How to end the war against Japan: Invasion or A-bomb,... file:///Users/edmarek/Documents/Talking%20Proud/HistoryDo...

How to end the war against Japan: Invasion or A-bomb, or both
file:///Users/edmarek/Documents/Talking%20Proud/HistoryDo...
"How to" end the war against Japan:
Invasion or A-bombs, or both?
Go!
A lot of people these days talk about ending the war in Iraq, as
though these things can be done "just like that." No one knew
how to end the war with Japan in 1945, no one. At a top level,
there were three options. Invade. Employ atomic weapons, more
than two. Occupy immediately should Japan collapse internally
or surrender by surprise. There was also a combo scenario to
employ many atomic weapons and invade, either separately, or at
the same time. The invasion was set and it was a "Go." Units
were identified, many were training. We'll discuss the three
options.
By Ed Marek, editor
December 10, 2007
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This is a photo of the Potsdam Conference, in Germany, on July
17, 1945, from the Truman Library. The participants were
Britain, the Soviet Union and the Soviet Union. The purpose was
to determined how to administer the defeated Germany, which
had surrendered unconditionally on May 8, 1945. As an item left
to last, the conferees issued an ultimatum to Japan to surrender
unconditionally, or face complete destruction.
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In truth, no one at the table knew how to end the war against
Japan. No one knew what it would take to get the Japanese to
surrender unconditionally.
Just a day before this conference began, on July 16, 1945, the
Trinity Test of the Atomic bomb, the first and only test prior to
operational employment, succeeded. Four days after the
conference began, on July 21, 1945, President Truman formally
approved the use of the A-bomb against Japan and three days
later, on July 24, 1945, he approved the invasion of Japan's
Home Islands in an effort called "Operation Downfall." Also in
the bag of options was "Operation Blacklist" which was a plan to
occupy Japan on very short notice should the government there
and the state suddenly collapse or should the government
suddenly surrender unconditionally.
Wearing my Air Force T-shirt, I met a WWII vet in the grocery
store, introduced myself, shook his hand, thanked him for his
service, and asked where he served. He replied, Southwest
Pacific, island hopping, ended up in Guam. In Guam, he trained
to invade Japan. Looking at my T-shirt, he then smiled broadly,
as did his wife, and said, "But you Air Corps boys took care of
that. We didn't have to go. Thank you!"
I have thought a great deal about this veteran. His comment
seems to make perfect sense. I think it is the widespread belief
that the two atomic bombs dropped on Japan did it: they ended
the war in the Pacific.
But I'm not so sure ending the Pacific War came that easily. The
Allies delivered a lot of knockout punches to the Japanese, they
had a lot more to deliver, but still it took them a very long time
before they threw in the towel.
If there was a single event that ended
the war, it was when Emperor
Hirohito delivered his radio speech on
August 15, 1945. That's when he
called it a day. He told his people this:
"I have ordered the Imperial
Government to inform the four
Governments of the United
States, Great Britain, China and
the Soviet Union that our
Empire is willing to accept the
provisions of their Joint Declaration."
The "Joint Declaration" was the Potsdam Declaration, which
demanded the unconditional surrender of Japan. He refused to
say the words unconditional surrender publicly; he even refused
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to use the word surrender. So even with his radio speech there
was skepticism and uncertainty.
Hirohito surveys bomb damage in Tokyo, August 1945. Presented by WWII
Multimedia Database
The US dropped the first A-bomb on Hiroshima on August 6,
1945, the second on Nagasaki on August 9. In no mood to miss
out on the spoils of war, the Soviets declared war in Japan on
August 8 and invaded Manchuria. The Allies had hoped surely
that would be enough.
It was not enough. It took six days of grueling debate in Japan's
inner circles of power, and one thwarted coup attempt, before the
emperor took to the microphone. It then took until September 2,
1945 for Japan to sign the formal documents. During the
intervening period, the Soviets continued their march through
Manchuria, and US forces prepared to occupy Japan, taking
every precaution to avoid being trapped and fooled. There was
an attitude of uncertainty about what might happen for some
time, even into the occupation.
We might commend an article we did on October 16, 2005,
"Peacekeeper, a brave and able warrior, is retired," the section,
"The 20th Air Force, bombers over Japan to hot missiles ready to
go, World War II Days." It provides some good background on
the final days.
The Japanese never thought they could defeat the US militarily.
Some boasted they would conquer the US, but there was no
serious thought given to such an endeavor. Instead, the Japanese
wanted to force a negotiated settlement with the US that would
award many or all of its Pacific holdings to the Japanese. That
would make Japan a global economic and military power worthy
of great respect in any king's court.
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Japanese Admiral Isoroku
Yamamoto, shown here, the man
who led the attack on Pearl Harbor,
is quoted saying it this way on a
number of occasions to members of
the Cabinet in Japan in 1940:
"I can run wild for six
months (after Pearl Harbor),
after that, I have no
expectation of success."
The Japanese strategy to seek a negotiated settlement had a
fundamental flaw. Once the Japanese advance took full throttle
and the attack on Hawaii came on December 7, 1941, the term
"negotiated settlement" left the American lexicon. Yes, it was
discussed, but not seriously. The US wanted complete victory
and an unconditional surrender.
The Allied strategy in WWII at its top-level was to defeat
Germany first and obtain an unconditional surrender there, then
defeat Japan and obtain an unconditional surrender there.
Admiral Karl Donitz
General Alred Jodl
But getting an unconditional surrender from Germany was no
"slam dunk" either. Hitler was dead, Admiral Karl Donitz
became the Führer. General Alfred Jodl was the Chief of the
Operations Staff of the Armed Forces High Command, second to
General Wilhelm Keitel, Germany's senior military leader.
Donitz appointed Jodl to negotiate with the Allies. Donitz
directed Jodl to play around for time, so as many German troops
as possible could out of the Soviet zone and into the western
zone. General Eisenhower, the Allied Supreme Command,
refused to deal with Jodl. Eisenhower grew impatient, and,
through his own representative, ordered Jodl to surrender
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unconditionally or face a western blockade that would prevent
his troops from escaping from Soviet lines. With approval from
Donitz, Jodl followed Ike's order. The Allies had done everything
they could to make sure the Germans could not reconstitute in
the Austrian Alps at a location known as the "National Redoubt."
The point we wish to make is that the Allies had virtually
destroyed Germany. There were very few targets left. Yet,
uncertainties remained.
USS West Virginia struck at Pearl Harbor.
In the case of Japan, their high point was December 7-8, 1941,
when they attacked Pearl Harbor and invaded the Philippines.
Douglas Dauntless shipborne dive bombers during the attack on the Japanese
fleet off Midway, June 4 to June 6, 1942. Presented by the National Park
Service.
Just six months later, as Yamamoto had predicted, the US fleet
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and Army Air Force soundly defeated the Japanese fleet at
Midway. From that point on, the Japanese were on the defensive
and the Americans and their Allies were on the offensive. From
this point on, the best the Japanese could hope for was to prolong
the war, make it as costly to the US and her allies as possible,
and force the US to a negotiated settlement favorable to Japan. In
short, Japan would fight a war of attrition. The Japanese were
very successful doing this. The war lasted just over four more
years.
Right up to the very end, the Japanese military leadership was
prepared to expend all souls under its command and all souls of
its citizens to force a negotiated settlement. The US was prepared
to take on that challenge and invade Japan until an unconditional
surrender were obtained. That plan was known as "Operation
Downfall." In turn, the Japanese prepared for the invasion and
many Japanese military leaders felt they could defeat the
invasion and inflict so many American casualties that the US
would be forced into a negotiated settlement.
American ground forces invaded Guadalcanal in the distant
Solomons Islands near Australia on August 7, 1942. This was the
first major US ground offensive in the war and the first major
amphibious landing by the US Marines in their history. From this
victory onward, the US took the offensive, US forces marching,
flying and sailing up Admiral Nimitz's chain of islands to
Okinawa and doing the same through General MacArthur's chain
of islands that included New Guinea and the Philippines to
Okinawa.
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On April 1, 1945, all these American forces and more converged
on Okinawa in arguably the most fierce battle of the war. It lasted
through June 1945. The Americans prevailed in victory. The
Allies were now about 320 miles from Japan's Home Islands.
B-29 "Superfortress," presented by Boeing.
General Henry "Hap" Arnold's B-29 long range bombers were
hammering the Home Islands daily from islands in the Marianas
won by the blood and sacrifice of many American forces. With
Iwo Jima in American hands, these bombers picked up a fighter
escort from Iwo Jima to their targets on the Home Islands and
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back. Furthermore, Iwo Jima gave the bombers an emergency
base. Indeed, the first B-29 to make an emergency landing at Iwo
Jima, "Dinah Might," landed during the heat of fighting.
Yokohama ablaze from a B-29 incendiary bombing attack. Yokohama
Yokohama is on the peninsula facing the western coast of Tokyo Bay, and
served as a main port facility for Tokyo. Presented by Air Raid against Cities of
Kawasaki and Yokohama
The realization dawned on the military leadership that most of
Japan was built from wood, making the entire country vulnerable
to incendiary bombing. The American incendiary bombing
campaign showed little mercy. Cities were burned to the ground.
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The aftermath of the US fire bomb raid on Tokyo, March 10th, 1945. Presented
by Japan Nihon Livedoor Blog.
While it was obvious to most that the US was inflicting
enormous damage on the Japanese, the reality was that US
military and civilian leaders did not know what it would take to
cause Japan to surrender unconditionally. Privately to be sure,
many acknowledged this. Our forces in the Pacific saw it the
same way.
Most military leaders believed they would have to invade, even
if the A-bombs were employed. No one really knew what the
A-bomb would do once employed. Some were not sure they
would work. Some did not believe the Japanese would surrender
even if these bombs were used. Once dropped, most of our
fighting forces thought the war would end, but they were not
really sure. Even if the war did end, they knew they would have
to go in as an occupation force, and no one knew how that would
be received by the Japanese.
There were so many uncertainties about what it would take for
the Japanese to surrender unconditionally that the American
leadership had to whittle down the possibilities simply to
assemble plausible plans. They whittled them down to three.
The one favored the most by senior military commanders and
cabinet secretaries was to invade Japan's Home islands. That was
Operation Downfall.
A contingency plan, dubbed "Blacklist," was developed to
respond to a sudden and unexpected collapse of the Japanese
government or a sudden and unexpected agreement to surrender
unconditionally. In either case, the US would have to move
considerable occupation forces into Japan's Home Islands and do
so promptly. There was a lot in common between Downfall and
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Blacklist.
Finally, there was the plan to drop as many as two newly
developed Atomic bombs on specified targets on the Japanese
Home Islands, and then wait to see what happens. If required,
they could drop follow-on A-bombs coming off the line over the
next months until the Japanese gave in. If the Japanese would
still not give in, then the invasion would have to go ahead and
more A-bombs coming off the line could be employed tactically.
By the summer of 1945, Downfall and Blacklist were both
"doable." But many uncertainties still surrounded the A-bomb.
The Japanese leadership understood well that invasion was now
not only possible, but probable. They had been bringing home
their very best ground units from the Asian mainland to face this
eventuality. Many top Japanese leaders, especially in the military,
felt they could defeat an American invasion. We do not think
these men knew about the A-bomb.
So, here we are. It's summer 1945, the US and its Allies are 320
miles away from Japan's Home Islands, Japan is in a shambles,
getting worse every day, but both sides were gearing up for
invasion, a fight that had every chance of being the bloodiest in
human history.
What is fascinating here is that no one knew how to end the
Pacific war. The Japanese still thought they could rig up a
negotiated settlement, through the Soviets, but the Soviets had
already double-crossed them and were preparing to invade
Manchuria and declare war against Japan in a deal made with the
Americans. There were calls in the US to agree to conditions, at
least a condition that would leave the emperor in place and on
the throne. But the leadership would not agree to such a
condition publicly.
I'm going to give you a very brief glimpse at the Downfall Plan,
and, an even more brief look at Blacklist. I will follow that by
summarizing the evolution of political events at home leading to
Japan's ultimate unconditional surrender in September 1945. And
then I want to take on a job that has slowed publication of this
report for several months: try to put a human face on the force
that would have had to invade had the invasion occurred.
Operation Downfall - The Invasion of Japan
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Operation Downfall was the name given to the overall invasion
of Japan. It would be the largest amphibious invasion in the
history of warfare.
Operation Olympic was the name
used for Phase 1, the invasion of the
southern Kyushu Island. The
landings were scheduled to begin on
November 1, 1945. US ground
warfare had largely stopped with the
victory in Okinawa in June. US
forces were dispersing throughout
the Pacific to rest, resupply, regroup,
and train for the invasion. Okinawa
and the Philippines would be the main jump-off points for
Operation Olympic. General MacArthur would command the
invasion.
The 6th US Army, the "Alamo
Force," motto, "Born of War,"
would lead the invasion. This Army
was commanded by Lt. General
Walter Krueger, who had fought in
northern New Guinea, Leyte and
Luzon.
The 6th Army would employ three
corps of nine divisions, three
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Marine, six Army, with others available if required.
There is a lot of good documentation of the plan on the internet.
Three we used are:
Downfall, the plan for the invasion of Japan, presented by
the US Army
Operation Downfall, the Invasion of Japan, November
1945, presented by
Operation Downfall: The planned assault on Japan,
presented by History of War
There are more.
These are the units tapped to execute the Operation Olympic plan
to invade Kyushu Island.
6th US Army - Operation Olympic, November 1, 1945
V Amphibious Corps - Target, southwestern Kyushu
2nd Marine Division
(MARDIV), "Follow
Me", Guadalcanal,
Tarawa, Saipan,
Okinawa
3rd MARDIV,
"Fighting Third",
Bougainville, Guam,
Iwo Jima
5th MARDIV, "The
Spearhead", Iwo Jima
XI Corps - Target, southern Kyushu
1st Cavalry Division,
"Hell for Leather",
Admiralty Islands,
Leyte, Luzon
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43rd Infantry
Division, "Winged
Victory Division",
New Caledonia,
Guadalcanal, Russell
Islands, New Guinea,
Lingayen Gulf, Luzon
Americal Division
"Americal",
Guadalcanal,
Bougainville, Leyte
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I Corps - Target, southeastern Kyushu
41st Infantry Division,
"Jungleers", New
Guinea, Philippines
25th Infantry Division,
"Tropic Lightning",
Guadalcanal, New
Georgia, Luzon
33rd Infantry
Division, "Winged
Victory Division",
New Guinea,
Lingayen Gulf, Luzon
IX Corps - Reserve Force
98th Infantry Division,
"Iroquois", Hawaii, no
combat yet
77th Infantry Division,
"Statue of Liberty
Division", Guam,
Leyte
83rd Infantry
Division,
"Thunderbolt
Division", Normandy,
Northern France,
Rheinland, ArdennesAlsace, Central
Europe
Operation Coronet was the name used for Phase 2, the invasion
of the Tokyo or Kanto Plain on Honshu and beyond. The 1st and
8th US Armies had the lead. The 10th Army would follow as
reinforcement later if required. This invasion was scheduled to
begin on March 1, 1946.
As an aside, the political view in the US was that this war had to
be over no later than the end of 1947. The feeling was the
American people would not tolerate its continuation beyond
then.
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8th US Army
1st US Army
As best we can tell, specific units were not firmly identified for
Operation Coronet. That said, we have seen this chart which does
show a selection process had been hatched.
Provision Order of Battle for invasion of Japan, August 1945. Presented by US
Army Command and General Staff College
Coronet would be supported by all army and naval forces in the
Pacific and, in addition, would be augmented by combat units
from Europe whose war, the troops thought, had just ended.
The 1st and 8th US Armies would employ 10 reinforced infantry
divisions, three Marine divisions, and two armored divisions. As
an aside, employment of these Marine three divisions meant that
the entire US Marine Corps would be involved in the total
invasion package, Phases 1 and 2.
Thirty days after the initial landings, each army would be
reinforced by a corps of three divisions. Five days later, an
airborne division and an Army Reserve Corps of three more
divisions would be added. All together, this would be a 25
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division force. These 25 divisions were to seize the Kanto Plain,
including the general areas of Tokyo and Yokohama, and then
carry out any additional operations necessary to break Japanese
resistance. Strategic reserve for the entire operation would
consist of a corps of three divisions located in the Philippines
and a sufficient number of divisions from the United States to
permit reinforcement at the rate of 4 per month.
The plan envisioned the complete destruction of the state of
Japan if required.
Summary of Political Events to End the War
William Burr has edited "The Atomic Bomb and the End of
World War II, a Collection of Primary Sources," presented by
George Washington University as "National Security Archive
Briefing Book No, 162." This is a fantastic resource to
understanding what was happening behind the scenes as people
scurried about trying to end WWII in the Pacific.
We'll drop back momentarily to early 1945.
Our forces had just completed the successful invasion of Iwo
Jima, fought from February through March 1945. The US
military then invaded Okinawa starting on April 1, 1945, and
finished up in late June.
These were among the most costly and fierce battles for
Americans in any war. The Japanese lost over 20,000 killed on
Iwo Jima. The Americans lost 6,825 killed and 27,909 total
casualties. On Okinawa, the Japanese lost about 66,000 killed
and 7,000 captured. The Americans suffered 12,513 killed or
missing, and a total of about 72,000 casualties.
Franklin Delano Roosevelt's funeral procession with horse-drawn casket,
Pennsylvania Ave.
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On April 12, 1945, just shortly after the invasion of Okinawa
began, President FDR died. While his health had obviously
deteriorated, his death nonetheless came as a psychological
shock to the nation and to American combat forces in the Pacific.
Vice President Harry Truman takes the oath of office as President of the United
States, April 12, 1945.
Vice President Harry Truman was sworn in as president. Truman
served in France during WWI as an artillery officer, and rose to
the rank of major. This experience served him well in the months
ahead. He was elected to the US Senate in 1934 and was a strong
supporter of FDR's policies. History Central reported his
ascendancy to the presidency this way:
"His brief period as Vice President was uneventful.
Truman was having a drink in the office of Senate Speaker
Sam Rayburn when he was summoned to the White House
on April 12, 1945. Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt greeted him
with the words, 'Harry, the President is dead.' Truman
replied, 'Is there anything I can do for you?' Mrs.
Roosevelt shook her head and replied, 'Is there anything
we can do for you? For you are the one in trouble now.'"
Just two weeks later, on April 25,
Secretary of War Henry Stimson,
shown here, briefed President
Truman on the existence of the
A-bomb project, the "Manhattan
Project," and told him the target
was Japan. Mr. Truman did not
know about this project previously.
Stimson brought a memorandum
signed by General L. R. Groves, the
project manager, to discuss the
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bomb with the president. Stimson also brought his own talking
paper. Both are presented by the National Security Archive.
Mr. Truman was told the first bomb would be ready by
August 1, 1945, a second one before the end of the year,
and succeeding ones about every 60 days thereafter.
A test would be conducted in July.
The target is Japan.
The 20th Air Force commanded by General Curtis Lemay
has organized a composite group to train and equip for the
attack.
Initial echelons would soon depart for an overseas
destination to prepare for the drop.
Various aspects of the technology are known among
scientists worldwide. It is probable that other nations will
learn how to build these bombs. Russia will probably be
the first to succeed.
Not only was he briefed about the project, he was told that target
selection had begun. By the end of May, he was told that Kyoto
(the ancient capital), Hiroshima, Kokura and Niigata were the
targets.
At this same time, April 1945, planners in the Pentagon advised
the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) that they believed the Japanese
would not accept an unconditional surrender unless they were
given a loose definition of the word "unconditional." These
analysts argued that any American threat to defeat the Japanese
"absolutely" would not be enough to get them to surrender. They
told the Chiefs that the only alternative that seemed workable
would be annihilation of the Japanese state and most of its
people.
On May 8, 1945, the war in Europe ended. This was very
important to the Pacific war. FDR, Churchill and Stalin set the
defeat of Germany in Europe as priority number one that had to
be completed first. Then they could turn to ending the war
against Japan.
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A 1945 U.S. Army map showing the possible extent of the National Redoubt.
Presented by Answers.com
It's worth noting here yet again that obtaining an unconditional
surrender from the Germans was no easy chore. The country was
in ruins, the German military was virtually destroyed, but there
were fears the German leadership would establish a significant
military capability in what was called the National Redoubt in
the Alps of Austria, and fight on from there. The Germans had
already put a jet fighter into combat and there was no telling
what else they might have in development. The word "Redoubt"
is a term for an area to which remaining forces of a nation can be
withdrawn if the main battle is lost, or even beforehand if defeat
is considered to be inevitable. General George Patton had to
divert his forces to block such an effort, and General Eisenhower
asked Marshal Stalin to do the same. As it turns out, the idea of a
Redoubt was more a German deception than a reality.
Nonetheless, it affected military decision-making. We earlier
discussed that with Hitler dead, the German military leadership
wanted to gain as much time as they could to get their forces out
of Soviet territories, so the Germans were slow to accept an
unconditional surrender.
This is one of many reasons the US military leadership worried
so much about what it would take to get the Japanese to
surrender unconditionally and helps explain why they favored
invasion.
The A-bomb was a very secretive effort and did not enjoy much
popularity among American military leaders. General Douglas
MacArthur was told of plans to employ it against Japan. He was
not impressed, saying this:
"In the mean time, I have a war to fight."
We'll talk more to this in a moment.
Victory in Okinawa by mid-May was almost assured. As a result,
on May 25, 1945, JCS issued the execute order for Operation
Downfall. The Chiefs directed General MacArthur, General
Henry "Hap" Arnold and Admiral Chester Nimitz to implement
Phase I of the invasion, Operation Olympic.
The JCS followed-up its execute order and submitted the
Operation Downfall plan to President Truman in June 1945.
President Truman received this plan at a time when the A-bomb
had not yet even been tested.
In a diary entry of June 17, 1945, the president, in office for only
two months and kept largely out of the war loop by FDR, noted
what seemed to be his only two options: invade and blockade, or
bomb and blockade. By "bomb" could be meant continued
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incendiary bombing of the islands and/or employment of the
A-bomb.
With the invasion plan on his desk, President Truman called a
meeting in the White House on June 18, 1945. At this meeting,
the JCS, the secretaries of war and the Navy confirmed their
opinion that the Kyushu Operation Olympic was the best
solution. At meeting's end, the president said the Joint Chiefs
should proceed with the Kyushu operation. The decision to issue
an execute order had been validated. Downfall was a "Go."
On July 2, 1945, Secretary Stimson sent the president a memo
which said this, among other things:
"The plans of operation (Downfall) up to and including the
first landing have been authorized and the preparations for
the operation are now actually going on."
We'll stop here and switch gears a bit.
In May 1945, some say even earlier, MacArthur's staff began
planning for the occupation of Japan. The assumption underlying
this plan was that it would be implemented once the Japanese
had accepted the terms of an unconditional surrender. That said,
it could also apply if there were a sudden implosion of the
Japanese government that demanded a rapid occupation before
things got out of hand. The plan that emerged in August was
called "Operation Blacklist."
As an aside, General MacArthur, and many others, believed that
the US needed to tell the Japanese that they could retain the
institution of the emperor after their surrender. Some believed the
term "unconditional surrender" could still be used, with private
assurances that the emperor could remain. MacArthur for one
believed that the war would end quickly if the US provided such
an assurance. It is our understanding the US ended up providing
such a private assurance, an argument which stands today in the
minds of many as reason not to have dropped the two A-bombs.
Major James D. Brinson, USA, wrote a thesis on the subject of
Operation Blacklist, "A study of postwar Japan (1945-1950)," in
which he said:
"Well before the war ended, the US invested much time
and resources to develop the plans and policies for
administering Japan ... Over two thousand Army and Navy
officers were trained by August of 1945 for duty in Japan
as military and civil affairs specialists. The training centers
established and civilian universities involved in this effort
were significant.
"The extensive prior planning for postwar Japan had
established initial policies for the occupation to implement.
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One of the policies for postwar Japan was to leave the
Emperor in place after defeating the Japanese military.
Another was to use the existing government structure as
much as possible. Many of these policies were specified in
the US Initial Post Surrender Policy for Japan which was
transmitted by the State-War-Navy Coordination
Committee to the US military leadership in the Pacific on
29 August 1945."
"Operation Blacklist" projected that the Japanese would accept
an unconditional surrender (with the understanding that the
institution of emperor would be left in tact) sometime between
August 1 and October 15, 1945. General MacArthur would lead
the occupation. The occupation would start with a series of
landings by US Army and attached forces. The objectives were
to occupy critical areas on the Home Islands and the Korean
peninsula, gain control over Japan's military and the civilian
population, and impose the terms of the unconditional surrender.
Since no one knew the date of initiation of this plan, forces were
to be ready to go on a moment's notice.
So two plans were on the table, Downfall and Blacklist. Both
involved landing a considerable number of American forces
landing on Japan's beaches, which by the way, were few and far
between. For example, the US 6th Army was scheduled to invade
Kyushu for Operation Downfall and was also scheduled to
occupy Kyushu under Blacklist. Similarly, the US 8th Army,
scheduled to invade Honshu for Downfall, was designated the
occupying force for northern Japan. The 10th Army, which was
to be a reinforcement for Operation Coronet, was designated to
go to Korea. That was later changed to the XXIV Corps of the
10th Army. The US 1st Army, scheduled to invade Honshu for
Downfall, was in Europe and for Blacklist was no longer needed.
So the situation for MacArthur was this. He and his staff were
doing the bulk of Downfall and Blacklist planning, both plans
were considered executable, and each had the president's
approval. The A-bomb, on the other hand, was an unknown.
So let's address the A-bomb. The A-bomb was first tested on July
16, 1945 in New Mexico. That was known as the "Trinity Test."
The test bomb was called the "Gadget." The Gadget worked in
this test. But this test was an experiment. No one knew for sure
what the results of the experiment might be. Betting pools were
set up among the scientists.
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The preparation of the "Gadget" for the Trinity test, July 1945. Presented by
wikimedia commons.
Perhaps more important, the Gadget's components were raised by
a pulley system to the top of a 20-meter tower for a final
assembly there.
Setting up the "Gadget" for the Trinity test, 1945. Norris Bradbury is on the left.
Presented by wikimedia commons.
The final assembly took some effort by specialized teams. The
detonation was delayed because of weather. Some 45 seconds
before detonation, a robot assembly took control and there was
no human control of the concluding sequence of events. The
method of detonation was "implosion" at the top of the tower
caused by a spherical arrangement of explosive charges that
would increase the density inside the sphere that would set off a
nuclear explosion.
From a military perspective, especially after a long and brutal
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war in the Pacific, this was an experimental test from a tower that
demanded a great deal of scientific intervention. This was not
even close to being a test of a weapon dropped from an aircraft,
much less a final test of a weapon that had passed muster and
was ready to be operationally employed by a B-29. So, one can
understand the military reluctance to try using it operationally at
this stage of its development. Furthermore, the military and
others, having seen what the bomb did do during its test, worried
about the moral implications of the military being the first to use
it in anger.
All that notwithstanding, Eleanor Roosevelt was right. It was
President Truman who bore the burdens of this war on his
shoulders. It was July 1945, Japan was largely in ruins, it had
virtually no navy or air force, Okinawa was ours, and the
Japanese have not surrendered. From Truman's vantage, the
success of the Trinity presented another option to join with
Downfall and Blacklist.
Truman's earlier diary note took form. He could employ the
A-bomb or invade. If the Japanese surprised everyone with a
sudden unconditional surrender, or if the government in Japan
completely and suddenly collapsed, he could order a rapid
occupation. He had three plans. As we will discuss in a moment,
he had even another option: employ the A-bomb and invade.
President Truman formally approved the use of the A-bomb
against Japan on July 21, 1945 and formally approved Operation
Downfall on July 24, 1945. An atomic bomb attack against Japan
and an invasion of Japan were now both a "Go." While these
"Go" orders were real, the president would constantly and
continuously revisit the options.
The appropriate flag officers already had their execute orders for
Operation Downfall. On July 24, 1945, Secretary of War Stimson
passed on the A-bomb order to General Thomas Handy, USA,
the acting chief of staff. General Marshall, the chief of staff, was
with President Truman at the Potsdam Conference with Churchill
and Stalin, so the job of physically passing the "Go" order went
to Handy.
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A-bomb targets. The National Security Archives contain multiple memos to
define the targets.
On July 25, General Handy, shown
here, gave the A-bomb order to
General Carl Spaatz, commander of
the Army Air Force. The order was
to attack Japan with the atomic
bomb, the first weapon to be
dropped on one of four possible
targets: Hiroshima, Kokura, Niigata
or Nagasaki; Kyoto, the ancient
capital, had been removed from the
target list, and Nagasaki added. The
order read in part as follows:
"The 509th Composite
Group, 20th Air Force will deliver its first special bomb as
soon as weather will permit visual bombing after about 3
August 1945 on one of the targets: Hiroshima, Kokura,
Niigata and Nagasaki ... Additional bombs will be
delivered on the above targets as soon as made ready by
the project staff. Further instructions will be issued
concerning targets other then those listed above ... It is
desired that you personally deliver one copy of this
directive to General MacArthur and one copy to Admiral
Nimitz for their information."
In sum, on the day that General Spaatz received his order to
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employ the A-bomb against Japan, the US military was working
with two orders, this one, scheduled for late August, and the one
to execute "Operation Downfall" on November 1, 1945. In
addition, MacArthur had Operation Blacklist in his hip pocket
should he have to quickly occupy Japan.
With regard to Downfall, D.M. Giangreco has written this:
"Construction of the massive prefabricated components of
a portable harbor to support forces invading Honshu had a
priority second only to the Manhattan Project which had
produced the bomb. Stateside hospitals were readied for a
flood of wounded."
On July 26, through the Potsdam Declaration, the US demanded
Japan surrender unconditionally or face "prompt and utter
destruction." As expected, on July 28, Japan publicly rejected the
demands of the Potsdam Declaration. Japan's prime minister not
only rejected it, but said this:
"We will do nothing but press on to the bitter end to bring
about a successful completion of the war."
The US had earlier intercepted Japanese messages indicating that
the Japanese were trying to use the good offices of the Soviets to
bring about an end to the war.
That said, in an intercept of July 22,
1945, Japanese Foreign Minister
Shigen Togo, shown here, issued
clear direction on the matter of
unconditional surrender:
"With regard to unconditional
surrender, we are unable to
consent to it under any
circumstances whatever.
Even if the war drags on and
it becomes clear that it will
take much more bloodshed,
the whole country as one man
will pit itself against the
enemy in accordance with the Imperial Will so long as any
enemy demands unconditional surrender."
This must have been a difficult message for Togo to issue. He
was against the war from the outset, and was one of the main
players in convincing the emperor to end it. At this point in time,
Togo was hoping the Soviets could help them obtain a peace that
at the least would keep the emperor in place. None of this
worked.
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Little Boy atomic bomb unit on trailer cradle in pit. Note bomb bay door in
upper right-hand corner. August 1945. Presented by wikipedia.
The orders had gone out in July. Let the record affirm the first
A-bomb, "Little Boy," was dropped by the 12-man crew of the
B-29 Enola Gay, callsign "Dimples Eight Two," on Hiroshima on
August 6, 1945. Colonel Paul Tibbets was the aircraft
commander. It did not come as much of a surprise to his crew,
but Tibbets told his crew for the first time they would be
dropping the A-bomb on this mission.
This mission had been delayed several times for bad weather. At
first, the 4th looked good, then the 5th, then the 6th.
Weather over the target was forecast as good for August 6.
Takeoff was at 1645Z (2:45 am) August 5, 1945. Takeoff speed
was 155 mph. In 10 minutes, over Saipan at 4,700 ft. Three hours
later they were over Iwo Jima. About five hours after launch,
Little Boy was armed. Dimples 82 climbed to 30,700 ft. A
reconnaissance aircraft reported that cloud cover over Hiroshima
was three-tenths. Tibbets informed his crew they would bomb
Hiroshima. The target was a T-shaped bridge in Hiroshima. Six
and one half hours after takeoff, Little Boy was dropped.
As soon as the bomb dropped out of the aircraft, the B-29
pitched because it had just gotten rid of 10,000 lbs. Tibbets went
into a tight turn, levels out, everything is okay with the aircraft,
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and Tibbets wanted to get to the Sea of Japan as quickly as he
could. The crew started filling out its logs, the shockwave was
coming at them, and their equipment measured being hit by 2.5
Gs at 10.5 miles from the target.
A flash report was sent out from the Enola Gay following the
drop:
"Results clearcut, successful in all respects. Visible effects
greater than New Mexico test. Conditions normal in
airplane following delivery."
Atomic cloud rises over Hiroshima. Photo taken from the B-29 Enola Gay about
30 seconds after the A-bomb exploded. Presented by Atomic Bomb Museum.
The aircrew reported the following:
"Target at Hiroshima attacked visually 1/10th cloud at
052315Z. No fighters. No flak."
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At the White House, President Truman announces Japan's surrender. Photo
credit: Abbie Rowe, Washington, DC, August 14, 1945. Presented by National
Archives.
President Truman announced the attack. This is part of what he
said:
"Sixteen hours ago an American airplane dropped one
bomb on Hiroshima, an important Japanese Army base.
That bomb had more power than 20,000 tons of T.N.T. It
had more than two thousand times the blast power of the
British 'Grand Slam' which is the largest bomb ever yet
used in the history of warfare.
"The Japanese began the war from the air at Pearl Harbor.
They have been repaid many fold. And the end is not yet ...
We are now prepared to obliterate more rapidly and
completely every productive enterprise the Japanese have
above ground in any city. We shall destroy their docks,
their factories, and their communications. Let there be no
mistake; we shall completely destroy Japan's power to
make war.
"... If they do not now accept our terms they may expect a
rain of ruin from the air, the like of which has never been
seen on this earth. Behind this air attack will follow sea
and land forces in such numbers and power as they have
not yet seen and with the fighting skill of which they are
already well aware."
President Truman (center seated) announcing that Russia declared war on Japan,
August 8, 1945. The man on the lower right smiling is Secretary of State James
Byrnes. Presented by the Harry Truman Library.
On August 8, the Soviets turned on the Japanese, declared war
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against them, and marched into Japanese-occupied Manchuria, a
surprise to the Japanese that such an invasion came so early. It
turned out that the US and USSR had been in cahoots on a Soviet
declaration of war against Japan, though, as you will see, one of
the reasons Truman felt a need for speed to end the war had to do
with his distrust of the Soviets.
To demonstrate how much uncertainty about how the war would
end still existed as of August 8, Secretary of the Navy James
Forrestal sent a memo directly to the president which said,
among other things:
"It is my opinion that the matter of common direction and
command for the final operations against Japan in the
Pacific (Downfall) is still not satisfactorily settled ... I
suggest that you give serious consideration to the selection
of either General Marshall or General Eisenhower to
assumed the over-all command."
Even though one A-bomb had been dropped, Forrestal was
nonetheless focused on and worried about who would command
the invasion of Japan.
The Fat Man bomb being readied on Tinian. Presented by Atomic Archive
On August 9, the crew of the B-29 Bockscar dropped the "Fat
Man" A-bomb on Nagasaki. The mission was scheduled for
August 11, but a typhoon forced a change to August 9.
Major Charles Sweeney, shown
here, was the squadron commander
and decided to go on this mission,
making him the aircraft
commander. Capt. Charles Don
Albey was normally the pilot for
this aircraft, but he moved over to
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the co-pilot's seat for the skipper.
The mission callsign was "Dimples
Seven Seven."
The mission encountered some
problems. First, The B-29 Great
Artiste was on the schedule to fly this mission. Sweeney, the
squadron commander, had flown most often aboard Great
Artiste. But she had been outfitted with gear compatible with the
first mission, so the B-29 Bockscar was handed the mission, and
was to be flown by the Great Artiste's crew. Technically, there
was an aircraft familiarity issue.
Then there was a problem with the fuel transfer pumps. Tibbets
told Sweeney he didn't need the extra 600 gallons in the reserve
tank that could be transferred by these pumps. After a long
discussion, Sweeney decided to launch. Bockscar took off at
3:49 am with a crew of 11, plus some observers, an hour behind
schedule. The bomb was armed about 30 minutes later, at 4:15
am.
The typhoon forced Sweeney to fly higher than desired, using
more fuel than desired, and west of the route, forcing use of even
more fuel than desired.
Next, one of the observation aircraft did not meet up with
Bockscar at the rendezvous point. He was orbiting about 9,000
feet above Bockscar "in the soup" at the rendezvous but the two
never saw each other. Even though ordered to wait no longer
than 15 minutes, Sweeney waited 40 minutes, and decided to go
without the other aircraft. Sweeney decided to go to the first
target on his list, Kokura.
Bockscar got to the target, but the bombardier could not see it
because of smoke from firebombing the previous day. The crew
attempted three runs at the target, but it was blocked by smoke
each time. Bockscar was receiving anti-aircraft fire and some
enemy fighters did get airborne. Sweeney then turned to the
secondary target, Nagasaki.
Fuel was now an issue because of the time wasted going to and
flying around Kokura. The skies had clouded up. Sweeney told
the crew they would have only one run at the target, and he
instructed the crew to go in on radar. This was against the rules,
which required visual acquisition of the target, but all hands
agreed to go in radar anyway. At the last moment, the
bombardier said he had the target visually. The bomb was
released at 11:58 am.
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Nagasaki strike photo, August 9, 1945. Presented by The Hawai'i Nisei Story.
Sweeney immediately put his aircraft on a course to Okinawa
rather than Tinian or the emergency landing field at Iwo Jima.
The crew discussed ditching in the ocean. As they approached
Okinawa, they radioed Mayday and received no response. He
told the crew to drop flares. Still no response. Without any
approvals from air traffic control, the crew maneuvered their
aircraft behind two aircraft in line to land. They then lost one of
their four engines. As they landed, a second engine went idle.
They landed, with only 35 gallons fuel, essentially empty.
The report from the 313th Bomb Wing read as follows:
"Bombed Nagasaki 090158Z (2158 EWT 9:58 PM 8
August 10:589 8/9 Japan) visually with no fighter
opposition and no flak. Results 'technically successes' but
other factors involved make conference necessary before
taking further steps. Visible effects about equal to
Hiroshima. Trouble in airplane following delivery requires
us to proceed to Okinawa.. Fuel only to get to Okinawa."
We recommend you read the documents on the National Security
Archives web site for the full reports.
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President Truman did not announce the Nagasaki attack. He did
give a radio speech after the attack, but made no mention of it,
other than to say this:
"The world will note that the first atomic bomb was
dropped on Hiroshima, a military base. That was because
we wished in this first attack to avoid, insofar as possible,
the killing of civilians. But that attack is only a warning of
things to come. If Japan does not surrender, bombs will
have to be dropped on her war industries and,
unfortunately, thousands of civilian lives will be lost. I
urge Japanese civilians to leave industrial cities
immediately, and save themselves from destruction."
It's now August 9, 1945, two A-bombs had been dropped
successfully on Japan, and, according to intercepts of Japanese
message traffic, the Japanese Supreme War Council meeting that
day could not agree on how to approach the Americans. In all
cases, the Japanese wanted to attach conditions to a surrender,
ranging from one (the emperor) to four, the latter three of which
included no occupation, no foreign war crimes trials, and
acceptance of voluntary Japanese military withdrawals and
demobilization.
At this meeting, the fear of domestic upheaval was discussed
with some arguing that continuing the war would alleviate
domestic anxieties and bring the country together to fight off the
Americans.
Throughout, hope continued that the Japanese could achieve a
negotiated settlement with the Americans. The prime minister
asked the emperor's decision. The emperor said, in round-about
language, he would end the war on condition that "the Imperial
House, the people and the national territory remain." He said the
war was hopeless and there was no chance for victory.
As a result, the Japanese sent a telegram on August 10 via
Switzerland and Sweden that they would accept the terms of the
Potsdam Declaration upon "the understanding that its does not
comprise any demand which prejudices the prerogatives of His
Majesty as sovereign ruler." In short, one condition.
On August 10, President Truman, having received the surrender
offer, stopped any further employment of the A-bomb. General
Marshall informed General Groves that no more A-bombs could
be released over Japan without express authority from the
President.
It's time to pause again in order to raise the "Soviet Problem" and
the "need for speed" mentioned previously.
While the Americans were unsure "how to" end the war, they
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were sure of one thing: there was a need for speed. It had to end
quickly. Operation Downfall's two phases were scheduled for
November 1, 1945 and March 1, 1946. As mentioned previously,
the political advisors felt the American people would not tolerate
a war into 1947.
With Downfall and Blacklist on the table, either way the
Americans intended to occupy Japan and assign an American
officer to be the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers
during that occupation. But the fly in the ointment was that an
American occupation force had to get in there quickly or face the
prospect of the Soviets wanting a piece of the occupation and
command action. The Soviets might even want to participate in
the invasion.
Greater Manchuria is in the various shades of red. While not reflected on this
map, please recall that Japan at the time occupied the entire Korean peninsula,
Sakhalin Island, and much of the Kurile Island chain as well. Map presented by
wikipedia.
The Soviet Union invaded Manchuria on August 6, 1945, the day
of the Hiroshima bombing. The Japanese expected the Soviet
invasion, but in the fall, not in August 1945. The Soviets moved
four armies into Manchuria. This area was considered
strategically important to the Soviets, Chinese, and Japanese, and
each had long sought ownership of it.
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Soviet T–34 medium tanks on the road in Manchuria. Presented by Lone Sentry.
While Japan's force structure in the region was formidable, it had
deteriorated in quality over the years and, expecting an American
invasion of the Home Islands, Japan moved the veteran divisions
back to the homeland. As a result, US leaders worried that the
Soviets might advance so rapidly in Manchuria that they would
attempt to lay some kind of claim to the Japanese Home Islands
and demand to participate in the invasion, occupation and peace
process --- muddling the whole works, as they did in Europe.
There had been hope that a Soviet invasion of Manchuria
coupled with a Soviet declaration of war against Japan, which
came on August might be enough to cause the Japanese to
surrender quickly, fearing a Soviet occupation. Such a sudden
Japanese surrender would require rapid implementation of
Blacklist. In either event, US occupation was needed quickly,
which meant a Japanese surrender was needed quickly.
The question of Soviet involvement in the occupation of Japan
was raised on August 10 by the Soviets with US Ambassador to
Moscow Averill Harriman. Kimie Hara, in the book, JapaneseSoviet Relations Since 1945: Difficult Peace, reported that Stalin
raised it again on August 16, 1945, suggesting that the Soviets
ought to get all the Kuriles, including Sakhalin, and the northern
half of Hokkaido. Hara further said that "Soviet military
commanders were 'energetically' undertaking their strategic plan
of occupying the 'Northern Territories' of Japan.'"
Even with the emperor's radio announcement, the Soviets
continued military actions against Japanese forces on Sakhalin
and Shumshu Island in the Kurile Chain.
It is arguable whether the Soviets could have mounted any kind
of invasion attempt against northern Japan. Nonetheless, these
were uncertain times and it was valid to worry.
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Major General Clayton Bissell,
shown here, was General Marshall's
chief of intelligence. On August 12,
he laid out what he saw were the
options open to Japan:
Drag out what had turned
into negotiations by electric
wire until they could get
something they could live
with.
Reject all of it and continue
hostilities.
Accept the Allied proposal to
end the war. This proposal on the surface was
unconditional surrender with a Supreme Commander of
Allied Powers in charge in Japan during an occupation.
However, the US felt there was wiggle room in the words
to lead the Japanese to understand the emperor's position
could remain.
Bissell opined that the first option gave the Japanese the initiative
and should not be permitted. He offered that the US would
prevail should further hostilities go on, to wit, an invasion. He
said A-bombs would not be needed for at least the first 30 days
of the invasion, leaving open their use after that, during an
invasion. With regard to the last option, Bissell felt the Japanese
people would go along with the emperor's decision, however
reluctantly, He felt Japanese forces would obey his decision in
Manchuria, but they would not surrender to Koreans on the
Korean peninsula. A US force wold have to be sent there to
accept a Japanese surrender. What might happen in China was a
toss up. The Allies would have to act there to maintain control.
Elsewhere, Japanese forces would obey the emperor, in Bissell's
opinion.
Also on August 12, Japan's Vice Chief of the Army General Staff
issued a circular that said, in part:
"As a result of Russia's entrance into the war, the
Empire, in the fourth year of its endeavor, is faced
with a struggle for the existence of the nation.
However, the Imperial Army and Navy are
resolutely determined to continue their efforts to
preserve the national structure, even if it means the
destruction of the Army and Navy ... We will
continue the war to the bitter end."
In a telephone conversation of
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August 13, 1945 between General
John E. Hull, shown here, assistant
chief of staff for the War
Department's Operations Division
(OD) and Colonel L. E. Seeman, an
associate of General Groves
(Manhattan Project), Hull discussed
the relationships between
employment of further atomic
weapons and the impending
invasion of the home islands.
Recall that two A-bombs had
already been dropped. General Hull was active in planning
Allied operations throughout the entire war and was seen by
many as a top authority on integrating strategy with operations.
Seeman confirmed to Hull that a third bomb was ready, that it
could be shipped on August 16, and could be dropped on Japan
on August 19. General Curtis Lemay, commander of the 20th AF
which had dropped the first two bombs, had already asked
Colonel Tibbets if there were any more, and Tibbetts replied to
the affirmative, one more, ready to go. Lemay ordered Tibbets to
get that third bomb out to Tinian immediately. That process then
began.
Hull then started computing with Seeman how many bombs
would be available through the end of October. Together they
computed that the total bombs that could be available by the end
of October, and dropped if required, was seven. Recall that the
Operation Downfall - Olympic landings were to commence on
Kyushu on November 1, 1945.
Hull, on August 13, was working on a planning assumption that
the Japanese would not capitulate despite the two bombs dropped
thus far. Several days had already passed without a peep from the
Japanese.
Given this planning assumption, Hull then discussed what the
targets ought to be, and suggested that they ought to be targets
that would support the invasion. In other words, he was
pondering using the bombs while the invasion was underway, in
Seeeman's words, "nearer a tactical use rather than the other
(strategic) use."
Seeman responded he had thought about this. He opined that the
invasion force would have to be at least six miles away from a
target, though he cautioned that he was unsure about whether the
Air Force could place it within 500 ft. of the point from which
they would compute the six miles.
General MacArthur, like many general officers, was not
enamored by the idea of employing the bomb. That said, like
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Secretary Hull, he did give thought to integrating it as a tactical
weapon should the tactical operations at Kyushu and Honshu fail
to bring the Japanese to their senses. Admiral Nimitz saw it
about the same.
So that was August 13. A military coup in Japan unfolded but
failed on August 14. There was also an attempt to steal the
recording made by the emperor agreeing to surrender. It failed as
well.
On August 14-15, 1945 (we get confused on the impact of the
international dateline when we read dates in the research), Japan
surrendered unconditionally. President Truman received a
message from the Japanese Government on August 14, 1945
which said, among other things:
"His Majesty the Emperor has issued an Imperial
rescript regarding Japan's acceptance of the
provisions of the Potsdam declaration."
Emperor Hirohito delivered his speech by radio to his people on
August 15, 1945 which said, among other things:
"I have ordered the Imperial Government to inform the
four Governments of the United States, Great Britain,
China and the Soviet Union that our Empire is willing to
accept the provisions of their Joint Declaration."
For the sake of his people and royal ambiguity, he called the
Potsdam Declaration the "Joint Declaration."
Japanese surrender signatories arrive aboard the USS Missouri in Tokyo Bay to
participate in surrender ceremonies, September 2, 1945. A most interesting area
of research would be to learn about all the precautionary efforts that US forces
had to make to be sure this didn't blow in their faces. Presented by the National
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Archives.
General Yoshijiro Umezu, Chief of the Army General Staff, signs the
Instrument of Surrender on behalf of Japanese Imperial General Headquarters,
on board USS Missouri (BB-63), 2 September 1945. Watching from across the
table are Lieutenant General Richard K. Sutherland and General of the Army
(five star) Douglas MacArthur. Representatives of the Allied powers are behind
General MacArthur. Photographed from atop Missouri's 16-inch gun turret # 2.
Official U.S. Navy Photograph, now in the collections of the National Archives.
Presented by the Naval History Center.
A formal treaty was signed on September 2, 1945, in Tokyo Bay.
So that was that. Many of the forces slated to invade now landed
unopposed as an occupation force, the occupation began and the
rest is history.
The Japanese announcement to accept an unconditional
surrender came only 11 weeks and one day before the might of
the US military would invade the Home Islands. Our veteran in
the grocery store is right to have uttered a sigh of relief. Most of
those who would invade were already hardened veterans of the
war in the Pacific, and some from the war in Europe.
Many opine that dropping the A-bombs saved many American
lives. That is true. How many casualties might result from the
Operation Downfall invasion was controversial then and remains
so today. The generally accepted figure was that the US would
suffer one million casualties. Some even said more.
The truth, thankfully, is no one knows.
D.M. Giangreco prepared a paper on this subject, entitled,
"Casualty projections for the US invasion of Japan, 1945-46:
Planning and policy implications." He doggedly describes the
numerous discussions and papers written on the subject, and
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then, sums it all up this way:
"Researchers look at the forest of documents created over
fifty years ago and almost immediately become lost during
their hunt for extreme comments and inconsistencies. The
fundamental truth, however, was that the Army and War
Department manpower policy of 1945--- in all its
aspects--- was established in such a way that the Army
could sustain an average of 100,000 casualties per month
from November 1945 through the fall of 1946 and still
retain relatively fully manned and combat-effective units
through its use of new Selective Service inductees and
reassigned soldiers from demobilized units. That
casualties would be massive was so basic an
understanding, that it was functionally a 'self-evident
truth' held by decision makers at virtually all levels.
Little or no paper discussion was required or conducted
within the Army, and events beyond its purview rendered
an invasion unnecessary. The Army, as an institution,
believed its soldiers would suffer extreme losses during
an invasion of Japan, and all its actions in 1945 were
based on that assumption."
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