1. law, govt and politics

Review of Sustainability Measures and Other
Management Controls for 1 October 2008
Volume 1: Final Advice Papers and Summary
of Recommendations
09 September 2008
1
CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................................... 3
STATUTORY OBLIGATIONS AND POLICY GUIDELINES.............................................. 6
ORANGE ROUGHY (ORH 3B) - FINAL ADVICE ............................................................. 28
DEEMED VALUE RATES FOR SELECTED FISHSTOCKS – FINAL ADVICE.............. 65
SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS........................................................................... 109
2
INTRODUCTION
1
This paper provides you with the Ministry of Fisheries (MFish) initial position, final
advice and recommendations on those sustainability measures and other
management controls reviewed for 1 October 2008.
2
This Final Advice Paper (FAP) is produced in three volumes:
Volume 1
Statutory Obligations and Policy Guidelines
Final Advice Papers
Summary of Recommendations
Volume 2
Summary of Submissions
Initial Position Papers
Volume 3
Submissions
Initial Position Papers
3
The initial position papers (IPP) were developed for consultation as required under the
Fisheries Act 1996 (the Act). They contained MFish’s initial position on the
fishstocks and deemed values identified for review. MFish emphasised that the views
and recommendations outlined the papers were preliminary and were being provided
as a basis for consultation with stakeholders.
Consultation
4
On or about 30 June 2008 MFish provided copies of the IPPs (contained in Volume 2)
to iwi, stakeholders and you. Stakeholders and iwi were asked to provide written
submissions on the IPP by 11 August 2008.
5
A summary of the submissions received for each IPP are contained in Volume 2. The
submissions themselves are included in Volumes 3.
3
Final Advice Paper
6
This paper contains MFish’s final advice to you on management measures for orange
roughy (ORH 3B) and deemed value rates for selected fishstocks for the 1 October
2008 sustainability round.
7
Each FAP section provides MFish discussion (including an analysis of your statutory
obligations in relation to each issue) and MFish’s preferred options.
8
A summary of recommendations for both of the FAPs is included at the end of
Volume 1.
9
A copy of this final advice paper will be made available to iwi and stakeholders who
made a submission on these proposals, following the announcement of your decisions.
Implementation of Decisions
10
Following your final decision on any changes to management controls for 1 October
2008, officials will provide you with a draft letter to stakeholders outlining your
decisions.
11
In addition, s 12(2) of the Act requires that after setting or varying any sustainability
measure, you are required to write to sector groups advising them of the reasons for
your final decisions.
4
Section One
Statutory Obligations and Policy Guidelines
5
STATUTORY OBLIGATIONS AND POLICY GUIDELINES
1
The Final Advice Paper (FAP) provides the Minister with the best information
available to make a decision, legal obligations, the available options and the
risks/consequences of each possible course of action. In short, MFish provides full
information and ensures that the implications of actions are understood. Included in
this analysis will be the possible consequences of leaving all management measures
unchanged (the status quo).
2
This section provides guidance on the interpretation those sections of the Fisheries
Act 1996 (the Act) that are most relevant to setting sustainability measures. This will
help interpret the information and advice provided in individual papers.
Purpose of the Fisheries Act 1996 (s 8)
3
The purpose of the Fisheries Act 1996 is to provide for the utilisation of fisheries
resources while ensuring sustainability. It is a statement of the overarching goal for
fisheries management against which all decisions under that Act must be measured.
The purpose statement guides the exercise of decision making powers pursuant to the
Act.
4
“Ensuring sustainability” as defined provides a guide on desirable yields from a
fishery. Fisheries resources are to be maintained with the potential to meet the
reasonably foreseeable needs of future generations. In addition, the purpose requires
that any adverse effects of fishing on the aquatic environment should be avoided,
remedied or mitigated.
5
“Utilisation” of fisheries resources is defined as conserving, using, enhancing, and
developing fisheries resources to enable people to provide for their social, economic
and cultural wellbeing. There is a positive obligation to provide for the use of
fisheries resources. While the Act does not require the government to promote fishing
or maximise value, there is a positive obligation to provide a level and quality of
access to fisheries resources, thereby enabling people to provide for their social,
economic and cultural wellbeing from fishing. Section 8 refers to “enabling people to
provide for their social, economic and cultural wellbeing”. This implies decisions
under the Act should enable people to provide for their own wellbeing.
Decisions should create the opportunities.
6
The Select Committee in its final report to the House of Representatives on the
Fisheries Bill (as it then was) stated that the intention of the Bill was to “facilitate the
activity of fishing while having regard to the sustainability of harvests and mitigating
the effects of fishing on the environment”. In the Coromandel Scallops Fishermen’s
Association (Inc) v Minister of Fisheries case (Wellington CP 182/99, 13 September
1999) the High Court noted that “utilisation is subject to the overriding objective of
sustainability” (at page 22). In an earlier judgment, the High Court considered that
“when in doubt decision makers must favour conserving the fishing stock”, noting
that this was plain from the “international agreements” (see Roaring Forties Seafoods
Limited & Ors v Minister of Fisheries (High Court, Wellington CP 64/97, 1 May
1997) at page 9).
6
7
Since then the courts have given further consideration to how the purpose of the Act is
to be applied, and in particular the relationship between utilisation and sustainability.
In the Squid Fishery Management Co v Minister of Fisheries, 13 July 2004, CA39/04
litigation, the Court of Appeal noted that:
“The Minister…was required to balance utilisation objectives and conservation values. In
the context of a harvestable species, this requires utilisation to the extent that it is
sustainable...”
8
The purpose statement provides for one purpose that contains the elements of
providing for utilisation and ensuring the sustainability of fisheries resources. This
does not mean that one arm of the purpose is more important than the other is.
Rather, it means that the two arms operate in parallel, and not independently of each
other. Both elements need to be fully considered when acting under the Act.
However, the bottom line must always be sustainability.
9
In operation the range of management measures that may be applied to achieve the
purpose of the Act will produce a continuum of potential outcomes. This continuum
reflects the balance that must be struck between providing for utilisation whilst
ensuring sustainability. The continuum represents the range of options that must
ensure sustainability with varying degrees of risk. Each option within the continuum
also provides different levels of utilisation depending on the level of risk to
sustainability the decision maker considers acceptable. The decision on a particular
point on the continuum is in essence a decision on the appropriate balance between
sustainability risk and short-term utilisation on a case by case basis. However, the
overriding point is that sustainability must be ensured by each option. The explicit
reference in the definition of “utilisation” to social, economic, and cultural factors
indicates that all decisions made under the Act should consider these issues.
Future Generations
10
The Act, in its directive to provide for future generations, draws no direct distinction
between the next generation and some distant generation in time. No precise
determination is possible of where one generation begins and another generation ends.
The time scale involved may be dependent upon the interests that are to be taken into
account. Logically the time frame relevant to the reasonably foreseeable needs of
future generations may be as short as each generation of children or an indefinite time
in the future.
11
The needs of future generations however are to be considered in the context of the
purpose of the Act and the provisions of the Act as a whole. The obligation is not
open ended, it is what decision makers can reasonably identify as a need for a
particular generation. Future generation objectives are characterised by uncertainty —
what level of population will exist in the future; what future preferences will be; what
future requirements will be; what the impacts of our present actions will be; and, what
technological innovations will allow. But in cases of uncertainty the information
principles of the Act (s 10) are to be applied appropriately.
12
The objective of the Act is to sustain fisheries resources for future use, not to provide
for how future generations may desire to use such resources. Uncertainty is therefore
to be considered in the context of how current decisions impact on the ability to
7
provide for future use of the resource. Reference to “maintaining potential” to meet
needs suggests that the crucial requirement in respect of future generations is to
ensure the renewability of fisheries resources indefinitely at a quantity that provides
for continual utilisation. Hence, the aim of the Act can be seen in part as providing
for the extractive use of fisheries resources in the present, whilst maintaining the
potential of those fisheries resources to provide for future generations.
13
The maintenance of the general functioning of the aquatic environment is intended by
the Act only in respect of managing fishing activities. Whereas enhancement of the
aquatic environment, beyond that achieved through the avoidance, remedy or
mitigation of adverse effects of fishing, is not. In terms of maintenance of the
productivity of natural resources, the Act requires that biomass of a fishstock be
maintained at a level that is at or above the level required to produce the MSY. MSY
is the greatest yield that can be achieved over time while maintaining the stock’s
productive capacity. Therefore MSY caters for both maintenance of reproductive
potential and ongoing utilisation. For most harvested stocks MSY is a practical means
of providing for the reasonably foreseeable needs of future generations. The Act
provides some circumstances for departure from this reference point in respect of
stocks listed on the Third Schedule to the Act (s 14), and stocks maintained at a level
below BMSY but above their long-term viability (ss 14A and 14B).
14
The interests of future generations are described in s 8(2)(a) as relating to “fisheries
resources” which are defined as “fish, aquatic life, seaweed”. No express reference is
made to the inanimate elements of the aquatic ecosystem. It is considered implicit in
the legislation that a sustainable aquatic ecosystem is integral to, or a pre-requisite of,
the ability of fisheries resources to meet the reasonably foreseeable needs of future
generations. However, in meeting reasonably foreseeable needs of future generations
the scope of the Act relates to managing the effects of fishing, not all impacts on the
aquatic environment.
Effects of Fishing
15
The obligation to avoid, remedy, or mitigate adverse effects of fishing pursuant to
s 8(2)(b) of the Act is the second element of ensuring sustainability. Consideration as
to what is adverse may be assessed on scientific knowledge about the environment,
but may also utilise traditional knowledge. It is also likely to be influenced by
stakeholder/community perceptions as to what is acceptable.
16
The requirement to “remedy” or “mitigate” suggests that such measures may be
implemented over a time frame relevant to the circumstances of the individual
decision and nature of the activity involved. Equally achievement of this objective
will contribute to maintaining the potential of fisheries resources to contribute to the
wellbeing of future generations.
17
The Act does not define an “adverse effect”; rather it defines the term “effect”. The
term “effect” has a very broad definition, including effects that are temporary or
permanent; past, present, or future; cumulative; any potential effect of high
probability; and any potential effect of low probability, which has a high potential
impact. No threshold is specified as to the magnitude of any adverse effect required
before any measure in response is to be adopted. Hence the measures adopted in
response should be commensurate with the nature and extent of the adverse effect.
8
There are a number of other variable factors that will influence whether an effect is
considered adverse: characteristics of the aquatic environment; impacts from the
removal of fish; the scale, intensity, and duration of effects; scarcity of environment
type at local, regional, national, international level; resilience of habitat; the effects of
activities other than fishing at a region level, the relationship of fishing effects to this;
human perception and values; and the level of information available on any of these.
18
The Act does not prescribe an order of priority between the obligations to avoid,
remedy or mitigate. The onus is on the decision maker to ensure that any adverse
effects can be avoided, remedied or mitigated. The obligation to “avoid, remedy or
mitigate” is not subject to any qualifier to the effect that such measures only need to
be undertaken to an agreed standard. The appropriate response must depend on the
circumstances of the case, and should be guided by the environmental principles (s 9)
and the information principles (s 10) in the Act.
19
Decision makers can weigh up all the environmental factors contributing to the effect,
along with the possible options available for avoidance; consider relevant social,
economic and cultural factors; take into account the environmental and information
principles of the Act; and opt for the most appropriate option of either avoid, remedy
or mitigate. In some instances, only one response may be effective. Accordingly,
completely irreversible effects are to be avoided. In other instances, it may be
appropriate to consider a range of options. MFish acknowledges that sustainability is
not a purpose to be traded off against utilisation through an analysis of the benefits
and costs. However, the Act allows a range of approaches for achieving
sustainability, and these may, and indeed should, be compared in terms of benefits and
costs.
International Obligations
20
Section 5(a) of the Act provides that the Act shall be interpreted, and all persons
exercising or performing functions, duties, or powers under the Act shall act, in a
manner consistent with New Zealand’s international obligations relating to fishing.
Those acting pursuant to the Act must understand, and act in a manner consistent
with, the international obligations that the New Zealand Government has accepted. A
general principle to apply is that where there is a choice in interpretation of the Act or
the exercise of discretion, s 5(a) requires that the decision maker choose the option
that is consistent with New Zealand’s international obligations relating to fishing.
21
It is MFish’s view that the provisions of the Act, and the proposed exercise of powers
under the legislation, are generally consistent with New Zealand’s existing
international obligations relating to fishing.
Treaty of Waitangi (Fisheries Claims) Settlement Act Obligations
22
The Act shall be interpreted, and all persons exercising or performing functions,
duties, or powers under the Act, are required to act in a manner consistent with the
provisions of the Treaty of Waitangi (Fisheries Claims) Settlement Act 1992. This
also requires an interpretation that best furthers the agreements expressed in the Deed
of Settlement referred to in the Preamble to the Settlement Act.
9
23
The Settlement Act acknowledges that the Crown continues to be subject to the
principles of the Treaty of Waitangi in respect of non-commercial Maori fishing
rights. The Settlement Act did not extinguish the duty to act in accordance with the
principles of the Treaty in respect of non-commercial Mäori fishing rights and
interests, and goes as far as specifically requiring this in relation to the obligations
under s 10 of the Settlement Act.
24
MFish acknowledges the following basic requirements apply to the Crown’s
obligation to act in accordance with the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi:
25
a)
that the Crown acts reasonably and in good faith towards its Treaty partner;
b)
that the Crown makes informed decisions; and
c)
that the Crown avoids impediments to providing redress, and avoids creating
new grievances.
These principles put an onus on MFish to establish structures and work practices that
ensure it is capable of meeting its obligations to Mäori under fisheries legislation. In
New Zealand Mäori Council v Attorney General [1987] 1 NZLR 641 the Court of
Appeal concluded:
“the responsibility of one treaty partner to act in good faith fairly and
reasonably towards the other puts the onus on a partner, here the Crown,
when acting within its sphere to make an informed decision, that is a
decision where it is sufficiently informed as to the relevant facts and law to
be able to say it has had proper regard to the impact of the principles of the
Treaty.” (at page 683)
26
The principle of partnership and the requirement to act in good faith towards the other
Treaty partner extends an obligation on the Crown to also consider and act on any
proposals put forward by tangata whenua for the management of their customary
fisheries. The principle of avoiding the creation of new grievances is of particular
relevance in the fisheries environment now that a full and final settlement has been
achieved. Fisheries management decisions seldom impact on one sector group alone,
and the risk of such decisions adversely impacting on the secured rights and interests
of Mäori is a very real one.
Environmental Principles (s 9)
27
The Act prescribes three environmental principles that the Minister must take into
account when exercising powers in relation to utilising fisheries resources and
ensuring sustainability.
Principle 1: Associated or dependent species should be maintained
above a level that ensures their long-term viability.
28
The Act defines “associated and dependent species” as any non-harvested species
taken or otherwise affected by the taking of a harvested species. “Harvested species”
is defined as any fish, aquatic life or seaweed that for the time being may be taken
with lawful authority. Fishers have lawful authority to take most species. Exceptions
10
include those where a fisher does not have a permit to take a species listed on
Schedule 4C to the Act – these are subject to the permit moratorium – and protected
species such as marine mammals and most seabirds. These together constitute
associated or dependent species.
29
The term “long-term viability” (in relation to a biomass level of a stock or species) is
defined in the Act as a low risk of collapse of the stock or species, and the stock or
species has the potential to recover to a higher biomass level. This principle therefore
requires the continuing existence of species by maintaining populations in a condition
that ensures a particular level of reproductive success. The long term viability will be
different for each species so necessitates a case-by-case analysis.
30
Long-term viability could be achieved at very low levels of population size,
depending on associated risks, such as recruitment failure at low population sizes.
Where fishing is affecting the viability of associated and dependent species, there is
an obligation to take appropriate measures, such as method restrictions, area closures,
and potentially adjustments to the total allowable catch (TAC) of the target stock.
Principle 2: Biological diversity of the aquatic environment should be
maintained.
31
32
“Biological diversity” means the variability among living organisms, including
diversity within species, between species, and of ecosystems. The “aquatic
environment” is defined as:
a)
The natural and biological resource comprising any aquatic ecosystem; and
b)
Includes all aquatic life and the oceans, seas, coastal areas, inter-tidal areas,
estuaries, rivers, lakes and other places where aquatic life exists.
When considering any decision under the Act, particularly sustainability measures, the
impact of current or future impacts on biodiversity must be taken into account. The
maintenance of biodiversity needs to be considered in the context of the purpose of
the Act, which is that, where possible, a resource should be used to the extent that
sustainability is not compromised. Determining the level of fishing or the impacts of
fishing that can occur requires an assessment of the risk that fishing might cause
biodiversity to be reduced to an unacceptable level.
Principle 3: Habitat of particular significance for fisheries management
should be protected.
33
Habitat is not defined in the Act, but MFish considers it to be “the place or type of
area in which an organism naturally occurs” (NZ Biodiversity Strategy). The
Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act (USA) defines
“essential fish habitat” as “those waters and substrate necessary to fish for spawning,
breeding, feeding or growth to maturity”. The maintenance of healthy fishstocks
requires the mitigation of threats to fish habitat. However, fishing may not be the sole
source of the threat; a range of terrestrial activities may impact on fisheries habitats.
Habitats of special significance, such as those that assist in the reproductive and
productive process of a fishery, should be protected. Adverse effects on such areas
must be avoided, remedied or mitigated.
11
Information Principles (s 10)
34
The nature of the data and assumptions used to generate fisheries assessments and the
results produced contain inherent variation and uncertainty. The Act specifies the
information principles that must be taken in account when making decisions in
relation to utilisation of fisheries resources or ensuring sustainability.
a)
Decisions should be based on the best available information. The Act defines
best information that, in the particular circumstances, is available without
unreasonable cost, effort or time;
b)
Decision makers should consider any uncertainty in the information available
in any case;
c)
Decision makers should be cautious when information is uncertain, unreliable
or inadequate; and
d)
The absence of, or any uncertainty in, any information should not be used as a
reason for postponing or failing to take any measure to achieve the purpose of
the Act.
35
A person with decision making powers under the Act is required “to take into
account” the information principles set out in s 10. The information principles do not
of themselves impose any statutory or fiduciary duty on the Crown to actively obtain
the information necessary such that the obligations under the Act are able to be
discharged. The information principles provide guidance as to how decisions are to
be legitimately made on the basis of the information which is available.
36
The principle that decisions should be based on the best available information,
provides guidance that decision-makers (ie the Minister or MFish) should seek to
obtain the best information provided that, in the particular circumstances, is available
without unreasonable cost, effort or time (as provided for in the definition of best
available information in section 2 of the Act). Where new and better information
comes to light during the decision-making process, that information should be
incorporated into, and update, the information basis for a proposed decision.
Determining uncertainty – scientific and anecdotal information
37
Information as defined in the Act includes scientific, customary Maori, social or
economic information and any analysis on any such information. The best available
information for any given decision will likely necessarily incorporate both scientific
and anecdotal (or quantitative and qualitative) information. As such both scientific
and anecdotal information should be considered and weighed accordingly when
making management decisions.
38
The weighting assigned to particular information is subject to the certainty, reliability
and adequacy of that information. As a general principle, information on stock status
outlined in the MFish Fishery Assessment Plenary Report, when available, should be
given significant weighting. The information presented in the Report is subject to a
robust process of scientific peer review.
12
39
Anecdotal information on stock status typically should receive lesser weighting than
the Plenary Report.
However, MFish believes that corroborated anecdotal
information has a useful role to play in the stock assessment process and in the
management process. Such processes should take account of all relevant inputs, and
MFish believes that anecdotal information may provide useful, supplementary
information to that contained in the Plenary Report, and should be taken into
consideration where appropriate.
40
Although all sector groups are invited to participate in the stock assessment process,
recreational, environmental and customary interests are often not represented due to a
lack of resources. Therefore, anecdotal information from these groups may not be
available at the time of the assessment to help interpret the quantitative modelling
results. In particular, there are often difficulties in obtaining scientific information on
the local availability of stocks in areas of importance to customary and recreational
fishers given that the Plenary Report often focuses on assessing the status of a stock at
the QMA level. Anecdotal information from customary and recreational sources may
be an especially useful source of information in these cases.
How to make decisions under uncertainty: Fisheries Act 1996
41
The current Fisheries Act 1996 makes clear that while decision makers should be
cautious where information is uncertain, unreliable or inadequate, they should not
postpone decisions until they have full or completely certain information. The
information on which decisions must be based may be unreliable in itself; or it may be
insufficient to draw firm conclusions about the extent of a sustainability risk. More
commonly, it suffers both these weaknesses. In these circumstances decision makers
must balance competing risks: the risk of unnecessarily constraining utilisation on the
one hand, versus the risk of placing sustainability in jeopardy, on the other.
Consultation (s 12)
42
When the Minister implements a sustainability measure under the Act, [he] is required
to consult with those classes of persons having an interest (including, but not limited
to, Maori, environmental, commercial and recreational interest) in the stock or the
effects of fishing on the aquatic environment in the area concerned.
43
Statutory consultation occurs after policy options have been developed. The IPP
provides stakeholders with the opportunity to comment on the various options. The
FAP provides advice to the Minister that includes the results of that consultation.
44
Section 12 also requires the Minster to provide for the input and participation of
tangata whenua having a non-commercial interest in the stock concerned or an interest
in the effects of fishing on the aquatic environment in the area concerned. The
Minister must also have regard to kaitiakitanga. This is a legal requirement, and
reflects the provisions of the Settlement Act, and the Crown’s commitment to its
treaty partner. Input and participation may include tangata whenua being involved in
identifying concerns and developing proposals as well as being involved in
formulating possible outcomes.
13
Sustainability Measures
45
The Act provides for the setting of sustainability measures. The Act defines as
“sustainability measures” those measures set under Part III of the Act for the purpose
of ensuring sustainability. There are a range of measures that can be adopted under
Part III, the most identifiable being a TAC for stocks in the Quota Management
System (QMS) and catch limits for non-QMS stocks.
Factors to be taken into account when setting sustainability measures
46
Prior to setting or varying a sustainability measure the Minister is required to take a
number of factors into account. The purpose and principles of the Act (ie ss 8−10),
together with ss 5 and 12, are applicable to any decision the Minister may make to set
or vary a sustainability measure.
Stock characteristics and management controls
47
Under s 11(1) the Minister may set or vary any sustainability measure, including a
Total Allowable Catch (TAC), after taking into account the following factors:
a)
Any effects of fishing on the stock and the aquatic environment;
b)
Any existing controls that apply to the stock or area concerned;
c)
The natural variability of the stock concerned.
48
In accordance with achieving the purpose of the Act, any adverse effects of fishing on
the aquatic environment should be avoided, remedied, or mitigated. As noted above
in the section on environmental obligations, where MFish is aware of issues related to
the effects of fishing associated with the stocks discussed, or issues are raised in
submissions, they are discussed in the sections relating to that stock.
49
In general, the assessment for a fishstock will take into account the variability of the
fishstock. Although the principal management mechanism for New Zealand’s
commercial fisheries is a catch limit, this is augmented by a number of other input
controls such as gear restrictions, minimum sizes and area closures. The assessment
and advice in the sections following take these existing controls into account.
Plans and the Hauraki Gulf Marine Park Act
50
Under section 11(2) the Minister must also have regard to relevant provisions of:
a)
Any regional policy statement, regional plan, or proposed regional plan under
the Resource Management Act 1991;
b)
Any management strategy or management plan under the Conservation Act
1987 that apply to the coastal marine area and which the Minister considers to
be relevant;
c)
Sections 7 and 8 of the Hauraki Gulf Marine Park Act 2000 (see below).
14
51
The Hauraki Gulf Marine Park Act 2000 amended s 11(2)(c) of the Act to require the
Minister, when setting or varying any sustainability measure relating to the Hauraki
Gulf, to have regard to any provisions of ss 7 and 8 of that Act. Section 13 of the
Hauraki Gulf Marine Park Act also requires decision-makers carrying out functions
for the Hauraki Gulf under the Fisheries Act to have particular regard to the
provisions of sections 7 and 8 of the Hauraki Gulf Marine Park Act. Section 7 of the
Hauraki Gulf Marine Park Act recognises the national significance of the Hauraki
Gulf including its capacity to provide for the relationship of tangata whenua and the
social, economic, recreational and cultural well-being of people and communities.
Section 8 sets out the objectives of the management of the Hauraki Gulf, which
include the maintenance of the Hauraki Gulf for the social and economic well-being
and its contribution to the recreation and enjoyment, of the people and communities of
the Hauraki Gulf and New Zealand. Many of these objectives mirror the concepts
expressed in the purpose set out s 8 of the Fisheries Act, with perhaps a more explicit
emphasis on recreational well-being.
Fisheries plans and services
52
53
The Act (s 11(2A)) also requires that the Minister takes into account, before setting or
varying any sustainability measure:
a)
any conservation services or fisheries services;
b)
any relevant fisheries plan approved under this Part; and
c)
any decisions not to require conservation services or fisheries services.
Fisheries plans will specify a management framework for managing one or more
stocks or areas in accordance with the purpose and principles of the Fisheries Act.
Fisheries plans allow for explicit trade-offs between services and catch levels to be
achieved in a transparent manner. There are no fisheries plans currently in place
which require specific consideration. In future as fisheries plans are developed,
specific reference to the implications for sustainability measures resulting from
contents of the plan will be made in each stock section.
General considerations
54
Consideration also needs to be given to how a sustainability measure is to be
implemented. In approving the use of a sustainability measure, the Minister should
consider the most effective way of achieving the desired outcome. The Minister may
conclude that a sustainability measure does not need to be formally set.
55
An important factor in supporting the use of non-statutory measures is the degree of
support for the measure and the nature of the monitoring and enforcement regime
proposed to support the measure. An example of a non-statutory measure is a catch
limit for a single species within a multi-species stock, such as oreo, or the use of a
catch spreading arrangement for orange roughy on the Chatham Rise. Non-statutory
measures may be supported by legally binding contractual arrangements entered into
by the fishers concerned. However, as the Crown is not formally a party to such
agreements, there is no formal sanction imposed under the Fisheries Act for a breach
of a sustainability measure implemented by non-statutory means. Any failure to
15
adhere to non-statutory measures may mean that the Crown would be increasingly
unlikely to rely on such measures subsequently.
56
Sustainability measures may also be set by regulatory means. The Act provides for
the use of a regulation, or Gazette notice where necessary, to implement a
sustainability measure. In the first instance, regulations are the preferred mechanism
to implement general sustainability measures. However, a Gazette notice may
provide a more timely and flexible response to particular situations than a regulatory
response. For example, a Gazette notice may be used where a non-statutory
implementation of a sustainability measure does not prove effective.
Other Management Controls
57
The primary sustainability measure for quota management stocks is the TAC. This
can be supported by a number of management controls that collectively ensure the
sustainability of the stock and provide for utilisation within accepted limits.
58
Section 11 provides for the setting of sustainability measures. A range of possible
supporting measures is specified in s 11(3), but the list of options is not limiting.
Sustainability measures may relate to size limits, biological state, fishing seasons,
methods restrictions and closed areas. For non–QMS stocks, measures can also
include general and commercial catch limits. The measures provided for under s 11
may be applied at a local level to address localised depletion or localised
sustainability problems.
59
The most appropriate sustainability measure to be set or varied will depend on the
precise nature of the issue being addressed.
Quota Management Stocks
60
The Act imposes a statutory requirement for the Minister to set a TAC for each QMS
stock (s 13(1)). This requirement is modified by the condition that the Minister is not
required to set an initial TAC for any fish stock unless it is proposed to also set or
vary the TACC for that stock under s 20 of the Act (s 13(10)). For those fishstocks
for which no TAC has been set, MFish’s policy has been to set TACs and allowances
progressively over time, as the need to review those specific fishstocks arises.
Setting a Total Allowable Catch
61
The Act contains a number of specific provisions to ensure a stock is managed
sustainably. A key measure is the setting of a total allowable catch (TAC) for a QMS
stock.
62
In the structure of the Act, setting a TAC is first a measure taken to ensure
sustainability. As such, social, economic and cultural factors are not mandatory
considerations when setting a TAC. However, the purpose of the Act is: to provide
for the utilisation of fisheries resources while ensuring sustainability. Therefore, in
setting TACs, values for the utilisation of resources are also key considerations, and
so social, economic and cultural factors are permissible considerations where
appropriate.
16
63
For example, where the stock biomass target is set at a level that can produce the
maximum sustainable yield (MSY), then utilisation values are being provided for in
allowing the MSY to be taken. However, where utilisation values would be higher at
stock levels above a level that can produce the maximum sustainable yield – levels
that are also more certain to be ensuring sustainability – social, economic and cultural
factors would be appropriate considerations when setting the TAC.
64
The Act contains a number of different options (outlined below) for setting stock
target levels. All of the options are consistent with the purpose of “ensuring
sustainability”, but each option provides for a different management outcome.
Maximum Sustainable Yield (s 13)
65
In the case of quota management stocks, s 13 of the Act specifies a requirement to
maintain a fishstock at a target stock level being at, or above, a level that can produce
the MSY. MSY is defined, in relation to any fishstock, as being the greatest yield that
can be achieved over time while maintaining the stock’s productive capacity, having
regard to the population dynamics of the stock and any environmental factors that
influence the stock. A requirement to maintain stocks at a level that is capable of
producing the MSY is generally recognised internationally as being an appropriate
fishstock target, although there is some international support for MSY representing a
minimum fishstock target.
66
If a stock is currently at its target level (at or above a biomass that will support MSY),
s 13(2)(a) requires the Minister to set a TAC that will maintain the stock at that target
level, having regard to the interdependence of stocks.
Rebuilding the stock towards target levels
67
If the stock is currently below a target stock level, there is a requirement pursuant to
s 13(2)(b) to set a TAC that will result in the stock being restored to a target stock
level (at or above a biomass that will support MSY) in a way and rate which has
regard to the interdependence of stocks and within a period appropriate to the stock,
having regard to its biological characteristics and any environmental conditions
affecting the stock.
Fishing down a stock toward target levels or maintaining above
68
If the stock is above a target stock level (above a biomass that will support MSY),
there is a requirement under s 13(2)(c) to set a TAC that will result in the stock
moving towards the target stock level having regard to the interdependence of stocks.
That target stock level may be at or above a biomass that will support MSY.
Way and the rate
69
In determining the way in which, and rate at which, a stock is altered to achieve the
target stock level, the Minister is required to have regard to such social, cultural and
economic factors considered relevant (s 13(3)). Section 13(3) makes it explicit that
those qualifying factors are relevant in the determination of the way and rate, rather
than in the determination of the target stock level. By “having regard” to the relevant
factors specified by the Act, the Minister must consciously consider those matters and
17
give due weight to them. However, the Minister has the discretion to give such
weight to the matters as considered appropriate.
70
It is also important to note that, when the Minister is considering a significant
reduction to the TAC, the advice to the Minister provides a careful cost/benefit
analysis of a reasonable range of the way and rate options available in moving the
fishery towards target biomass. This is so that, if the Minister decides on a TAC
reduction having a major economic impact, it is evident that all other reasonable
possibilities have been carefully analysed and why the TAC adopted was considered
to be the preferable one – see New Zealand Fishing Industry Association (Inc) and
Ors v Minister of Fisheries and Ors (CA82/97, 22/7/97)
71
The rate of rebuild to achieve the target biomass, and therefore the timeframe adopted
to do so, is a matter for the Minister’s discretion. There is no set time frame within
which the Minister must achieve a rebuild or “fishing down” of a stock. The Minister
is given discretion under the Act to determine the rate at which the TAC is varied,
subject to consideration of the relevant circumstances on a case by case basis.
72
Such considerations may include the potential impacts of decisions on the social,
cultural and economic values of tangata whenua and stakeholders, including
commercial and non-commercial fishers, and non-extractive users. Reference to
cultural factors in s 13(3) encompasses but is not limited to the interests of Mäori and
their cultural practices and values.
73
The interdependence of stocks (i.e. any fish, aquatic life or seaweed of one or more
species that are treated as a unit for the purpose of fisheries management) is a
statutory consideration under section 13 for determining a TAC. In turn the TAC
determines the level at which a stock is managed relative to a level that can produce
the MSY. The interdependence of stocks may include the relationships among and
between harvested species. MFish interprets interdependence of stocks as a situation
where there is a direct trophic relationship (i.e. one stock is likely to be directly
affected through a predator or prey relationship by the abundance of another stock) or
mutually beneficial relationship between stocks. This is therefore distinct from the
requirement to protect the viability of associated and dependent species expressed in
the environmental principles.
Management above Bmsy
74
The Act allows the Minister to manage fisheries at or above the biomass that will
produce MSY (BMSY) on an ongoing basis. In the case of quota management stocks,
s 13 of the Act provides the scope for a stock to be managed at levels higher than
BMSY. Such a target level may be an appropriate management strategy in order to
meet the wider social, cultural or economic goals provided for under s 8 (the purpose)
of the Act, or due to the interdependence of stocks, for the sustainability associated
and dependent species, or to prevent damage to the aquatic environment.
B
75
Where common goals exist or values coincide in particular stock target levels, a high
degree of consensus amongst stakeholders may support management above BMSY.
For example, an agreed management strategy may be developed among commercial
and on-commercial stakeholders to improve catch rates or produce large fish. In such
cases MFish would support the consensus in advice to the Minister.
18
76
MFish considers that management above BMSY is likely to be appropriate where there
is consensus amongst stakeholders to do so. However, there is no legal requirement
restricting the Minister to make this choice where such consensus either exists or does
not exist.
Managing sub-stocks
77
Under section 13, the Minister has a mandatory duty to set the TAC at a level that
enables a stock that is below BMSY to be restored to at least a level that can produce
MSY. In setting the TAC, the Minister must base this decision on BMSY for the stock
as a whole (i.e. within the QMA) and not the individual level of any sub-stocks. For
example, the Minister should not set the TAC at a level solely designed to bring a
component sub-stock to BMSY.
78
The management of localised depletion or localised sustainability problems poses
some challenges. Measures designed to ensure sustainability at a QMA level may not
be effective at providing desired levels of access to fisheries on a localised basis. A
determination is required as to which measures will best address the specific
sustainability issue confronted. The Act allows scope for a range of measures, both
regulatory and voluntary, that may be applied at the stock or local level to address
sustainability issues. These include catch spreading arrangements; area specific catch
limits and bag limits; closed areas; controls on methods, size, and season; and spatial
measures such as mätaitai and taiapure.
79
Varying a TAC is primarily used to address stock-wide sustainability issues.
However, localised sustainability issues may affect the maintenance of the stock at or
above the level that can produce the maximum sustainable yield, and therefore a TAC
adjustment may be appropriate. The size of the area and/or the number of areas
depleted is relevant to this consideration.
Other matters
80
The Act specifies that the TAC is the primary tool for moving a stock towards the
target stock level. Other measures may be adopted in conjunction with a change in
the TAC, however such additional measures should not be relied on as a substitute for
varying the TAC.
81
Under section 13(4), the Minister may vary any TAC for any quota management
stock. When considering any such variation, the Minister is to have regard to the
matters specified in ss13(2) and (3).
82
Any TAC that is set or varied has effect on and from the first day of the next fishing
year for the stock concerned. An exception applies to those stocks listed on the second
schedule to the Act (see heading below).
83
Section 13(5) of the Act specifies that a TAC of zero may be set. It may be in
situations where there are strong biological reasons for prohibiting all removals from a
stock in order to ensure sustainability. The setting of a zero TAC may be part of a
specified rebuild strategy to move the stock towards the target stock level. Prior to
setting a zero TAC the Minister would need to have regard to the social, cultural and
economic costs and benefits associated with such a measure.
19
Amendment of Section 13
84
At present, Parliament is considering a Bill that, if passed, will amend section 13 of
the Fisheries Act 1996. The Bill provides for technical amendments as a consequence
of the judgment of Miller J in Anton’s Trawling Company Limited v The Minister of
Fisheries (High Court, Wellington, CIV 2007-485-2199, 22 February 2008). The
court in that case decided that before a TAC can be set under section 13, the Minister
must be provided with an estimate of both current biomass and the biomass that can
produce the maximum sustainable yield (MSY).
85
Since the Act came into force, various management strategies—all consistent with the
concept of MSY—have been pursued, some using modelled estimates of biomass
levels and others using alternative indicators of the relative state of the stocks. Some
of the alternative indicators have direct links to MSY. In other cases the links are
inferred. These alternative approaches are commonly used in fish stocks where
information on biomass is not readily available. This is the case for the majority of
New Zealand’s 629 quota management stocks and is the norm internationally, being
commonly used in jurisdictions with similar regimes such as Australia, the United
States, and Canada.
86
The amendments will enable TACs to continue to be set under section 13 using
existing management approaches where the current biomass and the biomass that can
produce a MSY are not able to be estimated reliably.
87
In effect, considerations in decision-making should not change (this is the intention of
the amendment), but advice on the setting and variation of TACs under section 13 will
need to identify which subsection should be used to provide the proper criteria for the
decisions. This will depend on whether biomass estimates now required by the
existing section 13(2) are available for the particular stock in question.
Allocation of the TAC
88
The Minister is required to make allowances for different fishing interests under
sections 20 and 21 of the Act. The Minister makes a separate decision about allocation
after setting the TAC. In setting or varying the TACC under section 20, and thus
establishing the commercial share, the Minister must allow for Mäori customary noncommercial fishing interests, recreational interests and all other mortality to that stock
caused by fishing under section 21; these will be discussed below.
Discretion to allocate TAC
89
The Minister, on each occasion [he or she] reconsiders allocation of the TAC for that
stock, has the discretion to determine, on a case-by-case basis, how to allocate the
TAC. There is little statutory guidance on the apportionment of the TAC among sector
groups, either with respect to quantitative measure or prioritisation of allocation.
90
A conscious transfer of catch between sectors is a legitimate activity under the Act.
An allocation decision that adversely affects ITQ holders but which advantages –
deliberately or incidentally – non-commercial interests is not in itself outside, or
contrary to, the purpose of the Act.
20
91
The appropriate allocation is a matter for the Minister’s assessment bearing in mind
all relevant considerations on each occasion [he or she] revisits the issue. The
allocation of the TAC can be changed under various circumstances, not just in relation
to a change in biomass. For example, the Minister is not precluded from giving extra
allowance to meet a greater recreational demand, subject to [his] obligation to weigh
carefully all the competing demands on the TAC before deciding how much should be
allocated to each sector group.
Customary allowance
92
The allowance made for customary fishing should satisfy customary interests, and
therefore the allowance should not constrain the level of customary catch taken. The
customary fishing regulations (Fisheries (South Island Customary Fishing)
Regulations 1999 and the Fisheries (Kaimoana Customary Fishing) Regulations 1998)
do not provide for the Crown to place limitations on customary fishing, apart from to
ensure the sustainability of a particular stock. Customary take is regulated through the
authorisation system in the customary regulations, which requires that all customary
fishing is to be undertaken in accordance with tikanga and the overall sustainability of
the fishery.
93
In most cases, there is little information on customary fishing, although this will
improve as customary regulations take effect and better reporting processes are
implemented.
94
In the meantime, setting appropriate customary allowances is difficult. MFish has
adopted a policy that bases the customary allowance on the recreational allowance,
such that:
•
The allowance is set at (and in some cases above) the recreational allowance
for species of importance to customary users;
•
The allowance is set at half the recreational allowance for species known to be
taken by customary fishers but are not of importance; and
•
No specific allowance is provided where there is no known customary catch of
a species.
95
By following this approach, it is unlikely that customary take would ever exceed the
allowance. Customary allowances may well be reduced if the Minister is confident
that actual customary take will remain within the revised allowance.
96
In response to submissions on the 2006 IPPs, MFish agreed that it may be possible to
more accurately determine customary Maori interest in specific fisheries. MFish is
undertaking an examination on the way in which customary allocations are derived
and to produce guidelines on how this may be better achieved over the medium term.
This work is at a preliminary stage and no outputs are available to influence
customary allowances at this time.
Recreational allowance and the commercial allocation
97
Prior to setting the TACC, the Minister must also allow for recreational interests in
the stock – an allowance must be made for recreational fishers where demand exists.
21
However, there is no requirement to provide for recreational demand in full, nor does
the recreational allowance take priority over the commercial allowance.
98
In terms of those considerations the Minister is to take into account, MFish notes that
s 8 of the Act, in the context of utilisation of fisheries resources, refers explicitly to
the Act enabling people to provide for their social, economic and cultural wellbeing.
99
Outlined below are descriptions of some of the relevant considerations that may be
taken into account when allocating a TAC. This is not an exhaustive list. MFish
considers that those factors which may be relevant to the exercise of the Minister’s
discretion, in addition to the principles specified in s 5 (international law and
Settlement Act obligations), s 8 (purpose statement), s 9 (environmental principles)
and s 10 (information principles) of the Act, include, but are not limited to:
a)
the characteristics and current status of stock;
b)
the existing allocations;
c)
current catch levels;
d)
previous decisions;
e)
equity of allocation – notion of “shared pain” when stock declines / “shared
benefit” when stock rebuilds;
f)
participation levels and importance of the resource, including customary
values;
g)
population trends;
h)
the extent to which people’s social, economic and cultural well-being will be
satisfied, both directly and indirectly;
i)
assessment of relative value of resource to respective sectors;
j)
current and past fishing practices (including overfishing, voluntary shelving or
closures by a stakeholder);
k)
investment and initiatives undertaken to develop or enhance the resource;
l)
impact on ability of sector to take allocation provided;
m)
customary fishing rights (as confirmed by the Settlement), recreational fishers
common law fishing rights, and commercial fishers property rights as quota
holders;
n)
economic impact of allocative decisions;
o)
social and cultural impact of decisions;
p)
recreational fishers’ common law right to fish, subject to statutory limitations;
and
22
q)
100
any loss of access to particular species.
Information about the current status of the stock relative to the statutory target level,
existing catch levels, existing allowances and catch levels, plus previous decisions
may be informative of the actions that need to be taken.
Proportional vs reallocative
101
Where the TAC is reduced, either TACCs and/or other allowances must also be
reduced. There is no statutory obligation to undertake a proportional reduction
between recreational and commercial interests.
102
The Act assigns no priority between commercial and recreational interests, except to
the extent that customary and recreational non-commercial interests must be provided
for to some degree where they exist. Within that framework, the Act permits the
preference of one sector to the disadvantage of another; for example to provide for
greater allowance for recreational interests in proportion to the commercial allocation.
103
Notwithstanding the Minister’s discretion to allocate catch, case law also considers
that it is not unreasonable for commercial and recreational fishers to share some of the
“pain” from a reduction in the TAC. There is no requirement that the interests of
recreational or commercial fishers must be fully provided for.
104
MFish considers in situations where there is an absence of information about the
relative benefits to be derived from allocating a stock to one or other sector then it is
equitable for both commercial and recreational fishers to ensure the sustainability of
the stock through a reduction in the TACC and recreational allowance (along with the
implementation of commensurate to effect a reduction in catch – such as bag limit
reductions). Equally, commercial and recreational fishers should derive shared benefit
from the rebuild of a fishery in terms of the allocation provided to the respective
sectors, all other things being equal.
Monitoring allowances
105
If the TAC is reduced, the Minister should take reasonable steps to monitor the
customary and recreational allowances so as to ensure that the level of harvest is
within those allowances. To fail to do so provides a risk that any reduction to those
allowances, and also the TAC, could be rendered futile.
Ability to take allocation
106
Consideration should also be given to the ability of a sector to take the allowance
provided. Impediments may exist that preclude the sector from exercising the full
extent of their entitlement. Tools are available in the Act that enhance the ability of
different sectors to exercise their right to fish. As well as implementing specific
measures in support of allocative decisions, caution should be taken to ensure that a
decision does result in a sector being precluded from being able to take the allowance
allocated.
23
Enhancement
107
Logically those parties who are responsible for the enhancement of a resource should
receive the benefit of the activity. However, the ability to ascertain the increased yield
from a fishery as a result of enhancement activities and hence the extent of the
allocation provided to the sector is problematic. The development of a fishery
resource involves demonstrating through research and/or monitoring that an increase
of catch from existing and new fisheries is sustainable. It is generally assumed that the
development will occur as a result of a structured deliberate initiative. It may be
possible for any one sector to develop a fishery. In such situations, it may be
desirable for the sector that undertakes the development of a fishery to be entitled to
be allocated the benefits of that development.
Population trends
108
Population trends are reflected in the level of recreational fishing undertaken, both on
a national and regional context. The growth of urban centres, in particular Auckland,
have a significant impact on particular fisheries. An allowance for the recreational
interest and the corresponding management controls for a stock could take into
account existing population distribution and growth. Hence where a greater
recreational demand arises the Minister is not precluded by any proportional rule from
providing an increased allowance to the recreational entitlement subject to weighing
all competing demands on the TAC (see New Zealand Fishing Industry Association
(Inc) and Ors v Minister of Fisheries and Ors (CA82/97, 22/7/97) page 18).
Value
109
The Minister is required to allocate the TAC in order to enable people to provide for
their social, economic and cultural wellbeing. An assessment of value is important to
determine the wellbeing that will flow from any allocation decision. Where one sector
values a resource more than other sectors, an allocation of the resource in favour of
that sector is likely have a greater positive effect on the well-being of the participants
in that sector (than an alternative allocation approach).
110
Certain fisheries are considered to be of particular value or importance to fishers.
In considering the extent of the recreational and Mäori customary allowance it is
appropriate to consider the nature of the species and the importance of the species to
fishers. For example the recreational sector may place a particularly high value on
some species of sports fish.The abundance of a species, and the availability of
particular size fish for a specific stakeholder group, may be factors relevant to the
Minister’s decision.
111
MFish notes that it is difficult to quantify the relative value of a resource to each
sector. However, when considering value, a broad and inclusive concept of value is
appropriate. The value attributed to a resource is not limited solely to financial value
but a range of non-market, or qualitative, values.
Impact of overfishing
112
Overfishing of a TAC may result in the subsequent reduction of that TAC.
Reported overfishing by individual commercial fishers is subject to existing controls
24
under the Act. The consistent overfishing of the TACC or an allowance, which results
in the reduction of the TAC, as a general principle, ought to be attributed to the
stakeholder group responsible for the overfishing.
Undercatch of allowance
113
Stakeholders may elect to exercise their fishing rights in a manner, which results in
their allocation in a fishery being undercaught. Voluntary closures and shelving of
allocation may be undertaken as a means of improving the abundance of a species and
the availability of certain sized fish. Such methods may improve recruitment. In the
absence of explicit shares in a fishery, any subsequent increase in the TAC as a result
of such methods would be available to all stakeholders. Stakeholders are not immune
from any subsequent decrease in the TAC for sustainability purposes simply on the
basis of the previous undercatch of their allowance.
114
The Act does explicitly recognise underfishing rights of commercial fishers.
Where the person holding annual catch entitlement for a stock (not the owner of the
ITQ) undercatches the extent of their entitlement, the person may carry forward the
extent of the undercatch to the second fishing year up to a maximum of 10% of the
total Annual Catch Entitlement (ACE) they held in the first fishing year. The carry
forward of underfishing rights does not apply when the TACC is reduced in the
second fishing year (s 67A(2)(b)).
Analysis of impacts
115
A variation of the TACC and recreational and customary allowances may have
significant social, cultural and economic implications for stakeholders and
consequential downstream economic activity. In New Zealand Fishing Industry
Association (Inc) and Ors v Minister of Fisheries and Ors (CA82/97, 22/7/97), the
Court of Appeal noted that where a decision with major economic impact is
considered necessary the rationale for that decision should be clearly transparent.
Those affected ought to be able to establish that all other reasonable possibilities were
analysed and that the decision adopted was the preferable option.
116
In reducing a TACC, the Minister should carefully weigh the economic impact of any
such action on individual quota owners, those fishers dependent on obtaining annual
catch entitlement, and on the QMS generally. However, the reduction of the TACC is
not rendered unlawful simply on the basis that the decision adversely impacts the
property right inherent in the QMS. In the context of fisheries legislation, a property
right constitutes a right to harvest, which is subject to the Minister’s statutory powers.
Accordingly, MFish considers that financial security of a property right is a valid but
not irrefutable consideration in the context of the Minister’s TAC/allocative decisions.
117
The actual financial costs associated with allocative decisions are to be assessed
according to the nature of the fishery. Downstream impacts may result as a
consequence of allocative decisions made in respect of both recreational and
commercial stakeholders. In addition to the commercial harvesting and processing
sector a significant number of service industries are linked to the fishing industry,
including charter operators, sale of fishing gear, repair and transport related services.
Decisions may also impact on particular communities where the fishing and fishing
related services provide a significant contribution to a local economy.
25
118
A cost benefit analysis is designed to act as a tool for deriving the most efficient and
productive solution. In itself such an analysis is not intended to impose a barrier to
implementing measures considered necessary for fisheries management purposes.
In many instances MFish does not have access to the information necessary for a
detailed cost benefit analysis to be undertaken. Invariably it is the stakeholders
concerned who hold the relevant information. MFish requests that stakeholders
provide relevant information in the course of their submissions to the Minister on
management proposals. MFish endeavours to undertake a cost benefit analysis, to the
extent possible with the available information, where there is likely to be a significant
impact for a proposed decision
All other fishing-related mortality
119
An allowance can be made for any mortality to a stock that results from fishing. This
includes illegal catch, discards and incidental mortality from fishing gear. Often, little
quantitative information is available to assess the level of fishing-related mortality,
although inferences can be drawn from the impact associated with a particular
method, or information from similar stocks or species.
120
Where quantitative estimates of other sources of fishing-related mortality are
available, this is used as the basis for determining the allowance. If no estimates are
available, but other sources of mortality are known to occur based on information
from similar stocks or methods, then MFish generally recommends a nominal
allowance. If there is no known mortality, then no allowance is made.
121
Where it is possible to determine the fishing-related mortality caused by a sector
group (for example the incidental mortality related to a specific type of fishing gear
used by a particular sector) then the fishing-related mortality attributable to that sector
should be deducted from the allowance for that sector. Where this is not possible an
estimate of other sources of fishing related mortality should be deducted from the
TAC.
26
Section Two
Final Advice Papers
27
ORANGE ROUGHY (ORH 3B) - FINAL ADVICE
Figure 1: Quota Management Area (QMA) and sub-stock boundaries for ORH 3B
Executive Summary
1
ORH 3B is a large and spatially complex fishery, comprised of several biological
stocks. 1 A range of sub-stock catch limits are managed under a voluntary agreement
by the Deepwater Group (DWG) which represents the owners of 97.95% of the ORH
3B quota. Monthly reports on catch by sub-stock and sub-area are provided to MFish.
2
The status of the individual sub-stocks that make up ORH 3B (Figure 1) are evaluated
independently, with the results compiled to determine the status of ORH 3B as a
whole. No new stock assessment information is available for the Northwest Chatham
Rise, Puysegur or the Sub-Antarctic portion of ORH 3B in 2008. 2 The most recent
(2006) assessment of the Northwest Chatham Rise estimated that the biomass was
likely to be below the biomass that can produce the maximum sustainable yield
(BMSY); Puysegur remains voluntarily closed in recognition that it is likely to be below
BMSY; and there is no information on the status of the remainder of the Sub-Antarctic
portion of ORH 3B.
B
3
The 2008 Plenary agreed that the 2004 and 2006 model-based stock assessments for
the East and the South Chatham Rise are not reliable. These assessments were set
aside and existing survey and fishery information was assembled and analysed to
1
To avoid confusion, unless otherwise clarified in the text ‘stock’ refers to the QMA management unit; ‘substock’ or ‘biological stock’ refers to a biologically or geographically distinct orange roughy population; and the
term ‘sub-area component’ is used where it is necessary to consider areas within sub-stock boundaries.
2
The Arrow Plateau is closed to bottom trawling by regulation under the Benthic Protected Area (BPA)
initiative.
28
evaluate the stock structure and status of the East and South Chatham Rise portion of
ORH 3B.
4
The Plenary concluded that for the East and South Chatham Rise:
•
The orange roughy found on this part of the Chatham Rise comprise a single
biological stock;
•
The unfished biomass (B0) was estimated to be 300,000 - 450,000 t;
•
The best estimate of Bcurrent is 98,000 tonnes;
•
Current mature biomass (Bcurrent) is between 15 and 30% B0; 3
•
The sub-stock is most likely below the management target (30% B0).
5
Combining the best available estimates of Bcurrent and B0 for the Northwest Chatham
Rise, the East and South Chatham Rise and Puysegur suggests a B0 of the order of
450,000 t and a Bcurrent of the order of 105,000 t. On this basis the assessed portion of
ORH 3B is probably of the order of 23% B0. BMSY for orange roughy stocks is
estimated to be 30% B0.
6
While there is no information on the status of the Sub-Antarctic portion of ORH 3B
apart from Puysegur, this part of the QMA contributes only a small percentage of the
biomass of ORH 3B as a whole. Based on a simple spatial analysis of the total orange
roughy catch from ORH 3B since the fishery began, the sub-stocks for which stock
assessments have been undertaken have provided approximately 95-96% of the total
orange roughy biomass taken from ORH 3B. It is not credible that the portions of
ORH 3B that have not been assessed could contain sufficient orange roughy biomass
to lift the stock as a whole to, or above, BMSY. Based on the best available
information for each of the sub-stocks, the ORH 3B stock as a whole is likely to be
below BMSY.
7
As no new stock assessment information is available for the Northwest Rise or the
Sub-Antarctic portion of the QMA, the Ministry of Fisheries (MFish) is not proposing
to change the management of these parts of ORH 3B at this time. However a new
management strategy is proposed for the East and South Chatham Rise.
8
The strategy is based on setting a catch limit based on the fishing mortality rate (F) 4
that will result in the sub-stock fluctuating around the biomass that will support the
maximum sustainable yield (FMSY). On the basis of the best available information, the
FMSY-based yield is 4,410 t. This represents a 3,240 t reduction from the current
catch. However, once established, and fully implemented, the strategy is likely to
result in relatively small annual variations to the catch limit on the East and South
Chatham Rise
3
Estimates of B0 and Bcurrent have been derived in different ways - B0 from previous stock assessments and
Bcurrent using the estimated spawning biomass and the percentage of mature fish that spawn each year. In
determining that the stock was likely between 15 and 30% B0 the Plenary considered all available information
rather than just the best estimates of Bcurrent and B0.
4
The fishing mortality rate is the amount of fish that die each year due to fishing.
B
B
29
9
In making your determination on the TAC for ORH 3B, you must consider the way
and rate that the ORH 3B stock is rebuilt. As the proposed reduction in the TAC
would all be deducted from the East and South Chatham Rise catch limit, the focus of
your way and rate decision relates to the timeframe over which the East and South
Chatham Rise catch limit is reduced to the FMSY-based yield estimate to initiate a
rebuild of this part of the ORH 3B stock.
10
MFish does not consider that retaining the status quo is appropriate. Given the low
productivity of orange roughy stocks the biomass of the sub-stock is likely to continue
to decline further below BMSY under the existing management settings. MFish does
also not support an option of reducing the catch limit to 4,410 t in one year. This
would impose a significant economic cost to the Industry over a short timeframe. It
would also limit the flexibility to incorporate better information used to define the
FMSY-based yield estimate.
11
MFish considers it appropriate to consider a staged implementation of the new
strategy whereby successive annual catch limit reductions would be taken until the
FMSY-based yield is reached. Such a staged approach recognises that the FMSY-based
yield estimate will be refined over time. The IPP proposed two options to reach the
target catch limit of 4,410 tonnes by:
Option 1)
Reducing the catch limit by 1,080 tonnes for each of three years;
Option 2)
Reducing the catch limit by 1,620 tonnes for each of two years.
As new information better defines the estimate of current biomass each year, the
target catch limit for the East and South Chatham Rise will change. The size of the
catch limit reductions in the second and third year of IPP Option 1, and the second
year of IPP Option 2, will be altered to accommodate these changes ensuring that the
refined catch limit is reached within the specified timeframes.
12
Support for each of these options from submitters was essentially split by interest
group. All Industry submissions supported the three year option and all submissions
from environmental groups supported IPP Option 2 or greater reductions than those
included in this option.
13
After considering submissions MFish recommends that you adopt a three year
introduction timeframe (IPP Option 1). The primary reasons for this position are:
14
•
MFish does not consider that the three year option will create an unacceptable
sustainability risk for the ORH 3B stock;
•
There will be a greater economic impact on the Industry under the two year
option;
•
A three year implementation timeframe will provide greater flexibility to
incorporate changes to the FMSY-based yield estimates as new information on
current biomass becomes available.
The paper includes the following sections:
i)
Summary of options in the IPP and the MFish recommended option;
30
ii)
Details of consultation and summary of submitters’ views;
iii)
A summary of the science review of the status and structure of the East and
South Chatham Rise sub-stock undertaken in 2007-08;
iv)
An overview of the proposed management strategy and implementation;
v)
Rationale for the management options included in the IPP;
vi)
Assessment of management options against statutory requirements.
Summary of Options
15
The existing management arrangements are summarised in the table below.
ORH 3B
Sub-Areas
Northwest Chatham Rise
East and South Chatham Rise
East Chatham Rise
Spawning Box (Jun-Aug)
Northeast Chatham Rise
Southeast Chatham Rise
South Chatham Rise
Puysegur
Arrow Plateau (BPA)
Sub-Antarctic
Feature limit
Research survey allowance
TACC
Other sources of fishing
related mortality
TAC
31
Existing catch
limits (t)
750
7650
(Maximum) 6500
3200
1650
1650
(Maximum) 1750
0
0
1850
500
250
10500
525
11025
16
The management options for the 2008-09 fishing year that were proposed in the IPP
are summarised in the table below. The options represent a staged transition to the
new FMSY-based strategy whereby successive annual catch limit reductions would be
taken until the FMSY-based yield is reached. Such a staged approach recognises that
the FMSY-based yield estimate will be refined over time. The two options proposed
were based on reaching a target catch limit of 4,410 tonnes by:
Option 1)
Reducing the catch limit by 1,080 tonnes for each of three years
Option 2)
Reducing the catch limit by 1,620 tonnes for each of two years
ORH 3B
Sub-Areas
Northwest Chatham Rise
East and South Chatham Rise
Puysegur
Arrow Plateau (BPA)
Sub-Antarctic
Feature limit
Research survey allowance
TACC
Other sources of fishing
related mortality
TAC
Catch limits (t) under
IPP option 1
750
6570
0
0
1850
500
250
9420
Catch limits (t) under
IPP option 2
750
6030
0
0
1850
500
250
8880
470
445
9890
9325
MFish recommended option (IPP option 1)
17
Under this option the catch limit for the East and South Chatham Rise would be
reduced by 14%, or 1,080 t. Arrangements under this proposal would be to:
AGREE to
a)
i)
Reduce the TAC for ORH 3B from 11,025 tonnes to 9,890 t and the
TACC from 10,500 tonnes to 9,420 tonnes; and
ii)
Set an allowance of 470 t for other sources of fishing related mortality;
and
iii)
Retain zero allowances within the TAC for customary Maori and
recreational fishing interests;
AND
b)
Request that Industry implement the following sub-stock catch limits within
the TACC:
i)
East and South Chatham Rise be reduced to 6,570 t;
ii)
Catch limits for the Northwest Chatham Rise, Arrow Plateau, Puysegur
and Sub-Antarctic sub-areas remain unchanged and the 500 t feature
limits in the Sub-Antarctic sub-area remain in place;
iii)
Retain a catch limit of 250 t for Industry research surveys;
AND
32
c)
Request that Industry continue to spread catch across ORH 3B and continue to
monitor catch against voluntary catch limits;
AND
d)
Request that Industry confirm the voluntary agreement on catch limits within
ORH 3B and;
•
continue to submit annual updates and specific DWG annual
agreements that pertain to the ORH 3B fishery to MFish;
•
continue to submit monthly monitoring reports pertaining to catch
levels by both sub-stock and sub-area to MFish;
•
continue to notify MFish when catch reaches 80% of the sub-stock and
sub-area limits, and notify MFish when any limit has been reached.
NOTE that
a)
This decision initiates a three year staged transition to an FMSY-based harvest
strategy for the East and South Chatham Rise whereby the annual catch limit is
4.5% of the best available estimate of current biomass.
b)
Further TAC changes will be necessary to alter the catch limit for the East and
South Chatham Rise to the FMSY-based yield over 3 years. The quantum of the
necessary catch limit changes will be derived annually and you will be
provided with management advice for 1 October 2009 and 1 October 2010.
c)
When fully implemented the FMSY-based harvest strategy will embed the
method of calculating the recommended annual catch limit for the East and
South Chatham Rise.
Consultation
18
Your decision whether or not to adjust the TAC for ORH 3B is a decision under
section 13(2)-(4) of the Act and therefore the consultation requirements of section 12
apply. Further, in respect of your decision whether or not to adjust the TACC for
ORH 3B, the consultation requirements set out in section 21(2) apply.
19
Consultation on the IPP was undertaken with such persons or organisations
representative of those classes of persons having an interest in the stock or the effects
of fishing on the aquatic environment in the area concerned, including Mäori,
environmental, commercial, and recreational interests. During the consultation period
discussions were held with both Industry and ENGO representatives to explain the
proposed harvest strategy for the East and South Chatham Rise.
Submissions Received
20
Submissions regarding this proposal were received from:
•
Deepwater Group Ltd. (DWG);
•
Environment and Conservation Organisations of NZ Inc. (ECO);
33
21
•
New Zealand Seafood Industry Council Ltd. (SeaFIC);
•
Royal Forest and Bird Protection Society of New Zealand Inc (Forest & Bird);
•
Sanford Ltd. (Sanford).
While little new information was provided through the submission process, clear
positions were established as to submitters’ preferred options. The views expressed
by submitters fall into two broad categories – that taken by Industry and that by the
environmental non-government organisations (ENGOs). It is of note however that the
preferred options for each of these stakeholder groups are significantly closer than in
previous years. Specific TAC and catch spreading arrangements supported by
submitters are summarised in the table below.
Status
quo
Sub-stocks and subarea component
Industry
Environmental NGOs
DWG,
SeaFIC
and
Sanford
(option 1)
F&B
(optio
n 2)
ECO
750
750
750 t
410 t
7,650
6,500
(max)
3,200
1,650
1,650
1,750
(max)
0t
6,570
------
6,030
-50%
(max)
----
0t
0t
Under
6,000 t
-3,000 t
(max)
---0t
Arrow Plateau
0t
0t
0t
0t
Sub-Antarctic
Feature limit
1,850 t
500 t
1,850 t
500 t
1,850 t
500 t
Research survey
allowance
TACC
TAC
250 t
250 t
250 t
1,300 t
100150 t
250 t
10,500
11,025
9,420
9,890
8,880 t
9,325 t
7,960 t
8,405 t
Northwest Chatham
Rise
East and South
Chatham Rise
East Chatham Rise
Spawning box
NE Chatham Rise
Southeast Chatham Rise
South Chatham Rise
Puysegur
22
All submitters either explicitly or implicitly support the rejection of the model-based
stock assessments for the East and South Chatham Rise and adoption of the proposed
FMSY-based harvest strategy.
23
Industry submitters (DWG, Sanford and SeaFIC) all support a three year reduction to
the FMSY-based catch limit (IPP Option 1). ENGO submitters on the other hand
support a faster reduction with Forest & Bird supporting IPP Option 2 and ECO
supporting a greater reduction to the catch limit for the East and South Chatham Rise
than that proposed under this option.
24
All submitters apart from ECO support the status quo for the other sub-stocks that
make up ORH 3B. ECO supports reductions to the catch limits on the Northwest
Chatham Rise and the Sub-Antarctic.
25
Both Forest & Bird and ECO consider that environmental effects were not adequately
addressed in the IPP, particularly in relation to the impact of bottom trawling on
34
benthic organisms and assemblages. Forest & Bird also expressed concern at fish and
shark bycatch and requested that the FAP include information on the International
Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) threat status of these bycatch species
(Appendix 4).
26
Specific comments provided by submitters are included where relevant in the body of
the FAP.
Background
Science review
27
The MFish Chief Scientist briefed you in September 2007 on the status of Chatham
Rise orange roughy. This briefing described the 2004 and 2006 model-based stock
assessments for the East and the South Chatham Rise as “not credible” and concluded
that:
“The Chief Scientist, along with many other members of the FAWG [Deepwater
Fisheries Assessment Working Group], believes it is time to abandon the [previous]
models for the East Chatham Rise and the South Chatham Rise as the key assessment
and management tools, and to instead focus on model-independent analyses of the
data at hand”.
28
In your decision letter on sustainability measures introduced on 1 October 2007, you
requested that existing survey and fishery information be assembled and analysed to
“provide a more credible evaluation of the status of the East and South Chatham Rise
orange roughy stocks”. This work was undertaken and presented to the 2008 Plenary.
Sub-stock structure
29
Before reviewing stock status, the sub-stock structure of orange roughy on the
Chatham Rise was comprehensively reviewed. The approach evaluated all available
data including: catch distribution and catch per unit effort (CPUE) patterns; location
of spawning and nursery areas; inferred migrations; size, maturity and condition data;
genetic studies; and habitat and natural boundaries.
30
The Plenary agreed that it is most likely that the Northwest Chatham Rise is a separate
biological stock, and that the East and South Chatham Rise is a single biological
stock. This represents a change from the previous stock assessment boundaries that
partitioned the East and South Chatham Rise into four sub-area components: the
Spawning Box and Eastern Flats, the Northeast Hills, the Andes, and the South
Chatham Rise.
31
Spatial partitioning of the ORH 3B stock used in this paper reflects the stock structure
agreed by the Plenary in 2008 and is shown in Figure 1.
Stock status
32
The status of the Northwest Chatham Rise, Puysegur and Sub-Antarctic components
of the ORH 3B stock were not reviewed by either the FAWG or the Plenary in 2008
35
and the Arrow Plateau is closed to bottom trawling under the Benthic Protected Areas
(BPA) initiative.
33
The Plenary Report states that the previous stock assessments for the East and South
Chatham Rise are no longer considered reliable for two reasons. First, the accepted
stock structure for this part of the Chatham Rise has changed and second, that the
rebuild predicted by those assessments was largely driven by model assumptions
about incoming recruitment, rather than actual data.
34
Analyses of the main observational data were reviewed by the Plenary to draw
conclusions on the likely status of this sub-stock. The data considered included:
research trawl surveys; acoustic surveys of the Plume and background areas; catch
patterns; and standardised CPUE. The main conclusions of the 2008 Plenary
regarding the East and South Chatham Rise are:
a. The unfished biomass (B0) is estimated to have been between 300,000 t and
450,000 t;
b. The spawning stock was likely to have been reduced to 30% of this level by the
early 1990s. There is no clear evidence of rebuilding after the early 1990s;
instead, there are indications that it may have continued to be reduced in size due
to fishing;
c. The current estimate of the status of the sub-stock is most likely below the
management target (30% B0);
d. The best estimate of Bcurrent is 98,000 tonnes;
e. The current total mature biomass (Bcurrent) is thought to be between 15% and 30%
B0. 5
B
35
The Plenary Report concludes that the East and South Chatham Rise sub-stock is
likely to have been fished to below BMSY and that the current fishing mortality rate (F)
is continuing to fish down the sub-stock. With the rejection of the existing stock
assessment models for the East and South Chatham Rise, a new strategy for managing
this fishery is required.
The proposed management strategy for the East and South
Chatham Rise
36
The proposed new management strategy is based on setting a catch limit based on the
fishing mortality (F) that, if applied constantly, would result in the maximum
sustainable yield (FMSY). Under this FMSY-based management strategy, the same
proportion of the biomass will be taken from the East and South Chatham Rise substock each year. If the sub-stock is above BMSY, the amount taken will be higher than
if the sub-stock was below BMSY, resulting in the sub-stock being fished down
5
Estimates of B0 and Bcurrent have been derived in different ways - B0 from previous stock assessments and
Bcurrent using the estimated spawning biomass and the percentage of mature fish that spawn each year. In
determining that the stock was likely between 15 and 30% B0 the Plenary considered all available information
rather than just the best estimates of Bcurrent and B0.
B
B
36
towards the target level. Conversely, if the sub-stock is below BMSY the amount taken
will be lower, allowing the sub-stock to rebuild. 6
37
38
The strategy will embed the method of calculating the recommended annual catch
limit for the East and South Chatham Rise. The three step process for determining the
catch limit under the FMSY-based strategy is summarised as follows:
i)
The biomass of spawning fish on the East and South Chatham Rise is
estimated by summing the best available estimates of the biomass of
known spawning aggregations across the East and South Chatham Rise
(Bspawn);
ii)
Bspawn is multiplied by the best available estimate of the percentage of
fish that spawn every year (the multiplier) to estimate current biomass
(Bcurrent);
iii)
Bcurrent is multiplied by FMSY to determine the catch limit.
B
B
There are four key components to the FMSY strategy:
i)
An estimate of FMSY;
ii)
An annual estimate of current biomass (Bcurrent);
iii)
A research programme to better inform the Bcurrent estimate;
iv)
A Fisheries Plan.
Estimating FMSY
39
An estimate of FMSY equal to the level of natural mortality (M) has been proposed for
implementing the proposed strategy for the East and South Chatham Rise. This
approach accords with international best practice and is consistent with the draft
Harvest Strategy Standard, which has been consulted on with stakeholders.
Estimating Bcurrent
40
Annual estimates of Bcurrent will be determined by the FAWG and presented at the
Plenary.
41
The best estimate of Bcurrent available is derived by scaling up the estimated spawning
biomass (Bspawn) by the proportion of the mature biomass that joins the spawning
aggregations each year (the multiplier).
42
Spawning is known to occur primarily in the Plume with additional smaller spawning
aggregations forming in other localities across the East and South Chatham Rise. An
acoustic survey of the Plume is undertaken annually to provide an estimate of
spawning biomass on this part of the Chatham Rise. Estimates of spawning biomass
in other areas of the East and South Chatham Rise have been derived from existing
survey data. These data have been collected sporadically and the estimates are less
6
This is the case provided that the stock has not been reduced to a level where ‘depensatory effects’ are evident.
Depensatory effects occur when a population level becomes very low, and may include fundamental changes in
the biology or behaviour of the species, such as the inability to spawn or the inability of individuals to find
mates. This effect inhibits a population from rebuilding back to former levels.
37
well defined at this time. The best estimate of spawning biomass is obtained by
summing the best estimates of biomass from all known spawning aggregations.
43
There have been a number of studies, both in New Zealand and elsewhere, that have
considered the percentage of mature orange roughy that spawn each year. A range for
the multiplier has been derived from a review of the available studies.
Research programme to better define Bcurrent
44
While there is an accepted estimate of spawning biomass in the Plume, there remains
considerable uncertainty surrounding the spawning biomass in other parts of the East
and South Chatham Rise. There is also uncertainty as to the proportion of mature
orange roughy that spawn each year. A research plan designed to reduce key areas of
uncertainty in the estimates of spawning biomass and the multiplier is a key
component of the management strategy.
Fisheries Plan
45
A Fisheries Plan for the East and South Rise orange roughy fishery is being developed
by MFish in consultation with Industry and ENGO representatives. Initial meetings
have already been held with each of these sector groups.
46
The Fisheries Plan contemplates a more transparent and straightforward management
process. It will set out the management objectives, the key elements of the
management strategy and the supporting research, information and monitoring
requirements.
47
Dependent on your decision, the Plan will explicitly prescribe the management
transition to full implementation of the FMSY-based approach. This will ensure that all
parties understand the rationale, what changes are required and when these will be
introduced.
Summary
48
In summary the best available information estimates that the current biomass of
orange roughy on the East and South Chatham Rise is below BMSY; and the current
fishing mortality rate (Fcurrent) is above FMSY. It is now time to put in place a longterm, sustainable management strategy for the East and South Chatham Rise orange
roughy fishery. MFish proposes to embed in the fisheries plan a strategy to determine
catch limits for the East and South Chatham Rise by setting the fishing mortality rate
(F) to a level that will result in the biomass of the sub-stock averaging the biomass
that can support the maximum sustainable yield over the long term (FMSY).
49
Your decision for the 2008-09 fishing year represents the first step in the transition to
an FMSY-based approach.
38
Rationale for proposed management options
Status of the East and South Chatham Rise sub-stock
50
The Plenary has considered the location of stock assessment and management
boundaries on the Chatham Rise and has agreed that the East and South Chatham Rise
should be considered as a single sub-stock. Both options reflect the revised stock
structure with no distinction made between the East Chatham Rise and the South
Chatham Rise.
51
The Plenary concluded that the East and South Chatham Rise sub-stock is likely to be
below the management target of 30% B0, and therefore needs to be rebuilt. Setting
the catch limit through the application of an FMSY approach (by setting the catch limit
equal to FMSY multiplied by the current biomass) will effect this rebuild. Management
options proposed in the IPP initiate a transition to such an FMSY–based approach over
two or three years.
52
The Plenary agreed that it was appropriate to estimate current biomass (Bcurrent) by
collating the best available information on the size of the current spawning biomass
across the East and South Chatham Rise and scaling this figure up by the ratio of total
mature biomass to spawning biomass (the multiplier) considered typical of orange
roughy stocks. An appropriate range for the multiplier was derived from a literature
search. Although acknowledging uncertainty in both the estimates of current
spawning biomass and the multiplier, the Plenary agreed that, based on the best
available information, Bcurrent was likely to be in the range 15 to 30% B0 with a best
estimate of 98,000 t.
53
Of the two submissions that commented on the status of the sub-stock both SeaFIC
and ECO acknowledge that for orange roughy BMSY is currently assumed to be
30%B0. SeaFIC agrees with the likely range of 15-30% B0 and the statements that
current biomass is likely or probably below BMSY. ECO considers that the sub-stock
is likely to be closer to 20% than 30% B0.
Management strategy settings
54
The FMSY-based approach has been discussed with fisheries scientists, Industry and
environmental NGO representatives. Feedback received to date suggests a broad level
of support for the approach and no submissions were received opposing its
implementation. SeaFIC notes that although your decision this year will initiate a
transition to an FMSY-based harvest strategy for the East and South Chatham Rise,
further details of the operation of the strategy will be developed and implemented
through a fisheries plan. SeaFIC considers that clarification of how the strategy will
be implemented through the fisheries plan process is critical to provide stability and
certainty for stakeholders.
55
A key component of the strategy is the definition of FMSY. The IPP proposed setting
FMSY equal to the natural mortality (M). This position is supported by MFish Science
and submissions from SeaFIC, Sanford and DWG. Discussions with ECO and Forest
& Bird suggest their support for a more precautionary approach although no
alternative figures were provided through submissions. On the basis of scientific
advice that using FMSY equals M accords with international best practice and is
39
compatible with the draft Harvest Strategy Standard, it is considered appropriate that
M is used as a proxy for FMSY.
56
A research and monitoring programme is being developed to improve estimates of
Bcurrent by reducing uncertainty in both the estimates of spawning biomass and the
multiplier. As the results of this programme become available they will be reviewed
by the FAWG and the Plenary, enabling better estimation of Bcurrent, and FMSY-based
yield in future years. While there remains uncertainty surrounding the level of
sustainable catch that this process will ultimately settle on, it is clear that the
estimated sustainable catch will change as new information comes to hand.
B
Implementation of strategy
57
MFish does not consider that retaining the status quo is appropriate. Given the low
productivity of orange roughy stocks the biomass of the stock is likely to continue to
decline further below BMSY under the existing management settings.
58
MFish proposed in the IPP that an appropriate way and rate to move the sub-stock to
at or above the level that can produce MSY is to embark on a series of reductions until
the FMSY level is reached. Under IPP option 1 the catch limit will equal the FMSYbased yield estimate by 1 October 2010 (i.e. the catch limit will be reduced to the
FMSY-based yield estimate in three steps). IPP Option 2 will result in the catch limit
equalling the FMSY-based yield estimate by 1 October 2009 (i.e. the catch limit will be
reduced to the FMSY-based yield estimate in two steps).
59
The proposed reductions in the catch limit under both options are predicated on the
FMSY-based yield remaining at 4,410 t. As noted above the yield estimate is likely to
change as new information from the research programme comes to hand. The
adjustments to the catch limit on the East and South Chatham Rise in years two and
three (under the three year option) and year two (under the two year option) will be
revised each year to ensure that the catch limit equals the updated FMSY-based yield at
the end of the implementation timeframe.
60
The catch limit will remain above the FMSY-based yield until 1 October 2010 under
option 1 and until 1 October 2009 under option 2, and the East and South Chatham
Rise sub-stock is likely to continue to decline until the FMSY-based yield is met. In the
IPP MFish did not support an option of reducing the catch limit to 4,410 t in one year
on the basis that this would impose a significant economic cost to the Industry over a
short timeframe.
61
MFish proposes that the Bcurrent estimate used in calculating the appropriate catch limit
should generally be the average of the three most recent Bcurrent estimates. This will
smooth out annual fluctuations and is likely to result in smaller year to year variations
to the recommended catch limit on the East and South Chatham Rise.
40
Assessment of Management Options
Considerations at the stock (QMA) level
Total allowable catch
Section 13 (2)
62
ORH 3B is managed under section 13 of the Act which requires that you set a TAC
that will result in the stock being restored to or above, or maintains the stock at or
above, a level that can produce the maximum sustainable yield (BMSY 7 ).
63
Stock assessment information reported in the Fisheries Assessment Plenary (the
Plenary) considers ORH 3B by sub-stock – specifically the Northwest Chatham Rise,
the East and South Chatham Rise, and the Sub-Antarctic (Arrow Plateau, Puysegur,
Pukaki South and the remaining southern areas). The status of ORH 3B in relation to
BMSY is determined by considering the status of each sub-stock separately and then
combining these assessments together to get a picture of the stock as whole.
B
64
65
66
Status of the Northwest Chatham Rise sub-stock
The status of the Northwest Chatham Rise is based on the assessment conducted in
2006. The Plenary noted that this assessment is uncertain because the estimated status
of the Northwest Chatham Rise was strongly dependent on the CPUE data for the flat
areas and the extent to which these data index the entire sub-stock is unknown. Model
runs that included all data estimated that the biomass was below BMSY at 11% (range
8-16%) B0. Bcurrent was estimated to be 6,000 t (range 4,200-9,300 t) and B0 was
estimated as 55,000 t (range 51,400-59,500 t). In 2006 you decreased the catch limit
for the Northwest Chatham Rise from 1,500 to 750 tonnes, which was assessed to be
the level that would allow the sub-stock to rebuild.
Status of the East and South Chatham Rise sub-stock
While no new model-based assessments were available in 2008 the Plenary evaluated
the status of the East and South Chatham Rise sub-stock using available data sources.
The Plenary concluded that the sub-stock was likely to be below BMSY and in the
range 15-30% B0. Bcurrent was estimated to be 98,000 (48,000-168,000) and B0 was
estimated to be in the range 300,000 – 450,000 t. 8
Status of the Sub-Antarctic (including the Arrow Plateau) sub-stock
The Sub-Antarctic portion of ORH 3B consists of 10 areas. 9 The catch from each
area has varied over the years with only Priceless and North Pukaki still contributing
reasonable catches. To date the only Sub-Antarctic area for which a stock assessment
has been completed is Puysegur. The 2008 Plenary reported that the status of this
sub-stock remains unchanged from that accepted by the 1998 Plenary. That report
states that Bcurrent is estimated as being 1,100 t and B0 as 17,000 t. Puysegur remains
voluntarily closed in recognition that it is likely to be below BMSY at 7% B0.
7
BMSY for orange roughy stocks is estimated to be 30% B0.
Estimates of B0 and Bcurrent have been derived in different ways - B0 from previous stock assessments and
Bcurrent using the estimated spawning biomass and information on the percentage of mature fish that spawn each
year.
9
Auckland, Arrow, Antipodes, Priceless, North Pukaki, Bounty, Macquarie, Puysegur, Fiordland, and Snares.
8
B
41
67
Based on the best available information these sub-stocks are all below the biomass
that can support the maximum sustainable yield. Combining the best available
estimates of Bcurrent and B0 for the Northwest Chatham Rise, the East and South
Chatham Rise and Puysegur suggests a B0 of the order of 450,000 t and a Bcurrent of
the order of 105,000 t. On this basis the assessed portion of ORH 3B is probably of
the order of 23% B0. BMSY for orange roughy stocks is estimated to be 30% B0.
68
While there is no information on the status of the Sub-Antarctic portion of ORH 3B
apart from Puysegur, this part of the QMA contributes only a small percentage of the
biomass of ORH 3B as a whole. This is supported by a simple analysis of the total
orange roughy catch that has been taken from the various sub areas that have made
make up ORH 3B since the fishery began. Analysis of catch data 10 shows that 77%
(415,000 t) of the total catch has come from the East and South Chatham Rise; 15%
(78,000 t) has come from the Northwest Chatham Rise; and the Sub-Antarctic and
Arrow Plateau has provided the remaining 8% (44,000 t). Of this 44,000 t,
approximately 45% has come from Puysegur.
69
70
Status of the ORH 3B stock as a whole
On the basis of these figures, the sub-stocks for which stock assessments have been
undertaken have provided approximately 95-96% of the total orange roughy biomass
taken from ORH 3B since the fishery began. It is not credible that the portions of
ORH 3B that have not been assessed could contain sufficient orange roughy biomass
to lift the stock as a whole to, or above, BMSY.
You should therefore set the TAC for ORH 3B under section 13(2)(b) of the Act.
Section 13(2)(b) is appropriate in cases where the stock biomass is likely to be below
BMSY and requires a TAC that restores a stock biomass towards a level that is at or
above a level that can produce the maximum sustainable yield, having regard to the
interdependence of stocks, biological characteristics and environmental conditions.
B
71
MFish does not consider that retaining the status quo is appropriate. Given the low
productivity of orange roughy stocks, the biomass of the stock is likely to continue to
decline further below BMSY under the existing management settings.
72
MFish proposes to introduce an FMSY-based harvest strategy for the East and South
Chatham Rise component of ORH 3B. On the basis of the best available information,
implementation of this strategy will result in a reduction of the catch limit for this
portion of the ORH 3B stock from 7,650 tonnes to 4,410 tonnes. Once implemented,
the FMSY-based harvest strategy by definition will result in the stock moving towards
the level that can produce the maximum sustainable yield.
Section 13 (3)
73
Section 13 (3) requires that, in considering the way and the rate that the stock may be
moved towards a level that can produce MSY under s 13(2)(b), you shall have regard
to such social, cultural and economic factors as you consider relevant.
10
Dunn, M. (2008) Draft descriptive analysis of catch and effort data from New Zealand orange roughy
fisheries in ORH 3B to the end of the 2006-07 fishing year.
42
74
Option 1 in the IPP proposed a reduction in the TACC of 1,080 t. A conservative
estimate of the landed value of 1,080 t of orange roughy derived from the 2006-07
port price in ORH 3B equates to a value of $3.2 million. The majority of orange
roughy is exported so a better estimation of value may be derived from export
earnings. On the basis of the export value of the most common product state
exported, 11 1,080 t of orange roughy is worth approximately $3.9 million.
75
Option 2 in the IPP proposed a reduction in the TACC of 1,620 t. A conservative
estimate of the landed value of 1,620 t of orange roughy derived from the 2006-07
port price in ORH 3B equates to a value of $4.9 million. The majority of orange
roughy is exported so a better estimation of value may be derived from export
earnings. On the basis of the export value of the most common product state
exported 12 , 1,620 t of orange roughy is worth approximately $5.8 million.
TACC and Allowances
76
The TAC must be apportioned between the relevant sectors and interests set out under
the provisions of s 20 and s 21 of the Act. Section 21 prescribes that you shall make
allowances for Maori customary non-commercial interests, recreational fishing
interests, and for any other sources of fishing-related mortality, before setting the
TACC. In determining these allowances, you should consider how the allowances
will enable people to provide for their social, economic and cultural wellbeing (as
provided for in the purpose of the Act).
77
There are no known Maori customary or recreational fisheries for orange roughy.
MFish proposes that you set allowances of zero tonnes for recreational and Mäori
customary fishing under both options. This is consistent with the approach that has
been adopted since orange roughy became a QMS species in 1986.
78
Other sources of fishing-related mortality has been previously set at 5% of the TACC
to account for lost fish, discards etc. There is no information to support a variation to
this figure at this time.
Considerations at the sub-stock level
79
Proposed sub-stock and sub-area 13 voluntary catch limits for the 2008-09 fishing year
are discussed below. MFish recommends that these catch limits and reporting
requirements continue to be managed by DWG. Under both options MFish will
monitor DWG reports and operators’ fishing patterns to evaluate the effectiveness of
these voluntary catch limits. MFish will ensure that, through joint MFish-DWG
communications, operators are fully informed as to the progress of catch taken against
sub-stock and sub-area limits.
East and South Chatham Rise
80
11
12
13
Without a clear understanding of recruitment it is not possible to determine the rebuild
rate of orange roughy stocks, although lower catch limits will initiate a rebuild faster
Based on final FOB export figures for December 2007
Based on final FOB export figures for December 2007
The sub-stock boundaries are defined in Appendix 2.
43
than higher catch limits. The research programme will incorporate annual plume
surveys plus additional work to better define the mature orange roughy biomass on the
East and South Chatham Rise. The quantum of further reductions to the TAC will be
determined annually when the methods for determining current mature biomass have
been better developed. MFish considers that a staged approach to reducing the TAC,
given uncertainty in available information at the present time, is appropriate having
regard to relevant economic factors.
81
MFish requested that Industry, through the submission process, provide any additional
information on social, cultural and economic factors relevant to this decision. All
three Industry submissions supported option 1 of the IPP to reduce the TAC to include
the FMSY-based yield estimate for the East and South Chatham Rise over three years.
82
Sanford supports reducing the catch limit for the East and South Chatham Rise to
ensure the long term sustainability of the ORH 3B fishery but express a preference for
a slower reduction in catch. SeaFIC considers that there is no urgency to reduce
fishing mortality too severely but that there is a need to start a reduction both to bring
the catch limit into line with the proposed FMSY-based harvest strategy and to meet
statutory obligations under s 13 of the Act. SeaFIC also notes that as stated in the
IPP, estimates of Bcurrent will be updated regularly and the catch limit target may
therefore change as FMSY is approached. Implicit in their submission is that a slower
staged reduction of F to FMSY will provide greater flexibility to incorporate these
changes – either up or down – as they become apparent.
83
DWG supports the SeaFIC position and argues that in its view estimates of Bcurrent will
likely increase as more information becomes available. Specifically DWG submits
that estimates of spawning biomass in the 2008 Plenary report for the NE Hills (700
tonnes), Mt Muck (1,500 tonnes), Andes (2,400 tonnes) and the South Chatham Rise
(2,400 tonnes) are very conservative. DWG bases its position on Industry survey
estimates in 2003, 2006 and 2008 that suggests that biomass on Mt Muck and the NE
Hills may be considerably higher than estimates presented in the Plenary report.
84
Both Forest & Bird and ECO support a faster reduction than Industry on the basis that
orange roughy are vulnerable to overfishing, recruitment concerns and the view that
there are no known spawning aggregations on the South Chatham Rise. Forest & Bird
supports IPP Option 2 while ECO supports a slightly larger reduction than that
proposed under IPP Option 2 on the basis that there is no known spawning area on the
South Chatham Rise and its contention that fish in this area are likely to spawn on hill
features on the East Chatham Rise.
85
MFish accepts that information on the biomass present outside the spawning plume is
uncertain although historically spawning fish have been recorded on numerous
features across the East and South Chatham Rise as shown by the map in Appendix 2.
However, it is not possible at the present time to quantify the spawning biomass on
these features or even to determine whether spawning fish still aggregate on these
features.
86
ECO’s reference to recruitment concerns relates to information considered by the
Plenary in 2008 that suggests that the minimum size of observed orange roughy in
trawl surveys may have increased in recent years. If real, this suggests that
recruitment has been poor or absent at the bottom end of the observed length range. It
44
is estimated that fish of this size would reach the spawning stock and the fishery in
about 11 years. The Plenary states that further surveys would be required to determine
whether the drop in recruitment is real.
87
Although uncertain, the Plenary report stands as the best available information as to
the current orange roughy biomass on the East and South Chatham Rise. MFish
proposes that the FMSY-based catch limit target of 4,410 tonnes should stand as the
management target until better information is available to refine biomass estimates.
88
MFish does not, however, consider that there is an immediate concern for the longterm sustainability of the East and South Chatham Rise sub-stock if a three year rather
than two year timetable is adopted for the implementation of the FMSY-based harvest
strategy. MFish recognises that imposing TAC reductions over a two year timeframe
will have a greater economic impact on the Industry than the three year timeframe.
89
Given the significant economic cost of implementing the strategy MFish recommend
that for the East and South Chatham Rise:
i)
The FMSY-based harvest strategy is adopted;
ii) In the absence of new information the target catch limit is 4,410 tonnes;
iii) The catch limit is reduced to the FMSY-based catch limit over three years;
iv) As new information on Bcurrent becomes available the FMSY-based catch limit
will be revised. You or your successor will be provided with advice in 2009
and 2010 recommending changes to the TAC to complete the phased
introduction of the FMSY-based strategy based on these revised estimates.
Northwest Chatham Rise
90
In 2006 you decreased the catch limit for the Northwest Chatham Rise from 1,500 to
750 tonnes, which was assessed to be the level that would allow the sub-stock to
rebuild.
91
In their recent submission, ECO has repeated the argument made in their 2006 and
2007 submissions in support of a catch reduction to, or below, the CAY estimate for
2007 of 410 tonnes. The ECO position was considered in making your 2006 decision
on the appropriate catch limit for the Northwest Chatham Rise. MFish considers that
the 2006 decision was appropriate and in the absence of new stock assessment
information, does not consider that you should vary the current management
arrangements for this sub-stock at this time.
92
MFish recommends retaining the existing catch limit for the Northwest Chatham Rise.
Arrow Plateau
93
The Arrow Plateau has been closed to bottom trawling by regulation under the
Benthic Protected Areas (BPA) initiative and the catch limit for this portion of the
stock will remain at zero.
45
Puysegur
94
The fishery has been voluntarily closed since 1997-98 and MFish does not
recommend varying this position at this time.
Sub-Antarctic
95
The catch limit for the Sub-Antarctic was increased in 2006 to 1,850 t on the basis of
the 2006 stock assessment and no new information is available at the sub-stock scale
to suggest that this limit should be reviewed. Industry supports retention of the
existing catch level. ECO repeats its submission from 2007 that there is no evidence
that the Sub-Antarctic fishery is sustainable and it considers that the existing catch
limit implies an unrealistically large sub-stock size given an absence of large
spawning aggregations in this area. ECO also notes that declines in the Priceless
CPUE and significant catch reductions in the East Pukaki fishery in support of its
contention that the Sub-Antarctic catch limit should be reduced to below 1,300 t.
Priceless and East Pukaki are sub-areas within the Sun-Antarctic portion of ORH 3B.
96
MFish considers that your 2006 decisions remain appropriate. In the absence of new
stock assessment information, MFish does not propose varying the current
management arrangements at this time. ECO’s concerns over CPUE indices at spatial
scales below that of the sub-stock level are discussed below.
97
MFish recommends retaining the existing catch limit for the Sub-Antarctic.
Considerations at the sub-area component level
98
The sub-area component boundaries are defined in Appendix 3.
East and South Chatham Rise
99
The IPP proposed setting a limit of 50% on the percentage of the East and South
Chatham Rise that could be taken from the main spawning plume.
100
SeaFIC sees no rationale in further restricting the East and South Chatham Rise catch
by constraining removals from the Plume. It notes that the fleet targeting orange
roughy on the East and South Chatham Rise is now restricted to only two or three
vessels and that for market reasons fishing occurs throughout the year. SeaFIC
contends that in practice the proposed limit will not be exceeded and given there is no
explicit rationale defined in the IPP they do not support the proposed measure.
101
DWG also does not agree to the proposed measure but agrees to deliver catch
outcomes that will result in less than 50% of the East and South Chatham Rise catch
limit being taken from the spawning plume.
102
Neither Forest & Bird nor ECO discuss the proposed limit in their submissions
although ECO includes a spawning box limit in their preferred option. Forest & Bird
also expressed support for retention of a catch limit on spawning fish in discussions
with MFish.
103
MFish notes that sub-area catch limits are voluntary and that the DWG has agreed to
deliver catch outcomes that meet or exceed the proposal. MFish also acknowledges
46
that, as noted by SeaFIC, the DWG submission aligns with market requirements for
orange roughy product supply throughout the year. MFish does not therefore
recommend the formal adoption of a limit on catch that can be taken from the plume.
104
MFish undertakes to monitor catch from the plume.
Sub-Antarctic sub-area limits
105
A 500 tonne feature limit is in place in the Sub-Antarctic portion of ORH 3B. MFish
is notified when 80% of a feature limit is taken and a feature is closed once its feature
limit is reached. As in its 2007 submission ECO supports a reduction in feature limits
closer to that provided in ORH 1 of 100-150 t.
106
Feature limits in ORH 1 are set as a standard size and apply to a circle of 10nm radius
around individual features (such as hills, knolls etc.). In contrast Sub-Antarctic
features consist of feature complexes and these have been gridded into squares with
an area of 100 nm2 each (see Appendix 5). The 500 tonne feature limit applies to
each of these squares. While not directly comparable to the feature limit
arrangements in ORH 1, MFish considers that the feature limits and reporting
framework are operating effectively to spread catch across Sub-Antarctic features. In
the absence of new stock assessment information, MFish does not propose varying the
current management arrangements at this time.
107
MFish will continue to monitor DWG reports against reported catch and to monitor
operators’ fishing patterns to evaluate the effectiveness of voluntary catch limits in
2008-09. MFish will also ensure that, through joint MFish-DWG communications,
operators are fully informed as to the progress of catch taken against the SubAntarctic feature limits.
Environmental considerations
108
MFish is in the process of developing environmental standards – including a seabird
standard and a benthic impact standard - to ensure that statutory obligations to avoid,
remedy or mitigate the adverse effects of fishing are met. These standards will
ultimately be used to inform fisheries plan development.
109
Key environmental issues in relation to the ORH 3B fishery and the options proposed
in this paper are discussed below.
Finfish and shark bycatch
110
Both ECO and Forest & Bird express concern at the impact of orange roughy fishing
on non-target fish species. Specifically Forest & Bird requests that the number and
species (including IUCN threat status) of non-target catch should be specified.
111
Information on the catch of the top 50 bycatch species from orange roughy fisheries is
included in Appendix 4. This information relates to the fishing years 1999-2004 and
is compiled from observer data. 14 Those species with an IUCN listing are
14
Anderson, O.F. Fish discards and non-target fish catch in the New Zealand orange roughy trawl fishery: 1999-2000 to 2004-05. Draft
report to the Aquatic Environment Working Group.39 p.
47
highlighted. There are a number of generic codes included in this table so it is not
possible to compile a full list of species. However of the species listed, eight species
of sharks or chimaeras have an IUCN listing. Of these 5 have an IUCN status of least
concern, one as near threatened (Plunket’s shark) and two are listed as vulnerable
(basking shark and spiny dogfish).
112
A specific national plan of action for the conservation and management of sharks is in
preparation by MFish. This plan proposes protection of basking shark. The IUCN
status of spiny dogfish is largely driven by concerns over European stocks.
Nonetheless the NPOA-Sharks proposes an evaluation of management measures
currently in place for spiny dogfish in New Zealand.
113
Plunket’s shark is a relatively uncommon shark found in south-eastern Australia, New
Zealand and south-Eastern Africa. Its depth range is 200m to 1,500m although most
commonly found below 500m. The aggregating behaviour of Plunket’s shark makes
it susceptible to localised depletion and there is concern that larger females may be
found at the deeper extent of its depth range which overlaps with the orange roughy
fishery. The IUCN Red List states that ‘any increases in catches from increasing
deepwater fisheries should be viewed with concern’. MFish notes that initiatives
already undertaken in ORH 3B, including a reduction in vessels and effort, will likely
limit interactions with this species. The TAC reduction proposed in this paper will
further limit such interactions. It is also of note that there is a large part of both the
geographic and depth range of this species that is outside ORH 3B and some areas of
the likely range for this species are protected from bottom trawling under the BPA
Initiative. MFish will continue to monitor catches of this species.
114
While a number of deepwater finfish species that share similar habitat to orange
roughy are taken in the ORH 3B fishery (including black, smooth and spiky oreo,
black cardinal fish and alfonsino) targeted orange roughy fishing historically captures
over 90% orange roughy (by greenweight). No increase in the orange roughy TAC is
contemplated and consequently there should be no additional adverse implications for
fish or shark bycatch.
Marine mammals
115
There is a low level of interaction between marine mammals and deepwater trawl
vessels generally and there have been 4 observed fur seal deaths associated with these
fisheries for the period 2004-2007. All of these captures occurred in the SubAntarctic deepwater trawl fisheries.
116
MFish considers that the management proposal will have no additional adverse
implications for fur seals and other marine mammals as none of the options should
result in an increase in fishing effort.
Seabirds
117
While trawl fisheries for orange roughy are known to interact with seabirds, and
fishing-related mortalities of seabird species are known to occur, orange roughy
fisheries are considered to pose relatively low risk to seabirds compared to other
fisheries. Analysis of seabird interactions with vessels targeting orange roughy was
undertaken by the Department of Conservation in 2008 (Appendix 5). This study
48
found that there is a low number of interactions with seabirds in the deepwater trawl
fisheries generally.
118
The few vessels that dominate the catch in ORH 3B apply mitigation measures
ranging from on-board meal plants (one vessel), batch discarding (all vessels) and
back of the boat mitigation measures (all vessels). Consequently the level of
interaction and fishing related mortality is considered to be low for the vessels that
fish in ORH 3B.
119
It is difficult to quantify the overall impact as knowledge of the population
characteristics of seabird species is typically limited. It is known however that the
Chatham Rise and Sub-Antarctic regions are areas of vulnerable and threatened
seabird species such as the Chatham Island Albatross and the Chatham Petrel (the
International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN) status is critically
endangered); the Northern and Southern Royal Albatross (IUCN status is endangered
and vulnerable respectively); and the Salvin’s Albatross (IUCN status is vulnerable).
120
The management proposal should have no additional adverse implications for seabirds
as no increase in orange roughy catch entitlements is proposed.
Benthic impacts and coral bycatch
121
Bottom trawling can affect fragile benthic invertebrate communities but adverse
effects may be reduced if vessels repeatedly trawl along the same towlines in a
fishery. There are cost implications for Industry in terms of lost or damaged gear
when fishing in new areas. As a consequence Industry generally follows known trawl
tracks on the Chatham Rise. Nonetheless benthic organisms and assemblages are
taken by bottom trawls targeting orange roughy and observed coral bycatch for the
period 1 July 2004-30 June 2007 is summarised in Appendix 5.
122
Two initiatives are in place to address benthic impacts generally. In 2001 you
regulated a trawl closure covering a selection of 19 seamounts of varying size and
depth within New Zealand. In 2007 you then closed 17 further areas, covering
approximately 1.2 million square kilometres, to bottom trawling by regulation under
the BPA Initiative. The map in Appendix 7 shows the location of the BPA and
seamount closures within the ORH 3B QMA. The map also shows the areas of
potential orange roughy habitat based on depth alone (i.e. the area between 750m and
1500m depth). For the whole of the QMA 15% of this area falls within either BPAs
or seamount closures. The distribution of these closed areas is skewed towards the
Sub-Antarctic parts of the QMA with 2.9% of the area between 750 and 1500m deep
on the Chatham Rise closed to trawling.
123
Further analysis of benthic habitats, the footprint of the orange roughy fishery and
areas that are already protected will be advanced through the fisheries plan.
Compliance implications
124
Key offences that may occur in ORH 3B include misreporting of QMA, species and
weights and fishing in closed areas. MFish considers that the proposed management
options resulting in a significant reduction in the TAC over time may increase the
incentive to offend.
49
125
The ORH 3B fishery is closely managed from an Industry perspective with few boats
operating in the fishery and the owners of 97.95% of the ORH 3B quota represented
by the Deepwater Group (DWG). DWG currently monitors adherence to voluntary
catch spreading arrangements and provides monthly reports to MFish. DWG notifies
MFish when catch reaches 80% of the sub-stock and sub-area limits, and also notifies
MFish when any limit has been reached.
126
MFish considers that the monitoring arrangements are robust and appropriate. DWG
and MFish will continue to closely monitor this fishery to ensure compliance with
management arrangements.
50
APPENDIX 1
Statutory Considerations
When setting or varying the TAC and TACC under the Act, you are required to consider a
series of principles and factors:
a)
Section 13(2) MFish recommends that the TAC is varied pursuant to s
13(2)(b) to enable ORH 3B to be restored to a level at or above BMSY.
Combining the best available estimates of Bcurrent and B0 for the ORH 3B substocks for which stock assessments have been undertaken (Northwest Chatham
Rise, the East and South Chatham Rise and Puysegur) suggests a B0 in the
order of 450,000 t and a Bcurrent in the order of 105,000 t. On this basis the
assessed portion of ORH 3B is estimated to be at 23% B0. BMSY for orange
roughy stocks is estimated to be 30% B0.
There is no information on the status of the Sub-Antarctic portion of ORH 3B
apart from Puysegur. However the sub-stocks for which stock assessments
have been undertaken have provided approximately 95-96% of the total orange
roughy biomass taken from ORH 3B since the fishery began. It is not credible
that the portions of ORH 3B that have not been assessed could contain
sufficient orange roughy biomass to lift the stock as a whole to, or above,
BMSY.
B
The proposed TAC reduction under both options will be implemented by
reducing the catch limit on the East and South Chatham Rise. The reduction
will reduce the catch limit for this sub-stock towards the yield estimates
derived from an FMSY strategy. Catch limits derived from an FMSY strategy by
definition will rebuild a stock that is below BMSY. Further research is planned
to refine yield estimates and further TAC reductions may be contemplated in
future.
The specific considerations set out in s 13(2)(b) include having regard to the
interdependence of stocks, the biological characteristics of the stock and any
environmental conditions affecting the stock. As such, in considering the
proposed TAC options and corresponding proposed periods of rebuild, you
must take into account:
i)
The interdependence of stocks for ORH 3B (as required by s
13(2)(b)(i)). There is no information to suggest the interdependence of
stocks should affect the level of the TAC for ORH 3B at this time.
Given that the fishery primarily targets aggregations of orange roughy,
it is relatively clean, and bycatch proportions are low.
ii)
Environmental factors affecting ORH3B (as required under s
13(2)(b)(ii)). No specific environmental conditions affecting the ORH
3B stock have been identified.
iii)
The biological characteristics of ORH3B (as required under s
13(2)(b)(ii)). It is known that orange roughy are very long-lived and
51
late maturing, which are biological characteristics that render them
slow to recover from overfishing.
b)
Section 13(3) requires that, in considering the way and rate at which a stock is
moved towards BMSY, you have regard to such social, cultural, and economic
factors as you consider relevant when determining the way and rate at which to
move the stock biomass toward or above the BMSY level.
MFish has considered the economic impact of reducing the TAC to the FMSY
yield estimates for the East and South Chatham Rise. MFish proposes a staged
approach to reducing the TAC to allow Industry time to rationalise their
operations as the TAC decreases. This staged reduction will occur in concert
with a research programme to update the yield estimates.
Industry has consolidated the fleet deployed in the ORH 3B fishery and
thereby significantly reduced the number of personnel involved in this fishery.
While reduction in the TAC will likely reduce the number of days vessels
expend in this fishery, the proposed cuts are not anticipated to have a
significant social impact.
MFish is not aware of any recreational or customary Mäori interest in the
fishery and no other cultural factors that MFish considers are relevant to a
determination under section 13(3).
c)
Sections 5(a) and (b) require the Act to be interpreted consistently with New
Zealand’s international obligations with respect to fishing and with the
provisions of the Treaty of Waitangi (Fisheries Claims) Settlement Act 1992.
Provisions of general international instruments such as the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and the Fish Stocks Agreement
have been implemented through the provisions of the Fisheries Act 1996 and
given effect here. MFish considers that the options are consistent with both
New Zealand’s international obligations relating to fishing and the provisions
of the Treaty of Waitangi (Fisheries Claims) Settlement Act 1992.
d)
Section 8 of the Act describes the purpose of the Act as being to provide for
the utilisation of fisheries resources while ensuring sustainability, and defines
the meanings of utilisation and sustainability. The management options
presented seek to achieve the purpose of the Act. The proposals ensure
sustainability under the respective catch limits via sub-stock management and
monitoring measures that address risk as appropriate to the different levels of
catch, and take into account the respective costs of management versus the
utilisation benefits.
e)
Sections 9(a) and (b) require you to take into account that associated or
dependent species (those that are not harvested) be maintained at or above a
level that ensures their long-term viability, and that the biological diversity of
the aquatic environment should be maintained. The specific nature and extent
of effects of fishing on any particular sub-stock in ORH 3B and the
environment are generally understood to be localised and specific to
aggregations of orange roughy at 850-1,200 metre depths. While some
bycatch of non-harvested species is known, the impact that fishing for
ORH 3B has on the long term viability and biological diversity of the aquatic
environment is of greater concern in regions of steep sloping and highly
diverse topographic features. Some features within ORH 3B have been set
52
aside from all trawling, including ten seamounts and the Arrow Plateau, to
mitigate the benthic effects of fishing.
The main prey species for orange roughy include mesopelagic and
benthopelagic prawns, fish and squid, with other organisms such as mysids,
amphipods and euphausiids occasionally being important. MFish has
considered the effects on associated and dependent species and biodiversity
that would affect the setting of the TAC and determined the impact is
addressed under the catch spreading arrangements.
f)
Section 9(c) requires you to take into account the principle that habitat of
particular importance for fisheries management should be protected.
While trawling can adversely affect fragile benthic invertebrate communities,
the commercial bycatch of benthic invertebrates is seldom recorded or
examined. Research has revealed marked differences in the bottom fauna of
fished and unfished seamounts off New Zealand and Tasmania, and those
differences have been ascribed to the impact of bottom trawling. Researchers
have reported anecdotal evidence of bycatch of coral species in developing
orange roughy fisheries in New Zealand.
Across the ORH 3B QMA 15% of the area within the recognised depth range
of orange roughy is closed to bottom trawling through either the BPA initiative
or the seamount closures.
g)
Section 10 of the Act sets out the information principles, which require that
decisions be based on the best available information, taking into account any
uncertainty in that information, and applying caution when information is
uncertain, unreliable, or inadequate. In accordance with s 10, the absence of
information should not be used as a reason to postpone, or fail to take, any
measure to achieve the purpose of the Act, including providing for utilisation
at levels considered to be sustainable. A thorough review of available
information has been undertaken in 2008 and the best available information
has been used to derive management options. MFish has endeavoured to set
out the relevant uncertainty in, and inadequacy of, that information so that the
appropriate caution can be applied in assessing the proposed management
options.
h)
Section 11(1)(a): Before varying the TAC for ORH 3B, you must take into
account any effects of fishing on any stock and the aquatic environment. No
information about any effects of fishing on any stock or on the aquatic
environment additional to that discussed elsewhere in the paper is considered
relevant to the consideration of sustainability measures for ORH 3B at this
time.
i)
Section 11(1)(b): Before varying the TAC for ORH 3B, you must take into
account any existing controls under the Act that apply to the stock or area
concerned. For ORH 3B, the measures that apply currently are a TAC, TACC
and an allowance for incidental fishing-related mortality. No other mandatory
controls under the Act apply specifically to ORH 3B, but there are a number of
voluntary sub-area catch limits as described above. In addition, specific
seamount closures are located within ORH 3B.
53
j)
Section 11(1)(c): Before varying the TAC for ORH3B, you must take into
account the natural variability of the stock. Orange roughy year-to-year
biomass is not known to be highly variable, and therefore the natural
variability of orange roughy is not a concern in setting the TAC for ORH 3B.
k)
Sections 11(2)(a) and (b): Before varying the TAC for ORH3B, you must
have regard to any provisions of any regional policy or plan under the
Resource Management Act 1991 and any management strategy or plan under
the Conservation Act 1997 that apply to the coastal marine area and you
consider relevant. MFish is not aware of any such provisions that should be
taken into account for ORH 3B.
l)
Section 11(2)(c): Before varying the TAC for ORH3B, you must have regard
to sections 7 and 8 of the Hauraki Gulf Marine Park Act 2000 that apply to the
coastal marine area and you consider relevant.. The distribution of orange
roughy in the ORH 3B QMA does not intersect with the Park boundaries.
m)
Section 11(2A)(b): Before varying the TAC for ORH3B, you must take
account of any relevant and approved fisheries plans. There is no approved
fisheries plan in place for ORH 3B.
n)
Sections 11(2A)(a) and (c): Before varying the TAC for ORH3B, you must
take into account any conservation or fisheries service, or any decision not to
require such services. MFish does not consider that existing or proposed
services materially affect the proposals for the ORH 3B stock. No decision
has been made to not require a service in this fishery at this time.
o)
Sections 20 and 21 specify a number of matters that must be taken into
account when setting or varying a TACC. Section 21 requires you to allow for
non-commercial Mäori and recreational fishing interests, and other sources of
fishing-related mortality when setting or varying the TACC. The nature of the
ORH 3B fishery and the interests of recreational and customary fishers have
been considered in proposing the TACCs.
p)
Section 21(4) also requires that any mätaitai reserve or closure/restriction
under s 186A to facilitate customary fishing be taken into account. There is
one mätaitai reserve in ORH 3B generally (Te Whaka a Te Wera Maitaitai –
located in Paterson Inlet, Stewart Island), but this does not intersect with the
ORH 3B fishery. No area has been closed or fishing method restricted (that
affects the fishery within ORH 3B) under the customary fishing provisions of
the Act.
q)
Section 21(5) also requires that any regulations to prohibit fishing made under
s 311 be taken into account when setting allowances for recreational interests.
No restrictions under s 311 have been placed on fishing in any area within
ORH 3B.
54
APPENDIX 2
Locations across the Chatham Rise where spawning orange roughy have been located from observer (red
circles) and research (blue triangle) data
55
APPENDIX 3
Definition of ORH 3B sub-stock boundaries
Note: All positions are given in degrees, minutes and decimal minutes format. Figures in
brackets are decimal degrees with western longitudes given as a progression of eastern
longitude (for example 179º W is given as 181).
Existing sub-stock boundaries
Sub-stock boundaries under proposed options
56
Northwest Chatham Rise (unchanged)
The area within the box defined by the points:
42º10.0’ S, 174 º42’ E
42º10.0’ S, 178 º00’ W
44º00.0’ S, 178 º00’ W
44º00.0’ S, Coastline
43º44.3’ S, 173 º07.5’ E
43º08’ S, 173 º57’ E
(-42.166667, 174.700000)
(-42.166667, 182.000000)
(-44.000000, 182.000000)
(-44.000000, coastline )
(-43.738333, 173.125000)
(-43.133333, 173.950000)
Existing South Chatham Rise
The area defined by the points:
44º00’ S, 171 º55.8’ E
44º00’ S, 175 º00’ W
46º00’ S, 175 º00’ W
46º00’ S, 170 º15.6’ E
(-44.000000, 171.930000)
(-44.000000, 185.000000)
(-46.000000, 185.000000)
(-46.000000, 170.260000)
Note that for the area defined above, points 1 and 4 are linked by the coastline. For reporting
purposes the following rectangular box that overlaps with the South Island may be used:
44º00’ S, 170 º15’ E
44º00’ S, 175 º00’ W
46º00’ S, 175 º00’ W
46º00’ S, 170 º15.6’ E
(-44.000000, 170. 256977)
(-44.000000, 185.000000)
(-46.000000, 185.000000)
(-46.000000, 170. 260000)
Existing East Chatham Rise
The area within the box defined by the points below:
42º10’ S, 178 º00’ W
42º10’ S, 173 º40’ W
46º00’ S, 173 º40’ W
46º00’ S, 175 º00’ W
44º00’ S, 175 º00’ W
44º00’ S, 178 º00’ W
(-42.166667, 182.000000)
(-42.166667, 186.333333)
(-46.000000, 186.333333)
(-46.000000, 185.000000)
(-44.000000, 185.000000)
(-44.000000, 182.000000)
Proposed East and South Chatham Rise
The East Chatham Rise and the South Chatham Rise areas defined above combined.
Arrow Plateau (unchanged)
The area within the box defined by the points:
42º10’ S, 173 º40’ W
42º10’ S, 171º00.07’W
46º00’ S, 171º46.68’W
46º00’ S, 173 º40’ W
(-42.166667, 186.333333)
(-42.166667, 188.998833)
(-46.000000, 188.222000)
(-46.000000, 186.333333)
Note that for the area defined above, points 2 and 3 are linked by the boundary of the EEZ.
57
Puysegur (unchanged)
The area within the rectangular box defined by the points:
46º00’ S, 165 º00’ E
46º00’ S, 166 º30’ E
47º30’ S, 166 º30’ E
47º30’ S, 165 º00’ E
(-46.000000, 165.000000)
(-46.000000, 166.500000)
(-47.500000, 166.500000)
(-47.500000, 165.000000)
Sub-Antarctic (unchanged)
The remaining area within ORH 3B. Specifically the area (excluding Puysegur) within the
EEZ and below 46º00’ S on the East Coast and 44º15.6’ S on the West Coast.
58
APPENDIX 4
The top 50 species or species groups by weight from all observer records for the orange roughy target
fishery for the 1999-2000 to 2004-2005 fishing years. Records are ordered by decreasing percentage of
catch and includes IUCN status.
Species
code
Common Name
Scientific name
Estimated
catch (t)
% of
catch
IUCN status
ORH
Orange roughy
Hoplostethus
atlanticus
17,246
75.05
Not listed
SSO
Smooth oreo
Pseudocyttus
maculatus
3,093
13.46
Not listed
BOE
Black oreo
Allocyttus niger
732
3.18
Not listed
SHA
Any shark
275
1.19
Generic code
HOK
Hoki
235
1.02
Not listed
COU
Coral (unspecified)
187
0.81
Generic code
CDL
Black cardinalfish
171
0.75
Not listed
SLK
Slickheads
167
0.73
Generic code
RAT
Rattails
Macrouridae
123
0.54
Generic code
Etmopterus spp.
118
0.51
Least concern
or data
deficient
ETM
Macruronus
novaezelandiae
Epigonus telescopus
SND
Shovelnose spiny
dogfish
Deania calcea
86
0.37
Least concern
BYX
Alfonsino & longfinned beryx
Beryx splendens & B.
decadactylus
68
0.29
Not listed
MOD
Any morid cod
54
0.24
Generic code
WSQ
Warty squid
Moroteuthis spp.
44
0.19
Not listed
LCH
Long-nosed chimaera
Harriotta raleighana
38
0.17
Least concern
JAV
Javelinfish
Lepidorhynchus
denticulatus
38
0.17
Not listed
SOR
Spiky oreo
Neocyttus
rhomboidalis
38
0.16
Not listed
HAK
Hake
Merluccius australis
37
0.16
Not listed
RIB
Ribaldo
Mora moro
37
0.16
Not listed
BEE
Basketwork eel
Diastobranchus
capensis
36
0.16
Not listed
WHR
Unicorn & white
rattails
Trachyrincus spp
29
0.12
Not listed
WHX
59
Species
code
Common Name
Scientific name
Estimated
catch (t)
% of
catch
IUCN status
HJO
Johnson's cod
Halargyreus johnsonii
20
0.09
Not listed
ECH
Echinoderms
Echinodermata
14
0.06
Generic code
GSP
Pale ghost shark
Hydrolagus sp. B2
10
0.04
Least concern
LIN
Ling
Genypterus blacodes
7
0.03
Not listed
BNS
Bluenose
Hyperoglyphe
antarctica
6
0.02
Not listed
WOE
Warty oreo
Allocyttus verrucosus
5
0.02
Not listed
EPR
Robust cardinal fish
Epigonus robustus
4
0.02
Not listed
CYP
Longnose velvet
dogfish
Centroscymnus
crepidater
4
0.02
Least concern
SPD
Spiny dogfish
Squalus acanthias
4
0.01
Vulnerable
SQX
Squid (unspecified)
3
0.01
Generic code
SKA
Skate
Rajidae,
Arhynchobatidae
3
0.01
Generic code
BSL
Black slickhead
Xenodermichthys
copei
3
0.01
Not listed
SMC
Small-headed cod
Lepidion
microcephalus
3
0.01
Not listed
EPL
Bigeye cardinalfish
Epigonus lenimen
3
0.01
Not listed
CRU
Crustaceans
(unspecified)
2
0.01
Generic code
SPE
Sea perch
Helicolenus spp.
2
0.01
Not listed
GSH
Dark ghost shark
Hydrolagus
novaezealandiae
2
0.01
Least concern
GRC
Grenadier cod
Tripterophycis
gilchristi
2
0.01
Not listed
INV
Invertebrates
(unspecified)
2
0.01
Generic code
DWE
Deepwater eel
1
0.01
Generic code
PLS
Plunket's shark
Centroscymnus
plunketi
1
0.01
Near
threatened
SRI
Knifetooth dogfish
Scymnodon ringens
1
0.01
Not listed
CHI
Chimaera (unspecified)
Chimaera spp.
1
0.01
Generic code
LEG
Giant lepidion
Lepidion schmidti &
L. inosimae
1
0.01
Not listed
RCH
Widenosed spookfish
Rhinochimaera
pacifica
1
0.01
Least concern
BSK
Basking shark
Cetorhinus maximus
1
0.00
Vulnerable
DSS
Deepsea smelt
Bathylagus spp
1
0.00
Not listed
RUD
Rudderfish
Centrolophus niger
1
0.00
Not listed
60
APPENDIX 5
Observed captures of seabirds, fur seals and corals in the deepwater trawl fisheries for the
periods 1 July 2004 – 30 June 2005, 1 July 2005 – 30 June 2006 and 1 July 2006 – 30 June
2007. 15 This data is combined across all trawl fisheries although the majority of observer
coverage has been on the Chatham Rise and in the Sub-Antarctic.
2004/05 2005/06 2006/07
Observer cover (%)
Bullers albatross
Northern Royal albatross
Salvin's albatross
Albatross (unidentified)
Seabirds
Cape petrel
Grey petrel
White‐faced storm petrel
TOTAL
Pinipeds Fur Seals
Bamboo
Black
Bubblegum
Bushy
Crested cup
Deepwater branching
Flabellum
Golden
Gorgonian
Coral (kg)
Long polyp soft
Madrepora
Precious
Red
Red hydrocoral
spiny white hydrocoral
Unid'd
Rubble
TOTAL
Hydroids (kg)
15
19.91
0
1
1
0
1
1
0
4
1
0
81
485
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
2367
0
0
20884
0
23817
0
18.89
2
0
0
1
0
0
1
4
1
99
47
822
158
15
78
7
22
1
1
0
1
3
0
0
5177
605
7036
7
28.12
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
2
205
92
1064
2398
17
50
6
15
0
0
3
1
22
6
2
813
13184
17878
2
Draft CSP observer report for the period 1 July 2004 – 30 June 2007, Marine Conservation Services,
Department of Conservation. 37 p.
61
APPENDIX 6
Definition of ORH 3B sub-area component boundaries
Note: All positions are given in degrees, minutes and decimal minutes format.
Figures in brackets are decimal degrees with western longitudes given as a
progression of eastern longitude (for example 179º W is given as 181).
Existing East and South Chatham Rise sub-area component boundaries
which are all removed under proposed options
Spawning Box (existing)
The area within the rectangular box defined by the points:
42º10’ S, 178 º00’ W
42º10’ S, 175 º00’ W
44º00’ S, 175 º00’ W
44º00’ S, 178 º00’ W
(-42.166667, 182.000000)
(-42.166667, 185.000000)
(-44.000000, 185.000000)
(-44.000000, 182.000000)
During the period June 1 to 31 August.
Northeast Chatham Rise (existing)
The area within the rectangular box defined by the points:
42º10’ S, 178 º00’ W
42º10’ S, 173 º40’ W
44º00’ S, 173 º40’ W
44º00’ S, 178 º00’ W
(-42.166667, 182.000000)
(-42.166667, 186.333333)
(-44.000000, 186.333333)
(-44.000000, 182.000000)
62
Southeast Chatham Rise (existing)
The area within the rectangular box defined by the points:
44º00’ S, 175 º00’ W
44º00’ S, 173 º40’ W
46º00’ S, 173 º40’ W
46º00’ S, 175 º00’ W
(-44.000000, 185.000000)
(-44.000000, 186.333333)
(-46.000000, 186.333333)
(-46.000000, 185.000000)
Sub-Antarctic feature monitoring (unchanged)
DWG monitors catch on the northern and eastern Pukaki Rise using the 'Feature Monitoring
Grid' below. Each grid box is approximately 10nm by 10nm and each can have no more than
500 t of ORH taken from it. Grid cell A13 roughly aligns with the previous Priceless Box
and grid cell A18 is the previous 'SE Box'. Catches are also monitored throughout the SubAntarctic sub-area. GIS analyses are performed to identify any feature or 10nm x 10nm area
where accumulated catches approach the 500 t feature limit.
63
APPENDIX 7
Area of the ORH 3B QMA within the recognised depth range of orange roughy and areas closed to
bottom trawling through both the seamount closures and the BPAs.
64
DEEMED VALUE RATES FOR SELECTED FISHSTOCKS
– FINAL ADVICE
1
This paper sets out the Ministry of Fisheries (MFish) recommendations of the deemed
value rates for selected fish stocks for the 2008-09 fishing season. To identify stocks
where the desired incentives for fishers to acquire ACE to balance against their
catches, MFish uses the process outlined in the deemed value standard. A summary
of this standard can be found in Appendix 1.
Executive summary
2
Under s 75 (1) of the Act the Minister of Fisheries is required to set interim and
annual deemed value rates for each quota management stock. Section 75 (2)(a)
requires the Minister, when setting deemed value rates, to take into account the need
to provide an incentive for every commercial fisher to acquire and hold sufficient
annual catch entitlement (ACE) that is not less than the total catch of that stock taken
by the commercial fisher. Section 75 (2)(b) sets out the factors the Minister may have
regard to when setting deemed values. These factors from s 75 (2)(a) and 75 (2)(b)
form the basis of the information sheets that have been produced for all the stocks
under review. An outline of other relevant provisions of the Fisheries Act is provided
at the end of this paper.
3
The deemed value standard has been used to review the appropriateness of the
incentives under the current deemed value rates as part of this sustainability round.
4
The deemed value standard details a set of criteria which MFish uses to determine
whether a fish stock should be considered for a deemed value review because
inappropriate incentives to balance catch against ACE may exist. Table 1 details the
stocks that met one or more of these criteria and therefore were eligible for a review.
It also includes the recommended deemed value changes.
65
Table 1: Stocks that met the review criteria set out in the Deemed Value Standard
Summary of Recommended deemed value changes
Annual
Fish Stock Reviewed
Interim
Differential
Species Name
Barracouta
BAR5
No change
No change
No change
Blue cod
BCO3
Increased to
Increased to Adjusted to match annual
$3.75 per kg
$2.50 per kg
rate
Blue shark
BWS1
No change
No change
No change
Elephant fish
ELE3
No change
No change
No change
Frostfish
FRO8
No change
No change
No change
Garfish
GAR1
No change
No change
No change
Grey mullet
GMU1, GMU2, GMU3 &
No change
No change
No change
GMU7
Gurnard
GUR3
No change
No change
Alter differential deemed
values
Hake
HAK1
No change
No change
No change
Hapuka/Bass
All HPB stocks
No change
No change
No change
John dory
JDO2 & JDO7
No change
No change
No change
Kingfish
KIN7 & KIN8
Increased to
Increased to Adjusted to match annual
$10.00 per kg
$5.00 per kg
rate
Ling
All LIN stocks
No change
No change
No change
Moki
MOK1
No change
No change
No change
Parore
PAR1 and PAR2
Increased to
Increased to
No change
$0.34 per kg
$0.17 per kg
Paua
All PAU stocks
Increased to
Increased to Adjusted to match annual
$66.00 per kg
$50.00 per kg
rate
Pilchard
PIL1
No change
No change
No change
Porae
POR2
Increased to
Increased to
No change
$1.35 per kg
$0.68 per kg
Ruby fish
RBY3 & RBY4
No change
No change
No change
Ribaldo
RIB5
Increased to
Increased to
No change
$0.30 per kg
$0.15 per kg
Ribaldo
RIB7
No change
No change
Higher differential
deemed values applied
Rough skate
RSK1 & RSK3
No change
No change
No change
Gemfish
SKI1 & SKI2
Decreased to
Decreased to Adjusted to match annual
$1.50 per kg
$0.75 per kg
rate
Sea perch
SPE2
No change
No change
No change
Sea perch
SPE8
No change
No change
No change
Rig
SPO2
No change
No change
Alter differential deemed
values
Rig
SPO7
No change
No change
No change
Arrow squid
SQU1T
No change
No change
No change
Smooth skate
All SSK stocks
No change
No change
No change
Kina
SUR1A & SUR7A
No change
No change
No change
Swordfish
SWO1
Decreased to
Decreased to
No change
$3.00 per kg
$1.50 per kg
Tarakihi
TAR1 & TAR8
No change
No change
No change
Trumpeter
TRU4
No change
No change
No change
White warehou
WWA4
No change
No change
No change
5
In addition, stocks that are being considered for a total allowable catch (TAC) review
as part of the October 2008 sustainability round are also included in this review
process. These stocks are listed in Table 2 below.
66
Table 2: Stocks that are being considered for a TAC adjustment and therefore will also require a review
of their deemed value rates
Summary of Recommended deemed value changes
Annual
Fish Stock Reviewed
Interim
Differential
Species Name
Bluenose*
All BNS stocks
Not in this FAP Not in this FAP
Not in this FAP
Orange roughy
ORH3B
No change
No change
No change
*Advice will be presented in separate FAP
6
All stocks in Tables 1 and 2 were considered at the deemed value review group
meeting held Monday 5 May 2008. If the review group considered that a deemed
value adjustment was appropriate, a range of information sources (see Appendix 2)
was then used to propose a new deemed value rate. Individual assessments for each
stock are set out in this paper. The deemed value review group included both MFish
staff and a industry representative from SeaFIC.
7
The proposals were then put out for consultation. A range of views on the proposed
deemed value changes were received from stakeholders. MFish has taken these views
into consideration and where appropriate has incorporated them into the
recommended deemed value rates for your consideration.
8
You are not limited to choosing the deemed value rates proposed in this paper; rather
you can set the deemed value rates at any level that you consider will best meet your
obligations under the Act. You can also choose to leave the deemed value rates
unchanged provided you are satisfied that this meets your statutory obligations,
although MFish considers the proposed adjustments to the deemed value rates for the
stocks listed in this advice paper are appropriate at this time.
Submissions
9
Submissions were received from the following stakeholders:
• Aotearoa Fisheries Ltd (AFL);
• Area 2 Inshore Finfish Management Company Ltd (Area 2 Inshore);
• Challenger Finfisheries Management Company Ltd (Challenger);
• Egmont Seafood Limited (ESL);
• Environment and Conservation Organisations of NZ Inc. (ECO);
• Independent Fisheries Ltd (Independent);
• Sanford Limited (Sanford);
• Seafood Industry Council (SeaFIC).
10
All submissions relate to specific stocks and the proposed deemed value rates for
these stocks.
67
Background
11
The purpose of the deemed value framework is to provide an incentive for fishers to
acquire sufficient ACE to balance against catch. MFish considers that the objectives
of the catch balancing regime are to ensure that:
a)
Catch is harvested, landed and balanced with ACE;
b)
There are no significant deemed value payments when ACE is left unused at
the end of the fishing year; and
c)
Individual fishers are not able to use deemed values to undermine the QMS.
12
The catch balancing regime is a key fisheries management tool contributing to both
sustainability and utilisation objectives. The sustainability objectives are achieved
when deemed value rates encourage fishers to balance catch with available ACE and
in so doing constrain harvesting to the total allowable commercial catch (TACC).
Incorrectly set deemed values have led to catches in excess of TACC in some fisheries
in the past, which may have sustainability implications.
13
Utilisation objectives are achieved by providing flexibility for commercial operators
to manage unexpected and small overruns in ACE holdings by allowing periodic
rather than continuous balancing. In the long term, the sustainability implications that
may result from overfishing could result in TACC reductions, which also impact on
utilisation objectives.
14
MFish developed the Deemed Value Standard in 2007 to ensure that deemed value
rates are set so as to best meet the purpose of the Act. Justice J Priestly in the case of
Pacific Trawling Limited and Independent Fisheries Limited v The Minister of
Fisheries, High Court, Napier, CIV 2007-441-1016, 29 August 2008 states that:
15
“[81] The Deemed Value Standard (2007) is neither a gloss on nor an expansion of
the s 75 criteria. Rather it is a policy document setting out various circumstances
which might trigger a review of DVs.”
16
“[82] In short I consider Appendix 1 to the Final Advice represents new work by the
Ministry setting out in a coherent way the circumstances after which a DV review will
occur. The document does not constitute a template for the exercise of the Minister’s s
75 powers.”
17
The Deemed Value Standard provides guidance but you are not bound by it and all
decisions made regarding deemed values are made under the powers provided to you
by s 75.
Rationale for management options
18
Under s 75(1) of the Act the Minister of Fisheries is required to set interim and annual
deemed value rates for each quota management stock. Section 75 (2)(a) requires the
Minister, when setting deemed value rates, to take into account the need to provide an
incentive for every commercial fisher to acquire and hold sufficient ACE that is not
less than the total catch of that stock taken by the commercial fisher.
68
19
The Act requires both annual and interim deemed value rates to be set for all stocks
which will take effect on the first day of each fishing year. Prior to 2007, interim
deemed value rates were set at 50% of the annual rate. There is a risk that setting
interim deemed value rates too low will delay the balancing of catch until the end of
the fishing season. This may lead to a race for ACE and insufficient ACE to cover all
catch, therefore leading to the TACC being exceeded.
20
While MFish recommends that the interim deemed value rates will remain at 50% of
the annual rates for most stocks, MFish recommends higher interim deemed value
rates for some of the stocks under review. Details of what percentage of the annual
deemed value the interim deemed values have been set at can be found in the analysis
of each stock. In some instances it may be appropriate to set the interim rate closer to
the annual rate. If fishers were required to pay a higher interim deemed value rate, it
may encourage them to obtain ACE to balance their catch more regularly instead of
delaying this until the end of the fishing year. MFish proposes that, in situations
where more regular balancing is warranted to ensure catch levels do not exceed
available ACE, the interim deemed value should be set closer to the annual rate.
21
MFish recommends that you should use differential deemed value rates. The purpose
of differential deemed values is to create greater incentives at the individual level to
balance catch with ACE.
22
Unlike both the annual and interim deemed value rates, differential deemed value
rates apply at the individual fisher level only. MFish considers differential deemed
value rates to be an important tool in addressing situations where fishers take excess
catch with the intention of paying deemed values instead of balancing with ACE.
23
As part of a flexible approach to setting deemed values, MFish is recommending that
differential deemed values are set at a level that will provide a strong incentive for
fishers to balance catch with ACE. For some stocks this may mean applying
differential deemed values at small percentages of overcatch such as 5% to discourage
any fishing on deemed values; for others it may mean applying differential deemed
value rates at 20% overcatch to allow some minor over catch.
24
MFish’s recommendations for differential deemed value rates depend on the stock and
the behaviours that MFish considers deemed values ought to manage. The actual rates
at which the differentials are set are flexible and are not necessarily based on the
annual rate. Instead, they can be set at any financial amount that Minister considers is
necessary to provide the appropriate disincentive for fishers to take fish without ACE.
25
For each stock in this review interim, annual and differential deemed value rates are
proposed at a level that MFish considers will ensure every incentive is provided to
fishers to balance catch with ACE.
Process
26
The Deemed Value Standard sets out a process for reviewing and adjusting deemed
value rates. This process is being followed for the October 2008 sustainability round.
69
27
All quota management system (QMS) stocks with a fishing year beginning 1 October
were assessed against the following deemed value criteria as set out in the Deemed
Value Standard:
a)
Catch in excess of a TACC;
b)
Catch in excess of an individual’s ACE holdings and deemed values have been
invoiced but ACE has remained unused;
c)
Changes to the port price of a stock (Note: 2008-09 port price is data collected
in 2008 that is used for setting 2008-09 levies);
d)
Direct request from the Seafood Industry Council (SeaFIC) on behalf of quota
owners;
e)
Recent changes to a stock’s TACC or the TACC of key bycatch stocks;
f)
Stock has recently entered the QMS and the initial deemed value rate was set
using limited information.
28
Following an assessment of the stock’s performance against the criteria described
above an analysis spreadsheet (“analysis spreadsheet”) was prepared. This analysis
spreadsheet details the stock’s performance against the criteria described above.
29
This information was analysed to determine why deemed value rates for some stocks
may not be effective. The analysis spreadsheet described above was used to answer
questions such as:
a)
Likely reasons for the TACC overcatch/ACE breaches (where fisher behaviour
or stock biology is the major factor);
b)
An assessment of the bycatch fisheries associated with the stocks under review
(to ensure any changes to the target stock deemed value rates do not have an
adverse effect on the sustainability of bycatch stocks);
c)
If there has been significant changes in the structure of quota/ACE holdings
for the stocks;
d)
Likely risk that the deemed value may not provide the appropriate incentive to
balance catch with ACE;
e)
Impact of changes in market price and/or structure for the fish product/species
under review.
30
Information relevant to a deemed value adjustment is summarised in the analysis
section for each stock. Information sheets for each stock can be found in Appendix 2.
31
All stocks included on the list (Tables 1 and 2) were reviewed by the deemed value
review group at a meeting, held on Monday 5 May 2008. This review group consisted
of a representative from SeaFIC and MFish officials. At this meeting, each stock was
assessed using the information and analysis described above. This assessment
determined if a deemed value adjustment was appropriate.
32
If a deemed value adjustment was considered appropriate, the following information
sources were used to determine what the proposed new deemed value rate should be
70
proposed. This information was available to all participants at the deemed value
review group meeting:
a)
Port price;
b)
ACE trading price;
c)
Export prices as a proxy for market values (where appropriate);
d)
Bycatch ratios (where appropriate);
e)
Cost recovery levy rates; and
f)
Past deemed value payments.
Consultation process
33
Section 75A of the Act requires you to consult, if practicable, with persons or
organisations that you consider represent classes of persons who have an interest in
the stocks under review, including Maori, recreational, commercial and environmental
interests. MFish followed its standard consultation process for IPPs in the October
2008 sustainability round. This involved posting all IPPs on MFish’s website and
alerting stakeholders to this through a letter sent to approximately 350 companies,
organisations and individuals.
34
In addition to making the IPP publicly available, MFish also consulted with SeaFIC to
discuss the proposed deemed value rates.
SeaFIC
35
SeaFIC participated in the deemed value review group meeting and MFish has also
kept SeaFIC informed of the development of the deemed values rates that are
recommended for your consideration in this advice paper.
Assessment of management options
36
This section sets out a summary of the analysis for each stock, an assessment of why a
deemed value adjustment is appropriate and recommended deemed value rates for
your consideration.
37
MFish considers that not all stocks included on the review list required a deemed
value adjustment. Details of these stocks are presented at the end of the analysis
section.
38
MFish advises that for stocks that are subject to a TAC review in this sustainability
round, you may need to reconsider the appropriate deemed value rate when you have
set the TACC for that stock to ensure consistency of the two decisions. Where there
are different TACC choices for your consideration, this paper provides
recommendations on deemed value rates that MFish believes provide an incentive to
protect the new TACC level.
39
If significant deeming is occurring in a fishery, this is strong evidence that the
incentives are probably not correct and the situation needs to be rectified. In this
71
advice, MFish is recommending deemed value rates for the next fishing year so you
need to be concerned that the incentives will be correct going ahead. MFish has tried
to be proactive in recommending deemed value rates for fisheries were there is
potential for problems in the future instead of being reactive and only taking action
once problems become apparent certain fisheries.
40
Thus, the recommendations are trying to maintain the appropriate incentives going
forward instead of waiting for the incentives to become inappropriate before
responding.
41
As a general guide to setting deemed value rates under s 75 (2)(a), MFish advises the
following actions should be considered to ensure the correct incentives are in place for
commercial fishers to acquire or maintain sufficient ACE to cover their catch:
42
a)
When deemed value rates are below ACE price: Increase deemed value rates
to a level between ACE price and landed price to provide the incentive to
balance catch with ACE. There are transaction costs associated with finding,
buying and registering transfers of ACE. Deemed values should be sufficiently
above ACE price, such that fishers would not ordinarily pay the deemed values
to avoid those transaction costs;
b)
When deemed value rates are above landed price: Decrease deemed value rates
to a level between ACE price and landed price to provide an incentive not to
discard fish;
c)
When there are different deemed values rates across QMAs for a species:
Consider whether less variation in deemed value rates across the QMAs may
be appropriate to avoid providing an incentive not to misreport catch and so to
fail to balance catch with ACE for the correct stock.
MFish further advises that an important exception arises with respect to its advice in
the previous paragraph that deemed values should generally be set below landed price.
That exception arises when:
a)
A species is a bycatch in a multispecies fishery, such as a mixed trawl fishery;
and
b)
The catch of that bycatch species constrains the ability of the fishing fleet to
capture other target species.
In this circumstance, the bycatch species is said to have a “shadow value” which
reflects its value in permitting greater catches of other species in the overall fisheries
complex. When the shadow value is high, the ACE value that will constrain catch to
the TACC can often exceed the landed value. In this instance, the deemed value will
typically need to exceed the landed value.
43
When the ACE price and the deemed values are above the landed value, incentives to
discard the species are created. This may be an inevitable result of providing
appropriate incentives under 75 (2) (a) for fishers to acquire ACE to cover their
catches. When this occurs, you are likely to face recommendations from industry to
lower deemed values in order to avoid incentives to discard. The industry’s
perspectives in such cases are understandable. However, obligations under 75 (2) (a)
may be such that it is not possible to accommodate industry’s legitimate concerns. It
may be necessary to rely on compliance tools to prevent discarding when this occurs.
72
44
Several submitters including AFL, Area 2 Inshore, Challenger, ESL, Sanford and
SeaFIC argue that the Minister should consider whether TACCs are appropriate
before adjusting deemed value rates. Justice J Priestly in the case of Pacific Trawling
Limited and Independent Fisheries Limited v The Minister of Fisheries, High Court,
Napier, CIV 2007-441-1016, 29 August 2008 states:
“[76] The obligations which the Minister has under Part 3 and the TAC and TACC
setting mechanisms were not, in my judgment, matters which come into play when the
Minister was setting DV rates under s 75…..In my judgment it is not permissible for
the Minister, when considering DVs and the s 75(2)(a) requirement, to turn his mind
to the possibility that relevant TACs may need revision or have been set faultily.”
45
Arguments raised in submissions about TAC and TACC levels are therefore not
relevant to your decision.
46
The analysis for each stock follows.
Blue cod: BCO3
47
Blue cod (BCO3) is a target fishery (potting) but also a key bycatch species in the
southern inshore fin fishery. BCO3 is included in the review because:
a)
It has been consistently over-caught in recent fishing seasons (106% of
available ACE in the 2006-07 fishing season);
b)
Deemed value invoices of $49,779 were issued at the end of the 2006-07
fishing season;
c)
The port price for BCO3 has increased from $2.94 per kg in 2006-07 to $3.81
per kg in 2007-08 (an increase of $0.87 per kg).
48
The consistent over-fishing raises questions whether fishers have the appropriate
incentives to acquire sufficient ACE, which you must take into account when setting
deemed values under s 75 (2) (a). You may also have regard to the extent to which
catch of the stock has exceeded or is likely to exceed the TACC for the stock in any
year in setting deemed values under s 75 (2) (b) (v). You may also have regard to the
market value of the stock in setting deemed values under s 75 (2) (b) (iii). When the
price of a species increases, there is an increased probability that incentives to land
catches in excess of the TACC will arise
49
In the IPP, MFish proposed to increase the annual deemed value rate for BCO3 so that
it better reflects the landed price suggested by export price and other information in
this fishery.
50
MFish also proposed to set the interim deemed value rate at 66.66% of the annual
deemed value rate to encourage fishers to balance their catch with ACE regularly
instead of paying interim deemed values.
51
The differential deemed value rates for BCO3 would also change so they are in line
with the proposed annual deemed value rate.
52
ECO and Sanford supported the deemed value rates for BCO3 set out in the IPP.
73
53
SeaFIC did not support the deemed value rates for BCO3 set out in the IPP. SeaFIC
submitted that the TACC for BCO3 should be reviewed urgently. SeaFIC submits
BCO3 is in high abundance and those fishers trawling for other target stocks are
unable to avoid catching high levels of BCO3. SeaFIC submits that increasing the
deemed value rates for BCO3 will increase levels of catch mis-reporting.
54
AFL submitted that the TACC was too low for BCO3. AFL submitted that increasing
the annual deemed value rate to $3.75 per kg would not decrease catch but lead to an
increase in discarding. AFL submits that the current annual deemed value rate of
$3.25 per kg is already above the marginal price of ACE and is acting as a
disincentive to targeting the stock
55
MFish now has the 2008-09 port prices to consider in its analysis of BCO3. The
2008-09 port price for BCO3 is $3.84 per kg. This has increased by $0.03 per kg
since last year. As stated earlier, you may have regard to the market value of the
stock in setting deemed values under s 75 (2) (b) (iii).
56
BCO3 presents a difficult choice given the over-fishing (your obligations under s 75
(2) (a)) and AFL comments regarding discarding. However, MFish recognises that
there are problems with port price underestimating the true landed value of all species
including BCO3. After considering information received in submissions and the
evidence of continuing over-fishing, MFish is making the same recommendations to
you that were proposed in the IPP.
57
MFish recommends you approve the following deemed value rates for BCO3 for the
2008-09 season:
58
a)
Annual deemed value rate to increase from $3.25 per kg to $3.75 per kg;
b)
Interim deemed value rate to increase from $1.63 per kg to $2.50 per kg.
MFish recommends adjusting differential deemed value rates as outlined in the table
below.
Table 3: Proposed differential deemed value rates for BCO3
Current differential rates
Proposed differential rates
Catch in excess
Current deemed
Catch in excess Proposed deemed
of ACE holdings value rate for BCO3 of ACE holdings value rate for BCO3
(%)
($)
(%)
($)
20
3.90 per kg
20
4.50 per kg
40
4.55 per kg
40
5.25 per kg
60
5.20 per kg
60
6.00 per kg
80
5.85 per kg
80
6.75 per kg
100
6.50 per kg
100
7.50 per kg
Bluenose: All BNS stocks
59
The deemed value advice for all BNS stocks will be presented in a separate deemed
value FAP accompanying the BNS TAC review FAP.
74
Gurnard: GUR3
60
GUR3 is a bycatch of the ELE3, FLA3, RCO3 and TAR3 target fisheries of the
southern inshore finfish fishery. The 2008 plenary states that the abundance of GUR3
is at its highest level in 20 years and that current catches are probably sustainable in
the short to medium term. Data from the South-east Winter Trawl Survey indicates
relative biomass is now twice the level of the early 1990s, when the TACC was 600
tonnes. The TAC and TACC for GUR3 will be reviewed in 2009.
61
There is a high abundance of GUR3, which is creating bycatch problems in the
southern inshore finfish fishery. This has resulted in catches in excess of ACE and
deemed value payments.
a)
In the last three fishing seasons GUR3 has been over caught (124% of
available ACE in the 2006-07 fishing season);
b)
Deemed value invoices of $216,356 were issued at the end of the 2006-07
fishing season.
62
The deemed value rates for GUR3 were changed in the October 2007 review to
protect the TACC. Deemed value invoices incurred in the 2007-08 fishing year as
stated in the IPP (1 October 2007 to 14 April 2008) showed a drop from $30,023 to
$7,219, a significant decrease compared to the same time period last year.
63
However, these changes may have encouraged non-reporting and discards. With the
high abundance of GUR3, fishers report that they cannot avoid catching gurnard as
bycatch. If fishers discard bycatch, then they are not acquiring ACE to match their
catches. Therefore, incentives to discard raise questions about whether fishers have
correct incentives to acquire ACE to cover their catches, per s 75 (2) (a). And under s
75 (2) (b) (i), you may specifically have regard for the desirability of avoiding
incentives to discard fish. Under present circumstances, it is difficult to set deemed
values that discourage avoidable catches in excess of the TACC but still provide an
incentive to land unavoidable bycatches.
64
In the IPP, MFish recognised that the deemed value structure for GUR3 may not
encourage fishers to balance their catch with ACE.
65
In the IPP, MFish proposed to leave the annual and interim deemed values unchanged,
but to reduce the differential deemed values. The deemed values that were
implemented last year have had the desired effect of reducing the incentives to land
fish without acquiring ACE. However, given that all ACE for GUR3 will be used
under current conditions, fishers who have large bycatches of GUR3 cannot be sure
that they can acquire sufficient ACE to stay within 20% of their ACE. If a fisher
cannot find ACE to purchase, the fisher would pay $1.92 per kg for catches more than
20% over ACE and $2.24 per kg for catches more than 40% over ACE. Facing the
risk of ramped differentials, fishers may be tempted to discard GUR3 if their ACE
holdings are insufficient. To reduce this risk, MFish proposes to eliminate the 20%
and 40% steps in the differential values, and start differentials at 50% above ACE
holdings. Fishers who land gurnard in excess of ACE holdings at the time of the
catch will not face differential deemed values unless their landings exceed ACE by
more than 50%.
75
66
MFish believes that for this stock for the current year, this is an appropriate way to
balance your responsibilities under s 75 (2) (a) to provide incentives for fishers to
balance catches against ACE while also having regard for the objective of not creating
incentives to discard, per s 75 (2) (b) (i). If the TAC is reviewed next year, as
planned, it seems likely that the deemed values and differential structure would be
recommended for change. This differential structure, therefore, is likely to be in place
only for one year.
67
ECO and SeaFIC support the deemed value rates for GUR3 set out in the IPP.
SeaFIC submitted that the TACC for GUR3 should be reviewed urgently.
68
AFL proposed increasing the annual deemed value rate for GUR3 to $2.00 per kg.
AFL also supported removing the differential deemed values entirely. (AFL also
proposed either removing or setting the interim deemed value rate at the annual
deemed value rate. This option is not available under the Act.)
69
MFish recommends you approve the following deemed value rates for GUR3 for the
2008-09 season:
70
a)
Retain the existing annual deemed value rate of $1.60 per kg;
b)
Retain the existing interim deemed value rate of $0.80 per kg.
MFish recommends adjusting differential deemed value rates as outlined in the table
below.
Table 4: Proposed differential deemed value rates for GUR3
Current differential rates
Catch in excess
Current deemed
of ACE holdings
value rate for
(%)
GUR3 ($)
Proposed differential rates
Catch in excess
Proposed deemed
of ACE holdings value rate for GUR3
(%)
($)
20
1.92 per kg
50
2.08 per kg
40
2.24 per kg
60
2.56 per kg
60
2.56 per kg
80
2.88 per kg
80
2.88 per kg
100
3.20 per kg
100
3.20 per kg
Kingfish: KIN7 & KIN8
71
KIN7 is caught as a bycatch in the jack mackerel fishery in area 7 (JMA7) but it is
also an important recreational fish stock. This was reflected in the TACC allocation
that was set when the stock entered the QMS in 2003; a 21 tonne TAC was set but just
7 tonnes was allocated for commercial use. The KIN7 stock is believed to be on the
margins of the distribution of kingfish and, while there is incomplete information
about the status of the stock, it is important that catches are constrained to the TACC.
All kingfish stocks are listed on the 6th Schedule of the Act which means a kingfish
can be returned to the sea, provided it is likely to survive. While this option is
available to fishers who catch kingfish as a bycatch in JMA7, the survival of a
kingfish caught in a large trawl net is unlikely.
72
Current deemed value rates are not constraining KIN7 catches to the TACC limit
(182% of ACE was caught during the 2006-07 fishing year) as the value from the jack
mackerel fishery makes it feasible for fishers to continue to fish in excess of the KIN7
TACC and pay deemed values on their excess catch. Three companies were
76
responsible for just under 90% of the total deemed value bill of $71,292 which was
invoiced at the end of the 2006-07 fishing year.
73
For these reasons there are concerns in relation to the matter that you must take into
account under 75 (2) (a), namely the need to provide an incentive for every
commercial fisher to balance their catch with ACE. MFish therefore recommends you
consider amending the deemed value rates for KIN7 for the 2008-09 fishing year.
74
Vessels targeting JMA7 operate across both the KIN7 and KIN8 fisheries. There are
concerns that by increasing the deemed value rates in KIN7 this may create an
incentive for fishers to continue fishing in KIN7 while misreporting their catch as
KIN8. In addition, KIN8 has also been routinely overfished since it was introduced to
the QMS (between 107% – 159% of ACE in each of the last four years). At the end of
2007-08 fishing year the total deemed value amount invoiced was just under $31,000
and one company was responsible for two thirds of this amount. These factors indicate
that the incentive to balance catch with ACE, which you must take into account under
75 (2) (a), is not being provided for KIN8. MFish is also proposing that you amend
the deemed value rates in KIN8, and that you adopt the same rates as those proposed
for KIN7 in order to avoid creating any incentive to misreport.
75
Both KIN7 and KIN8 act as a constraint on fishers seeking to utilise their JMA7 ACE
and this has resulted in some stakeholders simultaneously opposing any increase to
the deemed value rates and recommending lower deemed value rates instead.
Stakeholders raised two key issues with regard to the proposed deemed value rates for
both KIN stocks:
76
a)
There are concerns that by increasing the KIN7 and KIN8 deemed value rates
above the market price for the species, this will only encourage fishers to
dump their catch rather than report it, or use the 6th Schedule provision
allowing live kingfish to be returned to the sea when the kingfish has little
chance of survival. They are also concerned that implementing management
measures that make dumping inevitable will have an impact on the quality of
information that is available to inform future stock assessments;
b)
The reason why both KIN7 and KIN8 constrain utilisation of the JMA7 fishery
is because commercial fishers’ allocation was reduced below average
historical landings when kingfish entered the QMS in 2003. This was in
response to the decision to give the majority of the TAC allocation to
recreational fishers. Both Challenger and SeaFIC are concerned that the TACC
has been set too low and that it is inappropriate to use high deemed value rates
to defend what they consider to be an incorrectly set TACC.
Independent advises in its submission that the current price it receives for frozen at
sea kingfish is $2.20 per kg which is well below the current (and proposed) annual
deemed value rate. In Independent’s view such a discrepancy will only encourage
fishers to dump their catch because the cost of landing and reporting the catch is so
prohibitive. Independent recommends that instead of increasing the deemed value for
kingfish it should be lowered so that it reflects market price and encourages fishers to
report their catch. This view is also supported by ESL.
77
77
MFish has some sympathy for the issues that stakeholders have raised. However, you
are required to set deemed value rates as per section 75 of the Act. This means you
must take into account the need to provide an incentive for every commercial fisher to
acquire or maintain sufficient ACE for the stock they are fishing (s. 75 (2)(a)). If you
set the deemed value rates for both kingfish stocks to reflect the market price that has
been provided in the submissions it is unlikely that you will provide an incentive for
fishers to either acquire the necessary ACE or cease fishing when all ACE has been
utilised because of the value of jack mackerel caught with the kingfish.
78
MFish also notes that the 2007 export price for frozen kingfish is around $5.00 per kg
which is considerably higher than the $2.20 per kg price provided in the submission
from Independent. Chilled kingfish attracts a premium export price of over $22 per kg
but since the majority of the kingfish caught in the JMA fishery will be frozen at sea it
therefore will not be able to realise the premium for chilled product.
79
The Act, however, does permit you to have a regard to the desirability that fishers will
land the catch for which they do not have ACE when you are deciding where to set
the deemed value rate (s. 75 (2)(b)(i)). This means you can set the deemed value rate
at a level that will encourage fishers to land and report their catch (rather than
dumping it) but only if in setting it at that level you have taken into account the need
to provide fishers with an appropriate incentive to balance their catch with ACE.
Moreover, as noted in the deemed value standard, when a bycatch stock is
constraining a target stock, it may be necessary to set the deemed value rate of the
bycatch stock in excess of its market price so as to give the correct financial incentive
to fishers to cease fishing or (if possible) to alter fishing practices to reduce or avoid
bycatch.
80
In MFish’s view lowering or maintaining the existing deemed value rates will not
reduce overfishing in either kingfish fishery
81
As noted above you are not required to consider the appropriateness of either the
KIN7 or KIN8 TACC when setting deemed values.
82
ECO and Sanford support the deemed value rates for KIN7 and KIN8 set out in the
IPP.
83
MFish recommends the following deemed value rates for KIN7 and KIN8 for the
2008-09 season, however you can choose to set the deemed value rates for both stocks
at a level that you consider is appropriate, considering your obligations under section
75 of the Act.
84
Annual deemed value rate to increase:
i)
KIN7: from $8.90 per kg to $10.00 per kg;
ii)
KIN8: from $8.90 per kg to $10.00 per kg;
a) Interim deemed value rate to increase:
iii)
KIN7: from $4.45 per kg to $5.00 per kg;
iv)
KIN8: from $4.45 per kg to $5.00 per kg;
78
85
MFish recommends adjusting differential deemed value rates as outlined in the table
below.
Table 5: Proposed differential deemed value rates for KIN7 & KIN8
Current differential rates
Catch in excess
Current deemed
of ACE holdings value rate for KIN7
(%)
& KIN8 ($)
Proposed differential rates
Catch in excess
Proposed deemed
of ACE holdings value rate for KIN7 &
(%)
KIN8 ($)
20
10.80 per kg
20
12.00 per kg
40
12.60 per kg
40
14.00 per kg
60
14.40 per kg
60
16.00 per kg
80
16.20 per kg
80
18.00 per kg
100
18.00 per kg
100
20.00 per kg
Parore: All PAR stocks
86
Parore is principally caught as a bycatch in the grey mullet, flatfish and trevally setnet
fisheries in northern New Zealand. Most of the catch comes from eastern Northland
and the Firth of Thames (PAR1) and the Kaipara and Manukau Harbours (PAR9).
87
In PAR1, 82% of the TACC was caught in 2006-07. PAR1 was included in this
review because there were deemed value payments when 19% of ACE remained
unused during the 2006-07 fishing year. Deemed value payments equalled $1,893
which represents 6 tonnes, or approximately 10% of the 61 tonne TACC. This is a
small amount in dollar terms but not in terms of the percentage of the TACC being
deemed. This raises questions about whether fishers have appropriate incentives to
acquire sufficient ACE, which you must take into account when setting deemed
values under s 75 (2) (a). The average ACE price was $0.23 per kg in the most recent
trading year. There has been a slight increase in the port price from $1.53 per kg to
$1.78 per kg. You may have regard to the market value of the stock in setting deemed
values under s 75 (2) (b) (iii). When the price of a species increases, there is an
increased probability that incentives to land catches in excess of the TACC will arise.
88
When MFish reviews a stock for a possible deemed value change, MFish also reviews
other stocks of the same species. The market value and fishing costs may be similar
for other stocks of the same species. If there is evidence that fishers lack appropriate
incentives to acquire ACE for PAR1, there is some possibility that there may exist or
may soon develop conditions that undermine the incentive to acquire ACE for PAR2
and PAR9, which would raise concerns under s 75 (2) (a).
89
In PAR9, 44% of the TACC was caught in 2006-07. Deemed value payments of
$301, which represents approximately 5% of the TACC, were made. As with the
other two PAR stocks, the price has increased from $1.45 per kg to $1.82 per kg.
PAR9 currently has a slightly higher annual deemed value ($0.34 per kg) than PAR1
and PAR2 ($0.31 per kg). The average ACE price in the most recent year was $0.25
per kg.
90
PAR2 is a relatively small fishery, with a TACC of 2 tonnes. PAR2 includes all New
Zealand waters not covered by PAR1 and PAR9. This area is not the main range of
the species. Only a small percent of the TACC (1%-3%) has been taken in recent
years, mostly on deemed values. The port price for PAR2 increased significantly in
the last year, from $0.69 per kg to $1.82 per kg. This recent price is in line with
prices in PAR1 and PAR9, where most of the fishery occurs. There is no information
79
on ACE price in the most recent year.
91
When MFish recommends a change to the deemed value for a stock, MFish reviews
whether incentives may be created for fishers to misreport the QMA in which fish
were caught. This may arise if fishers can avoid acquiring ACE by reporting the catch
as coming from a different QMA and paying the deemed value for that misreported
area. This incentive may be created when deemed values in two adjoining areas have
different rates. At present, annual deemed values are higher in PAR9 ($0.34 per kg)
than in PAR1 ($0.31 per kg) and PAR2 ($0.31 per kg). When fishers misreport
landings in order to take advantage of lower deemed value payments in some area,
they fail to acquire ACE in the area where they actually caught the fish. This raises
issues under s 75 (2) (a) about whether fishers have appropriate incentives to acquire
ACE for the area where the fish are caught.
92
In the IPP, MFish stated it believed that the current deemed value rates were not
providing the appropriate incentive to fishers to balance their catch with ACE in
PAR1. MFish proposed to set the same annual ($0.31 per kg) and interim deemed
value ($0.16 per kg) rates for all the PAR stocks and introduce differential deemed
values into all the PAR stocks. The differentials would have resulted in substantially
higher deemed value payments for fishers who acquire little or no ACE in relation to
their catches. Under that recommendation, the current annual deemed value rate for
PAR9 of $0.34 per kg would have fallen to $0.31 per kg.
93
MFish believed the approach of uniform deemed values across QMAs would remove
any incentive to misreport PAR to take advantage of a lower deemed value rate in a
neighbouring PAR fishery.
94
ECO supported the deemed value rates for all PAR stocks set out in the IPP.
95
Sanford did not support the deemed value rates for all PAR stocks set out in the IPP.
Sanford submitted that no deemed value rates should be lowered, which would have
been the result in PAR9.
96
AFL and SeaFIC did not support the deemed value rates for all PAR stocks set out in
the IPP. AFL and SeaFIC submitted that it was inappropriate to introduce differential
deemed value rates into low value fisheries.
97
AFL proposed that the annual deemed value rate for all PAR stocks be increased to
$0.35 per kg as they believe the current annual deemed value rate is acting as a cap on
ACE prices. Fishers pay deemed values for 10% of the catch in PAR1, even when
ACE remains available. The current average ACE prices of $0.23 per kg in PAR1
and $0.25 per kg in PAR9 are close to the deemed value rates of $0.31 per kg in
PAR1 and $0.34 per kg in PAR9. This evidence tends to support AFL’s arguments.
(AFL also proposed setting the interim deemed value rate at the annual deemed value.
However, this option is not available under the Act.)
98
Based on information received in submissions, MFish is making different
recommendations to you than it proposed in the IPP.
99
MFish does advise that some action is necessary to ensure that fishers have
appropriate incentives to acquire ACE for PAR1, per s 75 (2) (a). Rather than
80
introducing differential deemed values as proposed in the IPP, which was opposed by
some in industry, MFish recommends raising the interim and annual deemed values
for PAR1. MFish recommends that the rates currently in force in PAR9 be applied to
PAR1 in order to provide appropriate incentives to acquire ACE, per s 75 (2) (a). The
economic conditions in PAR9 may be similar to PAR1, and the current rates in PAR9
seem to have created appropriate incentives in PAR9.
100
MFish recommends that the same rates be set in PAR2 as in PAR1 and PAR9. PAR2
has a small TACC, and it abuts both PAR1 and PAR9. By setting the same deemed
value rates in all three parore QMAs (PAR1, PAR2, and PAR9), incentives to
misreport the stock of origin for catches as PAR2 and thus to fail to acquire
appropriate ACE in PAR1 and PAR9 are avoided. Incentives to fail to acquire
sufficient ACE, which would raise concerns under 75 (2) (a), are thereby avoided.
101
MFish recommends you approve the following deemed value rates for all PAR stocks
for the 2008-09 season:
a)
b)
Annual deemed value rate to:
i)
PAR1: increase from $0.31 per kg to $0.34 per kg;
ii)
PAR2: increase from $0.31 per kg to $0.34 per kg;
iii)
PAR9: remain at $0.34;
Interim deemed value rate to:
iv)
PAR1: increase from $0.16 per kg to $0.17 per kg;
v)
PAR2: increase from $0.16 per kg to $0.17 per kg;
vi)
PAR9: remain at $0.17 per kg;
102
Because there is no fishing for PAR10 (in the Kermadec area), deemed values do not
affect the incentives to acquire ACE for FMA 10, per 75 (2) (a). Therefore, MFish
recommends that you make no changes for deemed values for PAR10.
103
MFish recommends continuing to have no differential deemed value rates in these
fisheries.
Paua: All PAU Stocks
104
Paua is an important species to both commercial and non-commercial fishers. The
commercial value per kg is high.
105
Paua is a specific target; it is never caught as in incidental bycatch. Therefore, the
issue of unintended bycatches does not arise for PAU stocks.
106
All PAU stocks are on the Eighth Schedule, which requires minimum holdings of
PAU ACE before commercial harvestings. The minimum holdings are 1 tonne except
PAU6 were the minimum holding is 100 kg. Fishers are required to hold ACE prior
to fishing.
81
107
The factors cited above have led previous Ministers to decide that the appropriate
incentive for PAU stocks is to provide a very strong incentive to catch only the
amount of PAU for which fishers have ACE. The objective when applying s 75 (2)
(a) has been to provide a strong disincentive against catches in excess of ACE. This
has been accomplished by setting the annual deemed value at approximately twice the
port price. A fisher would suffer a large loss on any catches in excess of ACE. By
setting the deemed value at twice the port price, it is very unlikely that even if prices
increase during a fishing year that any incentive would arise to land paua in excess of
ACE.
108
The paua industry has been supportive of providing a strong incentive for landing
only paua for which the fisher has ACE. MFish advises that this approach continues
to provide appropriate incentives to balance catches with ACE, per s 75 (2) (a).
109
Because of the strong disincentives for catches in excess of ACE, there are typically
very low deemed value payments. For 2006-07, there were no deemed value
payments in PAU1, PAU3, PAU5D, PAU6, and PAU10. There were payments of
less than $900 in PAU2, PAU5A, and PAU7. Because the annual deemed value rate
was $60 per kg, this represents less than 20 kg in each area. Deemed value payments
of $3,900 were made in PAU4 and of $20,460 were made in PAU5B.
110
To maintain the strong incentive not to exceed ACE, the deemed values must be
adjusted to reflect changes in price. There has been an increase in the port price for
all PAU stocks (except PAU10, which is not fished) to $44.39 per kg (an increase of
$7.38 per kg) in 2007-08.
111
MFish believes it is important to continue the strategy of setting the annual deemed
value rate at least twice the port price for paua. In the IPP, MFish proposed to shift
the annual deemed value rate for all PAU stocks to $90.00 per kg to account for the
increase in port price. This is approximately twice the current port price.
112
MFish also proposed to set the interim deemed value rate at 77.77% of the annual
deemed value rate to encourage fishers to balance their catch with ACE regularly
instead of paying interim deemed values.
113
The differential deemed value rates for all PAU stocks would then be adjusted to
match the proposed annual deemed value rate.
114
ECO supported the deemed value rates for all PAU stocks set out in the IPP.
115
SeaFIC submitted that it agreed that the deemed value rates for all the PAU stocks
need to be increased; the increase should be based on the 2008-09 port price of $33.15
per kg. SeaFIC also submitted that the interim deemed value should be set at 50% of
the annual deemed value rate.
116
AFL supported SeaFIC’s submission on all the PAU stocks.
117
MFish agrees that the increase in the deemed value rates for all PAU stocks should be
based on the 2008-09 port price.
118
MFish recommends you approve the following deemed value rates for all PAU stocks
for the 2008-09 season:
82
a)
b)
Annual deemed value rate to increase:
i)
PAU1: from $60.00 per kg to $66.00 per kg;
ii)
PAU2: from $60.00 per kg to $66.00 per kg;
iii)
PAU3: from $60.00 per kg to $66.00 per kg;
iv)
PAU4: from $60.00 per kg to $66.00 per kg;
v)
PAU5A: from $60.00 per kg to $66.00 per kg;
vi)
PAU5B: from $60.00 per kg to $66.00 per kg;
vii)
PAU5D: from $60.00 per kg to $66.00 per kg;
viii)
PAU6: from $60.00 per kg to $66.00 per kg;
ix)
PAU7: from $60.00 per kg to $66.00 per kg;
Interim deemed value rate to increase:
x)
PAU1: from $30.00 per kg to $50.00 per kg;
xi)
PAU2: from $30.00 per kg to $50.00 per kg;
xii)
PAU3: from $30.00 per kg to $50.00 per kg;
xiii)
PAU4: from $30.00 per kg to $50.00 per kg;
xiv)
PAU5A: from $30.00 per kg to $50.00 per kg;
xv)
PAU5B: from $30.00 per kg to $50.00 per kg;
xvi)
PAU5D: from $30.00 per kg to $50.00 per kg;
xvii)
PAU6: from $30.00 per kg to $50.00 per kg;
xviii) PAU7: from $30.00 per kg to $50.00 per kg;
119
Because there is no fishing for PAU10 (in the Kermadec area), deemed values do not
affect the incentives to acquire ACE for FMA 10, per 75 (2) (a). Therefore, MFish
recommends that you make no changes for deemed values for PAU10.
120
MFish recommends adjusting differential deemed value rates as outlined in the table
below.
Table 6: Proposed differential deemed value rates for all PAU stocks
Current differential rates
Catch in excess
Current deemed
of ACE holdings
value rate for all
(%)
PAU stocks ($)
Proposed differential rates
Catch in excess
Proposed deemed
of ACE holdings value rate for all PAU
(%)
stocks ($)
20
72.00 per kg
20
79.20 per kg
40
84.00 per kg
40
92.40 per kg
60
96.00 per kg
60
105.60 per kg
80
108.00 per kg
80
118.80 per kg
100
120.00 per kg
100
132.00 per kg
Porae: All POR stocks
121
Porae is principally caught as a bycatch in inshore setnet fisheries in northern New
Zealand. It is generally taken in association with snapper and trevally in east
Northland and Coromandel, and with tarakihi and blue moki around Gisborne.
83
122
Porae (POR2) was included in this review because 135% of ACE was caught in the
2006-07 fishing year and deemed value invoices of $2,108 were incurred. There has
also been an increase in the port price from $1.83 per kg to $2.15 per kg. The deemed
value rates for POR2 are also out of line with deemed value rates of the other POR
stocks. In POR1, deemed value invoices of $3,140 were issued when 4% of ACE was
unused at the end of the 2006/2007 fishing season. In POR3, deemed value invoices
of $1 were issued when 99% of ACE was unused at the end of the 2006/2007 fishing
season.
123
The over-fishing of POR2 during the 2006-07 fishing year raises questions whether
fishers have the appropriate incentives to acquire sufficient ACE, which you must
take into account when setting deemed values under s 75 (2) (a). You may also have
regard to the extent to which catch of the stock has exceeded or is likely to exceed the
TACC for the stock in any year in setting deemed values under s 75 (2) (b) (v).
124
There has also been an increase in the port price from $1.83 per kg to $2.15 per kg.
You may have regard to the market value of the stock in setting deemed values under
s 75 (2) (b) (iii). When the price of a species increases, there is an increased
probability that incentives to land catches in excess of the TACC will arise
125
In the IPP, MFish proposed to set the same annual and interim deemed value rates for
all POR stocks and introduce differential deemed values for all POR stocks. If there is
evidence that fishers lack appropriate incentives to acquire ACE for POR2, there is
some possibility that there may exist or may soon develop conditions that undermine
the incentive to acquire ACE for POR1 and POR3, which would raise concerns under
s 75 (2) (a).
126
This approach would remove any incentive to misreport POR landings in order to take
advantage of a lower deemed value rate in a neighbouring POR fishery.
127
ECO and Sanford supported the deemed value rates for all POR stocks set out in the
IPP.
128
AFL did not support the deemed value rates for all POR stocks set out in the IPP.
AFL submitted that the low TACC in POR2 is constraining catch in the inshore setnet
fishery. AFL submitted that increasing the annual deemed value rate to $1.35 per kg
will not decrease catch but lead to an increase in discarding. AFL proposed that the
interim deemed value should be removed or set at the annual deemed value rate, and
that until a TACC review has occurred that differential deemed values should not
apply to this fishery.
129
Area 2 Inshore and SeaFIC did not support the deemed value rates for all POR stocks
set out in the IPP. Both Area 2 Inshore and SeaFIC submitted that the 135% of ACE
caught during the 2006-07 fishing season is due to misreporting of POR1 as POR2 by
one permit holder. They submitted that all fishers should not be punished by the
actions of one fisher. Both note that the fisher responsible for the misreporting has
now left the fishery.
130
MFish agrees the breach of the TACC for POR2 was likely the result of the actions of
one fisher but if the lower deemed value rate is retained for POR2, the incentive
remains for other fishers to misreport catches and so not to balance their catch with
84
ACE for the correct stock. Misreporting of catches can have negative impacts on the
quality of assessments of stock biomass and on the availability of ACE to legitimate
fishers. MFish does not agree that correcting inappropriate incentives is punishing
fishers.
131
Based on information received in submissions, MFish is making different
recommendations to you than it proposed in the IPP.
132
MFish recommends keeping no differential deemed value rates in POR1, POR2 and
POR3. This is a change from the deemed value rates proposed in the IPP. MFish
agrees with submitters that at this stage it is inappropriate to introduce differential
deemed values into these low value fisheries.
133
However, MFish recommends that the same rates still be set in POR2 as in POR1 and
POR3. The economic conditions in POR2 are probably similar to the economic
conditions in POR1 and POR3, so appropriate incentives will exist to acquire ACE for
POR2, per s 75 (2) (a).
134
By setting the same deemed value rates in all three porae QMAs (POR1, POR2, and
POR3), incentives to misreport the stock of origin for catches and thus to fail to
acquire appropriate ACE are avoided. Incentives that are inconsistent with the
objectives of 75 (2) (a) are thereby avoided.
135
MFish recommends you approve the following deemed value rates for all POR stocks
for the 2008-09 season:
a)
b)
Annual deemed value rate to:
i)
POR1: remain at $1.35 per kg;
ii)
POR2: increase from $0.69 per kg to $1.35 per kg;
iii)
POR3: remain at $1.35 per kg;
Interim deemed value rate to:
iv)
POR1: remain at $0.68 per kg;
v)
POR2: increase from $0.35 per kg to $0.68 per kg;
vi)
POR3: remain at $0.68 per kg;
136
Because fishing is not allowed for POR10, deemed values do not affect the incentives
to acquire ACE for FMA 10, per 75 (2) (a). Therefore, MFish recommends advises
that you make no changes for deemed values for POR10.
137
MFish recommends continuing to have no differential deemed value rates in these
fisheries.
Ribaldo: RIB3, RIB4, RIB5, RIB6 & RIB7
138
Ribaldo was classified as a low knowledge stock when it was brought into the QMS in
1998. This classification meant that a low TACC was set but low deemed values were
also introduced to encourage fisher’s to report their catch. The TACC for RIB7 was
reviewed during the October 2006 sustainability round and was substantially
increased from 55 tonnes to 330 tonnes. The deemed value rates were also increased
85
at the same time from an annual deemed value rate of $0.07 per kg to $0.80 per kg
and from an interim deemed value rate of $0.04 per kg to $0.40 per kg. However, the
TACC was over-fished (122% of ACE caught) during the 2006-07 fishing year which
would suggest the deemed value rates were not set at an appropriate level when last
reviewed by MFish.
139
During the 2006-07 fishing year $67,350 in deemed value payments were invoiced for
RIB7. Three companies were responsible for 93% of these payments. There are
currently no differential deemed value rates in place for any RIB stock and MFish
believes this provides fishers with a strong incentive to continue to fish without ACE.
140
The existence of over-fishing during the 2006-07 fishing year does mean that fishers
may not have the appropriate incentives to acquire sufficient ACE to balance their
catch. You are required to consider if the appropriate incentives are in place under s
75 (2) (a). You may also have regard to the extent to which catch of the stock has
exceeded or is likely to exceed the TACC in any year ( s 75 (2) (b) (v)).
141
MFish is proposing that differential deemed value rates are applied in RIB7 in two
incremental stages; for catch that is 110% of ACE holdings a rate of $1.20 per kg will
apply and for catch that is 120% of ACE holdings a higher rate of $2.00 per kg will
apply.
142
In the IPP, MFish also considered it appropriate to set consistent deemed value rates
for stocks that are routinely fished as part of the same fishing trip so as to avoid any
incentive for fishers to misreport catch by taking advantage of a lower deemed value
rate in a neighbouring stock. For this reason MFish had proposed increasing the
deemed value rates for RIB3, RIB4, RIB5 and RIB6 so that their interim and annual
deemed value rates matched those of RIB7 and so that the proposed differential
deemed value rates also apply. MFish now considers that since these stocks have not
been over-fished in recent years and given the current port price of $0.48 per kg it
may be inappropriate at this time to increase the deemed value rates for RIB3, RIB4,
RIB5 and RIB6 so that they are fully in line with RIB7.
143
However, MFish is concerned that the current deemed value rates for RIB5 are set too
low given that the 2008-09 port price for the stock is $0.48 per kg. MFish believes
this could provide fishers with an incentive to fish in excess of ACE holdings and it
could mean that your obligations under s. 75 (2) (a) may not be met. For this reason
MFish recommends that you increase the deemed value rates for RIB5 so that the
interim deemed value rate is increased from $0.03 per kg to $0.15 per kg and the
annual deemed value rate is increased from $0.06 per kg to $0.30 per kg. This change
will mean that similar deemed value rates will apply across RIB3, RIB4 and RIB5.
144
MFish will continue to monitor RIB3, RIB4, RIB5 and RIB6 during the 2008-09
fishing year to ensure that catch quantities stay within the limit of the TACC. If there
is evidence of over-fishing or misreporting between stocks then the deemed value
rates for these stocks will be reviewed for the 2009-2010 fishing year.
145
ECO and Sanford support the introduction of differential deemed value rates and the
application of a standard deemed value regime for all RIB stocks, as set out in the IPP.
86
146
AFL supports the use of differential deemed value rates and recommends that these
rates are implemented at 5% and $0.20 increments, starting at $1.00 per kg.
147
SeaFIC supports differential deemed value rates for RIB7 but does not believe that
standard rates should be applied to RIB3, RIB4, RIB5 and RIB6. SeaFIC does not
consider it appropriate to apply standard deemed value rates in an attempt to reduce
misreporting.
148
Based on information received in submissions, MFish has amended the
recommendations that were proposed in the IPP as follows. MFish recommends
introducing differential deemed values in RIB7 to stop the deliberate over-fishing that
appears to be carried out by a few fishers. Differential deemed values should have
minimal impact on those fishers who are catching RIB7 as a genuine bycatch as
differential deemed values should only impact on those fishers who are deliberately
over-fishing RIB7. MFish also recommends that the deemed value rates for RIB5 are
adjusted so that they mirror the interim and annual deemed value rates currently in
place for RIB3 and RIB4.
149
MFish recommends you approve the following deemed value rates for RIB3, RIB4,
RIB5, RIB6 and RIB7 for the 2008-09 season:
a)
b)
150
Annual deemed value rate to:
i)
RIB3: remain at $0.30 per kg;
ii)
RIB4: remain at $0.30 per kg;
iii)
RIB5: increase from $0.06 per kg to $0.30 per kg;
iv)
RIB6: remain at $0.80 per kg;
v)
RIB7: remain at $0.80 per kg;
Interim deemed value rate to:
vi)
RIB3: remain at $0.15 per kg;
vii)
RIB4: remain at $0.15 per kg;
viii)
RIB5: increase from $0.03 per kg to $0.15 per kg;
ix)
RIB6: remain at $0.40 per kg;
x)
RIB7: remain at $0.40 per kg;
MFish recommends introducing differential deemed value rates in RIB7 as outlined in
the table below.
Table 7: Proposed differential deemed value rates for RIB7
Current differential rates
Proposed differential rates
Current deemed value
Catch in excess of
rate for RIB3, RIB4,
Catch in excess of
ACE holdings (%) RIB5, RIB6 & RIB7 ($) ACE holdings (%)
10
20
Differential deemed
values currently do not
apply
87
Proposed deemed
value rate for RIB3,
RIB4, RIB5, RIB6 &
RIB7 ($)
10
1.20 per kg
20
2.00 per kg
Rough skate: RSK1 and RSK3
151
Rough skate occur throughout New Zealand, but are most abundant around the South
Island in depths down to 500m. Most of the catch is taken as bycatch by bottom
trawlers, but skate are also taken by longliners.
152
RSK1 and RSK3 have been included in this review because the deemed value rates
for these fisheries are out of line with the other RSK stocks. The possibility that
catches may be misreported as RSK1 or RSK3 to take advantage of the lower deemed
values raises questions whether fishers have the appropriate incentives to acquire
sufficient ACE, which you must take into account when setting deemed values under s
75 (2) (a). You may also have regard to any other matters you consider relevant in
setting deemed values under s 75 (2) (b) (vi). By removing this difference in the
deemed value rates there should not be any incentive to misreport RSK to take
advantage of a lower deemed value rate in a neighbouring RSK fishery.
153
In RSK1, deemed value invoices of $564 were issued when 17% of ACE remained
used during the 2006-2007 fishing year. In RSK3, deemed value invoices of $1,520
were issued when 17% of ACE remained used during the 2006-2007 fishing year.
154
This change also brings the deemed value rates for all rough skate in line with the
deemed value rates for all smooth skate (SSK). MFish is aware that it can be difficult
to identify each species of skate once it had been processed so the matching of
deemed value rates should remove any opportunity to misreport the species of skate
caught to take advantage of a lower deemed value rate.
155
Rough skate is listed on the 6th Schedule of the Fisheries Act and therefore it can be
returned to the sea provided it is likely to survive.
156
ECO and SeaFIC supported the deemed value rates for RSK1 and RSK3 set out in the
IPP.
157
AFL proposed either removing or setting the interim deemed value rate at the annual
deemed value rate.
158
While submissions supported the proposed deemed value rates, MFish recommends
taking no action at this time. MFish continues to be concerned that the differences in
deemed value rates for RSK1 and RSK3 as compared to other RSK stocks and as
compared to SSK stocks is an issue. However, the 2008-09 port price of $0.42 per kg
would suggest that $0.44 per kg may be too high for RSK1 and RSK3. Further,
catches in excess of TACCs in some RSK and SSK stocks suggests that cuts in other
deemed values may not be appropriate. Rather than taking action now, MFish
proposes to review comprehensively the deemed values for all RSK and SSK stocks
prior to October 2009.
159
Therefore, MFish is making different recommendations to you than it proposed in the
IPP.
160
MFish recommends you retain the existing deemed value rates for RSK1 and RSK3
for the 2008-09 season:
88
a)
b)
161
Annual deemed value rate:
i)
RSK1: $0.23 per kg;
ii)
RSK3: $0.30 per kg;
Interim deemed value rate:
iii)
RSK1: $0.22 per kg;
iv)
RSK3: $0.22 per kg;
MFish recommends continuing to have no differential deemed value rates in these
fisheries.
Gemfish: SKI1 & SKI2
162
SKI2 is both a target fishery and a bycatch of the TAR2 trawl fishery. In five out of
the last six fishing seasons SKI2 has been over-caught (123% of available ACE in the
2006-07 fishing season).
163
In October 2007, you approved an increase in the deemed value rates for SKI2. The
purpose of this increase was to provide stronger incentives for fishers to acquire ACE
to cover catches, consistent with the objectives of s 75 (2) (a).
164
However, the port price for SKI2 has dropped from $3.14 per kg in 2006-07 to $1.54
per kg in 2007-08 (a decrease of $1.60 per kg). This means that the annual deemed
value of $1.75 is now above the port price. Fishers may now have an incentive to
dump fish since the deemed value is greater than the price they receive for it. When
fishers have incentives to dump fish, they do not have the appropriate incentives to
acquire ACE, which s 75 (2) (a) requires you to take into account. It is therefore
appropriate to consider a change to the deemed value. S 75 (2) (b) (i) also allows you
specifically to have regard for discards.
165
In the IPP, MFish proposed a decrease to the annual deemed value rate to $1.29 to
better reflect current market prices.
166
When MFish recommends a change to the deemed value for a stock, MFish reviews
whether incentives may be created for fishers to misreport the QMA in which fish
were caught. This may arise if fishers can avoid acquiring ACE by reporting the catch
as coming from a different QMA and paying the deemed value for that misreported
area. This incentive may be created when deemed values in two adjoining areas have
different rates. At present, annual deemed values are higher in SKI1 ($2.64) than
either the current ($1.75) or proposed deemed values for SKI2. When fishers
misreport landings in order to take advantage of lower deemed value rates in some
area, they fail to acquire ACE in the area where they actually caught the fish. This
raises issues under s 75 (2) (a) about whether fishers have appropriate incentives to
acquire ACE for the area where the fish are caught.
167
To remove any incentive for fishers to misreport SKI2 as coming from SKI1, MFish
proposed that the deemed value rates for SKI1 was adjusted so it is in line with SKI2.
168
Area 2 Inshore, ECO and SeaFIC support the deemed value rates for SKI1 and SKI2
set out in the IPP.
89
169
SeaFIC submits that TACC for SKI2 should be reviewed urgently. SeaFIC submits a
TACC increase has been sought based on perceived increasing abundance and
managers at the working group are currently unwilling to agree to an increase citing
the scientific evidence is inconclusive. SeaFIC submits that the review needs to be
accelerated to address the TACC concerns.
170
Sanford did not support the lower deemed value rates for SKI1 and SKI2 set out in the
IPP.
171
AFL did not support the deemed value rates for SKI1 and SKI2 set out in the IPP.
AFL submitted that reducing the annual deemed value rates in SKI1 and SKI2 will
continue to cause the deemed value rates to act as a cap on the ACE price. (AFL also
proposed either removing or setting the interim deemed value rate at the annual
deemed value rate. This option is not available under the Act.)
172
New information on gemfish stocks show the 2008-09 port price for SKI1 and SKI2
has increased from $1.54 per kg in 2007-08 to $1.74 per kg in 2008-09. Average
ACE prices for 2006-07 were $1.21 in SKI1 and $0.61 in SKI2. The proposed rate of
$1.29 in the IPP would seem to risk creating incentives to fish on deemed values
rather than acquire ACE in SKI1. MFish agrees with AFL that by setting the annual
deemed value at $1.29 as proposed in the IPP, it may create incentives to pay deemed
values rather than to purchase ACE. Therefore, MFish recommends that a higher
annual deemed value of $1.50 per kg be applied in SKI1 and SKI2.
173
MFish recommends you approve the following deemed value rates for SKI1 and SKI2
for the 2008-09 season:
a)
b)
174
Annual deemed value rate:
i)
to decrease from $2.64 per kg to $1.50 per kg in SKI1;
ii)
to decrease from $1.75 per kg to $1.50 per kg in SKI2;
Interim deemed value rate:
i)
to decrease from $1.32 per kg to $0.75 per kg in SKI1;
ii)
to decrease from $0.88 per kg to $0.75 per kg in SKI1.
MFish recommends adjusting differential deemed value rates as outlined in the table
below.
Table 8: Proposed differential deemed value rates for SKI1 & SKI2
Catch in excess
of ACE holdings
(%)
Current differential rates
Current deemed
Catch in excess
value rate for SKI1 of ACE holdings
($)
(%)
Proposed differential rates
Current deemed
Catch in excess
Proposed deemed
value rate for SKI2 of ACE holdings value rate for SKI1 &
($)
(%)
SKI2 ($)
20
3.168 per kg
20
3.60 per kg
20
1.80 per kg
40
3.696 per kg
40
4.20 per kg
40
2.10 per kg
60
4.80 per kg
60
2.40 per kg
80
2.70 per kg
100
3.00 per kg
60
4.224 per kg
80
4.752 per kg
100
5.280 per kg
80 and over
5.40 per kg
Sea perch: SPE8
175
Sea perch (SPE8) is a bycatch species of the deepwater fishery in QMA8. SPE8 is
90
included in the review because the port price has increased from $0.60 per kg to $1.76
per kg (an increase of $1.16 per kg).
176
The 2007-08 port price ($1.76 per kg) is higher than the annual deemed value rate
($0.24 per kg) suggesting fishers could fish, pay the deemed value and still realise a
profit.
177
The rise in port price raises questions whether fishers have the appropriate incentives
to acquire sufficient ACE, which you must take into account when setting deemed
values under s 75 (2) (a). You may also have regard to the market value of the stock
in setting deemed values under s 75 (2) (b) (iii). When the price of a species
increases, there is an increased probability that incentives to land catches in excess of
the TACC will arise
178
The port price for the other SPE fisheries has increased slightly (increases range from
$0.01 per kg to $0.03 per kg).
179
In the IPP, MFish proposed to increase the annual deemed value rate for SPE8 so that
it better reflects the port price in this fishery.
180
ECO and Sanford support the deemed value rates for SPE8 set out in the IPP.
181
AFL, Challenger and SeaFIC submitted that the 2008-09 port price for SPE8 should
be used as this has fallen from $1.76 per kg to $0.52 per kg.
182
Based on information received in submissions, MFish is making different
recommendations to you than it proposed in the IPP.
183
MFish agrees that the new port price means there is no reason to increase the current
deemed value rates as they are providing the appropriate incentives required under s
75 (2) (a).
184
MFish recommends you retain the existing deemed value rates for SPE8 for the 200809 season:
185
a)
Annual deemed value rate of $0.24 per kg
b)
Interim deemed value rate of $0.12 per kg
MFish recommends continuing to have no differential deemed value rates in this
fishery.
Rig: SPO2
186
187
Rig (SPO) is caught as bycatch in most inshore trawl fisheries. SPO2 has been
included in this review because:
a)
It has been consistently over caught in the last twelve fishing seasons (113% of
available ACE in the 2006-07 fishing season).
b)
Deemed value invoices of $36,241 were issued at the end of the 2006-07
fishing season.
The deemed value rates for SPO2 were changed in the October 2007 review to better
91
protect the TACC because of persistent over fishing. The 2007-08 port price for
SPO2 of $2.82 per kg suggests the market value of rig has decreased. This may
encourage fishers to discard fish since the annual deemed value rate is now above the
port price.
188
Under s 75 (2) (a), you must consider whether there are appropriate incentives for
fishers to acquire ACE. If fishers face inappropriate incentives to discard bycatch,
then fishers may not have correct incentives to acquire ACE to cover their catches.
And under s 75 (2) (b) (i), you may have regard for the desirability of avoiding
incentives to discard fish.
189
The consistent over-fishing raises questions whether fishers have the appropriate
incentives to acquire sufficient ACE, which you must take into account when setting
deemed values under s 75 (2) (a). You may also have regard to the extent to which
catch of the stock has exceeded or is likely to exceed the TACC for the stock in any
year in setting deemed values under s 75 (2) (b) (v).
190
The differential deemed value rates for SPO2 were altered to set a lower over catch
level to encourage fishers to balance with ACE as the majority of deeming was being
carried out by two companies. One company has since left the fishery. The unique
differential deemed value rates were also introduced because it has been overfished
the past 12 fishing years.
191
In the IPP, MFish considered a decrease to the annual deemed value rate closer in line
with port price was appropriate. MFish also considered that the unique differential
deemed value rates may now be providing an incentive to dump fish since the ramped
deemed value is greater than the price they receive for it. MFish proposed the
differential deemed value rates would also change to reflect the proposed annual
deemed value rate and revert to the standard ramping system.
192
ECO and SeaFIC supported the deemed value rates for SPO2 set out in the IPP.
193
SeaFIC submits that SPO2 is an unavoidable bycatch in inshore fisheries in QMA2.
While the SPO2 TACC was increased in 2004, the increased TACC was still lower
than a number of catches in the previous years. Consequently, it has been continued
to be over-caught since that increase.
194
SeaFIC submits that since the port price for 2008/09 has increased to $3.63 per kg, an
increase rather than a decrease in the deemed value would normally be supported.
However, given the high abundance issue and a desire to ensure catches are accurately
reported SeaFIC favours decreasing the deemed value as proposed by the Ministry.
Therefore, SeaFIC supports the deemed value rates proposed in the IPP but for
different reasons.
195
AFL did not support the deemed value rates for SPO2 set out in the IPP. AFL
submitted that reducing the annual deemed value rates for SPO2 will continue to
cause the deemed value rates to act as a cap on the ACE price.
196
Area 2 Inshore did not support the deemed value rates for SPO2 set out in the IPP.
Area 2 inshore submitted that until the TACC for SPO2 is reviewed, it cannot support
any changes to the deemed value rates.
92
197
Since the IPP was released, MFish has finalised the 2008-09 port price for SPO2 and
it has increased from $2.82 per kg to $3.63 per kg. MFish agrees with AFL that
setting the annual deemed value at $2.00 as proposed in the IPP may cap ACE prices.
198
Based on information received in submissions, MFish is making different
recommendations to you than it proposed in the IPP.
199
Given the increase in port price, it is no longer necessary to drop the current deemed
value rates as they are providing the appropriate incentives required under s 75 (2) (a).
200
However, MFish still recommends the change to the differential deemed value for
SPO2 to return it to a standard ramping system. MFish believes that for this stock for
the current year, this is an appropriate way to balance your responsibilities under s 75
(2) (a) to provide incentives for fishers to balance catches against ACE while also
having regard for the objective of not creating incentives to discard, per s 75 (2) (b)
(i).
201
MFish recommends you approve the following deemed value rates for SPO2 for the
2008-09 season:
202
a)
Annual deemed value rate to remain at $3.00 per kg
b)
Interim deemed value rate to remain at $1.50 per kg
MFish recommends adjusting differential deemed value rates as outlined in the table
below.
Table 9: Proposed differential deemed value rates for SPO2
Current differential rates
Proposed differential rates
Proposed deemed
Catch in excess of Current deemed value Catch in excess of value rate for SPO2
ACE holdings (%)
rate for SPO2 ($)
ACE holdings (%)
($)
10
6.00 per kg
25
8.00 per kg
50
11.00 per kg
20
3.60 per kg
40
4.20 per kg
60
4.80 per kg
80
5.40 per kg
100
6.00 per kg
Broadbill swordfish: SWO1
203
Broadbill swordfish (SWO1) is both a bycatch in the bigeye and southern bluefin tuna
fisheries and a target fishery.
204
In meeting your obligations to take account of the need to provide incentives for
fishers to acquire ACE to cover their catches, per 75 (2) (a), MFish has generally
advised you that the incentives will be appropriate if the deemed value rate is above
the ACE price and below the landed price. If the deemed value is above the ACE
price, then fishers have incentives to acquire ACE rather than pay deemed values. If
the deemed value is below the landed value, then incentives are not created to
misreport or to discard in order to avoid deemed value payments. SWO1 is included
in this review because initial deemed value rates were set with limited information, in
the absence of an active ACE market. Information from the ACE market is now
available and can inform your decision-making on the appropriate deemed value.
93
205
MFish is concerned that the current level of the deemed value is close to port price.
206
Port price for SWO 1 ranges between $4.00-$6.51 on the basis of greenweight. The
current annual deemed value is $4.25 (the interim deemed value is $2.13).
207
Ninety percent of ACE trades reported between 2004 and 2008 were at or below
$1.18 per kg (excluding $0 and nominal trades of $1 a transaction). There is now
evidence that the initial deemed value of $4.25 is well above the rate that is required
to make it more economic to purchase ACE than to use deemed values.
208
MFish advises that you can continue to meet your obligations under 75 (2) (a) to
provide incentives for fishers to acquire ACE while also giving greater regard to
possible incentives to discard, per s 75 (2) (b) (i), by lowering the deemed value
somewhat.
209
In the IPP, MFish proposed an annual deemed value rate of $3.00 per kg based on the
2007-08 port price ($6.51) and the ACE price ($1.18).
210
AFL, ECO and SeaFIC support the deemed value rates for SWO1 set out in the IPP
211
Sanford does not support the deemed value rates for SWO1 set out in the IPP.
212
MFish recommends you approve the following deemed value rates for SWO1 for the
2008-09 season:
213
a)
Annual deemed value rate to decrease from $4.25 per kg to $3.00 per kg.
b)
Interim deemed value to decrease from $2.13 per kg to $1.50 per kg
MFish recommends continuing to have no differential deemed value rates in this
fishery.
Stocks reviewed but no deemed value adjustment proposed
214
The remaining stocks listed in Tables 1 and 2 were also reviewed but following their
assessment at the deemed value review group meeting, MFish does not consider an
adjustment is warranted at this time, as the current deemed value rates are providing
the appropriate incentives required under s 75 (2) (a). Further information on why
MFish considers the deemed value rates for these stocks should remain unchanged for
the coming season is described below.
Barracouta: BAR5
215
Barracouta (BAR5) was included in this review because there has been deemed value
payments when 16% of ACE remained unused during the 2006-07 fishing year.
There has also been an increase in the port price from $0.19 per kg to $0.25 per kg.
216
Upon further investigation, one company incurred 100% of the total deemed value
payments ($46,165) during the 2006-07 fishing year. This company has now gone
into liquidation. When removing this company from the analysis, all other catch of
BAR5 during the 2006-07 fishing season was balanced with ACE, so the current
94
deemed value rates are appropriate. Therefore, MFish did not propose an adjustment
to the deemed value rates in the IPP.
217
MFish recommends that you retain the existing deemed value rates for BAR5 for the
2008-09 season:
i)
Annual deemed value rate of $0.25 per kg;
ii)
Interim deemed value rate of $0.12 per kg.
Blue shark: BWS1
218
Blue shark (BWS1) was included in this review because there has been deemed value
payments when 62% of ACE remained unused during the 2006-07 fishing year.
There has also been an increase in the port price from $0.17 per kg to $3.84 per kg.
219
In the IPP, MFish considered that, since only 42% of the TACC for BWS1 was caught
during the 2006-07 fishing season and that it is also on the 6th Schedule of the
Fisheries Act, the current deemed value rates were appropriate. Therefore, MFish did
not propose an adjustment to the deemed value rates in the IPP.
220
MFish recommends that you retain the existing deemed value rates for BWS1 for the
2008-09 season:
i)
Annual deemed value rate of $0.15 per kg;
ii)
Interim deemed value rate of $0.08 per kg.
Elephant fish: ELE3
221
Elephant fish (ELE3) was included in this review because it is has been over caught
the last four years. There has also been a slight increase in the port price from $1.80
per kg to $1.90 per kg.
222
In the IPP, MFish considered that, since the over catch has been relatively small (2%
to 8% of the TACC) and the change in port price is minimal, the current deemed value
rates were appropriate. Therefore, MFish did not propose an adjustment to the deemed
value rates in the IPP.
223
MFish recommends that you retain the existing deemed value rates for ELE3 for the
2008-09 season:
i)
Annual deemed value rate of $1.41 per kg;
ii)
Interim deemed value rate of $1.21 per kg.
Frostfish: FRO8
224
Frostfish (FRO8) was included in this review because 111% of ACE was caught in
the 2006-07 fishing year. It was also over caught the previous two years.
225
In the IPP, MFish decided due to a lack of information on this stock, it will monitor
the situation in this fishery. This stock would be revisited next year, so the current
deemed value rates were appropriate for the time being. Therefore, MFish did not
propose an adjustment to the deemed value rates in the IPP.
95
226
Challenger supports retaining the current deemed value rates for FRO8.
227
MFish recommends that you retain the existing deemed value rates for FRO8 for the
2008-09 season:
i)
Annual deemed value rate of $0.15 per kg;
ii)
Interim deemed value rate of $0.08 per kg.
Garfish: GAR1
228
Garfish (GAR1) was included in this review because there has been an increase in the
port price from $5.76 per kg to $8.41 per kg.
229
In the IPP, MFish considered that, since the TACC has never been breached and no
deemed value payments were incurred in GAR1 during the 2006-07 fishing year, the
current deemed value rates are appropriate. However, due to the large increase in port
price, MFish would monitor the situation in this fishery and revisit this stock next
year. Therefore, MFish did not propose an adjustment to the deemed value rates in the
IPP.
230
MFish recommends that you retain the existing deemed value rates for GAR1 for the
2008-09 season:
i)
Annual deemed value rate of $1.80 per kg;
ii)
Interim deemed value rate of $0.90 per kg.
Grey mullet: GMU1
231
Grey mullet (GMU1) was included in this review because there has been deemed
value payments when 14% of ACE remained unused during the 2006-07 fishing year.
There has also been an increase in the port price from $2.55 per kg to $3.09 per kg.
232
In the IPP, MFish considered that, since the TACC was not breached, the current
deemed value rates were appropriate. MFish did not propose an adjustment to the
deemed value rates in the IPP.
233
AFL submits that the current annual deemed value rate for GMU1 is acting as a cap
on ACE price. AFL proposes that the annual deemed value rate be increased to $1.50
per kg.
234
The average ACE price for the 2006-07 fishing year was $0.58 per kg for GMU1.
This makes the current deemed value rate twice the average ACE price. MFish
considers that the deemed value rate is not acting as a cap on ACE price.
235
MFish recommends that you retain the existing deemed value rates for GMU1 for the
2008-09 season:
i)
Annual deemed value rate of $1.21 per kg;
ii)
Interim deemed value rate of $0.60 per kg.
96
Hake: HAK1
236
Hake (HAK1) was included in this review because it is the major bycatch species in
the hoki fishery and is susceptible to over fishing as its shadow price is higher than its
port price.
237
In the IPP, MFish considered that, since only 55% of the TACC for HAK1 was caught
during the 2006-07 fishing season, the current deemed value rates were appropriate.
Therefore, MFish did not propose an adjustment to the deemed value rates in the IPP.
238
AFL submits that the current annual deemed value rate for HAK1 is acting as a cap on
ACE price. AFL proposes that the annual deemed value rate be increased to $1.50 per
kg.
239
The average ACE price for the 2006-07 fishing year was $0.90 per kg for HAK1.
This makes the current deemed value rate $0.27 per kg above the average ACE price.
MFish considers that the deemed value rate is not acting as a cap on ACE price.
However, MFish will monitor this fishery over the next year to see if the average ACE
price continues to climb towards the annual deemed value rate.
240
MFish recommends that you retain the existing deemed value rates for HAK1 for the
2008-09 season:
i)
Annual deemed value rate of $1.17 per kg;
ii)
Interim deemed value rate of $0.59 per kg.
Hapuka/Bass: All HPB stocks
241
Hapuka/Bass (All HPB stocks) was included in this review because the port price for
all HPB stocks fell during the 2006-07 fishing year. The fall in the port prices for the
HPB stocks ranged from $0.23 per kg to $1.15 per kg.
242
In the IPP, MFish considered that, since only one of the TACCs for HPB (HPB3) was
over caught during the 2006-07 fishing season and there was minimal deemed value
payments when ACE remained unused in the remaining HPB stocks, the current
deemed value rates were appropriate. Therefore, MFish did not propose an adjustment
to the deemed value rates in the IPP.
243
Challenger supports retaining the current deemed value rates for all HPB stocks.
244
MFish recommends that you retain the existing deemed value rates for all HPB stocks
for the 2008-09 season:
a) Annual deemed value rate
i)
HPB1: $2.95 per kg;
ii)
HPB2: $2.52 per kg;
iii)
HPB3: $2.30 per kg;
iv)
HPB4: $1.80 per kg;
v)
HPB5: $1.80 per kg;
97
vi)
HPB7: $2.83 per kg;
vii)
HPB8: $2.18 per kg;
viii)
HPB10: $2.95 per kg;
b) Interim deemed value rate
ix)
HPB1: $1.48 per kg;
x)
HPB2: $1.26 per kg;
xi)
HPB3: $1.15 per kg;
xii)
HPB4: $0.90 per kg;
xiii)
HPB5: $0.90 per kg;
xiv)
HPB7: $1.42 per kg;
xv)
HPB8: $1.09 per kg;
xvi)
HPB10: $1.48 per kg.
John dory: JDO2 & JDO7
245
John dory (JDO2 & JDO7) was included in this review because MFish decided, when
it changed the deemed value rates for these stocks in October 2007, it would revisit
these stocks to ensure the new deemed value rates were set at the correct level.
246
In the IPP, MFish considered that the changes made in October 2007, for the 2007-08
fishing year were providing the correct incentives in these fisheries. Therefore, MFish
did not propose an adjustment to the deemed value rates in the IPP.
247
MFish recommends that you retain the existing deemed value rates for JDO2 and
JDO7 for the 2008-09 season:
i)
Annual deemed value rate of $5.25 per kg;
ii)
Interim deemed value rate of $2.62 per kg.
Ling: All LIN stocks
248
Ling (LIN1, LIN2, LIN3, LIN4, LIN5, LIN6 & LIN7) was included in this review
because there has been deemed value payments when ACE remains unused during the
2006-07 fishing year in all the LIN stocks except for LIN7 which was slightly over
caught. There has also been a significant increase in the port price from $1.36 per kg
to $3.07 per kg (all LIN stocks except for LIN1 which has increased to $2.24 per kg).
249
In the IPP, MFish considered that the changes made in October 2007 for the 2007-08
fishing year were providing the correct incentives in these fisheries. Therefore, MFish
did not propose an adjustment to the deemed value rates in the IPP.
250
MFish recommends that you retain the existing deemed value rates for all LIN stocks
for the 2008-09 season:
i)
Annual deemed value rate of $2.38 per kg;
ii)
Interim deemed value rate of $1.20 per kg.
98
Moki: MOK1
251
Moki (MOK1) was included in this review because there has been deemed value
payments when 3% of ACE remained unused during the 2006-07 fishing year. There
has also been a slight increase in the port price from $0.73 per kg to $0.91 per kg.
252
In the IPP, MFish considered that, since the TACC was not breached, the current
deemed value rates were appropriate. Therefore, MFish did not propose an adjustment
to the deemed value rates in the IPP.
253
AFL submits that the current annual deemed value rate for MOK1 is acting as a cap
on ACE price. AFL proposes that the annual deemed value rate be increased to $1.20
per kg.
254
The average ACE price for the 2006-07 fishing year was $0.59 per kg for MOK1.
This makes the current deemed value rate $0.29 per kg above the average ACE price.
MFish considers that the deemed value rate is not acting as a cap on ACE price.
However, MFish will monitor this fishery over the next year to see if the average ACE
price continues to climb towards the annual deemed value rate.
255
MFish recommends that you retain the existing deemed value rates for MOK1 for the
2008-09 season:
i)
Annual deemed value rate of $0.88 per kg;
ii)
Interim deemed value rate of $0.44 per kg.
Orange roughy: ORH3B
256
Orange roughy (ORH3B) was included in this review because MFish is reviewing its
TACC as part of the October 2008 sustainability round. It was also reviewed as part
of the October 2007 deemed value review.
257
In the IPP, MFish considered that the changes made in October 2007 for the 2007-08
fishing year were providing the correct incentives in this fishery. Therefore, MFish
did not propose an adjustment to the deemed value rates in the IPP.
258
ECO supports retaining the current deemed value rates for ORH3B.
259
MFish recommends that you retain the existing deemed value rates for ORH3B for the
2008-09 season regardless of the any decision regarding the TACC level of ORH3B:
i)
Annual deemed value rate of $4.00 per kg;
ii)
Interim deemed value rate of $2.00 per kg.
Pilchard: PIL1 & PIL8
260
Pilchard (PIL1 & PIL8) was included in this review because when MFish thought the
port price was significantly above the current deemed value rate. Upon further
analysis, it was discovered that a clerical error explained the issue.
99
261
In the IPP, MFish considers that the current deemed value rates were providing the
correct incentives in these fisheries. Therefore, MFish did not propose an adjustment
to the deemed value rates in the IPP.
262
Challenger supports retaining the current deemed value rates for PIL1 and PIL8.
263
MFish recommends that you retain the existing deemed value rates for PIL1 and PIL8
for the 2008-09 season:
i)
Annual deemed value rate of $0.60 per kg;
ii)
Interim deemed value rate of $0.30 per kg.
Ruby fish: RBY3 & RBY4
264
Ruby fish (RBY3 & RBY4) was included in this review because 617% of ACE was
caught in RBY4 and 118% of ACE was caught in RBY3 in the 2006-07 fishing year.
265
In the IPP, MFish considers that, since this is the first time RBY3 has ever been over
caught, it would monitor the situation to see if this is an anomaly or deliberate over
fishing. RBY4 has been over fished in the past three fishing seasons but this stock has
a low TACC (6 tonnes) and is a low knowledge species. MFish decided that further
investigation was required into these stocks to determine what was causing the over
catch. Therefore, MFish did not propose an adjustment to the deemed value rates in
the IPP.
266
MFish recommends that you retain the existing deemed value rates for RBY3 and
RBY4 for the 2008-09 season:
a) Annual deemed value rate
i)
RBY3: $0.03 per kg;
ii)
RBY4: $0.42 per kg;
b) Interim deemed value rate
iii)
RBY3: $0.02 per kg;
iv)
RBY4: $0.21 per kg.
Sea perch: SPE2
267
Sea perch (SPE2) was included in this review because 118% of ACE was caught in
the 2006-07 fishing year. There has also been a slight increase in the port price from
$0.60 per kg to $0.63 per kg.
268
In the IPP, MFish considered that, since SPE2 shows significant variation in the level
of catch (under and over caught) on a year to year basis, it would continue to monitor
this stock to see why catch is so variable. This stock will be revisited next year, so
MFish decided that the current deemed value rates were appropriate for the time
being. Therefore, MFish did not propose an adjustment to the deemed value rates in
the IPP.
100
269
AFL submits that the current annual deemed value rate for SPE2 is acting as a cap on
ACE price. AFL proposes that the annual deemed value rate be increased to $0.80 per
kg.
270
MFish has re-evaluated the data currently available and believes that there is still not
enough information available to justify increasing the current deemed value rates for
SPE2. MFish will still revisit this stock next.
271
MFish recommends that you retain the existing deemed value rates for SPE2 for the
2008-09 season:
i)
Annual deemed value rate of $0.07 per kg;
ii)
Interim deemed value rate of $0.04 per kg.
Rig: SPO7
272
Rig (SPO7) was included in this review because 120% of ACE was caught in the
2006-07 fishing year. There has also been a slight decrease in the port price from
$3.19 per kg to $2.82 per kg.
273
In the IPP, MFish considered that, since this is the first time this stock has been over
caught in the past ten years, it would monitor the situation to see if this is an anomaly
or deliberate over fishing. This stock would be revisited next year, so MFish decided
that the current deemed value rates were appropriate for the time being. Therefore,
MFish did not propose an adjustment to the deemed value rates in the IPP.
274
Challenger supports retaining the current deemed value rates for SPO7.
275
MFish recommends that you retain the existing deemed value rates for SPO7 for the
2008-09 season:
i)
Annual deemed value rate of $2.80 per kg;
ii)
Interim deemed value rate of $1.40 per kg.
Arrow squid: SQU1T
276
Arrow squid (SQU1T) was included in this review because 101% of ACE was caught
and deemed value payments of $1,562,068 were incurred in the 2006-07 fishing year.
277
Upon further investigation, one company incurred 99.8% of the total deemed value
payments ($1,558,641) during the 2006-07 fishing year. This company has now gone
into liquidation. When removing this company from the analysis the remaining
amount of deeming is within acceptable levels, so the current deemed value rates were
appropriate. MFish did not propose an adjustment to the deemed value rates in the
IPP.
278
MFish recommends that you retain the existing deemed value rates for SQU1T for the
2008-09 season:
i)
Annual deemed value rate of $0.88 per kg;
ii)
Interim deemed value rate of $0.44 per kg.
101
Smooth skate: SSK1
279
Smooth skate (SSK1) was included in this review because 157% of ACE was caught
in the 2006-07 fishing year. There has also been a slight decrease in the port price
from $0.39 per kg to $0.36 per kg.
280
In the IPP, MFish decided due to a lack of information on this stock, it would monitor
the situation in this fishery. This stock would be revisited next year, so the current
deemed value rates were appropriate for the time being. Also changes made to the
deemed value rates for rough skate (RSK) brings them in line with the deemed value
rates for smooth skate (SSK). Therefore, MFish did not propose an adjustment to the
deemed value rates in the IPP.
281
MFish recommends that you retain the existing deemed value rates for SSK1 for the
2008-09 season:
i)
Annual deemed value rate of $0.44 per kg;
ii)
Interim deemed value rate of $0.22 per kg.
Kina: SUR1A & SUR7A
282
Kina (SUR1A & SUR7A) was included in this review because there has been an
increase in the port price of $0.40 per kg in SUR1A and SUR7A. Also there was
discussion around whether kina should be managed as a high value single stock
species under the deemed value review standard.
283
In the IPP, MFish considered that, the current port price was not sufficient enough to
warrant kina being managed under the high value single stock species section of the
deemed value review standard. MFish believed that the current deemed value rates
provided an incentive for fishers to balance their catch with ACE. Therefore, MFish
did not propose an adjustment to the deemed value rates in the IPP.
284
MFish recommends that you retain the existing deemed value rates for SUR1A and
SUR7A for the 2008-09 season:
a) Annual deemed value rate
i)
SUR1A: $1.70 per kg;
ii)
SUR7A: $1.94 per kg;
b) Interim deemed value rate
iii)
SUR1A: $0.85 per kg;
iv)
SUR7A: $0.97 per kg.
Tarakihi: TAR1 & TAR8
285
Tarakihi (TAR1 & TAR8) was included in this review because MFish decided, when
it changed the deemed value rates for these stocks in October 2007, it would revisit
these stocks to ensure the new deemed value rates were set at the correct level.
102
286
In the IPP, MFish considered that the changes made in October 2007 for the 2007-08
fishing year were providing the correct incentives in these fisheries. Therefore, MFish
did not propose an adjustment to the deemed value rates in the IPP.
287
Challenger supports retaining the current deemed value rates for TAR1 and TAR8.
288
MFish recommends that you retain the existing deemed value rates for TAR1 and
TAR8 for the 2008-09 season:
c) Annual deemed value rate
i)
TAR1: $3.00 per kg;
ii)
TAR8: $2.50 per kg;
d) Interim deemed value rate
iii)
TAR1: $1.50 per kg;
iv)
TAR8: $1.25 per kg.
Trumpeter: TRU4
289
Trumpeter (TRU4) was included in this review because 107% of ACE was caught; the
port price increased by $0.29 per kg and deemed value payments of $8,139 were
incurred in the 2006-07 fishing year.
290
In the IPP, MFish considered that the current deemed value rates were providing the
correct incentives in this fishery. Therefore, MFish did not propose an adjustment to
the deemed value rates in the IPP.
291
MFish recommends that you retain the existing deemed value rates for TRU4 for the
2008-09 season:
i)
Annual deemed value rate of $0.50 per kg;
ii)
Interim deemed value rate of $0.25 per kg.
White warehou: WWA4
292
White warehou (WWA4) was included in this review because there has been deemed
value payments when 9% of ACE remained unused during the 2006-07 fishing year.
293
In the IPP, MFish considered that the changes made in October 2007 for the 2007-08
fishing year were providing the correct incentives in this fishery. Therefore, MFish
did not propose an adjustment to the deemed value rates in the IPP.
294
AFL submits that the current annual deemed value rate for WWA4 is acting as a cap
on ACE price. AFL proposes that the annual deemed value rate be increased to $1.20
per kg.
295
The ACE price for the 2006-07 fishing year was $0.40 per kg for WWA4. This
makes the current deemed value rate more than double the average ACE price. MFish
considers that the deemed value rate is not acting as a cap on ACE price.
103
296
MFish recommends that you retain the existing deemed value rates for WWA4 for the
2008-09 season:
i)
Annual deemed value rate of $1.03 per kg;
ii)
Interim deemed value rate of $0.52 per kg.
Compliance implications
297
The proposed changes to the deemed value rates could provide an incentive for
commercial fishers to dump or misreport their catch rather than pay the higher
deemed value rates. There are indicators that suggest that such offending is occurring
in GUR3.
298
Dumping and misreporting are serious offences and will be investigated and
prosecuted wherever possible. MFish will continue to monitor fishing activities to
detect and deter potential dumping. These efforts will be supported by the increased
surveillance capability at sea through Project Protector and upgraded aircraft.
Likewise, MFish Compliance’s activities will continue to include inspections of
vessels, landings and transfers, and analysis of returns to detect and deter potential
misreporting.
104
Statutory consideration
299
Section 8 – Section 8 of the Act describes the purpose of the Act as being to provide
for the utilisation of fisheries resources while ensuring sustainability. The proposed
rates presented will continue to provide for utilisation and will ensure that possible
TACC breaches do not occur which could undermine sustainability.
300
Section 9 – Section 9 sets out the environmental principles that should be taken into
account when exercising or performing functions, duties or powers under the Act.
These principles have been taken into account and MFish is of the view that the
proposed rates are consistent with the environmental principles of the Act.
301
Section 10 – Section 10 sets out the information principles that should be taken into
account when exercising or performing functions, duties or powers under the Act. The
Minister must when considering his decision regarding the proposed rates, also take
into account the principles set out in s. 10.
302
Section 75 - Section 75 of the Act sets out the requirements of when and how deemed
value rates should be set. MFish considers that the proposed adjustments to the
deemed value rates best meet the requirements under this section of the Act.
303
Section 75 (2)(a) – Section 75 (2) (a) requires the Minister to take into account the
need to provide an incentive for every commercial fisher to acquire or maintain
sufficient ACE that is not less than the total of that stock taken by the commercial
fisher. MFish considers that the Deemed Value Standard satisfies the requirements
under this section of the Act.
304
Section 75 (2)(b) – Section 75 (2) (b) sets out the matters the Minister may have
regard to when setting deemed values. These factors have formed the basis of the
content of the information sheets (see Appendix 2). These matters have been
considered in the assessment of proposed deemed value adjustments for each stock as
set out in the “Analysis” section of this IPP.
305
Section 75 (4) – Section 75 (4) permits the Minister to set different deemed value
rates in respect of the same stock which apply to different levels of catch in excess of
annual catch entitlement. This is the authority under which differential deemed value
rates have been proposed for the some stocks.
306
Section 75 (6) – Section 75 (6) details the constraints on the Minister when setting
deemed value rates. MFish believes these constraints have been duly considered in
developing the deemed value rates proposed in this paper.
307
Section 75 (7) – Section 75 (7) gives the Minister the authority to amend deemed
value rates. This is the authority under which the proposed amendments to the deemed
value rates are being made for some stocks
162
Section 75A – The Minister is required when practicable, to conduct consultation
prior to setting any interim or annual deemed value rates. MFish will to consult on the
proposed deemed values, on behalf of the Minister with persons or organisations that
are representative of classes of persons who have an interest in these stocks.
105
Summary of the Guidelines for Setting Deemed Values (2007)
Aim
To set a deemed value rate above the ACE price to encourage
fishers to balance catch through the purchase of ACE rather than
the payment of deemed values.
For high value single species stocks, the deemed value rate will be
considerably above the ACE price.
When is a
deemed value
reviewed?
(1) When a fish stock enters the QMS.
(2) If one of the following indicators listed below is met:
•
Catch is in excess of a TACC
•
Deemed value payments invoiced in the previous fishing
year but ACE remained unused
•
Changes to the port price of the stock
•
Direct request from SeaFIC on behalf of quota owners
•
Recent changes to a stock’s TACC or the TACC of key
bycatch stocks
•
Stock has recently entered the QMS and the deemed value
rate was set using limited information.
How are deemed
values set?
Deemed values will be set on a stock by stock basis for all fish
stocks apart from those categorised as high value fishstocks.
High value
fishstocks
These are high value single species stocks: paua, rock lobster,
scallops, oysters and eels.
Deemed values set following analysis of the following information
sources:
1. Port price
2. ACE trading price
Information sources
used
3. Export prices as a proxy for market value (where
appropriate)
4. Bycatch information (ratios and shadow values)
5. Review of previous deemed value payments
6. Cost recovery levy rates
Annual deemed
values
Set at 200% of the highest port price.
Interim deemed
values
Greater flexibility in setting interim deemed value rates. Interim
deemed values will continue to be set at 50% of the annual
deemed value as standard, but higher interim values may be used
to ensure regular balancing
Differential
Differential deemed values maintained but flexibility in when and
106
deemed values
All other Fish
stocks
how they are applied.
The goal is to set the deemed values set on a stock by stock basis
using the best available information for that stock. The goal will be
to set the deemed value rate at some level above the marginal
price of ACE.
Deemed values set following analysis of the following information
sources
1. Port price
2. ACE trading price
Information sources
used
3. Export prices as a proxy for market value (where
appropriate)
4. Bycatch information (ratios and shadow values)
5. Review of previous deemed value payments
6. Cost recovery levy rates
Annual deemed
values
Interim deemed
values
Annual deemed value set above the ACE price.
Greater flexibility in setting interim deemed value rates. Interim
deemed values will not automatically be set at 50% of the annual
deemed value as standard.
Differential deemed Differential deemed values maintained but flexibility in when and
how they are applied.
values
107
Section Three
Summary of Recommendations
108
SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS
Orange roughy (ORH 3B)
1
MFish recommends that you:
AGREE to
a)
i)
Reduce the TAC for ORH 3B from 11,025 tonnes to 9,890 t and the
TACC from 10,500 tonnes to 9,420 tonnes; and
ii)
Set an allowance of 470 t for other sources of fishing related mortality;
and
iii)
Retain zero allowances within the TAC for customary Maori and
recreational fishing interests;
AND
e)
Request that Industry implement the following sub-stock catch limits within
the TACC:
i)
East and South Chatham Rise be reduced to 6,570 t;
ii)
Catch limits for the Northwest Chatham Rise, Arrow Plateau, Puysegur
and Sub-Antarctic sub-areas remain unchanged and the 500 t feature
limits in the Sub-Antarctic sub-area remain in place;
iii)
Retain a catch limit of 250 t for Industry research surveys;
AND
f)
Request that Industry continue to spread catch across ORH 3B and continue to
monitor catch against voluntary catch limits;
AND
g)
Request that Industry confirm the voluntary agreement on catch limits within
ORH 3B and;
•
continue to submit annual updates and specific DWG annual
agreements that pertain to the ORH 3B fishery to MFish;
•
continue to submit monthly monitoring reports pertaining to catch
levels by both sub-stock and sub-area to MFish;
•
continue to notify MFish when catch reaches 80% of the sub-stock and
sub-area limits, and notify MFish when any limit has been reached.
NOTE that
d)
This decision initiates a three year staged transition to an FMSY-based harvest
strategy for the East and South Chatham Rise whereby the annual catch limit is
4.5% of the best available estimate of current biomass.
e)
Further TAC changes will be necessary to alter the catch limit for the East and
South Chatham Rise to the FMSY-based yield over 3 years. The quantum of the
109
necessary catch limit changes will be derived annually and you will be
provided with management advice for 1 October 2009 and 1 October 2010.
f)
When fully implemented the FMSY-based harvest strategy will embed the
method of calculating the recommended annual catch limit for the East and
South Chatham Rise.
Deemed value rates for selected fishstocks
Blue cod: BCO3
2
3
MFish recommends you approve the following deemed value rates for BCO3 for the
2008-09 season:
a)
Annual deemed value rate to increase from $3.25 per kg to $3.75 per kg
b)
Interim deemed value rate to increase from $1.63 per kg to $2.50 per kg
MFish recommends adjusting differential deemed value rates as outlined in the table
below.
Table 3: Proposed differential deemed value rates for BCO3
Current differential rates
Proposed differential rates
Catch in excess
Current deemed
Catch in excess Proposed deemed
of ACE holdings value rate for BCO3 of ACE holdings value rate for BCO3
(%)
($)
(%)
($)
20
3.90 per kg
20
4.50 per kg
40
4.55 per kg
40
5.25 per kg
60
5.20 per kg
60
6.00 per kg
80
5.85 per kg
80
6.75 per kg
100
6.50 per kg
100
7.50 per kg
Gurnard: GUR3
4
5
MFish recommends you approve the following deemed value rates for GUR3 for the
2008-09 season:
a)
Retain the existing annual deemed value rate of $1.60 per kg.
b)
Retain the existing interim deemed value rate of $0.80 per kg.
MFish recommends adjusting differential deemed value rates as outlined in the table
below.
110
Table 4: Proposed differential deemed value rates for GUR3
Current differential rates
Catch in excess
Current deemed
of ACE holdings
value rate for
(%)
GUR3 ($)
Proposed differential rates
Catch in excess
Proposed deemed
of ACE holdings value rate for GUR3
(%)
($)
20
1.92 per kg
50
2.08 per kg
40
2.24 per kg
60
2.56 per kg
60
2.56 per kg
80
2.88 per kg
80
2.88 per kg
100
3.20 per kg
100
3.20 per kg
Kingfish: KIN7 & KIN8
6
MFish recommends the following deemed value rates for KIN7 and KIN8 for the
2008-09 season, however you can choose to set the deemed value rates for both stocks
at a level that you consider is appropriate, considering your obligations under section
75 of the Act.
7
Annual deemed value rate to increase:
i)
KIN7: from $8.90 per kg to $10.00 per kg;
ii)
KIN8: from $8.90 per kg to $10.00 per kg;
b) Interim deemed value rate to increase:
8
iii)
KIN7: from $4.45 per kg to $5.00 per kg;
iv)
KIN8: from $4.45 per kg to $5.00 per kg;
MFish recommends adjusting differential deemed value rates as outlined in the table
below.
Table 5: Proposed differential deemed value rates for KIN7 & KIN8
Current differential rates
Catch in excess
Current deemed
of ACE holdings value rate for KIN7
(%)
& KIN8 ($)
Proposed differential rates
Catch in excess
Proposed deemed
of ACE holdings value rate for KIN7 &
(%)
KIN8 ($)
20
10.80 per kg
20
12.00 per kg
40
12.60 per kg
40
14.00 per kg
60
14.40 per kg
60
16.00 per kg
80
16.20 per kg
80
18.00 per kg
100
18.00 per kg
100
20.00 per kg
Parore: All PAR stocks
9
MFish recommends you approve the following deemed value rates for all PAR stocks
for the 2008-09 season:
c)
d)
Annual deemed value rate to:
i)
PAR1: increase from $0.31 per kg to $0.34 per kg;
ii)
PAR2: increase from $0.31 per kg to $0.34 per kg;
iii)
PAR9: remain at $0.34;
Interim deemed value rate to:
111
iv)
PAR1: increase from $0.16 per kg to $0.17 per kg;
v)
PAR2: increase from $0.16 per kg to $0.17 per kg;
vi)
PAR9: remain at $0.17 per kg;
10
Because there is no fishing for PAR10 (in the Kermadec area), deemed values do not
affect the incentives to acquire ACE for FMA 10, per 75 (2) (a). Therefore, MFish
recommends that you make no changes for deemed values for PAR10.
11
MFish recommends continuing to have no differential deemed value rates in these
fisheries.
Paua: All PAU Stocks
12
MFish recommends you approve the following deemed value rates for all PAU stocks
for the 2008-09 season:
c)
d)
Annual deemed value rate to increase:
i)
PAU1: from $60.00 per kg to $66.00 per kg;
ii)
PAU2: from $60.00 per kg to $66.00 per kg;
iii)
PAU3: from $60.00 per kg to $66.00 per kg;
iv)
PAU4: from $60.00 per kg to $66.00 per kg;
v)
PAU5A: from $60.00 per kg to $66.00 per kg;
vi)
PAU5B: from $60.00 per kg to $66.00 per kg;
vii)
PAU5D: from $60.00 per kg to $66.00 per kg;
viii)
PAU6: from $60.00 per kg to $66.00 per kg;
ix)
PAU7: from $60.00 per kg to $66.00 per kg;
Interim deemed value rate to increase:
x)
PAU1: from $30.00 per kg to $50.00 per kg;
xi)
PAU2: from $30.00 per kg to $50.00 per kg;
xii)
PAU3: from $30.00 per kg to $50.00 per kg;
xiii)
PAU4: from $30.00 per kg to $50.00 per kg;
xiv)
PAU5A: from $30.00 per kg to $50.00 per kg;
xv)
PAU5B: from $30.00 per kg to $50.00 per kg;
xvi)
PAU5D: from $30.00 per kg to $50.00 per kg;
xvii)
PAU6: from $30.00 per kg to $50.00 per kg;
xviii) PAU7: from $30.00 per kg to $50.00 per kg;
13
Because there is no fishing for PAU10 (in the Kermadec area), deemed values do not
affect the incentives to acquire ACE for FMA 10, per 75 (2) (a). Therefore, MFish
recommends that you make no changes for deemed values for PAU10.
112
14
MFish recommends adjusting differential deemed value rates as outlined in the table
below.
Table 6: Proposed differential deemed value rates for all PAU stocks
Current differential rates
Catch in excess
Current deemed
value rate for all
of ACE holdings
(%)
PAU stocks ($)
Proposed differential rates
Catch in excess
Proposed deemed
of ACE holdings value rate for all PAU
(%)
stocks ($)
20
72.00 per kg
20
40
84.00 per kg
40
79.20 per kg
92.40 per kg
60
96.00 per kg
60
105.60 per kg
80
108.00 per kg
80
118.80 per kg
100
120.00 per kg
100
132.00 per kg
Porae: All POR stocks
15
MFish recommends you approve the following deemed value rates for all POR stocks
for the 2008-09 season:
c)
d)
Annual deemed value rate to:
i)
POR1: remain at $1.35 per kg;
ii)
POR2: increase from $0.69 per kg to $1.35 per kg;
iii)
POR3: remain at $1.35 per kg;
Interim deemed value rate to:
iv)
POR1: remain at $0.68 per kg;
v)
POR2: increase from $0.35 per kg to $0.68 per kg;
vi)
POR3: remain at $0.68 per kg;
16
Because fishing is not allowed for POR10, deemed values do not affect the incentives
to acquire ACE for FMA 10, per 75 (2) (a). Therefore, MFish recommends advises
that you make no changes for deemed values for POR10.
17
MFish recommends continuing to have no differential deemed value rates in these
fisheries.
Ribaldo: RIB3, RIB4, RIB5, RIB6 & RIB7
18
MFish recommends you approve the following deemed value rates for RIB3, RIB4,
RIB5, RIB6 and RIB7 for the 2008-09 season:
c)
Annual deemed value rate to:
i)
RIB3: remain at $0.30 per kg;
ii)
RIB4: remain at $0.30 per kg;
iii)
RIB5: increase from $0.06 per kg to $0.30 per kg;
iv)
RIB6: remain at $0.80 per kg;
v)
RIB7: remain at $0.80 per kg;
113
d)
19
Interim deemed value rate to:
vi)
RIB3: remain at $0.15 per kg;
vii)
RIB4: remain at $0.15 per kg;
viii)
RIB5: increase from $0.03 per kg to $0.15 per kg;
ix)
RIB6: remain at $0.40 per kg;
x)
RIB7: remain at $0.40 per kg;
MFish recommends introducing differential deemed value rates in RIB7 as outlined in
the table below.
Table 7: Proposed differential deemed value rates for RIB7
Current differential rates
Proposed differential rates
Current deemed value
Catch in excess of
rate for RIB3, RIB4,
Catch in excess of
ACE holdings (%) RIB5, RIB6 & RIB7 ($) ACE holdings (%)
10
20
Differential deemed
values currently do not
apply
Proposed deemed
value rate for RIB3,
RIB4, RIB5, RIB6 &
RIB7 ($)
10
1.20 per kg
20
2.00 per kg
Rough skate: RSK1 and RSK3
20
MFish recommends you retain the existing deemed value rates for RSK1 and RSK3
for the 2008-09 season:
c)
d)
21
Annual deemed value rate:
i)
RSK1: $0.23 per kg;
ii)
RSK3: $0.30 per kg;
Interim deemed value rate:
iii)
RSK1: $0.22 per kg;
iv)
RSK3: $0.22 per kg;
MFish recommends continuing to have no differential deemed value rates in these
fisheries.
Gemfish: SKI1 & SKI2
22
MFish recommends you approve the following deemed value rates for SKI1 and SKI2
for the 2008-09 season:
a)
b)
Annual deemed value rate:
i)
to decrease from $2.64 per kg to $1.50 per kg in SKI1;
ii)
to decrease from $1.75 per kg to $1.50 per kg in SKI2;
Interim deemed value rate:
i)
to decrease from $1.32 per kg to $0.75 per kg in SKI1;
114
ii)
23
to decrease from $0.88 per kg to $0.75 per kg in SKI1.
MFish recommends adjusting differential deemed value rates as outlined in the table
below.
Table 8: Proposed differential deemed value rates for SKI1 & SKI2
Current differential rates
Current deemed
Catch in excess
value rate for SKI1 of ACE holdings
($)
(%)
Catch in excess
of ACE holdings
(%)
Proposed differential rates
Current deemed
Catch in excess
Proposed deemed
value rate for SKI2 of ACE holdings value rate for SKI1 &
($)
(%)
SKI2 ($)
20
3.168 per kg
20
3.60 per kg
20
1.80 per kg
40
3.696 per kg
40
4.20 per kg
40
2.10 per kg
60
4.80 per kg
60
2.40 per kg
80
2.70 per kg
100
3.00 per kg
60
4.224 per kg
80
4.752 per kg
100
5.280 per kg
80 and over
5.40 per kg
Sea perch: SPE8
24
25
MFish recommends you retain the existing deemed value rates for SPE8 for the 200809 season:
a)
Annual deemed value rate of $0.24 per kg
b)
Interim deemed value rate of $0.12 per kg
MFish recommends continuing to have no differential deemed value rates in this
fishery.
Rig: SPO2
26
27
MFish recommends you approve the following deemed value rates for SPO2 for the
2008-09 season:
a)
Annual deemed value rate to remain at $3.00 per kg
b)
Interim deemed value rate to remain at $1.50 per kg
MFish recommends adjusting differential deemed value rates as outlined in the table
below.
Table 9: Proposed differential deemed value rates for SPO2
Current differential rates
Proposed differential rates
Proposed deemed
Catch in excess of Current deemed value Catch in excess of value rate for SPO2
ACE holdings (%)
rate for SPO2 ($)
ACE holdings (%)
($)
10
6.00 per kg
25
8.00 per kg
50
11.00 per kg
20
3.60 per kg
40
4.20 per kg
60
4.80 per kg
80
5.40 per kg
100
6.00 per kg
Broadbill swordfish: SWO1
28
MFish recommends you approve the following deemed value rates for SWO1 for the
2008-09 season:
115
29
a)
Annual deemed value rate to decrease from $4.25 per kg to $3.00 per kg.
b)
Interim deemed value to decrease from $2.13 per kg to $1.50 per kg
MFish recommends continuing to have no differential deemed value rates in this
fishery.
Tom Chatterton
Manager Deepwater and National Issues
APPROVED / NOT APPROVED / APPROVED AS AMENDED
Hon Jim Anderton
Minister of Fisheries
/
/ 2008
116