada National Guard, 1-221
Cavalry), the Operations Group (resident scenario writers and referee/reviewers called
observer/controllers), and Civilians on the Battlefield (Arab-American contractors who
represent local Iraqis). She further discussed NTC’s operations with then commanding
general Brig. Gen. Robert W. Cone.11
The author also made first-hand observations of training. She watched exercises unfold
in the field (“the box”) over five days of a week-long exercise on stability-and-support
operations. She observed these scenarios from both sides of the conflict and embedded
with BLUFOR for a night. Together, these experiences provided a well-rounded picture
of NTC’s training as well as an opportunity to critique that training from an IHL
perspective.
On a third visit to NTC in August 2007, the author again traveled with a Carr Center
delegation. She observed the First Brigade, Fourth Infantry Division, training in the field
and had extensive meetings with officers, most notably Brig. Gen. Dana Pittard, the new
11
For more information on the operations of NTC, see the Appendix.
5
commanding general, and members of the Operations Group. This mission allowed her
to update the paper.
The author also did extensive documentary research for this project, which reinforced the
mission’s findings and conclusions.12 Press reports confirmed the need for better training.
In February 2006 the Army Times reported, “Commanders in Iraq and Afghanistan want
tougher pre-deployment training for soldiers heading to those war zones.”13 It quoted
General William Wallace, commander of the Training and Doctrine Command
(TRADOC), saying that troops “don’t think they [training exercises] are tough enough or
rigorous enough.”14 In 2007, the press reported that some troops no longer have time
between deployments to train at NTC or equivalent centers. Given the importance of
such training to minimizing civilian casualties, this trend is disturbing from a
humanitarian as well as military perspective.15
Key Recommendations
To prepare soldiers to minimize civilian casualties, NTC, and other military training
facilities, should:
•
Improve the content of and training on rules of engagement by:
o Allowing at minimum and on a regular basis selective scrutiny of its ROE under
IHL
o Emphasizing training on ROE related to minimizing civilian harm, thus
improving on its performance before the major hostilities in Iraq in 2003
o Inculcating in enlisted men the importance of minimizing harm to civilians and
offering repeated opportunities to test their knowledge
o Evaluating the progress troops are making as they learn ROE
12
Notably, the author and research assistants examined army manuals and regulations and scoured through
40,000 pages of reports from the Center for Army Lessons Learned.
13
Matthew Cox and M. Scott Mahaskey, “Tougher Training; TRADOC Looks to Intensify Prep for Troops
Heading into Combat,” Army Times, February 27, 2006, p. 8.
14
Ibid.
15
At least two brigades that deployed in spring 2007 did not receive training at NTC. Ann Scott Tyson,
“Increase May Mean Longer Army Tours,” Washington Post, March 29, 2007; “Group Says Congress
Must Restrict Use of Troops ‘Not Combat-Ready,’” Inside the Army, March 12, 2007; Robert Burns, “In
Their Rush to Reach Baghdad, 2 Army Units Will Forgo Desert Training,” Associated Press, February 27,
2007.
6
•
Improve realism of environment by:
o Expanding the size and complexity of its villages and creating a full-scale urban
training facility
o Bringing in more Arab-Americans to role play civilians on the battlefield
o Permitting a more aggressive OPFOR and encouraging dialogue between
OPFOR and BLUFOR
o Increasing cultural training
o Adding more scenarios involving vehicles and checkpoints
•
Improve the review of training by:
o Expanding the scope of technology to track individual soldiers on the battlefield
to determine who shot whom
o Pursuing its new initiative to record civilian casualties across time and doing
battle damage assessments that take into account humanitarian as well as
military successes and failures.
II. The History and Operation of NTC
The National Training Center, located at Fort Irwin, California, is one of four US Army
Combat Training Centers (CTCs) around the world.16 The CTCs have a unique mandate
among the Army’s training facilities. As outlined in Army Regulation 350-50, they are
distinguished by their degree of realism, permanent opposing force (OPFOR), and
detailed feedback by observer/controllers.17 Commanders are required to “provide a
realistic, stressful combat training environment . . . which approximates actual combat.”18
OPFOR adds to the realism by providing a formidable opponent for the trainees. Always
16
The other Combat Training Centers, also affected by this evolution, are the Battle Command Training
Program (BCTP) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, the Joint Multinational Readiness Center (JMRC) (formerly
the Combat Maneuver Training Center (CMTC)) in Hohenfels, Germany, and the Joint Readiness Training
Center (JRTC) at Fort Polk, Louisiana. Each has a specific mission: BCTP provides “realistic, stressful
training and leader development.” CMTC/JMRC focuses on “joint and combined arms training,” in other
words inter- and intra-service training. JRTC trains “our nation’s joint contingency forces,” or light
infantry and Special Forces. Department of the Army, “Combat Training Center Program,” Army
Regulation 350-50, January 24, 2003, pp. 1-2.
17
Ibid., pp. 1, 16 (“The maneuver CTCs (CMTC, JRTC, and NTC) provide required training for groundmaneuver brigades to conduct brigade force-on-force live maneuver training against an adaptive,
opportunities-based OPFOR on an instrumented battlefield with feedback provided by a professional force
of O/Cs [observer-controllers].”).
18
Ibid., p. 11.
7
An observer/controller, who reviews the performance of NTC’s trainees, watches as a medical convoy approaches a village where it
will face an improvised explosive device (IED) attack. Frank feedback is one of the characteristics of NTC. Photo by Bonnie
Docherty, 2007.
stationed at the CTC, it is familiar with the terrain of the center and the tactics of the
enemy it portrays. The extent of the criticism given to troops also characterizes the CTCs.
Trainees at all levels receive frank reviews of their actions.
NTC’s particular mission has evolved over the past two decades. The Army founded it in
1980 to train armored units.19 It encompasses an area the size of Rhode Island, which
allowed room for large tank-on-tank battles. In recent years, especially since September
11, it has adapted in response to new combat conditions, in particular counterinsurgency
operations. This change has involved revamping its physical plant and updating the
exercises it conducts.
19
See generally Daniel P. Bolger, Dragons at War: 2-34th Infantry in the Mojave (Novato, Calif.: Presidio
Press, 1986). The Navy originated the CTC more than 30 years ago. Defense Science Board Task Force,
“Training Superiority & Training Surprise,” January 2001, p. 7.
8
The goal of NTC is to make military training as close to combat as possible so that troops
can learn lessons in a safe environment. “They can make mistakes here and it doesn’t
cost a life,” said a civilian contractor manager.20 It runs about 10 trainings per year in a
mountainous desert spread out over “Iraq-like distances.”21 A typical rotation lasts three
weeks—one at base and two in the field. The four main players in NTC training are:
BLUFOR (the trainees), OPFOR (the opposing force), the Operations Group (scenario
writers and observer/controllers (O/Cs)), and Civilians on the Battlefield. The four
groups interact in scenarios set up by the Operations Group. A detailed description of the
operation of NTC and its adaptation to contemporary combat conditions is given in the
Appendix.
III. International Humanitarian Law
While the Army’s main goal at NTC is to prepare troops militarily for combat, it also has
a duty to teach them to avoid civilian harm on the battlefield. As the Army is aware, its
responsibilities under international law limit its actions and, in the process, help protect
non-combatants. “We save lives, not only our guys but Iraqis,” said S. Sgt. Timothy
Wilson.22 International humanitarian law, also called the law of war, governs the conduct
of state and non-state actors during times of armed conflict and thus should guide military
training.
The four Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, represent the cornerstone of IHL, and
their two associated Additional Protocols of 1977 (hereinafter Protocol I and Protocol II)
supplement those safeguards. For the purposes of this paper, Protocol I provides the
relevant provisions for minimizing civilian harm during armed conflict.23 The basic rule
of this branch of IHL is distinction, which requires all parties engaged in an armed
conflict to distinguish between civilians and combatants. Article 48 of Protocol I states
that “the Parties to the conflict shall at all times distinguish between the civilian
population and combatants and between civilian objects and military objectives and
20
Interview with Titan Site Manager #1 (name withheld), Fort Irwin, California, July 24, 2005. Lt.
Thomas Faber echoed this view saying, “They make mistakes here they won’t make in Iraq. It is key to
learn from mistakes here.” Interview with Lt. Thomas Faber, OPFOR, Fort Irwin, California, July 26, 2005.
21
Interview with Brig. Gen. Robert W. Cone, NTC commanding general, Fort Irwin, California, July 26,
2005.
22
Interview with S. Sgt. Timothy Wilson, OPFOR, Fort Irwin, California, July 24, 2005.
23
As mentioned above, the United States is not party to Protocol I, but it recognizes all the relevant articles
as customary law. Lacey and Bill, eds., Operational Law Handbook, pp. 5-2, 5-3.
9
accordingly shall direct their operations only against military objectives.”24 This
provision is particularly essential in counterinsurgency operations, such as those in Iraq
and Afghanistan, where enemy combatants often try to blend in with the civilian
population.
Attacks that strike military objectives and civilians or civilian objects without distinction
are considered indiscriminate and are prohibited. While Protocol I recognizes that some
civilian deaths are inevitable, it says states cannot legally target civilians or engage in
indiscriminate attacks. Article 51(4) and Article 51(5) define the concept of
indiscriminate in several ways, including attacks that 1) are not directed at “a specific
military objective,” 2) use a means or method of war cannot be directed at “a specific
military objective,” 3) use a means or method of war with effects that cannot be limited, 4)
treat separate urban military objectives as one (e.g., carpet bombing), and 5) are
disproportionate.25 A disproportionate attack “may be expected to cause incidental loss
of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof,
which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage
anticipated.”26 Training facilities should emphasize all of these rules in order to prepare
its troops to reduce civilian casualties in real combat.
Militaries are also legally bound to minimize civilian harm. Article 57(2)(a)(ii) of
Protocol I imposes a duty on states to “take all feasible precautions in the choice of
means and methods of attack with a view to avoiding, and in any event to minimizing,
incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects.”27 An
effective military training program will help armed forces meet that responsibility.
IV. Rules of Engagement
Rules of engagement, foundational to all military training, enhance civilian protection by
guiding soldiers’ actions in military operations. When asked how best to learn to protect
civilians during conflict, soldiers regularly said, “Train on ROE.” It is important for
ROE, some of which are standard and some of which vary by operation, to outline the
24
Protocol I, art. 48.
Ibid., art. 51(4, 5).
26
Ibid., art. 51(5)(b).
27
Ibid., art. 57(2)(a)(ii).
25
10
IHL rules for protecting civilians. They must do so in a clear and straightforward way so
soldiers can understand and remember them. Soldiers must receive repeated training on
ROE so that they follow them without thinking when under the stress of armed conflict.
“It gives me a tool. It is easy to understand. . . . When I get separated, I fall back on the
ROE,” said BLUFOR Lt. Richard Mohr.28 To reach this level of mastery, the ROE must
be taught again and again. Lt. Col. Johnny H. Isaak, the OPFOR commander, said,
“Everybody stresses ROE. They demand constant vigilance.”29 Capt. Bill Dougherty,
another BLUFOR officer, added it is important to “keep emphasizing ROE. Not every
Iraqi is a bad guy.”30 Both the content of and training on ROE are crucial to minimizing
civilian casualties. At this point, however, soldiers have not fully absorbed these lessons.
While NTC did not declassify its complete ROE for national security reasons, it released
its ROE Smart Card, a pocket guide carried by all soldiers, which has been in effect since
May 2005.31 Several officers said it accords with the ROE used in Iraq now. Although
abbreviated, the card seems in line with IHL. It recognizes the right to self-defense but
also outlines rules based on the principle of distinction. Soldiers may only use force
against a person who shows hostile intent and can be positively identified as a legitimate
target.32 The card improves upon that used during major hostilities in Iraq in 2003 by
adding guidelines for increasing force gradually.33 More detail should be added, however,
such as a definition of hostile intent, and the Smart Card should be regularly updated to
fit the situation on the ground. An outside evaluation of ROE is essential to
understanding fully the content and adequacy of NTC’s ROE training on reducing
28
Interview with Lt. Richard Mohr, BLUFOR, Fort Irwin, California, July 25, 2005.
Interview with Lt. Col. Johnny H. Isaak, commander, OPFOR, Fort Irwin, California, July 28, 2005.
30
Interview with Capt. Bill Dougherty, BLUFOR, Fort Irwin, California, July 25, 2005.
31
MNC-I [Multi-National Corps–Iraq] ROE Card, in effect as of May 22, 2005, obtained by the author
from NTC, November 8, 2007. Another source of guidelines on civilian protection for soldiers is “Soldier
Standards,” a public document taught at NTC and presented the author in a 2007 briefing. It states, for
example:
1) Soldiers fight only enemy combatants. . . .
7) Soldiers treat civilians humanely. . . .
9) Soldiers should do their best to prevent violations of the law of war.
10) Soldiers report all violations of the law of war to their superior.
Col. Steven Salazar, “The National Training Center,” (powerpoint presentation), August 23, 2007, slide on
“Soldier Standards.”
32
MNC-I ROE Card.
33
For a copy of the ROE card for major hostilities in Iraq in 2003, see Human Rights Watch, Off Target:
The Conduct of the War and Civilian Casualties (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2003),
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2003/usa1203/ (accessed October 29, 2007), pp. 138-39.
29
11
civilian casualties. The Army should make it a practice to allow, at minimum, selective
scrutiny of NTC’s ROE to confirm that the relevant rules are consistent with IHL and that
troops are following them.
After establishing appropriate ROE, the US military must train on them. A quiz done
before each rotation highlights the need for substantial ROE training at NTC. The center
films enlisted men answering questions about ROE and explaining how they believe they
should handle a situation under these rules. Answers vary widely, and soldiers
sometimes do not know how to respond. In one film, of five soldiers interviewed, two
had not yet had an ROE class and one did not know what an ROE class was. Asked
when they could engage, one said when a person shows hostile intent, the correct answer;
the others said when they feel threatened or if a person does not heed their warnings.
Asked whether they could engage a crowd that rolls away a US Army vehicle just hit by
an improvised explosive device (IED), the responses included: yes; no, unless there is
hostile intent; and “I don’t know.”34 Col. Steven Salazar, commander of Operations
Group, said, “The dipstick is the video. When solders can’t answer, it reincentivizes
officers.”35 The success of the incentive is unclear, however, as NTC does not film
trainees at the end of a rotation to see if or how they improved.
NTC tracks the evolution of units rather than individuals under another system. It ranks
them on counterinsurgency fundamentals, including ROE, at the beginning and end of
training. In a sample of eight units, all received a ranking of one or two (out of five) at
the beginning and three at the end.36 This change does not seem sufficient. For example,
although a three means “conducted to standard,” at that level Smart Cards, pocket-sized
cards with key ROE, are only available; at level four are they actually enforced. Given
34
“7-10 Man on Street,” CD-ROM of ROE quiz filmed on August 14, 2007 (on file with author). None of
the soldiers had received a class on detention operations or could identify their unit’s evidence custodian.
35
Interview with Col. Steven Salazar, commander, Operations Group, Fort Irwin, California, August 24,
2007.
36
Col. Steven Salazar, “The National Training Center,” slide on “COIN [Counterinsurgency]
Fundamentals.” The eight counterinsurgency fundamentals are: negotiations; cultural understanding;
language capability; counter IED; counter sniper; escalation of force (EOF)/ROE; search, detain, and
prosecute; tactical questioning; and every soldier a sensor and ambassador. Ibid. Rank one is defined as
“No understanding of EOF/ROE training.” Rank two is defined as “Equipment and procedures trained to
Squad Leader level, equipment distributed, Covered in CO/TM [company/team] OPORD/FRAGO
[operations order/fragmentary order (the latter is an adjustment or update to tasks assigned in an existing
OPORD)], Language Cards/Electronic interpreters available.” Rank three, “conducted to standard,” is
further defined as “Equipment and procedures trained to soldier level, adequate equipment O/H [on hand],
covered in Patrol OPORD/FRAGO and rehersals [sic], SOPs [standard operating procedures]/Smart-Card
available.” NTC, Observer/Controller Handbook, July 21, 2007, p. 2-4.
12
the importance of ROE generally and with regard to minimizing civilian casualties, NTC
should both better document the impact of training and aim for higher scores.37
Field interviews at NTC confirm that more needs to be done. While officers seemed to
have confidence in existing ROE training, enlisted soldiers were generally more skeptical.
Lt. Greg Coulter said, “We want to eliminate collateral damage. . . . You know what you
can and can’t do. You’re trained on it.”38 Capt. John Bodenhamer said, “We constantly
train on civilian protection.”39 Enlisted men, by contrast, often gave blank looks when
BLUFOR troops and Iraqi policemen carry a civilian injured by an insurgent-emplaced IED on a stretcher. An OPFOR soldier plays
the Iraqi civilian. To minimize US-caused civilian casualties, soldiers must repeatedly train on rules of engagement that require troops
to distinguish between combatants and civilians. Photo by Bonnie Docherty, 2007.
37
A four is defined as: “Smart-Card/SOPs enforced, effective use of language cards/electronic interpreters
to mitigate EOF/ROE incidents, accurate and timely reporting through the COC [chain of command] when
an EOF incident occurs.” A five is defined as: “Thorough, and complete investigation is conducted by the
command within 72 hours of an incident being reported.” NTC, Observer/Controller Handbook, p. 2-4.
38
Interview with Lt. Greg Coulter, BLUFOR, Fort Irwin, California, July 26, 2005.
39
Interview with Capt. John Bodenhamer, BLUFOR, Fort Irwin, California, July 27, 2005.
13
asked how they were taught to minimize civilian casualties. At least one trainee felt there
was not enough training on this issue. He said, “I wish there were more interaction with
civilians on the squad level, individual soldiers.”40 Other troops said some civilian
casualties are “understandable.”41 Sgt. John Garner II commented, “You can only protect
[civilians] to a point. You go over to another country and it’s a crapshoot. . . . You can
never get enough training.”42 While civilian casualties are inevitable in war, NTC must
make sure its trainees do not become complacent or indifferent to the protection of
civilians.
One of the most valuable lessons for the protection of civilians is “positive
identification,” an ROE requirement that troops identify an opponent with reasonable
certainty before shooting. Capt. Matty Nahas said, “It is very hard to distinguish between
civilian and insurgent. Until they display hostile intent, they are civilians.”43 Although it
is a difficult task, officers described several ways NTC teaches troops to tell combatant
from civilian. Maj. Cameron Kramer said, “We look for who is out of place. If we
understand demographics, [we understand] who’s new in town, who doesn’t fit, who
walks away.”44 Captain Bodenhamer said, “The biggest thing to look for is indicators—
someone who stands out, is standoffish.”45 US troops also learn to look at hands rather
than at faces.46 “[The enemy] can only kill with their hands. They need hands to push a
button or a trigger,” Captain Dougherty said.47 If weapons are hidden or pointed at them,
soldiers consider the person hostile.48 If not, they are taught to have a “measured
40
Interview with soldier #1 (name withheld), BLUFOR, Fort Irwin, California, July 24, 2005.
Interview with S. Sgt. Tony Ball, OPFOR, Fort Irwin, California, July 28, 2005.
42
Interview with Sgt. John Garner, II, BLUFOR, Fort Irwin, California, July 26, 2005. Civilian protection
can be increased by making it more important during training. A 1997 JRTC manual, for example, says the
trainees’ “primary task is to minimize civilian interference on the JRTC battlefield,” not to minimize harm
to civilians. “Categories of Civilians Encountered during JRTC Rotations,” 1997, available in “21st
Century Complete Guide to the U.S. Army Center for Lessons Learned (CALL),” Core Federal Information
Series, CD-ROM.
43
Interview with Capt. Matty Nahas, company commander, BLUFOR, Fort Irwin, California, July 24, 2005.
44
Interview with Maj. Cameron Kramer, observer/controller, Operations Group, Fort Irwin, California, July
24, 2005. Coordinating with local officials can also help send messages to civilians about how to avoid
being killed. “Civilian Issues,” available in “21st Century Complete Guide to the U.S. Army Center for
Lessons Learned (CALL),” Core Federal Information Series, CD-ROM.
45
Interview with Capt. John Bodenhamer, BLUFOR, Fort Irwin, California, July 27, 2005.
46
Interview with Capt. Matty Nahas, company commander, BLUFOR, Fort Irwin, California, July 24, 2005.
47
Interview with Capt. Bill Dougherty, BLUFOR, Fort Irwin, California, July 25, 2005.
48
Interview with Capt. Matty Nahas, company commander, BLUFOR, Fort Irwin, California, July 24, 2005.
41
14
response. If they have a rock, don’t shoot.”49 Soldiers said suicide bombers, who kill US
troops and Iraqi civilians, are especially difficult to identify.50 In one scenario, a woman
swooned into a crowd of soldiers killing most of them. They missed the signs not
because they were hesitant to shoot, but because they were not paying attention to her.
NTC must ensure continued and effective practice on positive identification in order to
ingrain ROE in troops.
ROE are related to escalation of force (EOF) procedures. EOF can be defined as
“sequential actions which begin with nonlethal force measures . . . and graduate to lethal
measures . . . to include warning, disabling, or deadly shots in order to defeat a threat and
protect the force.”51 The military uses EOF procedures at, for example, checkpoints and
demonstrations. According to Capt. Chris Kuzio, they have three purposes: 1) to protect
US soldiers, 2) to protect the Iraqi people, and 3) to change the Iraqi perception that
Americans will kill them.52 The Army’s counterinsurgency fundamentals as well as
many soldiers link EOF and ROE.53 An observer/controller giving an after-action review
told a unit, “If you see [soldiers] shooting civilians, it is improper EOF. They are not
following the ROE.”54 Like ROE, EOF procedures are designed to regulate the use of
force and provide rules that, if well drafted and trained on, can help minimize civilian
casualties. EOF procedures followed properly can result in harm to civilians, but they
more often reduce it.55 As a result, NTC should treat them the same way they should
treat ROE.
Recent US military history demonstrates that ROE are significant for minimizing the
effects of war on civilians. In its report Off Target: The Conduct of the War and Civilian
Casualties in Iraq on the conduct of war in Operation Iraqi Freedom, Human Rights
Watch found that “problems with training on, dissemination of, and clarity of [ROE] may
49
Interview with Lt. Richard Mohr, BLUFOR, Fort Irwin, California, July 25, 2005.
Interview with Capt. Matty Nahas, company commander, BLUFOR, Fort Irwin, California, July 24, 2005.
51
Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), “Escalation of Force (EOF) Conference Packet,” Carr Center
for Human Rights and PKSOI Workshop, March 26-27, 2007, p. 13.
52
Interview with Capt. Chris Kuzio, observer/controller, Operations Group, Fort Irwin, California, August
23, 2007.
53
NTC, Observer/Controller Handbook, pp. 2-1-2-4.
54
After-action review observed by author, Fort Irwin, California, August 23, 2007.
55
Lt. Col. Paul Kreis explained that soldiers can conduct improper EOF procedures and kill an insurgent or
conduct proper procedures and cause civilian casualties. Interview with Lt. Col. Paul Kreis, chief of
operations, Operations Group, Fort Irwin, California, August 23, 2007.
50
15
have, in some instances, contributed to loss of civilian life.”56 For example, an afteraction report from the Third Infantry Division said, “Late receipt of ROE caused
confusion on a number of issues that were not clearly written. These matters were not
resolved until hostilities began, meaning we could not train soldiers on the provision.”57
An NTC trainee who served with the First Armored Division in Iraq reiterated this
problem. “We went in more aggressive. We were not trained. We made many
mistakes,” he said.58
Human Rights Watch has documented other incidents of insufficient training on ROE
that led to civilian casualties in Iraq and Afghanistan. In al-Fallujah on April 18, 2003,
members of the 82nd Airborne Division killed 17 people and injured more than 70, when
responding to a protest. While witnesses and the US military disagree about whether the
demonstration was peaceful or not, Human Rights Watch found evidence of inadequate
training.59 In the first six months after the end of major hostilities, other US soldiers in
Iraq complained that there was inadequate training for stability-and-support operations.
A 2003 after-action report said, “Transitioning from combat to SASO [stability-andsupport operations] requires a substantial and fundamental shift in attitude. . . . The
soldiers are blurred and confused about the rules of engagement.”60 It spoke specifically
about checkpoints, one of the major sources of US-caused civilian deaths. In 2004 in
Afghanistan, Human Rights Watch found that ROE “designed for combat situations seem
to be applied where law enforcement protocols are required.”61 It called for better
training for arrest operations in urban areas, which had caused unnecessary civilian
casualties.62
56
Human Rights Watch, Off Target, p. 99.
“Third Infantry Division (Mechanized) After Action Report, Operation Iraqi Freedom,” July 2003,
http://www.carson.army.mil/Moblas/NBC/3rdIDAARIraqJuly03.pdf (accessed October 29, 2007), p. 286.
58
Interview with soldier #3 (name withheld), BLUFOR, Fort Irwin, California, July 24, 2005.
59
Human Rights Watch, Iraq—Violent Response: The U.S. Army in Fallujah, vol. 15, no. 7(E), June 2003,
http://hrw.org/reports/2003/iraqfalluja/ (accessed October 29, 2007), p. 1.
60
After Action Report, “SUBJECT: Operation Iraqi Freedom After Action Comments,” April 24, 2003,
conducted by TCM C/3-15 Infantry, Task Force 1-64 (reproduced in Human Rights Watch, Iraq—Hearts
and Minds: Post-War Civilian Deaths in Baghdad Caused by U.S. Forces, vol. 15, no. 9(E), October 2003,
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2003/iraq1003/ (accessed October 29, 2007), p. 55).
61
Human Rights Watch, “Enduring Freedom”: Abuses by U.S. Forces in Afghanistan, vol. 16, no. 3(C),
March 2004, http://hrw.org/reports/2004/afghanistan0304/ (accessed October 29, 2007), p. 11.
62
Ibid., p. 10.
57
16
NTC personnel shared similar stories from theater about the need for better training. Lt.
Col. Michael Harris served in Iraq from 2005 to 2006. “The way we treated the Iraqis
was terrible. It was poor training or the way they grew up. They hit every car they
passed. They kicked and grabbed. The battalion commander allowed it,” he said.63
While Harris said his squadron took care to avoid unnecessary casualties or property
damage,64 the incidents he witnessed demonstrate the significance of training on as well
as content of ROE. NTC must address these mistakes and avoid them in the future.
In order to do so, NTC must provide soldiers repeated opportunities to learn and train on
ROE before they go in theater. Training starts in the classroom and at home base, but as
the quiz results discussed above show, it is inadequate. Brigadier General Pittard, who
assumed the position of commanding general in the summer of 2007, acknowledged the
problem. “It’s a valid concern. We can’t be satisfied if a PFC [private first class] is not
confident. The young PFC has to make decisions with a trigger,” Pittard said.65 During
his tenure, Commanding General Cone, who took over NTC in September 2004, worked
to develop “embedded” ROE training.66 “You develop muscle density through
repetition,” Lt. Col. Thomas Magness said.67 As part of this approach, a variety of
scenarios is essential so troops learn to shift back and forth from high- to low-intensity
conflict. “We take soldiers and switch their mindset. They know when to turn things off
and on,” Captain Nahas said.68 Putting soldiers in repeated and realistic contact with
civilians tests them on the IHL components of ROE.
63
Interview with Lt. Col. Michael Harris, officer in charge, Army Center of Excellence, Fort Irwin,
California, August 24, 2007.
64
Email communication from Lt. Col. Michael Harris, officer in charge, Army Center of Excellence, to
Bonnie Docherty, September 1, 2007.
65
Interview with Brig. Gen. Dana Pittard, NTC commanding general, Fort Irwin, California, August 24,
2007.
66
Interview with Brig. Gen. Robert W. Cone, NTC commanding general, Fort Irwin, California, July 26,
2005.
67
Interview with Lt. Col. Thomas H. Magness, observer/controller, Operations Group, Fort Irwin,
California, July 26, 2005 (“Soldiers make mistakes. You want them to make mistakes here so they can all
learn from it.”).
68
Interview with Capt. Matty Nahas, company commander, BLUFOR, Fort Irwin, California, July 24, 2005.
17
V. Realism of Environment
Realism of environment helps train troops to abide by IHL by requiring them to deal with
actual combat pressures. Settings, civilians, cultural details, and scenarios all contribute
to the authenticity of a training exercise. Of the three components of training, realism is
the area where NTC has made the most progress and needs the most improvement. One
officer described it as the biggest training challenge.69 As it stands, the realism of NTC’s
training is insufficient to prepare soldiers to fight insurgents in an urban environment
while minimizing civilian casualties.
Current Conditions
In recent years NTC has updated its training to make it more closely resemble the
situation in Iraq and Afghanistan. “Training about two years ago started to look forward
[to 21stcentury urban conflict] . . . ,” said Maj. John Clearwater in 2006. “The whole
focus is on where the next fight is going to be and how we prepare soldiers for that.”70 In
a radical change, NTC has made its physical plant more than a setting for tank-on-tank
combat. To its vast expanse of open desert, it has added cave complexes to mimic those
in Afghanistan and 15 small towns to allow troops to practice urban warfare, or “military
operations in urban terrain” (MOUT). NTC has hired Arab-Americans to play civilians
and dressed its OPFOR soldiers in native garb. It has used a cultural expert to inform its
training. Finally, its list of scenarios now includes not only large armored battles, but
also counterinsurgency operations of the sort being conducted in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Except for a focus on clearing out caves, training for Afghanistan is essentially the same
as for Iraq, which is referred to below.71
To guide ongoing developments, NTC maintains regular communication with the Iraqi
and Afghan theaters. First, it benefits from the experiences of veterans. According to
Colonel Salazar, all senior trainers have served in Iraq or Afghanistan.72 Second, NTC
organizes group visits to the theater. Lieutenant Colonel Magness, along with 16 other
69
Interview with Lt. Col. Charles M. Evans, deputy commander, Operations Group, Fort Irwin, California,
August 23, 2007.
70
Telephone interview with Maj. John Clearwater, NTC public affairs officer, Washington, DC, July 31,
2006.
71
Ibid.
72
Interview with Col. Steven Salazar, commander, Operations Group, Fort Irwin, California, August 23,
2007.
18
observer/controllers, spent five days in Iraq with the Third Infantry Division in July 2005.
“It’s a tremendous source of reference. But stuff over there changes. We have to keep
going back over there. The fresher the lessons are, the better you can do,” he said.73
Observer/controllers now travel to the region four times a year.74 Finally, NTC
communicates biweekly with the Multi-National Corps–Iraq (MNC–I), which controls
military operations in the region. “They give us their thinking on trends, what they want
us to work on, what they’re seeing. We catch it into our next rotation,” said Lt. Col. Brad
Stewart of the Operations Group.75 As it engages in such on-site and electronic
exchanges, NTC should not only acquire information on how to make training settings
and scenarios more realistic but also learn about challenges troops on the ground face
distinguishing between soldiers and civilians.
Many of the troops interviewed praised the realism of NTC. Observer/controller Major
Kramer said, “It gets very real. People forget they are here in California.”76 Soldiers
who have fought in or visited Iraq echoed this statement. An officer and veteran of
Operation Iraqi Freedom said the experience gave him “flashbacks of things in theater. . . .
I have to check myself that I’m not in combat.”77 Lieutenant Colonel Magness, an
observer/controller who conducted a fact-finding mission to Iraq, said, “You can’t
replicate Iraq here, you never will. You don’t have the rubble, trash, cars, people, and
noise. But when you’re in the middle of downtown Medina Wasl [one of NTC’s villages]
and the people are around you with smoke, dust, heat, noise, it’s close enough.”78 NTC
strives to appeal to all the senses, adding calls to prayer and Iraqi cooking smells to the
desert environment and native villages.79
73
Interview with Lt. Col. Thomas Magness, observer/controller, Operations Group, Fort Irwin, California,
July 27, 2005.
74
Interview with Capt. Chris Kuzio, observer/controller, Operations Group, Fort Irwin, California, August
23, 2007.
75
Interview with Lt. Col. Dale (Brad) Stewart, chief of plans and operations, Operations Group, Fort Irwin,
California, August 23, 2007.
76
Interview with Maj. Cameron Kramer, observer/controller, Operations Group, Fort Irwin, California, July
24, 2005.
77
Interview with Capt. John Bodenhamer, BLUFOR, Fort Irwin, California, July 27, 2005.
78
Interview with Lt. Col. Thomas H. Magness, observer/controller, Operations Group, Fort Irwin,
California, July 27, 2005.
79
Interview with Capt. Chris Kuzio, observer/controller, Operations Group, Fort Irwin, California, August
23, 2007.
19
While the atmosphere gives soldiers some of the feeling of Iraq, NTC needs to strive for
a more complete setting. “It’s good in many respects. It’s useful, but it’s not the real
thing,” a soldier said.80 The different views of NTC’s realism are in part attributable to
whether or not a trainee had been to Iraq. A BLUFOR battalion commander said those
who had not been in theater were “relatively unfazed [by the realism]. [To them, i]t’s a
training exercise.”81 Field research corroborated this statement. The new trainees’ lack
of reaction is disconcerting since NTC’s role is to awaken them to what lies ahead.
Room for Improvement
While NTC has made changes, it must improve realism in settings, actors, cultural
training, and scenarios. First, the towns should more closely resemble those of the
Middle East and Afghanistan in size and appearance. As an Iraqi civilian said, “The
towns are not like this. They extend block after block and have 500 people.”82 By
contrast, NTC’s villages are generally quite small, each consisting of one or two dozen
identical metal shipping containers. One can survey most of a village from a single
vantage point. Lieutenant Colonel Magness, one of many soldiers to call for bigger
towns in 2005 and 2007,83 said, “We need a bigger urban training area. Even Medina
Jabal [the largest NTC town] still has a number of buildings you can count.”84 Soldiers
in combat will face much larger urban centers of mud structures and mazes of narrow
roads. “I wish Tiefort City [the English name for Medina Jabal] was so big you could get
lost in it,” an OPFOR company commander said.85 Appearance is also a problem. By
2007, NTC had installed facing on some of the shipping containers, but they still did not
closely resemble structures in Iraq or Afghanistan. “We’re looking to improve. The
buildings don’t look like this. We’re sending people to Iraq to learn how to make bricks,
80
Interview with soldier #1 (name withheld), BLUFOR, Fort Irwin, California, July 24, 2005.
Interview with Lt. Col. Patrick Donohoe, battalion commander, BLUFOR, Fort Irwin, California, July 25,
2005.
82
Interview with Arab-American woman #1 (name withheld), Civilian on the Battlefield, Fort Irwin,
California, July 25, 2005.
83
See, e.g., interview with Capt. Bill Dougherty, BLUFOR, Fort Irwin, California, July 25, 2005 (“We
need a gigantic MOUT site. Guys are going to get killed in firefights and fighting in an urban environment.
We need dense urban architecture and population.”); interview with Lt. Thomas Faber, OPFOR, Fort Irwin,
California, July 26, 2005 (“The only thing I would complain about is size. Most [of the mock villages] are
the size of a city block.”); interview with Capt. Chris Kuzio, observer/controller, Operations Group, Fort
Irwin, California, August 23, 2007 (“We need bigger cities. . . . When 120 soldiers are in a city of 43,000
Iraqis, they have to make friends.”).
84
Interview with Lt. Col. Thomas H. Magness, observer/controller, Operations Group, July 27, 2005.
85
Interview with OPFOR company commander (name withheld), Fort Irwin, California, July 25, 2005.
81
20
A typical village consists of a small number of beige shipping containers. Although NTC has since added facing on some of the
containers and started construction of a larger urban center, its 15 towns need to be larger and more complex. Photo by Bonnie
Docherty, 2005.
to study the architecture, shopkeeps, balconies,” said Captain Kuzio.86 The realism of
NTC’s villages needs to be improved to give soldiers a better feel of what operating in
theater is like. “Friction could be improved with buildings, a first-class urban warfare
setting . . . roads, buildings on the side, traffic, chaos. . . . The number one priority is to
get an urban training capability,” Lieutenant Colonel Magness said. Without practice in a
more realistic environment, soldiers may be unprepared to protect civilians in the
confusion of a real city.
The most recent commanding generals have sought to improve the settings at NTC.
Commanding General Cone ordered construction of an urban capital with 200-plus
buildings. He said it would be three kilometers square and include eight “major [military
and civilian] objectives,” such as a palace, prison, factory, and hospital. The existing
86
Interview with Capt. Chris Kuzio, observer/controller, Operations Group, Fort Irwin, California, August
23, 2007.
21
metal containers would be turned into a slum.87 Cone’s successor Brigadier General
Pittard said in the summer of 2007 that he expects NTC to complete the project by the
end of fiscal year 2009 or 2010 and wants to expand the plan to 500 buildings.88 By
August 2007, NTC had opened seven buildings to be used for training just outside the
town of Medina Jabal and added a Joint Security Station where Iraqi and US soldiers
lived together in the town center.89 A lower-cost possibility for addressing the size
concern in the short term would be to reduce the number of towns—in some rotations
only six to eight of the 15 are used90—and create fewer, larger ones. The latter proposal
should be a temporary substitute and not a permanent solution to the problem. Even if
the war with Iraq ended, the developments would still be useful. “Can you think of any
enemy that wouldn’t try to draw us into cities?” asked Cone.91 Colonel Salazar said, “No
one thinks we’re going back to tank battles. It’s our advantage and they understand they
can’t overmatch us. We want to lay a foundation for the future.”92 Creating an urban
center as soon as possible is essential to establishing a realistic training environment.
NTC should examine its setting on a micro as well as macro level. The interiors of its
buildings, like their exteriors, are virtually the same. Most consist of a long, narrow,
open first floor, a staircase, and a second floor with one or two rooms. In real life, they
will face buildings with various footprints and floor plans. A member of the Operations
Group at another CTC described the extensive training needed to prepare troops for
“close quarters battle,” including raids on homes. “Rehearsals are the most important
life-saving step. . . ,” he said. “Soldiers need to experience the problems associated with
it to prepare for this type of operation.”93 Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) have
87
Interview with Brig. Gen. Robert W. Cone, NTC commanding general, Fort Irwin, California, July 26,
2005.
88
Interview with Brig. Gen. Dana Pittard, NTC commanding general, Fort Irwin, California, August 24,
2007.
89
Interview with Lt. Col. Ron Metternich, Operations Group, Fort Irwin, California, August 23, 2007.
90
Interview with Brig. Gen. Robert W. Cone, NTC commanding general, Fort Irwin, California, July 26,
2005.
91
Ibid. Such conflicts became increasingly common in the 1990s. See Capt. O. Kent Strader,
“Counterinsurgency in an Urban Environment,” 1997, available in “21st Century Complete Guide to the
U.S. Army Center for Lessons Learned (CALL),” Core Federal Information Series, CD-ROM.
92
Interview with Col. Steven Salazar, commander, Operations Group, Fort Irwin, California, August 23,
2007.
93
The complexities of “close quarters battle” and the need to train on it are outlined in an article from a
member of JRTC’s Operations Group. Sfc. Robert J. Ehrlich, “Close Quarters Battle (CQB) Training,
2002,” available in “21st Century Complete Guide to the U.S. Army Center for Lessons Learned (CALL),”
Core Federal Information Series, CD-ROM.
22
documented the humanitarian dangers of house raids in military operations in Iraq and
Afghanistan.94 Variety inside buildings would help soldiers better practice civilian as
well as force protection during searches.
In April 2007, NTC opened a new complex of four two-story homes in which soldiers
train on house searches before their field rotation starts. These structures closely
resemble those in Iraq with stucco walls, flat roofs, interiors furnished like typical Arab
homes, and details such as Arab clothes, cooking, music, and posters of imams. The
Operations Group hides weapons caches behind wardrobes and heating vents for
BLUFOR troops to find. The trainees learn to follow a careful search procedure that
involves, for example, knocking on the door and explaining who they are, photographing
the scene before and after “so they can’t be accused of something they didn’t do,” and
systematically going through every room and returning innocent objects to their original
place.95 They also train to search Iraqi residents with soldiers of the same sex. “Until
they find something, we assume [the residents] are innocent. It changes if they find
something and leads to an arrest procedure,” said Sgt. Maj. George McKerrow, an
advisor from the UK military.96 The realism of these building interiors should be
replicated in the villages so soldiers face such obstacles in the course of field training
exercises.
In conjunction with building larger and more complex cities, NTC should hire more
Arab-Americans to play civilians. Since 2005 there have been about 250 such Civilians
on the Battlefield to train with each 3,000- to 5,000-person brigade, which is a radically
different proportion from that in Iraq. S. Sgt. Tony Ball, an Iraq veteran, said, “The
number of people is overwhelming [in Iraq]. Here they are a lot easier to control. . . .
The more you deal with mass, the more you learn to work with crowds.”97 Cultural
advisor Saed Kakei described the quantity of Arab-Americans as “a very limited
capacity” and said he is calling for more.98 In one scenario, a protest of a couple dozen
chanting Iraqis followed around soldiers looking for bomb-making equipment. While
they challenged the soldiers, there were about as many troops as demonstrators. “You
94
See, e.g., Human Rights Watch, Hearts and Minds, pp. 26-29; Human Rights Watch, “‘Enduring
Freedom,’” pp. 10-21.
95
Interview with Sgt. Maj. George McKerrow, UK search advisor, Fort Irwin, California, August 24, 2007.
96
Ibid.
97
Interview with S. Sgt. Tony Ball, OPFOR, Fort Irwin, California, July 28, 2005.
98
Interview with Saed Kakei, NTC subject matter expert advisor, Fort Irwin, California, August 23, 2007.
23
can get the training objective, but 800 people scares the bejeezus out of soldiers,” said
Maj. Tom Olszowy of the Operations Group.99 Officers, including Commanding General
Pittard, want to at least quadruple the number. “The realism is not there. There are not
enough [Arab-Americans]. I will not be satisfied until there are 1,000,” Pittard said.100
Forcing soldiers to confront large numbers of civilians tests their ability to show restraint
when dealing with massive, often unruly crowds.101
NTC has also restricted the roles its Arab-American contractors can play. Traditionally,
with the exception of Iraqi police and army role players, Arab-Americans could neither
carry the laser guns the soldiers use nor drive vehicles, which encounter US troops at
checkpoints and in convoys. OPFOR troops wearing Arab clothing supplemented the
Arab-Americans, playing other civilians and insurgents, but they were clearly identifiable.
As a result, BLUFOR troops could figure out that “only Americans are threats,”102 and
there was less opportunity for trainees to learn to deal with the confusion of facing
combatants and civilians who look alike. During the author’s visit in August 2007,
Commanding General Pittard said that he hoped to change this policy soon.103 The
Operations Group reportedly followed through on allowing Arab-Americans to carry
guns in September and planned to grant permission for them to drive around
November.104 NTC must finish making these changes and review their implementation
so as not to undermine the purpose of having Arab-American role players.
99
Interview with Maj. Tom Olszowy, Operations Group, Fort Irwin, California, July 28, 2005; interview
with OPFOR company commander (name withheld), Fort Irwin, California, July 25, 2005; interview with
Lt. Col. Johnny H. Isaak, commander, OPFOR, Fort Irwin, California, July 28, 2005 (“[They should be]
packed in and more in big groups. Soldiers get better a flavor of a town with bad guys and huge numbers
of civilians—40, 50, 100 [Iraqis] they can keep their eyes on.”).
100
Interview with Brig. Gen. Dana Pittard, NTC commanding general, Fort Irwin, California, August 24,
2007. See also interview with Lt. Col. Charles M. Evans, deputy commander, Operations Group, Fort
Irwin, California, August 23, 2007.
101
Non-Arab-American role players are also important. NTC already incorporates the media, but it has had
difficulties accurately portraying NGOs and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).
Interview with Maj. Tom Olszowy, Operations Group, Fort Irwin, California, July 28, 2005. On
Commanding General Pittard’s orders after a 2007 meeting with the Carr Center delegation, NTC
integrated ICRC role players into the rotation although as of October it was continuing “to refine and
improve” them. Email communication from Lt. Col. Paul Kreis, chief of operations, Operations Group, to
Bonnie Docherty, October 29, 2007.
102
Interview with Brig. Gen. Dana Pittard, NTC commanding general, Fort Irwin, California, August 24,
2007.
103
Ibid.
104
Email communication from Lt. Col. Paul Kreis, chief of operations, Operations Group, to Bonnie
Docherty, October 29, 2007.
24
Protestors, played largely by Arab-American contractors, greet BLUFOR officers and town leaders after a meeting at town hall. The
crowd chanted anti-US slogans throughout the meeting, which addressed security and humanitarian assistance. NTC needs more
civilian role players to challenge BLUFOR troops’ ability to minimize harm to civilians. The faces of the Arab-Americans have been
blurred to protect their identity. Photo by Bonnie Docherty, 2005.
25
NTC, meanwhile, could better use OPFOR as a training force. Spc. Noah Miller argued
OPFOR should be allowed to be even more aggressive.105 For example,
observer/controllers should permit OPFOR to get closer to the BLUFOR troops, and
possibly even make contact. The current minimum distance allowed between combatants
within a building is three meters.106 Miller’s comrade Spc. Cesar Valdes said, “When
chanting we are so far away they don’t feel threatened. Let us get a little rowdy.”107
Although observer/controller referees typically preempt physical contact, OPFOR should
be allowed to challenge adherence to ROE as vigorously as possible. In addition to
testing BLUFOR, playing OPFOR is a valuable training exercise. “We get an
understanding of what they [enemy soldiers] think,” said OPFOR Sgt. Jason Zimmerman.
“Every soldier coming in should have a chance to experience both sides. You get a better
understanding of the enemy.”108 A dialogue between OPFOR and BLUFOR would help
pass OPFOR’s understanding of the enemy on to the trainees.
As a corollary to improving the role playing of Iraqi civilians and insurgents, NTC should
continue and increase its cultural training. “This is a war where cultural knowledge may
be more important than the number of bullets that you have,” a military expert told the
Army Times.109 Soldiers must learn to understand the culture so as not to offend local
inhabitants. Such training begins in the classroom. NTC’s new cultural advisor Saed
Kakei conducts two three-hour sessions on cultural awareness and negotiations—one for
officers and one for non-commissioned officers.110 Culture is also discussed in the afteraction reviews. In one review, an observer/controller told a medical unit, with regard to
treating female victims with female soldiers, “You know the cultural differences. . . . I’d
treat them with the same respect as any American. They’re on our side.”111 NTC’s
Observer/Controller Handbook has a section on Arab culture so the trainers can be
prepared to pass the information on.112 Attention to details like introducing oneself to the
mayor, taking time for a cup of tea, or being careful not to show the offensive bottoms of
their boots are important ways to promote cultural exchange. Officers, however,
105
Interview with Spc. Noah Miller, OPFOR, Fort Irwin, California, July 28, 2005.
“NTC Exercise Operating Procedure—JAN 2006,” p. 56.
107
Interview with Spc. Cesar Valdes, OPFOR, Fort Irwin, California, July 28, 2005.
108
Interview with Sgt. Jason Zimmerman, OPFOR, Fort Irwin, California, July 28, 2005.
109
“Around the Army,” Army Times, January 10, 2005, p. 7 (quoting David R. Segal, director of the Center
for Research on Military Organization at the University of Maryland).
110
Interview with Saed Kakei, NTC subject matter expert advisor, Fort Irwin, California, August 23, 2007.
111
After-action review observed by author, Fort Irwin, California, August 23, 2007.
112
NTC, Observer/Controller Handbook, July 31, 2007, pp. 2-17-2-34.
106
26
described cultural training as the “toughest part.”113 Kakei said, “The most critical thing
we need soldiers to be aware of is to emphasize elements of culture. It’s not a war of
interests. It’s about getting along.”114 Cultural awareness helps soldiers better
understand, distinguish, and protect civilians.115
Up to this point, cultural training has been insufficient.116 Soldiers at NTC complained
about past training. “The first time [in Iraq] we didn’t understand the culture. We
thought the call to prayers was a threat,” said one veteran.117 Another said, “We needed
better cultural training. They showed us a[n Arabic] language card, but there were some
things wrong in the original.”118 NTC’s changes have improved but not solved the
situation. Classes, for example, are limited in length and do not target the enlisted men
who do the bulk of the fighting. “We must talk about the importance of cultural training
and awareness. With most 18- to 19-year-old men from the middle to lower classes, you
have to be sure to make it important to them, to tie it to their personal survival and
success. It furthers the mission and force protection,” said BLUFOR battalion
commander Lt. Col. Patrick Donohoe.119 Kakei said he would like to see more training in
113
Interview with Maj. Cameron Kramer, observer/controller, Operations Group, Fort Irwin, California,
July 24, 2005.
114
Interview with Saed Kakei, NTC subject matter expert advisor, Fort Irwin, California, August 23, 2007.
115
Commanding General Cone said, “Our goal is to make sure there is a fundamental understanding of
culture.” Interview with Brig. Gen. Robert W. Cone, NTC commanding general, Fort Irwin, California,
July 25, 2005. See also Megan Scully, M. Scott Mahaskey, and Roberto Schmidt, “Every Soldier a Sensor;
Intelligence Increasingly Focuses on Relationships among Individuals,” Intelligence, Surveillance and
Reconnaissance, June 1, 2004, p. 29 (“The term ‘social intelligence’—an in-depth knowledge of local
culture and customs . . . . is key to sorting out friend from foe on a battlefield without lines or uniforms.”).
116
Officers outside of NTC also highlighted the need for better training in culture. See, e.g., Roxana Tiron,
“Army Criticized for Not Learning from Past Wars,” National Defense, September 1, 2004, p. 16 (quoting
Maj. Gen. Robert Scales (ret.) and saying “Many of the perceived failures in Iraq are rooted in cultural
ignorance, which leads to poor personal connections with the people U.S. troops are trying to help.”); J.R.
Wilson, “MOUT Makeover; Urban Combat Training Villages Get Facelift for Modern Battlefield,”
Training and Simulation Journal, December 1, 2004, p. 37 (quoting Lt. Col. James Riley, chief of tactics
for the Combined Arms and Tactics Directorate, saying “Right now it’s a lesson identified, but the learning
part of it is to understand that cultural awareness is key to the future battlefield.”); Cox and Mahaskey,
“Tougher Training,” Army Times (reporting that General Wallace of TRADOC said that commanders
wanted more pre-deployment knowledge of the region).
117
Interview with soldier #2 (name withheld), Fort Irwin, California, July 25, 2005.
118
Interview with soldier #3 (name withheld), BLUFOR, Fort Irwin, California, July 24, 2005. The need
for cultural training was also recognized in Afghanistan. See S. Sgt. Franklin R. Peterson, “Civil Affairs—
Respect and Mission Accomplishment–OEF,” available in “21st Century Complete Guide to the U.S. Army
Center for Lessons Learned (CALL),” Core Federal Information Series, CD-ROM.
119
Interview with Lt. Col. Patrick Donohoe, battalion commander, BLUFOR, Fort Irwin, California, July
25, 2005.
27
this area.120 Shortcomings in cultural training lead to hostility between soldiers and
civilians and endanger the latter as well as the former. Soldiers become more confused
and scared and therefore less careful about distinguishing between combatants and noncombatants.
To enhance their training on protection of civilians, soldiers should face certain scenarios
more often. In particular, because there are few OPFOR and civilian vehicles driving
around the box, trainees are given limited opportunities to deal with cars. Only 120
operate in a facility the size of Rhode Island.121 “Perfect scenery would include more
people, more vehicles,” Lieutenant Colonel Magness said.122 As one interviewee
explained, when a white truck launches a mortar on a BLUFOR base, it is usually easy to
track the responsible vehicle because there are few other vehicles on the road, especially
at night.123 This fact can make troops less careful about identifying specifically which
cars they should attack. Reckless driving alone does not signal an enemy. For example,
a unit “killed” the mayor’s son and four other civilians by accident because he was
driving a fast blue car. The officer in charge had to apologize to the mayor and try to
regain local support from a town that wanted him to leave.124
Certain interactions with vehicles put civilians particularly at risk. “The biggest
heartburn in Iraq was checkpoints,” said veteran Captain Nahas in 2005.125 Two years
later, Captain Kuzio, another veteran, made a similar observation. “Convoys and TCPs
[traffic control points, or checkpoints] are the biggest US causes of civilian casualties.”126
Newspaper reports support Kuzio’s statement that drivers and passengers of cars driving
too close to military convoys or patrols are common victims.127 US forces also have a
120
Interview with Saed Kakei, NTC subject matter expert advisor, Fort Irwin, California, August 23, 2007.
Interview with Brig. Gen. Dana Pittard, NTC commanding general, Fort Irwin, California, August 24,
2007.
122
Interview with Lt. Col. Thomas H. Magness, observer/controller, Operations Group, Fort Irwin,
California, July 27, 2005.
123
Interview with Sfc. Scott Brown, OPFOR, Fort Irwin, California, July 28, 2005.
124
Interview with Titan site manager #2 (name withheld), Fort Irwin, California, July 25, 2005.
125
Interview with Capt. Matty Nahas, company commander, BLUFOR, Fort Irwin, California, July 24,
2005.
126
Interview with Capt. Chris Kuzio, observer/controller, Operations Group, Fort Irwin, California, August
23, 2007.
127
See, e.g., “Car Bomb Kills Three in Iraq,” Deutsche Presse-Agentur, December 19, 2005 (reporting US
soldiers killed a truck driver who approached a patrol in Latifiya); Anna Badkhen, “Colonel’s Toughest
Duty,” San Francisco Chronicle, October 14, 2005 (reporting the death of civilian woman in a car near
other cars that sped by a convoy. The convoy did not stop to help. Lt. Col. Todd Wood said, “These . . .
121
28
documented history of killing civilians at checkpoints. Human Rights Watch recorded 11
such deaths in Iraq in 2003.128 The press reported at least an additional eight deaths in
2004,129 three deaths in 2005,130 and seven deaths in 2006.131 Some cases were
particularly public or egregious. For example, in 2005 US forces killed an Italian
Intelligence officer, Nicola Calipari,132 and a physician and Knight-Ridder correspondent,
Yasser Salihee. In February 2006, they reportedly killed a family of five civilians trying
to enter Samara, which was then cordoned off.133 Additional casualties have occurred in
Afghanistan.134 A Pentagon report said that lack of training may have contributed to
these types of casualties.135
patrols that drive around and shoot people have been a thorn in everybody’s side all year.”); “Security
Incidents in Iraq, August 15,” Reuters News, August 15, 2005 (reporting a US convoy killed one and
wounded two civilians in a car); “Security Incidents in Iraq, August 2,” Reuters News, August 2, 2005
(reporting a US patrol shot and killed one Iraqi and wounded two in a tank truck that tried to overtake
them); Richard C. Paddock, “US Soldiers are Wreckless [sic],” Los Angeles Times, July 26, 2005
(describing multiple attacks on civilians near convoys and at checkpoints); “Iraqi Civilian Is Shot Dead,”
Gulf Daily News, July 15, 2005 (describing a civilian shot for driving too close to a US vehicle).
128
Human Rights Watch, Hearts and Minds.
129
Rory McCarthy, “Iraq Crisis: ‘We Can’t Get Him Back, but They Should Pay,’” Guardian (London),
December 9, 2004 (reporting efforts at compensation for the death of Najim Abdullah Hamid nine months
prior); Jackie Spinner, “Talks to Avoid Fallujah Offensive Break Down,” Washington Post, November 6,
2004 (describing witness accounts of seven family members killed at a checkpoint).
130
Russell Carollo and Larry Kaplow, “Justice at War: Troops Receive Light Sentences for Violent Crimes
against Iraqis,” Dayton Daily News, October 2, 2005 (reporting death of a taxi driver at a checkpoint);
Paddock, “US Soldiers are Wreckless [sic],” Los Angeles Times (describing multiple attacks on civilians
near convoys and at checkpoints); Paddock, “Egyptian Diplomat in Iraq Missing,” Los Angeles Times, July
4, 2005 (reporting on the death of Yasser Salihee, a physician and Knight-Ridder Correspondent,); Jacki
Lyden, “Dr. Yasser Salihee, Translator and Friend,” NPR, July 2, 2005,
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=4726759 (accessed March 16, 2007).
131
“Over Dozen Civilians Killed in a Wave of Violence in Iraq,” Deutsche Presse-Agentur, February 23,
2006 (reporting the death of five family members at a checkpoint near Samara); “U.S. Soldiers Kill Woman
in Car,” Agence France-Presse, January 17, 2006 (reporting US soldiers “killed one woman and wounded
three in a car which failed to stop at a checkpoint”); “Security Incidents in Iraq, January 7,” Reuters News,
January 7, 2006 (reporting US soldiers killed one and wounded one at a checkpoint in Baiji). In 2007, more
casualties came from house raids or crossfire. The Los Angeles Times reported that in at least some cases,
soldiers may have fired “wildly” after being attacked, but said that it was impossible to confirm witness
reports. Tina Susman, “Close and Deadly Contact,” Los Angeles Times, June 12, 2007.
132
“Iraq: U.S. Checkpoints Continue to Kill,” Human Rights Watch news release, May 5, 2005,
http://hrw.org/english/docs/2005/05/04/iraq10578.htm (accessed October 29, 2007).
133
“Over Dozen Civilians Killed in a Wave of Violence in Iraq,” Deutsche Presse-Agentur.
134
In 2006 and 2007, the majority of Coalition-caused civilian casualties in Afghanistan came from air
strikes, but artillery strikes, special forces operations, and vehicle-related incidents, especially those
involving convoys that were attacked by Taliban forces, also reportedly led to casualties. “Another
common insurgent tactic is suicide car bombings aimed at military convoys. In response, jittery troops
sometimes fire on civilians who are merely driving erratically or who accidentally come between military
vehicles. Often there are more such shootings when a contingent of troops has recently arrived in
29
NTC’s increasing emphasis on vehicle-based incidents shows a recognition of these
dangers but still falls short. NTC trains soldiers to follow detailed EOF procedures136 and
since late spring 2007 has issued checkpoint, or traffic control point (TCP), kits, which
include tools to slow down and warn vehicles, such as cones, spike strips, bullhorns, stop
signs, and lights.137 Soldiers receive a two-hour course on the equipment before starting
field training.138 A typical field rotation, such as that in August 2007, features four
permanent checkpoints as well as “snap TCPs,” which are put up on the spot.139
Nevertheless, NTC suffers from a shortage of scenarios and a lack of realism in those that
occur. More scenarios are essential given the danger vehicle-related incidents pose
civilians. Checkpoints should be set up in towns as well as on open roads so that troops
train to operate them in congested environments. A lack of traffic reduces the realism of
not only checkpoints but also convoys. “It’s not easy to replicate. Vehicles are used
Afghanistan.” Laura King, “Errant Afghan Slayings Surge,” Los Angeles Times, July 6, 2007. On March 4,
2007, a Marine unit killed 19 civilians and wounded 50 while fleeing a suicide attack on its convoy. A US
military commander ruled that the Marines’ actions consisted of “excessive force”; Army Col. John
Nicholson apologized two months later. See, e.g., Jason Straziuso, “Bloodstains in the Sand after U.S.Afghan Friendly Fire Battle Kills 8 Afghan Police Officers,” Associated Press, June 12, 2007; Pamela
Constable, “Afghans Growing Irate over Casualties,” Washington Post, May 12, 2007; “US Military
Apologizes for Afghan Civilian Deaths,” Reuters News, May 8, 2007; Griff Witte, “Marines Open Fire
after Afghan Ambush,” Washington Post, March 5, 2007. For information on other incidents, see Rahim
Faiez, “Karzai Warns NATO: Afghan Life Not Cheap,” Associated Press, June 23, 2007 (discussing
civilian deaths from air strikes and artillery fire); Jason Straziuso, “NATO Image Problem,” Associated
Press, June 16, 2007 (reporting that a US Humvee gunner fired on a crowd, killing one and injuring two,
after a suicide attack); Constable, “Afghans Growing Irate over Casualties,” Washington Post (reporting
that US Special Operations units killed six civilians in a raid); Amir Shah, “U.S.-Led Coalition Airstrike
that Killed 9 Targeted Militant’s House, Says Afghan Official,” Associated Press, March 6, 2007 (reporting
that a NATO-led convoy in Kandahar killed the driver of a car that came too close to a convoy). US forces
also killed at least three civilians and injured two in a pickup truck that failed to stop at a checkpoint in
Afghanistan in 2004. See “3 Afghans Killed by U.S. Forces; Didn’t Stop at Checkpoint,” Dow Jones
International News, August 22, 2004.
135
“Iraq: U.S. Checkpoints Continue to Kill,” Human Rights Watch news release (quoting a May 2 report
from the Pentagon).
136
Each checkpoint is supposed to have three lines: 1) the “alert line” at 300 meters with cones and Arabic
signs warning drivers to slow down, 2) the “warning line” at 200 meters, which adds serpentine concertina
wire so vehicles have to slow down, and 3) the “stop line” at 100 meters with obstacles, such as tire
puncture strips, that vehicles would have to penetrate to advance. The soldiers manning the checkpoint
must follow about a dozen steps before firing a warning shot. Interview with Capt. Chris Kuzio,
observer/controller, Operations Group, Fort Irwin, California, August 23, 2007.
137
Interview with contractor (name withheld), Army Center of Excellence, Fort Irwin, California, August
24, 2007.
138
Ibid.
139
Interview with Col. Steven Salazar, commander, Operations Group, Fort Irwin, California, August 23,
2007.
30
daily, but there are thousands of trails. It’s not like Baghdad where you’re on the
highway next to the exit,” Captain Kuzio said.140 Blocking some of the trails could
increase traffic congestion and thus the challenges trainees face. Only one bullet point of
an 11-page chapter on convoy operations in NTC’s Observer/Controller Handbook,
however, addresses civilians and how to warn them of danger.141 Given that car bombs at
checkpoints and on roads are one of the major killers of soldiers and civilians in Iraq142
and vehicle-related incidents have been a major source of US-caused casualties, US
troops should be better prepared to anticipate and handle them.143
Increasing realism can in some, but not all, cases cost money. “We have no shortage of
ideas. It’s a money problem,” Colonel Salazar said.144 This paper does not attempt to
evaluate the budget priorities of the US Department of Defense or NTC. Instead, it seeks
to highlight areas where improvement is necessary. Realism is critical to NTC’s success
at minimizing civilian casualties, and the center should continue to push its development
in these directions.
VI. Review of Training
Review of training ensures a training center’s lessons, including those on minimizing
civilian harm, are taught successfully. After-action reviews should assess not only the
military success of a mission but also its effects on civilians in the area. This task
140
Interview with Capt. Chris Kuzio, observer/controller, Operations Group, Fort Irwin, California, August
23, 2007.
141
It says:
Prevent civilians and civilian vehicles from entering convoys.
Consider placing signs on convoy vehicles in the native dialects to warn civilians and
motorists to stay away from the convoy and that failure to do so may result in deadly force to
be used against them (depending on the ROE).
NTC, Observer/Controller Handbook, July 2007, pg. 3-7
142
See, e.g., John F. Burns, “3 Car Bombs Leave 18 Dead and 46 Hurt in a Shiite Suburb of Baghdad,”
New York Times, June 23, 2005; Karl Vick and Khalid Saffar, “Car Bomb Kills 11 Near Green Zone,”
Washington Post, December 14, 2004; Human Rights Watch, A Face and a Name: Civilian Victims of
Insurgent Groups in Iraq, vol. 17, no. 9(E), October 2005, http://hrw.org/reports/2005/iraq1005/ (accessed
October 29, 2007), p. 1.
143
Another scenario soldiers requested more of in 2005 was the detention of suspicious Iraqis. NTC
seemed to have increased that training by 2007. This paper does not discuss this issue in depth because it is
focused on minimizing harm to civilians in combat.
144
Interview with Col. Steven Salazar, commander, Operations Group, Fort Irwin, California, August 24,
2007.
•
31
requires monitoring individual soldiers’ activities to pinpoint problems and evaluating
training exercises under the IHL rules discussed above. Although it looks closely at
specific incidents, NTC has failed systematically to identify and analyze patterns of
civilian casualties.
NTC currently uses after-action reviews as its main source of feedback on performance in
training scenarios. “The AAR [after-action review] remains the CTC’s cornerstone for
leadership development through self-evaluation.”145 It offers feedback troops do not get
in theater.146 Immediately after each exercise, observer/controllers lead frank discussions,
An observer/controller leads an after-action review, or hotwash, after an exercise in which a medical unit faced multiple IEDs. New
technology allows BLUFOR soldiers to watch video of their actions immediately after the fact, but NTC needs to enhance its
technology and tracking of civilian casualties in order to train troops to minimize humanitarian harm. Photo by Bonnie Docherty,
2007.
145
Mick Bednarek, Thomas P. Odom, and Stephen Florich, “Expanding Jointness at the Joint Readiness
Training Center,” Military Review, January 1, 2005, p. 51.
146
Interview with Col. Steven Salazar, commander, Operations Group, Fort Irwin, California, August 24,
2007.
32
called “hotwashes,” of soldiers’ actions and their consequences. “We discuss how they
respond to local people. How well messages are passed up. How well they are reading
the mood in town. How well they see things that are out of place. How well they protect
sources’ identities.”147 Officers later receive broader after-action reviews organized by
the leaders of the Operations Group. In the reviews, NTC engages soldiers by
encouraging them come up with their own solutions.148 At all levels reviews should
include issues of interaction that may result in loss of civilian lives. They should also
look beyond individual anecdotes to general trends.
NTC can significantly improve its review process in two ways. The first involves
technology that would gather data on individual soldiers and role players. Soldiers and
civilians at NTC currently wear Multiple Integrated Laser Engagement System (MILES)
harnesses. These sensors signal whenever a person is hit by a laser gun, indicating that
he or she is dead or injured. They do not identify the shooter, however. If many shots
are fired, it can be difficult to determine who killed a civilian, which leads to many
questions, such as: Did BLUFOR or OPFOR fire the shot? If the former, which
individual and why? If the latter, was he or she blending in the crowd dressed like a
civilian? Were there ways to identify the OPFOR player as a potential threat to troops
and civilians? Without such information, NTC cannot adequately teach lessons in how to
distinguish persons on the battlefield and to avoid causing civilian casualties.
One of the qualities that enhanced NTC’s Cold War-era training was its ability to track
tanks as they moved in the field. Trainees could review their individual movements after
the fact to determine how they performed. Similar technology should be used today for
both combatants and civilians. “We need continued investment in instrumentation. . . .
We need to be able to play back what happened, how, etc. We need to instrument every
single person on the battlefield,” observer/controller Lieutenant Colonel Magness said.149
Ideally such technology would also trace hits back to the shooter. NTC should add such
supplementary technology, which is available, to its training package.
147
Interview with Maj. Cameron Kramer, observer/controller, Operations Group, Fort Irwin, California,
July 24, 2005. At the beginning of one after-action review, an observer/controller told his trainees,
“Everyone participates. There will be . . . no thin skin. If you are not part of the solution, you are part of
the problem.” After-action review observed by author, Fort Irwin, California, August 23, 2007.
148
Lt. Col. Paul Kreis said, “They talk among themselves and come up with a solution. You’ll solve it if
you have ownership. If you are told, it won’t inculcate.” Interview with Lt. Col. Paul Kreis, chief of
operations, Operations Group, Fort Irwin, California, August 23, 2007.
149
Interview with Lt. Col. Thomas H. Magness, observer/controller, Operations Group, Fort Irwin,
California, July 27, 2005.
33
NTC, which is “welcoming of technology,”150 has experimented with three means of
tracking soldiers. Its most successful use of technology is a program that gives
observer/controllers video cameras to capture training scenarios. The footage is used in
powerpoint presentations in after-action reviews, even during hotwashes in the field.151
NTC has also set up $3.3 million of camera equipment around one village to observe
troop movement. “Soldiers love the direct feedback,” Commanding General Cone
said.152 His replacement, Commanding General Pittard, said he wants to “replicate
London,” which is famous for its public surveillance system.153 This program, which was
implemented by 2005 and has changed little since then, should be expanded to other
villages. Finally, NTC introduced I-HITS, a sensor attached to individuals on the
battlefield, in one village. In 2005, Cone said NTC was comparing contracts and needed
$3 million to implement the whole package.154 By August 2007, the center seemed to be
backing off this technology and relying more on cameras for expense reasons.155
Whatever the form, the training center needs more such technology as a first step toward
preventing civilian casualties.
Second, NTC should keep and analyze records of civilians killed or injured during its
rotations to identify patterns that cause casualties. The US military has a poor track
record of conducting such humanitarian-based battle damage assessments in real
combat.156 The US Air Force, for example, conducts “collateral damage estimates”
before an air attack but does not look at civilian casualties and evaluate the accuracy of
150
Interview with Brig. Gen. Robert W. Cone, NTC commanding general, Fort Irwin, California, July 26,
2005.
151
Interview with Col. Steven Salazar, commander, Operations Group, Fort Irwin, California, August 23,
2007.
152
Interview with Brig. Gen. Robert W. Cone, NTC commanding general, Fort Irwin, California, July 26,
2005.
153
Interview with Brig. Gen. Dana Pittard, NTC commanding general, Fort Irwin, California, August 23,
2007.
154
Interview with Brig. Gen. Robert W. Cone, NTC commanding general, Fort Irwin, California, July 26,
2005.
155
Interview with Col. Steven Salazar, commander, Operations Group, Fort Irwin, California, August 23,
2007.
156
The battle damage assessments the author conducted for Human Rights Watch for several past conflicts,
including the ground war in Iraq, exemplify this methodology. It involves not only looking at whether a
military operation is successful, but also what its impact on the local population is. Human Rights Watch’s
methodology includes interviewing victims, witnesses, doctors, and belligerents; gathering hospital records;
and doing ballistics analysis. It then analyzes this information to determine why civilians are killed or
injured. Counting casualties is not sufficient; it is more important to identify their causes and effects.
34
its estimates post-conflict.157 As a result of this “broken” system, during major hostilities
in Iraq, the US Air Force continued to use a flawed leadership targeting methodology,
killing zero of 50 targeted leaders but hundreds of civilians.158 Although the US military
released a report on the number of Iraqi civilians killed or injured by insurgents, it
publicly said it did not track US-caused casualties in Iraq.159
Until this fall, Army trainers did not record or analyze civilian casualties at NTC.
“Tracking specific numbers [of civilian casualties] is not part of the objective,” said
Major Clearwater in 2006. “Each event is looked at as a stand-alone in the training
process.”160 The technology to do such an analysis is cheap and available. A military
computer program called a Crystal Report records data from events, linking cause and
effect. Presented with a proposal to use the report to document civilian casualties,
Lieutenant Colonel Harris thought it would be feasible. He suggested recording three
types of incidents: 1) civilian casualties from pre-planned US/Coalition operations, 2)
civilian casualties caused by US or Coalition forces but in response to an insurgent attack,
and 3) civilian casualties resulting from innocent Iraqis inadvertently coming into contact
with an ongoing military operation.161 While Colonel Salazar remained skeptical of the
benefits of such tracking, Commanding General Pittard voiced his support for this easyto-implement recommendation from the author and pledged, in August 2007, to
implement it in the next rotation.162 The Operations Group reportedly did so using
software that allowed it to display information by types of incidents, locations, and units
involved; it has “not made a transition to using Crystal” yet.163 In the training
environment like in reality, information about the numbers and circumstances of
casualties will be invaluable to minimizing civilian casualties in future armed conflicts.
157
Human Rights Watch, Off Target, pp. 18-20, 26-27.
Ibid., p. 27.
159
See, e.g., Sabrina Tavernise, “U.S. Quietly Issues Estimate of Iraqi Civilian Casualties,” New York
Times, October 30, 2005, p. 10; Department of Defense Briefing, “Coalition Provisional Authority Update
Briefing to Include Background Briefing on Iraqi Compensation,” (quoted in Human Rights Watch, Hearts
and Minds, p. 10).
160
Telephone interview with Maj. John Clearwater, NTC public affairs officer, Washington, DC, July 31,
2006.
161
Email communication from Lt. Col. Michael Harris, officer in charge, Army Center of Excellence, to
Bonnie Docherty, September 1, 2007.
162
Interview with Col. Steven Salazar, commander, Operations Group, Fort Irwin, California, August 24,
2007; interview with Brig. Gen. Dana Pittard, NTC commanding general, Fort Irwin, California, August 24,
2007.
163
Email communication from Lt. Col. Paul Kreis, chief of operations, Operations Group, to Bonnie
Docherty, October 29, 2007.
158
35
While, as noted above, NTC needs more additional types of scenarios, its current
operations provide cases of civilian casualties to analyze. The press has recorded
multiple training incidents at NTC in addition to the ones mentioned in this paper.
Troops blew up a busload of voters,164 injured eight civilians in a raid on a town, and at a
checkpoint, shot at a Ford Bronco carrying CNN reporters, who were shot again when
they stepped out of the car.165 A lieutenant colonel called in an air strike when insurgents
attacked his unit from a building; the attack killed more than 20 civilians.166 A solitary
soldier surrounded by villagers panicked and killed several of them.167 NTC treats such
incidents seriously. The lieutenant colonel became “one of the savviest graduates of the
course,” and the solitary soldier was dismissed from the Army after a psychological
evaluation.168 “If the soldier demonstrates disregard for the Iraqi population, we initiate
an investigation as if we were in the field,” Colonel Salazar said.169 The individual afteraction reviews of these cases are useful, but NTC must also continue its recently initiated
record keeping and analyze it for patterns in civilian casualties as a whole.
VII. Conclusion
While NTC should intensify and expand its efforts to make avoidance of civilian harm a
priority of military training, other facilities and countries should heed the lessons its
example provides.170 Militaries of every nation should have ROE that meet IHL
standards and should ingrain them in their troops. To the extent feasible, they should
164
Walt Torbert, “Look at War Opens Eyes of Aspiring Journalists,” editorial, Atlanta Journal-Constitution,
September 28, 2004.
165
Dave Hirschman and Moni Basu, “Dress Rehearsal for Combat: Georgia Unit’s Desert Training Is Last
Stop on Way to Iraq,” Atlanta Journal-Constitution, April 16, 2005.
166
Filkins and Burns, “Deep in a U.S. Desert,” New York Times.
167
Ibid.
168
Ibid.
169
Interview with Col. Steven Salazar, commander, Operations Group, Fort Irwin, California, August 23,
2007. NTC also requires investigations of incidents that fall short of causing serious injury or death. For
example, a soldier fired a shot in the air at a demonstration, an Iraq veteran shoved the butt of a rifle in a
woman’s chest and swore, and BLUFOR troops failed to stop the Iraqi police from beating a detainee.
Someone role playing a British journalist caught the latter on film, and it was shown to troops. Interview
with Lt. Col. Ron Metternich, Operations Group, Fort Irwin, California, August 23, 2007; interview with Lt.
Col. Michael Harris, officer in charge, Army Center of Excellence, Fort Irwin, California, August 24, 2007.
170
Foreign militaries often observe training at NTC. During the August 2007 rotation, representatives from
the Japanese and Argentinean militaries visited. Interview with Capt. Chris Kuzio, observer/controller,
Operations Group, Fort Irwin, California, August 23, 2007.
36
develop training facilities that replicate the type of combat troops will face. As soldiers
learn to apply ROE in such realistic environments, trainers should review their actions
with an eye to civilian casualties as well as military success. These interrelated principles
of military training, when fully implemented, can help troops reduce civilian casualties in
military operations.
37
Appendix: The Operation of NTC in Detail
NTC training involves four major players. BLUFOR, short for “Blue Force,” is a regular
Army or National Guard unit that is rotating through training at NTC. It comes in
brigades that are often heading to Iraq or Afghanistan. After a week at base, troops train
in the field 24 hours a day, seven days a week, getting little sleep and having to fight in
temperatures up to 120˚F. If they suffer “casualties,” at least one unit required officers to
write letters home to victims’ families.171 In addition to facing a military opponent,
BLUFOR must learn to operate in the presence of civilians.
OPFOR, the opposing force, is a permanent presence at NTC. Today it is trained to play
insurgents and sometimes civilians. The 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment (11th ACR) has
historically filled this role at NTC, but it deployed to Iraq in 2005 and a National Guard
unit from Nevada, the 1-221 Cavalry, replaced it. The 11th ACR has since returned.
According to Army Regulation 350-2,
The OPFOR Program is intended to be a “sparring partner” for commanders. Use
of OPFOR in training events is intended to provide realistic field training through
operations against a noncooperative, uncompromising opponent that uses tactics,
doctrine, and equipment representative of a composite of forces that could be
encountered in current or future combat operations. . . . [S]cenarios used in Army
training events will be structured for maximum free play, including an
opportunity [for OPFOR] to “win” the fight.172
In the current environment, the enemy is one that has little respect for IHL and regularly
endangers civilians in the course of battle.
The Operations Group (Ops Group) consists of two parts. The scenario writers design
the situations combatants on both sides face during their field exercises. “We are the
condition setters to allow it [the unit] to reach its training objective. . . . Our job is to
171
These letters are sent to the home of one of the commanding officers. He reads and reviews them after
their training is over. Interview with Capt. Matty Nahas, company commander, BLUFOR, Fort Irwin,
California, July 24, 2005.
172
Department of the Army, “Opposing Force (OPFOR) Program,” Army Regulation 350-2, April 9, 2004,
p. 1.
38
create challenging scenarios, to make it as challenging as possible. It should be the worst
14 days of their life except for getting shot at in Iraq,” Major Olszowy said.173 The
writers modify the scenarios during the rotation to account for units’ actions and to train
on areas that need more work. The Operations Group’s observer/controllers are both
referees and reviewers. They walk the battlefield during the scenarios to make sure the
conflict does not get out of hand (for example, soldiers are not allowed to push civilians
or start fistfights): “When things get real emotional, we referee,” said observer/controller
Major Kramer.174 They then conduct after-action reviews with the unit and its officers to
explain to them what they did right and wrong. Both parts of the Operations Group are
key to teaching soldiers to minimize civilian casualties. The scenario writers can place
troops in contact with civilians, and the observer/controllers can judge how they handle
the interaction.
The last major player, who is particularly important for this paper, is the Civilian on the
Battlefield. NTC has recognized the limits of relying entirely on soldiers for its training.
Previously, OPFOR soldiers in crew cuts and baseball hats represented Civilians on the
Battlefield, but since summer 2004 NTC has hired Arab-American contractors
(“linguists”) through Titan to play that role.175 More accurately dressed OPFOR troops
supplement their ranks. Major Kramer described the linguists as the “best part of the
training.”176 This change has brought Arabic speakers and more women to the field.
There are 250 linguists across the mock settings in use.177 They are required to wear
culturally appropriate clothing and to pretend not to speak any English so that BLUFOR
troops can only communicate with them through a translator. “Soldiers are naïve. They
need to hear the sound of the language. . . . We need to help soldiers to be familiar with
[Arab] faces. We teach them [Arabic] words,” said one Iraqi role player.178 “There are
important cultural differences and we lay barriers they have to deal with,” a Titan site
manager said.179 Civilians are given identification cards and a sheet that tells them what
173
Interview with Maj. Tom Olszowy, Operations Group, Fort Irwin, California, July 28, 2005.
Interview with Maj. Cameron Kramer, observer/controller, Operations Group, Fort Irwin, California,
July 24, 2005.
175
Titan also has contracts with Fort Hood and Fort Riley. Interview with Titan Site Manager #1 (name
withheld), Fort Irwin, California, July 24, 2005.
176
Interview with Maj. Cameron Kramer, observer/controller, Operations Group, Fort Irwin, California,
July 24, 2005.
177
Interview with Saed Kakei, NTC subject matter expert advisor, Fort Irwin, California, August 23, 2007.
178
Interview with Arab-American woman #2 (name withheld), Civilian on the Battlefield, Fort Irwin,
California, July 28, 2005.
179
Interview with Titan Site Manager #1 (name withheld), Fort Irwin, California, July 24, 2005.
174
39
role they are to play. While some act as ordinary citizens, others represent a mayor,
imam, or police officer. Whatever their role, they are living in a combat zone and face
risks from both BLUFOR and OPFOR.
These four groups interact in scenarios set up by the Operations Group. Some trainings,
like the ones observed in February 2004 and August 2007, are “lanes,” which involve
repeating an exercise until it is done correctly. Others, like the ones observed in July
2005, are free-flowing. Lieutenant Colonel Harris described the progression as “crawl”
(BLUFOR’s arrival at NTC), “walk” (lane training), and “run” (free-flow training, also
called full spectrum operations).180 The latter scenarios run all day every day and require
soldiers to live with their mistakes. “If they make mistakes, we hold it against them,” an
OPFOR commander said.181 In a cordon and search, a unit seals off a town and looks for
insurgents, weapons caches, and equipment to make IEDs. Protests consist of crowds
chanting anti-US slogans in English and Arabic; the linguists are often aggressive and try
to provoke the soldiers into abusing them. IEDs and suicide bombers also threaten the
soldiers; the latter challenge them to distinguish between combatants and civilians.
In these counterinsurgency training scenarios, OPFOR and the Civilians on the
Battlefield test soldiers’ capacity to deal appropriately with foreign populations whose
sympathies may be unclear or volatile. BLUFOR officers must negotiate with local
leaders to increase security and ensure human services. NTC labels villages black
(hostile), white (friendly), or gray (neutral), and civilians will change their character in
response to the soldiers’ actions.182 For example, if a unit kills an imam in a white town
it will quickly turn black, or if a unit provides adequate security and human services, a
gray town may become white. “We have to work the consequence management piece.
We keep pulling at the thread,” said Colonel Salazar.183 The civilians even change the
Arabic graffiti to reflect the mood in the town and its status as a black, white, or gray
180
Interview with Lt. Col. Michael Harris, officer in charge, Army Center of Excellence, Fort Irwin,
California, August 24, 2007.
181
Interview with OPFOR company commander (name withheld), Fort Irwin, California, July 25, 2005.
182
Interview with Maj. Cameron Kramer, observer/controller, Operations Group, Fort Irwin, California,
July 24, 2005.
183
Interview with Col. Steven Salazar, commander, Operations Group, Fort Irwin, California, August 23,
2007.
40
village. The changes hone troops’ observation skills and their ability to work with a
translator.184
An OPFOR role player described how they frustrated soldiers by pretending not to speak
English or understand hand signals. They treated a hand held up to indicate stop, for
example, as a “high-five.”185 “We try to get them to lose control. We try to push them to
their limits, to see what their breaking point is,” said Staff Sergeant Wilson, who was
playing an Iraqi café owner.186 If BLUFOR offended or abused the townspeople, he
switched from civilian to insurgent. While the initial reactions to provocation can be too
strong, by the end of the second week in the field, the troops tend to improve.187 “We see
if we can make them make huge mistakes here,” Sergeant First Class Brown said. “We
punch buttons really well. We have an unfair advantage because we’re soldiers and we
know how to make them mad.”188 Such training is an important way to teach restraint,
which can help minimize civilian casualties.
While the heart of NTC’s training occurs in the field, soldiers also learn lessons on base
the week before. As discussed earlier, soldiers train on house raids and checkpoint
procedures. In December 2005, NTC became a Department of Defense IED Center of
Excellence, which means it will be the leader in testing new tactics and technology. “Our
goal is before soldiers go to Iraq to have them have the latest experience with new
equipment,” said Major Clearwater.189 IEDs have been a major source of US casualties
in Iraq and also cause many civilian deaths. A unit receives a week of training in how to
use counter-IED equipment from 17 instructors before its rotation. Once in the field it
184
Interview with Maj. Cameron Kramer, Fort Irwin, California, July 24, 2005. The value of having a
translator to read graffiti was illustrated outside Fallujah in 2004. A US Marine officer entered an
apartment complex where an Iraqi national guard lieutenant pretended to be friendly. The Marine
translator, an Iraqi-American, noticed, however, that the Iraqis had moved the patients from the hospital but
had forgotten to take down a banner welcoming home the “brave heroes of Fallujah,” referring to
insurgents. Bing West, No True Glory: A Frontline Account of the Battle for Fallujah (New York: Bantam
Books, 2005), pp. 169-70.
185
Interview with Sfc. Scott Brown, OPFOR, Fort Irwin, California, July 28, 2005.
186
Interview with S. Sgt. Timothy Wilson, OPFOR, Fort Irwin, California, July 24, 2005.
187
Ibid.
188
Interview with Sfc. Scott Brown, OPFOR, Fort Irwin, California, July 28, 2005.
189
Telephone interview with Maj. John Clearwater, NTC public affairs officer, Washington, D.C., July 31,
2006. See also Sara Wood, “IED Center, Task Force to Bridge Gap between Training Centers, Theater,”
American Forces Press Service, December, 7, 2005,
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=18609 (accessed October 29, 2007).
41
faces 10 IEDs a day and 40 vehicle-borne IEDs (VBIEDs) over two weeks.190 The task
force in charge of the project numbers 300 people, and the Department of Defense has
authorized it to spend $25 million per contract.191 This program, which can benefit
civilians as well as combatants, will enhance the realism of the types of scenarios US
soldiers face.
While NTC has much room for improvement in the areas of rules of engagement, realism
of environment, and review of training, protection of civilians plays a role throughout
BLUFOR’s training. Colonel Salazar compares the relationship to the local people to a
“love bank” in which one must make more deposits than withdrawals. For example,
torturing detainees at Abu Ghraib represents a withdrawal while successfully negotiating
to provide security and humanitarian assistance to a village is a deposit. “[The soldiers]
understand the concept and how it affects their buddies,” Salazar said.192 Part of this
concern for civilians is operational. “Minimizing civilian casualties is fundamental to
everything we do. It is part of the upside down triangle [which defeats insurgents by
destroying weapons caches, targeting bomb makers, and separating insurgents from the
populace],” said Lt. Col. Paul Kreis of the Operations Group.193 After-action reviews
spread a similar message. An observer-controller said at one, “You can win hearts and
minds or create new insurgents. As ambassadors of the United States, you don’t want to
make us look bad. We want them to trust us because we’re there to help.”194 Protecting
civilians is thus a place where military and humanitarian interests overlap.
Respect for Iraqis and US soldiers as human beings also plays a role. Lieutenant Colonel
Harris, who served in Iraq, wrote, “My Squadron put much thought into preventing
needless and unnecessary injury or death to our fellow Iraqis, nor did we want to damage
their personal property . . . because their well-being, quality of life and opportunity to
190
Interview with Lt. Col. Michael Harris, officer in charge, Army Center of Excellence, Fort Irwin,
California, August 24, 2007.
191
Wood, “IED Center, Task Force to Bridge Gap between Training Centers, Theater,” American Forces
Press Service.
192
Interview with Col. Steven Salazar, commander, Operations Group, Fort Irwin, California, August 23,
2007. For a more detailed description of the upside down triangle, see interview with Col. Steven Salazar,
commander, Operations Group, Fort Irwin, California, August 23, 2007.
193
Interview with Lt. Col. Paul Kreis, chief of operations, Operations Group, Fort Irwin, California, August
23, 2007.
194
After-action review observed by author, Fort Irwin, California, August 23, 2007.
42
pursue happiness and security is no different than [that of] any other human.”195 He
continued by expressing concern for the effects of combat on his troops. “Equally
important, needlessly wounding or killing another is something that likely remains in the
mind of the Soldier who caused the injury.”196 Harris focused on treating both civilians
and soldiers as people, not just players on the battlefield. By teaching this value as well
as giving soldiers tools of the trade, NTC can best train troops to minimize civilian
casualties in armed conflict.
195
Email communication from Lt. Col. Michael Harris, officer in charge, Army Center of Excellence, to
Bonnie Docherty, September 1, 2007 (typos corrected).
196
Ibid.
43