1. art and entertainment
2. humor

Polit Behav (2009) 31:79–102
DOI 10.1007/s11109-008-9064-y
ORIGINAL PAPER
The Daily Show with Jon Stewart and Audience Attitude
Change During the 2004 Party Conventions
Jonathan S. Morris
Published online: 6 May 2008
Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2008
Abstract The intention of this analysis is to examine The Daily Show with Jon
Stewart’s coverage of politics and assess the persuasive power of the program’s
unique brand of humor. Evidence from a content analysis of The Daily Show’s
‘‘Indecision 2004’’ coverage of the Democratic and Republican Party Conventions
shows the program’s humor was much harsher during the Republican Convention
than it was during the Democratic Convention. While the humor in both conventions was heavily based on self-deprecation and the exploitation of conventional
political stereotypes, the ridicule of Republicans focused much more on policy and
character flaws. Humor pointed toward Democrats, on the other hand, tended to
focus more on innocuous physical attributes. Analysis of panel data collected by the
National Annenberg Election Survey during the 2004 national party conventions
shows that exposure to The Daily Show’s convention coverage was associated with
increased negativity toward President Bush and Vice-President Dick Cheney. These
relationships remain significant even when controlling for partisan identification and
ideology. Attitudes toward the Democratic ticket, John Kerry and John Edwards
remained consistent.
Keywords Humor American politics Jon Stewart The Daily Show 2004 party conventions
In recent years, there has been an explosion of research examining the effects of
late-night comedy on public attitudes toward politics (see Baum 2002, 2003, 2005;
Brewer and Cao 2006; Hollander 2005; Moy et al. 2005; Young 2006; Young
2004a; Young and Tisinger 2006). This research has grown as scholars have noted
that the line between entertainment and politics is becoming increasingly blurred
J. S. Morris (&)
Department of Political Science, East Carolina University, Greenville, NC 27858, USA
e-mail: [email protected]
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(Davis and Owen 1998; Fox and Van Sickel 2001). It has been found that politicians
use late-night comedy programs as a strategic tool to sway potential voters (Baum
2005), and evidence indicates that these programs have the potential to educate
viewers about politics and stimulate political interest among those who may
otherwise be disengaged from the political process (Baum 2002, 2003a, 2003b;
Brewer and Cao 2006; Jones 2005; Young and Tisinger 2006).
More than any other late-night source of political comedy, The Daily Show with
Jon Stewart is gaining increased attention from political communication scholars
(see Baumgarter and Morris 2006; Baym 2005; Holbert et al. 2007; Jones 2005;
Morris and Baumgartner 2008; Young 2008; Young and Tisinger 2006). Overall,
the consensus of this research is that The Daily Show does have the potential to
influence political discourse as well as overall attitudes. Some researchers have
suggested that the show’s poignant criticisms of the modern news media have
pioneered new avenues of political journalism in America (Baym 2005; Jones 2005;
Young 2008). Others have found that The Daily Show contributes positively to the
democratic process by sparking political interest among portions of the American
public that would otherwise be estranged from politics and government (Baum
2003; Young and Tisinger 2006). Findings have also shown that regular Daily Show
watchers have high levels of political knowledge and sophistication—even higher
than frequent viewers of hard news (National Annenberg Election Survey 2004).
Still others have uncovered evidence to suggest that The Daily Show’s sharp satire
against all things political may foster higher levels of cynicism among an alreadycynical population of young adults (Baumgartner and Morris 2006).
Jon Stewart’s notoriety has transcended the simple label of ‘‘comedian,’’ to that
of newsmaker, news reporter, and popular culture icon. On The Daily Show, Stewart
has interviewed foreign heads of state, Nobel Prize winners, presidential candidates,
and former Presidents of the United States. In 2005, a Harris Poll found that Jon
Stewart was the second-most popular personality on television—second only to
Oprah Winfrey (Hoffman 2006). Also in 2005, Stewart was named among Time
magazine’s 100 most powerful entertainers on the planet (Hoffman 2005). His
‘‘mock’’ American government textbook, America (the book): A Citizen’s Guide to
Democracy Inaction (2004), was a bestseller.
Similar to other late night comics such as David Letterman and Jay Leno, Stewart
has tended to be more critical of politicians in power. Unlike his late-night
counterparts, however, Stewart’s show is strongly political in nature. Also,
Stewart’s own partisan leanings have not been kept in the dark, and he does not
make claims of political neutrality. During the 2004 presidential campaign, Stewart
publicly announced his intention to vote for Democratic nominee John Kerry
(Garofoli 2004), and media writer Howard Kurtz of the Washington Post noted
during the campaign that, ‘‘…Stewart relentlessly mock[s] Bush while just poking
gentle fun at Kerry’s ponderous speaking style’’ (Kurtz 2004). Outside of the
electoral context, Stewart’s satire has clearly articulated support for more liberal
policy positions such as universal health care, support for homosexual rights, a
reversal of tax-breaks for the wealthy, and a military withdraw from Iraq. It is this
clarity of Stewart’s political views that make him unique from his late night talkshow contemporaries.
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What if The Daily Show and Jon Stewart are friendlier toward Democrats and more
critical of Republicans? Why should such a tendency be considered significant? The
program is a half-hour, entertainment-based, talk show that openly mocks its own
credibility as ‘‘fake news.’’ Perhaps, then, the trend should not matter. Stewart himself
has made the case that he should not be taken seriously as a news provider or
commentator (see Young and Tisinger 2006, p. 115). He has frequently argued that his
program’s only purpose is to amuse its writers and its audience. When asked about the
influence of The Daily Show, Stewart once commented: ‘‘There’s no threat—we have
no power—so of course it’s fun to watch… It scratches an itch, but it also makes no
dent’’ (Folkenflik 2003). In an infamous altercation on CNN’s Crossfire, conservative
host Tucker Carlson chided Stewart for being too soft on the left. Stewart replied by
pointing out to Carlson, ‘‘The show that leads into me [on Comedy Central] is puppets
making crank phone calls’’ (Cable News Network 2004).
The reality, however, is that Jon Stewart and The Daily Show are taken seriously
by journalists, public officials, political candidates, and viewers. Web satirist Ana
Marie Cox noted, ‘‘To say his [show] is just a comedy show is a cop-out in a way.
He’s gotten so much power’’ (Kurtz 2004). In 2004, Stewart was on the cover on
Newsweek and was cited as one of the more influential figures in the presidential
election. As of 2006, almost one in five Americans (21%) reported watching The
Daily Show at least sometimes, which is a significant increase from 12% in 2002
(Pew Research Center 2006). When looking at adults under 30—who are less likely
to follow traditional sources of news—this number increases to 34%.
There is also evidence that a significant portion of the public does learn about
politics from The Daily Show and other late-night comedy programs. For example,
26% of Americans reported learning something about the 2004 presidential
campaign from comedy shows like The Daily Show and Saturday Night Live (Pew
Research Center 2004a). Among young adults age 18–24, this percentage more than
doubles to 56%. Furthermore, research has found that even small levels of exposure
to The Daily Show’s coverage of politics and government in an experimental
environment can influence political attitudes toward candidates and institutions,
especially during elections (Baumgartner and Morris 2006).
With these points in mind I pursue an empirical examination of The Daily Show’s
tendency to point its satire more sharply at Republicans than Democrats. I begin by
developing a theory of how Jon Stewart’s brand of humor has strong persuasive
power. I then analyze The Daily Show’s coverage of the 2004 party conventions and
illustrate that its satire during the Republican Convention was much sharper than
during the Democratic Convention. Finally, I rely on panel data collected during the
conventions to illustrate that exposure to The Daily Show during the time of the
Republican Convention was associated with increased disapproval for President
Bush and Vice President Cheney.
The Daily Show and Political Persuasion
The number of programming options available on television has grown dramatically
in the last decade and a half. The consequence is that television news providers
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confront increased competition to create products that provide news which is both
entertaining and informative (Bennett 2007; West 2001). The Daily Show, however,
has thrived in this infotainment environment because it provides compelling
entertainment combined with tidbits of news on politics. When attention is divided
among competing sources of information, The Daily Show offers an entertaining and
humorous alternative that draws more viewers (see Jones 2005b).
Beyond entertainment and some political information, Jon Stewart and The Daily
Show offer another element through its satire: political perspective. The Daily Show
is saturated with stinging editorials and ironic humor that identifies hypocrisies
which persist in politics (Baym 2005; Jones 2005a). In this sense, Stewart and the
writers of The Daily Show are providing editorial commentary packaged as satire.
The direct persuasive power of editorials on the public is well documented (Dalton
et al. 1998; Kahn and Kenny 2002; Druckman and Parkin 2005), and Brinkman
(1968) found that the interaction of editorials and political humor had a significant
affect on readers’ political attitudes as well.
Indeed, research has found that humor in general has persuasive power. Schmidt
(1994), for example, discovered that humorous messages are better at grabbing an
individual’s attention than non-humorous messages, and Sternthall and Samuel
(1973) contend that the delivery of humor can increase the likeability of the humor
source, thus increasing the chance that a viewer will agree with the source. Humor
has also been found to generate a positive mood among viewers (Kuiper et al. 1995;
Sinclair et al. 1994), and individuals are less likely to disagree with a persuasive
message when they are in a good mood (Freedman et al. 1978). Thus, it is logical to
expect that editorial commentary can also influence an audience when it is presented
by a funny and likeable source (in this case Jon Stewart).
Political discourse at its best is characterized by the presentation of counterarguments and multiple perspectives on a given issue or event. There is evidence to suggest
that political humor can reduce the impact of counterarguments, thus increasing the
persuasive power of a humorous message (Osterhouse and Brock 1970; Young
2004b). This effect is amplified when persuasive humor is combined with ‘‘ironic
wisecracks’’ and a ‘‘self-effacing’’ demeanor from the source (Baumgartner 2007;
Lyttle 2001). Self-effacing humor is commonplace on The Daily Show (Baym 2005;
Jones 2005), and it has been shown that when an information source frequently
defames its own credibility in a humorous style, it ironically gains credibility among
viewers, thus increasing its persuasive power (Baumgartner 2007; Lyttle 2001;
Walster et al. 1966). In other words, when Jon Stewart defames his own legitimacy
(which he frequently does on and off The Daily Show), he actually gains credibility as a
trustworthy political observer with no stake in the process.
Stewart’s personal political leanings are fairly clear, but there is no reason to
assume that The Daily Show is purposefully attempting to persuade viewers by
propagating an ideological agenda. In fact, his self-effacing demeanor gives viewers
the impression that he has no such intention. In this sense, Stewart is unique from
many other political observers who do not claim objectivity—most notably political
talk radio, in which the goal of persuasion is much more evident (Barker 2002).
The preceding discussion about the effects of humor identifies reasons why we
can expect Stewart’s criticism of politicians and political institutions to be
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persuasive. Even if The Daily Show is not purposefully attempting to influence
viewers, it is the nature of the message (self-effacing humor) that gives it persuasive
power. If Stewart’s satire is directed at one person or party more than its opposition,
it then is reasonable to expect an effect on the audience.
The analysis presented below tests (a) whether or not The Daily Show’s brand of
humor during the 2004 party conventions was more sharply pointed at Republicans
than at Democrats, and (b) whether or not The Daily Show’s audience during this
time became more critical of the Republican nominee for President. If they were
indeed influenced, more negative attitudes toward the Republican nominees should
be evident. Because the nature of political humor is inherently critical of its targets,
it is not expected that attitudes toward the Democratic nominees among The Daily
Show’s audience will become more positive. Indeed, previous experimental research
has found that exposure to Stewart’s ridicule of Democratic presidential candidates
can lower evaluations of those candidates was well (Baumgartner and Morris 2006).
I expect, however, that any decrease in support for the Democratic nominees will be
less pronounced than any decrease in support for the Republicans.
The Daily Show’s Coverage of the 2004 Party Conventions
The first step in this analysis is to test whether or not The Daily Show is more critical
of one side of the political spectrum than it is of the other. The approach The Daily
Show took to covering the party conventions in 2004 provides an excellent
opportunity to make such a comparison. Because the structure of party conventions
is so similar, The Daily Show used the same broadcasting approach to cover both
conventions, providing four full days of coverage for each and reporting from the
convention site.
For both party conventions the programming focused almost exclusively on the
personalities and events surrounding the proceedings, and coverage was provided by
the same anchor (Stewart) and set of correspondents (Steven Colbert, Rob Cordry,
Samatha Bee, and Ed Helms). In short, the structure of the coverage from one
convention to the next was virtually identical, thus providing a baseline for
comparing whether or not the topic and tone of the jokes varied. This facilitates an
objective comparison (see Niven 1999, 2001, 2002, 2003). As David Niven notes,
‘‘By focusing on situations in which political leaders from the two parties have
produced comparable results or engaged in comparable behavior, we can test the
media’s reaction in a situation in which we can logically expect it should be
similar’’ (2002, p. 74).
Footage of The Daily Show’s coverage of the 2004 conventions was obtained
from a DVD collection of ‘‘Indecision 2004,’’ which contained all of the footage
from both party conventions. In terms of organizing the analysis, the selection of the
unit of analysis had to be carefully considered. Typically, television news coverage
is unitized by the story, which can be identified as broadcast around a common issue
or event that is delivered with a recognizable introduction and ending (Neuendorf
2002). The Daily Show, on the other hand, typically does not have defined stories;
instead it offers humorous comments outside the confines of a story, or even a
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defined topic. While a particular story containing highlights from the previous night
of convention speeches may last multiple minutes on The Daily Show, there can be a
wide range of jokes that may take very different tones across a number of topics.
Determining only one primary topic in a story containing possibly dozens of jokes
and satirical comments oversimplifies the situation. It is the humorous comments
that define the coverage. Thus, a much more thorough approach is to organize the
units by each joke or satirical comment that was arranged around a cohesive target,
which was typically a person or party in this case. If no target could be defined, then
the joke (or attempted joke) was dropped from the analysis. Only jokes that drew
laughter from the audience were analyzed.
This approach to unitizing the coverage has some potential limitations. First, like
all humor, political satire can be transmitted by words left unsaid that may require
the receiver to connect the dots. It is possible that not all receivers would connect
the dots the same way. This could influence reliability. Second, if the audience is
biased in one direction or another, it is possible that their response to the humor may
be biased as well—thus influencing the accompanying laughter. Nevertheless, The
Daily Show does wish to appeal to a broad audience, so complexity and inference in
the humor is kept to a minimum, and there were almost no instances in which it was
apparent that Stewart was attempting to be funny, but the audience failed to
respond. Thus, it was determined that targeted punch lines drawing laugher was the
best unit of analysis.
Unitizing the coverage by targeted humor yielded 251 jokes during the course of
the convention coverage. Interviews with guests and introductions were excluded
from the analysis. During the Democratic convention 131 targeted jokes were
delivered, and 120 were delivered during the Republican convention. As mentioned
before, the vast majority of these jokes targeted the individuals and processes
surrounding the convention. There were, primarily, eight categories of targets. The
content analysis of topics was conducted by a research assistant blind to the study. A
second coder was used to confirm the reliability of the initial analysis. Agreement
on joke topic was acceptable (Cronbach’s alpha = .71). Table 1 outlines these
targets and illustrates the percentage of the time each target was humorously
discussed. Not surprisingly, Democrats and Democratic figures dominated the
coverage during their convention, and vice-versa for the Republicans.
The target of the joke, however, tells us very little about how the humor may have
been perceived by the audience. In order to gain a better grasp of the nature of the
humor delivered in each convention, I constructed a content analysis that coded for the
tone of humor that was delivered by Stewart and his colleagues. Table 2 outlines the
mutually exclusive categories of humor created for the content analysis. These
categories include: complimentary, self-deprecating, physical, stereotypical, dismissive, policy-based, and character-based. Within Table 2, the second column provides
the definition for each category, and the third column provides examples taken from
the coverage to illustrate each. Again, a second coder was used to measure reliability of
the analysis, and agreement was high (Cronbach’s alpha = .73).
When each humorous statement is analyzed by the categories of tone, we get a
much more nuanced understanding of how The Daily Show’s humor differed across
conventions. The number of jokes was relatively similar, but that does not translate
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Table 1 Humor targets by
convention
85
Target
Democrat
convention
(%)
Republican
Total (%)
convention (%)
Democratic Party
12
2
7
Republican Party
0
28
13
George W. Bush
4
9
6
John Kerry
4
0
4
Dick Cheney
0
3
2
John Edward
3
0
1
Other Democrats
39
3
21
Other Republican
0
18
8
The Media
4
2
3
31
23
27
The Daily Show
Other
N
0
13
6
131
120
251
into similar types of humor. Table 3 demonstrates this distribution of each tone of
humor over the coverage of the two conventions, and there are several interesting
findings. As expected, The Daily Show engaged in a great deal of self-deprecating
humor during each convention. In total, one in five jokes involved The Daily Show
making fun of itself. These jokes were primarily aimed at the fact that the program
is ‘‘fake news’’ and the notion that the host and correspondents should not be taken
seriously. The distribution of this self-deprecation was consistent across the
conventions, constituting 21% of the humor in the Democrat Convention, and 19%
in the Republican convention. Jokes with a complimentary tone, on the other hand,
were rare in both conventions. This is not surprising given the tendency for political
humor to draw from the weaknesses and flaws for politics and politicians, rather
than their more positive attributes. This type of humor was consistent across the two
conventions as well.
It should also not be surprising that humor that exploited stereotypes of politics
and politicians was frequent in The Daily Show’s coverage. Almost one-third of the
humor focused on the parties and the people associated them conforming to widely
held stereotypes. Typically, this humor was based on crude assumptions, such as
‘‘Republicans are rich and white,’’ or ‘‘Democrats are soft on crime and prone to
drug use,’’ which makes the humor accessible to a wider range of viewers. Ridicule
for pandering, which was common, also fell under this category. The frequency of
this humor did not vary across conventions significantly.
Another category was dismissive humor, which generates laughs by highlighting
irrelevance of individuals or groups that are attempting to be otherwise. In this
regard, the futilities of the actors are exploited for humor. This approach was most
frequently applied to poke fun at presidential ‘‘also-rans,’’ as well as protestors
outside of the conventions. Compared to other categories of humor, dismissive
humor was rare across both conventions.
There were, however, multiple categories of humor that were disproportionately
employed, and it is this set of differences that is most compelling. Humor of a
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Table 2 Content analysis of joke tone
Category
Definition
Example
Complimentary
An individual/group is given a
complement on positive behavior or
ideas. This is often used to set up
another individual/group for more
critical observations or critique the
target’s contemporaries, often without
naming them
–John Edwards introduced by Stewart as
‘‘a country lawyer with comparatively
good looks’’
Self-deprecating The host explicitly ridicules the
importance of the show and/or the
people involved in its production. Can
also be a correspondent acting grossly
uninformed and/or lacking basic
intelligence
–Jimmy Carter is referred to as a ‘‘sweet
guy’’ and Nobel Peace Prize winner
–Rob Corrdry’s visit to Boston (his
hometown) where he laments on his
childhood mistakes, drinks with old
friends who make fun of him, and
drunkenly searches for his girlfriend
–Stewart calls his coverage of the
convention ‘‘award shunning’’
Physical
Statement that mentions a non–Stewart calls Democratic candidate
consequential weakness of the target
Dennis Kucinich a ‘‘mystic gnome,’’
such as physical appearance,
and Richard Gephardt a ‘‘moonface’’
momentarily odd behavior, or an
–Picture of John Kerry in a NASA ‘‘clean
incidental mistake or political
suit’’
miscalculation. Not a criticism of policy
–Sound
of crickets playing in the
or character
background after George Pataki botches
a joke from a podium speech
Stereotypical
Statement that an individual or party is
conforming to negative stereotypes of
associated with politicians and/or
politics. Includes pandering
–Stewart observes at the RNC that,
‘‘Madison Square Garden hasn’t seen
this many white people, since, ever’’
–The tendency for Democrats to lose
winnable elections is likened to the
(then) perennial losers, the Boston Red
Sox
Dismissive
Statement which highlights the notion that –Stewart fails to recognize a former
a given person, party, or special interest
candidate for the party nomination by
group is irrelevant to the campaign and/
saying, ‘‘I don’t know who that guy is’’
or the political process
Policy
Statement that highlights flawed policy
(past or present) or failed policy
–Stewart shows footage of protestors at
RNC getting arrested and jokes that
they are headed to Guantanamo Bay
Character
Statement that highlights flaws in an
individual’s character, but does not
criticize a policy
–Zell Miller is ridiculed as angry and/or
crazy following RNC keynote address
–Dick Cheney is criticized for dodging
military service in Vietnam
physical nature, which tends to highlight humorous appearance, momentarily odd
behavior, incidental errors, or political miscalculation was employed at the
Democratic Convention with much greater frequency than the Republican
Convention (28% vs. 7%, p \ .01). That is, political awkwardness was a much
more common theme during the Democratic Convention. During the Republican
Convention, on the other hand, political awkwardness was much less themed in
favor of humor that focused on policy and character. Both policy and character
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Table 3 Tone of humor by
convention
87
Tone of humor
Republican
convention (%)
Self-deprecating
21
Complimentary
8
6
29
31
Stereotypical
* p \ .01 (two-tailed difference
of means test)
Democratic
convention (%)
19
Dismissive
6
3
Physical*
28
7
Policy*
6
21
Character*
1
13
Other
2
0
131
120
N
shortcomings were exploited for laughs with significantly more frequency during
the Republican Convention. The difference in frequency across the conventions was
statistically significant for both these types of humor (p \ .01).
The picture that emerges from the analysis presented in Table 3 is one of a
comedy show that ridiculed the convention participants in different ways. Based on
the findings, it could be interpreted that the participants in the Democratic
Convention were covered in a more light-hearted fashion, frequently portrayed as
pandering (a frequent stereotype) and politically bumbling. While the Republicans
were also portrayed in a stereotypical light (also often pandering), the humor took a
sharper edge, and over one-third of the jokes preyed on policy failures or character
flaws surrounding the participants. Certainly, these findings cannot uncover intent,
nor can they determine whether or not the variation in humor was warranted. The
findings do, however, illustrate that a discrepancy in coverage did appear to exist. I
now turn to a discussion of whether or not attitude change among convention
viewers was associated with exposure to The Daily Show’s coverage of the
convention.
Survey Data Analysis
To test for the presence of attitude change during the conventions, I rely on two
panel studies conducted during the party conventions in the summer of 2004. The
National Annenberg Election Survey (NAES) conducted two panel surveys that
were administered before and after each party convention. For each convention, a
random sample of adults from the continental United States was contacted before
the convention and asked a series of questions regarding media usage, political
attitudes, and feelings toward the candidates. The respondents were then
re-contacted in the 10 days following the convention and the questions were
re-administered. The sample for the Democratic Convention (N = 1,016) was
initially contacted between July 16 and July 25, 2004, and re-contacted between
July 30 and August 8 (the convention was held from July 26–29). The sample for
the Republican Convention (N = 1,049) was initially contacted between August 20
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and August 29, 2004, and re-interviewed between September 3 and September 13
(the convention was held August 30–September 2). Only those respondents who
were successfully re-contacted for the second wave of the panel were included in the
data set.
The key dependent variables in this analysis are perceptions of the candidates in
the week following each convention while controlling for pre-convention perceptions. Several measures of candidate favorability are employed, including overall
favorability (zero to 10-scale) and the degree to which the respondent concurred
with statements that the nominees were (a) easy to like as a person, (b) trustworthy,
and (c) likely to say one thing but do another. Agreement was listed on a zero to
10-scale, and respondents who did not recognize a candidate’s name were treated as
missing data.
To measure the key predictors (media exposure during the time of the
conventions), the NAES asked respondents in the second wave of the panel to
list their media habits in the previous week. The items included as indicators in this
analysis were newspaper readership, network news exposure, cable news exposure,
political talk radio exposure, exposure to The Daily Show, and exposure to The Late
Show with David Letterman, The Tonight Show with Jay Leno, or Late Night with
Conan O’Brien (the measures from the second wave were used). The newspaper,
network TV, and cable news items are all measured on a zero- to seven-scale
(number of days used in the last week). The measure of exposure to political talk
radio was also based on the number of days used in the previous week. Exposure to
National Public Radio (NPR), however, was not included in this measure in order to
create a more accurate assessment of persuasive talk radio sources, the majority of
which are conservative in nature (Barker 2002).
The late night comedy exposure items were collected by asking respondents to
list the number of days in the previous week that they watched late-night comedy.
All respondents that said they watched at least one day were asked the follow-up
question, ‘‘Which of the following late-night comedy programs do you watch most
often—the ‘Late Show’ with David Letterman, ‘The Tonight Show’ with Jay Leno,
or ‘The Daily Show’ with Jon Stewart, or ‘Late Night’ with Conan O’Brien?’’ From
this item, four late-night variables were constructed: exposure to Jon Stewart
(1 = Stewart most often; 0 = all other respondents), exposure to Leno (1 = Leno
most often; 0 = all other respondents), Letterman (1 = Letterman most often;
0 = all other respondents), or Conan O’Brien (1 = O’Brien most often; 0 = all
other respondents). Those respondents who reported watching ‘‘other’’ late night
programmings were coded the same as those who reported not watching late-night
comedy at all in the previous week. Other control variables were included as
predictors as well, including the respondents’ gender, age, race education, and
income (these variables were collected in wave one). I also controlled for partisan
identification (7 point scale) and ideology (5 point scale).
In a two-wave panel, measuring attitudes in the second wave, while controlling
for that same measurement in wave one, represents the best approach to modeling
attitude change (Kenski and Romer 2006). The inclusion of a lagged value of Yt-1
is a common method under such circumstances to control for the inertial nature of
political attitudes toward presidential candidates in a general election but still
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observe changes as a function of an external shock. This is particularly applicable in
this case of using the pre-convention rating to predict post-convention ratings
because the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable indicates the extent to
which respondents maintain their attitude within the overall distribution over time.
As Bartels (2006) notes, ‘‘Change scores may be calculated from observed
responses at two points in time and subjected directly to statistical analysis, or (more
generally) new opinions can be analyzed as a function of old opinions and
intervening characteristics or events’’ (p. 142).
Before moving onto a discussion of the multivariate models, it is useful to outline
the attributes of the Stewart audience during the convention. It is important to note
first that The Daily Show’s audience did not constitute a tiny portion of the latenight viewing audience. Although The Daily Show airs on cable television, as
opposed broadcast television, almost one-in-five viewers of late-night comedy were
Daily Show watchers during the Democratic Convention (18%), and a similar
percentage of late-night comedy viewers watched The Daily Show during the
Republican Convention (20%). Not surprisingly, the majority of the late-night
audience consists of Leno and Letterman faithful, but the size of The Daily Show’s
audience should not be discounted, particularly when compared to Conan O’Brien’s
share, which was less than five percent. As far as the overall portion of the sample,
Stewart viewers constitute approximately 6%, which is about half the size of the
Leno or Letterman audience. These percentages fit well with the percentage of
‘‘regular’’ viewers of each program as listed by other samples in 2004 (see Pew
Research Center 2004b).
As Table 4 shows, there are some distinct attributes of The Daily Show audience
that warrant discussion. In accordance with findings from earlier studies, The Daily
Show’s audience is younger, more educated, slightly wealthier, and more
Democratic in orientation compared to the other late-night television audiences.
These attributes, however, should not be overstated. The mean age of The Daily
Show’s viewers (low-forties) shows that the audience is not solely young adults.
Also, while the Stewart audience is more Democratic that Leno or Letterman’s
viewers, The Daily Show viewers are not overwhelmingly Democratic. In fact,
barely half of the Stewart viewers (51% in both samples) classified themselves as
Democrats, and the percent of The Daily Show viewers that are self-described
Independents is comparable to the other audiences.
The results from Table 4 illustrate that, overall, The Daily Show’s audience
would be more likely to favor the Democratic ticket over the Republican ticket. By
itself, of course, this is an underwhelming finding that fits with conventional
wisdom regarding Stewart’s audience. The more interesting question, however, is if
exposure to The Daily Show’s coverage of a significant political event (in this case
the party conventions) correlates with attitude change.
In Table 5, overall favorability toward Kerry and Bush after each convention is
regressed on the predictors discussed above, including pre-convention favorability
(zero to 10 scale). The strong coefficients associated with the lagged value of the
dependent variable illustrate significant favorability stability, which is not
surprising. However, there was not an overwhelming polarizing effect—attitude
change was present, and it was variable across both samples.
123
90
Polit Behav (2009) 31:79–102
Table 4 Attributes of Stewart audience compared to other late-night talk show audiences
Audience
Stewart
Dem
Conv.
Leno
Rep
Conv.
Dem
Conv.
Rep
Conv.
Letterman
O’Brien
Dem
Conv.
Dem
Conv.
Rep
Conv.
Rep
Conv.
% Male
56
61
47
55
41
53
55
50
Mean age
43
41
51
52
49
51
30
38
% White
92
95
84
92
88
80
100
65
% Democrat
51
51
31
33
32
31
56
42
% Republican
13
12
33
31
34
31
27
8
% Independent
23
41
28
28
28
36
9
42
% 4 year college degree
or more
57
56
44
42
39
46
18
33
% Household income
above $100,000
17
28
15
11
15
14
9
25
Total % of late-night
TV audience
18
20
40
36
34
35
4
4
Total % of sample
N
5
6
12
10
10
10
1
1
55
59
124
106
105
102
11
12
Indeed, there is evidence to suggest that exposure to The Daily Show was
associated with significant changes in candidate evaluations, but only under certain
circumstances. As the first two columns of ordinary least squares estimates in
Table 5 show, exposure to The Daily Show during the Democratic Convention was
not significantly associated with increased negativity toward Kerry or Bush. By
contrast, exposure to The Daily Show’s coverage of the Republican Convention did
have a negative influence on overall favorability toward President Bush. Even when
controlling for other variables, including the partisanship and ideology of the
respondents, the average viewer of The Daily Show exhibited a significant drop in
favorability toward Bush.
To be sure, exposure to other media sources was significantly associated with
attitude change. Following the Democratic Convention, exposure to network
coverage was associated with increased favorability toward Kerry, and newspaper
usage was significantly associated with decreased favorability toward Bush. The
substantive impact of these predictors, however, is rather small. That is, the
coefficient for newspaper readership (-.05) and network news viewership (.05)
means that a movement from one extreme of the scale (zero) to the other (seven)
would entail a change of barely 1/3rd of a point in support (on a zero to 10 scale).
On the other hand, The Daily Show watchers’ rating for Bush dropped by over
2/3rds of a point. Also, it is somewhat surprising that the political talk-radio
predictor was insignificantly associated with attitude change toward either candidate
during such a politically charged time period, as existing studies have documented
the persuasive nature of the medium (Barker 2002; Jones 2002).
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91
Table 5 Post-convention favorability toward presidential candidates
Favorability after the Democratic
National Convention (0–10 scale)a
Favorability after the Republican
National Convention (0–10 scale)a
Kerry favorability
Bush favorability
Kerry favorability
Bush favorability
Pre-convention rating .61 (.02)**
.70 (.02)**
.72 (.02)**
.75 (.02)**
Genderb
.01 (.11)
-.15 (.10)
.11 (.09)
-.06 (.10)
Age
.00 (.00)
.00 (.00)
.00 (.00)
-.00 (.00)
Racec
-.51 (.17)**
.45 (.16)**
-.07 (.15)
.10 (.15)
Education
.01 (.03)
-.03 (.03)
.01 (.02)
-.04 (.02)*
Income
-.02 (.03)
.02 (.03)
-.05 (.03)*
-.03 (.03)
Party identificationd
.30 (.03)**
-.27 (.03)**
.24 (.03)**
-.24 (.03)**
Ideologye
.22 (.06)**
-.19 (.06)**
.09 (.06)
-.13 (.06)*
Newspaperf
.02 (.02)
-.05 (.02)**
-.00 (.02)
-.01 (.02)
Networkg
.05 (.02)*
.01 (.02)
-.01 (.02)
-.00 (.02)
Cableh
-.00 (.02)
.03 (.02)
-.02 (.02)
.01 (.02)
Talk radioi
-.04 (.03)
.01 (.03)
-.02 (.02)
.01 (.02)
Stewartj
-.30 (.24)
-.11 (.23)
.02 (.21)
-.68 (.22)**
Lenok
-.07 (.16)
-.08 (.16)
-.01 (.15)
.25 (.16)
Lettermanl
-.19 (.17)
-.29 (.17)*
-.09 (.16)
.26 (.16)
O’Brienm
-.27 (.49)
.05 (.46)
.45 (.43)
.91 (.44)
Constant
.90 (.35)*
3.05 (.41)**
.50 (.28)*
3.29 (.36)**
Adjusted R2
.75
83
.82
.85
N
890
911
933
939
Variable
* p \ .05; ** p \ .01 (one-tailed)
Note: Cell entries are unstandardized OLS coefficients with standard errors in parentheses
a
The dependent variable was measured by asking respondents, ‘‘On a scale of zero to 10, how would
your rate George W. Bush? Zero means very unfavorable, and 10 means very favorable. Five means you
do not feel favorable or unfavorable. Of course, you can use any number between zero and 10’’
b
1 = male; 0 = female
c
1 = white; 0 = non-white
d
1 = strong Republican; 2 = Republican; 3 = Independent leaning Republican; 4 = Independent/
other/no answer/don’t know; 5 = Independent leaning Democrat; 6 = Democrat; 7 = strong Democrat
e
1 = very conservative; 2 = conservative; 3 = moderate; 4 = liberal; 5 = very liberal
f
The number of days in the past week the respondent read a newspaper (0–7)
g
The number of days in the past week the respondent watched the national network news (0–7)
h
The number of days in the past week the respondent watched cable news (0–7)
i
The number of days in the past week the respondent listened to talk radio other than NPR (0–7)
j
1 = subject watched late night comedy at least one day in the past week, and watched The Daily Show
more than any other late night comedy show; 0 = all other respondents
k
1 = subject watched late night comedy at least one day in the past week, and watched The Tonight
Show with Jay Leno more than any other late night comedy show; 0 = all other respondents
l
1 = subject watched late night comedy at least one day in the past week, and watched The Late Show
with David Letterman more than any other late night comedy show; 0 = all other respondents
m
1 = subject watched late night comedy at least one day in the past week, and watched Late Night with
Conan O’Brien more than any other late night comedy show; 0 = all other respondents
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Polit Behav (2009) 31:79–102
Regarding the other late-night comedy sources, exposure to Late Night with
David Letterman was negatively associated with a decreased favorability toward
Bush following the Democratic convention. The impact of the Letterman variable
on that model, however, is less than half of that of The Daily Show in the postRepublican Convention model of Bush favorability. Aside from the negative effect
of the Letterman variable on Bush’s favorability following the Democratic
Convention, there were no additional significant effects from exposure to other
late night comics.
The findings from Table 5 could possibly be viewed with skepticism. Although
exposure to The Daily Show’s coverage of the Republican Convention is associated
with less support for President Bush, the relationship may be inconsequential
considering the audience is more Democratic than other late-night sources. If partisan
viewers of The Daily Show who are already resentful toward President Bush become
slightly more so during the Republican Convention, is such a relationship substantively significant? To address this concern, Table 6 estimates the models in Table 5,
but only for non-partisans, or individuals who did not consider themselves to be a
Democrat or Republican (i.e., individuals who are pure Independents or Independents
who only lean toward the Democratic or Republican Parties). That is, I excluded all
respondents who classified themselves as a Democrat or Republican (strong partisans
were also excluded). As it can be seen, non-partisan viewers of The Daily Show still
displayed a significant drop in support for President Bush, and no such relationship
exists among any of the other late-night comedy audiences.
Looking beyond the nonpartisans, there may be other mitigating conditions of
partisanship that influenced reactions to The Daily Show’s coverage of the
conventions. In order to formally test whether or not the impact of The Daily Show
was significantly different on self-identified Independents, Democrats, or Republicans, I estimated the models in Table 5 separately for Democrats and Republicans
(not shown) in addition to Independents. I then conducted a Wald test in the postestimation in order to test the following null hypothesis for each of the four models:
bðDemocratic Stewart viewersÞ ¼ bðRepublican Stewart viewersÞ ¼ bðIndependent Stewart viewersÞ
In each of the four post estimations, the Wald test of the null hypothesis failed to
generate an F-statistic that was statistically significant (p B .10). The conditional
effect of partisanship, in other words, was insignificant.
Tables 7 and 8 goes beyond the general measure of favorability toward the
candidates, and demonstrates the relationship between the predictors and specific
attributes of the candidates following the Democratic Convention. To measure
attitudes along these dimensions, respondents were asked to agree with a series of
statements on a scale of zero to 10. Specifically, respondents were asked, ‘‘On as
scale of zero to 10, how does [insert phrase] apply to [John Kerry or George W.
Bush]? Zero means it doesn’t apply at all, and 10 means it applies extremely well.’’
In conjunction with the more general favorability ratings following the Democratic
Convention listed in Tables 5–6, the effect of The Daily Show is largely
insignificant on evaluations of attributes of both candidates. Of the six models
listed, the Daily Show variable is significant in only one: Bush’s likeability as a
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93
Table 6 Post-convention favorability toward presidential candidates among non-partisans
Favorability after the Democratic
National Convention (0–10 scale)a
Favorability after the Republican
National Convention (0–10 scale)a
Kerry favorability
Bush favorability
Kerry favorability
Bush favorability
Pre-convention rating .61 (.06)**
.66 (.05)**
.66 (.04)**
.71 (.04)**
Genderb
.06 (.23)
-.36 (.24)
.17 (.19)
-.15 (.21)
Age
-.02 (.01)*
.01 (.01)
.00 (.01)
-.00 (.01)
Variable
Race
-.28 (.37)
-.03 (.37)
-.43 (.27)
-.17 (.31)
Education
-.02 (.06)
-.12 (.06)
.03 (.05)
-.08 (.05)*
-.05 (.06)
.13 (.06)*
-.07 (.05)
-.03 (.06)
Income
c
Partisan leaning
.63 (.17)*
-.60 (.17)**
.75 (.13)**
-.52 (.16)**
Ideology
.25 (.16)
-.29 (.16)*
.11 (.11)
-.15 (.13)
Newspaper
.02 (.04)
-.10 (.04)*
.03 (.03)
-.00 (.04)
Network
.07 (.05)
.03 (.05)
-.02 (.04)
-.04 (.04)
Cable
-.02 (.04)
.09 (.04)*
.01 (.03)
.03 (.04)
Talk radio
.00 (.06)
-.04 (.06)
.01 (.04)
.05 (.04)
Stewart
-.07 (.70)
.47 (.72)
.39 (.38)
-1.13 (.43)**
Leno
.41 (.31)
-.03 (.32)
.03 (.31)
.19 (.35)
Letterman
-.22 (.34)
.17 (.35)
.08 (.28)
.19 (.32)
O’Brien
-1.59 (1.63)
-.98 (1.65)
1.02 (.80)
.54 (.90)
Constant
.41 (.85)
4.82 (1.15)**
-1.48 (.66)*
5.36 (.97)**
Adjusted R2
.66
.72
.74
.77
N
207
212
286
292
* p \ .05; ** p \ .01 (one-tailed)
Note: Cell entries are unstandardized OLS coefficients with standard errors in parentheses
a
The dependent variable was measured by asking respondents, ‘‘On a scale of zero to 10, how would
your rate George W. Bush? Zero means very unfavorable, and 10 means very favorable. Five means you
do not feel favorable or unfavorable. Of course, you can use any number between zero and 10’’
b
See Table 5 for description of independent variables
c
1 = Independent leaning Republican; 2 = Independent/other/no answer/don’t know; 3 = Independent
leaning Democrat
person. None of the Kerry variables are significantly influenced by exposure to The
Daily Show. Kerry’s trustworthiness did significantly increase among newspaper
readers, which is not entirely surprising given that today’s traditional media are
most likely to cover the parties’ tightly-scripted ‘‘informercial’’ of the candidate’s
best qualities during conventions (see Panagopoulos 2007). Exposure to talk radio
during the same time, on the other hand, was negatively related to evaluations of
Kerry’s trustworthiness, which is also not surprising given the rightward leanings of
the talk radio hosts and their audiences (Barker 2002; Jones 2002). His likeability as
a person, and the tendency to agree that he says one thing but does another (i.e.,
‘‘flip-flop’’), was not associated with exposure to talk radio, as one might expect.
The Republican Convention, again, is a different story. As Table 8 demonstrates,
viewers of The Daily Show’s coverage of the Republican Convention were more
123
123
.02 (.03)
.02 (.03)
1.56 (.53)**
.63
559
Constant
Adjusted R2
N
558
.76
.93 (.45)**
-.73 (.58)
.29 (.24)
-.16 (.21)
-.22 (.30)
-.11 (.03)**
.05 (.03)*
.35 (.04)**
539
.34
5.23 (.81)**
-.42 (1.03)
-.33 (.39)
.49 (.36)
.58 (.52)
.04 (.06)
-.04 (.42)
-.02 (.05)
-.04 (.05)
-.30 (.13)*
-.33 (.06)**
-.03 (.06)
-.02 (.06)
.69 (.36)*
.01 (.01)
.08 (.24)
.60 (.03)**
599
.66
5.18 (.62)**
-.46 (.68)
-.25 (.28)
.02 (.26)
-.72 (.38)*
-.03 (.04)
.03 (.03)
-.03 (.04)
.01 (.03)
-.29 (.09)**
.29 (.05)**
-.02 (.05)
-.07 (.04)*
-.24 (.25)
.00 (.01)
-.12 (.17)
606
.72
3.83 (.61)**
-.78 (.67)
-.36 (.28)
-.22 (.28)
-.60 (.26)
-.04 (.04)
.02 (.03)
-.04 (.04)
-.04 (.03)
-.24 (.09)**
-.34 (.05)**
-.01 (.05)
-.02 (.04)
.37 (.25)
.01 (.01)*
-.22 (.17)
.61 (.03)**
Bush is
Trustworthya
597
.43
1.47 (.70)*
-.16 (.90)
.13 (.37)
-.14 (.34)
-.17 (.50)
-.04 (.06)
.03 (.04)
.06 (.05)
.01 (.04)
.39 (.12)**
.33 (.06)**
-.13 (.06)*
.09 (.05)
-.67 (.33)*
-.01 (.01)
.07 (.22)
.40 (.04)**
Bush says one thing
and does anothera
b
See Table 5 for description of independent variables
The dependent variable was measured by asking respondents, ‘‘On a scale of zero to ten, how does [insert phrase] apply to John Kerry/George W. Bush? Zero means it
doesn’t apply at all, and 10 means it applies extremely well’’
a
Note: Cell entries are unstandardized OLS coefficients with standard errors in parentheses
* p \ .05; ** p \ .01 (one-tailed)
.23 (.27)
-.33 (.69)
Letterman
O’Brien
-.56 (.36)
.05 (.25)
Stewart
Leno
-.02 (.03)
.04 (.04)
Cable
Talk radio
.01 (.03)
.01 (.02)
.05 (.04)
Newspaper
Network
.32 (.04)**
.15 (.08)*
.33 (.05)**
.15 (.09)*
Party identification
-.03 (.04)
Ideology
-.01 (.04)
-.00 (.04)
Education
Income
-.36 (.21)*
-.00 (.00)
-.01 (.01)
-.49 (.25)*
Age
Race
Genderb
.62 (.03)**
-.16 (.14)
.57 (.03)**
-.00 (.17)
Pre-convention rating
Bush is easy
to like as a persona
Kerry says one
thing and does anothera
Kerry is easy
to like as a persona
Kerry is
Trustworthya
George W. Bush
John Kerry
Table 7 Post-democratic convention ratings of presidential nominees
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Polit Behav (2009) 31:79–102
.13 (.09)
.11 (.26)
.51 (.63)
-.41 (.48)
.67
586
Letterman
O’Brien
Constant
Adjusted R2
N
599
.72
.27 (.46)
.62 (.61)
.21 (.24)
.51 (.24)
1.02 (.34)
-.11 (.03)**
-.00 (.03)
-.00 (.03)
.03 (.03)
583
.44
6.95 (.75)**
-.54 (.86)
.15 (.35)
.25 (.36)
.28 (.50)
.11 (.05)*
.02 (.04)
.05 (.04)
.04 (.04)
-.28 (.13)*
-.49 (.06)**
.04 (.06)
-.06 (.05)
-.23 (.34)
-.01 (.01)
-.30 (.22)
.37 (.04)**
Kerry says one thing
and does anothera
608
.68
3.57 (.62)**
.92 (.69)
-.29 (.27)
-.02 (.28)
-.73 (.39)*
.05 (.04)
.02 (.03)
-.02 (.04)
.04 (.03)
-.15 (.10)
-.24 (.05)**
.03 (.05)
-.07 (.04)*
.14 (.28)
-.00 (.01)
-.09 (.17)
.66 (.03)**
Bush is easy to like
as a persona
George W. Bush
621
.80
3.94 (.50)**
-.17 (.57)
-.54 (.23)**
-.08 (.23)
-.56 (.32)*
.04 (.03)
.02 (.03)
.03 (.03)
.03 (.02)
-.14 (.08)*
-.32 (.04)**
.03 (.04)
-.04 (.03)
-.33 (.23)
-.00 (.00)
-.21 (.14)
.70 (.03)**
Bush is
Trustworthya
612
.41
-.22 (.69)
-.26 (.92)
-.32 (.37)
.23 (.37)
.93 (.52)*
-.06 (.05)
-.02 (.04)
.02 (.05)
.01 (.04)
.32 (.14)**
.48 (.06)**
-.00 (.06)
.07 (.05)
-.57 (.37)
.01 (.01)
.41 (.23)*
.30 (.04)**
Bush says one thing
and does anothera
123
b
See Table 5 for description of independent variables
a
The dependent variable was measured by asking respondents, ‘‘On a scale of zero to ten, how does [insert phrase] apply to John Kerry/George W. Bush? Zero means it
doesn’t apply at all, and 10 means it applies extremely well’’
Note: Cell entries are unstandardized OLS coefficients with standard errors in parentheses
* p \ .05; ** p \ .01 (one-tailed)
-.00 (.36)
.25 (.26)
Stewart
-.04 (.03)
Talk radio
Leno
-.01 (.03)
-.04 (.03)
Network
Cable
.20 (.09)*
-.01 (.03)
Ideology
Newspaper
.28 (.05)**
.28 (.05)**
Party identification
-.01 (.03)
-.04 (.01)
-.03 (.04)
.05 (.04)
Education
Income
-.02 (.24)
.00 (.01)
.01 (.01)
.30 (.25)
Age
Race
.64 (.03)**
.08 (.15)
.64 (.03)**
.06 (.16)
Genderb
Kerry is
Trustworthya
Pre-convention rating
Kerry is easy
to like as a persona
John Kerry
Table 8 Post-republican convention ratings of presidential nominees
Polit Behav (2009) 31:79–102
95
96
Polit Behav (2009) 31:79–102
critical of Bush following the convention. They were significantly less likely to
agree that Bush is easy to like as a person and less likely to agree that Bush is
trustworthy. And, they were significantly more likely to agree that Bush says one
thing but does another. As was the case with the previous findings, The Daily Show
variable had very little impact on evaluations of John Kerry following the
Republican Convention. Ratings of Kerry’s trustworthiness actually increased,
which was not expected. Most likely, the unexpected direction of the coefficient is
more an artifact of decreased trust in Bush rather than anything Stewart said about
Kerry. In other words, the portrayals of Bush and the Republicans was so negative
that Kerry’s trustworthiness may have improved by comparison.
Regarding other media sources in the model, Post-Republican Convention ratings
of John Kerry’s trustworthiness and his tendency to say one thing but do another
was significantly influenced by talk radio in the direction one might expect. During
this convention (and the rest of the campaign), talk radio hosts such as Rush
Limbaugh and Sean Hannity were not shy in criticizing Kerry’s credibility and
tendency to ‘‘flip-flop,’’ so it is not surprising that their similar-minded audience
responded.
Also, it should be pointed out that George W. Bush’s trustworthiness among
David Letterman’s audience did significantly drop during the Republican Convention. In terms of the size of the coefficient, this effect was very similar to that of The
Daily Show’s audience (approximately one-half of a point). Bush’s likeability
among the Letterman’s audience did not significantly change, nor did the tendency
to believe that Bush says one thing but does another. Nevertheless, this finding,
combined with the significant decline in Bush’s overall favorability among the
Letterman audience following the Democratic Convention (see Table 5), starts to
illustrate a trend. While the ‘‘Letterman effect’’ on Bush’s favorability is not as
consistently significant as the ‘‘Stewart effect,’’ the findings here do indicate that
Letterman and his audience may have been more hostile toward President Bush in
2004 than Leno or Obrien and their audiences.
Table 9 illustrates the results of analyses in which favorability toward both vicepresidential candidates were regressed on the media exposure predictors and the
control variables. Multiple media sources were significantly associated with changes
in favorability. Following the Democratic Convention, network news watchers
displayed a significant increase in Edwards’ favorability, and Cheney’s favorability
decreased among those who read the newspaper more often. Following the
Republican Convention, Edwards’ favorability dropped among the talk radio
audience.
Regarding the effect of exposure to The Daily Show during the Republican
Convention, attitudes toward Bush appear to have spilled over into attitudes toward
Vice-President Dick Cheney. As Table 9 shows, the relationship between The Daily
Show exposure and favorability toward the vice-presidential candidates follows the
same pattern as it does with the presidential candidates. Exposure to the Democratic
Convention on The Daily Show was not significantly associated with changes in
favorability toward either candidate. During the Republican Convention, on the
other hand, Vice-President Cheney’s favorability did significantly drop by a half of
a point among The Daily Show’s audience. Cheney is widely regarded as one of the
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97
Table 9 Post-convention favorability toward vice presidential candidates
Variable
Pre-Convention
Rating
Favorability after the Democratic
National Convention (0–10 scale)a
Favorability after the Republican
National Convention (0–10 scale)a
Edwards
favorability
Cheney
favorability
Edwards
favorability
Cheney
favorability
.56 (.03)**
.70 (.02)**
.69 (.02)**
.71 (.02)**
Genderb
-.18 (.12)
-.19 (.11)
.18 (.10)
-.18 (.11)
Age
-.00 (.00)
-.00 (.00)
-.00 (.00)
.00 (.00)
Race
-.50 (.18)**
-.02 (.17)
.16 (.16)
-.01 (.17)
Education
.00 (.03)
-.05 (.03)*
.03 (.02)
-.05 (.03)*
Income
-.03 (.03)
-.03 (.03)
-.07 (.03)**
.04 (.03)
Party identification
.32 (.04)**
-.23 (.03)**
.27 (.03)**
-.25 (.03)**
Ideology
.20 (.07)**
-.19 (.06)**
.09 (.06)
-.20 (.06)**
Newspaper
.01 (.03)
-.04 (.02)*
-.00 (.02)
-.01 (.02)
Network
.08 (.03)**
.01 (.02)
-.03 (.02)
.00 (.02)
Cable
-.01 (.02)
.03 (.02)
-.01 (.02)
-.02 (.02)
Talk radio
-.01 (.03)
.02 (.03)
-.05 (.02)**
-.02 (.02)
Stewart
.14 (.27)
-.23 (.24)
.15 (.23)
-.49 (.24)*
Leno
.08 (.18)
.03 (.16)
.03 (.17)
.29 (.18)
-.03 (.18)
Letterman
.13 (.19)
-.18 (.17)
.12 (.17)
O’Brien
.05 (.52)
.24 (.48)
.48 (.47)
.50 (.48)
Constant
1.39 (.39)**
3.65 (.42)**
.31 (.32)
3.33 (.39)**
Adjusted R2
.68
.78
.74
.79
N
852
896
892
925
* p \ .05; ** p \ .01 (one-tailed)
Note: Cell entries are unstandardized OLS coefficients with standard errors in parentheses
a
The dependent variable was measured by asking respondents, ‘‘On a scale of zero to 10, how would
your rate George W. Bush? Zero means very unfavorable, and 10 means very favorable. Five means you
do not feel favorable or unfavorable. Of course, you can use any number between zero and 10’’
b
See Table 5 for description of independent variables
most influential vice-presidents in history, and he is seen as a significant figure in
the Bush Administration (see Baumgartner 2006). Thus, it is understandable how
approval for Cheney would possibly decrease significantly as a result of exposure to
frequent ridicule of the policies and figures in the Bush Administration and
Republican Party as a whole.
Taken as a whole, the findings presented in Tables 5–9 demonstrate a clear trend
regarding the effects of exposure to The Daily Show during the party conventions.
While exposure to The Daily Show during the Democratic Convention had little
impact on feelings about the candidates, exposure to Stewart’s program during the
Republican Convention was clearly negatively associated with favorability toward
President Bush as well as Vice-President Cheney. Certainly, other media exposure
variables were significant as well. Table 5 shows that network news exposure was
positively associated with favorability toward John Kerry, while newspaper
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exposure and exposure to The Late Show with David Letterman significantly
decreased evaluations of President Bush following the Democratic Convention. In
the analysis of non-partisans presented in Table 6, newspaper readership was
negatively related to evaluations of President Bush, while cable news exposure had
a positive effect after the Democratic Convention. In Tables 7, it can be seen that
perceptions of Kerry’s trustworthiness became more positive among newspaper
readers, but became more negative among the talk radio audience following the
Democratic Convention. Following the Republican Convention, talk radio exposure
was also negatively associated with views of Kerry’s trustworthiness and positively
associated with the tendency to agree that he says one thing, but does another. And,
exposure to David Letterman’s program was negatively related to Bush’s
trustworthiness evaluation (see Table 8).
The effects of media sources other than The Daily Show illustrate some
interesting trends. For example, the talk radio audience displayed lower favorability
toward Kerry and Edwards on more than one measure, and the newspaper audience
appeared to show decreased favorability toward Bush and Cheney as well on
multiple items. However, none of the media sources were as consistent as The Daily
Show in their significant impact on favorability. I now turn to a closing discussion of
the implications of these findings regarding Jon Stewart, The Daily Show, and the
audience.
Discussion
Based on existing theories regarding the persuasiveness of humor, I hypothesized
that Stewart’s clever brand of political satire and self-effacing humor carry weight
with viewers. This study does not portend to argue that Jon Stewart and the writers
of The Daily Show are purposefully trying to influence their viewers, which is why I
do not conclude that The Daily Show is necessarily biased in its coverage. While it is
clear that The Daily Show was harder on Republican policies and personalities than
Democrats during the 2004 party conventions, the uneven criticism may have been
warranted. After all, the Republicans were the party that controlled Congress, and
their nominee for president was the incumbent. Thus, it is not entirely surprising that
there was sharper criticism during the national convention of the party in power, and
future analyses of The Daily Show’s political humor should pay attention to how
Stewart’s humor may or may not change as the power pendulum in Washington
swings—particularly in the White House. Nevertheless, my analysis has shown that
the coverage was particularly uneven during the 2004 party conventions—a
situation in which both parties and their nominees were engaging in very similar
behavior, and the structure of The Daily Show’s coverage was identical from one
convention to the next.
The analyses of the panel data must also be interpreted with restraint. Although
the two samples analyzed in this study appear to be representative of the overall
population, they are just two samples. Within these two samples, the percentage of
individuals who watched The Daily Show more than any other late-night comedy
program during the conventions is relatively small (6%). However, this number is
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similar to the percentage of ‘‘regular’’ Stewart viewers found by other surveys (Pew
Research Center 2004b), so the representativeness of the sample should not
necessarily be called into question. Also, the popularity of Jon Stewart and The
Daily Show has continued to rise. As of October, 2007, Nielsen Media ratings
showed The Daily Show averaged approximately 1.6 million viewers per night, a
three-fold increase from when he took over the show in 1999.
While recognizing the limitations in this study, the trends uncovered here have
importance to the field of public opinion and political communication. The attitude
shift of Stewart’s audience during the Republican National Convention was
significant, and watchers of The Daily Show became increasingly hostile toward
President Bush and Vice-President Cheney, while attitudes toward John Kerry and
John Edwards remained fairly consistent. This relationship held even when several
demographic and attitudinal factors were controlled, and the effect was not limited
to partisan Democrats.
Time and time again, Stewart and his colleagues have asserted that they are just
having fun pointing out the absurdities that emanate from the people and processes
involved in today’s political world. There is little reason to think that they are
disingenuous in this claim. Regardless, even though Stewart may not intend to
persuade anyone, the evidence suggests this may have happened within the context
of the 2004 National Party Conventions. This distinguished The Daily Show from
other late-night comedy sources as well as the other news media sources included in
this analysis, none of which exercised a comparable effect on their viewers. Even
exposure to talk radio, which has been found to be quite persuasive (Barker 2002),
failed to significantly associate with attitude change on a consistent basis during the
conventions.
According to Thomas Patterson (1994), a great power has been placed at the feet
of the modern American news media. Historically the media were content to operate
as watchdogs and entertainers, but their responsibility has dramatically increased in
the last half-century. The heavy erosion of state and local party organizations has
crippled the ability of the political parties to fulfill their traditional role of educating
the electorate on political issues and events. Much to the media’s chagrin, they have
been pulled in to fill the information vacuum created by the political parties’
grassroots disappearance. From Patterson’s perspective, the media have failed to
wield this power responsibly. Instead of acting in the public’s interest, they eschew
this new responsibility in favor of the pursuit of profit. Although Jon Stewart enjoys
poking fun at the modern news media for this shortcoming (see Young 2008), he
ironically finds himself in a similar conundrum. As the lines between news and
entertainment become increasingly blurred, political comics such as Jon Stewart and
Stephen Colbert have unwittingly become recognized by many observers as
legitimate news providers and commentators. In this regard, Jon Stewart has
inherited a power he did not seek and probably does not want. He is now a popular
culture icon, and a significant portion of the American electorate take Jon Stewart’s
satirical political commentary very seriously. It will be interesting to see how he and
his colleagues address this new responsibility over the next several years—if they
chose to recognize it at all.
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Acknowledgments This manuscript has benefited greatly from the comments of Jody C Baumgartner,
James McCann, Todd Shields, and three anonymous reviewers. The author would like to thank Kara
Craig for her valuable research assistance.
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