Client briefing October 2005 How to negotiate private equity agreements Introduction Key Issues What is a private equity transaction? Private equity transactions in the UK market range from venture capital through development capital of various types to latestage buyouts (management or leveraged buyouts/ MBOs or LBOs). Private equity institutions have in recent years predominantly led late-stage buyouts. Management-led transactions still exist but these tend to be in the low or mid range of late-stage buyouts. For the purposes of this article a private equity transaction is a typical UK MBO/LBO structure with a single private equity institution as Investor and a UK management team. The investor takes a majority equity stake in the new company (newco) structure with management taking a minority stake. Drivers of the transaction structure The balance of power Transaction documents Provisions of the equity documentation Private equity transactions can at first glance appear complex - effectively three transactions within a transaction (debt, equity and acquisition) with many different moving parts. This article explains how one particular component of the transaction (the equity arrangements) works, by focusing on the commercial drivers of the parties involved, the principal documents entered into by those parties and the key provisions within those documents. It also seeks to highlight the common approaches of the investor on the one hand, and management on the other hand, to negotiating these provisions. The following diagram illustrates a typical UK MBO/LBO structure. The need for three newco vehicles is driven by tax structuring requirements (principally the desire of the investor to obtain tax deductions for the target group in respect of the interest on the shareholder debt) and the desire of the banks to be structurally preferred to the investor's shareholder debt and the equity in topco. Investor Management e.g 10% e.g 90% Ordinary Shares Shareholder debt (loan notes; DDBs; PIK notes) Banks Topco Ltd Midco Ltd Senior/Mezz Debt If you would like to know more about the subjects covered in this publication or our services, please contact: Simon Cooke +44 (0)20 7006 1375 Bidco Ltd To email one of the above, please use [email protected] Target UK/552884/01 Clifford Chance LLP, 10 Upper Bank Street, Canary Wharf, London, E14 5JJ, UK www.cliffordchance.com Client briefing How to negotiate private equity agreements 2 Drivers of the transaction structure Why has the typical structure for the documentation of UK private equity transactions developed as it has? This has been driven by the underlying requirements of the parties to a transaction. The Investor's motivation • To protect the investment of its underlying fund investors in the target business (in which it has a large financial stake and limited knowledge of the business itself) and to enable its investment to grow in a controlled manner; • To be able to realise its investment (that is. effect an exit), to control the exit process and to ensure it can exit 100% of the business in a tax efficient manner; • To be able to incentivise the management to work to grow the value of the business; • To control the valuable equity in topco and control who benefits from an increase in its value over the life of the investment. Management's motivation • To run what it sees as its business without undue restriction from the majority institutional shareholders (that is, the investor); • To be adequately compensated and incentivised to work hard and to grow the value of the business, ideally through an equity stake in topco; • To ensure that its minority equity interest is adequately protected from actions by the majority investor and that any gain in value of its equity interest as the business grows in value is achieved in a tax efficient manner. The balance of power Where does the balance of power as regards negotiation of the equity documentation lie? This will depend on the facts of each individual transaction but unless it is a management-sourced deal and/or the business is very reliant on specific individual members of the management team, it is probable that the investor will hold the position of power. There is logic to do this - the investor is committing most of its equity financing to the transaction and is acquiring control of the business. It would, therefore, ultimately expect to hold a stronger negotiating position. Having said this the investor will be keen not to completely dominate or be overly aggressive towards the management team in the context of the negotiation of the equity documentation. It will want to preserve a good working relationship with the Management going forward and it also has its reputation in the market to think about. No private equity house will want to be seen as treating its management teams poorly or unfairly. Accordingly, the investor is likely to take a reasonable and rational, if firm, approach to negotiating the equity documentation. It will also usually be prepared to pay (as part of the overall deal costs) for management's legal representation for the purposes of the negotiation. Key Transaction Documents The following constitute the main documents commonly used in relation to the equity aspects of a private equity transaction: Document Principal Purpose Subscription and shareholders/investment Agreement Contains topco/midco equity and shareholder debt subscription mechanics; investor rights and management obligations and res trictions; and provisions governing the operation of the business going forward. Articles of association of topco Provisions controlling the constitution and share capital of topco. Shareholder debt instrument Constitutes the shareholder debt (for example, loan notes/deep discounted bonds/payment in kind or PIK notes), which forms the majority of the equity funding. Management service agreements Sets out the detailed terms and conditions of each manager's employment with topco/one of its subsidiaries. © Clifford Chance Limited Liability Partnership September 2005 Client briefing How to negotiate private equity agreements 3 Document Principal Purpose Warrant instrument If warrants to subscribe for equity in topco (akin to share options, usually exercisable on an exit) are to be issued to the lending banks (commonly mezzanine lenders only) this document contains the terms and conditions of those warrants. Intercreditor/subordination/ priority Deed Document which contractually provides that the bank debt ranks in priority to the shareholder debt and equity. Manager's questionnaire A manager's confirmation regarding his/her personal position (for example, no previous criminal offences, bankruptcies). Provisions of the equity documentation The majority of the provisions can be found either in the investment agreement or the articles of topco, together with the management service agreements. The important provisions can be categorised under three broad headings: those relating to the investor controlling its investment; those relating to management's equity stake; and those relating to the investor's ability to exit its investment. Controlling the investme nt Board control While the usual position will be that day-to-day control of the business will remain with management, the investor will ultimately require the ability to control the board of directors of topco, particularly in circumstances where something goes wrong. In the ordinary course, however, it will require the right to appoint one or two representative non-executive directors, while retaining the right as majority shareholder to appoint additional directors if the need arises. It is also becom ing increasingly common in late-stage LBOs and MBOs for the Investor to require topco to adopt a corporate governance structure similar to that of a listed company (for example, using an audit committee and a remuneration committee) as best practice. Management generally recognise the Investor's requirement ultimately to control the board if it feels it needs to. They might, however, require some input on the appointment of additional non-executive directors to the board, for example any non-executive chairman who is to be appointed. This would normally be limited in the equity documentation to a right of consultation rather than an absolute veto right on the part of the management. Contractual control The investment agreement will typically contain a set of veto rights in favour of the investor. The Investor's intention is not to get involved in the day-to-day operation of the Business, but certain operational decisions will require permission in advance from the investor. The veto rights would generally be split into core corporate concerns (for example, changes to topco's constitution, winding up of topco) and operational concerns (for example, entering into material contracts or capital expenditure, making material acquisitions or disposals of assets, appointing senior employees or directors). As with board control, management generally accepts that the investor requires a level of control over the operations of the business it owns. So long as the financial thresholds as to what constitutes, for example, material capital expenditure, there is generally limited negotiation over the veto rights. Management warranties This is often one of the most emotive issues for management and one that can result in much negotiation. From the investor's perspective, these warranties are not about financial recompense if the business turns out not to be what the investor thought it had acquired (unlike those obtained in the sale and purchase agreement from the vendor). Instead, the warranties are aimed at obtaining disclosure from the management of all possible issues relating to the business that may not otherwise have been disclosed to the investor through its financial, commercial and legal due diligence process. The warranties would typically be given in relation to such things as the accuracy of the due diligence reports commissioned by the investor in relation to the business; the business plan going forward and the personal position of the management team. In most cases these warranties will be limited to management's awareness of giving the warranties, which should, if they are well advised, enable them to get comfortable with giving a properly drafted set of warranties. In terms of liability for breach of warranty, the investor will not be seeking potentially to bankrupt a manager but will look to have him or her put a sufficient amount at risk to extract a so called hand on heart disclosure from the manager in response to the warranty. The common position reached is either an amount equal to the manager's annual salary (or a multiple thereof) or an amount equal to the investment that the manager has made for his or her equity stake in topco. Restrictive covenants Typically an investor will require non-compete, and non-solicitation of customers/clients and employees of the business, covenants from each of the management team for a period after they have left employment with the business. The usual © Clifford Chance Limited Liability Partnership September 2005 Client briefing How to negotiate private equity agreements 4 negotiating point here is the duration of these covenants, with typical periods ranging between one and three years. Management might seek to argue that their service agreements contain restrictive covenants and so they need not be included in the investment agreement. From the investor's perspective, however, the covenants are more enforceable if in the investment agreement (and might be for a longer duration) and so it will require the covenants to be included. For consistency, the investor will want to ensure that the scope of the covenants in a manager's service agreement match those given in the investment agreement (other than in respect of duration). Positive covenants The investment agreement will oblige management to procure financial and other information relating to the business is provided to the investor on a regular basis (for example, monthly managem ent accounts, annual budget and annual accounts) in order that the investor is able to monitor its investment. If the investor has US investors in its underlying funds, it is likely that such investors will require management rights pursuant to ERISA (US Employee Retirement Income Security Act) to enable them to obtain favourable tax treatment in the US in relation to their investment in the Business. If this is the case, management will be obliged to procure that these management rights are granted. Management will also be obliged to implement the corporate governance structure required by the Investor and put in place all appropriate insurances (including directors' and officers' liability insurance). All of these provisions are usually acceptable to the management team, provided they are given enough time to prepare financial information for delivery to the Investor. Minority protection for management One of the management's drivers is to protect its minority equity interest in topco. The most common area of contention here is anti-dilution protection. As majority shareholder and (ultimately) in control of the topco board, the investor might otherwise be able to issue new shares in topco diluting management's equity stake. But an investor will not want to agree in the equity documentation any restrictions on its ability to raise further equity capital in topco. It will generally offer management pre-emption rights on new issues of shares (that is on a put up or shut up basis - if management does not put up its share of the subscription monies it must shut up and be diluted) but if, for example, when raising new finance the investor must put in additional shareholder debt as well as ordinary equity, it might require management to invest in this strip rather than simply acquiring ordinary equity (effectively for a much lower value than the investor acquires its equity). This becomes difficult for management as they are unlikely to be able to fund a full strip investment and so will probably be diluted. The investor might also be prepared to grant management a small number of veto rights. Common examples include the group entering into transactions with related parties of the investor other than on arms' length terms, substantially changing the nature of the business and making changes to the articles of topco that would adversely affect management's equity stake. Management might seek further rights in the documentation but the investor is unlikely to be willing to grant any substantial extras. The investor will usually want the ability to override the minority protection rights in certain situations in order to be able to act quickly and with flexibility. The most obvious example is to effect a so-called rescue financing, where the business is in financial difficulties and requires financial restructuring on a quick timetable. As this is a practical concern in the best interests of the business and all the shareholders, management tends to accept this override provision in principle. Management equity A large part of the rationale behind the whole MBO/LBO concept is that the investor provides financial support to the business and strategic guidance but does not get involved in the day-to-day operations of the business. This is left to the management team that the investor has picked to run the business on its behalf. In order to get the maximum out of the management team it must be properly incentivised to work to grow the business and create value for the investor. It is widely considered that giving management or employees an ownership interest or equity stake in the business for which they work is one of the most effective ways of incentivising them to work hard. In accordance with this traditional model management will, in addition to the terms of their employment set out in their respective service agreements, be offered ordinary equity in topco at the outset of the transaction. This equity will, however, be subject to certain specific restrictions. Management shares In order to keep this incentivisation tool as effective as possible, the investor wants to keep the equity in topco in the right hands, that is, those of its current management team. Accordingly, the articles of topco will prevent management from transferring those shares without the consent of the investor. Management will seek to negotiate certain exceptions to this blanket transfer restriction and commonly the investor will allow management to transfer to immediate family members and family trusts, provided that such persons agree to comply with the relevant compulsory transfer provisions of the articles. Management might also request the ability to transfer its shares within the management team. This is usually unacceptable to the investor as it could result in a mis -match of individual managers' holdings and prejudice the incentivisation rationale behind the original allocation of the management equity. Topco's articles will also include compulsory transfer or leaver provisions if any manager ceases to be employed by the business. Again, this is to ensure that the equity in topco remains in the hands of those who are able to work to enhance the value of the business. This is not the case for a manager who leaves. Accordingly the leaver provisions will provide © Clifford Chance Limited Liability Partnership September 2005 Client briefing How to negotiate private equity agreements 5 that the investor (or, sometimes, the board or the remuneration committee of the board) may require a leaving manager to transfer his shares, usually to a replacement employee, another member or members of management or to an employee trust that will look after those shares pending allocation to another manager in the future. The concept of the leaver provisions as being a necessary feature of the MBO/LBO model is generally recognised by management - they would also not want one of their number to benefit from an increase in value in the business if that person was no longer working to create that value. The central concern of management when negotiating these provisions is how much they will be paid for their shares when required to transfer them. Good leaver/bad leaver provisions The traditional way in which this is approached is to categorise a leaving manager as either a good leaver or a bad leaver, with the price payable for his shares upon leaving depending on which category he falls into. This is another emotive area for management when negotiating the equity documentation as, potentially, a manager could be sacked having worked hard for the business for a period and nonetheless be entitled to none of the increase in value of his shares in topco over that period. From the investor's perspective it sees itself and the management as being bound together in the investment for the life of the investment and only those who are there at the end should benefit from any increase in value in the business other than in limited circumstances. Typically, good leaver categories include death (although aggressive investors may seek to exclude suicide from this category!); retirement at usual retirement age; and permanent sickness or incapacity. The most obvious of the bad leaver categories is dismissal for gross misconduct or so-called hand in the till offences, which is invariably accepted by management. The contentious area is causes of cessation of employment that fall between the two obvious categories. From an investor's perspective if a manager resigns voluntarily then this should be a bad leaver event. Management tends to want circumstances constituting constructive or unfair dismissal to be in the good leaver category, but the investor usually resists this, given the potential width of these concepts. Ultimately this is a matter for negotiation and can result in there being a third intermediate leaver category. The most common position is that if manager are categorised as good leavers they will be paid the market value for their shares at the time of leaving, if required to sell them pursuant to the leaver provisions. If they are categorised as bad leavers they will be paid the lower of either the market value of their shares, or what they paid for them when they originally acquired them. Market value will either be agreed by the parties or referred to the auditors of topco, or another independent valuer, for expert determination. Service agreement - cross default One further provision sometimes requested by the In vestor tends to be a contentious one - that which states that if a Manager commits a material breach of the Investment Agreement this will constitute grounds for summary dismissal under his service agreement, thereby entitling the employer to terminate his employment without pay in lieu of notice. In addition, summary dismissal will almost certainly result in the leaving Manager being categorised as a bad leaver, which would mean he obtained no additional value for his shares in topco. For obvious reasons Management does not tend to take too kindly to this "double whammy", the main argument being that the employment terms and the good leaver/bad leaver provisions relating to the equity stake should be kept separate. From the Investor's perspective this is not entirely a valid argument as the reason the Manager is being issued shares in the first place is because of his role as a Manager and employee of the Business. A compromise could be to specify those material provisions of the Investment Agreement (e.g. warranties, restrictive covenants and positive covenants) to which this "cross-default" clause should apply. The exit One of the fundamental drivers for the Investor in the transaction is that it has the ability to exit its investment in the Business. Linked to this is the importance for the Investor to have the ability to force the sale of 100% of the share capital of topco. If it is not able to deliver 100%, this will be likely to impact adversely on the amount a third party purchaser would be willing to pay for the Investor's majority stake - no purchaser would relish buying a company with a minority interest. Accordingly the equity documentation contains provisions that enable the investor to achieve its aims in relation to exit. Setting the ground rules The investment agreement will usually contain provisions requiring the co-operation generally of the management team if the investor sees a potential exit option, whether this be a sale or an Initial Public Offering (IPO) of the business. In addition, in the current climate investors are keen to ensure that the documentation extends these co-operation obligations to circumstances in which the investor requires the business to be refinanced with additional and cheaper debt, enabling the investor to take out some of its investment before a full exit (usually via a repayment of shareholder debt). In addition the investment agreement will make it clear that no warranties will be given by the investor at exit in relation to its stake in topco other than as to title to the shares. The main contentious provision in this area is that the investor will often require a provision that management will give customary warranties relating to the business on an exit. Management generally does not like committing to such obligation so far in advance of the eventual exit, even though the © Clifford Chance Limited Liability Partnership September 2005 Client briefing How to negotiate private equity agreements 6 provision is unlikely to be enforceable due to lack of certainty (that is, as to the terms of the relevant warranties). In light of this, the investor is sometime willing to drop this provision. Forcing an exit To ensure that the investor can deliver 100% of the share capital of topco, the articles of the company will contain socalled drag-along rights in relation to the shares owned by management. If the investor finds a buyer for its shares in topco it can force the management to sell its shares to the third party purchaser on the same terms (that is, drag them along). Management will generally accept this provision but will, if well advised, require that the sale to third parties be on genuinely arms length terms and that the management will be paid the same amount per share for its shares as the investor. If the investor agrees to receive share-for-share (or other non-cash) consideration for its shares in topco, it is very unlikely to give management a cash-only option for its shares in topco, because this would probably prejudice negotiations with the purchaser and/or the return the investor would obtain on its investment. The quid pro quo for Management to the drag-along rights, are so-called tag-along rights that will usually be included in the articles of topco. These say the investor cannot sell the majority or all of its shares to a third party purchaser without also requiring the purchaser to acquire management's minority stake in topco on the same terms (that is, management can tag along on the sale). The investor will always agree to grant the management tag-along rights in these situations as it is only fair that if the investor is exiting its investment, management is also allowed to take the benefit of its hard work over the life of the investment and participate in the exit. As the market for IPOs has picked up, investors are keen to retain the ability to achieve an exit through an IPO of the business. It would be practically impossible to effect an IPO without the co-operation of management (as they will play a vital role in presenting the business to potential investors) so the management co-operation provisions in the investment agreement must also extend to an IPO situation. It is legally possible to include provisions which would allow the investor to force an IPO of the business if it sees the right opportunity (although these need to be carefully drafted in order to ensure that they are not unenforceable on grounds of uncertainty), but the practical position remains that if the management is against the idea, the IPO is unlikely to happen. Principles remain despite increased complexity Despite a reputation across the profession as a very specialist area, private equity as a concept is not by any means rocket science. Specific elements of these transactions have evolved through market practice over the years, resulting in private equity transactions being done in a certain way, with only some of the provisions within the relevant documentation tending to be heavily negotiated. Having said this, this article is based upon a very traditional, simple UK MBO/LBO structure, with a single private equity institutional investor. As the private equity industry has developed, the market has become more sophisticated. Many more private equity players than in the past have raised large amounts of money from their fund investors. Coupled with fewer attractive assets for sale, private equity investors are now looking at larger and more complex transactions, often joining together as a consortium or equity club to undertake these deals. However, the basic tenet of the investor's rationale for undertaking the transaction, and its relationship with the management team of the target business, is consistent with the structure described in this article, even on the more complex transactions of today's competitive market. This Client briefing does not necessarily deal with every important topic or cover every aspect of the topics with which it deals. It is not designed to provide legal or ot her advice. www.cliffordchance.com If you do not wish to receive further information from Clifford Chance about events or legal developments which we believe may be of interest to you, please either send an email to [email protected] or by post at Clifford Chance LLP, 10 Upper Bank Street, Canary Wharf, London E14 5JJ. Amsterdam n Bangkok n Barcelona n Beijing n Berlin n Budapest n Dubai n D üsseldorf n Frankfurt n Hong Kong n London n Luxembourg n Madrid n Milan n Moscow n Munich n New Yor k n Padua n Paris n Prague n Rome n São Paulo n Shanghai n Silicon Valley n Singapore n Tokyo n Warsaw n Washington, D.C. © Clifford Chance Limited Liability Partnership September 2005
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