Uncertainty and the Geography of the Great Recession Daniel Shoag (Harvard Kennedy School) Stan Veuger (American Enterprise Institute) Exploring the Price of Policy Uncertainty, April 2015 United States House of Representatives April 12, 1935 Mr. FITZPATRICK: What is the gentleman’s plan to take care of the unemployment in this country? Mr. KNUTSON: What is my plan? Mr. FITZPATRICK: Yes. Mr. KNUTSON: Reassure industry. Mr. FITZPATRICK: How? Mr. KNUTSON: By removing all the uncertainty that you folks have created. Let us assure industry and we will end unemployment in a short time. Explanations for the Severity of the Great Recession Macroeconomists have suggested several, non mutually exclusive hypotheses to explain the severity of the 2007-2009 recession: Insufficient demand due to household deleveraging Slow adjustment to structural shocks Credit constraints due to financial sector problems Increased policy and economic uncertainty Regional Variation in Unemployment Rates There is substantial regional variation in the employment losses associated with the recession: The five states most affected saw unemployment rise by over 6 points The five states least affected saw unemployment rise by under 2.1 points How does this variation relate to the various explanations introduced above? It is correlated with variation in housing price declines and construction unemployment losses Mian and Sufi (2011) and Philippon and Madrigan (2011) show that it is also correlated with high and steeply declining household debt to income ratios Gozzi and Goetz (2010) and Greenstone and Mas (2012) show that it is correlated with credit supply and bank balance sheet losses. Is the Cross Section Inconsistent with the Uncertainty Hypothesis? “[A]n increase in business uncertainty at the aggregate level does not explain the stark cross-sectional patterns in employment losses we observe” – Mian and Sufi (2012) This paper: • Develops state-level uncertainty measures and documents their association with employment outcomes Shows that predetermined state government institutions affect regional uncertainty and unemployment • Follows existing literature by examining relationship between regional uncertainty and unemployment after controlling for other hypotheses • Presents a simple model of hiring and firing that produces correct predictions for the cross-section of employment levels • Part 1 State-Level Uncertainty Measures and State-Level Unemployment Outcomes Seven State-Level Measures of Uncertainty We develop seven distinct measures of state-level uncertainty: • Uncertainty in the news • Google searches • Mid-session budget cuts • Mid-session tax increases • Revenue deviations • Coincident index deviations • State credit ratings The measures are all strongly correlated with state-level changes in the unemployment rate between 2006 and 2009. State-Level Uncertainty A Local Uncertainty Index Robustness Tests Placebo Test: Other Time Periods Placebo Test: Other Outcomes Part 2 Do Predetermined State Government Features Drive Both Uncertainty and Unemployment? Existing Institutions Affect Local Uncertainty Same Institutions Affected Employment Outcomes Part 3 An Assessment of Competing Hypotheses Is Uncertainty ‘Explained’ by Housing? Is Uncertainty ‘Explained’ by Aggregate Demand? Is Uncertainty ‘Explained’ by Credit Supply? Is Uncertainty Independently Important? Part 4 A Simple Model of Hiring and Firing Model: Set-up • Assume an economy with multiple industries indexed by i, each populated with a continuum of firms • Firms receive a stochastic productivity draw each period of life that takes a value of either • Draw determines whether their optimal production requires high or low employment • When a firm’s employment matches its productivity draw, it earns a profit equal to π; it receives zero otherwise • Firms’ stochastic productivity draws are persistent, so probability of receiving the same draw • Larger value of p reflects less uncertainty • Firms must pay a fixed cost proportional to profits Ciπ to adjust their employment state and discount the future at rate β • Assume that C is sufficiently low that, absent the uncertainty shock, all firms find it profitable to adjust to their desired level of employment Model: Steady State Given our setup, firms solve: We define population density within industry across states as: We solve for ergodic distribution of firm population across states Given that solution, we can calculate the endogenous net hiring occurring within an adjusting industry each period: Model: Uncertainty Shock Now we consider the effect of a temporary (1 period) uncertainty shock Because the shock is temporary, continuation value functions do not change, only the odds of reaching them changes Firms decide to adjust despite temporary shock if induced uncertainty is low relative to the costs After a temporary uncertainty shock: • The adjustment rule for hiring and firing firms is symmetric • Firms in an industry i continue to adjust if: • Firms in an industry that does not continue to adjust fail to hire young workers. Employment in these industries shrink at a rate of Model: Predictions We can now identify three cross-sectional implications of an uncertainty shock. Uncertainty shocks are more likely to reduce employment: 1. In industries with larger baseline turnover 2. In occupations with larger adjustment costs 3. Among younger workers Part 5 Industries, Occupations, On-the-job Training, and Age Uncertainty and the Cross-Section of Industries Uncertainty and On-the-job Training Uncertainty and Age Uncertainty and Firm-Level Hiring Conclusions The association between local policy uncertainty and local employment losses is strong, making policy uncertainty a potentially important part of the narrative explaining the depth and length of the Great Recession This cross-sectional evidence complements the more firmly established time series evidence supporting the policy uncertainty driver of poor economic performance The microeconomic model of hiring and firing presented here produces non-trivial predictions regarding the impact of uncertainty that are confirmed by empirical tests State Uncertainty Measures Both Underlying Sensitivity to National Shocks And State Gov’t Amplification • For each industry, regress national employment against a trend and the Bloom, Baker, Davis Index from 1990 onward • Create an underlying economic sensitivity measure for each state by weighting industry sensitivities by state industry shares
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