1. law, govt and politics
2. legal issues
3. human rights

 1 Explaining variation in EU human rights policy
Theoretical framework and research design of a comparative case study
Johanna von Bahr
Paper to be presented at SNES Spring Conference, Stockholm, 19 – 20 March 2015.
Abstract
The human rights dimension of European foreign policy has grown to encompass the broadest
array of human rights, ranging from torture to freedom of religion and freedom of expression
online. The list of rights-holders specified in policies has also been lengthened and now
includes for example women and girls, persons with disabilities, children, indigenous people
and lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex (LGBTI) persons. Still, the level of
integration of different human rights concerns in EU external policy varies greatly. While
several studies have demonstrated inconsistencies in the implementation of EU human rights
policies, this paper presents a study to explain how variations are established already at the
policy formulation stage. Drawing on rationalist resource-exchange theory, and a comparative
case design, the aim of the study is to explain how interactions between EU institutions and
HROs influence policy formulation in the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP),
Enlargement policy and Development co-operation. The study compares three cases of human
rights: children’s rights, the rights of persons with disabilities and the rights of LGBTI
persons.
2 Introduction
The human rights dimension of European foreign policy has grown to encompass the broadest
array of human rights, ranging from torture to freedom of religion and freedom of expression
online. The list of specified rights-holders has also expanded and now includes women and
girls, persons with disabilities, children, indigenous people and lesbian, gay, bisexual,
transgender and intersex (LGBTI) persons. Still, the level of integration of different human
rights concerns in EU external policy varies greatly. Several studies have demonstrated
inconsistencies in the implementation of EU human rights policies (for an overview, see
Schimmelfennig [2009]), for reasons such as member state strategic interests, or deficient
institutional resources. I will instead attempt to explain how variations in human rights
policies are established already at the policy formulation stage. This will be done through a
comparative cases study of three cases of human rights policy in EU external affairs:
children’s rights, the rights of persons with disabilities and the rights of LGBTI persons. This
paper presents the theoretical framework and research design of the forthcoming study.
The endeavour to explain differences in the level of integration of different human rights
issues in EU external affairs is important for several reasons. First, the literature on human
rights policy-making in EU foreign affairs consists of ample case studies on themes such as
gender mainstreaming (Elgström [2000]; Lister and Carbone [2006]; Pollack and HafnerBurton [2000, 2010]), democracy and ‘good governance’ promotion (see, e.g., Börzel and
Risse [2004]; Cardwell [2011]) children’s rights (Grugel and Iusmen [2012]; Iusmen [2013]),
the rights of persons with disabilities (De Burca, 2010), LGBTI rights (Swiebel [2009]; Mos
[2013]), death penalty (Manners, 2002) and the International Criminal Court (Garský, 2013).
So far, there has been no attempt to compare EU policy-making across different human rights
areas. This paper hence provides a unique comparative study of how three different cases of
human rights have been integrated in EU external policy. Through the comparative approach,
in contrast to the single cases study, we will be able to eliminate potential causes to human
rights integration in EU external policy. Secondly, the paper will add to the scholarship on
human rights lobbying at the EU level, a segment of the EU interest group literature that is
still relatively small (Grugel and Iusmen, 2011). Finally, since the EU constitutes the world’s
largest foreign aid donor and an important player in the global economy, its external human
rights policies can potentially have great influence for the fulfilment of human rights
worldwide. The study will identify the extent to which the human rights policies correspond
to the idea of a ‘normative power Europe’ (Manners 2002).
3 The forthcoming study will compare how three human rights concerns have been integrated in
CFSP, development co-operation and enlargement policy, from 2007 and up to present time.
Drawing primarily on rationalist resource-exchange theory, the paper defines hypotheses on
how exchanges of access and information between EU institutions and international human
rights organizations (HROs) can explain variations in policy formulation. Evidence from the
three cases will then be compared in order to assess the extent to which variables are
necessary and/or sufficient to explain the policy outcomes. Data is collected through a
combination of qualitative face-to-face and telephone interviews with officials from the
Commission and External Action Service, permanent representatives of the Council Working
Group on Human Rights (COHOM), as well as with staff at UN agencies and, detailed policy
document analysis.
Preliminary findings that will be presented in a forthcoming version of the paper, show that
while disability rights have been integrated primarily in development policy, LGBTI rights
have emerged as a salient theme in CFSP, as manifested in the 2013 EU guidelines on LGBTI
(Council of the European Union [2013]). Child rights, on the other hand have been integrated
in both policy areas. As regards pre-accession assistance (IPA), the new IPA regulation
contains explicit references to LGBTI and disability rights, but is silent as regards child rights
(European Parliament and the Council of the European Union [2014]). These variations in
human rights policies can be explained by disparities in both the demand for this information
by the EU institutions and the supply of information from HROs. Firstly, on the demand side,
HROs have been the most influential in the context of high level of preference heterogeneity
among member states. This explains the gap between the progressive policies on LGBTI, and
the preferences held by several of the new, and some of the old, member states. Support from
the most influential member states, usually some of the ‘big three’ is however a necessary
condition for a human rights issue to be integrated in EU external policy. Secondly, the
formation of strong alliances between HROs and the European Parliament has significant
effects for human rights integration. With the increased foreign policy competence granted to
the European Parliament through the Lisbon Treaty, this effect has grown to become a
necessary condition for successful human rights integration. Finally, treaty ratification is not a
sufficient criterion for human rights integration in EU external policy. Despite the EU
ratification of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, disability rights
have only been marginally addressed in the CFSP, and the issue of disability and development
has still not been raised in a Commission Communication.
4 In the next section of the paper, the theoretical framework and hypotheses will be presented.
The following section provides a description of the comparative research design. The paper
concludes with a mapping of the studied human rights policies, i.e. the dependant variable of
the study.
Theoretical framework
Many case studies and an increasing number of systematic studies (see, e.g., Murdie and
Davis [2012]; Simmons, [2009]) have shown that human rights organizations (HROs) play a
vital role for the transnational diffusion of human rights norms and policies. While EU
scholars (see, e.g., Broscheid and Coen [2003]; Mazey and Richardson [2006]) have studied
the formation of long-standing relationships between interest groups and the Commission,
largely built on information exchanges, studies of human rights advocacy towards the EU
institutions are however scarce (Grugel and Iusmen, 2012). Grugel and Iusmen (2012) and
Iusmen (2012) find that child rights organizations influenced agenda- setting in EU external
policy on children’s rights through the supply of detailed expertise in international law and
child rights implementation, which the Commission lacked.
While non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have traditionally been studied as
theoretically and empirically distinct from other interest groups, recent empirical studies have
successfully applied interest group theory on NGOs (Bloodgood, 2010, Tallberg et al, 2014). I
agree with the view that advocacy NGOs, like other interest groups, are instrumental actors
with the aim to influence decision-makers (Tallberg et al. 2014). Co-operation between
interest groups and IOs is defined as exchanges of resources (Bouwen [2002]; Steffek
[2013]). Steffek defines this relationship as ‘a reciprocal interaction in which organizations
exchange resources of the material or immaterial kind for mutual benefit’ (2013: 994). Based
on the logic of the rationalist resource- exchange model, the EU grants access to HROs to the
policy process in exchange for information that the HROs have and the EU institutions cannot
efficiently or sufficiently collect themselves (Bouwen [2002[; Tallberg et al. [2014]).
Although access does not equal influence, recent systematic research has however shown that
NGO access to IOs is the most important determinant of NGO influence (Tallberg et al 2014).
The systematic study by Tallberg et al. (2013) shows that non-state actors in the fields of
human rights and development are invited by IOs in policy formulation, implementation, and
monitoring of policies. They are however rarely invited in decision-making (Tallberg et al.
5 2013). According to Steffek (2013) IOs are more likely to formally invite NGOs to participate
in the research and analysis phase, rather than in the policy formulation phase. However, he
notes that informal cooperation is likely to occur also in the policy formulation phase,
between staff of the IO Secretariat and HROs. Below I will define hypotheses on how
variations in EU access to HROs in policy formulation and HRO supply of information can
explain variations in human rights policies.
EU access
As the roles of the EU institutions vary in the policy formulation phase, so does the
information requested from interest groups. In order to develop hypotheses on HRO access to
the different EU institutions I will draw on Bouwen’s (2002) theory of interest group
lobbying. According to Bouwen (2002), the Commission will provide the highest degree of
access to actors that can provide the ‘access good’ expert knowledge. Expert knowledge is
demanded in the agenda setting and policy development phase, especially in new legislative
areas. Expert knowledge is expected to increase the Commission’s efficiency and
effectiveness, or its so-called output legitimacy. Previous systematic research has shown that
IO demand for non-state actors resources is high in the context of technically complex policy
areas, local implementation needs, and when societal actors hold relevant information on
policy, implementation and compliance (Tallberg et al. 2013). Human rights policy-making in
EU external policy is likely to meet all these criteria. Importantly, HROs are expected to
possess this type of information at a higher level than EU institutions. Further, as the most
supranational institution in EU policy-making, the Commission also demands information on
the European Encompassing Interest, which can help it push member states to agree on
policies that go beyond the lowest common denominator (Bouwen, 2002). This ‘access good’
is related to input legitimacy, which Bouwen (2002) defines as the ‘democratic decisionmaking at the EU level through the participation of citizens and interest groups’ (p.371). In
the context of human rights, the Commission will hence also grant access to associations that
can offer information on the European Encompassing Interest. The EEAS is expected to have
similar demands for input. The first hypothesis can be formulated as:
H1: HROs that supply expert knowledge have the highest degree of access to the Commission
and EEAS. HROs that supply input on the Encompassing European Interest have less access,
but better access than HROs that supply input on the Domestic Encompassing Interest.
6 In contrast, the member states are expected to primarily demand input on the Domestic
Encompassing Interest, which facilitates the bargaining process in the Council. National level
associations are hence expected to have the highest degree of access to the Council. Despite
the intergovernmental character of policy-making in the Council, the Council secretariat will
however also request input on the European Encompassing Interest, and to a lower degree
expert knowledge (Bouwen, 2002). This provides a second hypothesis:
H2: HROs that supply input on the Domestic Encompassing Interest have the highest degree
of access to the Council. HROs that supply input on the Encompassing European Interest
have less access but better access than HROs that supply expert knowledge.
Finally, the primary task of the European Parliament (EP) is to evaluate the Commission’s
legislative proposals from a European perspective. It therefore needs input on the European
Encompassing Interest rather than expert knowledge. Further, since Members of the EP
(MEPs) are elected directly they will also request information on Domestic Encompassing
Interest (Bouwen, 2002). The third hypothesis then is:
H3: HROs that supply input on the Encompassing European Interest have the highest degree
of access to the European Parliament. HROs that supply input on the Domestic Encompassing
Interest have less access to the European Parliament, but better access than HROs that supply
expert knowledge.
In addition to institutional factors, the preferences of EU institutions are expected to affect
access for HROs. In foreign policy matters (trade policy exempted) the costs and benefits to
societal groups are in general relatively weak, unclear or diffuse. Hence, decision makers are
expected to act under relatively limited pressure from societal groups. ‘The more general and
less predictable [policy area] the larger the space for leading politicians and partisan elites to
act on the basis of ideological predilections’ (Moravcsik 1993: 495). While human rights
generally are expected resonate with the national values and norms of EU member states, as
all have all ratified the core United Nations human rights conventions, there are nevertheless
significant differences in the extent to which states have institutionalized human rights norms
in their national legislation, as well as in their respective foreign policy agendas. The EEAS
and the Commission are generally expected to prefer human rights policies that expand their
policy making mandate (Tallberg 2002). They will hence demand information from HROs
7 and other actors that support the enlargement of their mandate. A recent study by Dür et al.
(2015) shows that in cases of divergent preferences among member states and EU institutions,
influence of citizen groups was higher than in cases of preference homogeneity. In line with
this finding, we would expect that:
H4: The more heterogeneous preferences among EU institutions and member states, the more
access will be provided for HROs in policy formulation.
HRO supply of information
This article applies a definition of ‘civil society’ as comprising of non-governmental, nonviolent and non-profit seeking actors (Steffek et al. 2008). An alternative concept, which is
often applied in interest group literature, is non-governmental organizations (NGOs) (Steffek,
2013). However, civil society is a broader concept as it includes organizations that would not
classify as NGOs, such as labour unions and churches. Both concepts exclude corporations1.
According to Keck and Sikkink (1998) ‘principled-issue networks’ are distinguished from
other types of interest groups, as they may choose outsider strategies over insider status, if the
desired norm transformation is perceived to happen too slowly or at a too limited scale. While
inside strategies involve direct interaction with decision makers, outside strategies put
pressure on decision makers through the mobilization of public opinion (and is often referred
to as ‘shaming’) (Dellmuth et al. forthcoming). Human rights organizations are defined as
civil society organizations engaged in human rights advocacy with an ultimate aim to
transform prevailing norms, policies and practices. They are expected to be instrumental
actors with principled aims (see more above). HROs are further anticipated to attempt to
influence EU policy-making through both inside and outside strategies (Dür [2008]; Dür et al.
[2013]). The focus of the current study is however only the insider strategies used by HROs in
interaction with EU institutions.
Most of the HROs that carry out advocacy at EU level are international umbrella
organizations, such as Save the Children International and the European Region of the
International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans & Intersex Association (ILGA). They sometimes
act individually, and sometimes form larger advocacy networks. The term human rights
organizations (HROs) is used here to denote both individual organizations and networks.
1 As a comparison, ‘transnational actors‘ (TNAs) comprise of all non-state actors that act across state boarders
(Uhlin, 2010 p. 17) 8 Based on the logic of the resource-exchange model, the relationship between HROs and EU
institutions will only be sustained if both parties provide the goods that the other party needs.
As we have seen above, EU institutions primarily demand the ‘access goods’ expert
knowledge and information on European Encompassing Interest. Expert knowledge in the
context of human rights policy would include expertise in human rights law and policy, up-todate information on the situation the ground’ including on the experiences of domestic civil
society, and practical knowledge on how to apply a human rights- based approach to policy
and programming. Regarding the European Encompassing Interest it is expected that
European umbrella associations and organizations that directly represent their constituencies
are best equipped to provide this access good. We hence predict that:
H5: The more capable a HRO is at providing expert knowledge or input on the European
Encompassing Interest, the more likely it will be granted formal or informal access to EU
institutions.
Previous research has demonstrated that human rights NGOs have influenced national
delegations to international organizations (IOs) (Clark et al. 1998). This study is nevertheless
too small to systematically account for domestic advocacy by HROs towards the member
states.
Further, I argue that HROs should in general prefer EU policy instruments with
comprehensive scopes (in terms of geographic and thematic coverage) and mandatory
monitoring mechanisms. However, different types of HROs are expected to have different
preferences regarding the precision of policies. For single-topic organizations, precision in
policy texts is vital to make sure that their specific concern is addressed with sufficient detail.
Multi-topic organizations should however prefer more comprehensive and vague policy
formulations over precise texts that exclude some of the topics they work on. This would
provide that:
H6: The narrower the agendas of the HROs that are granted access to the policy formulation
process, the more precise policy texts.
9 Finally, based on the literature on human rights treaty ratification of states, treaty ratification
provides civil society, with an opportunity to build political support and gain legitimacy for
their demands for human rights (Risse et al. [1999]; Simmons [2013]). While this is especially
true for domestic actors that have a large and on-going stake in the outcomes of ratification,
this may also be true for European level HROs. Another hypothesis will therefor be
developed, as follows:
H7: The ratification of International human rights treaties by the EU and/or its member states,
should increase HRO influence over EU human rights policy.
Comparative case design
The comparative case design allows for an assessment of the extent to which explanatory
variables are necessary and/or sufficient to explain the policy outcomes. The primary
weakness of the comparative case study design is however what Lijphart (1971:687) calls the
“problem of many variables”. One way to minimize this problem is to select cases that share
many features and operate within comparable contexts, but display sufficient variation
regarding the conditions to be analysed (Lijphart [1971]; Rihoux [2006]). This is the small-n
counterpart to quantitative control for potential independent predictors of influence.
I have selected three cases that concern the rights of specifically defined groups: children,
persons with disabilities and LGBTI persons. Alternative cases could have been the rights of
women or indigenous people. While, gender equality and women’s empowerment in EU
foreign policy have been studied extensively already (see, e.g., Elgström [2000]; Pollack and
Hafner-Burton [2000, 2010]; Lister and Carbone [2006]), the case of indigenous peoples’
rights is not considered a comparable case in this study as it involves collective rights and the
right to land. Moreover, cases related to human rights violations caused by war or other crisis
is not included in the study in order to avoid complex discussions on the relationship between
human rights and International Humanitarian Law. Hence, children and armed conflict will
not be discussed in the case of children’s rights.
While similar on these regards, the cases differ on one aspect that might play a vital role in
human rights integration in EU external policy, namely the International legal basis of
different human rights concerns. The rights of persons with disabilities gained a unique legal
status in 2011, when the EU became a party to the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons
10 with Disabilities (CRPD). This provides that EU level policies, legislative and programming
actions must comply with the CRPD’s provisions on disability rights, within the limits of EU
competences. Further, the EU has committed itself to regularly report on progress made
towards the implementation of the convention to the United Nations Committee on the Rights
of Persons with Disabilities. The rights of children are defined in the UN Convention on the
Rights of the Child (1989) to which all member states are state parties. As regards LGBTI
persons, the right to non-discrimination is enshrined in numerous international instruments,
including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). Explicit
references to sexual orientation and gender identity are however not made in any of the core
human rights treaties. In 2008, the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) issued a
statement on human rights, sexual orientation and gender identity, which was supported by 68
countries, including by the EU member states. The hypotheses on treaty ratification (see
above) would predict that the HROs engaged in disability issues should be the best positioned
to hold EU institutions accountable to their human rights commitments, while the LGBTI
movement should have the most disadvantaged position. However the degree and type of
influence HROs exercise has to be studied empirically, as we do not know if theories to
predict effects of ratification for states also apply to regional organizations.
Method for measuring actor influence
Influence can be defined as: “when one actor intentionally transmits information to another
that alters the latter’s actions from what would have occurred without that information.”
(Knoke 1990:3). Measuring influence in policy formulation is to attempt to reply to the
counterfactual question: Without the involvement of actor x, would the policies have been
formulated differently? It is not possible to measure actor influence in policy-making directly.
A mere comparison of policy statements is not enough, as policy convergence may simply be
coincidental. Influence instead involves a causal process (Lowery et al. 2008). Further, to
compare preferences of different actors and identify the level of preference-attainment may
hide gaps between what actors demand publicly and what they wish to accomplish
unofficially (Uhlin 2011). Moreover, influence measured by actors’ self-assessment is also
problematic since actors may have strategic reasons to under-or overestimate their influence
(Tallberg et al. 2014). Methodological triangulation provides the best opportunity to resolve
these problems.
11 The focus of the current study is how the exchange relationships between EU institutions and
HROs affect policy formulation. Influence through HROs’ outsider strategies will hence not
be studied. The first five hypotheses are focused on the relationships between different EU
institutions and HROs while the last hypothesis instead predicts the effects of HRO
characteristics (multi-or single-topic) and issue characteristics (International legal basis) for
policy formulation. In order to test the first five hypotheses, information is collected on the
access provided for HROs as well as on their supply of information. In this way we follow the
process through which influence has been exercised, and thus avoid the problem of ‘black boxing’ the process (Dür 2008). Secondly, in qualitative interviews, different actors have
been asked about their perceived influence over policy formulation, as well as over the
influence by other actors involved in the process. In addition, document analysis of actor
preferences ex ante and ex post policy adoption has been carried out. In order to identify
member states’ preferences, foreign policy statements, development policies and EU
presidency programs have been analysed. In addition, I have recorded recommendations made
by EU member states in the United Nations Universal Periodic Review (UPR). The
preferences of the other EU institutions have been identified through analysis of different
legislative drafts and policy proposals. As regards HROs, I have studied policy documents,
statements and opinions in open Commission consultations.
Mapping human rights across external policies
This brief chapter presents a description of the integration of the three cases of human rights
across CFSP, development co-operation and Enlargement policy.
CFSP
Though not legally binding, EU human rights guidelines represent ‘a strong political signal
that they are priorities for the Union’ (EEAS 2014). The guidelines serve as implementation
tools for EU representations upon which to base specific actions in multilateral forums,
regional and bilateral relations as well as in geographic and thematic development aid
instruments. For a complete list of human rights guidelines see Annex 1.
The integration of the three cases in human rights guidelines is assessed according to three
specific policy dimensions, which viewed together classify policies on a scale from ‘hard’ to
‘soft’. The three dimensions are inspired by the work by Abbott and Snidal (2000) on hard
and soft law, as interpreted by Pollack and Hafner-Burton (2010) in their comparative study
12 on gender mainstreaming and environmental integration in the EU. The classification has
however been adapted to fit the non-legally binding EU human rights guidelines. The
underlying logic of the classification is that hard policy instruments are more likely to lead to
compliance by Commission DGs and services than soft policies (ibid).
I have defined the precision as the distinctiveness and clarity of goals and activities. Some
guidelines have checklists of issues to be addressed in relations with third party. This is
considered a high precision in activities. The scope of the policy has been assessed by the
clarity of the administrative responsibilities (for example EU delegations) and the extent to
which geographic coverage is specified (for example in all countries that have not ratified
treaty x). Third, as regards monitoring, it has been identified if the implementing units are
required to report on compliance with the guideline. Table 1 presents a summary of how the
three cases are covered in human rights guidelines. Disability rights are not covered in any
specific guidelines. The child rights guidelines from 2007 present a first focus area for
implementation: violence against children. This issue is to be implemented in a pilot program
of maximum ten countries, which are not named. The guideline on LGBTI provides a
checklist of specific policy and legal issues to include in an analysis the situation of LGBTI.
LGBT is hence the most integrated human rights issue in human rights guidelines
Table 1. Human rights guidelines
Rights-­‐holders Human rights guidelines Precision of goals and activities Scope & monitoring Children ‘Promotion and Protection of Child Rights’ (2007) 2 Priority area: violence against children. No checklist. Priority area to be pilot-­‐
tested in ten countries. COHOM review of guidelines and pilot reports. Persons with disabilities None specifically on disability. -­‐ -­‐. LGBTI persons ‘Promote and protect the enjoyment of all human rights by lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex (LGBTI) persons’ (2013) Clear and concise objectives, priority areas. Checklist. Priority countries specified. COHOM review. Reporting by Heads of missions. 2 The 2003/2008 Guidelines of Children Affected by Armed Conflict are not included in the analysis
for reasons discussed above.
13 Development and Enlargement policy
The Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI) allocating €19,662 million for the period
2014-2020, is the largest of the external financing instruments covered by the EU budget. The
DCI covers all developing countries except the countries covered by the Pre-Accession
Instrument (see below). The geographic programmes under the DCI cover developing
countries in Asia, Central Asia, Middle East, Latin America, and South Africa. The DCI
further includes two thematic programmes: 'Global public goods and challenges' of which at
least a quarter is allocated to social inclusion and human development; and a programme that
provides support to civil society and local authorities. In addition, the DCI includes a regional
programme to support the strategic partnership between the EU and Africa.
The Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA) allocates €11,699 million for the period
2014-2020 to candidate and aspiring candidate countries: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Kosovo , Montenegro, Serbia, Turkey and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. The
∗
IPA aims to support the countries in the implementation of reforms as part of the preparation
to become EU members. The main elements of the IPA are support for the rule of law and
fundamental rights, economic governance, regional co-operation and administrative capacity.
Table 2 shows how the three human rights cases have been integrated in the three different
policy instruments: DCI, IPA and human rights guidelines. As seen, all cases have been
integrated in two out of three policies. While LGBTI has not been integrated in the DCI,
children are not explicitly referred to in the IPA, and finally, persons with disabilities are not
covered in any human rights guidelines. The forthcoming article will seek to explain this
variation.
14 Table 2. Human rights across external policies
Rights-­‐
holders Development Co-­‐
operation Enlargement Children Crosscutting issue -­‐ 2007. No checklist. Mentioned as regards support for economic, social and territorial development. -­‐ Regulation on establishing Human rights Regulation on an Instrument for Pre-­‐
guidelines Development Cooperation accession Assistance Instrument 2014-­‐2020 2014-­‐2020 (€19,662 million) (€11,699 million) Persons with Crosscutting isse disabilities LGBTI persons CFSP -­‐ Mentioned as regards 2013. Checklist. support for political reforms; rule of law; and promoting social inclusion and combating poverty. 15 References
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Annex 1. EU Human Rights Guidelines
Death Penalty (1998, updated 2008, 2013)
Torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (2001,
updated 2008, 2012)
Human Rights dialogues with third countries (2001, updated 2009)
Children and armed conflict (2003, updated 2008)
Human Rights Defenders (2004, updated 2008)
Promotion and Protection of the Rights of the Child (2007)
Violence against women and girls and combating all forms of discrimination
against them (2008)
International Humanitarian Law (2009)
Promote and protect the enjoyment of all Human Rights by lesbian, gay,
bisexual, transgender and intersex (LGBTI) persons (2013)
Promotion and protection of freedom of religion or belief (2013)
Freedom of Expression Online and Offline (2014)
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