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How to Seize the
Moment in Egypt
Blueprint for Congress and the Obama Administration
Released April 2011
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dignity to which every individual is entitled and will stem
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Introduction
Popular protests continue to shake the Middle East
and North Africa from Morocco to Iran. Forced to
endure decades of repressive, corrupt, and unresponsive
government, people across the region are rising up to
demand a better life. Protesters have many motives, from
lack of economic opportunity to police brutality to
unchecked official lawlessness. But central to all the
protests is the demand for governments that respect
human dignity—that is, for governments that uphold
human rights.
In his “Address to the Muslim World” in Cairo on June 4,
2009, President Obama underlined his commitment “to
governments that reflect the will of the people.” He
promised that the United States would support human
rights “everywhere” and identified them: “the ability to
speak your mind and have a say in how you are governed;
confidence in the rule of law and the equal administration
of justice; government that is transparent and doesn’t steal
from the people; the freedom to live as you choose.” This
is a reasonable encapsulation of the demands of the
protesters.
The United States, a longtime supporter of repressive
regimes in the region, bears its share of responsibility for
the suffering there. The damage inflicted by these corrupt
and sometimes brutal regimes will now have to be
remedied by emerging governments that will need support
from the international community, not least from the United
States.
The protests have forced the removal of two of the regions
most established authoritarian rulers, Tunisia’s Zine ElAbedine Ben Ali and Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak, creating the
possibility of fundamental reform. The United States now
has an invaluable opportunity to support the push for
democracy and in so doing to overhaul its approach
toward the region. This is the ideal moment to place a
commitment to human rights at the center of its
Middle Eastern policy.
Events of the past three months have demonstrated that
the old paradigm for U.S. policy—trying to maintain
stability in the region through close relationships with
autocrats—has suffered a blow; a fatal blow, we hope.
The stability engendered through repression has long
been largely illusory. Since the end of the Cold War,
there has been little stability in the Muslim World, and the
region has provided more than its fair share of threats to
U.S. strategic interests. The United States has fought
three major wars and is still embroiled in two of them, in
Iraq and Afghanistan. Military intervention has been
contemplated in other countries, and is currently under
way in Libya. Israel has not enjoyed peace with its
neighbors, the Palestinian-Israeli peace process is stalled,
oil prices have fluctuated alarmingly, and security
concerns about the threat of Islamic extremism and
nuclear proliferation continue to mount. At the risk of being
wise after the event, one is tempted to ask, what stability?
In recent years, authoritarian leaders like Mubarak and
Ben Ali found it politic to mask their dictatorial ways with a
pretense of democratization and promises of reform that
never came. This option of winking at sham reform while
benefiting from cooperation in key strategic areas will now
carry a heavier price for U.S. policymakers. The choice
going forward will be between unseemly alliances with
unmasked dictators and new partnerships with sovereign,
democratic governments. The United States should make
clear that it will have a new approach to its allies in the
region based on building mutually supportive alliances with
sovereign, democratic states. The United States will seek
the stability it needs to protect its interests through the
promotion of democracy and human rights, not through
abetting autocrats and dictators.
While change is inevitably unsettling, there is no reason
for pessimism, which could be self-fulfilling. There is,
however, a need for a new approach, and the patience to
see it through.
HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST BLUEPRINT—HOW TO SEIZE THE MOMENT IN EGYPT
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President Obama noted in Cairo that governments that
support human rights are more stable, successful and
secure. They make better strategic partners than the
despots the U.S. government has supported for so long. It
is precisely in the countries where the United States has a
long history of providing financial assistance and
cultivating close military and security cooperation that it
now has the greatest opportunity to shape new
relationships. These close relationships that have for
decades been placed in the service of repression and
authoritarianism, earning the United States the distrust
and enmity of people in the region, are now potential
assets in promoting a peaceful transition to democracy in
Egypt, the regional trendsetter, and Tunisia.
Instead of the discredited reliance on alliances with
autocrats, there is a need for a new paradigm that
builds genuine stability on the basis of responsive
government, respect for the rule of law and adherence
to international human rights standards.
Core U.S. interests and strategic concerns in the region
have not changed. Maintaining access to a reliable supply
of oil and other energy resources, combating terrorism and
the threat of religious extremism, containing the influence
of Iran, preventing nuclear proliferation, and ensuring
Israel’s security all remain high on the U.S. policy agenda.
These interests have been imperfectly served by the
stability-through-repression approach and will be better
served by an approach that champions government of the
people, by the people, for the people as the desirable
norm for America’s regional allies. Indeed, such an
approach would take as its model the mutually beneficial
relationships the United States enjoys with its closest
democratic allies in Europe and around the world.
The benefits of this new approach could be considerable:
instead of U.S. alliances with dictators in the region
becoming a rallying call for Al-Qaeda and other violent
anti-American extremists, partnerships with democratic
allies would improve the popular perception of the United
States and thereby serve its interests.
Desired Outcomes in
Transitional States
Tunisia and Egypt have already embarked on a path
towards democratic transition. Not only have presidents
been removed, but entire cabinets have been dismissed
and once monolithic ruling parties have been dissolved, in
the case of Tunisia, or severely weakened in Egypt. This is
stunning, rapid change, but in both countries the new
governing structures and the legal framework in which they
will operate are still under construction.
It does not take a mass popular uprising to implement
democratic change. A desirable change that is already
emerging across the region is for authoritarian
governments to announce and begin to implement political
reform programs, thereby preempting the need for
disruptive and risky mass protests. It should not be
forgotten that hundreds of people were killed in the “mostly
peaceful” Egyptian uprising, and any situation where large
crowds of protesters are confronting armed members of
the security forces can easily degenerate into
confrontations in which many people are killed. Such
reform programs have been announced in Jordan and
Morocco and are in the balance in Bahrain, which stepped
back from violent repression of protesters under U.S.
pressure, but then reverted to repression once more.
The mass protests have established a desirable context in
which authoritarian rulers have a strong incentive to put in
place meaningful reform programs that will better protect
human rights. U.S. policy should be focused on ways to
capitalize on this rare favorable moment for advancing
human rights in the region, by developing coordinated
strategies across the U.S. government designed to ensure
that governments make good on their pledges to reform.
The constituent elements of democratic society are well
known: protection of basic rights and freedoms; respect for
the rule of law and the fair and equal administration of
justice; representative and responsive government that is
accountable to the people. These are the broad goals of
democracy promotion that take on specific content and
form in each new setting.
HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST BLUEPRINT—HOW TO SEIZE THE MOMENT IN EGYPT
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Given its position as a leader within the Arab world, but a
leader whose influence waned under the oppressive rule
of President Mubarak, Egypt is the logical focal point for
U.S. human rights and democracy promotion policy in the
region.
Egypt has attributes and characteristics that make it wellsuited for this role. It has:
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A dynamic civil society already strongly engaged in
issues of human rights and democracy;
Professional organizations with a long history of
struggling against state control;
An independent media sector that was finding its feet
even before the uprising; and
A broad array of organized political forces that, within
a short period of time, should be able to provide a real
choice of political alternatives to the Egyptian
electorate.
Egypt is also potentially well-served by its state institutions.
The higher reaches of the judiciary jealously guarded its
independence under the old order and has the capacity
now to lead the Egyptian judiciary to be a force for stability
and the rule of law and a check on tyranny in the new
Egypt. The Egyptian military, long the dominant element in
the Egyptian state has, since the mass protests began on
January 25, used its influence to support the democratic
aspirations of the protest movement, while also having a
legacy of being major beneficiaries of the previous regime.
However, there are real questions over the extent they will
be willing to be the midwife to a genuine democratic
system that in the end would curtail its traditional
privileges.
The long-standing and rich bilateral U.S.- Egyptian
relationship is another factor that points to Egypt as the
natural priority target country in promoting democratic
transitions in the region. For that to happen, U.S.
policymakers should establish clear benchmarks for what
constitutes real progress towards human rights and
democracy in Egypt and evaluate their success by the
extent to which such changes are being achieved in
practice.
Key Human Rights Benchmarks in Egypt
Military Willingness to Share Executive Power
The ruling military council in Egypt, the Supreme Council
of the Armed Forces (SCAF) is an element of continuity
from the former regime. Since the 1952 Free Officers
revolution the Egyptian military has been the power behind
the throne in Egypt and former military officers have filled
the office of the presidency from Nasser to Sadat to
Mubarak. Under Mubarak, the military has enjoyed many
privileges as well as developing private business interests.
The military now controls one of the biggest business
empires in Egypt with little or no public scrutiny over its
activities. It therefore has ample reason to seek to ensure
that it emerges from the transition with its privileges as
intact as possible.
On the other hand, the military is one of the most
respected institutions in the country and, as a conscript
army, many millions of Egyptians have direct experience
with it through their own service or that of their relatives. In
a state where many institutions were undermined or
weakened by an overbearing authoritarian ruler, the
military has the capacity to hold the country together
through the transition process and to be the midwife of the
emergence of a more representative government.
In order for that to happen the military must be willing
eventually to submit to civilian oversight by an elected
government. In this transitional phase, the military could
indicate its willingness to share executive power by
bringing credible civilian figures, not tainted by previous
association with the Mubarak regime, into an interim
executive council that would rule through the elections for
a parliament and a new president, and would set in place
an inclusive, transparent process for revision of the
constitution.
HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST BLUEPRINT—HOW TO SEIZE THE MOMENT IN EGYPT
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While there appears to be broad popular support for the
role of the military as a force for stability in uncertain times
there is concern that in pushing through a compressed
timeline for the transition process the military may be
seeking to protect its own interests by ensuring that
political forces likely to push for real change will have
insufficient time to organize to secure strong
representation in parliament or to identify a broadly
supported opposition candidate to run for the presidency.
The forces most likely to benefit from an accelerated
timetable for elections are those that were organized in the
previous regime: the remnants of the formerly ruling
National Democratic Party and the Muslim Brotherhood.
Repeal of Repressive Legislation
On March 28, the Supreme Council announced that the
holding of parliamentary elections would be postponed
until September 2011, giving more time for new political
parties to coalesce and become organized. The council
also repeated its pledge to hand over power to an elected
civilian government as soon as possible. These are both
welcome statements, but concern remains that a
purportedly democratic revolution headed by an unelected
military council is a contradiction. Broadening the ruling
council to include independent civilian figures would put
additional substance behind the council’s statements.
Comprehensive reform of the constitution and other laws
that restrict basic freedoms will not happen until new,
elected governing authorities are in place, as a minimum
several months from now. Nonetheless, for elections to
take place in any kind of atmosphere of freedom and
fairness debilitating constraints on peaceful political activity
must be removed. Even at this stage, Egypt’s rulers
should publicly commit to the formation of a
representative, pluralistic constituent assembly to
undertake the task of rewriting the constitution.
A troubling indication of the military’s willingness to
exercise its absolute powers has been seen in the use of
military police to break up peaceful protests, as happened
in Tahrir Square on March 9, and against Coptic protesters
outside the main television building in Cairo on March 14.
The use of military courts to try protesters and others
accused of “thuggish behavior” is another worrying sign of
the military exercising unchecked powers. Some of the
protesters detained on March 9 have reported that they
were beaten and tortured while held in military custody.
Women have reported that they were subjected to forced
virginity tests. These abuses must be independently
investigated and those responsible held accountable for
their actions.
An important indicator of the integrity of the reform process
will be legislative change. Egypt has a very broad array of
repressive legislation specifically designed to curtail basic
freedoms of expression, assembly, and association and to
stifle pluralistic politics. Fundamental reforms are needed
in laws related to the functioning and registration of
political parties and laws that undermine the independence
of professional association and non-governmental
organizations. The Emergency Law, law number 162 of
1958, has developed into a catchall measure that negates
rights and freedoms provided for in the constitution and
elsewhere in Egyptian law.
In a positive development, the Supreme Council
announced a new political parties’ law on March 28. The
old Political Parties Committee, through which the ruling
National Democratic Party exercised control over its
potential rivals by denying permission to new parties to
register or by dissolving parties, has been replaced by an
independent committee of judges. Moreover, new
registration procedures are not burdensome; parties are
automatically granted legal status 30 days after submitting
their application, unless the judicial committee objects.
Disputes are to be settled by the administrative courts.
The Supreme Council has also underlined its intention to
repeal the Emergency Law ahead of planned elections.
Real change in Egypt will require the actions of the
military, from upholding public order to its economic
activities to its treatment of its citizens, to be made
transparent and for mechanisms of accountability to
civilian authorities to be firmly established.
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An End to Arbitrary Detention and Torture
Arbitrary detention and torture of detainees were common
practices under the Mubarak regime. Political opponents,
including nonviolent government critics, were sometimes
targeted for this kind of abuse, but its use was also
random and intimidatory, designed to deter dissent.
Criminal suspects were also commonly brutalized and
abused while in police custody. These abusive practices
became the hallmark of Mubarak’s authoritarian regime,
undermining public confidence in the police and making a
mockery of the rule of law.
Public dissatisfaction with the arbitrary and often brutal
treatment people received at the hands of the security
forces was one of the underlying causes of the unrest that
led to the overthrow of the president. In this regard, the
murder by police of Khaled Saeed outside an Alexandria
internet café in June 2010 became a symbol of police
brutality and a focal issue for mobilization in the months
leading up to January 25, 2011.
It is vital that Egypt’s post-Mubarak rulers uphold public
security through policing methods that abide by the rule of
law and respect the rights and freedoms of the people. If
abuses occur, and there have been troubling reports of
continuing abuses by military personnel in this transitional
period, they must be independently investigated and those
responsible held to account.
It is very encouraging that the new Minister of the Interior,
General Mansour al-Essawy announced the dissolution of
the State Security Intelligence Services on March 15,
responding to opposition protests against one of the most
abusive and unaccountable of the branches of the security
services. Activists are able to read the files that were
compiled against them, revealing both the extent to which
their rights were violated and a window onto how the
security services operated. It is vital that this welcome step
should be just that, one step on the way to comprehensive
reform of the security sector, and that the practices and
wide-ranging abuses of the past should be exposed, with
those responsible for crimes held to account.
An End to State Domination of Broadcast Media and
Monopolistic Control over the Telecommunications
and Internet Service Provider Sector
Freedom of expression was curtailed in Mubarak’s Egypt
by state domination of terrestrial broadcast media and of
the largest, most widely available newspapers. These
were the sources from which most Egyptians received
their news. Small independent newspapers and
magazines, independent websites and blogs, and satellite
television entered the media marketplace in recent years
diversifying the information available to Egyptians. At the
same time, the authorities managed news content by
detaining and abusing bloggers who criticized government
policy and exposed violations, or by prosecuting journalists
and editors who crossed “red lines’ of acceptable news
reporting.
Despite these restrictions, new communications
technologies such as cellphones, blogs and social
networking sites became important tools in sharing
information and organizing opposition to the government.
So effective did these communications platforms become
for the opposition that the government notoriously took the
draconian step of closing down access to the Internet
almost completely and disrupting cellphone service
throughout the country.
Monopolistic state control over the media is not conducive
to the development of a pluralistic democratic
environment. The brazen interference with and interruption
of Internet access and cellphone connectivity showed the
absence of a law-governed framework for the provision of
these basic services, and the protection of the right to
freedom of expression and access to information that they
provide.
Egypt’s new government needs to prioritize a more
pluralistic model for media ownership and control and
establish the legal and regulatory framework to permit
the functioning of essential communications
platforms in a transparent and law-governed manner.
HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST BLUEPRINT—HOW TO SEIZE THE MOMENT IN EGYPT
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Pitfalls and Dangers
U.S. efforts to promote successful, peaceful transitions to
democracy in Egypt and Tunisia face many challenges if
they are to result in successful outcomes. These include:
An increasingly complex regional situation
The Tunisian uprising set off a region-wide chain of events
that continues to develop in unexpected and often
challenging ways for U.S. policy. Protests against
authoritarian rulers in different countries provide different
opportunities and complications for U.S. policy. At the
rhetorical level, senior U.S. policymakers have established
a consistent message that the way for governments
throughout the region to respond to protests is through
meeting the legitimate demands of people for more
representative government and more freedom. President
Obama can point to the fact that this was a message he
communicated early in his presidency, in his Cairo speech
in June 2009, which he has built on as events have
developed.
Problems come when the U.S. government is forced by
events to put its rhetorical commitments into practice. In
Yemen, Bahrain, Syria, Iran, and Saudi Arabia the limits of
the reach of U.S. policy, for a variety of reasons, are being
exposed and popular movements for reform are facing
authoritarian retrenchment while the United States is left
standing on the sidelines. In Libya, the administration has
supported multilateral U.N. Security Council backed
military intervention to protect the civilian population—a
demanding, resource-intensive, and politically
controversial policy with uncertain outcomes.
Each of these country situations can have negative
implications, obviously for human rights conditions within
each country, but also from the continuing influence of
unreformed authoritarian holdout rulers on the region as a
whole. In the case of Libya, which borders both Egypt and
Tunisia, the violent suppression of the uprising was
contributing to mass flight from Libya of refugees and
migrants who seek refuge in neighboring states, thereby
creating large humanitarian challenges in states that are
dealing with their own transition problems. It appears at
this point that this pressure has been averted in the shortterm, but it remains a threat. Moreover, the disruption to
the Libyan economy will further damage the already
weakened economies of Egypt and Tunisia, which
previously benefited from remittances from migrants
working in Libya.
The complications and setbacks suffered by reform
movements, and the challenges such setbacks provide for
U.S. policy, should serve to underline the importance of
U.S. policy capitalizing on the opportunity presented by the
democratic transitions under way in Tunisia and Egypt.
Even if reform movements are frustrated or defeated in
other countries, further progress in Tunisia and especially
Egypt will, over time, turn the tide in the region away from
authoritarianism towards more responsive governments
and greater respect for human rights. For decades, the
Arab world has been a contiguous block of resistance to
human rights and democracy and, probably not
coincidentally, a source of instability and threats for U.S.
policy. Supporting the democratic forces within this block
would change this regional dynamic, and is a policy
objective worth pursuing energetically and patiently, but
above all strategically.
Sectarian Tensions
The final years of the Mubarak regime were marred by
troubling incidents of long-simmering sectarian violence
between Egypt’s majority Muslim population and the
minority Coptic Christians, exacerbated by institutionalized
discrimination against Christians and lack of progress in
official investigations into high-profile acts of violence
against Christians. The Mubarak regime also fueled
popular antisemitism.
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In the last days of the Mubarak presidency, his supporters
appeared to pursue a deliberate policy of provoking unrest
and instability to demonstrate that the country needed firm
leadership and to sow a fear of change. Inflaming
sectarian tensions is a tried and tested way of provoking
civil unrest in Egypt. Clashes that followed the burning of a
church in Helwan, provoked by rumors of a crosssectarian romance, led to the deaths of 13 people in Cairo
in early March, showing the continuing potential of
tensions to flare up.
The new visibility in public life of so-called Salafi activists,
religious extremists who claim to be pursuing a purer,
more authentic version of Islam, is already further
exacerbating sectarian tensions. Salafis have seized on
such issues as the alleged abduction by church authorities
of a Christian woman who is claimed to have voluntarily
converted to Islam to seek to stir up anti-Christian
sentiment. Salafism also has the potential to fuel intraMuslim conflict within Egypt. There are already reports of
Salafis attacking popular shrines that are viewed as unIslamic by the ultra-orthodox.
Egypt’s Christian minority has legitimate demands that
must be met by the government: to be treated to equal
representation in senior government positions and the
security forces; to uphold the right to build and repair
churches with the same conditions as apply to the building
and repair of mosques; and to be protected by the state
from acts of violent bigotry and sectarian hatred.
In the meantime, senior officials in the transitional
authorities must send a clear message that sectarian
violence will not be tolerated. The military leadership
responded positively by dispatching a team of military
engineers to rebuild the burned church.
Political Islam
The fear that the democratic transition in Egypt might be
hijacked by anti-democratic religious extremists is never
far from the surface of discussions about U.S. policy
options in the region. These fears were heightened by the
prominent role played by the Muslim Brotherhood in the
campaign in favor of the constitutional amendments
passed by referendum on March 19. This campaign at
times took on a religious tone with leaflets and banners
proclaiming a vote in favor as a religious obligation for
Muslims.
Even though several high-profile secular, liberal activists
campaigned against the constitutional amendments, there
are reasons, other than latent sympathy for the
Brotherhood and its political program, why the majority of
voters supported the amendments. For example, it is
understandable that after a tumultuous few months many
voters should want a return to normality—which the
amendments appeared best suited to provide. It may also
be the case that some of those who voted in favor of the
amendments saw the speedy transition away from military
rule as the best available choice, despite the risks of
empowering pre-established political forces, like the
Brotherhood, through an accelerated electoral calendar.
Others may have simply decided to follow the military´s
lead as a force for continuity and stability.
Given its organizational strength, it is to be expected that
the Muslim Brotherhood, in the form of the new political
party it has announced, the Freedom and Justice Party,
will win a sizeable proportion of seats in the parliamentary
elections. In the 2005 parliamentary elections,
Brotherhood candidates running as independents won 88
out of the 444 seats decided by voting, so the
Brotherhood’s ability to win parliamentary seats is not in
doubt.
The new political landscape presents challenges and
uncertainties for the Brotherhood. The Brotherhood has
operated for decades as a clandestine and formally
banned organization. Its political program has been
obscure, and since it has never had a realistic chance of
exercising political power, a message that it was not the
ruling party and that it was pious was enough to make it a
suitable vehicle for opposition sentiment.
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Operating in a more open political environment, in which it
will be challenged by a number of opposition parties, is
unknown political territory. It is already becoming clear that
it will not have the banner of political Islam to itself. Former
Brotherhood Guidance Bureau member, Abdel Moneim
Abouel Fotouh, has announced his intention to form a
political party, Nahdat Masr (Egypt’s Renaissance), for
example. The Al-Wasat (Center) party, previously denied
permission to register, is led by activists who were
associated with the Brotherhood.
The Brotherhood itself has internal divisions that may
become more apparent in an open political environment.
Already younger activists are demanding a greater say in
the leadership of the organization. These activists took
part in street protests during the overthrow of President
Mubarak while the Brotherhood’s leadership hesitated
before supporting the protesters, and then quickly
resumed its usual practice of seeking accommodation with
the authorities through backroom deals.
The Brotherhood is not primarily a political organization. It
sees its role as being primarily one of encouraging greater
piety and inculcating its religious values into the broader
population. Having to compete openly for political power
may, over time, come in conflict with that mission.
These considerations aside, in what is likely to be a highly
splintered field of political parties, the discipline and
cohesiveness of the Brotherhood will probably work to its
advantage.
It remains to be seen how maximal its pursuit of political
power may turn out to be. The Brotherhood has already
stated that it does not intend to field a candidate in the
presidential election and it is also likely that it will contest
only a proportion of parliamentary seats so even if it wins
most of them, it would not have a parliamentary majority.
It also remains to be seen what the political program of the
Freedom and Justice Party might be. It would be
uncharacteristic for the Brotherhood to propose policies
that go beyond the Egyptian political mainstream, and it is
likely that it will seek alliances with other political parties
that may increase its chance of becoming part of a
governing coalition, but would also involve compromise.
Speculation aside, the best defense against antidemocratic forces, within the Brotherhood or
elsewhere, lies with institutional safeguards and
checks and balances built into the emerging Egyptian
political system. The new political parties’ law retains a
prohibition on parties based on religion. Under the new
law, the supervisory judicial committee can bring a
complaint to the Supreme Administrative Court calling for
the dissolution of any party that violates Egyptian law.
Political parties in Egypt will operate within a constitutional
and legal framework that will outlaw political violence,
discrimination, and other anti-democratic practices; strong
enforcement of safeguards for political freedoms provided
for by law will be required.
The military authorities will remain a strong presence in the
Egyptian political system, even after the promised
resumption of civilian rule. The military will seek to
exercise strong control over security policy, especially as it
relates to the military and security relationship with the
United States. For these reasons, it is highly unlikely that
the military would permit any government to break existing
treaty agreements with Israel, and with U.S.
encouragement, security and economic cooperation
between Egypt and Israel is likely to continue. Whether it
improves is another open question.
Ultimately, an open pluralistic political environment will
police itself, and given Egypt’s sophistication, it will tend to
be self-correcting. Egypt’s democratic institutions were
weakened under Mubarak, but they now have the
opportunity to play the role they were intended to. Support
for these institutions, like the judiciary, the National Human
Rights Council, and institutions that regulate the media
and communications networks, should be a high priority
for U.S. policy in the months and years ahead, so that
Egypt’s democratic political system matures and gains
strength.
HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST BLUEPRINT—HOW TO SEIZE THE MOMENT IN EGYPT
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Potential Vectors of Influence
for U.S. Policy
U.S. Foreign Assistance
Over more than three decades since the Camp David
Accords, the U.S. government has provided the Egyptian
government with over $50 billion in foreign assistance, the
great majority of this in the form of military assistance. In
FY 2010 and FY 2011 the level of aid has been $1.56
billion, with $1.3 billion of that directed towards military
assistance (FMF). FMF is a package of grants and loans
for Egypt to purchase weapons, military equipment, and
training from the United States, and it will remain relevant
to the new Egypt. Of the $250 million in civilian aid (ESF),
some $25 million was earmarked for programs related to
democracy, human rights, and governance programs. It is
worth noting these programs were funded at double these
levels under the Bush Administration between FY 2006
and FY 2008.
There are at least two important factors to consider in the
allocation of the aid package: first, the concrete goals and
outcomes that each specific outlay is intended to achieve;
and, just as importantly, the political message sent by the
way the funds are allocated. The Obama Administration
ran into criticism for slashing the funds allocated to
democracy and human rights, not because there were
good projects that went unfunded, but because of the
perceived message that the Obama Administration cared
less about human rights and democracy than its
predecessor.
Sending an unequivocal and clearly understood
message of support for a democratic transition in
Egypt must be one of the highest priorities for the
administration at this time and adapting the foreign
assistance package would be one of the clearest ways
to do that. Democracy and governance assistance should
not only be in the form of direct support for independent
civil society, there is also a need for support to be provided
to state institutions essential to the functioning of a
democratic system. These include resources for the
judiciary, the police, and for bodies that failed to fulfill their
potential under President Mubarak but may now have a
chance to flourish, like the National Human Rights Council.
Egypt is at the beginning of a daunting series of elections
for members of parliament and for a new president.
Several U.S. government-supported institutions have great
expertise in the technical and logistical aspects of holding
free and fair elections. Such institutions must be
adequately funded so as to provide needed support to
state institutions, nascent political parties, and to civil
society organizations involved in voter education and
election monitoring. Each phase of the electoral process
should be supported by an independent, international
election monitoring initiative, to which the U.S. government
should contribute.
Beyond contributing directly to strengthening the
infrastructure of democracy in Egypt, the U.S. government
should also develop trade and other economic incentives
that will serve to strengthen democratic forces within
Egyptian society, and if implemented will reap mutual
benefits to both Egypt and the United States. Senators
Kerry, McCain, and Lieberman introduced S. 618 on
March 29, 2011, a bill to strengthen the private sectors in
Egypt and Tunisia by re-creating the enterprise funds that
were helpful in the development of the Central European
economies. There needs to be a parallel effort to focus
resources on the promotion and protection of human
rights.
S.618 is an exemplary start. However, additional and more
dramatic efforts are needed if human rights, prosperity,
and stability are to “win” in Egypt.
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Recommendation
The events in the Middle East and North Africa over the
past three months are so momentous and present so
many opportunities that the U.S. government should
respond with a carefully crafted reprogramming of foreign
assistance for Egypt, Tunisia, and other states on a
credible path to reform leading to more representative
government and better respect for basic rights and
freedoms. This should include:
1. Direct grants to support the infrastructure of
democracy in state institutions including: police and
other security sector reform, support for building
greater accountability into the functioning of ministries,
training for legislators in serving as elected
representatives of their constituencies, and support for
strengthening the judiciary and building the rule of law;
2. Support for efforts to gather information about crimes
and violations committed by the previous regime, and
to implement effective accountability mechanisms;
3. Support for the holding of free and fair elections at all
phases of the electoral process, including election
monitoring by domestic groups;
4. Support for the reform and reinvigoration of the
Egyptian National Human Rights Council;
5. Support for governments and independent
nongovernmental organizations for the creation of
credible regional and subregional human rights
institutions;
6. Support for NGOs and independent civil society
organizations, and for state structures that regulate
and register NGOs without impairing their ability to
operate free from state interference and control.
A second aspect of this reprogramming of assistance
should focus on creating economic incentives to
strengthen the transition to democracy. These may
include:
7. Investment funds to stimulate private investment in
businesses in Egypt and other transitional states;
8. Trade concessions working towards a free trade
agreement with a reformed Egypt and other states that
meet criteria for transparency, adherence to the rule of
law and good governance;
9. Direct assistance to sectors of the Egyptian economy
damaged by the upheavals of the transition period.
The existing $1.5 billion annual aid budget should be
reviewed and adapted to ensure that it responds to these
needs. In addition, the administration and Congress are
encouraged to prioritize this opportunity with the creativity
and vision it demands.
Other Financial Resources to Support
Transition
Although tight federal budgets may limit U.S. cash outlays
to Egypt at this time, there are other ways the U.S.
government can enable the Egyptian authorities to gain
access to needed funds at the right time. These include:
1. Providing assistance to locate and repatriate
funds stolen or misappropriated under the
previous regime. There have been rumors of very
large sums of money, in the tens of billions of dollars,
existing in offshore accounts, real estate, and other
assets linked to the Mubarak family and their
associates. The veracity of these reports must be
checked, but if it is established that such funds exist
then they could become a significant resource to
support the transition process and economic
reconstruction in Egypt. The United States should
provide technical assistance and political support to
the Egyptian authorities investigating these funds and
seeking their repatriation.
2. Concessionary trade arrangements: Egypt already
benefits from a variety of concessionary trade
arrangements with the United States, including socalled Qualified Industrial Zones (QIZ), designed to
encourage Egypt-Israeli cooperation, that permit the
tariff-free import to the United States of goods
produced in QIZs, located in Egypt, employing
Egyptian workers that include a certain percentage of
Israeli-produced materials in their manufacture. The
new Egyptian government will face elevated
expectations and strong pressure to create jobs to
meet the demands of unemployed and underemployed
young people. Trade agreements designed to
HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST BLUEPRINT—HOW TO SEIZE THE MOMENT IN EGYPT
10
stimulate growth in Egypt will be an important element
in any U.S. economic assistance package. Such
agreements can be designed that would have a
minimal demand on public funds, but would stimulate
private sector investment and, in the long term, would
provide mutual benefit for both the Egyptian and the
American economy.
3. Stimulate private investment. The U.S. government
should arrange for U.S. business leaders in relevant
sectors to visit Egypt, Tunisia, and other countries
engaged in a genuine transition process. Increased
investment would benefit Egypt, but could also benefit
U.S. businesses.
4. Debt forgiveness is a major demand of Egypt’s
transitional leaders in their meetings with U.S.
policymakers. Egypt is burdened by tens of billions of
dollars in foreign debt, part of it to the United States.
The United States should lead an international effort,
including the international financial institutions, if
appropriate, to consider debt forgiveness or
restructuring.
Appoint a Responsible Official to Coordinate
U.S. Government Support for Democratic
Transitions in the Middle East.
U.S. government response to the transitions underway is
complex, involving the State, Defense, Treasury,
Commerce, and Homeland Security departments, among
other agencies and programs. The president should
appoint a high-profile, experienced individual, with
standing in Washington and internationally, to lead and
coordinate this major effort. This would achieve maximum
efficiencies and effectiveness, and a high-profile
appointment would also be an important signal of
sustained U.S. support for the transition process.
Proactive Approach to Human Rights
Defenders
Recommendation
The U.S. government wants to maintain its leadership of
human rights, including as a leading supporter of human
rights activists and defenders in Egypt. The aim should be
to influence the new Egyptian authorities to carry out their
obligations towards human rights defenders (HRDs), and
to protect them from attacks and threats from state and
non-state actors. The overall objective should be to bring
about an environment where human rights defenders can
operate freely. The United States should publicly stress—
through statement and action—the importance it attaches
to the protection of human rights defenders.
There are many avenues it must take. For example, as is
becoming practice throughout the world:
1. When senior U.S. officials visit Egypt they should as a
matter of course include meetings with human rights
defenders.
2. Political dialogues between the U.S. government and
the Egyptian authorities should include a discussion of
the situation of human rights defenders.
3. The United States should raise individual cases of
concern whenever necessary.
4. The U.S. government should seek to ensure that
human rights defenders in Egypt can access
resources, including financial, from abroad.
5. It should declare publicly its commitment to HRD
protection and promotion, and publish a list of duties in
this area it expects its embassies to perform.
6. The United States should be publicly seen to be
working closely with other like-minded countries with
similar views on defender issues, at the U.N. Human
Rights Council, the U.N. General Assembly, and
elsewhere.
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11
In addition, the United States should encourage and
support national human rights institutions, like the Egyptian
National Council for Human Rights, for the promotion and
protection of human rights, in accordance with the Paris
Principles. It should also promote the strengthening of
existing regional mechanisms for the protection of human
rights defenders, such as the focal point on human rights
defenders of the African Commission on Human and
Peoples’ Rights. In the rest of the region it should
energetically support the creation of similar mechanisms.
In particular, U.S. Embassy personnel in Cairo and other
representatives of the U.S. government in Egypt should:
1. Establish and maintain contacts with human rights
defenders. They should invite them to the Embassy
and visit them in their offices, and where possible help
them publicize their work;
2. Appoint liaison officers to develop relationships with
HRDS;
3. Observe trials of human rights defenders where
appropriate;
4. Coordinate closely with other like-minded
governments on their analysis and information about
the situation of HRDs, including those at risk;
5. Promote networking between local activists and
activists in the region and internationally, including by
facilitating meetings of human rights defenders;
6. Address the situation of human rights defenders in
their reporting to the Department of State and other
parts of the U.S. government, noting in particular any
threats or attacks against human rights defenders; and
Encouraging the Development of an
Independent Internet and
Telecommunications Sector
The January 28 shutdown of the Internet and
telecommunications sector generated uncertainty and
widespread economic damage that must be addressed to
help ensure a smooth democratic transition. The sudden
and arbitrary disruption of Internet service, and the
interference and blocking of cellphone services
should serve as a wake-up call to the business
community that an unstable business climate in which
companies are forced to submit to government fiat,
without legal redress or mediation, is an untenable
basis on which to build a modern economy. The
independent business sector, and especially in this case
telecommunications and technology companies, have a
clear interest in a business environment governed by law
in which the powers of government, the obligations of
companies, and the rights of users would all be clear.
Democracy and human rights activists depend on Internet,
mobile phone, and social media platforms to organize,
communicate, and to network with supporters and experts
outside Egypt. They have experienced continuing
difficulties in using these services since the shutdown,
including service disruption, service degradation, and
hacking and surveillance. Their experiences prior to and
during the uprising demonstrate their vulnerability to state
repression. In a new Egypt they must receive legal
protection of their right to freedom of expression.
7. Offer support for human rights defenders in the safe
and effective use of communications technologies in
human rights promotion.
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There are two major threats to the integrity and security of
the information and communications technology (ICT)
sector in Egypt—the continuing Emergency Law and the
existing National Telecommunications Regulatory
Authority (NTRA), both of which provide sweeping powers
to the executive authority, currently the Supreme Council
of the Armed Forces (SCAF), to order service
interruptions, and which provide severe penalties—prison
sentences, fines, license revocation and physical disabling
of equipment—for noncompliance. The lack of an
independent regulatory authority, or transparency
surrounding government demands to limit ICT services in
ways that limit freedom of expression and leave users
vulnerable to official reprisals, is a significant threat to
democracy.
The establishment of an independent regulatory
framework that promotes the free flow of information,
protects users, and safeguards freedom of expression will
take time. However, there are several immediate steps
that could address the ongoing uncertainty and threat to
ICT services.
Recommendation
First, the SCAF should mandate independent judicial
review of its powers to suspend or disrupt ICT services.
Second, the SCAF should take immediate steps to
promote greater independence and transparency of the
NTRA. The NTRA’s charter provides that its governing
board will include three citizen representatives. The NTRA
should work with civil society to identify and seat
representatives who can bring the perspectives of the prodemocracy movement to the table, and help to curb any
tendencies to curtail services in ways that limit freedom of
expression in this critical transition period. The NTRA
charter also provides for the establishment of user and
company committees. These committees should be
reconstituted with representatives from civil society and
ICT sector companies affected by the January 28
shutdown. This would further ensure a helpful and
necessary counterweight to existing unaccountable
authorities, and promote a more balanced and transparent
approach to decisions affecting the stability and integrity of
service during the transition and beyond.
Facebook, Twitter, Google, and other U.S.-based
technology platforms have played a vital role in enabling
civil society to organize and to make their voices heard.
Companies that operate in environments where user rights
are at risk should conduct risk assessments and consider
changes to current policies and procedures to address
those risks. This could include policies to identify and
respond to government demands in ways that do not
curtail freedom of expression, and transparency with users
about their decision-making processes. Google has made
a commitment to these policies through its membership in
the Global Network Initiative. Its transparency tool
identifies areas of the world where service is impaired for
technical as well as government-ordered reasons. (The
tool does not provide information on the reasons for
government requests to limit service, nor does it describe
how those requests are handled, both of which would be
useful in addressing ongoing threats to users.) Facebook
has been one of the cornerstones for the pro-democracy
movement, and its ease of use and mulitfunctionality has
enabled a variety of campaign activities. However, as
activists have made clear, the public nature of the service
has put them at risk of surveillance, hacking, and blocking
of pages and accounts.
The U.S. government has an important role to play. It
should work with European allies to promote interim steps
that would address concerns about the integrity and
stability of ICT services, through a repeal of draconian
laws and transitional governance of the sector to include
civil society and affected companies; meet with U.S.
technology providers to discuss ongoing challenges that
users face and to identify solutions; and sponsor regular
embassy convenings with users to identify and address
ongoing challenges.
HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST BLUEPRINT—HOW TO SEIZE THE MOMENT IN EGYPT
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