HOW TO INNOVATE WITH A COMPETITOR? THE ROLE OF AMBIDEXTERITY AS A STRATEGIC DYNAMIC CAPABILITY Anne-Sophie FERNANDEZ*, Saïd YAMI** & Fiona JI*** *MRM-ERFI, University of Montpellier 1 Espace Richter, Rue Vendémiaire, Bât. B, CS 19519 – 34960 Montpellier Cedex – France [email protected] ***MRM-ERFI, University of Montpellier 1 and EUROMED Management Espace Richter, Rue Vendémiaire, Bât. B, CS 19519 – 34960 Montpellier Cedex – France [email protected] ** Ohio University Department of Management, College of Business, Athens, OH 45701 – USA [email protected] Abstract Previous research acknowledges the benefits of coopetition for innovation processes. However, the question of how to implement coopetitive strategies remains unexplored. In particular, tensions from coopetition need to be effectively managed since they constitute a high risk for the innovation process. Upon the concepts of coopetition and ambidexterity, we propose a theoretical framework in order to understand how coopetition programs can achieve innovation performance. Through a multi-level qualitative study, we investigate two European space innovation programs conducted by two main competitors: Astrium (EADS group) and Thales Alenia Space (Thales group). Our results show that innovation performance requests the development of ambidextrous capabilities at the organizational level to achieve a balance of exploration and exploitation processes. At the team level, project managers develop such capabilities while team members focus on exploration or exploitation. Key words: dynamic capabilities, innovation, ambidexterity, coopetition 1 HOW TO INNOVATE WITH A COMPETITOR? THE ROLE OF AMBIDEXTERITY AS A STRATEGIC DYNAMIC CAPABILITY Introduction Coopetition strategies1 are becoming strategic standards in complex and dynamic environments in which knowledge constitutes the core of competitiveness (Carayannis & Alexander, 1999) such as in high-tech industries (Gnyawali et al., 2008). Gnyawali and Park (2009) explain the spread of coopetition strategies by specific characteristics of high-tech industries: product life cycle shortening, technological convergence and the intensity of R&D costs. First, the success of launching new products depends on speed to market (Lynn & Arkgün, 1998). Thanks to coopetition, firms have quick access to the essential information and technologies for new product development. Coopetition helps firms to increase the speed to market of their new technologies (Gnyawali et al., 2006). Second, the technological convergence, defined as “the presence of a vast array of different types of technologies to perform similar tasks and the trend of technologies to merge into new technologies that bring together a myriad of media” (Gnyawali & Park, 2009, p. 315), creates opportunities to set up technological standards within the industry (Gomes-Casseres, 1994; Shapiro & Varian, 1999). Finally, coopetition allows firms to reduce their R&D expenses. Both radical and incremental innovations in high-tech industries are costly. Through coopetition, focal paired firms pool financial and other resources in order to benefit from partner’s expertise to develop more ambitious innovation programs. Therefore, current development of such strategies in hightech industries challenges the traditional understanding on complementary partnerships of cooperative relationships. By combining the advantages of the two opposite dimensions –i.e. collaboration and competition–, firms are more likely to reach a better level of performance than in a single dimension (collaboration or competition). The adoption and the implementation of a coopetition strategy is a source of a better long-term performance as stated by Czakon (2007, p. 2): “coopetition as a strategy designed and implemented to achieve a better performance levels and ultimately above average profitability in the long term through cooperation with a 1 While Brandenburger and Nalebuff (1996) adopt a broad definition of the concept, other scholars (e.g. Gnyawali & Park, 2011, Bengtsson & Kock, 2000) define coopetition more narrowly with a focus on dyadic interplay between two firms that compete and cooperate with each other simultaneously. For a deeper understanding of the phenomenon, we adopt in this reflection a narrow approach of coopetition which is “a simultaneous pursuit of collaboration and competition between a pair of firms” (Gnyawali & Park, 2011, p. 51). 2 firm’s competitors”. Thus, coopetition appears as a source of value creation (Brandenburger & Nalebuff, 1996), encourages organizational learning (Bengtsson & Solvell, 2004) and enhances innovation processes (Gnyawali et al., 2008; Ritala et al., 2009). Studies also show the positive relationship between coopetition and firm performance (Grangsjo, 2003; Ritala & Humerlina-Laukkanen, 2009). However, both conceptual and empirical studies are still lacking regarding the impact of coopetition on innovation performance. Therefore, our objective here is to propose a theoretical framework for further empirical testing. We argue that a better understanding is required on mechanism under which coopetition leads to innovation performance. Due to the combination of two opposites (Gnyawali et al, 2008; Gnyawali & Park, 2011; Bengtsson & Kock, 2000), coopetition is a relationship filled with tensions. It entails multiple opposing elements and dualities (Clarke-Hill, Li & Davies, 2003). The existence of multiple tensions partly explains the instability of alliances (Das & Teng, 2000) and can thus inhibit innovation performance. Coopetitive tensions need to be managed in order to ensure the success of the implementation of the relationship (Child & Faulkner, 1998). Coopetitive tensions are multilevel and multidimensional (Padula & Dagnino, 2007). When the purpose of coopetition is a common innovation, organizational tensions are critical. During the implementation of coopetition, several dilemmas appear. A first dilemma between sharing and protecting strategic resources results from coopetition (Oliver, 2004). Firms need to pool their key resources in order to create new ones while protecting their idiosyncrasy from their main competitor. In the following section, we focus on the tension derived from a balance of exploitation and exploration, which leads to innovation performance. Our study questions how two competitors can manage tensions in coopetitive innovation programs. A theoretical framework based on the concept of ambidexterity, viewed as a dynamic capability (Teece et al., 1997; Helfat et al, 2007; Teece, 2007), is developed in order to investigate the mechanisms under which coopetition can lead to innovation performance. Two innovative programs, initiated by the two main competitors Astrium (EADS group) and Thales Alenia Space (Thales group) are in-depth studied. The results show that innovation performance requests to manage exploration and exploitation between competitors, through an ambidextrous capability, defined as firms’ capabilities to simultaneous pursue exploitation and exploration of knowledge, competencies and technologies (Gupta, Smith & Shalley, 2006; March, 1991; Lavie, Stettner & Tushman, 2010). To build such ambidextrous capability, the partners invest in constructing duality management and learning dynamics to effectively manage tensions. 3 We present in a first section our theoretical framework which we articulate around three main points dealing, on the one hand, with the tension derived from the exploration / exploitation dilemma; secondly, the management of the exploration / exploitation tension through dynamic capabilities; and thirdly, ambidexterity as a key dynamic capability to manage coopetitive tensions. In a second section, we develop methodological elements through the research design and a brief presentation of our studied cases. The third section is dedicated to the results and the fourth section to discussion elements and conclusion. 1. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 1.1. Exploration / exploitation tension in coopetition Scholars suggested coopetition strategy as being critical for firm performance (Yami, Castaldo, Dagnino & Le Roy, 2010). In coopetition, firms have to deal with one major dilemma related with the management of learning capabilities. Should they develop the context to exploit their own competencies or to explore new knowledge from the partner to develop a common new knowledge? The dilemma between exploration and exploitation (Poole & Van de Ven, 1989; March 1991) appears as a key challenge for firms involved in coopetition. Exploitation generates short-term benefits for firms to improve quality and efficiency in their organizational development, while exploration provides opportunities for revolutionary changes and long-term performance (March, 1991). Inside an interorganizational network, the exploration process is based on a common pool of competencies owned by the network whereas the exploitation process is based on a private property of the competencies. The exploitation of competencies depends on the control over them (Dyer & Singh, 1988). However, exploitation and exploration require a different managerial mindset, different sources of allocated resources and a distinctive knowledge process, thus it is not an easy task to achieve both at the same time (March & Levinthal, 1993). In a coopetition context, the management of competencies becomes increasingly critical (Yami et al., 2010). Firms need to strategically manage their portfolio of competencies beyond their boundaries. Four challenges result from the exploration and exploitation dilemma in coopetition (Prévot, 2007). First, firms have to decide the extent to which competencies need to be shared so to make the innovation succeed. Because they are main competitors, partners may try to reduce their implication in the collaboration by limiting the pooling to the minimum (Fernandez & Le Roy, 2012). Second, focal firms intend to learn new competencies from the partner, and moreover, to learn more from the partner than the partner learns. Firms may try to disturb the reciprocity of the process. The third source of tensions is 4 related with the protection of competencies. Because of the collaboration, partners need to facilitate the replication of their competencies, which is highly risky in a coopetition context. Duplicated competencies can be used against the firm in a future phase of competition. Thus, firms need to limit the accessibility of their core competencies by implementing self-defense mechanisms (Hamel et al., 1989). The accessibility of the competencies depends on the level of the protection established by the firm, the historical of past relationships between the partners, the complexity and the tacit character of the competence (Inkpen, 1998). Finally, tensions arise from the management of the competencies shared during the collaboration. Firms remain competitors and try to obtain more control over the competencies jointly developed (Fernandez & Le Roy, 2012). The issues raised above greatly challenge knowledge acquisition, transfer and aspiration between two firms, which affect the process of exploitation and exploration. In coopetition, the dilemma between exploration and exploitation needs to be considered in a dynamic process. Because the intensity of collaboration and competition vary over time, firms need to deal with a temporal dimension. They need to balance between the integration of competencies learned through the collaboration –i.e. exploitation– and the pursuit of the collaboration –i.e. exploration– (Doz & Hamel, 1997). 1.2. Managing exploration / exploitation tension through dynamic capabilities In coopetition, firms’ objective is not to reduce tensions but it is rather to maintain and balance them (Chen, 2008). Regarding the exploration-exploitation dilemma, the issue for the firm is to maintain its competencies’ portfolio to limit the absorptive capacity (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990) of its partner-competitor. The strategic issue is not to choose between competition and cooperation but to manage the tensions between both (Clarke-Hill et al., 2003). The collaboration dimension is critical in coopetition since it encourages exploration by pooling key resources and core competencies in order to create new ones. The competitive dimension is essential in coopetition since it stimulates exploitation processes by avoiding complacence to keep the creative tension within organizations (Quintana-Garcia & Benavides-Velasco, 2004; Bengtsson & Solvell, 2004). In an inter-organizational conflicted context such as coopetition, a balance of exploitation and exploration plays a critical role. Thanks to innovation dynamic capabilities, firms would develop innovation through both exploration and exploitation processes (Mothe & Chanal, 2005). Innovation dynamic capabilities seem consistent with a dual management (Mothe & Brion, 2008). 5 The management allows partners to reach objectives perceived as mutually exclusive (Kale et al., 2000). It is also responsible for the management of organizational tensions during a new product development (Dougherty, 1996; Lewis et al., 2002). Managerial tools become essential in the management of coopetitive tensions and thus contribute to the success of coopetition. But, as shown by Coy (2006), managers and executives have difficulties to convince their colleagues to work with a competitor. Coopetition appears as a strong source of stress for individuals (Gnyawali et al., 2008). This double observation suggests that not everyone has the capability to work in a coopetitive context. In coopetition, individuals must hold technical competencies but managerial ones are even more essential (Walley, 2007). Companies, which have human resources able to deal with the paradox of coopetition, tend to be more involved in coopetition and reach higher levels of profit (Gnyawali & Park, 2011). We explore the concept of ambidexterity as a critical dynamic capability to manage the tension between exploration and exploitation in a context of coopetition, and thus to enhance partners’ innovation performance. In this respect, we refer here to Teece (2007) framework to locate and characterize the dynamic capabilities needed in such a context of coopetition, we label further ambidextrous capabilities. According to the author, at least for analytical purposes, dynamic capabilities can be split into three activities: “sensing”, “seizing” and “managing threats / transforming” the business opportunities that arise in the context of hypercompetition. Sensing stems from the “analytical systems (and individual capacities) to learn and to sense, filter, shape and calibrate opportunities” (p. 1326). These systems can relate both to the internal process (for example, how R&D spending are allocated or how technologies are selected) and the external processes (for example, how new customers or supplier innovations are detected). Seizing depends on “enterprise structures, procedures, designs and incentives for seizing opportunities” (p.1334). It pertains to the ability to build new business models, selecting decision-making protocols and industry boundaries but also to building loyalty and commitment. Managing threats / transforming depends on the “continuous alignment and realignment of specific tangible and intangible assets” (p.1340). It is linked to decentralization and near decomposability, modes of governance, cospecialization as well as knowledge management. Previous scholars studied exploration and exploitation processes as opposites (Gupta & Govindarajan, 2000), in a dialectic perspective (De Rond & Bouchikhi, 2004). Behind their opposition, exploration and exploitation processes can be complements. Farjoun (2010) recommends a duality approach to consider interdependencies between exploration and exploitation. For example, both exploitation and exploration are essential for organizational 6 learning (Benner & Tushman, 2002; Lavie et al., 2010). As pointed out by Gimeno (2004), behind their opposition, competition and collaboration may in fact work as complementary forces. If the related tensions are well managed, the simultaneous combination of exploration and exploitation processes (i.e. collaboration and competition) can be positively related to firm innovation performance. 1.3. Ambidextrous dynamic capability to manage coopetitive tensions Successful firms are those that can resolve the tension between exploitation and exploration, pursue ambidexterity and achieve long term superior performance (Gibson & Birkinshaw, 2004; He & Wong, 2004; Lavie, Stettner & Tushman, 2010). In this study, we identify three key drivers from coopetition for firms to develop an ambidextrous capability. These drivers include resources advantages, organizational structure for information flow as well as organizational culture. These three factors help us not only understand how coopetition can lead to a balance of exploitation and exploration, but also explain why and how some coopetition can successfully achieve innovation performance through an ambidextrous dynamic capability. 1.3.1. Shared Resources Resources are considered as crucial to the innovation process (Sorensen & Stuart, 2000). Slack resources have been identified as key drivers to exploration (Voss et al., 2008). However, some scholars have argued that larger firms introduce less radical innovation (Damanpour, 1996). Therefore, it is not the possession of slack resources which drives the development of ambidexterity, but the effective management of resources which fosters ambidexterity. In coopetition situation, firms can benefit from simultaneously pursuing both exploitation and exploration because they are more likely to access resources. Furthermore, coopetitive firms constantly manage the trade-off between exploitation and exploration within and outside their organization boundary; therefore, such firms tend to have capabilities to balance exploitation and exploration for resources allocation. In order to pursue learning through exploitation and exploration as well as to manage the balance between both, coopetitive partners acquire technological, business and managerial knowledge from each other. New knowledge acquired by the firm can be considered as sources of exploration. The focal firms need to develop certain absorptive capacity in order to identify the value of knowledge and aspire this latter in order to create new knowledge (Zhou & Wu, 2009). This is built on the common knowledge both companies have developed in the competitive market. 7 1.3.2. Organization Structure Furthermore, research investigated the development of the organizational structure, which allows firms to achieve an ambidextrous capability. A project-based organization fosters the development of individual potential and improves the capacity to tap individual knowledge and ideas (Verona & Ravasi, 2003). Project-bases organizations can be considered as flexible organizations (Volberda, 1996). On the contrary, in highly centralized organizations, exploration is hindered. Jansen et al. (2009) argued that centralization negatively affects exploratory innovation whereas formalization positively influences exploitative innovation. This is based on how the coordination mechanism impacts routine operation, formal duties, power, and problem solving process. Therefore, we argue that coopetition provides focal firms the structure for better coordination in order to achieve information flow within the two companies. Firms learn through the process of social and collective coordination. In this way, firms can keep constantly searching and evaluating practices and knowledge. These search and evaluation activities, involving collaboration outside the organization, are crucial for both exploitation and exploration. Fang, Lee & Schilling (2010) argue that firms need to invest in semi-isolated subgroups in order to facilitate the availability of information in an efficient manner so to achieve a balance of exploitation and exploration. Coopetition relationship here tends to provide such a facilitating environment for a semi-isolated program group. 1.3.3. Organization Culture and managers’ mindset In addition to collaboration and integration, firm culture has been identified as an essential force in driving exploitation and exploration (O’Reilly & March, 2004). An organization can have a culture characterized by opportunism, experimenting, risk taking, decisiveness and taking initiatives. These cultures allow creative thinking, furthermore encourage innovativeness for exploration. Beckman (2006) argued that managers’ experience, including their prior company affiliations, could predict whether a firm pursues exploratory and exploitative behaviors. The required organizational flexibility comes from managerial capabilities i.e. management challenge (Volberda, 1996). In a coopetition situation, original affiliations of management team members shape firm exploitation and exploration. Teams with common prior company affiliations are more likely to pursue exploitation while teams within which members come from a wide range of previous affiliations are more likely to pursue exploration. In coopetition programs, focal firms tend to assign people to these contexts over time, which provides an interesting combination of people sharing the same 8 affiliation with a dual identity. In this way, a balance of exploitation and exploration can be achieved. Figure 1 – Coopetition and innovation performance: a theoretical framework Coopetition Exploration / Exploitation Tension Managing Exploration / Exploitation Tension Innovation Learning Dynamics: Ambidexterity as a Dynamic Capability 2. METHOD 2.1. Research design 2.1.1. An in-depth case study Case-based exploratory methods are appropriate to tackle a phenomenon that is poorly understood (Eisenhardt, 1989), has multiple and complex elements (Dodgson et al. 2008) which evolve over time (Langley, 1999). As suggested by Bengtsson, Eriksson & Wincent (2010), case studies are recommended to investigate co-opetition phenomenon. In-depth case study exploring details of a multi-faceted and paradoxical phenomenon constitutes the best way to understand difficulties associated with the management of a coopetitive strategy (Gnyawali & Park, 2011). Accordingly, we conducted in-depth studies of two exemplar cases –one of radical innovation and one of incremental innovation– in order to develop insights about the phenomenon and tensions arising from it (Yin, 1994). The cases studied are embedded (Yin, 2003; Musca, 2006). They can be considered as exemplar and unique cases as they represent situations that are faced by many firms engaging in coopetition and help to generate insights by going inside the organizations and their relationships. We designed this research as an exploratory study in order to generate insights about the sources, the dimensions, and the management of tensions stemming from dyadic coopetitive relationships. In order to do so, we considered two collaborative programs conducted by Astrium (EADS group) and TAS (Franco-Italian joint venture between Thales [67%] and Finmeccanica [33%]) as exemplar cases of radical and incremental innovation in coopetition. 2.1.2. Data collection and analysis This research was carried out starting from a qualitative method of a standard case study. This method has enabled us to avoid the constraints of a preliminary choice of tools or types of 9 data to be used (Yin, 2003), making it possible to access heterogeneous data collected from a variety of sources (Langley and Royer, 2006). Moreover, this method makes it possible to analyze a phenomenon at several levels (Eisenhardt, 1989). The exploration and exploitation dilemma in coopetition could thus be examined at organizational level and team level. Following qualitative analysis criteria (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007; Yin, 2003), fifty-one semi-structured interviews, of about 60 minutes duration each, were conducted in both companies i.e. Astrium (EADS group) and Thales Aleania Space (Thales group) with top managers, project managers, and members of coopetitive and competitive team projects. These interviews were conducted face-to-face (except for five conference calls) individually, tape recorded and then transcribed as soon as possible to preserve the quality of information. All the face-to-face interviews were conducted in France. Ten were conducted in Paris offices, one in Cannes, and all others in Toulouse. Three were performed in English and the rest of them in French. Primary data based on interviews was evaluated against previously collected secondary data collected from multiple sources: extracts of contracts, presentations at meetings, managerial reports, experts’ analysis, press reviews etc. Whole data collected was analyzed through NVivo 8 Software following Miles & Huberman (1994) recommendations. In order to preserve respondents’ confidentiality, quotes are anonymous. Only respondent’s position or statuses are mentioned, and the company (affiliation) is not named. We use “firm A” or “firm B” to distinguish both partners. 2.2. Cases’ presentation 2.2.1. The manufacture of telecommunications’ satellites Manufacturing of telecommunication satellites represents the most competitive segment of the whole space industry. The worldwide market is divided among five major manufacturers: three US –Boeing Space System, Lockheed Martin, Space Systems Loral– and the two European mentioned above. All of them compete on global commercial markets to respond to bids from telecommunication operators. If competition is the dominant strategy between manufacturers, collaborative relationships tend to be developed between the two European manufacturers of telecommunications’ satellites located in the same area within the city of Toulouse in Southern France. Traditionally, European companies in the space industry have adopted a mode of organization by projects. For each program they build a team called Project Management Office (PMO) responsible for the governance of the program. The human resources parts of the team are full-time dedicated to the program. Other supporting teams are then made up depending on 10 the needs of the programs’ development. In that case, the team can be shared by several projects simultaneously. When TAS and Astrium decide to collaborate on a space program, they use the same organizational logic. They build a team with a mixed PMO. Each organization fully dedicates technical, financial and human resources to a common team with its main competitor. This mode of organization in mixed teams between competitors offers an exemplar configuration to investigate tensions arisen from coopetition. We choose to study in-depth two current coopetitive programs corresponding to the case of a radical innovation (Alphabus program) and the case of an incremental innovation (Yahsat program) developed in a coopetition context. These programs represent a unique configuration, very suitable to study exploration and exploitation tension in coopetition and how it is managed. 2.2.2. The Alphabus program: an exemplar case of radical innovation developed in coopetition The evolution of telecommunication services implies new satellite requirements in terms of power and capacity. The ranges Eurostar (Astrium) and Spacebus (TAS) are limited today in terms of operator expectations. The leading position of Boeing Space in the top-of-the-range market segment leaves Europeans in the position of challengers. European manufacturers wish to enter in competition by developing a new range of products. Such a development involves very high investment in R&D. For financial reasons, the CNES (National Center for Space Studies) and then the ESA (European Space Agency) encourage manufacturers to work on this fundamental innovation together. In 2001, Astrium and TAS, supported by both institutions, initiated a project called Alphabus. Their objective is double: first, it is to design a European orbital platform able to support very powerful telecommunications’ satellites; second, to market it together on the private worldwide market. The institutional support aims to stimulate innovation by European manufacturers to improve their competitiveness with US market leaders. Developing a major innovation program with a competitor is complex to be implemented. Companies have to think about a relevant organization to explore new technological opportunities based on a common knowledge base. Two-mixed project teams have been set up: the first one was between industrials and the other one with institutions. 2.2.3. The Yahsat program: an exemplar case of incremental innovation developed in coopetition In August 2007, Al Yah Satellite Communications Company (Yahsat), a subsidiary of Mubadala (United Arab Emirates), signed a contract with Astrium and TAS for the 11 manufacture of a dual system of telecommunications by satellite. With a global value of approximately 1.8 billion dollars, it represents the most important program at that moment. This project not only demonstrates the construction of a satellite but also the creation of a complete telecommunications’ system encompassing two satellites, two launchers, two ground stations, and a military network dedicated to civil use. Two main factors explain coopetition between Astrium and TAS. First, at the final stage of the global bidding procedure, Astrium and TAS were competing against each other, and also against Boeing, a US common competitor. The location of the market provides a real advantage to the European industry. The telecommunication operator Yahsat was more in favor of European manufacturers. Thus, strategically, Astrium and TAS, supported by European institutions, decided to bid together to win against a common threat from abroad. Second, contracts’ characteristics were a strong incentive leading Astrium and TAS to collaborate. The client being unknown before, its financial capacities to buy a satellite were highly questionable. Moreover, since 15% of the satellite’s price is due to suppliers after the launch, manufacturers are confronted to the high financial risk to not be paid at the end of the program which is not covered by insurances. Yahsat was not contract dealing with a simple satellite but is about a whole telecommunication system inducing very high technological risks. Financial risks coupled with technological risks constituted an inacceptable level of risks for a single company. Thus, the risk sharing represented a powerful driver for Astrium and TAS to coopete. While Yahsat is a completely new program for the industry, each partner developed before most of the core technologies used in the program. If Yahsat cannot be considered as a fundamental technological innovation, innovation was required to adapt the components to build the whole system. In order to achieve the common developments needed, Astrium and TAS set up a mixed-project team in which technological, financial and human resources were pooled. This original organizational mode is consistent to in-depth study the dilemma between exploration and exploitation in a context of incremental innovation developed in coopetition. 3. RESULTS 3.1. Exploration and exploitation tensions within the programs The success of the innovation developed jointly by TAS and Astrium depends on the resource sharing process between partners. Through the two coopetitive programs studied, TAS and Astrium want to achieve a same goal: the development of a whole system of telecommunications with Yahsat; the development of a new platform with Alphabus. To 12 achieve these goals, knowledge and know-how from both firms are required. Because of the similarity of Astrium and TAS technologies, risks of technology transfers are low. Since the organizations share their work methods and their production processes, risks of imitation are very high. 3.3.1. The Yahsat program When TAS and Astrium decide to cooperate for the realization of Yahsat, they are constraint to pool key strategic resources to develop the telecommunications system. Astrium and TAS have to share core competencies and confidential data. The success of the program is depending on the quality of the pooling. Yahsat requires the best from both companies. But, both partners want to preserve their idiosyncrasy because of their strong competition. They try to limit the resource-sharing process between each other. However, collaboration requires teams’ members to open their mind, to give access to their industrial processes, to share data and to communicate confidential information. Astrium and TAS cannot be just competitors. They cannot avoid the resource sharing of their key competencies and of their know-how just because they are competitors. This dilemma is particularly critical in the upstream phases of the program. For example, when Astrium and TAS decided to divide the industrial activity of the program, tension arose because both partners wanted the same strategic part of the program. The head of the Yahsat space segment from firm B testifies: “So, at the interfaces, some conflicts can also appear during the upstream stages, when we share the work, because Astrium and TAS have opposed interests so each one will try to do the same part of the program by saying, that is strategic, I think it’s strategic. So, if the two companies think that the same part is strategic, there is a conflict. Then we have to discuss it around a table. Each partner expresses its point of view and we have to make them converging.” The engineering of a satellite is a process requiring a strong coordination of multiple components. Each part of the process is completely interrelated with the others. In spite of the division of the industrial activity, team members need to share some strategic information in particular during the interfaces of the engineering process. Risks of transfers of know-how during these interfaces are very critical. Formal contracts don’t represent strong enough protection to the risk of imitation. But at the same time, Astrium and TAS cannot completely avoid the collaboration and the resources sharing. Know-how and core competencies have to be shared by both partners in spite of the risk of imitation. The same respondent confirms the presence of a learning process between both partners: 13 “Everyone from Astrium and from TAS has good ideas. So, we can learn ideas to improve our work after the program. It’s true that we are learning from working with them. But they also learn from working with us. Everyone benefits from the common work”. During a program such as Yahsat, each partner is involved in a dual process. Astrium and TAS play two simultaneous roles. Each company imitates the best practices while limiting the access to its ones. Astrium and TAS try to balance between the necessary sharing and the protection of their core competencies. At the team-project level this tensions between exploration and exploitation becomes higher. Engineers of each company consider that no information should be shared. They perceive each other as the enemy. In their perspective information about internal processes is confidential and must be protected. Astrium and TAS are two satellites manufacturers. They have the internal competencies and the know-how to build alone a telecommunication satellite. The information related to the payload, to the platform or to the integration of the payload on the platform is considered as very sensitive by each company. In spite of its high level confidentiality, information needs to be shared between team members to develop the common program. The head of the Yahsat space segment from firm B points out the ambiguity of the relationship: “We are in a collaborative process with our colleagues from firm A since for the program, we are building the payload and they will do the integration of it on the platform. In that sense, it is a real partnership. But it is also a competition because they don’t want to let us learning too much from them about the satellite. They are afraid that their main competitor benefit from it. And we reciprocally don’t give them too much information about the payload because we don’t want them to benefit from it. So, there is always this duality in our relationship in terms of competition and collaboration.” 3.3.2. The Alphabus program Because of its fundamental innovation nature, the development of Alphabus is based on an exploration process. The combination of the expertise of both companies will allow the success of a fundamental innovation. At the same time, Alphabus represents a rare opportunity for Astrium and TAS to improve their own ranges of products. Space innovations are costly and European companies do not have the financial capacity to conduct whole innovation programs. Astrium and TAS will exploit the Alphabus resource pooling to reinforce their own competitiveness. The division of the industrial activity is a critical stage in the Alphabus program. On the contrary of Yahsat, Alphabus refers to the development of a completely new platform of satellite. A new range of satellites is supposed to be built based on this new technology. In Yahsat, partners have to pool their core competencies to ensure the success of the program. In Alphabus the challenge is different. At the beginning of the 14 program, Astrium and TAS were agreeing to benefit from the synergies of the new development for their own range of products i.e. Eurostar and Spacebus. As the Alphabus project manager from the institution A explained, this stage was complex and a source of tensions: “And that was a commercial agreement but that went fairly smooth, what was much more difficult was the, let's call it the commercial agreement was in the future, what was much more difficult in the beginning was the industrial work share between the two parties for the building of Alphabus itself. That took a reasonable amount of time.” Whereas Yahsat program is based on sharing of the best competencies of both partners, in Alphabus, Astrium and TAS pool their weaknesses following an exploration process. Even if team members are afraid to open their mind within the team, the success the program depends on the good ideas from engineers and managers from both organizations. Exploitation process is simultaneously required to innovate fundamentally. In the space industry, a development is a very long process. It may take up to a few years between the design, the realization and the marketing of a component or equipment. Astrium and TAS need to anticipate the future Alphabus needs in terms of components and equipment. A first dilemma appears because of the fundamental innovation character of Alphabus between exploration and exploitation over time. The head of the Alphabus industrial segment for firm B underlines the importance of this perspective: “In 2001, we had to start to prepare the future because we could not keep using electronics components which would not be built anymore, which would be obsolete. The manufacturers of these components would stop building it. They would not keep building them just for us. We don’t use them enough. So, we needed to prepare the future, to think about which components should be replaced and which components could still be used”. After the definition of the necessary new developments, Astrium and TAS need to share the development. This stage was a source of critical tensions between the partners. Should they follow a rule of excellence to divide the developments? This rule would be more based on the exploitation of the know-how and the core competencies of each company. Or, should they enjoy the new developments to improve their own range of products? This perspective would be more in favor of an exploration process in order to increase the future firm’s competitiveness. The head of the Alphabus industrial segment for firm A points out this dilemma: “If we learn about doing 100 volts, then we can use 100 volts in our satellites. So there are two objectives: the product, I mean, the new range of products and improving the competing product, Eurostar or Spacebus. It’s both. We do Alphabus for that too.” 15 3.2. Managing exploration and exploitation tension 3.2.1. Ambidexterity at the organizational level Astrium and TAS didn’t sign any formal contract to define the rules of their collaboration. They just committed to respect some rules written in a document called GME (Momentary Group of Enterprises) for Yahsat and in a partnership agreement in the case of Alphabus. Those rules are supposed to give the partners some guidelines about how to structure every potential situation of tension during the program. But these formal rules are short and can’t foresee every potential source of tension. In terms of information management, Yahsat and Alphabus require exchanges of technical information. None of voluntary and deliberated training process is implemented between TAS and Astrium. Managers and team members both dedicated efforts to protect and share information simultaneously. It is not a question of helping the partner to solve its technical difficulties. If TAS or Astrium has difficulties for a development, the partner is not supposed to provide the solution. The phenomenon is accentuated by the pride of each company to find its own solution. Thus, each firm explores the solution at other units while exploiting the information in cooperative programs. Paradoxically, Astrium and TAS cannot leave its partner in trouble for too long. Delays are costly for both companies. Astrium and TAS cannot afford to reproduce the same mistakes in innovative programs. Without sharing all their previous experiences, they have to share minimal information about the solution. The communication is vague but allows the program to advance. The exploitation of knowledge related to technical failures is implemented to ensure the progress of the program. Through this exploitation process, the partner will be aware of the weaknesses of its competitor. They can exploit this knowledge in a future competition. Through the same process, the weaker partner could improve its competitiveness thanks to a learning process. In that sense, coopetitive programs represent an interesting opportunity for each partner. Astrium and TAS learn new processes or more effective methods from its partner. In terms of division of industrial activity, on Alphabus, Astrium and TAS proceed to a benchmark of all the processes developed by both companies. Following the exploitation process, the objective was to evaluate what components could be used on Alphabus. Both partners should validate each technical solution provided. This double validation loop ensures the best technical option for the program. The same procedure was developed on Yahsat to convince the client that the coopetition between Astrium and TAS allowed him a better technical performance at the end. At the same time, through the pooling activity manufacturers implement an exploration process. The objective was to find new technical options to improve the final program. In the case of Alphabus, the exploration 16 seemed to be more important than in Yahsat just because of the nature of the innovation. In terms of resource sharing, the learning capacity seems particularly critical in a coopetitive context. Through the pooling, each partner accesses the core assets of its main competitor. At the same time, the partner exposes itself to a high risk of imitation. Pooling different industrial approaches supports the reciprocal training of the best practices and thus a reciprocal exploration process. During a program such as Yahsat or Alphabus, Astrium and TAS play two simultaneous roles. They enhance their learning process i.e. the exploration process from their competitor while reducing learning opportunities of their competitor. Astrium and TAS remain strong competitors on the telecommunications satellites worldwide market. They want to preserve their idiosyncrasy to maintain their competitive advantage on the market. Inter-organizational resource sharing enhances the risk of imitation but is necessary to commonly innovate i.e. exploitation process. The creative process strongly depends on the resource pooling. Thus, organizations balance between learning opportunities offered by the concept and the protection of their core competencies. In that sense, Astrium and TAS develop ambidexterity capabilities allowing the exploitation of internal resources and the exploration of new opportunities. Regarding the resource sharing, the main rule is non-aggression. If a company considers a component as critical or confidential, they have the right to refuse to share it. The other company has no choice to accept it. But these formal rules are inadequate to efficiently deal with the multiple coopetitive tensions and in particular to efficiently manage the daily dilemma between exploration and exploitation processes. This management is one dimension of the mission of the project manager. The project manager becomes the intermediary between the organization and the project-team in terms of resource management. Taking into account the multiple tensions arising from the coopetitive context, the constitution of a motivated and competent project-team becomes highly critical for organizations. Astrium and TAS face some difficulties to find individuals who are able to work in such conflicted context, as the Yahsat process manager for firm A underlined: “We’ve started something that induced strong hostility and strong anger from team members. It’s a violent daily program. Yes, it’s daily violent. People struggle themselves to work efficiently with the other. It’s something very hard psychologically. It’s a very psychologically violent program, above all during its first year.” Astrium and TAS don’t have formal or explicit rules regarding to the resources allocation process. They have to simultaneously deal with internal programs mainly based on an exploitation process and with collaborative programs based on a combination of exploration and exploitation processes at different levels. In that sense, the organization involved in 17 coopetition develops an ambidexterity capacity. Each project manager defends his program to obtain the optimal human, financial and technological resources. This process creates internal tensions between all project managers, inside the company. The head of telecommunications programs has to manage between collaborative and competitive programs to balance exploration and exploitation processes. He is responsible for the resource allocation process. He is facing the risk of failure if the resources are not well allocated and the risk of transfers if the competitor imitates the core competencies shared in the program. 3.2.2. Ambidexterity at the team level The capacity of the project-team to efficiently manage the coopetitive tensions is strongly related to the composition of the team. The mix of the team is a major challenge. - The project manager In a program such as Yahsat or Alphabus, the mission of the project manager includes the management of tensions. He is the emblematic character of coopetition. Through its multiple daily tasks, he balances the levels of collaboration and competition within the team over time. He controls the intensity of the tensions and proposes some relevant ways to manage them. Since he internalizes in himself the paradox of coopetition i.e. the simultaneity of collaboration and competition regarding exploration and exploitations processes, he holds specific abilities. As pointed out above, there is no formal procedure to choose a competent project manager. The Yahsat project manager from firm B shared its own experience: “I’ve told to my boss that I was interested in it, and my program ended up in 2008. Hopefully the person in charge of the program before me, he decided to quit it. It is not easy to work on it every day, so he decided to quit. My boss knew that I could be interested in it, so I was on the list and he offered me the job.” Individuals don’t have incentives from their companies to work in a coopetitive context, in spite of the difficulties represented by such situations. They don’t get any bonuses; they don’t fasten their career. For some individuals, the coopetition context represents a challenge while for others it’s highly prohibitive. Some individuals only perceive the constraints of the program (the risks of imitation) while others focus their attention the opportunities (the learning dynamics). Being co-prime contractors, sharing the responsibilities and managing the confidentiality represent a high barrier for individuals. The Yahsat project manager for firm A testifies: 18 “I have had huge difficulties to find French people to work on Yahsat because they found the organization too complicated. Well, this kind of organization requires a lot of business travels so I’ve found competent people, competent well in quotations marks, but they refused to come, they’d rather work in a cooler program.” The implication and the involvement of the project manager are essential to ensure the success of a coopetitive program. The project manager must perfectly understand the reasons of such collaboration with a competitor. He must be convinced of the interest of the coopetition in spite of the high level of risks he is facing. The understanding of the project manager is critical since he is responsible for the intra-team communication. For example, in the case of leaking information, the project manager is responsible for the management of the situation. He reminds all the team members the objective of the program, the benefits for the company directly and indirectly for them. The conflicts must stay at the project-team level without slowing the progression of the program. As the Yahsat project manager for firm B, the trust between both project managers facilitates the management of tensions within the team: “We also have our management if we need it, just in case. But our first mission is to make the program progressing and to ensure that all the tensions remain at the level of the project-team. They don’t have to impact the rest of the organization or the other current programs. It works pretty well because we get along great with M. X but I guess If it had been another project manager with whom I didn’t get along with, it would have been very tough.” Project managers are also in charge of the management of confidential information at the interfaces. On a daily base, they decide what kind of information should be shared or not, depending on the needs of the program. Sometimes they may decide to share key data whereas they shouldn’t. They daily balance between exploration processes and exploitation processes to ensure the success of the program while protecting the core competencies of their companies. They don’t forget that, they will compete with the same people they’re collaborating with right now. Project managers from Astrium and TAS are also responsible for the composition of their project-team. They define the needs of the program in terms of human, financial and technological resources. Since individuals are strategic resources in innovation programs, the composition of the team becomes highly critical. - Team members As pointed out below, working in a coopetitive context can be schizophrenic for individuals. Hiring individuals for these programs is not easy. A first challenge appears while defining the required competencies. Should the project managers hire highly qualified individuals or should they hire individuals with relational skills? Actually, Yahsat and Alphabus require 19 very rare and scarce human resources holding both, technical expertise and relational skills. The head of the Yahsat engineering segment insists on the importance of the technical expertise mostly at the beginning of the program: “We count on the individuals’ qualities and on their individual former experiences to create a new process every time. So, that is level zero of the CMM. We call this level the time for heroes. We need the best people, very independent people to enhance the creativity. And then we need less experts and more adaptable people, with very precise processes defining what to do and how.” The coopetition context reinforces the need of relational competencies. Individuals must be able to deal with the paradoxical context, source of specific tensions. The balance between technical and relational skills is leading to the constitution of a project-team. Team members responsible for the design and the construction of Yahsat hold a high expertise coming from previous experiences and managerial and relational competencies. The mix between relational and technical ensures the success of the program. The development of Yahsat or Alphabus is based on the exploitation of Astrium and TAS competencies. Individuals involved in coopetitive programs such as Yahsat or Alphabus work in a different geographical area within the company, in a different building. This geographical separation is a way to limit the information exchanges and the risks of transfers with the competitor. For individuals, it represents also a complication to access to the internal information. Engineers need data from their departments to develop the program. Team members must develop some ambidexterity in terms of working with their internal colleagues as they use to do but at the same time, they must be able to separate their corporate work while they work on the program. The Yahsat engineering manager for firm A underlines the importance of the interpersonal dimension in the process: “On a side we need technical skills to make the program progressing. On the other side, to be respected by the competitor, because it’s true that when we work in the same company we kind of judge people by saying this one doesn’t understand anything to what I’m telling him, I’d rather have another one. But when you’re in the other company, it’s worse. So, they have to be technically competent but they also have to be open-minded to negotiate with the competitor while defending the interests of their own company.” 3.2.3. Experiences and Organizational Culture for Ambidexterity Collaborative relationships between Astrium and TAS are not recent. Before the industrial reorganizations, Astrium Toulouse and TAS Toulouse were not competitors but complementors. Astrium Toulouse was specialized in the construction of platforms whereas the activity of TAS Toulouse was more specialized in the construction of payloads. Such complementarities encourage both plants to vertically collaborate. One firm was building the 20 platform while the other was building the payload. The division of the industrial activity was clear and simple, like in outsourcing. Through these previous collaborative experiences between both partners, individuals from both companies developed capacities and mindsets. These capacities became essential in the current context of coopetition. The Alphabus engineering manager of firm B underlines the importance of the historical dimension: “It’s history. The plant of Cannes was Aerospatiale satellite. The plant of Thales Toulouse was Alcatel. And here, in Toulouse, it was Matra. So, I think that Matra Toulouse and Alcatel Toulouse have already collaborated in the past. The two companies, non-competitors, with distinct areas of competencies… It worked well. When we were doing an Arabsat satellite or something else, with a payload coming from the competence of Thales Toulouse and a platform and the integration of the satellite coming from the competence of Astrium Toulouse. It worked well. Alphabus and Yahsat mostly involve individuals from two French subsidiaries of Astrium and TAS located in the south of the country in the city of Toulouse in order to benefit from the capacities developed through these previous collaborative experiences. Even if they are technical experts, junior engineers lack of experience to deal with coopetitive tensions. The ambidexterity required by the context is not an ability but a capacity developed through previous experiences. Within each company, the head of telecommunications programs knows the background of each individual. He is aware of the previous collaborative (or coopetitive) experiences of each individual. This explains why the Alphabus project-team benefits from a previous similar program called Stentor and why the Yahsat project-team is similar as the previous Skynet team. The Yahsat satellite manager for firm A underlines the importance of the heritage of Skynet: “In each profile, for each position, there is a pool of people, good or not, well, some of them are better than the others but they all have their characteristics, their experiences which define their knowledge and above all their knowledge about working in collaboration with a competitor. We are an industry working by projects. So, when a program is ending, most of the team is affected to the next program. We try to not changing the core composition of the team to benefit from the previous experience. Regarding Yahsat, most of the satellite team, but also most the ground team have worked on Skynet before. The two programs are successive and are almost similar since they are military telecommunications programs.” Previous collaborative experiences helped organization to develop routines and capacities such as the ambidexterity to manage the specific tensions due to coopetition. But the cultural and geographical proximity between individuals also helped them to develop specific capabilities. Team members benefit from a cultural and geographical proximity facilitating the development of their capacities to manage coopetitive tensions. The Alphabus engineering manager of firm B explained: 21 “People are culturally closed. They live in the same place and it went fine. The collaborations went fine. So, people work easily together.” The following table 1 presents ambidexterity challenges and learning dynamics at the multilevels investigated. Table 1: Ambidexterity and learning dynamics at multi-levels Level of analysis Ambidexterity as a Dynamic Capability Learning dynamics Organization Development of ambidexterity capabilities: Balance between learning opportunities and core competencies protection Previous collaborative experiences Team Project manager Managerial capabilities: Balance between sharing and protecting knowledge Previous coopetitive experiences Team members Individual relational capabilities: Balance between collaboration and competition Previous participation in collaborative projects 4. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION While collaboration basically encourages exploration processes, competition furthers exploitation processes. On the contrary to classic collaboration between non-competitors, in coopetition, firms deal simultaneously with exploration and exploitation processes. Both processes occur at the same time and sometimes in the same activities. Thus, specific tensions arise and firms are required to develop specific capabilities to manage them. As regard coopetition, we suggest here to consider it as a dynamic process to understand the tensions that arise in a context of coopetition and their management. We highlight the importance of considering an intra-organizational level to analyze the management of coopetitive tensions. In a general way, the link with the concept of dynamic capabilities offers meaningful insights to understand the relationship management and coopetition mechanisms on innovation performance. Coopetition is a source of external knowledge for partners. This knowledge interacts with internal dynamic capabilities to enhance long-term innovation performance. In this respect, ambidexterity represents a specific dynamic capability which makes it possible to manage the tensions generated by the exploration /exploitation dilemma. We think that coopetition project, according to the nature of the innovation considered (incremental and/or fundamental), constitutes a particularly rich ground to characterize ambidexterity as dynamic capability at the base of the success of an innovation project. In the following purpose we suggest some reflections on the interest to consider these ambidextrous capabilities in a context of coopetition. 22 4.1. Sources and characteristic of ambidextrous capacities in a context of coopetition A first idea consists in considering these capabilities at various levels of analysis and through various dimensions. In this way, our study makes it possible to highlight the sources and characteristic of ambidexterity. Thus, beyond the dyad represented by the two partners, the two levels of analysis that are the organization and the project team appear as being the relevant levels in which ambidextrous capabilities emerge and are mobilized. In a finer way, it is on the level of analysis of the team that these ambidextrous capabilities make sense through the two important types of actors and their relationships which highlight the interpersonal and human dimensions in the coopetitive project: the project manager and the team-members. The existence of these various levels of analysis shows that ambidexterity in a context of coopetition is a process which irradiates in a transverse way a set of staffs which belong of course to partners’ structures, but especially to the interface of the borders of these structures, through the considered project logic. Our results stemming from the analysis of the cases go in the direction of Bengtsson et al. (2010) recommendation which stresses the importance to observe contexts of coopetition with multilevel lenses. However, we are conscious that the image is then complex and that each level of analysis would require deepening which constitutes future reflection issues. Then, the development of ambidextrous capabilities constitutes an effective response compared to the tensions emanating of the exploration / exploitation dilemma. These ambidextrous capabilities appear through various dimensions, in particular, learning processes and resource sharing in conflict context. Coopetitive projects require ambidexterity which is regarded here as the expression of a specific dynamic capability bringing into play the of the “sensing”, “seizing” and “transforming” activities or microfondations highlighted by Teece (2007). Thus, throughout a dynamic process of learning which goes beyond technical problem solving, it is a question of the mobilization of particular management capabilities in a context of coopetition loaded with tensions and conflicts of various nature and at various levels. Indeed, if we consider the project through its more innovating aspects as a new opportunity, we see clearly the analytical systems (and individual capacities) to learn and to sense, filter, shape and calibrate opportunities that characterizes the “sensing” activity, and which responsibility is dedicated to the project manager, key of vault of the program success. We see also the “seizing” activity through the enterprise structures, procedures, designs and incentives for seizing opportunities which correspond to the routines already present at the level of the partner companies, represented by the PMO and the way of building loyalty and commitment of staff involved in the programs. Finally, we observe the management of threats / transforming activity through the 23 continuous alignment and realignment of specific tangible and intangible assets which illustrated in particular by the decentralization and once again the role of the project manager, and also the knowledge management. Beyond the simple location of these activities, a finer work on the dynamics of emergence and development of these ambidextrous capabilities in a coopetitive project would constitute another issue which would make it possible to refine the framework of analysis proposed by Teece (2007). 4.2. Profiles of the ambidextrous actors managing coopetitive tensions The success in the management of coopetitive tensions invites to consider necessary competencies of the actors concerned, namely the project manager and its team-members, which exceed the technical, organizational or functional aspects, to consider essential managerial competencies (Walley, 2007). During the coopetitive project, the project manager seems to be the central character of the process and who must develop individual and managerial capabilities that are specific to the project and which exceed those already developed within the company to which he (she) is affiliated. Admittedly this particular context generates complexity and tensions but those one prove to be at the same time inherent in the coopetitive project and necessary for its success (Chen, 2008). Thus, the project manager must have a very good knowledge of the strategy pursued by his (her) company and the inscription of the coopetitive project in this one, so as to translate the strategic elements with the members of his (her) team whose culture is mainly engineers. Especially the project manager must be in addition capable to manage the conflicts which occur during the project and to communicate. Lastly, he (she) is responsible for the confidential information management. We are here in the presence of activities which require idiosyncratic skills. As for the team-members, beyond the technical skills, they must develop relational competencies and especially observe the strict rule of separation of their activities which leads them to distinguish in a schizophrenic way what comes within their company domain of that of the program. Ambidexterity is conceived on the level of whole participants in the coopetitive project and feeds on the learning of all the involved staff but requires a favorable context so that the coopetitive project can succeed. In line with O’Reilly & March (2004), this context is characterized by multiple coopetitive experiments and a whole of proximity elements which are expressed in cultural and geographical terms. Coopetition appears here as a positive value for innovation since it supposes the development of ambidextrous capabilities which are wanted by coopeting firms’ executives. 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