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Review of Sustainability Measures and Other
Management Controls for 1 October 2008
Bluenose (BNS 1, 2, 3, 7 and 8)
Volume 1
Statutory Obligations and Policy Guidelines
Final Advice Paper
Summary of Recommendations
Initial Position Paper
Summary of Submissions
12 September 2008
1
CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................................... 3
STATUTORY OBLIGATIONS AND POLICY GUIDELINES.............................................. 6
BLUENOSE (BNS 1, 2, 3, 7 AND 8) - FINAL ADVICE PAPER......................................... 29
SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS............................................................................. 74
BLUENOSE (BNS 1, 2, 3, 7 AND 8) – INITIAL POSITION PAPER.................................. 80
BLUENOSE (BNS 1, 2, 3, 7 AND 8) - SUMMARY OF SUBMISSIONS.......................... 116
2
INTRODUCTION
1
This paper provides you with the Ministry of Fisheries (MFish) initial position and
final advice and recommendations on those sustainability measures and other
management controls for all bluenose stocks (BNS 1, 2, 3, 7 and 8) reviewed for 1
October 2008.
2
This Final Advice Paper (FAP) is produced in two volumes:
Volume 1
Statutory Obligations and Policy Guidelines
Final Advice Paper
Summary of Recommendations
Initial Position Paper
Summary of Submissions
Volume 2
Submissions
Initial Position Papers
3
The initial position paper (IPP) was developed for consultation as required under the
Fisheries Act 1996 (the Act). It contained MFish’s initial position on the fishstocks
identified for review. MFish emphasised that the views and recommendations
outlined the papers were preliminary and were being provided as a basis for
consultation with stakeholders.
Consultation
4
On or about 30 June 2008 MFish provided copies of the IPP to iwi, stakeholders and
you. Stakeholders and iwi were asked to provide written submissions on the IPP by
11 August 2008.
5
The IPP, and a summary of the submissions received for the IPP are contained later in
this paper. The submissions themselves are included in Volumes 2.
3
Final Advice Paper
6
This paper contains MFish’s final advice to you on the proposals for a;l bluenose
stocks (BNS 1, 2, 3, 7 and 8) for the 1 October 2008 sustainability round.
7
The FAP provides MFish discussion (including an analysis of your statutory
obligations in relation to each issue) and MFish’s preferred options.
8
A summary of fishstock recommendations for all of the FAPs is included at the end of
the FAP.
9
A copy of this FAP will be made available to iwi and stakeholders who made a
submission on these proposals, following the announcement of your decisions.
Implementation of Decisions
10
Following your final decision on any changes to management controls for 1 October
2008, officials will provide you with a draft letter to stakeholders outlining your
decisions.
11
In addition, s 12(2) of the Act requires that after setting or varying any sustainability
measure, you are required to write to sector groups advising them of the reasons for
your final decisions.
4
Section One
Statutory Obligations and Policy Guidelines
5
STATUTORY OBLIGATIONS AND POLICY GUIDELINES
1
The Final Advice Paper (FAP) provides the Minister with the best information
available to make a decision, legal obligations, the available options and the
risks/consequences of each possible course of action. In short, MFish provides full
information and ensures that the implications of actions are understood. Included in
this analysis will be the possible consequences of leaving all management measures
unchanged (the status quo).
2
This section provides guidance on the interpretation those sections of the Fisheries
Act 1996 (the Act) that are most relevant to setting sustainability measures. This will
help interpret the information and advice provided in individual papers.
Purpose of the Fisheries Act 1996 (s 8)
3
The purpose of the Fisheries Act 1996 is to provide for the utilisation of fisheries
resources while ensuring sustainability. It is a statement of the overarching goal for
fisheries management against which all decisions under that Act must be measured.
The purpose statement guides the exercise of decision making powers pursuant to the
Act.
4
“Ensuring sustainability” as defined provides a guide on desirable yields from a
fishery. Fisheries resources are to be maintained with the potential to meet the
reasonably foreseeable needs of future generations. In addition, the purpose requires
that any adverse effects of fishing on the aquatic environment should be avoided,
remedied or mitigated.
5
“Utilisation” of fisheries resources is defined as conserving, using, enhancing, and
developing fisheries resources to enable people to provide for their social, economic
and cultural wellbeing. There is a positive obligation to provide for the use of
fisheries resources. While the Act does not require the government to promote fishing
or maximise value, there is a positive obligation to provide a level and quality of
access to fisheries resources, thereby enabling people to provide for their social,
economic and cultural wellbeing from fishing. Section 8 refers to “enabling people to
provide for their social, economic and cultural wellbeing”. This implies decisions
under the Act should enable people to provide for their own wellbeing.
Decisions should create the opportunities.
6
The Select Committee in its final report to the House of Representatives on the
Fisheries Bill (as it then was) stated that the intention of the Bill was to “facilitate the
activity of fishing while having regard to the sustainability of harvests and mitigating
the effects of fishing on the environment”. In the Coromandel Scallops Fishermen’s
Association (Inc) v Minister of Fisheries case (Wellington CP 182/99, 13 September
1999) the High Court noted that “utilisation is subject to the overriding objective of
sustainability” (at page 22). In an earlier judgment, the High Court considered that
“when in doubt decision makers must favour conserving the fishing stock”, noting
that this was plain from the “international agreements” (see Roaring Forties Seafoods
Limited & Ors v Minister of Fisheries (High Court, Wellington CP 64/97, 1 May
1997) at page 9).
6
7
Since then the courts have given further consideration to how the purpose of the Act is
to be applied, and in particular the relationship between utilisation and sustainability.
In the Squid Fishery Management Co v Minister of Fisheries, 13 July 2004, CA39/04
litigation, the Court of Appeal noted that:
“The Minister…was required to balance utilisation objectives and conservation values. In
the context of a harvestable species, this requires utilisation to the extent that it is
sustainable...”
8
The purpose statement provides for one purpose that contains the elements of
providing for utilisation and ensuring the sustainability of fisheries resources. This
does not mean that one arm of the purpose is more important than the other is.
Rather, it means that the two arms operate in parallel, and not independently of each
other. Both elements need to be fully considered when acting under the Act.
However, the bottom line must always be sustainability.
9
In operation the range of management measures that may be applied to achieve the
purpose of the Act will produce a continuum of potential outcomes. This continuum
reflects the balance that must be struck between providing for utilisation whilst
ensuring sustainability. The continuum represents the range of options that must
ensure sustainability with varying degrees of risk. Each option within the continuum
also provides different levels of utilisation depending on the level of risk to
sustainability the decision maker considers acceptable. The decision on a particular
point on the continuum is in essence a decision on the appropriate balance between
sustainability risk and short-term utilisation on a case by case basis. However, the
overriding point is that sustainability must be ensured by each option. The explicit
reference in the definition of “utilisation” to social, economic, and cultural factors
indicates that all decisions made under the Act should consider these issues.
Future Generations
10
The Act, in its directive to provide for future generations, draws no direct distinction
between the next generation and some distant generation in time. No precise
determination is possible of where one generation begins and another generation ends.
The time scale involved may be dependent upon the interests that are to be taken into
account. Logically the time frame relevant to the reasonably foreseeable needs of
future generations may be as short as each generation of children or an indefinite time
in the future.
11
The needs of future generations however are to be considered in the context of the
purpose of the Act and the provisions of the Act as a whole. The obligation is not
open ended, it is what decision makers can reasonably identify as a need for a
particular generation. Future generation objectives are characterised by uncertainty —
what level of population will exist in the future; what future preferences will be; what
future requirements will be; what the impacts of our present actions will be; and, what
technological innovations will allow. But in cases of uncertainty the information
principles of the Act (s 10) are to be applied appropriately.
12
The objective of the Act is to sustain fisheries resources for future use, not to provide
for how future generations may desire to use such resources. Uncertainty is therefore
to be considered in the context of how current decisions impact on the ability to
7
provide for future use of the resource. Reference to “maintaining potential” to meet
needs suggests that the crucial requirement in respect of future generations is to
ensure the renewability of fisheries resources indefinitely at a quantity that provides
for continual utilisation. Hence, the aim of the Act can be seen in part as providing
for the extractive use of fisheries resources in the present, whilst maintaining the
potential of those fisheries resources to provide for future generations.
13
The maintenance of the general functioning of the aquatic environment is intended by
the Act only in respect of managing fishing activities. Whereas enhancement of the
aquatic environment, beyond that achieved through the avoidance, remedy or
mitigation of adverse effects of fishing, is not. In terms of maintenance of the
productivity of natural resources, the Act requires that biomass of a fishstock be
maintained at a level that is at or above the level required to produce the MSY. MSY
is the greatest yield that can be achieved over time while maintaining the stock’s
productive capacity. Therefore MSY caters for both maintenance of reproductive
potential and ongoing utilisation. For most harvested stocks MSY is a practical means
of providing for the reasonably foreseeable needs of future generations. The Act
provides some circumstances for departure from this reference point in respect of
stocks listed on the Third Schedule to the Act (s 14), and stocks maintained at a level
below BMSY but above their long-term viability (ss 14A and 14B).
14
The interests of future generations are described in s 8(2)(a) as relating to “fisheries
resources” which are defined as “fish, aquatic life, seaweed”. No express reference is
made to the inanimate elements of the aquatic ecosystem. It is considered implicit in
the legislation that a sustainable aquatic ecosystem is integral to, or a pre-requisite of,
the ability of fisheries resources to meet the reasonably foreseeable needs of future
generations. However, in meeting reasonably foreseeable needs of future generations
the scope of the Act relates to managing the effects of fishing, not all impacts on the
aquatic environment.
Effects of Fishing
15
The obligation to avoid, remedy, or mitigate adverse effects of fishing pursuant to
s 8(2)(b) of the Act is the second element of ensuring sustainability. Consideration as
to what is adverse may be assessed on scientific knowledge about the environment,
but may also utilise traditional knowledge. It is also likely to be influenced by
stakeholder/community perceptions as to what is acceptable.
16
The requirement to “remedy” or “mitigate” suggests that such measures may be
implemented over a time frame relevant to the circumstances of the individual
decision and nature of the activity involved. Equally achievement of this objective
will contribute to maintaining the potential of fisheries resources to contribute to the
wellbeing of future generations.
17
The Act does not define an “adverse effect”; rather it defines the term “effect”. The
term “effect” has a very broad definition, including effects that are temporary or
permanent; past, present, or future; cumulative; any potential effect of high
probability; and any potential effect of low probability, which has a high potential
impact. No threshold is specified as to the magnitude of any adverse effect required
before any measure in response is to be adopted. Hence the measures adopted in
response should be commensurate with the nature and extent of the adverse effect.
8
There are a number of other variable factors that will influence whether an effect is
considered adverse: characteristics of the aquatic environment; impacts from the
removal of fish; the scale, intensity, and duration of effects; scarcity of environment
type at local, regional, national, international level; resilience of habitat; the effects of
activities other than fishing at a region level, the relationship of fishing effects to this;
human perception and values; and the level of information available on any of these.
18
The Act does not prescribe an order of priority between the obligations to avoid,
remedy or mitigate. The onus is on the decision maker to ensure that any adverse
effects can be avoided, remedied or mitigated. The obligation to “avoid, remedy or
mitigate” is not subject to any qualifier to the effect that such measures only need to
be undertaken to an agreed standard. The appropriate response must depend on the
circumstances of the case, and should be guided by the environmental principles (s 9)
and the information principles (s 10) in the Act.
19
Decision makers can weigh up all the environmental factors contributing to the effect,
along with the possible options available for avoidance; consider relevant social,
economic and cultural factors; take into account the environmental and information
principles of the Act; and opt for the most appropriate option of either avoid, remedy
or mitigate. In some instances, only one response may be effective. Accordingly,
completely irreversible effects are to be avoided. In other instances, it may be
appropriate to consider a range of options. MFish acknowledges that sustainability is
not a purpose to be traded off against utilisation through an analysis of the benefits
and costs. However, the Act allows a range of approaches for achieving
sustainability, and these may, and indeed should, be compared in terms of benefits and
costs.
International Obligations
20
Section 5(a) of the Act provides that the Act shall be interpreted, and all persons
exercising or performing functions, duties, or powers under the Act shall act, in a
manner consistent with New Zealand’s international obligations relating to fishing.
Those acting pursuant to the Act must understand, and act in a manner consistent
with, the international obligations that the New Zealand Government has accepted. A
general principle to apply is that where there is a choice in interpretation of the Act or
the exercise of discretion, s 5(a) requires that the decision maker choose the option
that is consistent with New Zealand’s international obligations relating to fishing.
21
It is MFish’s view that the provisions of the Act, and the proposed exercise of powers
under the legislation, are generally consistent with New Zealand’s existing
international obligations relating to fishing.
Treaty of Waitangi (Fisheries Claims) Settlement Act Obligations
22
The Act shall be interpreted, and all persons exercising or performing functions,
duties, or powers under the Act, are required to act in a manner consistent with the
provisions of the Treaty of Waitangi (Fisheries Claims) Settlement Act 1992. This
also requires an interpretation that best furthers the agreements expressed in the Deed
of Settlement referred to in the Preamble to the Settlement Act.
9
23
The Settlement Act acknowledges that the Crown continues to be subject to the
principles of the Treaty of Waitangi in respect of non-commercial Maori fishing
rights. The Settlement Act did not extinguish the duty to act in accordance with the
principles of the Treaty in respect of non-commercial Mäori fishing rights and
interests, and goes as far as specifically requiring this in relation to the obligations
under s 10 of the Settlement Act.
24
MFish acknowledges the following basic requirements apply to the Crown’s
obligation to act in accordance with the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi:
25
a)
that the Crown acts reasonably and in good faith towards its Treaty partner;
b)
that the Crown makes informed decisions; and
c)
that the Crown avoids impediments to providing redress, and avoids creating
new grievances.
These principles put an onus on MFish to establish structures and work practices that
ensure it is capable of meeting its obligations to Mäori under fisheries legislation. In
New Zealand Mäori Council v Attorney General [1987] 1 NZLR 641 the Court of
Appeal concluded:
“the responsibility of one treaty partner to act in good faith fairly and
reasonably towards the other puts the onus on a partner, here the Crown,
when acting within its sphere to make an informed decision, that is a
decision where it is sufficiently informed as to the relevant facts and law to
be able to say it has had proper regard to the impact of the principles of the
Treaty.” (at page 683)
26
The principle of partnership and the requirement to act in good faith towards the other
Treaty partner extends an obligation on the Crown to also consider and act on any
proposals put forward by tangata whenua for the management of their customary
fisheries. The principle of avoiding the creation of new grievances is of particular
relevance in the fisheries environment now that a full and final settlement has been
achieved. Fisheries management decisions seldom impact on one sector group alone,
and the risk of such decisions adversely impacting on the secured rights and interests
of Mäori is a very real one.
Environmental Principles (s 9)
27
The Act prescribes three environmental principles that the Minister must take into
account when exercising powers in relation to utilising fisheries resources and
ensuring sustainability.
Principle 1: Associated or dependent species should be maintained
above a level that ensures their long-term viability.
28
The Act defines “associated and dependent species” as any non-harvested species
taken or otherwise affected by the taking of a harvested species. “Harvested species”
is defined as any fish, aquatic life or seaweed that for the time being may be taken
with lawful authority. Fishers have lawful authority to take most species. Exceptions
10
include those where a fisher does not have a permit to take a species listed on
Schedule 4C to the Act – these are subject to the permit moratorium – and protected
species such as marine mammals and most seabirds. These together constitute
associated or dependent species.
29
The term “long-term viability” (in relation to a biomass level of a stock or species) is
defined in the Act as a low risk of collapse of the stock or species, and the stock or
species has the potential to recover to a higher biomass level. This principle therefore
requires the continuing existence of species by maintaining populations in a condition
that ensures a particular level of reproductive success. The long term viability will be
different for each species so necessitates a case-by-case analysis.
30
Long-term viability could be achieved at very low levels of population size,
depending on associated risks, such as recruitment failure at low population sizes.
Where fishing is affecting the viability of associated and dependent species, there is
an obligation to take appropriate measures, such as method restrictions, area closures,
and potentially adjustments to the total allowable catch (TAC) of the target stock.
Principle 2: Biological diversity of the aquatic environment should be
maintained.
31
32
“Biological diversity” means the variability among living organisms, including
diversity within species, between species, and of ecosystems. The “aquatic
environment” is defined as:
a)
The natural and biological resource comprising any aquatic ecosystem; and
b)
Includes all aquatic life and the oceans, seas, coastal areas, inter-tidal areas,
estuaries, rivers, lakes and other places where aquatic life exists.
When considering any decision under the Act, particularly sustainability measures, the
impact of current or future impacts on biodiversity must be taken into account. The
maintenance of biodiversity needs to be considered in the context of the purpose of
the Act, which is that, where possible, a resource should be used to the extent that
sustainability is not compromised. Determining the level of fishing or the impacts of
fishing that can occur requires an assessment of the risk that fishing might cause
biodiversity to be reduced to an unacceptable level.
Principle 3: Habitat of particular significance for fisheries management
should be protected.
33
Habitat is not defined in the Act, but MFish considers it to be “the place or type of
area in which an organism naturally occurs” (NZ Biodiversity Strategy). The
Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act (USA) defines
“essential fish habitat” as “those waters and substrate necessary to fish for spawning,
breeding, feeding or growth to maturity”. The maintenance of healthy fishstocks
requires the mitigation of threats to fish habitat. However, fishing may not be the sole
source of the threat; a range of terrestrial activities may impact on fisheries habitats.
Habitats of special significance, such as those that assist in the reproductive and
productive process of a fishery, should be protected. Adverse effects on such areas
must be avoided, remedied or mitigated.
11
Information Principles (s 10)
34
The nature of the data and assumptions used to generate fisheries assessments and the
results produced contain inherent variation and uncertainty. The Act specifies the
information principles that must be taken in account when making decisions in
relation to utilisation of fisheries resources or ensuring sustainability.
a)
Decisions should be based on the best available information. The Act defines
best information that, in the particular circumstances, is available without
unreasonable cost, effort or time;
b)
Decision makers should consider any uncertainty in the information available
in any case;
c)
Decision makers should be cautious when information is uncertain, unreliable
or inadequate; and
d)
The absence of, or any uncertainty in, any information should not be used as a
reason for postponing or failing to take any measure to achieve the purpose of
the Act.
35
A person with decision making powers under the Act is required “to take into
account” the information principles set out in s 10. The information principles do not
of themselves impose any statutory or fiduciary duty on the Crown to actively obtain
the information necessary such that the obligations under the Act are able to be
discharged. The information principles provide guidance as to how decisions are to
be legitimately made on the basis of the information which is available.
36
The principle that decisions should be based on the best available information,
provides guidance that decision-makers (ie the Minister or MFish) should seek to
obtain the best information provided that, in the particular circumstances, is available
without unreasonable cost, effort or time (as provided for in the definition of best
available information in section 2 of the Act). Where new and better information
comes to light during the decision-making process, that information should be
incorporated into, and update, the information basis for a proposed decision.
Determining uncertainty – scientific and anecdotal information
37
Information as defined in the Act includes scientific, customary Maori, social or
economic information and any analysis on any such information. The best available
information for any given decision will likely necessarily incorporate both scientific
and anecdotal (or quantitative and qualitative) information. As such both scientific
and anecdotal information should be considered and weighed accordingly when
making management decisions.
38
The weighting assigned to particular information is subject to the certainty, reliability
and adequacy of that information. As a general principle, information on stock status
outlined in the MFish Fishery Assessment Plenary Report, when available, should be
given significant weighting. The information presented in the Report is subject to a
robust process of scientific peer review.
12
39
Anecdotal information on stock status typically should receive lesser weighting than
the Plenary Report.
However, MFish believes that corroborated anecdotal
information has a useful role to play in the stock assessment process and in the
management process. Such processes should take account of all relevant inputs, and
MFish believes that anecdotal information may provide useful, supplementary
information to that contained in the Plenary Report, and should be taken into
consideration where appropriate.
40
Although all sector groups are invited to participate in the stock assessment process,
recreational, environmental and customary interests are often not represented due to a
lack of resources. Therefore, anecdotal information from these groups may not be
available at the time of the assessment to help interpret the quantitative modelling
results. In particular, there are often difficulties in obtaining scientific information on
the local availability of stocks in areas of importance to customary and recreational
fishers given that the Plenary Report often focuses on assessing the status of a stock at
the QMA level. Anecdotal information from customary and recreational sources may
be an especially useful source of information in these cases.
How to make decisions under uncertainty: Fisheries Act 1996
41
The current Fisheries Act 1996 makes clear that while decision makers should be
cautious where information is uncertain, unreliable or inadequate, they should not
postpone decisions until they have full or completely certain information. The
information on which decisions must be based may be unreliable in itself; or it may be
insufficient to draw firm conclusions about the extent of a sustainability risk. More
commonly, it suffers both these weaknesses. In these circumstances decision makers
must balance competing risks: the risk of unnecessarily constraining utilisation on the
one hand, versus the risk of placing sustainability in jeopardy, on the other.
Consultation (s 12)
42
When the Minister implements a sustainability measure under the Act, [he] is required
to consult with those classes of persons having an interest (including, but not limited
to, Maori, environmental, commercial and recreational interest) in the stock or the
effects of fishing on the aquatic environment in the area concerned.
43
Statutory consultation occurs after policy options have been developed. The IPP
provides stakeholders with the opportunity to comment on the various options. The
FAP provides advice to the Minister that includes the results of that consultation.
44
Section 12 also requires the Minster to provide for the input and participation of
tangata whenua having a non-commercial interest in the stock concerned or an interest
in the effects of fishing on the aquatic environment in the area concerned. The
Minister must also have regard to kaitiakitanga. This is a legal requirement, and
reflects the provisions of the Settlement Act, and the Crown’s commitment to its
treaty partner. Input and participation may include tangata whenua being involved in
identifying concerns and developing proposals as well as being involved in
formulating possible outcomes.
13
Sustainability Measures
45
The Act provides for the setting of sustainability measures. The Act defines as
“sustainability measures” those measures set under Part III of the Act for the purpose
of ensuring sustainability. There are a range of measures that can be adopted under
Part III, the most identifiable being a TAC for stocks in the Quota Management
System (QMS) and catch limits for non-QMS stocks.
Factors to be taken into account when setting sustainability measures
46
Prior to setting or varying a sustainability measure the Minister is required to take a
number of factors into account. The purpose and principles of the Act (ie ss 8−10),
together with ss 5 and 12, are applicable to any decision the Minister may make to set
or vary a sustainability measure.
Stock characteristics and management controls
47
Under s 11(1) the Minister may set or vary any sustainability measure, including a
Total Allowable Catch (TAC), after taking into account the following factors:
a)
Any effects of fishing on the stock and the aquatic environment;
b)
Any existing controls that apply to the stock or area concerned;
c)
The natural variability of the stock concerned.
48
In accordance with achieving the purpose of the Act, any adverse effects of fishing on
the aquatic environment should be avoided, remedied, or mitigated. As noted above
in the section on environmental obligations, where MFish is aware of issues related to
the effects of fishing associated with the stocks discussed, or issues are raised in
submissions, they are discussed in the sections relating to that stock.
49
In general, the assessment for a fishstock will take into account the variability of the
fishstock. Although the principal management mechanism for New Zealand’s
commercial fisheries is a catch limit, this is augmented by a number of other input
controls such as gear restrictions, minimum sizes and area closures. The assessment
and advice in the sections following take these existing controls into account.
Plans and the Hauraki Gulf Marine Park Act
50
Under section 11(2) the Minister must also have regard to relevant provisions of:
a)
Any regional policy statement, regional plan, or proposed regional plan under
the Resource Management Act 1991;
b)
Any management strategy or management plan under the Conservation Act
1987 that apply to the coastal marine area and which the Minister considers to
be relevant;
c)
Sections 7 and 8 of the Hauraki Gulf Marine Park Act 2000 (see below).
14
51
The Hauraki Gulf Marine Park Act 2000 amended s 11(2)(c) of the Act to require the
Minister, when setting or varying any sustainability measure relating to the Hauraki
Gulf, to have regard to any provisions of ss 7 and 8 of that Act. Section 13 of the
Hauraki Gulf Marine Park Act also requires decision-makers carrying out functions
for the Hauraki Gulf under the Fisheries Act to have particular regard to the
provisions of sections 7 and 8 of the Hauraki Gulf Marine Park Act. Section 7 of the
Hauraki Gulf Marine Park Act recognises the national significance of the Hauraki
Gulf including its capacity to provide for the relationship of tangata whenua and the
social, economic, recreational and cultural well-being of people and communities.
Section 8 sets out the objectives of the management of the Hauraki Gulf, which
include the maintenance of the Hauraki Gulf for the social and economic well-being
and its contribution to the recreation and enjoyment, of the people and communities of
the Hauraki Gulf and New Zealand. Many of these objectives mirror the concepts
expressed in the purpose set out s 8 of the Fisheries Act, with perhaps a more explicit
emphasis on recreational well-being.
Fisheries plans and services
52
53
The Act (s 11(2A)) also requires that the Minister takes into account, before setting or
varying any sustainability measure:
a)
any conservation services or fisheries services;
b)
any relevant fisheries plan approved under this Part; and
c)
any decisions not to require conservation services or fisheries services.
Fisheries plans will specify a management framework for managing one or more
stocks or areas in accordance with the purpose and principles of the Fisheries Act.
Fisheries plans allow for explicit trade-offs between services and catch levels to be
achieved in a transparent manner. There are no fisheries plans currently in place
which require specific consideration. In future as fisheries plans are developed,
specific reference to the implications for sustainability measures resulting from
contents of the plan will be made in each stock section.
General considerations
54
Consideration also needs to be given to how a sustainability measure is to be
implemented. In approving the use of a sustainability measure, the Minister should
consider the most effective way of achieving the desired outcome. The Minister may
conclude that a sustainability measure does not need to be formally set.
55
An important factor in supporting the use of non-statutory measures is the degree of
support for the measure and the nature of the monitoring and enforcement regime
proposed to support the measure. An example of a non-statutory measure is a catch
limit for a single species within a multi-species stock, such as oreo, or the use of a
catch spreading arrangement for orange roughy on the Chatham Rise. Non-statutory
measures may be supported by legally binding contractual arrangements entered into
by the fishers concerned. However, as the Crown is not formally a party to such
agreements, there is no formal sanction imposed under the Fisheries Act for a breach
of a sustainability measure implemented by non-statutory means. Any failure to
15
adhere to non-statutory measures may mean that the Crown would be increasingly
unlikely to rely on such measures subsequently.
56
Sustainability measures may also be set by regulatory means. The Act provides for
the use of a regulation, or Gazette notice where necessary, to implement a
sustainability measure. In the first instance, regulations are the preferred mechanism
to implement general sustainability measures. However, a Gazette notice may
provide a more timely and flexible response to particular situations than a regulatory
response. For example, a Gazette notice may be used where a non-statutory
implementation of a sustainability measure does not prove effective.
Other Management Controls
57
The primary sustainability measure for quota management stocks is the TAC. This
can be supported by a number of management controls that collectively ensure the
sustainability of the stock and provide for utilisation within accepted limits.
58
Section 11 provides for the setting of sustainability measures. A range of possible
supporting measures is specified in s 11(3), but the list of options is not limiting.
Sustainability measures may relate to size limits, biological state, fishing seasons,
methods restrictions and closed areas. For non–QMS stocks, measures can also
include general and commercial catch limits. The measures provided for under s 11
may be applied at a local level to address localised depletion or localised
sustainability problems.
59
The most appropriate sustainability measure to be set or varied will depend on the
precise nature of the issue being addressed.
Quota Management Stocks
60
The Act imposes a statutory requirement for the Minister to set a TAC for each QMS
stock (s 13(1)). This requirement is modified by the condition that the Minister is not
required to set an initial TAC for any fish stock unless it is proposed to also set or
vary the TACC for that stock under s 20 of the Act (s 13(10)). For those fishstocks
for which no TAC has been set, MFish’s policy has been to set TACs and allowances
progressively over time, as the need to review those specific fishstocks arises.
Setting a Total Allowable Catch
61
The Act contains a number of specific provisions to ensure a stock is managed
sustainably. A key measure is the setting of a total allowable catch (TAC) for a QMS
stock.
62
In the structure of the Act, setting a TAC is first a measure taken to ensure
sustainability. As such, social, economic and cultural factors are not mandatory
considerations when setting a TAC. However, the purpose of the Act is: to provide
for the utilisation of fisheries resources while ensuring sustainability. Therefore, in
setting TACs, values for the utilisation of resources are also key considerations, and
so social, economic and cultural factors are permissible considerations where
appropriate.
16
63
For example, where the stock biomass target is set at a level that can produce the
maximum sustainable yield (MSY), then utilisation values are being provided for in
allowing the MSY to be taken. However, where utilisation values would be higher at
stock levels above a level that can produce the maximum sustainable yield – levels
that are also more certain to be ensuring sustainability – social, economic and cultural
factors would be appropriate considerations when setting the TAC.
64
The Act contains a number of different options (outlined below) for setting stock
target levels. All of the options are consistent with the purpose of “ensuring
sustainability”, but each option provides for a different management outcome.
Maximum Sustainable Yield (s 13)
65
In the case of quota management stocks, s 13 of the Act specifies a requirement to
maintain a fishstock at a target stock level being at, or above, a level that can produce
the MSY. MSY is defined, in relation to any fishstock, as being the greatest yield that
can be achieved over time while maintaining the stock’s productive capacity, having
regard to the population dynamics of the stock and any environmental factors that
influence the stock. A requirement to maintain stocks at a level that is capable of
producing the MSY is generally recognised internationally as being an appropriate
fishstock target, although there is some international support for MSY representing a
minimum fishstock target.
66
If a stock is currently at its target level (at or above a biomass that will support MSY),
s 13(2)(a) requires the Minister to set a TAC that will maintain the stock at that target
level, having regard to the interdependence of stocks.
Section 13(2A)
67
The Act has recently been amended by the addition of section 13(2A), this new
section is set out in full below. Consequential amendments were also made to other
subsections of section 13, but are not set out here.
Section 13(2A)
(2A) For the purposes of setting a total allowable catch under this section, if the
Minister considers that the current level of the stock or the level of the stock that can
produce the maximum sustainable yield is not able to be estimated reliably using the
best available information, the Minister must—
(a) not use the absence of, or any uncertainty in, that information as a reason for
postponing or failing to set a total allowable catch for the stock; and
(b) have regard to the interdependence of stocks, the biological characteristics of the
stock, and any environmental conditions affecting the stock; and
(c) set a total allowable catch—
(i) using the best available information; and
17
(ii) that is not inconsistent with the objective of maintaining the stock at or
above, or moving the stock towards or above, a level that can produce the
maximum sustainable yield.
68
The purpose of section 13(2A) is to enable the continuation of established practices in
relation to setting a TAC under section 13. Section 13(2A) provides a technical
amendment as a consequence of the judgment of Miller J in Anton’s Trawling
Company Limited v The Minister of Fisheries (High Court, Wellington, CIV 2007485-2199, 22 February 2008). The court in that case decided that before a TAC can be
set under section 13, the Minister must be provided with an estimate of both current
biomass (BCURRENT) and the biomass that can produce the maximum sustainable yield
(BMSY).
69
Since the Act came into force in 1996, various management strategies—all consistent
with the concept of MSY—have been pursued, some using modelled estimates of
biomass levels and others using alternative indicators of the relative state of the stocks
such as CPUE. Some of the alternative indicators have direct links to MSY. In other
cases the links are inferred. These alternative approaches are commonly used in fish
stocks where information on biomass is not readily available. This is the case for the
majority of New Zealand’s 629 quota management stocks and is the norm
internationally, being commonly used in jurisdictions with similar regimes such as
Australia, the United States, and Canada.
70
Section 13(2A) enables TACs to continue to be set under section 13 using existing
management approaches, even where the current biomass and the biomass that can
produce a MSY are not able to be estimated reliably for many stocks.
Specific Objectives of section 13(2A)
71
The key objective of the amendment to section 13(2A) is to restore the Minister’s
ability to make total allowable catch (TAC) decisions for all relevant stocks, in a way
that takes into account best available information, and is consistent with the following
objectives:
a)
The Minister should be able to make TAC decisions in the absence of the
biomass estimates currently required by section 13(2) of the Act, using the best
information available from a range of sources;
b)
Section 13(2A) does not disturb the balance between sustainability and
utilisation in the Act as it has functioned in respect of TAC setting in recent
years;
c)
No TAC decision under section 13(2A) should be knowingly inconsistent with
the current objective to maintain stocks, or move them toward a target level at
or above the level that can produce the maximum sustainable yield (the MSYbase objective);
d)
TAC setting should use the most information rich process available, without
necessitating a level of research and stock assessment investment involving
unreasonable cost, effort or time – consistent with section 10(a);
18
e)
TAC setting should continue to consider relevant social, cultural and economic
factors.
Rebuilding the stock towards target levels
72
If the stock is currently below a target stock level, there is a requirement pursuant to
s 13(2)(b) to set a TAC that will result in the stock being restored to a target stock
level (at or above a biomass that will support MSY) in a way and rate which has
regard to the interdependence of stocks and within a period appropriate to the stock,
having regard to its biological characteristics and any environmental conditions
affecting the stock.
Fishing down a stock toward target levels or maintaining above
73
If the stock is above a target stock level (above a biomass that will support MSY),
there is a requirement under s 13(2)(c) to set a TAC that will result in the stock
moving towards the target stock level having regard to the interdependence of stocks.
That target stock level may be at or above a biomass that will support MSY.
Way and the rate
74
In determining the way in which, and rate at which, a stock is altered to achieve the
target stock level, the Minister is required to have regard to such social, cultural and
economic factors considered relevant (s 13(3)). Section 13(3) makes it explicit that
those qualifying factors are relevant in the determination of the way and rate, rather
than in the determination of the target stock level. By “having regard” to the relevant
factors specified by the Act, the Minister must consciously consider those matters and
give due weight to them. However, the Minister has the discretion to give such
weight to the matters as considered appropriate.
75
It is also important to note that, when the Minister is considering a significant
reduction to the TAC, the advice to the Minister provides a careful cost/benefit
analysis of a reasonable range of the way and rate options available in moving the
fishery towards target biomass. This is so that, if the Minister decides on a TAC
reduction having a major economic impact, it is evident that all other reasonable
possibilities have been carefully analysed and why the TAC adopted was considered
to be the preferable one – see New Zealand Fishing Industry Association (Inc) and
Ors v Minister of Fisheries and Ors (CA82/97, 22/7/97)
76
The rate of rebuild to achieve the target biomass, and therefore the timeframe adopted
to do so, is a matter for the Minister’s discretion. There is no set time frame within
which the Minister must achieve a rebuild or “fishing down” of a stock. The Minister
is given discretion under the Act to determine the rate at which the TAC is varied,
subject to consideration of the relevant circumstances on a case by case basis.
77
Such considerations may include the potential impacts of decisions on the social,
cultural and economic values of tangata whenua and stakeholders, including
commercial and non-commercial fishers, and non-extractive users. Reference to
cultural factors in s 13(3) encompasses but is not limited to the interests of Mäori and
their cultural practices and values.
19
78
The interdependence of stocks (i.e. any fish, aquatic life or seaweed of one or more
species that are treated as a unit for the purpose of fisheries management) is a
statutory consideration under section 13 for determining a TAC. In turn the TAC
determines the level at which a stock is managed relative to a level that can produce
the MSY. The interdependence of stocks may include the relationships among and
between harvested species. MFish interprets interdependence of stocks as a situation
where there is a direct trophic relationship (i.e. one stock is likely to be directly
affected through a predator or prey relationship by the abundance of another stock) or
mutually beneficial relationship between stocks. This is therefore distinct from the
requirement to protect the viability of associated and dependent species expressed in
the environmental principles.
Management above Bmsy
79
The Act allows the Minister to manage fisheries at or above the biomass that will
produce MSY (BMSY) on an ongoing basis. In the case of quota management stocks,
s 13 of the Act provides the scope for a stock to be managed at levels higher than
BMSY. Such a target level may be an appropriate management strategy in order to
meet the wider social, cultural or economic goals provided for under s 8 (the purpose)
of the Act, or due to the interdependence of stocks, for the sustainability associated
and dependent species, or to prevent damage to the aquatic environment.
B
80
Where common goals exist or values coincide in particular stock target levels, a high
degree of consensus amongst stakeholders may support management above BMSY.
For example, an agreed management strategy may be developed among commercial
and on-commercial stakeholders to improve catch rates or produce large fish. In such
cases MFish would support the consensus in advice to the Minister.
81
MFish considers that management above BMSY is likely to be appropriate where there
is consensus amongst stakeholders to do so. However, there is no legal requirement
restricting the Minister to make this choice where such consensus either exists or does
not exist.
Managing sub-stocks
82
Under section 13, the Minister has a mandatory duty to set the TAC at a level that
enables a stock that is below BMSY to be restored to at least a level that can produce
MSY. In setting the TAC, the Minister must base this decision on BMSY for the stock
as a whole (i.e. within the QMA) and not the individual level of any sub-stocks. For
example, the Minister should not set the TAC at a level solely designed to bring a
component sub-stock to BMSY.
83
The management of localised depletion or localised sustainability problems poses
some challenges. Measures designed to ensure sustainability at a QMA level may not
be effective at providing desired levels of access to fisheries on a localised basis. A
determination is required as to which measures will best address the specific
sustainability issue confronted. The Act allows scope for a range of measures, both
regulatory and voluntary, that may be applied at the stock or local level to address
sustainability issues. These include catch spreading arrangements; area specific catch
limits and bag limits; closed areas; controls on methods, size, and season; and spatial
measures such as mätaitai and taiapure.
20
84
Varying a TAC is primarily used to address stock-wide sustainability issues.
However, localised sustainability issues may affect the maintenance of the stock at or
above the level that can produce the maximum sustainable yield, and therefore a TAC
adjustment may be appropriate. The size of the area and/or the number of areas
depleted is relevant to this consideration.
Other matters
85
The Act specifies that the TAC is the primary tool for moving a stock towards the
target stock level. Other measures may be adopted in conjunction with a change in
the TAC, however such additional measures should not be relied on as a substitute for
varying the TAC.
86
Under section 13(4), the Minister may vary any TAC for any quota management
stock. When considering any such variation, the Minister is to have regard to the
matters specified in ss13(2) and (3).
87
Any TAC that is set or varied has effect on and from the first day of the next fishing
year for the stock concerned. An exception applies to those stocks listed on the second
schedule to the Act (see heading below).
88
Section 13(5) of the Act specifies that a TAC of zero may be set. It may be in
situations where there are strong biological reasons for prohibiting all removals from a
stock in order to ensure sustainability. The setting of a zero TAC may be part of a
specified rebuild strategy to move the stock towards the target stock level. Prior to
setting a zero TAC the Minister would need to have regard to the social, cultural and
economic costs and benefits associated with such a measure.
Allocation of the TAC
89
The Minister is required to make allowances for different fishing interests under
sections 20 and 21 of the Act. The Minister makes a separate decision about allocation
after setting the TAC. In setting or varying the TACC under section 20, and thus
establishing the commercial share, the Minister must allow for Mäori customary noncommercial fishing interests, recreational interests and all other mortality to that stock
caused by fishing under section 21; these will be discussed below.
Discretion to allocate TAC
90
The Minister, on each occasion [he or she] reconsiders allocation of the TAC for that
stock, has the discretion to determine, on a case-by-case basis, how to allocate the
TAC. There is little statutory guidance on the apportionment of the TAC among sector
groups, either with respect to quantitative measure or prioritisation of allocation.
91
A conscious transfer of catch between sectors is a legitimate activity under the Act.
An allocation decision that adversely affects ITQ holders but which advantages –
deliberately or incidentally – non-commercial interests is not in itself outside, or
contrary to, the purpose of the Act.
92
The appropriate allocation is a matter for the Minister’s assessment bearing in mind
all relevant considerations on each occasion [he or she] revisits the issue. The
21
allocation of the TAC can be changed under various circumstances, not just in relation
to a change in biomass. For example, the Minister is not precluded from giving extra
allowance to meet a greater recreational demand, subject to [his] obligation to weigh
carefully all the competing demands on the TAC before deciding how much should be
allocated to each sector group.
Customary allowance
93
The allowance made for customary fishing should satisfy customary interests, and
therefore the allowance should not constrain the level of customary catch taken. The
customary fishing regulations (Fisheries (South Island Customary Fishing)
Regulations 1999 and the Fisheries (Kaimoana Customary Fishing) Regulations 1998)
do not provide for the Crown to place limitations on customary fishing, apart from to
ensure the sustainability of a particular stock. Customary take is regulated through the
authorisation system in the customary regulations, which requires that all customary
fishing is to be undertaken in accordance with tikanga and the overall sustainability of
the fishery.
94
In most cases, there is little information on customary fishing, although this will
improve as customary regulations take effect and better reporting processes are
implemented.
95
In the meantime, setting appropriate customary allowances is difficult. MFish has
adopted a policy that bases the customary allowance on the recreational allowance,
such that:
•
The allowance is set at (and in some cases above) the recreational allowance
for species of importance to customary users;
•
The allowance is set at half the recreational allowance for species known to be
taken by customary fishers but are not of importance; and
•
No specific allowance is provided where there is no known customary catch of
a species.
96
By following this approach, it is unlikely that customary take would ever exceed the
allowance. Customary allowances may well be reduced if the Minister is confident
that actual customary take will remain within the revised allowance.
97
In response to submissions on the 2006 IPPs, MFish agreed that it may be possible to
more accurately determine customary Maori interest in specific fisheries. MFish is
undertaking an examination on the way in which customary allocations are derived
and to produce guidelines on how this may be better achieved over the medium term.
This work is at a preliminary stage and no outputs are available to influence
customary allowances at this time.
Recreational allowance and the commercial allocation
98
Prior to setting the TACC, the Minister must also allow for recreational interests in
the stock – an allowance must be made for recreational fishers where demand exists.
However, there is no requirement to provide for recreational demand in full, nor does
the recreational allowance take priority over the commercial allowance.
22
99
In terms of those considerations the Minister is to take into account, MFish notes that
s 8 of the Act, in the context of utilisation of fisheries resources, refers explicitly to
the Act enabling people to provide for their social, economic and cultural wellbeing.
100
Outlined below are descriptions of some of the relevant considerations that may be
taken into account when allocating a TAC. This is not an exhaustive list. MFish
considers that those factors which may be relevant to the exercise of the Minister’s
discretion, in addition to the principles specified in s 5 (international law and
Settlement Act obligations), s 8 (purpose statement), s 9 (environmental principles)
and s 10 (information principles) of the Act, include, but are not limited to:
a)
the characteristics and current status of stock;
b)
the existing allocations;
c)
current catch levels;
d)
previous decisions;
e)
equity of allocation – notion of “shared pain” when stock declines / “shared
benefit” when stock rebuilds;
f)
participation levels and importance of the resource, including customary
values;
g)
population trends;
h)
the extent to which people’s social, economic and cultural well-being will be
satisfied, both directly and indirectly;
i)
assessment of relative value of resource to respective sectors;
j)
current and past fishing practices (including overfishing, voluntary shelving or
closures by a stakeholder);
k)
investment and initiatives undertaken to develop or enhance the resource;
l)
impact on ability of sector to take allocation provided;
m)
customary fishing rights (as confirmed by the Settlement), recreational fishers
common law fishing rights, and commercial fishers property rights as quota
holders;
n)
economic impact of allocative decisions;
o)
social and cultural impact of decisions;
p)
recreational fishers’ common law right to fish, subject to statutory limitations;
and
q)
any loss of access to particular species.
23
101
Information about the current status of the stock relative to the statutory target level,
existing catch levels, existing allowances and catch levels, plus previous decisions
may be informative of the actions that need to be taken.
Proportional vs reallocative
102
Where the TAC is reduced, either TACCs and/or other allowances must also be
reduced. There is no statutory obligation to undertake a proportional reduction
between recreational and commercial interests.
103
The Act assigns no priority between commercial and recreational interests, except to
the extent that customary and recreational non-commercial interests must be provided
for to some degree where they exist. Within that framework, the Act permits the
preference of one sector to the disadvantage of another; for example to provide for
greater allowance for recreational interests in proportion to the commercial allocation.
104
Notwithstanding the Minister’s discretion to allocate catch, case law also considers
that it is not unreasonable for commercial and recreational fishers to share some of the
“pain” from a reduction in the TAC. There is no requirement that the interests of
recreational or commercial fishers must be fully provided for.
105
MFish considers in situations where there is an absence of information about the
relative benefits to be derived from allocating a stock to one or other sector then it is
equitable for both commercial and recreational fishers to ensure the sustainability of
the stock through a reduction in the TACC and recreational allowance (along with the
implementation of commensurate to effect a reduction in catch – such as bag limit
reductions). Equally, commercial and recreational fishers should derive shared benefit
from the rebuild of a fishery in terms of the allocation provided to the respective
sectors, all other things being equal.
Monitoring allowances
106
If the TAC is reduced, the Minister should take reasonable steps to monitor the
customary and recreational allowances so as to ensure that the level of harvest is
within those allowances. To fail to do so provides a risk that any reduction to those
allowances, and also the TAC, could be rendered futile.
Ability to take allocation
107
Consideration should also be given to the ability of a sector to take the allowance
provided. Impediments may exist that preclude the sector from exercising the full
extent of their entitlement. Tools are available in the Act that enhance the ability of
different sectors to exercise their right to fish. As well as implementing specific
measures in support of allocative decisions, caution should be taken to ensure that a
decision does result in a sector being precluded from being able to take the allowance
allocated.
Enhancement
108
Logically those parties who are responsible for the enhancement of a resource should
receive the benefit of the activity. However, the ability to ascertain the increased yield
24
from a fishery as a result of enhancement activities and hence the extent of the
allocation provided to the sector is problematic. The development of a fishery
resource involves demonstrating through research and/or monitoring that an increase
of catch from existing and new fisheries is sustainable. It is generally assumed that the
development will occur as a result of a structured deliberate initiative. It may be
possible for any one sector to develop a fishery. In such situations, it may be
desirable for the sector that undertakes the development of a fishery to be entitled to
be allocated the benefits of that development.
Population trends
109
Population trends are reflected in the level of recreational fishing undertaken, both on
a national and regional context. The growth of urban centres, in particular Auckland,
have a significant impact on particular fisheries. An allowance for the recreational
interest and the corresponding management controls for a stock could take into
account existing population distribution and growth. Hence where a greater
recreational demand arises the Minister is not precluded by any proportional rule from
providing an increased allowance to the recreational entitlement subject to weighing
all competing demands on the TAC (see New Zealand Fishing Industry Association
(Inc) and Ors v Minister of Fisheries and Ors (CA82/97, 22/7/97) page 18).
Value
110
The Minister is required to allocate the TAC in order to enable people to provide for
their social, economic and cultural wellbeing. An assessment of value is important to
determine the wellbeing that will flow from any allocation decision. Where one sector
values a resource more than other sectors, an allocation of the resource in favour of
that sector is likely have a greater positive effect on the well-being of the participants
in that sector (than an alternative allocation approach).
111
Certain fisheries are considered to be of particular value or importance to fishers.
In considering the extent of the recreational and Mäori customary allowance it is
appropriate to consider the nature of the species and the importance of the species to
fishers. For example the recreational sector may place a particularly high value on
some species of sports fish.The abundance of a species, and the availability of
particular size fish for a specific stakeholder group, may be factors relevant to the
Minister’s decision.
112
MFish notes that it is difficult to quantify the relative value of a resource to each
sector. However, when considering value, a broad and inclusive concept of value is
appropriate. The value attributed to a resource is not limited solely to financial value
but a range of non-market, or qualitative, values.
Impact of overfishing
113
Overfishing of a TAC may result in the subsequent reduction of that TAC.
Reported overfishing by individual commercial fishers is subject to existing controls
under the Act. The consistent overfishing of the TACC or an allowance, which results
in the reduction of the TAC, as a general principle, ought to be attributed to the
stakeholder group responsible for the overfishing.
25
Undercatch of allowance
114
Stakeholders may elect to exercise their fishing rights in a manner, which results in
their allocation in a fishery being undercaught. Voluntary closures and shelving of
allocation may be undertaken as a means of improving the abundance of a species and
the availability of certain sized fish. Such methods may improve recruitment. In the
absence of explicit shares in a fishery, any subsequent increase in the TAC as a result
of such methods would be available to all stakeholders. Stakeholders are not immune
from any subsequent decrease in the TAC for sustainability purposes simply on the
basis of the previous undercatch of their allowance.
115
The Act does explicitly recognise underfishing rights of commercial fishers.
Where the person holding annual catch entitlement for a stock (not the owner of the
ITQ) undercatches the extent of their entitlement, the person may carry forward the
extent of the undercatch to the second fishing year up to a maximum of 10% of the
total Annual Catch Entitlement (ACE) they held in the first fishing year. The carry
forward of underfishing rights does not apply when the TACC is reduced in the
second fishing year (s 67A(2)(b)).
Analysis of impacts
116
A variation of the TACC and recreational and customary allowances may have
significant social, cultural and economic implications for stakeholders and
consequential downstream economic activity. In New Zealand Fishing Industry
Association (Inc) and Ors v Minister of Fisheries and Ors (CA82/97, 22/7/97), the
Court of Appeal noted that where a decision with major economic impact is
considered necessary the rationale for that decision should be clearly transparent.
Those affected ought to be able to establish that all other reasonable possibilities were
analysed and that the decision adopted was the preferable option.
117
In reducing a TACC, the Minister should carefully weigh the economic impact of any
such action on individual quota owners, those fishers dependent on obtaining annual
catch entitlement, and on the QMS generally. However, the reduction of the TACC is
not rendered unlawful simply on the basis that the decision adversely impacts the
property right inherent in the QMS. In the context of fisheries legislation, a property
right constitutes a right to harvest, which is subject to the Minister’s statutory powers.
Accordingly, MFish considers that financial security of a property right is a valid but
not irrefutable consideration in the context of the Minister’s TAC/allocative decisions.
118
The actual financial costs associated with allocative decisions are to be assessed
according to the nature of the fishery. Downstream impacts may result as a
consequence of allocative decisions made in respect of both recreational and
commercial stakeholders. In addition to the commercial harvesting and processing
sector a significant number of service industries are linked to the fishing industry,
including charter operators, sale of fishing gear, repair and transport related services.
Decisions may also impact on particular communities where the fishing and fishing
related services provide a significant contribution to a local economy.
119
A cost benefit analysis is designed to act as a tool for deriving the most efficient and
productive solution. In itself such an analysis is not intended to impose a barrier to
implementing measures considered necessary for fisheries management purposes.
26
In many instances MFish does not have access to the information necessary for a
detailed cost benefit analysis to be undertaken. Invariably it is the stakeholders
concerned who hold the relevant information. MFish requests that stakeholders
provide relevant information in the course of their submissions to the Minister on
management proposals. MFish endeavours to undertake a cost benefit analysis, to the
extent possible with the available information, where there is likely to be a significant
impact for a proposed decision
All other fishing-related mortality
120
An allowance can be made for any mortality to a stock that results from fishing. This
includes illegal catch, discards and incidental mortality from fishing gear. Often, little
quantitative information is available to assess the level of fishing-related mortality,
although inferences can be drawn from the impact associated with a particular
method, or information from similar stocks or species.
121
Where quantitative estimates of other sources of fishing-related mortality are
available, this is used as the basis for determining the allowance. If no estimates are
available, but other sources of mortality are known to occur based on information
from similar stocks or methods, then MFish generally recommends a nominal
allowance. If there is no known mortality, then no allowance is made.
122
Where it is possible to determine the fishing-related mortality caused by a sector
group (for example the incidental mortality related to a specific type of fishing gear
used by a particular sector) then the fishing-related mortality attributable to that sector
should be deducted from the allowance for that sector. Where this is not possible an
estimate of other sources of fishing related mortality should be deducted from the
TAC.
27
Section Two
Final Advice Paper
28
BLUENOSE (BNS 1, 2, 3, 7 AND 8) - FINAL ADVICE
PAPER
Figure 1: Quota Management Areas (QMAs) for BNS stocks.
Executive Summary
1
MFish recommends that you reduce the total allowable catches (TACs) and total
allowable commercial catches (TACCs) of five major bluenose fishstocks to address
sustainability risks in these fisheries. This paper discusses the costs and benefits of
options that reduce TACs by between 10% and 40% below recent catches.
2
All five major bluenose (BNS) fishstocks (BNS 1, 2, 3, 7 and 8 – Figure 1) have this
year been reviewed by the Adaptive Management Programme Working Group
(Working Group) and the Plenary. 1 All BNS stocks show significant declines in catch
per unit effort (CPUE) and current catches are not likely to be sustainable.
3
All CPUE indices for all BNS stocks show markedly similar declines in the period
between 1 October 2001 and 30 September 2007. For the six most reliable CPUE
series (at least one per fishstock), CPUE has declined by between 43% and 79%
(mean 64%) over the six years between 1 October 2001 and 30 September 2007.
4
CPUE has previously not been considered to be a reliable indicator of abundance for
BNS stocks. However, a similar declining trend in all CPUE indices over recent years
has increased confidence in their value as indices of abundance. If this decline is
1
The Plenary annually peer reviews and summarises the available science for fish stocks.
29
indicative of the overall abundance of BNS in these areas, then BNS abundance could
have declined by more than 50% across all areas over these six years.
5
Based on the declines in CPUE, MFish proposed reducing the TAC in BNS 1, 2, 3, 7
and 8. MFish consulted on new TACs that are between 10 and 40% below average
commercial catch between 1 October 2001 and 30 September 2007.
6
MFish considered that these options represented the range of reasonable options for
consultation because they increase the likelihood that the biomass of BNS stocks
remains at or rebuilds to appropriate levels. The final decision on the quantum of any
reduction in the TAC will depend on your interpretation of the severity of the
sustainability risk and the socio-economic impacts associated with various reductions.
7
All submitters supported the reduction of BNS TACs. The majority of submissions
focussed on operational and management issues that suggest the decline in CPUE
should be treated with caution.
8
MFish considered that any reduction in the TAC should be applied only to the
commercial sector. No submissions addressed this matter.
9
MFish also consulted on making an allowance for other sources of fishing-related
mortality in BNS 1, 3, 7 and 8. No such allowances are currently in place. No
submissions addressed this matter.
10
MFish also consulted on increasing deemed values in BNS 1, 3, 7 and 8. Further
information on this is included in a separate advice paper on deemed values which
should be considered in conjunction with this advice.
The Issue
Overview of the fisheries
11
TACs were first established for BNS upon establishment of the QMS in 1986–87,
with TACCs for all BNS stocks totalling 1 350 t. Over the past 15 years, all BNS
stocks have been managed under Adaptive Management Programmes (AMPs); details
of current TACs and allowances are provided below (Table 1).
12
BNS 1, the second largest fishery, entered an AMP in October 1996, with a TACC
increase from 705 t to 1 000 t. The majority of BNS is caught in bottom long-line
fisheries in the Bay of Plenty and off Northland.
13
BNS 2 is the largest fishery and was the most recent entry into an AMP in October
2004. The TACC was increased from 873 t to 1 048 t. Important trawl fisheries occur
off the Wairarapa Coast where BNS is a major bycatch. In recent years the bottom
long-line fishery has become increasingly important in BNS 2 and accounted for 70%
of landings in 2006–07.
14
BNS 3 entered an AMP in October 1992, with a TACC increase from 175 t to 350 t.
This was further increased within the AMP to 925 t in October 2001 (plus an
additional 250 t of ACE provided to Chatham Islands commercial fishers in 2001–02
and 2002–03 only). BNS 3 is the third most important of the BNS stocks and
30
contributed about 20% of the total BNS catch between 1989–90 and 2006–07. This
catch was primarily taken by bottom long-line and bottom trawl, each taking about
40% of the total historic catch. The BNS 3 fishery is an amalgam of several bycatch
and target BNS fisheries that have developed since the introduction of BNS 3 into the
QMS; many have small and sporadic catches.
15
BNS 7 entered the AMP in October 1994 when the TACC was increased from 97 t to
150 t. Bottom long-lining has accounted for 62% of the total BNS 7 landings since
1989–90 with midwater and bottom trawling accounting for another 30% of landings.
70% of BNS 7 landings come from the central west coast of the South Island
(Statistical Areas 033 and 034).
16
BNS 8 entered the AMP in October 1994 when the TACC was increased from 22 t to
100 t. Bottom long-lining has accounted for 94% of BNS 8 landings since 1989–90.
Over 75% of BNS 8 landings come from the combined Statistical Areas 041 and 801
in the northern Taranaki bight, with the remainder coming from the southern Taranaki
bight, south of Cape Egmont.
Table 1: Current TACs, TACCs and allowances for BNS stocks.
TAC
(t)
TACC
(t)
Customary
Allowance
(t)
Recreational
Allowance
(t)
Other sources of
fishing-related
mortality (t)
BNS 1
1 023
1 000
8
15
-
BNS 2
1 107
1 048
13
25
21
BNS 3
961
925
18
18
-
BNS 7
155
150
2
3
-
BNS 8
103
100
1
2
-
Biology
17
BNS have a pelagic larval phase and probably move into deeper areas as they grow.
BNS are distributed at depths from near-surface waters to 1 200 m; although their
main depth range is between 250 and 750 m with a peak between 300 and 400 m.
18
Recent estimates of age suggest a maximum of between 50 and 60 years. The
estimated age at maturity is approximately 10 years; with a corresponding length of
60-65 cm. Based on these recent age estimates, natural mortality is considered to be
between approximately 6 and 8 % per year.
Stock status
19
Full quantitative stock assessments are not available for any BNS stock to allow
assessment of stock status or long-term yields. Neither the AMP Working Group nor
the Plenary provided estimates of stock size in relation to the biomass that can
produce the maximum sustainable yield (BMSY) or current biomass (BCURRENT).
31
20
The best available information on the status of BNS stocks is an analysis of CPUE.
Eleven CPUE analyses were conducted on a variety of BNS fisheries that use both
trawl and long-line methods. An overlay plot of the six standardised CPUE indices
that the Working Group and Plenary considered to be most reliable, and representative
of the BNS 1, BNS 2, BNS 3 and BNS 7 and 8 stocks, is shown in Figure 2. 2 Each of
these indices is also shown separately in Figure 3.
21
All six CPUE indices show markedly similar declines in the period between 2001–02
and 2006-07. For the six most reliable CPUE series (Figures 2 and 3), declines appear
to have started around 2001–02 to 2002–03, with the indices declining by between
43% and 79% (mean 64%) over the six years from 2001–02 to 2006–07 (Table 2). 3
Figure 2: Overlay plots of relative CPUE indices from six BNS fisheries operating in five New
Zealand quota management areas (QMAs). Data are standardised to the 1997–98 to 2006–07
geometric mean. See below for explanation of each CPUE series.
BNS1(EN)BLL – Target BLL fishery for BNS, häpuku and ling in East Northland
BNS1(BP)BLL – Target BLL fishery for BNS, häpuku and ling off Bay of Plenty
BNS2(BNS)BLL – Target BLL fishery for BNS, häpuku and ling
BNS(CHAT)T-OR – Target trawl fishery for BNS and alfonsino on Chatham Rise
BNS3(TARG)BLL – Target BLL fishery for BNS and häpuku
BNS78(TARG)BLL – Target BLL fishery for BNS and häpuku in QMAs 7 and 8 combined
2
Each of the CPUE analyses are based on a suite of core vessels selected so that there was continuity of effort in
the fishery over the entire time period in the analysis, including the period of the decline.
3
All eleven CPUE indices, from which the most reliable six were selected, show similar declining trends in
CPUE.
32
22
CPUE has previously not been considered to be a reliable indicator of abundance for
BNS stocks because of uncertainty between the relationship between CPUE and
abundance. This uncertainty arises from a range of factors that could affect CPUE that
are not related to the size of the stock. Submitters provided several explanations for
why this may be so and these reasons are detailed in paragraph 74.
23
The Plenary noted that “There is a possibility that the long period of relatively stable
CPUE observations outlined [in Figure 2], in the face of increasing catches before the
period of decline, may be evidence of hyper-stability in CPUE caused by the
replenishment of adult stocks in specific areas or features.” When hyper-stability
occurs, CPUE declines at a slower rate than the underlying population, e.g. declines in
CPUE underestimate the true decline in abundance.
24
Hyper-stability can occur when stocks form aggregations that are targeted by fishers.
Whilst targeting these aggregations, catch rates remain high as the fish caught are
replenished by those that move in from surrounding areas. This is significant because
it has the effect of disguising biomass decline on the targeted seabed features until
such time as the wider population is not of sufficient size to replenish the target
aggregation at a rate greater than fishing mortality.
25
Recent increases in targeting of BNS in some areas, and increasing catches, could
have exceeded the replenishment rate, causing the rapid and synchronous declines in
CPUE since 2001–02. The relationship between CPUE and abundance for BNS may
not be linear, and is more likely to be hyper-stable.
26
Although the Plenary did not supply estimates of BCURRENT, MFish scientists consider
that it is still possible to make inferences about the status of the BNS stocks based on
the CPUE data. If CPUE were proportional to abundance then the stocks of BNS
would have declined by an average of 64% since 2001 (Table 2). The stock would
therefore be 36% of the biomass in 2001. As the history of substantial fishing
stretches back to 1986, the 2001 biomass will already be below B0. If the relationship
is hyper-stable the decline in biomass would be greater; perhaps as low as 26% of the
2001 biomass.
27
Although an estimate of BMSY as a percentage of B0 is not given in the Plenary, MFish
scientists consider that, based on species with similar life history including a very low
natural mortality (0.08), it is likely to be in the range of 30-45% B0 or higher. Thus, if
BNS is considered as one single New Zealand-wide stock and the relationship
between CPUE and abundance is hyper-stable as surmised in the 2008 Plenary, then
the current biomass is likely to be below BMSY. Further, if the relationship between
CPUE and abundance is not hyper-stable, a biomass that is 36% of the 2001 biomass,
BNS stocks are still likely to below BMSY.
B
33
Table 2: Estimates of CPUE decline over the most recent six years for the six CPUE models fitted to the years
2001–02 to 2006–07 (Figure 2). Data were obtained from the end points of linear models in Figure 3.
CPUE Model
Decline
(% over 6 years)
43 %
61 %
79 %
71 %
67 %
64 %
64 %
BNS 1 (EN ) BLL
BNS 1 (BP) BLL
BNS 2 (BNS) BLL
BNS 3 (CHAT) T-OR
BNS 3 (TARG) BLL
BNS 7 and 8 (TARG) BLL
Average
BNS1(EN)BLL
1.6
1.6
1.4
1.4
1.2
1.2
1.0
0.8
0.6
BNS1(BP)BLL
1.8
Relative Index
Relative Index
1.8
1.0
0.8
0.6
0.4
CPUE
0.4
0.2
fitted
0.2
0.0
CPUE
fitted
0.0
89/90 91/92 93/94 95/96 97/98 99/00 01/02 03/04 05/06
89/90 91/92 93/94 95/96 97/98 99/00 01/02 03/04 05/06
Fishing Year
Fishing Year
BNS2(BNS)BLL
1.6
1.6
1.4
1.4
Relative Index
Relative Index
1.2
1.0
0.8
0.6
0.4
1.2
1.0
0.8
0.6
0.4
CPUE
0.2
BNS3(CHAT)T-OR
1.8
0.2
fitted
0.0
CPUE
fitted
0.0
89/90 91/92 93/94 95/96 97/98 99/00 01/02 03/04 05/06
89/90 91/92 93/94 95/96 97/98 99/00 01/02 03/04 05/06
Fishing Year
Fishing Year
BNS3(TARG)BLL
2.5
2.5
BNS78(TARG)BLL
CPUE
fitted
2.0
Relative Index
Relative Index
2.0
1.5
1.0
0.5
1.5
1.0
0.5
CPUE
fitted
0.0
0.0
89/90 91/92 93/94 95/96 97/98 99/00 01/02 03/04 05/06
89/90 91/92 93/94 95/96 97/98 99/00 01/02 03/04 05/06
Fishing Year
Fishing Year
Figure 3: Plots of the six main standardised CPUE series for BNS from five BNS QMAs with linear
regressions fitted to the period of recent declining catch rate. The abbreviations used in the titles of each graph
are detailed in Figure 2.
34
Changes in the length of BNS caught
The decline in the East Northland CPUE data in BNS 1 is corroborated by a gradual
reduction in the proportion of mature fish (> 60 cm) in the sampled catch (Figure 5).
This indicates that a larger proportion of BNS catch is made of immature fish and this
could represent a reduction in the abundance of mature fish which may impact on
recruitment to the fishery. There is also information to suggest that the proportion of
fish larger than 60cm caught in the Chatham Rise bottom trawl fishery in BNS 3 has
declined (Figure 4). These trends are not evident across all BNS stocks.
1.2
All Sexes Combined
1.0
Proportion >60 cm
28
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0.0
94/95
96/97
98/99
00/01
02/03
04/05
06/07
Fishing Year
EN-BLL
BP-BLL
CR-BT
CR-BLL
WCNI-BLL
BNS 7&8-BLL
Figure 4: Summary of the total proportion of BNS > 60cm length by QMA / fishing area by
year, from commercial logbook programme data. See below for description of series.
EN-BLL – Target BLL fishery for BNS, häpuku and ling in East Northland (BNS 1)
BP-BLL – Target BLL fishery for BNS, häpuku and ling off Bay of Plenty (BNS 1)
CR-BT – Target trawl fishery for BNS and alfonsino on Chatham Rise (BNS 3)
CR-BLL – Target BLL fishery for BNS and häpuku (BNS 3)
WCNI-BLL – West Coast North Island target BLL fishery
BNS7&8BLL – Target BLL fishery for BNS and häpuku (BNS 7 and 8)
35
Summary of Options
Initial and Final Proposals
29
MFish consulted on three or four options for each BNS stock. These options remain
unchanged in this Final Advice Paper (FAP). A summary of options is provided
below (Table 3).
Table 3: Summary of the proposed options for all BNS stocks.
Option 1
Status
quo (t)
BNS 1
BNS 2
BNS 3
BNS 7
BNS 8
Option 2 –
TAC based on
a TACC set at
10% below
recent
commercial
catch (t)
Option 3 –
TAC based on
a TACC set at
30% below
recent
commercial
catch (t)
Option 4 –
TAC based on
a TACC set at
40% below
recent
commercial
catch (t)
TAC
1 023
825 (↓ 19%)
647 (↓ 37%)
558 (↓ 45%)
TACC
1 000
786
612
524
TAC
1 107
958 (↓ 13%)
753 (↓ 32%)
-
TACC
1 048
902
701
-
TAC
961
698 (↓ 27%)
551 (↓ 43%)
478 (↓ 50%)
TACC
925
649
505
433
TAC
155
96 (↓ 38%)
76 (↓ 51%)
-
TACC
150
89
70
-
TAC
103
47 (↓ 54%)
37 (↓ 64%)
-
TACC
100
43
33
-
30
Each BNS stock had the option of retaining the status quo; option 2: setting a TAC
based on a 10% reduction in recent commercial catch (this is based on the average
commercial catch of that stock between 1 October 2001 and 30 September 2007); and
option 3: setting a TAC based on a 30% reduction in recent commercial catch (based
on the average commercial catch of that stock between 1 October 2001 and 30
September 2007). In addition to these options, an option was presented for BNS 1 and
3 of a 40% reduction in recent commercial catch (based on the average commercial
catch of that stock between 1 October 2001 and 30 September 2007).
31
The reason for this additional option in BNS 1 and 3 was that catch has declined
significantly over the period between 1 October 2001 and 30 September 2007. This
meant that the average catch over this period was significantly higher than the last two
fishing years (Figures 5 and 7). As such, options 2 and 3 may not sufficiently increase
the likelihood that the biomass of BNS 1 and 3 will increase.
36
32
The average catch between 1 October 2001 and 30 September 2007 was selected as
the basis for considering reductions in TACs as this generally covers the period of
declining CPUE (Figures 2 and 3). MFish also considered that basing average catch
over this time period, rather than a shorter time, period was preferred because it better
accounted for any changes in fishing behaviour based on prevailing economic
conditions or other operational imperatives. Average commercial catch information
for each BNS stock is presented in Table 4.
33
When formulating the options for the IPP, MFish believed that a reduction of less than
10% may not sufficiently address any sustainability concerns. For some BNS stocks,
where catches have been declining steadily, this would not constrain catch below
harvest levels over the last two years (Table 6). MFish considers that any reduction
greater than 30% (or 40% for BNS 1 and 3) may impose too great a short-term cost on
the commercial industry relative to the benefits of reducing risk.
34
In MFish’s opinion, the options in the IPP represented a range of reasonable options
for the basis of consultation. This does not constrain you from considering measures
within the range consulted on (e.g. a 20% reduction) or options slightly outside this
range. However, the final decision on the quantum of any reduction in the TAC will
depend on your interpretation of the severity and immediacy of the sustainability risk
and the socio-economic impacts associated with various reductions.
35
Should you consider there is a need to reduce BNS catches significantly, but recognise
that such reductions would have substantial impact on fishers, you may consider a
phased reduction. A phased reduction would see you consulting on gradual reductions
of the TAC over several years to allow fishers the opportunity to minimise the impact
of reduced catches on their businesses. This would also allow CPUE to be reexamined and the effect of catch reductions assessed before considering further
management action.
Other Allowances and Deemed Values
36
In most BNS stocks, recent commercial catches have been below the annual TACC;
the exception being BNS 2. 4 As a result, proposed TACs based on recent catch
represent significant reductions to the existing TAC. The smallest proposed reduction
being from BNS 2 (13%, because of over-catch of the TACC); and the greatest
reduction being BNS 8 (64%, because of the greatest under-catch of the TACC)
(Table 3).
37
The options consulted on reduce only the commercial allowance, i.e. the TACC. This
is considered reasonable for two reasons. First, the initial AMP for each fishery
increased substantially the TACCs only; as this represented an allocation of the TAC
to the commercial sector, any reduction in the TAC should now be applied only to the
commercial sector. Secondly, the combined recreational and customary noncommercial allowances are very minor components of the BNS TACs: BNS 1 (2.2%);
BNS 2 (3.4%); BNS 3 (3.7%); BNS 7 (3.2%); BNS 8 (2.9%). It is also unlikely that
catches by these sectors have increased significantly in recent years.
38
The TAC for BNS 2 contains an allowance for other sources of fishing-related
mortality that is set at 2% of the TACC. Based on a TACC of 1 048 tonnes, this
4
Deemed values were increased in BNS 2 on 1 October 2007 to address this over-catch.
37
equated to 21 tonnes when it was set for the 1 October 2004 fishing year. MFish
considers that this proportional allowance should remain. There is no similar
allowance in BNS 1, 3, 7 or 8. There have been reports of predation by orca of BNS
caught by long-line and there is likely to be mortality associated with trawl fisheries.
MFish recommends that you set an allowance of 2% of the TACC for other sources of
fishing-related mortality in BNS 1, 3, 7 and 8 to align these stocks with BNS 2.
39
MFish also consulted on increasing deemed values in BNS 1, 3, 7 and 8. Separate
advice will be given to you on deemed values in BNS stocks. That paper should be
read in conjunction with this FAP.
Consultation
40
Consultation on the IPP was undertaken with such persons or organisations
representative of those classes of persons having an interest in the stock or the effects
of fishing on the aquatic environment in the area concerned, including Maori,
environmental, commercial, and recreational interests.
Submissions Received
41
Submissions on the IPP were received from:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Area 2 Inshore Finfish Management Company (Area 2);
AC Enterprises; BNS quota owners in BNS 1 and 2;
Challenger Finfisheries Management Company (Challenger);
Sanford Ltd;
Northern Finfisheries Management Company (Northern);
The Environment and Conservation Organisations on New Zealand (ECO);
Aotearoa Fisheries Ltd (AFL);
The New Zealand Seafood Industry Council (SeaFIC);
•
Stu Morrison (oral submission); a fisherman in BNS 7 and 8.
Rationale for Management Options
TAC
Stock Structure
42
The concurrent decline of six independent CPUE series covering all the main BNS
fisheries may indicate that there is a single New Zealand stock of BNS or some close
relationship among stocks in these QMAs. The Plenary noted that declines in CPUE
have been observed even in areas that are relatively lightly fished such as BNS 7 and
BNS 8. The existence of a single New Zealand-wide BNS stock declining in all areas
would imply not only that current catch in each BNS stock is unsustainable, but that
the overall combined catch is also unsustainable.
43
An environmental mechanism simultaneously affecting availability or catch-ability of
BNS across all QMAs is considered to be less likely than the possibility of a single
38
stock, or of correlated recruitment across sub-stocks. The Plenary considered that the
synchronous recent declines in CPUE were probably caused by high fishing mortality
and a possible coincidental decline in recruitment.
Status of the stocks
44
As discussed above, all CPUE indices show markedly similar declines in the period
between 1 October 2001 and 30 September 2007; these declines range from 43% to
79% (mean 64%) (Table 2).
45
There is currently no stock assessment available for any BNS stock that will allow
estimation of the biomass that can produce the maximum sustainable yield (BMSY) or
the current biomass (BCURRENT). However, as noted above, if BNS is considered as
one single New Zealand-wide stock and if the relationship between CPUE and
abundance is hyper-stable as surmised in the 2008 Plenary, then MFish scientists
consider that the current biomass is likely to be below BMSY.
B
Management Objectives
46
The purpose of the Act is to provide for the utilisation of fisheries resources while
ensuring sustainability. Based on the decline in CPUE in all BNS stocks, the Plenary
considered that current catches across all stocks are not likely to be sustainable.
Section 13
47
The Act has recently been amended by the addition of section 13(2A). Because no
decision has yet been made or considered under this new section, MFish has provided
some background and detail on the new section below. As this is an important section
of the Act, MFish has set put the new section out in full for your information.
48
Consequential amendments were also made to other subsections of section 13, but are
not set out here.
Section 13(2A)
(2A) For the purposes of setting a total allowable catch under this section, if the
Minister considers that the current level of the stock or the level of the stock that can
produce the maximum sustainable yield is not able to be estimated reliably using the
best available information, the Minister must—
(a) not use the absence of, or any uncertainty in, that information as a reason for
postponing or failing to set a total allowable catch for the stock; and
(b) have regard to the interdependence of stocks, the biological characteristics of the
stock, and any environmental conditions affecting the stock; and
(c) set a total allowable catch—
(i) using the best available information; and
39
(ii) that is not inconsistent with the objective of maintaining the stock at or
above, or moving the stock towards or above, a level that can produce the
maximum sustainable yield.
49
MFish considers that section 13(2A) should be used to set TACs for all BNS stocks in
this advice paper.
50
The purpose of section 13(2A) is to enable the continuation of established practices in
relation to setting a TAC under section 13. Section 13(2A) provides a technical
amendment as a consequence of the judgment of Miller J in Anton’s Trawling
Company Limited v The Minister of Fisheries (High Court, Wellington, CIV 2007485-2199, 22 February 2008). The court in that case decided that before a TAC can be
set under section 13, you must be provided with an estimate of both current biomass
(BCURRENT) and the biomass that can produce the maximum sustainable yield (BMSY).
51
Since the Act came into force, various management strategies—all consistent with the
concept of MSY—have been pursued, some using modelled estimates of biomass
levels and others using alternative indicators of the relative state of the stocks such as
CPUE. Some of the alternative indicators have direct links to MSY. In other cases the
links are inferred. These alternative approaches are commonly used in fish stocks
where information on biomass is not readily available. This is the case for the
majority of New Zealand’s 629 quota management stocks and is the norm
internationally, being commonly used in jurisdictions with similar regimes such as
Australia, the United States, and Canada.
52
Section 13(2A) enables TACs to continue to be set under section 13 using existing
management approaches, even where the current biomass and the biomass that can
produce a MSY are not able to be estimated reliably for many stocks. MFish considers
that the CPUE information is sufficient to establish that BNS stocks are below BMSY.
However, the information is not sufficient to estimate reliably the current level of the
stock or the level of the stock that can produce the maximum sustainable yield.
Consequently any decision to reduce TACs should be made under section 13(2A).
53
MFish considers that reducing BNS TACs to enable stocks, which are thought to be
below BMSY, to rebuild is an approach that is not inconsistent with the objective of
moving the stock towards or above a level that can produce the maximum sustainable
yield as required by section 13(2A)(c)(ii).
Specific Objectives of section 13(2A)
54
The key objective of the amendment to section 13(2A) is to restore your ability to
make total allowable catch (TAC) decisions for all relevant stocks, in a way that takes
into account best available information, and is consistent with the following
objectives:
a)
You should be able to make TAC decisions in the absence of the biomass
estimates currently required by section 13(2) of the Act, using the best
information available from a range of sources;
b)
Section 13(2A) does not disturb the balance between sustainability and
utilisation in the Act as it has functioned in respect of TAC setting in recent
40
years;
c)
No TAC decision under section 13(2A) should be knowingly inconsistent with
the current objective to maintain stocks, or move them toward a target level at
or above the level that can produce the maximum sustainable yield (the MSYbase objective);
d)
TAC setting should use the most information rich process available, without
necessitating a level of research and stock assessment investment involving
unreasonable cost, effort or time – consistent with section 10(a);
e)
TAC setting should continue to consider relevant social, cultural and economic
factors.
Recent BNS Catches
55
The TACCs in BNS 1, 3, 7 and 8 have been under-caught on average over the last six
years (Table 4 and Figures 5 to 9). In contrast, the TACC in BNS 2 has been overcaught in five of the last six fishing years with the exception of last year when only
957 of the 1 048 t TACC was taken.
Table 4: Average catch and TACCs between 1 October 2001 and 30 September 2007; percent of the TACC
caught; and 10%, 30% and 40% reductions in average catch. A 2% allowance for other sources of fishingrelated mortality has also been subtracted from all TACCs.
Average
TACC (t)
Average
catch (t)
% of
TACC
caught
10%
30%
40%
reduction reduction reduction
in catch (t) in catch (t) in catch (t)
BNS 1
1000
891
89%
786
612
524
BNS 2
961
1022
106%
902
701
-
BNS 3
1008
736
73%
649
505
433
BNS 7
150
101
67%
89
70
-
BNS 8
100
49
49%
43
33
-
56
The rationale for reducing the TACC is based on a decline in the CPUE of all BNS
stocks. As a result of the general trend of under-catching TACCs, MFish considers
that the level to which TACCs are reduced should be below recent catch. MFish also
considers that the TACC should be reduced below the average catch between 1
October 2001 and 30 September 2007.
57
Because of the varying extent to which TACCs have been caught in each BNS stock,
the options presented in this FAP will have the effect of reducing the TACCs for some
BNS stocks more than others.
Uniformity of management options
58
While there are differences in the magnitude of the decline in CPUE among BNS
stocks (Table 2), MFish believes the information is not sufficient to establish whether
41
there is greater risk to the sustainability of particular BNS stocks that would justify
greater or lesser reductions in TACCs. However, because of the difference in recent
catch among stocks, you may consider that for some stocks a greater reduction in the
TAC is necessary to ensure that the biomass of BNS stocks remains at, or rebuilds to,
a level that is not inconsistent with the MSY-based objective.
59
There may also be different social, cultural or economic considerations that warrant
different management responses in specific BNS stocks. Section 13(3) requires that
you have regard to social, cultural and economic factors when considering the way
and the rate at which a stock is moved to its target level. For example, reducing the
TACCs in BNS 7 and 8, where there are already low TACCs and catches, may
significantly reduce the availability of ACE in those fisheries. This may have a
significant impact on fishers that rely on ACE for their fishing operations. In light of
the possibility of a single BNS stock, any reduction in TACCs in such fisheries will
need to consider such social and economic factors.
Impact of TAC reductions
60
BNS is a relatively high value species with an export price in December 2007 of
approximately $7.37 per kg. 5 Based on recent catch, reducing the TAC of BNS stocks
would result in reductions in revenue (Table 5).
61
Current catches have averaged only 76% of the TACCs in the last two fishing years
(Table 6). Consequently when the average recent catches between 1 October 2005 and
30 September 2007 are compared to the proposed TACCs, the estimated revenue
reduction is significantly less across all stocks except BNS 2 (Table 7). However,
even reducing a TACC to a level above recent catch may have an impact on the asset
value of quota and hence impose a cost on quota holders. Such reductions may also
provide an incentive for fishers to catch more of their ACE even where there is little
financial benefit in doing so; essentially a “use it or lose it” approach.
Table 5: Estimated reduction in revenue based on difference between average catch between 1 October 2001
and 30 September 2007 and proposed new TACCs. Estimates are based on an export price of $7.37 per kg
greenweight.
Average
catch (t)
TACC
based on
10%
reduction
in catch (t)
Revenue
reduction
for 10%
reduction
TACC
based on
30%
reduction
in catch (t)
Revenue
reduction
for 30%
reduction
TACC
based on
40%
reduction
in catch (t)
Revenue
reduction
for 40%
reduction
BNS 1
891
786
$774,000
612
$2.06M
524
$2.70M
BNS 2
1 022
902
$804,000
701
$2.37M
-
-
BNS 3
736
649
$641,000
505
$1.70M
433
$2.23M
BNS 7
101
89
$88,000
70
$228,000
-
-
BNS 8
49
43
$44,000
33
$118,000
-
-
Total
2 799
2 519
$2.30M
1 959
$6.37M
977
$4.97M
5
Greenweight equivalent for the most common exported state – chilled headed and gutted.
42
Table 6: Average catches compared against TACCs in the last two fishing years.
Current
TACC
(t)
Average catch in 05/06
and 06/07 fishing years (t)
TACC in 05/06 and 06/07
fishing years (t)
Percentage
of TACC
caught
BNS 1
1 000
721
1000
72.1%
BNS 2
1 048
1 047
1 048
99.9%
BNS 3
925
524
925
56.6%
BNS 7
150
124
150
82.7%
BNS 8
100
35
100
35.0%
Total
3 223
2 450
3223
76.0%
Table 7: Estimated reduction in revenue based on difference between average catch between 1 October 2005
and 30 September 2007 and proposed new TACCs. Estimates are based on an export price of $7.37 per
kg greenweight.
TACC
based on
10%
reduction in
catch (t)
Reduction
in revenue
based on
10% TACC
reduction
TACC
based on
30%
reduction in
catch (t)
Reduction
in revenue
based on
30% TACC
reduction
TACC
based on
40%
reduction in
catch (t)
Reduction
in revenue
based on
40% TACC
reduction
BNS 1
786
nil
612
$803,000
524
$1.45M
BNS 2
902
$1.07M
701
$2.55M
-
-
BNS 3
649
nil
505
$140,000
433
$671,000
BNS 7
89
$258,000
70
$398,000
-
-
BNS 8
43
nil
33
$15,000
-
-
Total
2 519
$1.19M
1 959
$3.81M
977
$1.97M
TACC and Allowances
62
The TAC must be apportioned between the relevant sectors and interests set out in
sections 20 and 21 of the Act. Section 21 prescribes that you shall make allowances
for Maori customary non-commercial interests, recreational fishing interests, and for
any other sources of fishing-related mortality, before setting the TACC. In
determining the TACC and these allowances, you should consider how the allowances
will enable people to provide for their social, economic and cultural wellbeing (as
provided for in the purpose of the Act).
43
63
There are recreational and Mäori customary allowances for all BNS stocks (Table 1).
These allowances are a relatively small percentage of the TAC. Retaining the
allowances and reducing the TAC would represent a small re-allocation of the TAC to
the recreational and customary sectors. MFish recommends that you retain the
allowances for recreational and Mäori customary fishing.
64
No submissions were received on this issue.
Other sources of fishing-related mortality
65
Little quantitative information is available on the level of illegal catch or other sources
of mortality. It is likely that some indirect fishing-related mortality will occur because
of BNS escaping through trawl nets but being fatally injured. Similarly it is likely that
there is some additional predation associated with long-line fishing.
66
Under section 21 of the Fisheries Act, when setting or varying a TACC you must have
regard to the TAC and must allow for all other mortality to that stock caused by
fishing. It would be consistent with section 21 to set a limit for fishing-related
mortality for BNS 1, 3, 7 and 8.
67
There is already an allowance of 2% of the TACC for BNS 2 and MFish considers it
is appropriate to include a similar allowance for other BNS stocks. MFish
recommends that you set an allowance in BNS 1, 3, 7 and 8 at 2% of the TACC to
align the allowance with that in BNS 2 (Table 8).
68
MFish received no submission on the proposal to introduce an allowance for other
sources of fishing-related mortality of 2% of the TACC.
Table 8: Proposed allowances for other sources of fishing-related mortality for options 2, 3 and 4.
TACC based
on option 2
(t)
Allowance
based on
option 2 (t)
TACC based
on option 3
(t)
Allowance
based on
option 3 (t)
TACC based
on option 4
(t)
Allowance
based on
option 4 (t)
BNS 1
786
16
612
12
524
11
BNS 2
902
18
701
14
-
-
BNS 3
649
13
505
10
433
9
BNS 7
89
2
70
1
-
-
BNS 8
43
1
33
1
-
-
Discussion of Submissions
69
As summary of submissions is appended to this advice. The summary largely reflects
the general comments below and those detailed later in the paper with respect to
specific Options. Submitters raised two primary issues that are discussed below.
44
The reliability of CPUE
70
MFish stated in the IPP that CPUE has previously not been considered a reliable
indicator of abundance for BNS stocks. One reason for this is that CPUE may be
affected by numerous operational and management decisions that are unrelated to the
abundance of the stock. Consequently, managers have generally been cautious in their
reliance on CPUE as an index of abundance. However, the close coincidence observed
in declining CPUE in all BNS stocks has increased the confidence in their value on
this occasion as an index of abundance.
71
SeaFIC, like other submitters, noted that using CPUE data requires some care and that
until recently the use of CPUE data has been met with circumspection. SeaFIC agreed
that the combined decline of CPUE in all BNS stocks added weight to the use of
CPUE as an index of abundance. SeaFIC noted CPUE can only reflect underlying
abundance when biological and operational factors affecting CPUE can be
disentangled.
72
SeaFIC considered that the science alone was not a sufficient basis for making
credible TACC decisions but that other factors that may influence the CPUE need to
be incorporated into decision-making.
73
While submitters generally accepted that the decline in the CPUE data was of
concern, all but one provided reasons why CPUE may be declining independently of
stock abundance.
74
MFish considers that the factors summarised below from submitters could influence
the CPUE data and should be taken into account when you decide whether to reduce
the TAC in all BNS stocks. However, MFish is unable to advise on the extent to
which any of these factors may influence CPUE:
• The recent retirement of many experienced skippers. This could reduce CPUE as
less-experienced skippers may have lower catch rates than those who have more
experience at catching BNS and knowledge of the most productive fishing
grounds. More experienced skippers have moved to BNS fishing on the High Seas
rather than fishing inside New Zealand waters.
• Increases in fuel prices. This may result in fishers not travelling offshore in search
of new grounds where catch rates may be higher. Fishers may choose to forego
higher catch rates as the cost of the fuel to catch the fish outweighs the economic
benefit of higher catch rates.
• Maritime New Zealand changed the qualifications for skippers in approximately
2001. Up to that time, many skippers’ qualifications allowed them to fish out to
100 nautical miles from the coast. When the qualifications changed, many skippers
were only able to fish out to 12 nautical miles. This had the effect of concentrating
more vessels in the Territorial Sea and hence reducing catch rates in that area.
Skippers were not able to travel further offshore to target BNS on features outside
the Territorial Sea. In approximately 2004, the offshore limit for many skippers
was again changed to 20 miles which allowed many fishers to fish further offshore.
45
• An increasing emphasis on landing higher value fresh fish resulting in shorter
voyage times and fishing closer to shore. As a result, effort is concentrated in a
smaller area and may contribute to declining CPUE.
• Increased predation, particularly by orca, of BNS caught on longlines has been
reported. This can reduce yield and also CPUE.
• The introduction of auto-liners to the fishery in recent years. This may result in
more hooks being set than traditional lining methods. The auto-liners also set
hooks over a wider habitat range and are less discriminate than manual liners. This
results in a decline in CPUE. Fishers are also catching BNS as part of a mixed
species fishery that results in wider, less BNS-specific setting practice.
• Changes in fine-scale fishing patterns. Historically BNS 1 fishers undertook a
“rotational pinnacle (feature) farming practice” that would target specific features
for BNS by setting a relatively small number of hooks over a short period then
moving on before catch rates declined. This now occurs less since the introduction
of auto-line hooks and because there are less experienced skippers in the fishery
that are familiar with this fishing practice.
TACCs based on recent catch
75
There are a variety of factors that influence when, how and by whom BNS ACE will
be caught. These include catching capacity, market variables, external costs, weather
conditions, and availability of ACE for target and bycatch stocks. Submitters stated
that these factors have contributed to the recent decline in catches, and in particular
some larger BNS quota holders are not fishing their ACE for commercial reasons.
Some of the factors listed above, such as limiting the distance fishers can fish from
shore, may also be contributing to the recent decline in catches.
76
The capacity to catch BNS has reduced significantly since the entry of large tuna
species into the QMS—these vessels also caught some BNS. Upon the introduction of
the tuna species, many fishers took that opportunity to retire and sell their vessels and
newly-acquired quota. The tuna long line fleet reduced from approximately 120
vessels to 30 vessels.
77
For these reasons, some submitters considered smaller reductions in TACs should be
made because basing a TAC on catch history when fishers had chosen not to fish their
ACE was inequitable. Further, this could potentially undermine the incentive for
fishers to refrain from catching their ACE if it was more economic to do so.
Submissions in support of specific options
78
Where submitters supported specific options proposed in the IPP, these will be
discussed following that option.
79
SeaFIC stated that it did not have a view on the best options for setting TACCs in
each BNS stock. However, SeaFIC strongly encouraged the relevant commercial
stakeholder organisations to submit on the BNS fishery in their area so that the
individual circumstances of each fishery could be taken into consideration.
46
80
SeaFIC however did submit that, unless there are good operational reasons to indicate
otherwise, TACCs should be no greater, and ideally somewhat lower, than recent
catches.
Assessment of Management options
MFish General Comments
81
The following general comments are relevant to all BNS stocks. Rather than repeating
them in each section you should bear the following comments in mind when
considering options for all BNS stocks.
82
MFish agrees with submitters that the CPUE data indicate a need for a TAC reduction
for all BNS stocks. MFish also acknowledges that the operational and management
reasons that were supplied by submitters could explain why CPUE may be declining
independently of stock abundance; these were outlined in paragraph 74. However,
MFish considers there may be management and operational reasons that could also
increase CPUE; these include increasing skipper experience and advances in fishing
technology. The influence of any of these factors is unknown, and consequently the
extent to which the CPUE data represent the underlying abundance of the stock is also
unknown.
83
MFish considers that the uncertainty about the reliability of CPUE, and the possible
influence of management and operational factors on CPUE, do not justify a reduction
as large as that proposed under option 4 for BNS 1 and 3. These cuts represent 48 %
and 54 % reductions in the TACC for BNS 1 and 3 respectively and would result in
revenue reductions of $2.7 and $2.23 M for BNS 1 and 3.
84
Option 2 in all cases provides for more utilisation than option 3 but adopts a
correspondingly less cautious approach to ensuring sustainability. Option 2 also
places greater weight on the management and operational measures mentioned by
submitters in paragraph 74 that may affect CPUE independently of abundance.
85
In light of the uncertainties in the best available information and uncertain stock
information, the proposed reductions of the TAC under option 3 may provide greater
certainty over the longer term that BNS will be managed at or above BMSY. It is,
however, not possible to ascertain with any certainty the actual or likely effect of the
proposed TACs on the biomass and sustainability of BNS, and is best characterised as
a risk mitigation approach. The cost to utilisation must be weighed against the
mitigation of risk to sustainability.
86
Option 3 places greater weight on the level of uncertainty generally, and the risk that a
sustainability problem might not be detected in advance of substantial stock depletion.
The biology of BNS is also a consideration. BNS are a relatively long-lived species
(perhaps 50-60 years) and have a low natural mortality of 6-8 % (compared to orange
roughy 3B where natural mortality is thought to be approximately 4.5 %). As such,
BNS are a relatively low productivity species.
87
BNS are also known to form aggregations, this is important because when targeting
aggregations, catch rates remain high as the fish caught are replenished by those that
47
move in from surrounding areas. This may have the effect of disguising biomass
decline on the targeted seabed feature until such time as the wider population is no
longer of sufficient size to replenish the aggregation at a rate greater than fishing
mortality.
88
Since stock status is not known for any BNS stock, option 3 provides you with greater
certainty that sustainability is ensured over the longer term. This greater level of
certainty must be balanced with the greater costs to industry of option 3.
89
Additional information that would help to better determine where the stock is in
relation to BMSY is unlikely to be available in the near future. This may weigh in
favour of adopting a more cautious approach to ensuring sustainability as available
under option 3.
90
Until recently there has been little information available to determine the precise
location of fishing activity. This information will be available in the future due to
changes in the reporting requirements. Given the influence that concentrating fishing
effort in areas closer to the coast may have on CPUE, fine scale spatial information
may be important to manage BNS fisheries.
91
There is no Fisheries Plan approved for BNS under section 11A. Future management
through a BNS Fisheries Plan may provide a better management vehicle for BNS.
This may allow for catch-splitting arrangements and feature limits that have been used
to spread effort in other fisheries.
Way and rate of moving to BMSY
92
Section 13(3) of the Act requires that when considering the way that the stock will be
moved towards a level that is not inconsistent with maximum sustainable yield, you
must take have regard to such social, cultural and economic factors you consider
relevant.
93
If you determine that a rebuild is needed and that a reduction in the TAC to rebuild
the stock is appropriate, you must decide on the way and the rate to rebuild the stock.
MFish has provided you with two or three possible TAC levels for each BNS stock.
There is no statutory guidance on what an appropriate “way and rate” might be in any
given case – it is a matter for you to determine having regard to such social, cultural,
and economic factors you consider relevant.
94
In the case of BNS, given the uncertain information on stock size, it is not possible to
determine any meaningful rebuild timeframe. With such uncertainty over current
stock status, it is also not possible to measure the “rate” of movement towards a target
level. However, if you determine that a stock rebuild is appropriate under the
circumstances, MFish considers that a smaller TAC reduction under option 2 would
likely provide for a slower rebuild (stock increase) than that which otherwise would
occur under options 3 or 4. You may consider a slower rebuild to be appropriate given
the relevant social, cultural and economic factors.
95
Similarly, you may consider a series of staged TAC cuts as a different “way” of
rebuilding BNS stocks to the target level, which would also provide for a slower
rebuild than that which otherwise would occur under a single larger TAC reduction.
48
Such a staged reduction may allow fishers to mitigate some of the adverse economic,
social and cultural impacts of a large TAC reduction. For example, in light of the
effect that option 4 is likely to have on short term utilisation by commercial BNS 1
fishers, it is open to you to make a smaller TAC reduction than that proposed by
option 4 (such as the reduction proposed by option 2) with a view to making (in
principle) a further reduction for the 1 October 2009 fishing year. In other words, you
may select any series of staged TAC reductions to reach the ultimate target level.
96
That said, you must be aware that any future decision, as part of a staged reduction,
such as for the 1 October 2009 fishing year, on the TAC would be a fresh decision,
and must be based on the best information available at that time. MFish advises that it
is unlikely that there will be any better information at that time in relation to the stock
with respect to BMSY, or improved way and rate assessments for any BNS stock.
All BNS stocks
Option 1 – Retaining the Status Quo
97
Because the costs and benefits of option 1 are similar among BNS stocks they are
considered generically in this section.
Impact
98
As discussed above, the status quo has resulted in declines in CPUE of between 43%
and 79% (mean 64%) between 1 October 2001 and 30 September 2007 for the six
most reliable CPUE indices. Based largely on these data, the Plenary concluded that
current harvests of all BNS stocks are unlikely to be sustainable over the short to
medium term.
Costs
99
The status quo option maintains the current TAC for each BNS stock and will provide
for the opportunity for all BNS catches to increase above their recent levels.
100
Maintaining the status quo will likely result in the continuation of fishing at levels that
are considered by the Plenary as unlikely to be sustainable; this option therefore is
likely to be inconsistent with the purpose of the Act as it is unlikely to ensure the
sustainability of BNS stocks.
Benefits
101
There may be a short-term financial advantage to the commercial sector in
maintaining higher BNS catches in the coming fishing year or allowing more time to
adjust their fishing practices and infrastructure to accommodate any future reductions
in BNS TACs. However, these advantages are likely to be short lived if stocks decline
and subsequently result in significantly worse catches in future.
Submissions
102
No submitter supported option 1 for any BNS stock, nor does MFish support this
option for any BNS stock.
49
BNS 1
103
Two CPUE indices were presented above for BNS 1. CPUE in the East Northland
bottom long-line fishery declined by 43 % between 1 October 2001 and 30 September
2007; and by 61 % in the Bay of Plenty bottom long-line fishery. There is also
evidence of a gradual reduction in the proportion of mature fish (> 60 cm) in the
sampled catch. Three options are discussed below; all of which are summarised in
Table 10.
Hauraki Gulf Marine Park Act 2000
104
Section 11(2)(c) of the Fisheries Act requires you to take into account ss 7 and 8 of
the Hauraki Gulf Marine Park Act 2000 (HGMP Act) when setting or varying any
sustainability measure; this includes a TAC. Further, s 13 of the HGMP Act requires
you, when setting a TACC, to have particular regard to ss 7 and 8 of the HGMP Act
in so far as the decision relates to the Hauraki Gulf.
105
Section 7 recognises the national significance of the Hauraki Gulf including its
capacity to provide for the relationship of tangata whenua with the Gulf and the
social, economic, recreational, and cultural well-being of people and communities.
Section 8 sets out the objectives of the management of the Hauraki Gulf, which
include the maintenance of the Hauraki Gulf for the social and economic well-being
and its contribution to the recreation and enjoyment of the people and communities of
the Hauraki Gulf and New Zealand. The maintenance and enhancement of the
physical resources of the Gulf, which include BNS, is also an objective.
106
Given that the options proposed for BNS TACs do not change the customary or
recreational allowances, there is likely to be little impact on the historic, traditional,
cultural, and spiritual relationship of the tangata whenua; or the social, economic,
recreational, and cultural well-being of people and communities associated with the
Gulf.
107
There is a possibility that reduced commercial catch in the larger area of BNS 1 will
increase the availability of BNS to the customary and recreational sector in the
Hauraki Gulf. In addition, based on the proposals to reduce the TACC only, the
options for all BNS stocks will result in a greater proportion of the TAC being
allocated to non-commercial Mäori and recreational fishing interests.
108
There is little reported commercial catch of BNS from the Statistical Areas 005, 006
and 007. These Statistical Areas are situated in BNS 1 and also overlap with the
Hauraki Gulf Marine Park in the inner Hauraki Gulf. Between 1 October 2001 and 30
September 2007, 7.7 t of BNS was reported as being caught commercially from this
area using any method.
109
There is also partial overlap of the Hauraki Gulf Marine Park with the significantly
larger statistical area 008. This area encompasses the eastern side of Great Barrier
Island and the eastern coast of the Coromandel Peninsula down to Shoe Island. BNS
catches from area 008 are more significant. Between 1 October 2001 and 30
September 2007, 346 t of BNS was reported as being caught commercially from this
area. Given this small current catch, the well-being of the commercial sector is
unlikely to be affected by a TAC reduction. If the BNS 1 TACC is reduced
50
commercial fishers will still be able to harvest BNS from the Hauraki Gulf. MFish
believes that the options proposed in this paper do not impact significantly on the
wellbeing of the people of the Hauraki Gulf.
Option 2 - Impact and Costs
110
This option would reduce the TACC in BNS 1 from 1000 t to 786 t (a 21 % reduction
in the TACC). The average catch in BNS 1 between 1 October 2001 and 30
September 2007 was 891 t and, based on an export price of $7.37 per kg, this option
would represent a reduction in revenue of approximately $774,000.
111
BNS catches have declined since 2003 (Table 9 and Figure 5), although as discussed
above this could be due to a range of management and operational factors. The
average catch from the last two fishing years, 1 October 2005 to 30 September 2007,
was only 721 t. Based on the most recent catch information, a reduction in the TACC
to 786 t would not result in an actual reduction in catch or revenue, although this may
reduce quota value.
Table 9: Reported landings of BNS in BNS 1.
Reported
landings (t)
TACC (t)
2001–02
954
1 000
2002–03
1 051
1 000
2003–04
1 030
1 000
2004–05
870
1 000
2005–06
699
1 000
2006–07
742
1 000
1100
Historical TACC
Annual catch (t)
1000
900
800
TACC under Option 2
700
TACC under Option 3
600
500
2000
TACC under Option 4
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
Figure 5: Average catches in relation to the historical TACC and the proposed TACCs for Options 2 , 3 and 4.
112
Because of the decline in recent catches, a reduction in the TACC to 10% below
average catches between 1 October 2001 and 30 September 2007 will not constrain
catch at recent levels (Figure 5). As such, there is a risk that continuing to fish at
51
current levels, or potentially slightly higher levels, will not sufficiently arrest any
decline in stock size. The points raised by submitters and summarised above at
paragraph 74 are important to consider here as there may be reasons other than stock
abundance that are affecting CPUE.
Benefits
113
This option should increase the likelihood that BNS 1 increases to, or remains at, a
level that is not inconsistent with MSY. When compared to option 3, option 2 would
result in a smaller reduction to the TAC, and lower short-term financial costs to the
commercial sector. This option will give operators more time to adjust their fishing
practices and infrastructure to accommodate any future reductions in BNS TACs,
should they be necessary.
114
Reducing the TACC should have the advantage of leaving additional BNS in the
water. These additional fish may benefit the recreational and customary sectors by
maintaining or increasing catch rates and possibly, over time, the size of BNS
available.
Submissions
115
Northern represents quota owners in Areas 1, 8 and 9. Northern supported option 2 to
reduce the TACC to 10% below recent catch. However, there was no consensus
among Northern’s members, some of whom supported the more conservative TACC
reduction of 30% below recent catch.
116
Northern pointed out that until recently CPUE has not been considered by MFish to
be reliable enough to estimate BNS abundance and discussed some operational factors
that may be impacting on BNS CPUE as outlined above.
117
AC Enterprises are quota owners in BNS 1 and supported the submission of Northern.
118
Sanford is a significant quota holder in BNS stocks. Sanford accepted that the CPUE
analysis is providing an indication that BNS catches are currently unsustainable.
However, Sanford also urge caution in interpreting CPUE because of operational and
management changes that may also influence CPUE. Because of the reservations
about using CPUE as an indicator of stock size, Sanford also supported option 2.
Option 3 – Impacts and Costs
119
This option would reduce the TACC in BNS 1 from 1000 t to 612 t (a 39 % reduction
in the TACC). The average catch in BNS 1 between 1 October 2001 and 30
September 2007 was 891 t and, based on an export price of $7.37 per kg, this option
would represent a reduction in revenue of approximately $2.06M.
120
BNS catches have been declining steadily in BNS 1 over the last six years (Table 9
and Figure 5). The average catch from the last two fishing years, 1 October 2005 to 30
September 2007, was only 721 t. Based on these recent catches, a reduction in the
TACC to 612 t would represent a reduction in revenue of approximately $803,000.
52
121
Unlike option 2, option 3 will reduce the TACC below the average catch levels of the
last two fishing years.
Benefits
122
This option should provide a greater likelihood than option 2 that BNS 1 increases to,
or remains at, a level that is not inconsistent with MSY. When compared to option 2,
this option will result is a greater reduction in the TAC but would result in a greater
financial impact on operators than under options 1 or 2.
123
Reducing the TACC should have the advantage of leaving additional BNS in the
water. These additional fish may benefit the recreational and customary sectors by
increasing catch rates and possibly, over time, the size of BNS available.
Submissions
124
Some of Northern’s members supported a more conservative TACC reduction of 30%
below recent catch.
125
AFL submitted that a 10 % reduction in the TACC (option 2) for BNS 1 would not
reduce the TACC below the level of catch taken in the last two fishing years.
Consequently, AFL supported option 3.
Option 4 – Impacts and Costs
126
Because BNS catches have declined in BNS 1 since 2003 (Table 9 and Figure 5), the
six-year catch average is considerably higher than the catch from the last two fishing
years. As a result, option 1 does not constrain recent catch from the last two fishing
years. A fourth option was consulted on to reduce recent catch to a level further below
the average catch of the last two years to increase the likelihood that the biomass of
BNS 1 will increase.
127
This option would reduce the TACC in BNS 1 from 1000 t to 524 t (a 48% reduction
in the TACC). The average catch in BNS 1 between 1 October 2001 and 30
September 2007 was 891 t and, based on an export price of $7.37 per kg, this option
would represent a reduction in revenue of approximately $2.70M.
128
The average catch from the last two fishing years, 1 October 2005 to 30 September
2007, was 721 t. Based on these more recent catches, a reduction in the TACC to 524
t would represent a reduction in revenue of approximately $1.45M.
Benefits
129
Taking a long-term view, this option should provide a greater likelihood than option 3
that BNS 1 increases to, or remains at, a level that is not inconsistent with MSY.
When compared to option 3, this option will result is a greater reduction in the TAC
and would not provide the short-term financial advantage outlined above for option 1.
130
Reducing the TACC should have the advantage of leaving additional BNS in the
water. These additional fish may benefit the recreational and customary sectors by
increasing catch rates and possibly, over time, the size of BNS available.
53
Submissions
131
The Environment and Conservation Organisations on New Zealand (ECO) is a
national alliance of 62 groups with a concern for the environment. ECO supported
option 4 but gave no rationale for their preference.
Table 10. Summary of options proposed for BNS 1; the current TACC is 1000 t.
TACC
(t)
Customary
Allowance (t)
Recreational
Allowance (t)
Other sources of
fishing-related
mortality (t)
TAC (t)
Option 2
786
8
15
16
825
Option 3
612
8
15
12
647
Option 4
524
8
15
11
558
MFish recommendation for BNS 1
132
The comments in paragraphs 81 to 96 should be considered with the following
specific comments for BNS 1.
133
Based on the uncertainty around the current level of the stock, and uncertainty about
the extent to which CPUE reflects stock abundance, MFish recommends a cut in the
TACC represented by either option 2 or 3. MFish considers that the uncertainty about
the reliability of CPUE, and the possible influence of management and operational
factors on CPUE, do not justify a reduction as large as that proposed under option 4.
134
It is also open to you to select any TACC that falls between option 2 and 3 if you
think that this would better represent the balance between providing for utilisation and
ensuring sustainability. All options remain open to you.
BNS 2
135
CPUE in the target bottom long-line fishery declined by 79 % between 1 October
2001 and 30 September 2007. Two options are discussed below and are summarised
in Table 12.
Option 2 – Impact and Costs
136
This option would reduce the TACC in BNS 2 from 1 048 t to 902 t (a 14 % reduction
in the TACC). The average catch in BNS 2 between 1 October 2001 and 30
September 2007 was 1022 t and, based on an export price of $7.37 per kg, this option
would represent a reduction in revenue of approximately $804,000.
137
Unlike BNS 1, catches have remained relatively stable in BNS 2 over the last six
years (Table 11 and Figure 6). Although it appears that commercial fishers have had
to expend significantly more effort to maintain these catches, as is evident from the
large decline in CPUE of 79 % in BNS 2; the largest decline in any of the CPUE
indices.
54
138
The average recent catch between 1 October 2005 and 30 September 2007 is 1 047 t
and is greater than the average over the longer period. Based on these more recent
catches, a reduction in the TACC to 902 t would represent a reduction in revenue of
approximately $1.07M.
Table 11: Reported landings of BNS in BNS 2.
Reported
landings (t)
TACC (t)
2001–02
1 010
873
2002–03
933
873
2003–04
933
873
2004–05
1 162
1 048
2005–06
1 136
1 048
2006–07
957
1 048
1200
Annual catch (t)
1100
Historical TACC
1000
TACC under Option 2
900
800
TACC under Option 3
700
600
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
Figure 6: Average catches in relation to the historical TACC and the proposed TACCs under Options 2 and 3.
139
Because of the maintenance of catches in BNS 2, and in some years catch in excess of
the TACC, option 2 would set a TAC for BNS 2 that is below recent catch levels.
Benefits
140
This option should increase the likelihood that BNS 2 increases to, or remains at, a
level not inconsistent with MSY. When compared to option 3, this option will result
in a smaller reduction to the TAC and in lower short-term costs to the commercial
sector by maintaining higher BNS catches in the coming fishing year and by allowing
operators more time to adjust their fishing practices and infrastructure to
accommodate any future reductions in BNS TACs, should they be necessary.
141
Reducing the TACC should have the advantage of leaving additional BNS in the
water; these additional fish may benefit the recreational and customary sectors by
55
maintaining or increasing non-commercial catch rates and possibly, over time, the size
of BNS available.
Submissions
142
Area 2 represents quota owners in BNS 2. Area 2 surveyed all 45 owners of BNS 2
quota. Of the 16 responses Area 2 received, 12 favoured a decrease of the TAC. There
was a difference of opinion among the 12 respondents regarding the size of the TAC
decrease, but Area 2 submitted that option 2 had the support of the majority of quota
owners.
143
For the reasons outlined in BNS 1, Sanford supports option 2 to reduce the TACC in
all BNS stocks by 10 % below recent catch levels.
144
AFL supported option 2 for BNS 2 because this option would reduce catch below
recent levels.
Option 3 – Impact and Costs
145
This option would reduce the TACC in BNS 2 from 1 048 t to 701 t (a 33 % reduction
in the TACC). The average catch in BNS 2 between 1 October 2001 and 30
September 2007 was 1022 t and, based on an export price of $7.37 per kg, this option
would represent a reduction in revenue of approximately $2.37M.
146
The average recent catch between 1 October 2005 and 30 September 2007 is 1 047 t
and is greater than the average over the longer period (Figure 6). Based on these more
recent catches, a reduction in the TACC to 701 t would represent a reduction in
revenue of approximately $2.55M.
Benefits
147
This option should provide a greater likelihood than option 2 that BNS 2 increases to,
or remains at, a level that is not inconsistent with MSY. When compared to option 2,
this option will result in a greater reduction in the TAC and would not provide a shortterm financial advantage as outlined above for option 1.
148
Reducing the TACC should have the advantage of leaving additional BNS in the
water; these additional fish may benefit the recreational and customary sectors by
maintaining or increasing non-commercial catch rates and possibly, over time, the size
of BNS available. These benefits are greater for option 3 than for option 2.
Table 12. Summary of options proposed for BNS 2.
TACC
(t)
Customary
Allowance (t)
Recreational
Allowance (t)
Other sources of
fishing-related
mortality (t)
TAC (t)
Option 2
902
13
25
18
958
Option 3
701
13
25
14
753
56
Submissions
149
ECO supported the reduction in the TAC proposed under option 3; no rationale for
this position was given.
MFish recommendation for BNS 2
150
The comments in paragraphs 81 to 96 should be considered with the following
specific comments for BNS 2.
151
Based on the uncertainty around the current level of the stock, and uncertainty about
the extent to which CPUE reflects stock abundance, MFish recommends a cut in the
TAC represented by either option 2 or 3. However, you should be mindful of the
following:
152
a)
Unlike other BNS stocks, catches in BNS 2 have been maintained over the last
six years and both options 2 and 3 would reduce the TAC below recent catch
levels. Because catches have been maintained in BNS 2, the economic cost of
option 2 is higher in BNS 2 than for other BNS stocks (Table 5). The cost of
option 3 is also higher than for any other BNS stock (Table 5). As such, you
may consider this higher cost weighs in favour of returning the stock to BMSY
at a slower rate and hence selecting a smaller reduction to the TAC, as
represented by option 2.
b)
Commercial fishers have had to expend significantly more effort to maintain
these high catches as is evident from the large decline in CPUE of 79 % in
BNS 2. Given the aggregating behaviour of bluenose, and the risk that this
behaviour may have the effect of disguising biomass decline, you may
consider the sustainability risk is sufficient to warrant a greater TAC reduction
as represented by option 3.
It is also open to you to select any TACC that falls between options 2 and 3 if you
think that this would better represent the balance between providing for utilisation and
ensuring sustainability.
BNS 3
153
Two CPUE indices were presented above for BNS 3. CPUE in the Chatham Rise
trawl fishery (by-catch) declined by 71 % between 1 October 2001 and 30 September
2007; and by 67 % in the target bottom long-line fishery. There is also evidence of a
gradual reduction in the proportion of mature fish (> 60 cm) in the sampled catch in
the trawl fishery. Three options are discussed below; all of which are summarised in
Table 14.
Option 2 – Impact and Costs
154
This option would reduce the TACC in BNS 3 from 925 t to 649 t (a 30 % reduction
in the TACC). The average catch in BNS 3 between 1 October 2001 and 30
September 2007 was 736 t. Based on an export price of $7.37 per kg this would
represent a reduction in revenue of approximately $641,000.
155
Catches have declined in BNS 3 over the last six years with an average recent catch
between 1 October 2005 and 30 September 2007 of 524 t (Table 13 and Figure 7).
57
Based on these more recent catches, a reduction in the TACC to 649 t would not
represent an actual reduction in catch or revenue. However, selecting option 2 would
remove the opportunity for fishers to increase their catch to previous levels and may
reduce quota value.
Table 13: Reported landings of BNS in BNS 3. Asterisk denotes the 250 t transitional ACE provided to
the Chatham Islands.
Reported
landings (t)
TACC (t)
2001–02
733
925*
2002–03
876
925*
2003–04
915
925
2004–05
844
925
2005–06
536
925
2006–07
511
925
1000
Historical TACC
Annual catch (t)
900
800
700
TACC under Option 2
600
TACC under Option 3
500
TACC under Option 4
400
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
Figure 7: Average catches in relation to the historical TACC and the proposed TACCs under Options 2, 3 and
4. This does not include the 250 t transitional ACE provided to the Chatham Islands in 2001 and 2002.
156
Because of the decline in recent catches, a reduction in the TACC to 10% below
average catches between 1 October 2001 and 30 September 2007 will not constrain
recent catch. As such, there is a risk that continuing to fish at current levels will not
sufficiently arrest any decline in stock size.
Benefits
157
Option 2 should increase the likelihood that BNS 3 increases to, or remains at, a level
that is not inconsistent with MSY. However, given the recent under-catch of the
TACC this option would not constrain catches to the average catches of the last two
fishing years. As such, it is less clear that this option will increase the biomass of BNS
58
3. The benefit of this option to the commercial sector is that it does not result in any
loss in revenue compared to the last two fishing years.
Submissions
158
For the reasons outlined in BNS 1, Sanford supports option 2 to reduce the TACC in
all BNS stocks by 10 % below recent catch levels.
Option 3 – Impact and Costs
159
This option would reduce the TACC in BNS 3 from 925 t to 505 t (a 45 % reduction
in the TACC). The average catch in BNS 3 between 1 October 2001 and 30
September 2007 was 736 t and, based on an export price of $7.37 per kg, this option
would represent a reduction in revenue of approximately $1.70M.
160
Catches have declined in BNS 3 over the last six years with an average recent catch
between 1 October 2005 and 30 September 2007 of 524 t (Table 13 and Figure 7).
Based on these recent catches, a reduction in the TACC to 505 t would represent a
reduction in revenue of approximately $140,000.
161
Because of the decline in recent catches, a reduction in the TACC to 30% below
average catches between 1 October 2001 and 30 September 2007 will only represent a
small constraint on fishing when compared to average catches of the past two fishing
years.
Benefits
162
Given the recent under-catch of the TACC this option would constrain catches to
approximately those of the last two fishing years. As such, this option will result in a
greater likelihood that the biomass of BNS 3 will increase when compared to option 2.
The benefit of this option to the commercial sector is that it results in only modest
reductions in revenue compared to the last two fishing years.
Option 4 – Impacts and Costs
163
Because BNS catches have been declining steadily in BNS 3 over the last six years
(Table 13 and Figure 7), the six year average is considerably higher than the catch
from the last two fishing years. As a result, option 2 does not constrain recent catch
from the last two fishing years. A fourth option was suggested to reduce recent catch
to a level further below the average catch of the last two years to increase the
likelihood that the biomass of BNS 3 will increase.
164
This option would reduce the TACC in BNS 3 from 925 t to 433 t (a 53 % reduction
in the TACC). The average catch in BNS 3 between 1 October 2001 and 30
September 2007 was 736 t and, based on an export price of $7.37 per kg, would
represent a reduction in revenue of approximately $2.23M.
165
The average catch from the last two fishing years, 1 October 2005 to 30 September
2007, was only 524 t. Based on these recent catches, a reduction in the TACC to 433 t
would represent a reduction in revenue of approximately $671,000.
59
Benefits
166
This option should provide a greater likelihood than option 3 that BNS 3 increases to,
or remains at, a level that is not inconsistent with MSY. When compared to option 3,
this option will result in a greater reduction in the TAC and would have a greater
financial impact on vessel operators.
167
Reducing the TACC should have the advantage of leaving additional BNS in the
water; these additional fish may benefit the recreational and customary sectors by
maintaining or increasing non-commercial catch rates and possibly, over time, the size
of BNS available.
Table 14. Summary of options proposed for BNS 3.
TACC
(t)
Customary
Allowance (t)
Recreational
Allowance (t)
Other sources of
fishing-related
mortality (t)
TAC (t)
Option 2
649
18
18
13
698
Option 3
505
18
18
10
551
Option 4
433
18
18
9
478
Submissions
168
ECO supported the reduction in the TAC proposed by option 4; no rationale for this
position was given.
MFish recommendations for BNS 3
169
The comments in paragraphs 81 to 96 should be considered with the following
specific comments for BNS 3.
170
Based on the uncertainty around the current level of the stock, and uncertainty about
the extent to which CPUE reflects stock abundance, MFish recommends a cut in the
TAC represented by either option 2 or 3. MFish considers that the uncertainty about
the reliability of CPUE, and the possible influence of management and operational
factors on CPUE, do not justify a reduction as large as that proposed under option 4.
171
It is also open to you to select any TACC that falls between options 2 and 3 if you
think that this would better represent the balance between providing for utilisation and
ensuring sustainability. All options remain open to you.
BNS 7
172
The lack of data in both BNS 7 and 8 required a combined CPUE analysis for the
target bottom long-line fishery in these two areas. The CPUE declined by 64 %
between 1 October 2001 and 30 September 2007. Two options are discussed below
and are summarised in Table 16.
60
Option 2 – Impact and Costs
173
This option would reduce the TACC in BNS 7 from 150 t to 89 t (a 41 % reduction in
the TACC). The average catch in BNS 7 between 1 October 2001 and 30 September
2007 was 101 t and, based on an export price of $7.37 per kg, this option would
represent a reduction in revenue of approximately $88,000.
174
However, catches have fluctuated significantly in BNS 7 over the last six years; with
an average recent catch between 1 October 2005 and 30 September 2007 of 124 t
(Table 15 and Figure 8). Based on these recent catches, a reduction in the TACC to 89
t would represent a reduction in revenue of approximately $258,000.
Table 15: Reported landings of BNS in BNS 7.
Reported
landings (t)
TACC (t)
2001–02
70
150
2002–03
76
150
2003–04
117
150
2004–05
94
150
2005–06
84
150
2006–07
164
150
Annual catch (t)
200
160
Historical TACC
120
TACC under Option 2
80
40
2000
TACC under Option 3
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
Figure 8: Average catches in relation to the historical TACC and the proposed TACCs under Options 2 and 3.
175
Because of the fluctuation in catch in BNS 7, a TACC of 89 t would only have
constrained catches in three of the last six years (Figure 9).
176
Catches in BNS 7 are low compared to BNS 1, 2 and 3, yet the CPUE in BNS 7 and 8
still declined by 64 %. This lends support to the proposition that there may be a single
BNS stock.
61
Benefits
177
This option should increase the likelihood that BNS 7 increases to, or remains at, a
level that is not inconsistent with MSY. When compared to option 3, this option will
result in a smaller reduction to the TAC and in lower short-term financial costs to the
commercial sector by maintaining higher BNS catches in the coming fishing year and
by giving operators more time to adjust their fishing practices and infrastructure to
accommodate any future reductions in BNS TACs should they be necessary.
178
Reducing the TACC should have the advantage of leaving additional BNS in the
water; these additional fish may benefit the recreational and customary sectors by
maintaining or increasing non-commercial catch rates and possibly, over time, the size
of BNS available.
Submissions
179
For the reasons outlined in BNS 1, Sanford support option 2 to reduce the TACC in
all BNS stocks by 10 % below recent catch levels.
180
Challenger represents quota owners and fishers that operate in Fisheries Management
Areas 7 and 8. Challenger proposed the following staged reduction in the TACC for
BNS 7.
BNS 7 (current TACC 150 t)
a)
For the 2008/09 fishing year, reduce the TACC to 135 t (10% below the
current TACC).
b)
Reassess the CPUE for the 2009/10 fishing year.
c)
For the 2009/10 fishing year, if abundance shows a further decline, reduce the
TACC to 120 t (20 % below the 2007/08 TACC).
d)
For the 2010/11 fishing year, if abundance shows a further decline, reduce the
TACC to 105 t (30 % below the 2007/08 TACC).
181
Challenger also re-iterated the comments made in the IPP that large reductions in the
TACC in BNS 7 may significantly reduce the liquidity of the ACE market as larger
operators retain ACE to cover by-catch in larger fisheries, and that this would impact
on smaller fishers who rely on ACE for target BNS fisheries.
182
Mr Stu Morrison, a BNS fisherman in BNS 7 and 8, provided anecdotal information
that catch rates for manual lining had remained high in BNS 7 and 8. Further, Mr
Morrison stated that there remained large areas of BNS 7 and 8 that remain
unexplored and that cutting the BNS TAC would prevent exploratory fishing that may
demonstrate a larger stock of BNS.
183
Mr Morrison stated that he already has difficulty sourcing ACE in BNS 7 and 8 as
large fishers retain this ACE to cover BNS by-catch in ling fisheries. Reducing the
TAC in BNS 7 and 8 would result in him having even greater difficulty sourcing the
necessary ACE and would likely lead him to fish for BNS outside the EEZ where no
catch limits exist.
62
Option 3 – Impact and Costs
184
This option would reduce the TACC in BNS 7 from 150 t to 70 t (a 53 % reduction in
the TACC). The average catch in BNS 7 between 1 October 2001 and 30 September
2007 was 101 t and, based on an export price of $7.37 per kg, this option would
represent a reduction in revenue of approximately $228,000.
185
Because catches have fluctuated significantly in BNS 7 over the last six years; with an
average recent catch between 1 October 2005 and 30 September 2007 of 124 t (Table
15 and Figure 8) the recent catches have been higher than the average over the longer
period. Based on these recent catches, a reduction in the TACC to 70 t would
represent a reduction in revenue of approximately $398,000.
Benefits
186
This option should provide a greater likelihood than option 2 that BNS 7 increases to,
or remains at, a level that is not inconsistent with MSY. When compared to option 2,
this option will result is a greater reduction in the TAC and will have a greater
financial impact of vessel operators.
187
Reducing the TACC should have the advantage of leaving additional BNS in the
water; these additional fish may benefit the recreational and customary sectors by
maintaining or increasing non-commercial catch rates and possibly, over time, the size
of BNS available.
Table 16. Summary of options proposed for BNS 7.
TACC
(t)
Customary
Allowance (t)
Recreational
Allowance (t)
Other sources of
fishing-related
mortality (t)
TAC (t)
Option 2
89
2
3
2
96
Option 3
70
2
3
1
76
Submissions
188
ECO supported the reduction in the TACC proposed under option 3; no rationale for
this position was given.
MFish recommendations for BNS 7
189
The comments in paragraphs 81 to 96 should be considered with the following
specific comments for BNS 7.
190
MFish considers that a smaller reduction in the BNS 7 TAC, such as that proposed by
Challenger (but modified slightly to include a 2% allowance for other sources of
fishing-related mortality; this would move 2 tonnes from the TACC to the allowance),
may warrant consideration.
63
191
At 150 t the current BNS 7 TACC is small compared to the overall New Zealand BNS
TACC of 3,223 t (4.7%). This results in limited ACE being made available in BNS 7.
MFish agrees with Challenger that relatively large reductions in the TACC in BNS 7
may reduce the liquidity of the ACE market. The impact that this may have on smaller
fishers who rely on ACE for target BNS fisheries may support a lesser reduction in
the TACC for BNS 7.
192
Any increased risk to sustainability of the BNS 7 stock, as a consequence of a smaller
TAC cut, may be reduced by the possibility that BNS is a single New Zealand–wide
stock, given that BNS 7 would be such a small component that single stock.
193
If BNS is a single stock, reducing the TAC in BNS 7 by a smaller amount is unlikely
to pose a significant risk to the sustainability of BNS.
194
Under these circumstance, in addition to options 2 and 3, MFish considers it may be
reasonable to reduce the TACC for BNS 7 to a level between the current TAC (155 t)
and the TAC proposed in option 2 (96 t). All options remain open to you.
BNS 8
195
The combined CPUE index for the target bottom long-line fishery in BNS 7 and 8
declined by 64 % between 1 October 2001 and 30 September 2007. Two options are
discussed below and are summarised in Table 18.
Option 2 – Impact and Costs
196
This option would reduce the TACC in BNS 8 from 100 t to 43 t (a 57 % reduction in
the TACC). The average catch in BNS 8 between 1 October 2001 and 30 September
2007 was 49 t and, based on an export price of $7.37 per kg, this option would
represent a reduction in revenue of approximately $44,000.
197
However, the average recent catch between 1 October 2005 and 30 September 2007
was 35 t (Table 17 and Figure 9) and based on these recent catches, a reduction in the
TACC to 43 t would not represent reduction in catch or revenue.
Table 17: Reported landings of BNS in BNS 8.
Reported
landings (t)
TACC (t)
2001–02
17
100
2002–03
66
100
2003–04
96
100
2004–05
42
100
2005–06
20
100
2006–07
50
100
64
120
Annual catch (t)
Historical TACC
80
TACC under Option 2
40
TACC under Option 3
0
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
Figure 9: Average catches in relation to the historical TACC and the proposed TACCs under Options 2 and 3.
198
As in BNS 7, catches in BNS 8 are low compared to BNS 1, 2 and 3, yet the CPUE in
BNS 7 and 8 still declined by 64 %. This lends support to the proposition that there
may be a single BNS stock.
Benefits
199
This option should increase the likelihood that BNS 8 increases to, or remains at, a
level that is not inconsistent with MSY. However, given the consistent under-catch of
the TACC this option would not constrain catches based on the catch over the last two
fishing years. Therefore, it is less clear that this option will increase the biomass in
BNS 8. The benefit of this option to the commercial sector is that it does not result in
any loss in revenue compared to the last two fishing years.
Submissions
200
For the reasons outlined in BNS 1, Sanford supports option 2 to reduce the TACC in
all BNS stocks by 10 % below recent catch levels.
201
As for BNS 7, Challenger proposed the following staged reduction in the TACC for
BNS 8.
BNS 8 (current TACC 100 t)
202
a)
For the 2008/09 fishing year, reduce the TACC to 90 t (10% below the current
TACC).
b)
Reassess the CPUE for the 2009/10 fishing year.
c)
For the 2009/10 fishing year, if abundance shows a further decline, reduce the
TACC to 80 t (20 % below the 2007/08 TACC).
d)
For the 2010/11 fishing year, if abundance shows a further decline, reduce the
TACC to 70 t (30 % below the 2007/08 TACC).
Challenger also re-iterated the comments made in the IPP that large reductions in the
TACC in BNS 8 may significantly reduce the liquidity of the ACE market as larger
65
operators retain ACE to cover by-catch in larger fisheries, and that this would impact
on smaller fishers who rely on ACE for target BNS fisheries.
203
The comments of Mr Stu Morrison that were detailed in paragraphs 182 and 183 in
the discussion of BNS 7 are also relevant to your decision for BNS 8.
Option 3 – Impact and Costs
204
This option would reduce the TACC in BNS 8 from 100 t to 33 t (a 67 % reduction in
the TACC). The average catch in BNS 8 between 1 October 2001 and 30 September
2007 was 49 t and, based on an export price of $7.37 per kg, this option would
represent a reduction in revenue of approximately $118,000.
205
The average recent catch between 1 October 2005 and 30 September 2007 was 35 t
(Table 17 and Figure 9) and based on these recent catches, a reduction in the TACC to
33 t would represent a reduction in revenue of $15,000.
206
As in BNS 7, catches in BNS 8 are low compared to BNS 1, 2 and 3, yet the CPUE in
BNS 7 and 8 still declined by 64 %. This lends support to the proposition that there
may be a single BNS stock.
Benefits
207
This option should increase the likelihood that BNS 8 increases to, or remains at, a
level that is not inconsistent with MSY. However, given the consistent under-catch of
the TACC this option would not constrain catches based on the catch over the last two
fishing years, as such, it is less clear that this option will increase the biomass in BNS
8. The benefit of this option to the commercial sector is that it results in only a modest
reduction in revenue compared to the last two fishing years.
Table 18. Summary of options proposed for BNS 8.
TACC
(t)
Customary
Allowance (t)
Recreational
Allowance (t)
Other sources of
fishing-related
mortality (t)
TAC (t)
Option 2
43
1
2
1
47
Option 3
33
1
2
1
37
Submissions
208
ECO supported the reduction in the TACC proposed under option 3; no rationale for
this position was given.
MFish recommendations for BNS 8
209
The comments in paragraphs 81 to 96 should be considered with the following
specific comments for BNS 8.
210
MFish considers that a smaller reduction in the BNS 8 TAC, such as that proposed by
Challenger (but modified slightly to include a 2% allowance for other sources of
66
fishing-related mortality; this would move 2 tonnes from the TACC to the allowance),
may warrant consideration.
211
At 100 t the current BNS 8 TACC is small compared to the overall New Zealand BNS
TACC of 3,223 t (3.1%). This results in limited ACE being made available in BNS 8.
MFish agrees with Challenger and Mr Morrison that relatively large reductions in the
TACC in BNS 8 may reduce the liquidity of the ACE market as larger operators retain
ACE to cover by-catch in larger fisheries. The impact that this may have on smaller
fishers who rely on ACE for target BNS fisheries may support a lesser reduction in
the TACC for BNS 8.
212
Any increased risk to sustainability of the BNS 8 stock may be reduced by the
possibility that BNS is a single New Zealand–wide stock. The Plenary noted that
declines in CPUE were observed in BNS 7 and BNS 8 that had been relatively lightly
fished (Table 4).
213
If BNS is a single stock, reducing the TAC in BNS 8 by a smaller amount is unlikely
to pose a significant risk to the sustainability of BNS.
214
Under these circumstance, in addition to options 2 and 3, MFish believes that it may
be reasonable to consider reducing the TACC for BNS 8 to a level between the
current TACC (100 t) and the TAC proposed in option 2 (43 t). All options remain
open to you.
Compliance issues relevant to all BNS stocks
215
There may be compliance implications associated with any reductions in TACCs to
levels below current. The reduced ACE available may lead to some fishers not being
able to cover their catch.
216
This shortage of ACE may provide an incentive to misreport the area from which
catches were taken or the weight of species caught. In some cases different species
may be reported. Similarly there may be an increased likelihood that species will be
dumped.
217
MFish has monitoring and at sea surveillance in place to help detect illegal fishing
activity occurring. This is part of MFish’s overarching monitoring and compliance
activity.
67
Appendix One: Statutory Considerations
218
Section 5 of the Fisheries Act 1996 (the Act) requires that you shall act in a manner
consistent with New Zealand’s international obligations and Treaty of Waitangi
(Fisheries Claims) Settlement Act 1992. To this end, the provisions of general
international instruments such as UNCLOS and the Fish Stocks Agreement have been
implemented through the provisions of the Act. The Ministry is not aware of any
specific international obligations relating to BNS fisheries. The proposed options are
consistent with the obligations relating to the Treaty of Waitangi (Fisheries Claims)
Settlement Act 1992.
219
Section 8 of the Act describes the purpose of the Act as being to provide for the
utilisation of fisheries resources while ensuring sustainability, and defines the
meanings of utilisation and sustainability. The management options presented seek to
achieve the purpose of the Act. The proposals seek to ensure sustainability under the
respective catch limits and take into account the respective costs of management
versus the utilisation benefits.
220
Section 9 of the Act prescribes the following environmental principles that must be
taken into account when exercising powers in relation to utilisation of fisheries
resources while ensuring sustainability:
221
Sections 9(a) and (b) require you to take into account that associated or dependent
species (those that are not harvested) be maintained at or above a level that ensures
their long-term viability, and that the biological diversity of the aquatic environment
should be maintained. While some bycatch of non-harvested species is known in BNS
trawl fisheries, long-line fisheries have a relatively low level of by-catch.
Management of BNS fisheries will be within standards developed for protected
species such as seabirds.
222
By-catch of fish species is also monitored under the reporting requirements of the Act;
at this time there is no concern around any fish by-catch.
223
The impact that fishing for BNS stocks has on the long term viability and biological
diversity of the aquatic environment is of greater concern in regions of relatively more
bio-diverse topographic features. Large areas of the seabed have been set aside from
trawling under the recent Fisheries (Benthic Protection Areas) Regulations 2007.
These protected areas include many seamounts and other underwater topographic
features and cover some 1.2 million square kilometres or approximately 30% of New
Zealand’s EEZ.
224
Section 9(c) requires that you to take into account the principle that habitat of
particular importance for fisheries management should be protected. MFish are not
aware of any such habitats that are affected by BNS fisheries.
225
Section 10 of the Act sets out the information principles, which require that decisions
be based on the best available information, taking into account any uncertainty in that
information, and applying caution when information is uncertain, unreliable, or
inadequate. In accordance with s 10, the absence of information should not be used as
a reason to postpone, or fail to take, any measure to achieve the purpose of the Act,
68
including providing for utilisation at levels considered to be sustainable. A thorough
review of available information has been undertaken by the Adaptive Management
Programme Working Group and the Plenary and the best available information has
been used to derive management options. MFish has endeavoured to set out the
relevant uncertainty in, and inadequacy of, that information so that the appropriate
caution can be applied in assessing the proposed management options.
226
Section 11(1)(a): Before varying the TAC for any BNS stock, you must take into
account any effects of fishing on any stock and the aquatic environment. No
information about any effects of fishing on any stock or on the aquatic environment is
considered relevant to the consideration of sustainability measures for BNS stocks at
this time.
227
Section 11(1)(b): Before varying the TAC for BNS stocks, you must take into
account of any existing controls under the Act that apply to the stock or area
concerned. For BNS stocks, the measures that apply currently are a TAC, TACC,
recreational and customary allowances and, in BNS 2, an allowance for incidental
fishing-related mortality. These allowances are described in the body of the paper. No
other controls under the Act apply specifically to BNS stocks.
228
Section 11(1)(c): Before varying the TAC for BNS stocks, you must take into account
the natural variability of the stock. Annual variation in BNS biomass is not known to
be high, and therefore the natural variability of BNS is not a concern in setting the
TAC for any BNS stock.
229
Sections 11(2)(a) and (b): Before varying the TAC for BNS stocks, you must have
regard to any provisions of any regional policy or plan under the Resource
Management Act 1991 and any management strategy or plan under the Conservation
Act 1997 that apply to the coastal marine area and are considered relevant. MFish is
not aware of any such provisions that should be taken into account for any BNS stock.
230
Section 11(2)(c): Before varying the TAC for BNS stocks, you must have regard to
sections 7 and 8 of the Hauraki Gulf Marine Park Act 2000 that apply to the coastal
marine area and you consider relevant. A portion of BNS 1 overlaps with the Hauraki
Gulf Marine Park, as such, that Act must be considered in making decisions for BNS
1. The relevant sections of the Hauraki Gulf Marine Park Act 2000 are set out below
and are discussed in the body of the paper beginning at paragraph 104 above.
Hauraki Gulf Marine Park Act 2000
Section 7. Recognition of national significance of Hauraki Gulf
(1)
The interrelationship between the Hauraki Gulf, its islands, and catchments
and the ability of that interrelationship to sustain the life-supporting capacity of the
environment of the Hauraki Gulf and its islands are matters of national significance.
(2)
The life-supporting capacity of the environment of the Gulf and its islands
includes the capacity—
(a)
to provide for—
69
(i)
the historic, traditional, cultural, and spiritual relationship of
the tangata whenua of the Gulf with the Gulf and its islands;
and
(ii)
the social, economic, recreational, and cultural well-being of
people and communities:
(b)
to use the resources of the Gulf by the people and communities of the
Gulf and New Zealand for economic activities and recreation:
(c)
to maintain the soil, air, water, and ecosystems of the Gulf.
Section 8. Management of Hauraki Gulf
To recognise the national significance of the Hauraki Gulf, its islands, and
catchments, the objectives of the management of the Hauraki Gulf, its islands, and
catchments are—
(a)
the protection and, where appropriate, the enhancement of the lifesupporting capacity of the environment of the Hauraki Gulf, its islands,
and catchments:
(b)
the protection and, where appropriate, the enhancement of the natural,
historic, and physical resources of the Hauraki Gulf, its islands, and
catchments:
(c)
the protection and, where appropriate, the enhancement of those
natural, historic, and physical resources (including kaimoana) of the
Hauraki Gulf, its islands, and catchments with which tangata whenua
have an historic, traditional, cultural, and spiritual relationship:
(d)
the protection of the cultural and historic associations of people and
communities in and around the Hauraki Gulf with its natural, historic,
and physical resources:
(e)
the maintenance and, where appropriate, the enhancement of the
contribution of the natural, historic, and physical resources of the
Hauraki Gulf, its islands, and catchments to the social and economic
well-being of the people and communities of the Hauraki Gulf and
New Zealand:
(f)
the maintenance and, where appropriate, the enhancement of the
natural, historic, and physical resources of the Hauraki Gulf, its
islands, and catchments, which contribute to the recreation and
enjoyment of the Hauraki Gulf for the people and communities of the
Hauraki Gulf and New Zealand.
Section 13. Obligation to have particular regard to sections 7 and 8
Except as provided in sections 9 to 12, in order to achieve the purpose of this Act, all
persons exercising powers or carrying out functions for the Hauraki Gulf under any
Act specified in Schedule 1 [including the Fisheries Act 1996] must, in addition to
70
any other requirement specified in those Acts for the exercise of that power or the
carrying out of that function, have particular regard to the provisions of sections 7 and
8 and of this Act.
231
Section 11(2A)(b): Before varying the TAC for BNS stocks you must take account of
any relevant and approved fisheries plans. There is no approved fisheries plan in
place for any BNS stock.
232
Sections 11(2A)(a) and (c): Before varying the TAC for BNS stocks the Minister
must take into account any conservation or fisheries service, or any decision not to
require such services. MFish does not consider that existing or proposed services
materially affect the proposals for any BNS stock. No decision has been made to not
require a service in any BNS fishery at this time.
233
Section 13: MFish recommends that the TACs for BNS stocks be considered for
variation pursuant to s 13(2A) to enable BNS stocks to be moved towards or above a
level that can produce MSY.
234
Of the stocks that make up BNS, all have shown significant declines in CPUE over
the last six years. Although the Plenary did not supply estimates of BCURRENT and
BMSY, MFish scientists consider that it is still possible to make inferences about the
stock status of the BNS stocks based on the CPUE data. If BNS relationship between
CPUE and abundance is hyper-stable, the decline in biomass could result in stock
biomass of about 26% B0. Although an estimate of BMSY as a percentage of B0 is not
given in the Plenary, MFish scientists consider that, based on species with similar life
history including a very low natural mortality (0.08), it is likely to be in the range of
30-45% B0.
B
235
236
The specific considerations set out in s 13(2A) include having regard to the
interdependence of stocks, the biological characteristics of the stock and any
environmental conditions affecting the stock. As such, in considering the proposed
TAC options and corresponding proposed periods of rebuild, the Minister must take
into account:
i)
The interdependence of stocks for BNS stocks (as required by s
13(2A)(b)). There is no information to suggest the interdependence of
stocks should affect the level of the TAC for any BNS stock at this
time.
ii)
Environmental conditions affecting BNS stocks (as required under s
13(2A)(b)). No specific environmental conditions affecting BNS stocks
have been identified.
iii)
The biological characteristics of BNS (as required under s 13(2A)(b)).
It is known that BNS are relatively long-lived and late maturing, which
are biological characteristics that render them slow to recover from
overfishing.
Section 13(3) requires that you, in considering the way and rate at which a stock is
moved towards BMSY, have regard to such social, cultural, and economic factors as
you considers being relevant when determining the way and rate at which to move the
stock biomass toward or above the BMSY level.
71
237
MFish has considered the economic impact of reducing the BNS TACs. The final
decision on the quantum of any reduction in the TAC will depend on your
interpretation of the severity and immediacy of the sustainability risk and the socioeconomic impacts associated with various reductions.
238
Section 20 and 21 specify a number of matters that must be taken into account when
setting or varying a TACC. Section 21 requires you to allow for non-commercial
Mäori and recreational fishing interests, and other sources of fishing-related mortality
when setting or varying the TACC. Allowances for recreational and customary fishers
have been retained in the proposed TACs. Based on the proposals to reduce the TACC
only, the options for all BNS stocks will result in a greater proportion of the TAC
being allocated to non-commercial Mäori and recreational fishing interests.
Allowances for other sources of fishing-related mortality are also included in this
paper.
239
Section 21(4) also requires that any mätaitai reserve or closures/restrictions under s
186A to facilitate customary fishing be taken into account. Mätaitai reserves are
located within BNS QMAs; however, the nature of BNS fisheries being primarily
offshore and confined to deeper waters means that the options outlined in this paper
should not impact on mätaitai reserves or closures/restrictions under s 186A.
240
Section 21(5) also requires that any regulations to prohibit fishing made under s 311
be taken into account when setting allowances for recreational interests. MFish is not
aware of any restrictions under s 311 that have been placed on fishing in any area
within current BNS fisheries.
72
Section Three
Summary of Recommendations
73
SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS
241
MFish recommends that you;
a)
Note the contents of this paper;
b)
Agree to set an allowance for other sources of fishing-related mortality of 2%
of the TACC in BNS 1, BNS 3, BNS 7 and BNS 8 as set out in Table 8 of this
paper;
c)
Agree that any reductions of the TACs for BNS stocks be applied only to the
commercial sector;
BNS 1
Either
d)
Option 1: Retain the current TAC and allowances.
e)
Option 2: Reduce the BNS 1 TAC from 1,023 tonnes to 825 tonnes; and
within this:
OR
i)
Retain a customary allowance of 8 tonnes;
ii)
Retain a recreational allowance of 15 tonnes;
iii)
Set an allowance for other sources of fishing-related mortality of 2% of
the TACC; that being 16 tonnes;
iv)
Reduce the TACC from 1,000 tonnes to 786 tonnes.
OR
f)
Option 3: Reduce the BNS 1 TAC from 1,023 tonnes to 647 tonnes; and
within this:
i)
Retain a customary allowance of 8 tonnes;
ii)
Retain a recreational allowance of 15 tonnes;
iii)
Set an allowance for other sources of fishing-related mortality of 2% of
the TACC; that being 12 tonnes;
iv)
Reduce the TACC from 1,000 tonnes to 612 tonnes.
OR
g)
Option 4: Reduce the BNS 1 TAC from 1,023 tonnes to 558 tonnes; and
within this:
i)
Retain a customary allowance of 8 tonnes;
ii)
Retain a recreational allowance of 15 tonnes;
iii)
Set an allowance for other sources of fishing-related mortality of 2% of
the TACC; that being 11 tonnes;
iv)
Reduce the TACC from 1,000 tonnes to 524 tonnes.
74
BNS 2
Either
h)
Option 1: Retain the current TAC and allowances.
i)
Option 2: Reduce the BNS 2 TAC from 1,107 tonnes to 958 tonnes; and
within this:
OR
i)
Retain a customary allowance of 13 tonnes;
ii)
Retain a recreational allowance of 25 tonnes;
iii)
Retain an allowance for other sources of fishing-related mortality of
2% of the TACC; that being 18 tonnes;
iv)
Reduce the TACC from 1 048 tonnes to 902 tonnes.
OR
j)
Option 3: Reduce the BNS 2 TAC from 1,107 tonnes to 753 tonnes; and
within this:
i)
Retain a customary allowance of 13 tonnes;
ii)
Retain a recreational allowance of 25 tonnes;
iii)
Set an allowance for other sources of fishing-related mortality of 2% of
the TACC; that being 14 tonnes;
iv)
Reduce the TACC from 1,048 tonnes to 701 tonnes.
BNS 3
Either
k)
Option 1: Retain the current TAC and allowances.
l)
Option 2: Reduce the BNS 3 TAC from 961 tonnes to 698 tonnes; and within
this:
OR
i)
Retain a customary allowance of 18 tonnes;
ii)
Retain a recreational allowance of 18 tonnes;
iii)
Set an allowance for other sources of fishing-related mortality of 2% of
the TACC; that being 13 tonnes;
iv)
Reduce the TACC from 925 tonnes to 649 tonnes.
OR
m)
Option 3: Reduce the BNS 3 TAC from 1,023 tonnes to 647 tonnes; and
within this:
i)
Retain a customary allowance of 18 tonnes;
ii)
Retain a recreational allowance of 18 tonnes;
75
iii)
Set an allowance for other sources of fishing-related mortality of 2, %
of the TACC; that being 10 tonnes;
iv)
Reduce the TACC from 925 tonnes to 505 tonnes.
OR
n)
Option 4: Reduce the BNS 3 TAC from 1,023 tonnes to 558 tonnes; and
within this:
i)
Retain a customary allowance of 8 tonnes;
ii)
Retain a recreational allowance of 15 tonnes;
iii)
Set an allowance for other sources of fishing-related mortality of 2% of
the TACC; that being 9 tonnes;
iv)
Reduce the TACC from 925 tonnes to 433 tonnes.
BNS 7
Either
o)
Option 1: Retain the current TAC and allowances.
p)
Option 2: Reduce the BNS 7 TAC from 155 tonnes to 96 tonnes; and within
this:
OR
i)
Retain a customary allowance of 2 tonnes;
ii)
Retain a recreational allowance of 3 tonnes;
iii)
Retain an allowance for other sources of fishing-related mortality of
2% of the TACC; that being 2 tonnes;
iv)
Reduce the TACC from 150 tonnes to 89 tonnes.
OR
q)
Option 3: Reduce the BNS 7 TAC from 157 tonnes to 76 tonnes; and within
this:
i)
Retain a customary allowance of 2 tonnes;
ii)
Retain a recreational allowance of 3 tonnes;
iii)
Set an allowance for other sources of fishing-related mortality of 2% of
the TACC; that being 1 tonne;
iv)
Reduce the TACC from 150 tonnes to 70 tonnes.
OR
r)
Industry’s phased reduction option (modified to include an allowance for other
sources of fishing-related mortality): Reduce the BNS 7 TAC from 155 tonnes
to 141 tonnes; and within this:
i)
Retain a customary allowance of 2 tonnes;
ii)
Retain a recreational allowance of 3 tonnes;
76
iii)
Set an allowance for other sources of fishing-related mortality of 2% of
the TACC; that being 3 tonnes;
iv)
Reduce the TACC from 150 tonnes to 133 tonnes.
BNS 8
Either
s)
Option 1: Retain the current TAC and allowances.
t)
Option 2: Reduce the BNS 8 TAC from 103 tonnes to 47 tonnes; and within
this:
OR
i)
Retain a customary allowance of 1 tonne;
ii)
Retain a recreational allowance of 1 tonne;
iii)
Retain an allowance for other sources of fishing-related mortality of
2% of the TACC; that being 1 tonne;
iv)
Reduce the TACC from 100 tonnes to 43 tonnes.
OR
u)
Option 3: Reduce the BNS 8 TAC from 103 tonnes to 37 tonnes; and within
this:
i)
Retain a customary allowance of 1 tonne;
ii)
Retain a recreational allowance of 1 tonne;
iii)
Set an allowance for other sources of fishing-related mortality of 2% of
the TACC; that being 1 tonne;
iv)
Reduce the TACC from 100 tonnes to 33 tonnes.
OR
77
v)
Industry’s phased reduction option (modified to include an allowance for other
sources of fishing-related mortality): Reduce the BNS 8 TAC from 100 tonnes
to 94 tonnes; and within this:
i)
Retain a customary allowance of 1 tonne;
ii)
Retain a recreational allowance of 1 tonne;
iii)
Set an allowance for other sources of fishing-related mortality of 2% of
the TACC; that being 2 tonnes;
iv)
Reduce the TACC from 100 tonnes to 90 tonnes.
Tom Chatterton
Manager Deepwater and National Issues
Ministry of Fisheries
APPROVED / NOT APPROVED / APPROVED AS AMENDED
Hon Jim Anderton
Minister of Fisheries
/
/ 2008
78
Section Four
Initial Position Paper and Summary of
Submissions
79
BLUENOSE (BNS 1, 2, 3, 7 AND 8) – INITIAL POSITION
PAPER
Figure 1: Quota Management Areas (QMAs) for BNS stocks.
Executive Summary
1
All five major bluenose (BNS) fishstocks (BNS 1, 2, 3, 7 and 8 – Figure 1) have this
year been reviewed by the Adaptive Management Programme Working Group
(Working Group) and the Plenary. 6 All BNS stocks show significant declines in catch
per unit effort (CPUE) and current catches are not likely to be sustainable.
2
All CPUE indices for all BNS stocks show markedly similar declines in the period
between 1 October 2001 and 30 September 2007. For the six most reliable CPUE
series (at least one per fishstock), CPUE has declined by between 43% and 79%
(mean 64%) over the six years between 1 October 2001 and 30 September 2007.
3
CPUE has previously not been considered to be a reliable indicator of abundance for
BNS stocks. However, close coincidence observed in declining trends in the six most
reliable CPUE indices in recent years has increased confidence in their value as
indices of abundance. If this decline is indicative of the overall abundance of BNS in
these areas, then BNS abundance could have declined by more than 50% across all
areas over these six years. If there has been replenishment of the features being fished
in the period prior to the decline, the overall decline in abundance could be even
larger.
6
The Plenary annually peer reviews and summarises the available science for fish stocks.
80
4
The Plenary did not provide a stock assessment for any BNS stock to allow explicit
estimation of BMSY and BCURRENT. Further, uncertainty regarding the extent of the
stock which is contributing to the BNS fisheries in the various QMAs makes it
difficult to estimate BMSY for these stocks. However, although the Plenary did not
supply estimates of BCURRENT and BMSY, MFish scientists consider that it is still
possible to infer that BCURRENT is below BMSY in all BNS stocks.
5
The concurrent decline of six independent CPUE series covering all the main New
Zealand BNS fisheries may indicate that there is a single New Zealand stock of BNS.
The 2008 Plenary noted that declines in CPUE have been observed even in areas that
are relatively lightly fished such as BNS 7 and BNS 8. The existence of a single New
Zealand-wide BNS stock declining in all areas would imply not only that current
catches are not sustainable, but that the overall combined TACC is also not
sustainable.
6
MFish scientists consider that if BNS were assumed to be one single New Zealandwide stock then the current biomass would almost certainly be below BMSY. This
conclusion is based on further consideration of the CPUE indices and analyses
presented in the 2008 Plenary, together with interpretation of the likely relationship of
CPUE to abundance.
B
7
Based on the declines in CPUE, and the likelihood that BNS stocks are below BMSY,
MFish proposes reducing the total allowable catch (TAC) in BNS 1, 2, 3, 7 and 8.
MFish considers that new TACs should be based on a total allowable commercial
catch (TACC) that is between 10 and 40% below average commercial catch between
1 October 2001 and 30 September 2007.
8
MFish considers that these options represent the range of reasonable options for the
basis of consultation and will increase the likelihood that the biomass of BNS stocks
remains at or rebuilds to appropriate levels. The final decision on the quantum of any
reduction in the TAC will depend on the Minister’s interpretation of the severity of
the sustainability risk and the socio-economic impacts associated with various
reductions. The IPP focuses on providing an understanding of the sustainability risk
and the impacts of TAC reductions.
9
MFish considers that any reduction in the TAC should be applied only to the
commercial sector. This is considered reasonable because the initial Adaptive
Management Programme (AMP) for each fishery increased substantially the TACC
only. This represented an allocation of the TAC to the commercial sector so any
reduction in the TAC should now be applied only to the commercial sector. Secondly,
the combined recreational and customary non-commercial allowances are very minor
components of the BNS TACs (between 2.2% and 3.7%); it is unlikely that catches by
these sectors have increased significantly in recent years.
10
MFish also notes reports of predation of BNS caught by long-line and believes that an
allowance should be made in BNS 1, 3, 7 and 8 for other sources of fishing-related
mortality to reflect this and other mortality associated with trawling.
11
The approximate lost revenue for the commercial sector differs significantly among
BNS stocks and options.
B
81
12
MFish is also consulting on increasing deemed values in BNS 1, 3, 7 and 8. Further
information on this is included in the Ministry’s deemed value review.
The Issue
Overview of the fisheries
13
TACs were first established for BNS upon establishment of the QMS in 1986–87,
with TACCs for all BNS stocks totalling 1 350 t. Over the past 15 years, all BNS
stocks have been managed under AMPs; details of current TACs and allowances are
provided below (Table 1).
14
BNS 1, the second largest fishery, entered an AMP in October 1996, with a TACC
increase from 705 t to 1 000 t. The majority of BNS is caught in bottom long-line
fisheries in the Bay of Plenty and off Northland.
15
BNS 2 is the largest fishery and was the most recent entry into an AMP in October
2004. The TACC was increased from 873 t to 1 048 t. Important trawl fisheries occur
off the Wairarapa Coast where BNS is a major bycatch in trawl fisheries. In recent
years the bottom long-line fishery has become increasingly important in BNS 2 and
accounted for 70% of landings in 2006–07.
16
BNS 3 entered an AMP in October 1992, with a TACC increase from 175 t to 350 t.
This was further increased within the AMP to 925 t in October 2001 (plus an
additional 250 t of ACE provided to Chatham Islands commercial fishers in 2001–02
and 2002–03 only). BNS 3 is the third most important of the BNS stocks and
contributed about 20% of the total BNS catch between 1989–90 and 2006–07. This
catch was primarily taken by bottom long-line and bottom trawl, each taking about
40% of the total historic catch. The BNS 3 fishery is an amalgam of several bycatch
and target BNS fisheries that have developed since the introduction of BNS 3 into the
QMS; many have small and sporadic catches.
17
BNS 7 entered the AMP in October 1994 when the TACC was increased from 97 t to
150 t. Bottom long-lining has accounted for 62% of the total BNS 7 landings since
1989–90 with midwater and bottom trawling accounting for another 30% of landings.
70% of BNS 7 landings come from the central west coast of the South Island
(Statistical Areas 033 and 034).
18
BNS 8 entered the AMP in October 1994 when the TACC was increased from 22 t to
100 t. Bottom long-lining has accounted for 94% of BNS 8 landings since 1989–90.
Over 75% of BNS 8 landings come from the combined Statistical Areas 041 and 801
in the northern Taranaki bight, with the remainder coming from the southern Taranaki
bight, south of Cape Egmont.
82
Table 1: Current TACs, TACCs and allowances for BNS stocks.
TAC
(t)
TACC
(t)
Customary
Allowance
(t)
Recreational
Allowance
(t)
Other sources of
fishing-related
mortality (t)
BNS 1
1 023
1 000
8
15
-
BNS 2
1 107
1 048
13
25
21
BNS 3
961
925
18
18
-
BNS 7
155
150
2
3
-
BNS 8
103
100
1
2
-
Biology
19
BNS have a pelagic larval phase and probably move into deeper areas as they grow.
BNS are distributed at depths from near-surface waters to 1 200 m; although their
main depth range in between 250 and 750 m with a peak between 300 and 400 m.
20
Recent estimates of age suggest a maximum of between 50 and 60 years. The
estimated age at maturity is approximately 10 years; with a corresponding length of
60-65 cm. Based on these recent age estimates, natural mortality is considered to be
between approximately 6 and 8 % per year.
Stock status
21
There is currently no stock assessment available for any BNS stock to allow
assessment of stock status or long-term yields. There is no evaluation of stock size in
relation to the biomass that can produce the maximum sustainable yield (BMSY) or
current biomass (BCURRENT).
22
The best available information on the status of BNS stocks is an analysis of catch per
unit effort (CPUE). Eleven CPUE analyses were conducted on a variety of BNS
fisheries that use both trawl and long-line methods. An overlay plot of the six
standardised CPUE indices that the Working Group and Plenary considered to be
most reliable, and representative of the BNS 1, BNS 2, BNS 3 and BNS 7 and 8
stocks, is shown in Figure 2. 7 Each of these indices is also shown separately in Figure
4.
23
All six CPUE indices show markedly similar declines in the period between 2001–02
and 2006-07. For the six most reliable CPUE series (Figures 2 and 4), declines appear
to have started around 2001–02 to 2002–03, with the indices declining by between
43% and 79% (mean 64%) over the six years from 2001–02 to 2006–07 (Table 2). 8
7
Each of the CPUE analyses are based on a suite of core vessels selected so that there was continuity of effort in
the fishery over the entire time period in the analysis, including the period of the decline.
8
All eleven CPUE indices from which the most reliable six were selected show similar declining trends in
CPUE.
83
Figure 2: Overlay plots of relative CPUE indices from six BNS fisheries operating in five New
Zealand quota management areas (QMAs). Data are standardised to the 1997–98 to 2006–07
geometric mean. See below for explanation of each CPUE series.
BNS1(EN)BLL – Target BLL fishery for BNS, häpuku and ling in East Northland
BNS1(BP)BLL – Target BLL fishery for BNS, häpuku and ling off Bay of Plenty
BNS2(BNS)BLL – Target BLL fishery for BNS, häpuku and ling
BNS(CHAT)T-OR – Target trawl fishery for BNS and alfonsino on Chatham Rise
BNS3(TARG)BLL – Target BLL fishery for BNS and häpuku
BNS78(TARG)BLL – Target BLL fishery for BNS and häpuku in QMAs 7 and 8 combined
24
CPUE has previously not been considered to be a reliable indicator of abundance for
BNS stocks because the relationship between CPUE and abundance was not thought
to be linear. The likely consequences of non-linear relationships between CPUE and
abundance are briefly outlined here. One such non-linear relationship between CPUE
and vulnerable biomass (V) is shown in Equation 1, where q is the proportionality
constant and β (beta) is a power co-efficient (Hilborn and Walters 1992). 9
25
CPUE = qV β
26
When beta is equal to 1 the relationship between CPUE and abundance is
proportional. When beta is less than 1 the relationship is defined as hyper-stable
(CPUE declines slower than the abundance). In Figure 3 it can be seen that for
9
Equation 1
Hilborn, R. and C. J. Walters. 1992. Quantitative Fisheries Stock Assessment: Choice, Dynamics and
Uncertainty. Chapman and Hall, New York, 570 p.
84
decreasing values of beta the relationship becomes more and more curved (nonlinear).
Relationship between CPUE and abundance
1
0.9
0.8
0.7
beta=0.25
beta=0.50
beta=0.75
beta=1.00
CPUE
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Abundance
Figure 3: Relationship between CPUE and abundance.
27
The Plenary noted that “There is a possibility that the long period of relatively stable
CPUE observations outlined above, in the face of increasing catches before the period
of decline, may be evidence of hyper-stability in CPUE caused by the replenishment
of adult stocks in specific areas or features.” When hyper-stability occurs, CPUE
declines at a slower rate than the underlying population, e.g. declines in CPUE
underestimate the true decline in abundance.
28
Hyper-stability can occur when stocks form aggregations that are targeted by fishers.
Whilst targeting these aggregations, catch rates remain high as the fish caught are
replenished by those that move in from surrounding areas. This is significant because
it has the effect of disguising biomass decline on the specifically targeted seabed
features until such time as the wider population is not of sufficient size to replenish
the aggregation at a rate greater than fishing mortality.
29
Recent increases in targeting BNS in some areas, and increasing catches, could have
exceeded the replenishment rate, causing the rapid and synchronous declines in CPUE
observed since 2001–02.
30
The relationship between CPUE and abundance for BNS may not be linear, and is
more likely to be hyper-stable. Although the Plenary did not supply estimates of
BCURRENT and BMSY, MFish scientists consider that is still possible to make inferences
about the stock status of the BNS stocks based on the CPUE data. If CPUE were
proportional to abundance then the stocks of BNS would have declined by an average
of 64% since 2001. The stock would therefore be below 36% B0 as the history of
B
85
substantial fishing stretches back to 1986. If the relationship is hyper-stable the
decline in biomass would be greater; for beta values of 0.75, the CPUE declines
would mean that stock would be at about 26% B0. For lower values of beta the stock
status would be even lower. Although an estimate of BMSY as a percentage of B0 is
not given in the Plenary, MFish scientists consider that, based on species with similar
life history including a very low natural mortality (0.08), it is likely to be in the range
of 30-45% B0 or higher.
Thus, if BNS is considered as one single New Zealand-wide stock and the relationship
between CPUE and abundance is hyper-stable as surmised in the 2008 Plenary, then
the current biomass is likely to be below BMSY.
B
BNS1(EN)BLL
1.6
1.6
1.4
1.4
1.2
1.2
1.0
0.8
0.6
BNS1(BP)BLL
1.8
Relative Index
Relative Index
1.8
1.0
0.8
0.6
0.4
CPUE
0.4
0.2
fitted
0.2
0.0
CPUE
fitted
0.0
89/90 91/92 93/94 95/96 97/98 99/00 01/02 03/04 05/06
89/90 91/92 93/94 95/96 97/98 99/00 01/02 03/04 05/06
Fishing Year
Fishing Year
BNS2(BNS)BLL
1.6
1.6
1.4
Relative Index
Relative Index
1.2
1.0
0.8
0.6
0.4
1.2
1.0
0.8
0.6
0.4
CPUE
0.2
BNS3(CHAT)T-OR
1.8
1.4
0.2
fitted
0.0
CPUE
fitted
0.0
89/90 91/92 93/94 95/96 97/98 99/00 01/02 03/04 05/06
89/90 91/92 93/94 95/96 97/98 99/00 01/02 03/04 05/06
Fishing Year
Fishing Year
BNS3(TARG)BLL
2.5
2.5
BNS78(TARG)BLL
CPUE
fitted
2.0
Relative Index
2.0
Relative Index
31
1.5
1.0
0.5
1.5
1.0
0.5
CPUE
fitted
0.0
0.0
89/90 91/92 93/94 95/96 97/98 99/00 01/02 03/04 05/06
89/90 91/92 93/94 95/96 97/98 99/00 01/02 03/04 05/06
Fishing Year
Fishing Year
Figure 4: Plots of the six main standardised CPUE series for BNS from five BNS QMAs with linear
regressions fitted to the period of recent declining catch rate.
86
Table 2: Estimates of CPUE decline over the most recent six years for the six CPUE models fitted
to the years 2001–02 to 2006–07 (Figure 2). Data were obtained from the end points of linear
models in Figure 4.
CPUE Model
Decline
(% over 6 years)
43 %
61 %
79 %
71 %
67 %
64 %
64 %
BNS 1 (EN ) BLL
BNS 1 (BP) BLL
BNS 2 (BNS) BLL
BNS 3 (CHAT) T-OR
BNS 3 (TARG) BLL
BNS 7 and 8 (TARG) BLL
Average
Changes in the length of BNS caught
The decline in the East Northland CPUE data in BNS 1 is corroborated by a gradual
reduction in the proportion of mature fish (> 60 cm) in the sampled catch (Figure 5).
This indicates that a larger proportion of BNS catch is made of immature fish and this
could represent a reduction in the abundance of mature fish which may impact on
recruitment to the fishery. There are also indications of declines in the proportion of
fish larger than 60cm caught in the Chatham Rise bottom trawl fishery in BNS 3
(Figure 5). These trends are not evident across all BNS stocks.
1.2
All Sexes Combined
1.0
Proportion >60 cm
32
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0.0
94/95
96/97
98/99
00/01
02/03
04/05
06/07
Fishing Year
EN-BLL
BP-BLL
CR-BT
CR-BLL
WCNI-BLL
BNS 7&8-BLL
Figure 5: Summary of the total proportion of BNS > 60cm length by QMA / fishing area by
year, from commercial logbook programme data. See below for description of series.
EN-BLL – Target BLL fishery for BNS, häpuku and ling in East Northland (BNS 1)
BP-BLL – Target BLL fishery for BNS, häpuku and ling off Bay of Plenty (BNS 1)
CR-BT – Target trawl fishery for BNS and alfonsino on Chatham Rise (BNS 3)
CR-BLL – Target BLL fishery for BNS and häpuku (BNS 3)
WCNI-BLL – West Coast North Island target BLL fishery
BNS7&8BLL – Target BLL fishery for BNS and häpuku (BNS 7 and 8)
87
Summary of Options
33
A summary of options is provided below and is followed by a brief description of the
key features of each option (Table 3).
34
For each BNS stock several options are presented for varying TACs: all stocks have
the option of retaining the status quo; setting a TAC based on a 10% reduction in
recent commercial catch (this is based on the average commercial catch of that stock
between 1 October 2001 and 30 September 2007); and setting a TAC based on a 30%
reduction in recent commercial catch (based on the average commercial catch of that
stock between 1 October 2001 and 30 September 2007). In addition to these options,
an option is presented for BNS 1 and 3 of a 40% reduction in recent commercial catch
(based on the average commercial catch of that stock between 1 October 2001 and 30
September 2007).
35
The reason for this additional option in BNS 1 and 3 is that catch has declined
significantly over the period between 1 October 2001 and 30 September 2007. This
means that the mean over the period between 1 October 2001 and 30 September 2007
is significantly higher than the last two fishing years. As such, Options 2 and 3 may
not sufficiently increase the likelihood that the biomass of BNS 1 and 3 will increase.
36
The average catch between 1 October 2001 and 30 September 2007 was selected as
the basis for considering reductions in TACs as this generally covers the period of
declining CPUE (Figures 2 and 4). MFish also considers that an average over this
time period is preferable to a shorter period because it better accounts for any changes
in fishing behaviour based on prevailing economic conditions or other operational
imperatives. Average commercial catches from which options were derived are given
in Table 4.
37
MFish believes that a reduction of less than 10% will not sufficiently address the
sustainability concern. For some BNS stocks, where catches have been declining
steadily, this will not constrain catch below that taken in the last two years (Table 6).
Any reduction greater than 30% (or 40% for BNS 1 and 3) may impose too great a
short-term cost on the commercial industry relative to the benefits of reducing risk,
and the possibility of further adjustments to the TAC in the medium term.
38
In MFish’s opinion, these options represent a range of reasonable options for the basis
of consultation. This does not constrain the Minister from considering measures
outside this range; however, the final decision on the quantum of any reduction in the
TAC will depend on the Minister’s interpretation of the severity and immediacy of the
sustainability risk and the socio-economic impacts associated with various reductions.
39
Should the Minister consider there is a need to reduce BNS catches significantly, but
recognises that such reductions would have substantial impact on fishers, the Minister
may consider a phased reduction. A phased reduction would see the Minister
consulting on gradual reductions of the TAC over several years to allow fishers the
opportunity to minimise the impact of reduced catches on their businesses. This would
also allow CPUE to be re-examined and the effect of catch reductions assessed before
considering further management action.
88
40
In most BNS stocks, recent commercial catches have been lower than the TACCs; the
exception being BNS 2. 10 As a result, proposed TACCs based on recent catch
represent significant reductions compared to the existing TACC. The smallest
proposed reduction being from BNS 2 (13%, because of over-catch of the TACC);
and the greatest reduction being BNS 8 (67%, because of the greatest under-catch of
the TACC) and it is unlikely that catches by these sectors has increased significantly
in recent years.
Table 3: Summary of the proposed options for all BNS stocks.
Option 1
Status
quo (t)
BNS 1
BNS 2
BNS 3
BNS 7
BNS 8
Option 2 –
TAC based on
a TACC set at
10% below
recent
commercial
catch (t)
Option 3 –
TAC based on
a TACC set at
30% below
recent
commercial
catch (t)
Option 4 –
TAC based on
a TACC set at
40% below
recent
commercial
catch (t)
TAC
1 023
825
647
558
TACC
1 000
786
612
524
TAC
1 107
958
753
-
TACC
1 048
902
701
-
TAC
961
698
551
478
TACC
925
649
505
433
TAC
155
96
76
-
TACC
150
89
70
-
TAC
103
47
37
-
TACC
100
43
33
-
41
The options below reduce only the commercial allowance, i.e. the TACC. This is
considered reasonable for two reasons. First, the initial AMP for each fishery
increased substantially the TACCs only; as this represented an allocation of the TAC
to the commercial sector, any reduction in the TAC should now be applied only to the
commercial sector. Secondly, the combined recreational and customary noncommercial allowances are very minor components of the BNS TACs: BNS 1 (2.2%);
BNS 2 (3.4%); BNS 3 (3.7%); BNS 7 (3.2%); BNS 8 (2.9%).
42
The TAC for BNS 2 contains an allowance for other sources of fishing-related
mortality that is set at 2% of the TACC. Based on a TACC of 1 048, this equated to
21 tonnes when it was set for the 1 October 2004 fishing year. MFish considers that
this allowance should remain but be reduced to equate to 2 % of any reduced TACC.
There is no similar allowance in BNS 1, 3, 7 or 8. MFish also notes that there have
10
Deemed values were increased in BNS 2 on 1 October 2007 to address this over-catch.
89
been reports of predation of BNS caught by long-line. MFish proposes to set an
allowance of 2 % of the TACC for other sources of fishing-related mortality in BNS
1, 3, 7 and 8 to align these stocks with BNS 2.
43
MFish is also consulting on increasing deemed values in BNS 1, 3, 7 and 8. Further
information on this is included in the Ministry’s deemed value review.
Option 1 – Status quo option for all BNS stocks
44
The status quo option maintains the current TAC for each BNS stock. Further, based
on the average catch between 1 October 2001 and 30 September 2007, the current
TACs are under-caught in BNS 1, 3, 7 and 8 (Tables 4 and 6 and Figures 6 to 10).
Consequently, this option will allow the possibility for current catch to increase.
Given the Plenary’s opinion that current harvests in all BNS stocks are unlikely to be
sustainable over the short to medium term, this option is likely to be inconsistent with
the purpose of the Fisheries Act 1996 (the Act). The purpose of the Act is to provide
for the utilisation of fisheries resources while ensuring sustainability. The definition
of sustainability includes maintaining the potential of fisheries resources to meet the
reasonably foreseeable needs of future generations.
Option 2 – TAC set based on 10% reduction in recent commercial catch
45
This option reduces the TAC to a level that is 10% lower than the average commercial
catch between 1 October 2001 and 30 September 2007. An allowance for other
sources of fishing-related mortality would also be set for BNS 1, 3, 7 and 8 at 2 % of
the TACC. Allowances for customary and recreational interests would remain the
same.
Option 3 – TAC set based on 30% reduction in recent commercial catch
46
This option reduces the TAC to a level that is 30% lower than the average commercial
catch between 1 October 2001 and 30 September 2007. An allowance for other
sources of fishing-related mortality would also be set for BNS 1, 3, 7 and 8 at 2 % of
the TACC. Allowances for customary and recreational interests would remain the
same.
Option 4 – TAC set based on 40% reduction in recent commercial catch
for BNS 1 and 3 only
47
This option reduces the TAC to a level that is 40% lower than the average commercial
catch between 1 October 2001 and 30 September 2007. An allowance for other
sources of fishing-related mortality would also be set for BNS 1 and 3 at 2 % of the
TACC. Allowances for customary and recreational interests would remain the same.
90
Rationale for Management Options
Status of the stocks
48
As discussed above, all CPUE indices show markedly similar declines in the period
between 1 October 2001 and 30 September 2007; these declines range from 43% to
79% (mean 64%) (Table 2).
49
The declines in CPUE generally follow the increases in TACCs after stocks entered
the AMP. The decline in CPUE in BNS 3 appears to coincide with the TACC increase
in 2001–02. The steep decline in the East Northland fishery between 1997–98 and
1998–99 coincides with the entry of BNS 1 into the AMP in 1996–97 and the
accompanying TACC increase. However, the Bay of Plenty fishery was stable up to
around 2003–04 as was the East Northland fishery after the first decline. There was a
long period of catches in excess of the TACC in BNS 2, beginning in the early 1990s.
However, the decline in CPUE in BNS 2 coincides closely with the increase in the
BNS 2 TACC in 2003–04. Conversely, the increased TACCs substantially pre-dated
the decline estimated for BNS 7 and 8.
50
There is currently no stock assessment available for any BNS stock that will allow
estimation of the biomass that can produce the maximum sustainable yield (BMSY) or
the current biomass (BCURRENT).
51
However, as noted above, if BNS is considered as one single New Zealand-wide stock
and if the relationship between CPUE and abundance is hyper-stable as surmised in
the 2008 Plenary, then the current biomass is likely to be below BMSY.
B
Stock Structure
52
The concurrent decline of six independent CPUE series covering all the main BNS
fisheries may indicate that there is a single New Zealand stock of BNS or some close
relationship among stocks in these QMAs. The Plenary noted that declines in CPUE
have been observed even in areas that are relatively lightly fished such as BNS 7 and
BNS 8. The existence of a single New Zealand-wide BNS stock declining in all areas
would imply not only that current catch in each BNS stock is unsustainable, but that
the overall combined catch is also unsustainable.
53
An environmental mechanism simultaneously affecting availability or catch-ability of
BNS across all QMAs is considered to be less likely than the possibility of a single
stock, or of correlated recruitment across sub-stocks in the various areas. The Plenary
considered that the synchronous recent declines in CPUE were probably caused by
high fishing mortality and a possible coincidental decline in recruitment.
Management Objectives
54
The purpose of the Act is to provide for the utilisation of fisheries resources while
ensuring sustainability. Based on the decline in CPUE in all BNS stocks, the Plenary
considered that current catches in all BNS stocks are not likely to be sustainable.
55
Section 13(2) of the Act requires the Minister to set a TAC at or above a level that can
produce the maximum sustainable yield (MSY). The Plenary did not provide a stock
91
assessment for any BNS stock to allow explicit estimation of BMSY and BCURRENT.
Further, uncertainty regarding the extent of the stock which is contributing to the BNS
fisheries in the various QMAs makes it difficult to estimate BMSY for these stocks.
56
However, MFish scientists consider that if BNS were assumed to be one single New
Zealand-wide stock then the current biomass is likely to be below BMSY. This
conclusion is based on analyses of the CPUE indices in the bluenose fisheries,
together with interpretation of the likely relationship between CPUE and abundance.
B
Recent BNS Catches
57
The TACCs in BNS 1, 3, 7 and 8 have been under-caught on average over the last six
years (Table 4 and Figures 6 to 10). In contrast, the TACC in BNS 2 has been overcaught in five of the last six fishing years with the exception being last fishing year
when only 957 of the 1 048 t TACC was taken.
Table 4: Average catch and TACCs between 1 October 2001 and 30 September 2007; percent of the TACC
caught; and 10%, 30% and 40% reductions in average catch. A 2% allowance for other sources of fishingrelated mortality has also been subtracted from all TACCs.
Average
catch (t)
Average
TACC (t)
% of
TACC
caught
10%
reduction
in catch (t)
30%
reduction
in catch (t)
40%
reduction
in catch (t)
BNS 1
891
1000
89%
786
612
524
BNS 2
1022
961
106%
902
701
-
BNS 3
736
1008
73%
649
505
433
BNS 7
101
150
67%
89
70
-
BNS 8
49
100
49%
43
33
-
58
The rationale for reducing the TACC is based on a decline in the CPUE of all BNS
stocks. As a result of the general trend of under-catching TACCs, MFish considers
that the level to which TACCs are reduced should be below recent catch. MFish
considers that the TACC should be reduced below the average catch between 1
October 2001 and 30 September 2007. This period generally covers the period of
declining CPUE and is preferable to a shorter period because it better accounts for any
changes in fishing behaviour based on prevailing economic conditions or other
operational imperatives.
59
Because of the varying extent to which TACCs have been caught in each BNS stock,
the options will have the effect of reducing the TACCs for some BNS stocks more
than others.
Uniformity of management options
60
While there are differences in the magnitude of the decline in CPUE among BNS
stocks (Table 2), MFish believes the information is not sufficient to establish whether
there is greater risk to the sustainability of particular BNS stocks that would justify
greater or lesser reductions in TACCs. However, because of the difference in recent
92
catch among stocks, the Minister may consider that for some stocks a greater
reduction in the TAC is necessary to ensure that the biomass of BNS stocks remains
at, or rebuilds to, appropriate levels.
61
For example, catches in the last two fishing years are below the TACCs that are
proposed under Option 2 in BNS 1, 3 and 8 (Tables 6 and 7). As such, these options
represent no reduction in catch over this shorter recent period and no loss in revenue.
In these instances a greater reduction may be necessary to increase the likelihood that
the stocks will increase. This is also reflected by the addition of a 40 % option for
BNS 1 and 3.
62
There may also be different social, cultural or economic considerations that warrant
different management responses in specific BNS stocks. For example, reducing the
TACCs in BNS 7 and 8, where there are already low TACCs and catches, may
significantly reduce the availability of ACE in those fisheries. This may have a
significant impact on fishers that rely on ACE for their fishing operations. In light of
the possibility of a single BNS stock, any reduction in TACCs in such fisheries will
need to consider such social and economic factors.
Impact of TAC reductions
63
BNS is a relatively high value species with an export price in December 2007 of
approximately $7.37 per kg (greenweight equivalent for the most common exported
state – chilled headed and gutted). Reducing the TAC of BNS stocks would result in
reductions in revenue (Table 5).
64
Current catches have averaged only 76% of the TACCs in the last two fishing years
(Table 6). Consequently, when the reduced TACCs proposed are compared against
current, generally under-caught, TACCs, there appears to be a greater loss in revenue.
65
However, when the average recent catches between 1 October 2005 and 30 September
2007 are compared to the proposed TACCs, the estimated revenue reduction is
significantly less in all BNS stocks except BNS 2 (Table 7).
Table 5: Estimated reduction in revenue based on difference between average catch between 1 October 2001
and 30 September 2007 and proposed new TACCs. Estimates are based on an export price of $7.37 per kg
greenweight.
Average
catch (t)
TACC
based on
10%
reduction
in catch (t)
Revenue
reduction
for 10%
reduction
TACC
based on
30%
reduction
in catch (t)
Revenue
reduction
for 30%
reduction
TACC
based on
40%
reduction
in catch (t)
Revenue
reduction
for 40%
reduction
BNS 1
891
786
$774,000
612
$2.06M
524
$2.70M
BNS 2
1 022
902
$804,000
701
$2.37M
-
-
BNS 3
736
649
$641,000
505
$1.70M
433
$2.23M
BNS 7
101
89
$88,000
70
$228,000
-
-
BNS 8
49
43
$44,000
33
$118,000
-
-
Total
2 799
2 519
$2.30M
1 959
$6.37M
977
$4.97M
93
Table 6: Average catches compared against TACCs in the last two fishing years.
Current
TACC
(t)
Average catch in 05/06
and 06/07 fishing years (t)
TACC in 05/06 and 06/07
fishing years (t)
Percentage
of TACC
caught
BNS 1
1 000
721
1000
72.1%
BNS 2
1 048
1 047
1 048
99.9%
BNS 3
925
524
925
56.6%
BNS 7
150
124
150
82.7%
BNS 8
100
35
100
35.0%
Total
3 223
2 450
3223
76.0%
Table 7: Estimated reduction in revenue based on difference between average catch between 1 October 2005
and 30 September 2007 and proposed new TACCs. Estimates are based on an export price of $7.37 per
kg greenweight.
TACC
based on
10%
reduction in
catch (t)
Reduction
in revenue
based on
10% TACC
reduction
TACC
based on
30%
reduction in
catch (t)
Reduction
in revenue
based on
30% TACC
reduction
TACC
based on
40%
reduction in
catch (t)
Reduction
in revenue
based on
40% TACC
reduction
BNS 1
786
nil
612
$803,000
524
$1.45M
BNS 2
902
$1.07M
701
$2.55M
-
-
BNS 3
649
nil
505
$140,000
433
$671,000
BNS 7
89
$258,000
70
$398,000
-
-
BNS 8
43
nil
33
$15,000
-
-
Total
2 519
$1.19M
1 959
$3.81M
977
$1.97M
Assessment of Management Options
Other sources of fishing-related mortality
66
No quantitative information is available on the level of illegal catch or other sources
of mortality. It is likely that some indirect fishing-related mortality will occur because
of BNS escaping through trawl nets but being fatally injured. Similarly it is likely that
there is some additional predation associated with the long-line fishing.
94
67
MFish considers that it is appropriate to include an allowance for other sources of
fishing-related mortality for all BNS stocks. MFish propose to set an allowance in
BNS 1, 3, 7 and 8 at 2 % of the TACC to align the allowance with that in BNS 2
(Table 8).
Table 8: Proposed allowances for other sources of fishing-related mortality for Options 2, 3 and 4.
TACC
based on
Option 2 (t)
Allowance
based on
Option 2 (t)
TACC
based on
Option 3 (t)
Allowance
based on
Option 3 (t)
TACC
based on
Option 4
(t)
Allowance
based on
Option 4
(t)
BNS 1
786
16
612
12
524
11
BNS 2
902
18
701
14
-
-
BNS 3
649
13
505
10
433
9
BNS 7
89
2
70
1
-
-
BNS 8
43
1
33
1
-
-
All BNS stocks
Option 1 – Status Quo
68
Because the costs and benefits of Option 1 are similar among BNS stocks they are
considered generically in this section.
Impact
69
As discussed above, the status quo has resulted in declines in CPUE of between 43%
and 79% (mean 64%) between 1 October 2001 and 30 September 2007 for the six
most reliable CPUE indices. Based largely on these data, the Plenary concluded that
current harvests of all BNS stocks are unlikely to be sustainable over the short to
medium term.
Costs
70
As discussed above, the status quo option maintains the current TAC for each BNS
stock and will provide for the opportunity for BNS catches to increase above their
current levels in all stocks.
71
Maintaining the status quo will likely result in the continuation of fishing at levels that
are considered by the Plenary as unsustainable; this option therefore is likely to be
inconsistent with the purpose of the Act. The purpose of the Act is to provide for the
utilisation of fisheries resources while ensuring sustainability. The definition of
95
sustainability includes maintaining the potential of fisheries resources to meet the
reasonably foreseeable needs of future generations.
Benefits
72
There may be a short-term financial advantage to the commercial sector in
maintaining higher BNS catches in the coming fishing year or allowing more time to
adjust their fishing practices and infrastructure to accommodate any future reductions
in BNS TACs. However, these advantages are likely to be short lived if stocks decline
and subsequently result in significantly worse catches in future.
BNS 1
73
Two CPUE indices were presented above for BNS 1. CPUE in the East Northland
bottom long-line fishery declined by 43 % between 1 October 2001 and 30 September
2007; and by 61 % in the Bay of Plenty bottom long-line fishery. There is also
evidence of a gradual reduction in the proportion of mature fish (> 60 cm) in the
sampled catch. Three options are discussed below; all of which are summarised in
Table 10.
Option 2 - Impact and Costs
74
This option would reduce the TACC in BNS 1 from 1000 t to 786 t. The average
catch in BNS 1 between 1 October 2001 and 30 September 2007 was 891 t and, based
on an export price of $7.37 per kg, would represent a reduction in revenue of
approximately $774,000.
75
BNS catches have been declining steadily in BNS 1 over the last six years (Table 9
and Figure 6). The average catch from the last two fishing years, 1 October 2005 to 30
September 2007, was only 721 t. Based on these recent catches, a reduction in the
TACC to 786 t would not represent a reduction in catch or revenue.
Table 9: Reported landings of BNS in BNS 1.
Reported
landings (t)
TACC (t)
2001–02
954
1 000
2002–03
1 051
1 000
2003–04
1 030
1 000
2004–05
870
1 000
2005–06
699
1 000
2006–07
742
1 000
96
1100
Historical TACC
Annual catch (t)
1000
900
800
TACC under Option 2
700
TACC under Option 3
600
500
2000
TACC under Option 4
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
Figure 6: Average catches in relation to the historical TACC and the proposed TACCs for Options 2 , 3 and 4.
76
Because of the decline in recent catches, a reduction in the TACC to 10% below
average catches between 1 October 2001 and 30 September 2007 will not constrain
catch at recent levels (Figure 6). As such, there is a risk that continuing to fish at
current levels, or potentially slightly higher levels, will not sufficiently arrest any
decline in stock size implied by falling CPUE. Consequently, a greater reduction in
the TAC may be necessary for this stock.
Benefits
77
Taking a long-term view, this option should increase the likelihood that BNS 1
increases to, or remains at, a level that can produce MSY. When compared to Option
3, this option will result in a lesser reduction in the TAC and may provide a short-term
financial advantage to the commercial sector by maintaining higher BNS catches in
the coming fishing year or allowing more time to adjust their fishing practices and
infrastructure to accommodate any future reductions in BNS TACs should they be
necessary.
78
Reducing the TACC should have the advantage of leaving additional BNS in the
water. These additional fish may benefit the recreational and customary sectors by
increasing catch rates and possibly, over time, the size of BNS available.
Option 3 – Impacts and Costs
79
This option would reduce the TACC in BNS 1 from 1000 t to 612 t. The average
catch in BNS 1 between 1 October 2001 and 30 September 2007 was 891 t and, based
on an export price of $7.37 per kg, would represent a reduction in revenue of
approximately $2.06M.
97
80
BNS catches have been declining steadily in BNS 1 over the last six years (Table 9
and Figure 6). The average catch from the last two fishing years, 1 October 2005 to 30
September 2007, was only 721 t. Based on these recent catches, a reduction in the
TACC to 612 t would represent a reduction in revenue of approximately $803,000.
81
Unlike Option 2, Option 3 will reduce the TACC below the average catch levels of the
last two fishing years.
Benefits
82
Taking a long-term view, this option should provide a greater likelihood than Option
2 that BNS 1 increases to, or remains at, a level that can produce MSY. When
compared to Option 2, this option will result is a greater reduction in the TAC and
would not provide a short-term financial advantage as outlined above for Option 1.
83
Reducing the TACC should have the advantage of leaving additional BNS in the
water. These additional fish may benefit the recreational and customary sectors by
increasing catch rates and possibly, over time, the size of BNS available.
Option 4 – Impacts and Costs
84
Because BNS catches have been declining steadily in BNS 1 over the last six years
(Table 9 and Figure 6), the six year average is considerably higher than the catch from
the last two fishing years. As a result, Option 1 does not constrain recent catch from
the last two fishing years. A fourth option is suggested to reduce recent catch to a
level further below the average catch of the last two years to increase the likelihood
that the biomass of BNS 1 will increase.
85
This option would reduce the TACC in BNS 1 from 1000 t to 524 t. The average
catch in BNS 1 between 1 October 2001 and 30 September 2007 was 891 t and, based
on an export price of $7.37 per kg, would represent a reduction in revenue of
approximately $2.70M.
86
The average catch from the last two fishing years, 1 October 2005 to 30 September
2007, was only 721 t. Based on these recent catches, a reduction in the TACC to 524 t
would represent a reduction in revenue of approximately $1.45M.
Benefits
87
Taking a long-term view, this option should provide a greater likelihood than Option
3 that BNS 1 increases to, or remains at, a level that can produce MSY. When
compared to Option 3, this option will result is a greater reduction in the TAC and
would not provide a short-term financial advantage as outlined above for Option 1.
88
Reducing the TACC should have the advantage of leaving additional BNS in the
water. These additional fish may benefit the recreational and customary sectors by
increasing catch rates and possibly, over time, the size of BNS available.
98
Hauraki Gulf Marine Park Act 2000
89
Section 11(2)(c) of the Fisheries Act requires the Minister to take into account ss 7
and 8 of the Hauraki Gulf Marine Park Act 2000 when setting or varying any
sustainability measure; including a TAC. Further, s 13 of the Hauraki Gulf Marine
Park Act 2000 requires the Minister when setting a TACC to have particular regard to
ss 7 and 8 of the Hauraki Gulf Marine Park Act 2000 in so far as the decision relates
to the Hauraki Gulf.
90
Section 7 recognises the national significance of the Hauraki Gulf including its
capacity to provide for the relationship of tangata whenua with the Gulf and the
social, economic, recreational, and cultural well-being of people and communities.
Section 8 sets out the objectives of the management of the Hauraki Gulf, which
include the maintenance of the Hauraki Gulf for the social and economic well-being
and its contribution to the recreation and enjoyment of the people and communities of
the Hauraki Gulf and New Zealand. The maintenance and enhancement of the
physical resources of the Gulf, which include BNS, is also an objective.
91
Given that the options proposed for BNS TACs do not change the customary or
recreational allowances, there is likely to be little impact on the historic, traditional,
cultural, and spiritual relationship of the tangata whenua; or the social, economic,
recreational, and cultural well-being of people and communities associated with the
Gulf.
92
There is a possibility that reduced commercial catch in the larger area of BNS 1 will
increase the availability of BNS to the customary and recreational sector in the
Hauraki Gulf. In addition, based on the proposals to reduce the TACC only, the
options for all BNS stocks will result in a greater proportion of the TAC being
allocated to non-commercial Mäori and recreational fishing interests.
93
There is little reported commercial catch of BNS from the Statistical Areas 005, 006
and 007; between 1 October 2001 and 30 September 2007, 7.7 t of BNS was reported
as being caught commercially from this area using any method. These Statistical
Areas are situated in the BNS 1 and also overlap with the Hauraki Gulf Marine Park
in the inner Hauraki Gulf. Given this small current catch, the well-being of the
commercial sector is unlikely to be affected. If the TACC of BNS was reduced
commercial fishers would still able to harvest BNS from the Hauraki Gulf.
94
There is also partial overlap of the Hauraki Gulf Marine Park with the significantly
larger statistical area 008. This area encompasses the eastern side of Great Barrier
Island and the eastern coast of the Coromandel Peninsula down to Shoe Island. BNS
catches from area 008 are more significant; between 1 October 2001 and 30
September 2007, 346 t of BNS was reported as being caught commercially from this
area using any method. MFish believes that the options proposed in this paper do not
impact significantly on the wellbeing of the people of the Hauraki Gulf.
Table 10. Summary of options proposed for BNS 1.
TACC
(t)
Customary
Allowance (t)
Recreational
Allowance (t)
99
Other sources of
fishing-related
mortality (t)
TAC (t)
Option 2
786
8
15
16
825
Option 3
612
8
15
12
647
Option 4
524
8
15
11
558
BNS 2
95
CPUE in the target bottom long-line fishery declined by 79 % between 1 October
2001 and 30 September 2007. Two options are discussed belowand are summarised in
Table 12.
Option 2 – Impact and Costs
96
This option would reduce the TACC in BNS 2 from 1 048 t to 902 t. The average
catch in BNS 2 between 1 October 2001 and 30 September 2007 was 1022 t and,
based on an export price of $7.37 per kg, would represent a reduction in revenue of
approximately $804,000.
97
Unlike BNS 1, catches have remained relatively stable in BNS 2 over the last six
years (Table 11 and Figure 7). It appears that commercial fishers have had to expend
significantly more effort to maintain these catches as is evident from the large decline
in CPUE of 79 % in BNS 2; the largest decline in any of the CPUE indices.
98
The average recent catch between 1 October 2005 and 30 September 2007 is 1 047 t
and is greater than the average over the longer period. Based on these recent catches, a
reduction in the TACC to 902 t would represent a reduction in revenue of
approximately $1.07M.
Table 11: Reported landings of BNS in BNS 2.
Reported
landings (t)
TACC (t)
2001–02
1 010
873
2002–03
933
873
2003–04
933
873
2004–05
1 162
1 048
2005–06
1 136
1 048
2006–07
957
1 048
100
1200
Annual catch (t)
1100
Historical TACC
1000
TACC under Option 2
900
800
TACC under Option 3
700
600
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
Figure 7: Average catches in relation to the historical TACC and the proposed TACCs under Options 2 and 3.
99
Because of the maintenance of catches in BNS 2, and in some years catch in excess of
the TACC, this option would reduce catch below recent catch level.
Benefits
100
Taking a long-term view, this option should increase the likelihood that BNS 2
increases to, or remains at, a level that can produce MSY. When compared to Option
3, this option will result in a lesser reduction in the TAC and may provide a short-term
financial advantage to the commercial sector by maintaining higher BNS catches in
the coming fishing year or allowing more time to adjust their fishing practices and
infrastructure to accommodate any future reductions in BNS TACs should they be
necessary.
101
Reducing the TACC should have the advantage of leaving additional BNS in the
water; this will benefit all sector groups.
Option 3 – Impact and Costs
102
This option would reduce the TACC in BNS 2 from 1 048 t to 701 t. The average
catch in BNS 2 between 1 October 2001 and 30 September 2007 was 1022 t and,
based on an export price of $7.37 per kg, would represent a reduction in revenue of
approximately $2.37M.
103
The average recent catch between 1 October 2005 and 30 September 2007 is 1 047 t
and is greater than the average over the longer period (Figure 7). Based on these
recent catches, a reduction in the TACC to 701 t would represent a reduction in
revenue of approximately $2.55M.
101
104
Because of the maintenance of catches in BNS 2, this option represents the highest
reduction in catch and therefore most significant economic cost of the options
proposed in all BNS stocks.
Benefits
105
Taking a long-term view, this option should provide a greater likelihood than Option
2 that BNS 2 increases to, or remains at, a level that can produce MSY. When
compared to Option 2, this option will result in a greater reduction in the TAC and
would not provide a short-term financial advantage as outlined above for Option 1.
106
Reducing the TACC should have the advantage of leaving additional BNS in the
water; this will benefit all sector groups.
Table 12. Summary of options proposed for BNS 2.
TACC
(t)
Customary
Allowance (t)
Recreational
Allowance (t)
Other sources of
fishing-related
mortality (t)
TAC (t)
Option 2
902
13
25
18
958
Option 3
701
13
25
14
753
BNS 3
107
Two CPUE indices were presented above for BNS 3. CPUE in the Chatham Rise
trawl fishery (by-catch) declined by 71 % between 1 October 2001 and 30 September
2007; and by 67 % in the target bottom long-line fishery. There is also evidence of a
gradual reduction in the proportion of mature fish (> 60 cm) in the sampled catch in
the trawl fishery. Three options are discussed below; all of which are summarised in
Table 14.
Option 2 – Impact and Costs
108
This option would reduce the TACC in BNS 3 from 925 t to 649 t. The average catch
in BNS 3 between 1 October 2001 and 30 September 2007 was 736 t. Based on an
export price of $7.37 per kg this would represent a reduction in revenue of
approximately $641,000.
109
Catches have declined in BNS 3 over the last six years with an average recent catch
between 1 October 2005 and 30 September 2007 of only 524 t (Table 13 and Figure
8). Based on these recent catches, a reduction in the TACC to 649 t would not
represent reduction in catch or revenue.
102
Table 13: Reported landings of BNS in BNS 3. Asterisk denotes the 250 t transitional ACE provided to
the Chatham Islands.
Reported
landings (t)
TACC (t)
2001–02
733
925*
2002–03
876
925*
2003–04
915
925
2004–05
844
925
2005–06
536
925
2006–07
511
925
1000
Historical TACC
Annual catch (t)
900
800
700
TACC under Option 2
600
TACC under Option 3
500
TACC under Option 4
400
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
Figure 8: Average catches in relation to the historical TACC and the proposed TACCs under Options 2, 3 and
4. This does not include the 250 t transitional ACE provided to the Chatham Islands in 2001 and 2002.
110
Because of the decline in recent catches, a reduction in the TACC to 10% below
average catches between 1 October 2001 and 30 September 2007 will not constrain
recent catch. As such, there is a risk that continuing to fish at current levels, or
potentially slightly higher, will not sufficiently arrest any decline in stock size implied
by falling CPUE.
Benefits
111
Taking a long-term view, this option should increase the likelihood that BNS 3
increases to, or remains at, a level that can produce MSY. However, given the recent
under-catch of the TACC this option would not constrain catches based on the catch
over the last two fishing years, as such, it is less clear that this option will increase the
biomass in BNS 3. The benefit of this option to the commercial sector is that it does
not result in any loss in revenue compared to the last two fishing years.
103
Option 3 – Impact and Costs
112
This option would reduce the TACC in BNS 3 from 925 t to 505 t. The average catch
in BNS 3 between 1 October 2001 and 30 September 2007 was 736 t and, based on an
export price of $7.37 per kg, would represent a reduction in revenue of approximately
$1.70M.
113
Catches have declined in BNS 3 over the last six years with an average recent catch
between 1 October 2005 and 30 September 2007 of only 524 t (Table 13 and Figure
8). Based on these recent catches, a reduction in the TACC to 505 t would represent a
reduction in revenue of approximately $140,000.
114
Because of the decline in recent catches, a reduction in the TACC to 30% below
average catches between 1 October 2001 and 30 September 2007 will only represent a
small constraint on fishing in relation to average catches of the past two fishing years.
Benefits
115
Given the recent under-catch of the TACC this option would constrain catches to
approximately those of the last two fishing years. As such, this option will result in a
greater likelihood that the biomass of BNS 3 will increase when compared to Option
2. The benefit of this option to the commercial sector is that it results in only modest
reductions in revenue compared to the last two fishing years.
Option 4 – Impacts and Costs
116
Because BNS catches have been declining steadily in BNS 3 over the last six years
(Table 13 and Figure 8), the six year average is considerably higher than the catch
from the last two fishing years. As a result, Option 2 does not constrain recent catch
from the last two fishing years. A fourth option is suggested to reduce recent catch to
a level further below the average catch of the last two years to increase the likelihood
that the biomass of BNS 1 will increase.
117
This option would reduce the TACC in BNS 3 from 1000 t to 433 t. The average
catch in BNS 3 between 1 October 2001 and 30 September 2007 was 736 t and, based
on an export price of $7.37 per kg, would represent a reduction in revenue of
approximately $2.23M.
118
The average catch from the last two fishing years, 1 October 2005 to 30 September
2007, was only 524 t. Based on these recent catches, a reduction in the TACC to 433 t
would represent a reduction in revenue of approximately $671,000.
Benefits
119
Taking a long-term view, this option should provide a greater likelihood than Option
3 that BNS 3 increases to, or remains at, a level that can produce MSY. When
compared to Option 3, this option will result is a greater reduction in the TAC and
would not provide a short-term financial advantage as outlined above for Option 1.
120
Reducing the TACC should have the advantage of leaving additional BNS in the
water; this will benefit all sector groups.
104
Table 14. Summary of options proposed for BNS 3.
TACC
(t)
Customary
Allowance (t)
Recreational
Allowance (t)
Other sources of
fishing-related
mortality (t)
TAC (t)
Option 2
649
18
18
13
698
Option 3
505
18
18
10
551
Option 4
433
18
18
9
478
BNS 7
121
The lack of data in both BNS 7 and 8 required a combined CPUE analysis for the
target bottom long-line fishery in these two areas. The CPUE declined by 64 %
between 1 October 2001 and 30 September 2007. Two options are discussed below
and are summarised in Table 16.
Option 2 – Impact and Costs
122
This option would reduce the TACC in BNS 7 from 150 t to 89 t. The average catch
in BNS 7 between 1 October 2001 and 30 September 2007 was 101 t and, based on an
export price of $7.37 per kg, would represent a reduction in revenue of approximately
$88,000.
123
However, catches have fluctuated significantly in BNS 7 over the last six years; with
an average recent catch between 1 October 2005 and 30 September 2007 of 124 t
(Table 15 and Figure 9). Based on these recent catches, a reduction in the TACC to 89
t would represent a reduction in revenue of approximately $258,000.
Table 15: Reported landings of BNS in BNS 7.
Reported
landings (t)
TACC (t)
2001–02
70
150
2002–03
76
150
2003–04
117
150
2004–05
94
150
2005–06
84
150
2006–07
164
150
105
Annual catch (t)
200
160
Historical TACC
120
TACC under Option 2
80
40
2000
TACC under Option 3
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
Figure 9: Average catches in relation to the historical TACC and the proposed TACCs under Options 2 and 3.
124
Because of the fluctuation in catch in BNS 7, a TACC of 89 t would only have
constrained catches in three of the last six years (Figure 9).
125
Catches in BNS 7 are low compared to BNS 1, 2 and 3, yet the CPUE in BNS 7 and 8
still declined by 64 %. This lends support to the proposition that there may be a single
BNS stock.
126
Reducing the TACC in BNS 7 may significantly reduce the liquidity of the ACE
market as larger operators retain ACE to cover by-catch in larger fisheries such as
hoki. This may have considerable impact on smaller fishers who rely on ACE for
target BNS fisheries. Given this, and the possibility of a single New Zealand-wide
BNS stock, reductions in BNS 7 may have disproportionate impacts on individual
fishers in BNS 7.
Benefits
127
Taking a long-term view, this option should increase the likelihood that BNS 7
increases to, or remains at, a level that can produce MSY. When compared to Option
3, this option will result in a lesser reduction in the TAC and may provide a short-term
financial advantage to the commercial sector by maintaining higher BNS catches in
the coming fishing year or allowing more time to adjust their fishing practices and
infrastructure to accommodate any future reductions in BNS TACs should they be
necessary.
128
Reducing the TACC should have the advantage of leaving additional BNS in the
water; this will benefit all sector groups.
Option 3 – Impact and Costs
129
This option would reduce the TACC in BNS 7 from 150 t to 70 t. The average catch
in BNS 7 between 1 October 2001 and 30 September 2007 was 101 t and, based on an
export price of $7.37 per kg, would represent a reduction in revenue of approximately
$228,000.
106
130
Because catches have fluctuated significantly in BNS 7 over the last six years; with an
average recent catch between 1 October 2005 and 30 September 2007 of 124 t (Table
15 and Figure 9) the recent catches have been higher than the average over the longer
period. Based on these recent catches, a reduction in the TACC to 70 t would
represent a reduction in revenue of approximately $398,000.
131
Catches in BNS 7 are low compared to BNS 1, 2 and 3, yet the CPUE in BNS 7 and 8
still declined by 64 %. This lends support to the proposition that there may be a single
BNS stock.
132
Reducing the TACC in BNS 7 may significantly reduce the liquidity of the ACE
market as larger operators retain ACE to cover by-catch in larger fisheries such as
hoki. This may have considerable impact on smaller fishers who rely on ACE for
target BNS fisheries. Given this, and the possibility of a single New Zealand-wide
BNS stock, reductions in BNS 7 may have disproportionate impacts in individual
commercial fishers in BNS 7.
Benefits
133
Taking a long-term view, this option should provide a greater likelihood than Option
2 that BNS 1 increases to, or remains at, a level that can produce MSY. When
compared to Option 2, this option will result is a greater reduction in the TAC and
would not provide a short-term financial advantage as outlined above for Option 1.
134
Reducing the TACC should have the advantage of leaving additional BNS in the
water; this will benefit all sector groups.
Table 16. Summary of options proposed for BNS 7.
TACC
(t)
Customary
Allowance (t)
Recreational
Allowance (t)
Other sources of
fishing-related
mortality (t)
TAC (t)
Option 2
89
2
3
2
96
Option 3
70
2
3
1
76
BNS 8
135
The combined CPUE index for the target bottom long-line fishery in BNS 7 and 8
declined by 64 % between 1 October 2001 and 30 September 2007. Two options are
discussed below and are summarised in Table 18.
Option 2 – Impact and Costs
136
This option would reduce the TACC in BNS 8 from 100 t to 43 t. The average catch
in BNS 8 between 1 October 2001 and 30 September 2007 was 49 t and, based on an
export price of $7.37 per kg, would represent a reduction in revenue of approximately
$44,000.
107
137
However, the average recent catch between 1 October 2005 and 30 September 2007
was only 35 t (Table 17 and Figure 10) and based on these recent catches, a reduction
in the TACC to 43 t would not represent reduction in catch or revenue.
Table 17: Reported landings of BNS in BNS 8.
Reported
landings (t)
TACC (t)
2001–02
17
100
2002–03
66
100
2003–04
96
100
2004–05
42
100
2005–06
20
100
2006–07
50
100
120
Annual catch (t)
Historical TACC
80
TACC under Option 2
40
TACC under Option 3
0
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
Figure 10: Average catches in relation to the historical TACC and the proposed TACCs under Options 2 and 3.
138
As in BNS 7, catches in BNS 8 are low compared to BNS 1, 2 and 3, yet the CPUE in
BNS 7 and 8 still declined by 64 %. This lends support to the proposition that there
may be a single BNS stock.
139
Reducing the TACC in BNS 8 may significantly reduce the liquidity of the ACE
market as larger operators retain ACE to cover by-catch in larger fisheries such as
hoki. This may have considerable impact on smaller fishers who rely on ACE for
target BNS fisheries. Given this, and the possibility of a single New Zealand-wide
BNS stock, reductions in BNS 8 may have disproportionate impacts on individual
fishers in BNS 8.
Benefits
140
Taking a long-term view, this option should increase the likelihood that BNS 8
increases to, or remains at, a level that can produce MSY. However, given the
108
consistent under-catch of the TACC this option would not constrain catches based on
the catch over the last two fishing years, as such, it is less clear that this option will
increase the biomass in BNS 8. The benefit of this option to the commercial sector is
that it does not result in any loss in revenue compared to the last two fishing years.
141
Reducing the TACC under this option may not result in a reduction in catches
compared to the last two fishing years. Consequently, there may be little or no benefit
to any sector.
Option 3 – Impact and Costs
142
This option would reduce the TACC in BNS 8 from 100 t to 33 t. The average catch
in BNS 8 between 1 October 2001 and 30 September 2007 was 49 t and, based on an
export price of $7.37 per kg, would represent a reduction in revenue of approximately
$118,000.
143
The average recent catch between 1 October 2005 and 30 September 2007 was only
35 t (Table 17 and Figure 10) and based on these recent catches, a reduction in the
TACC to 33 t would represent a reduction in revenue of $15,000.
144
As in BNS 7, catches in BNS 8 are low compared to BNS 1, 2 and 3, yet the CPUE in
BNS 7 and 8 still declined by 64 %. This lends support to the proposition that there
may be a single BNS stock.
145
Reducing the TACC in BNS 8 may significantly reduce the liquidity of the ACE
market as larger operators retain ACE to cover by-catch in larger fisheries such as
hoki. This may have considerable impact on smaller fishers who rely on ACE for
target BNS fisheries. Given this, and the possibility of a single New Zealand-wide
BNS stock, reductions in BNS 8 may have disproportionate impacts on individual
fishers in BNS 8.
Benefits
146
Taking a long-term view, this option should increase the likelihood that BNS 8
increases to, or remains at, a level that can produce MSY. However, given the
consistent under-catch of the TACC this option would not constrain catches based on
the catch over the last two fishing years, as such, it is less clear that this option will
increase the biomass in BNS 8. The benefit of this option to the commercial sector is
that it results in only a modest reduction in revenue compared to the last two fishing
years.
147
Reducing the TACC under this option may not result in a reduction in catches
compared to the last two fishing years. Consequently, there may be little or no benefit
to any sector.
109
Table 18. Summary of options proposed for BNS 8.
TACC
(t)
Customary
Allowance (t)
Recreational
Allowance (t)
Other sources of
fishing-related
mortality (t)
TAC (t)
Option 2
43
1
2
1
47
Option 3
33
1
2
1
37
Review of Other Management Measures
Compliance
148
There may be compliance implications associated with any reductions in TACCs to
levels below current. The reduced ACE available may lead to some fishers not being
able to cover their catch.
149
This shortage of ACE may provide an incentive to misreport the area from which
catches were taken or the weight of species caught. In some cases different species
may be reported. Similarly there may be an increased likelihood that species will be
dumped.
150
MFish has monitoring and at sea surveillance in place to ensure that any illegal fishing
activity that occurs is detected. This is part of MFish’s overarching monitoring and
compliance activity.
Deemed values
151
MFish is also consulting on increasing deemed values in BNS 1, 3, 7 and 8. Further
information on this is included in the Ministry’s deemed value review.
110
Appendix One: Statutory Considerations
152
Section 5 of the Fisheries Act 1996 (the Act) requires that the Minister shall act in a
manner consistent with New Zealand’s international obligations and Treaty of
Waitangi (Fisheries Claims) Settlement Act 1992. To this end, the provisions of
general international instruments such as UNCLOS and the Fish Stocks Agreement
have been implemented through the provisions of the Act. The Ministry is not aware
of any specific international obligations relating to BNS fisheries. The proposed
options are consistent with the obligations relating to the Treaty of Waitangi
(Fisheries Claims) Settlement Act 1992.
153
Section 8 of the Act describes the purpose of the Act as being to provide for the
utilisation of fisheries resources while ensuring sustainability, and defines the
meanings of utilisation and sustainability. The management options presented seek to
achieve the purpose of the Act. The proposals seek to ensure sustainability under the
respective catch limits and take into account the respective costs of management
versus the utilisation benefits.
154
Section 9 of the Act prescribes the following environmental principles that must be
taken into account when exercising powers in relation to utilisation of fisheries
resources while ensuring sustainability:
155
Sections 9(a) and (b) require the Minister to take into account that associated or
dependent species (those that are not harvested) be maintained at or above a level that
ensures their long-term viability, and that the biological diversity of the aquatic
environment should be maintained. While some bycatch of non-harvested species is
known in BNS trawl fisheries, long-line fisheries have a relatively low level of bycatch. Management of BNS fisheries will within standards developed for protected
species such as seabirds.
156
By-catch of fish species is also monitored under the reporting requirements of the Act;
at this time there is no concern around any fish by-catch.
157
The impact that fishing for BNS stocks has on the long term viability and biological
diversity of the aquatic environment is of greater concern in regions of relatively more
bio-diverse topographic features. Large areas of the seabed have been set aside from
trawling under the recent Fisheries (Benthic Protection Areas) Regulations 2007.
These protected areas include many seamounts and other underwater topographic
features and cover some 1.2 million square kilometres or approximately 30% of New
Zealand’s EEZ.
158
Section 9(c) requires the Minister to take into account the principle that habitat of
particular importance for fisheries management should be protected. MFish are not
aware of any such habitats that are affected by BNS fisheries.
159
Section 10 of the Act sets out the information principles, which require that decisions
be based on the best available information, taking into account any uncertainty in that
information, and applying caution when information is uncertain, unreliable, or
inadequate. In accordance with s 10, the absence of information should not be used as
a reason to postpone, or fail to take, any measure to achieve the purpose of the Act,
111
including providing for utilisation at levels considered to be sustainable. A thorough
review of available information has been undertaken by the Adaptive Management
Programme Working Group and the Plenary and the best available information has
been used to derive management options. MFish has endeavoured to set out the
relevant uncertainty in, and inadequacy of, that information so that the appropriate
caution can be applied in assessing the proposed management options.
160
Section 11(1)(a): Before varying the TAC for any BNS stock, the Minister must take
into account any effects of fishing on any stock and the aquatic environment. No
information about any effects of fishing on any stock or on the aquatic environment is
considered relevant to the consideration of sustainability measures for BNS stocks at
this time.
161
Section 11(1)(b): Before varying the TAC for BNS stocks, the Minister must take
into account of any existing controls under the Act that apply to the stock or area
concerned. For BNS stocks, the measures that apply currently are a TAC, TACC,
recreational and customary allowances and, in BNS 2, an allowance for incidental
fishing-related mortality. These allowances are described in the body of the paper. No
other controls under the Act apply specifically to BNS stocks.
162
Section 11(1)(c): Before varying the TAC for BNS stocks, the Minister must take into
account the natural variability of the stock. Annual variation in BNS biomass is not
known to be high, and therefore the natural variability of BNS is not a concern in
setting the TAC for any BNS stock.
163
Sections 11(2)(a) and (b): Before varying the TAC for BNS stocks, the Minister
must have regard to any provisions of any regional policy or plan under the Resource
Management Act 1991 and any management strategy or plan under the Conservation
Act 1997 that apply to the coastal marine area and are considered relevant. MFish is
not aware of any such provisions that should be taken into account for any BNS stock.
164
Section 11(2)(c): Before varying the TAC for BNS stocks, the Minister must have
regard to sections 7 and 8 of the Hauraki Gulf Marine Park Act 2000 that apply to the
coastal marine area and you consider relevant. A portion of BNS 1 overlaps with the
Hauraki Gulf Marine Park, as such, that Act must be considered in making decisions
for BNS 1. The relevant sections of the Hauraki Gulf Marine Park Act 2000 are set
out below.
Hauraki Gulf Marine Park Act 2000
Section 7. Recognition of national significance of Hauraki Gulf
(1)
The interrelationship between the Hauraki Gulf, its islands, and catchments
and the ability of that interrelationship to sustain the life-supporting capacity of the
environment of the Hauraki Gulf and its islands are matters of national significance.
(2)
The life-supporting capacity of the environment of the Gulf and its islands
includes the capacity—
(a)
to provide for—
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(i)
the historic, traditional, cultural, and spiritual relationship of
the tangata whenua of the Gulf with the Gulf and its islands;
and
(ii)
the social, economic, recreational, and cultural well-being of
people and communities:
(b)
to use the resources of the Gulf by the people and communities of the
Gulf and New Zealand for economic activities and recreation:
(c)
to maintain the soil, air, water, and ecosystems of the Gulf.
Section 8. Management of Hauraki Gulf
To recognise the national significance of the Hauraki Gulf, its islands, and
catchments, the objectives of the management of the Hauraki Gulf, its islands, and
catchments are—
(a)
the protection and, where appropriate, the enhancement of the lifesupporting capacity of the environment of the Hauraki Gulf, its islands,
and catchments:
(b)
the protection and, where appropriate, the enhancement of the natural,
historic, and physical resources of the Hauraki Gulf, its islands, and
catchments:
(c)
the protection and, where appropriate, the enhancement of those
natural, historic, and physical resources (including kaimoana) of the
Hauraki Gulf, its islands, and catchments with which tangata whenua
have an historic, traditional, cultural, and spiritual relationship:
(d)
the protection of the cultural and historic associations of people and
communities in and around the Hauraki Gulf with its natural, historic,
and physical resources:
(e)
the maintenance and, where appropriate, the enhancement of the
contribution of the natural, historic, and physical resources of the
Hauraki Gulf, its islands, and catchments to the social and economic
well-being of the people and communities of the Hauraki Gulf and
New Zealand:
(f)
the maintenance and, where appropriate, the enhancement of the
natural, historic, and physical resources of the Hauraki Gulf, its
islands, and catchments, which contribute to the recreation and
enjoyment of the Hauraki Gulf for the people and communities of the
Hauraki Gulf and New Zealand.
Section 13. Obligation to have particular regard to sections 7 and 8
Except as provided in sections 9 to 12, in order to achieve the purpose of this Act, all
persons exercising powers or carrying out functions for the Hauraki Gulf under any
Act specified in Schedule 1 [including the Fisheries Act 1996] must, in addition to
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any other requirement specified in those Acts for the exercise of that power or the
carrying out of that function, have particular regard to the provisions of sections 7 and
8 and of this Act.
165
Section 11(2A)(b): Before varying the TAC for BNS stocks the Minister must take
account of any relevant and approved fisheries plans. There is no approved fisheries
plan in place for any BNS stock.
166
Sections 11(2A)(a) and (c): Before varying the TAC for BNS stocks the Minister
must take into account any conservation or fisheries service, or any decision not to
require such services. MFish does not consider that existing or proposed services
materially affect the proposals for any BNS stock. No decision has been made to not
require a service in any BNS fishery at this time.
167
Section 13: MFish recommends that the TAC be considered for variation pursuant to
s 13(2)(b) to enable BNS stocks to be restored to a level at or above BMSY. Whether or
not the TAC can, finally, be varied under this provision will depend upon what advice
can be given to the Minister on BCURRENT and BMSY once the consultation process is
completed.
168
Of the stocks that make up BNS, all have shown significant declines in CPUE over
the last six years. Although the Plenary did not supply estimates of BCURRENT and
BMSY, MFish scientists consider that it is still possible to make inferences about the
stock status of the BNS stocks based on the CPUE data. If BNS stocks are hyperstable, the decline in biomass would result in stock biomass of about 26% B0.
Although an estimate of BMSY as a percentage of B0 is not given in the Plenary, MFish
scientists consider that, based on species with similar life history including a very low
natural mortality (0.08), it is likely to be in the range of 30-45% B0.
B
169
170
The specific considerations set out in s 13(2)(b) include having regard to the
interdependence of stocks, the biological characteristics of the stock and any
environmental conditions affecting the stock. As such, in considering the proposed
TAC options and corresponding proposed periods of rebuild, the Minister must take
into account:
i)
The interdependence of stocks for BNS stocks (as required by s
13(2)(b)(i)). There is no information to suggest the interdependence of
stocks should affect the level of the TAC for any BNS stock at this
time.
ii)
Environmental factors affecting BNS stocks (as required under s
13(2)(b)(ii)). No specific environmental conditions affecting BNS
stocks have been identified.
iii)
The biological characteristics of BNS (as required under s 13(2)(b)(ii)).
It is known that BNS are relatively long-lived and late maturing, which
are biological characteristics that render them slow to recover from
overfishing.
Section 13(3) requires that the Minister, in considering the way and rate at which a
stock is moved towards BMSY, have regard to such social, cultural, and economic
factors as he considers being relevant when determining the way and rate at which to
move the stock biomass toward or above the BMSY level.
114
171
MFish has considered the economic impact of reducing the BNS TACs. The final
decision on the quantum of any reduction in the TAC will depend on the Minister’s
interpretation of the severity and immediacy of the sustainability risk and the socioeconomic impacts associated with various reductions.
172
Section 20 and 21 specify a number of matters that must be taken into account when
setting or varying a TACC. Section 21 requires the Minister to allow for noncommercial Mäori and recreational fishing interests, and other sources of fishingrelated mortality when setting or varying the TACC. Allowances for recreational and
customary fishers have been retained in the proposed TACs. Based on the proposals to
reduce the TACC only, the options for all BNS stocks will result in a greater
proportion of the TAC being allocated to non-commercial Mäori and recreational
fishing interests. Allowances for other sources of fishing-related mortality are also
included in this paper.
173
Section 21(4) also requires that any mätaitai reserve or closures/restrictions under s
186A to facilitate customary fishing be taken into account. Mätaitai reserves are
located within BNS QMAs; however, the nature of BNS fisheries being primarily
offshore and confined to deeper waters means that the options outlined in this paper
should not impact on mätaitai reserves or closures/restrictions under s 186A.
174
Section 21(5) also requires that any regulations to prohibit fishing made under s 311
be taken into account when setting allowances for recreational interests. MFish is not
aware of any restrictions under s 311 that have been placed on fishing in any area
within current BNS fisheries.
115
BLUENOSE (BNS 1, 2, 3, 7 AND 8) - SUMMARY OF
SUBMISSIONS
1
MFish received nine submissions on the BNS IPP; submitters are listed below:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
2
Area 2 Inshore Finfish Management Company (Area 2);
AC Enterprises;
Challenger Finfisheries Management Company (Challenger);
Sanford;
Northern Finfisheries Management Company (Northern);
The Environment and Conservation Organisations on New Zealand (ECO);
Aotearoa Fisheries Ltd (AFL);
The Seafood Industry Council (SeaFIC);
Stu Morrison (oral submission); a fisherman in BNS 7 and 8.
All submitters supported some reduction of the TAC. Submitters raised two primary
issues that are discussed in the body of the paper at paragraphs 74 to 77. Specific
preferences for TACs for each BNS stock are also addressed in the paper.
Area 2 Inshore Finfish Management Company
3
Area 2 surveyed all 45 owners of BNS 2 quota. Of the 16 responses Area 2 received,
12 favoured a decrease of the TAC. There was a difference of opinion among the 12
respondents regarding the size of the TAC decrease, but Area 2 submitted that Option
2 had the support of the majority of quota owners.
4
Area 2 has also levied its quota owners to write a catch sampling plan that will recommence sampling in the 1 October 2008 fishing year.
AC Enterprises
5
AC Enterprises are quota owners in BNS 1. AC Enterprises submitted that there was
additional information that should be considered when evaluating the CPUE data.
Factors other than the abundance of BNS could contribute to the decline in CPUE.
6
AC Enterprises also supported the submission from Northern Finfisheries
Management Company and SeaFIC.
Challenger Finfisheries Management Company (Challenger)
7
Challenger represents quota owners and fishers that operate in Fisheries Management
Areas 7 and 8.
8
Challenger requested that careful consideration be given to each individual BNS stock
rather than assuming that BNS is a single stock. Challenger also noted that CPUE has
116
not been considered as a basis for analysis of BNS in the past and caution against its
definitive use now. Like other submitters, Challenger accepts the decline in CPUE and
SeaFIC’s analysis, but offers other explanations, in addition to stock reduction, that
may be relevant to the CPUE decline.
9
Challenger did not support any of the options in the IPP but suggested a phased
reduction in the BNS 7 and 8 TACCs as follows.
BNS 7 (current TACC 150 t)
a)
For the 2008/09 fishing year, reduce the TACC to 135 t (10% below the
current TACC).
b)
Reassess the CPUE for the 2009/10 fishing year.
c)
For the 2009/10 fishing year, if abundance shows a further decline, reduce the
TACC to 120 t (20 % below the 2007/08 TACC).
d)
For the 2010/11 fishing year, if abundance shows a further decline, reduce the
TACC to 105 t (30 % below the 2007/08 TACC).
BNS 8 (current TACC 100 t)
10
a)
For the 2008/09 fishing year, reduce the TACC to 90 t (10% below the current
TACC).
b)
Reassess the CPUE for the 2009/10 fishing year.
c)
For the 2009/10 fishing year, if abundance shows a further decline, reduce the
TACC to 80 t (20 % below the 2007/08 TACC).
d)
For the 2010/11 fishing year, if abundance shows a further decline, reduce the
TACC to 70 t (30 % below the 2007/08 TACC).
Challenger also submitted that large reductions in the TAC will reduce the availability
of ACE because large operators will retain ACE to cover bycatch of BNS in other
fisheries. This would have a disproportionate impact on small operators that rely on
ACE for target BNS fisheries.
Sanford
11
Sanford is significant quota holders in BNS. Sanford accepted that the CPUE analysis
is providing an indication that BNS catches are currently unsustainable. However,
Sanford also urge caution in interpreting CPUE because of operational and
management changes that may also influence CPUE. Because of the reservations
about using CPUE as an indicator of stock size, Sanford support option 2 to reduce
the TACC in all BNS stocks by 10 % below recent catch levels.
12
Sanford is a shareholder in the Northern Finfisheries Management Company and
supported their submission
117
Northern Finfisheries Management Company
13
Northern represents quota owners in Areas 1, 8 and 9.
14
Northern supported option 2 to reduce the TACC to 10% below recent catch. This was
not a consensus among Northern’s members, some of whom supported the more
conservative TACC reduction of 30% below recent catch.
15
Northern pointed out that until recently CPUE has not been considered reliable
enough to estimate BNS abundance and outlined some operational factors that may be
impacting on BNS CPUE.
TACCs based on recent catch
16
There are a variety of factors that influence when, how and by whom BNS ACE will
be caught. These include catching capacity, market variables, external costs, weather
conditions, and availability of ACE for target and bycatch stocks.
17
Northern submitted that these factors have contributed to the recent decline in catches,
and also noted that some larger BNS quota holders are not fishing their ACE for
commercial reasons. For these reasons, Northern support a 10% reduction rather than
a larger reduction.
18
Northern also submitted that reducing the TAC based on current catch levels provided
an incentive to catch BNS when it may be more economical to leave the fish in the
water. This approach encourages fishers to adopt “use it or lose it” behaviour.
19
Northern support the SeaFIC submission.
The Environment and Conservation Organisations on New Zealand
20
ECO is a national alliance of 62 groups with a concern for the environment.
21
ECO reiterated some points made in the IPP that BNS are a relatively long-lived
species. ECO also submitted that CPUE has previously not been considered a reliable
indicator of abundance of BNS stocks and that CPUE had declined. ECO reiterated
that other factors may be responsible for CPUE decline but current catches and
TACCs do not appear sustainable and that BNS may be a single NZ-wide stock.
22
ECO submitted that the TACC should be set more conservatively and supported the
options that proposed the greatest reduction in the TACC in all cases: option 4 in BNS
1 and 3 and option 3 in BNS 2, 7 and 8.
Aotearoa Fisheries Ltd (AFL)
23
AFL provided comment on BNS 1 and 2 only. AFL submitted that a 10% reduction in
the TACC (option 2) for BNS 1 would not reduce the TACC below the level of catch
taken in the last two fishing years. Consequently, AFL supported option 3 which
would reduce the TACC to 30% below recent catch.
118
24
Unlike BNS 1, catches in BNS 2 have been maintained in recent years. AFL
supported option 2 for BNS 2 that would reduce the TACC to 10% below recent
catch.
The New Zealand Seafood Industry Council (SeaFIC)
25
The New Zealand Seafood Industry Council (SeaFIC) represents the interests of the
New Zealand seafood industry.
26
Like other submitters, SeaFIC note that using CPUE data requires some care and that
until recently the use of CPUE data has been met with circumspection. However, the
combined decline in CPUE across all BNS stocks added weight to the use of CPUE as
an index of abundance.
27
SeaFIC noted CPUE can only reflect underlying abundance when biological and
operational factors affecting CPUE can be disentangled. For this reason SeaFIC
considered that science alone was not a sufficient basis for making TACC decisions
but that other factors that may influence the CPUE need to be incorporated into
decision-making.
28
SeaFIC stated that it did not have a view on the best options for setting TACCs in
each BNS stock. However, SeaFIC strongly encouraged the relevant commercial
stakeholder organisations to submit on the BNS fishery in their area so that the
individual circumstances of each fishery could be taken into consideration.
29
SeaFIC however did submit that, unless there are good operational reasons to indicate
otherwise, that TACCs should be no greater, and ideally somewhat lower than recent
catches.
Stu Morrison (oral Submission taken by phone 22/08/08)
30
Anecdotal information from Mr Morrisson suggests that catch rates in BNS 7 and 8
are high.
31
Mr Morrison stated that he had difficulty obtaining ACE as quota holders retain ACE
to cover BNS bycatch; particularly for ling fishery.
32
Mr Morrison submitted that potential untested fishing grounds existed in the BNS 7
fishery and reductions in the TAC would reduce ACE availability and prohibit the
development of these fishing areas.
33
Mr Morrison suggested that CPUE would be affected by the increasing use of autoliners. He suggested auto-liners are more indiscriminate in their fishing practices and
that manual lining was far more appropriate for BNS and resulted in higher CPUE.
119