1. science
2. mathematics
3. geometry

Paper Presented at the 22nd IPSA World Congress
8-12 July 2012
Madrid, Spain
Sebastian Biba
PhD Candidate
National Chengchi University, Taiwan
How to Explain Cross-Strait Relations from an International Perspective?
The Strategic Triangle Approach versus the International System Approach
Abstract
The Taiwan Strait has been a hot spot in international relations for more than six
decades. In theoretical terms, the strategic triangle approach (STA) incorporating the
three bilateral relationships between the US, China, and Taiwan for a long time
proved expedient and accurate in explaining cross-Strait relations as seen from an
international perspective. This paper argues, however, that with the end of the Cold
War era growing complexities in all three bilateral relations have increasingly challenged the viability of the STA. It finds that, first, Taiwan’s huge and widening power
gap as compared to the US and China as well as the island’s concomitant and rising
dependence on the other two actors – that is on the US with respect to the island’s
military security and on China in terms of trade – represent phenomena not fully reflected by the STA. Second, the paper maintains that it is an inherent weak point of
the STA to designate bilateral relationships only as either amicable or hostile. This
amity-enmity dichotomy has become outdated as all three bilateral relations nowadays show increasing evidence of both cooperative and confrontational behavior
across and within different issue-areas and at the same time. The paper thus concludes that with chances to revamp the STA according to the new circumstances
also being few it is finally time to probe into new and more adequate theoretical
frameworks. The international system approach may be an interesting option in this
regard.
Introduction
After more than half a century, cross-Strait relations between the People’s Republic
of China (中華人民共和國, hereinafter PRC, China, mainland China, or the mainland)
and the Republic of China (中華民國, hereinafter ROC, or Taiwan) remain one of the
hot spots and unresolved problems in international relations, flaring up and cooling
down in irregular intervals. Since the end of the Chinese Civil War in 1949, the PRC
has unwaveringly expressed its view that Taiwan is part of China and that China
needs to be unified – by force if necessary. On the other hand, the ROC has
changed its stance over time. After its peaceful transformation into a democratic
country during the 1980s, Taiwan has no longer claimed to be itself the sole legitimate sovereign over the whole of China, but has at times rather sought to become a
sovereign and independent state on its own.1 Due to ambiguous US security guarantees towards Taiwan, this muddled situation has long created a political standoff between the PRC and the ROC, accompanied by ever increasing economic exchange
across the Strait. While overall relations between China and Taiwan might currently
1
This strife for de jure independence could especially be witnessed during the two terms of office of
President Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) and his pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party (民主進步
黨, DPP) from 2000 to 2008. The current leadership under President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) from the
Kuomintang (國民黨, KMT, Chinese Nationalist Party) has distanced itself from the objective of independence. In his inaugural address in 2008, Ma laid out his promise in dealing with cross-Strait relations saying that there would be "no reunification, no independence, and no war" during his presidency. See David B. Shear, “China-Taiwan: Recent Economic, Political and Military Developments
Across the Strait and Implications for the United States,” Testimony before the US-China Economic
and Security Review Commission, Washington, D.C., March 18, 2010, http://www.state.gov/p/ eap/rls/
rm/2010/03/138547.htm (accessed April 30, 2011).
Do not cite without author’s permission.
1
Paper Presented at the 22nd IPSA World Congress
8-12 July 2012
Madrid, Spain
Sebastian Biba
PhD Candidate
National Chengchi University, Taiwan
be as good as never before since the end of World War II, future developments continue to be far from certain.
As is natural when it comes to such a long-lasting trouble spot, much research has
been done over the decades on the reasons for this simmering conflict, the impediments to possible solutions, related domestic issues on both sides of the strait, the
role played by the US and so on and so forth.2 In combination, the complex state of
cross-Strait relations between Taiwan and mainland China has also brought to the
scene a variety of multi-faceted theoretical frameworks, which usually seek to explain
certain aspects of the problem. In a successful attempt to give an overview of what
may be considered the most relevant of these theories, the distinguished Taiwanese
scholar Wu Yu-Shan has compiled and delineated nine different approaches and
grouped them into three distinct categories, reflecting the respective levels of crossStrait interaction, domestic politics as well as the international system.3 After associating three theories with each category and highlighting the particular strengths and
weaknesses of every approach, Wu Yu-Shan eventually arrives at the conclusion
that, to sufficiently grasp the intricacies of cross-Strait relations, it is necessary to
draw on a synthetic framework integrating the theoretical thrusts of any of the three
categories.4
Acknowledging the need for a synthetic framework to capture all facets of the
cross-Strait issue, such an approach yet goes beyond the objective of this paper. Instead, focus will be laid on the international layer only. While this means an a priori
negligence of certain aspects (most of all of domestic rationales), it also provides for
the opportunity of a more in-depth analysis of this particular level of interaction. Additionally, it is on the international layer where, according to this author, a reassessment of long-held sentiments would be beneficial to account for changing realities: in retrospect, it is fair to say that for some decades the strategic triangle approach – comprising the analysis of the three bilateral relationships between China,
Taiwan, and the US – worked rather well in examining the international parameters of
the cross-Strait dispute.5 This paper, however, contends that growing post-Cold War
2
Among the more recent and more comprehensive works on divers cross-Strait topics are Alan M.
Wachman, Why Taiwan? Geostrategic Rationales for China’s Territorial Integrity (Stanford: Stanford
University Press, 2007); Peter C. Y. Chow, ed., The “One China” Dilemma (New York: Palgrave,
2008); Su Chi, Taiwan’s Relations with Mainland China: A Tail Wagging Two Dogs (London and New
York: Routledge, 2009); Jing Huang with Xiaoting Li, Inseparable Separation: The Making of China’s
Taiwan Policy (Singapore: World Scientific Publishing Company, 2010); and Kevin G. Cai, CrossTaiwan Strait Relations Since 1979: Policy Adjustment and Institutional Change Across the Straits
(Singapore: World Scientific Publishing Company, 2011).
3
Yu-Shan Wu, “Theorizing on Relations across the Taiwan Strait: Nine Contending Approaches,”
Journal of Contemporary China 9, no. 25 (November 2000): 407-28. The nine theories Wu mentions
are: the divided-nation model, integration theory, and power asymmetry theory (cross-Strait interaction), the vote-maximizing model, the developmental state paradigm and political psychology (domestic politics) as well as the strategic triangle approach, the international system approach, and constructivism (international system). In listing and describing these nine approaches, Wu also draws on two
earlier works, namely: Tun-jen Cheng, Chi Huang and Samuel S. G. Wu, eds., Inherited Rivalry (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1995); and Tzong-Ho Bao and Yu-Shan Wu, eds., Zhengbian zhong de
liang’an guanxi lilun (Contending theories in the study of cross-Strait relations) (Taipei: Wunan, 1999).
In 2009, the latter two then edited an updated version of the book. See Tzong-Ho Bao and Yu-Shan
Wu, eds., Chongxin jianshi zhengbian zhong de liang’an guanxi lilun (Revisiting the contending theories in the study of cross-Strait relations) (Taipei: Wunan, 2009).
4
Wu, “Theorizing on Relations across the Taiwan Strait,” 427. For his synthetic framework, he chose
the strategic triangle approach, the vote-maximizing model and power asymmetry theory.
5
In accordance with that statement, the strategic triangle approach has been employed frequently to
explicate cross-Strait relations from an international perspective. Examples include Yu-Shan Wu, “Exploring Dual Triangles: The Development of Taipei-Washington-Beijing Relations,” Issues & Studies
32, no. 10 (October 1996): 26-52, “From Romantic Triangle to Marriage? Washington-Beijing-Taipei
Do not cite without author’s permission.
2
Paper Presented at the 22nd IPSA World Congress
8-12 July 2012
Madrid, Spain
Sebastian Biba
PhD Candidate
National Chengchi University, Taiwan
complexities in the relationships between the three countries concerned can no
longer be adequately mirrored and explained by this concept and therefore increasingly lead to a decline in its usefulness: first, while some research has more recently
been conducted regarding the power asymmetry of the US-China-Taiwan triangle,6
the huge and still widening power gap between the US and China on the one hand
and Taiwan on the other hand nevertheless distorts the triangle’s structure to an unprecedented extent. Moreover, Taiwan’s concomitant high degree of dependence on
the other two actors involved – that is on the US with respect to its military security
and on China in terms of its economic security – describes a factor not explicitly included in the recent power asymmetry formulae. Both aspects, however, raise the
unpleasant question whether Taiwan can still be perceived of as an autonomous
player in the strategic triangle and thus represent new challenges for the concept.
Second, and even more important, the strategic triangle approach is not fit to include
denominations that go beyond the oversimplified categorization of states being either
friends or foes. An initially useful duality, the post-Cold War globalizing world, however, has meanwhile spawned generally more intricate state-to-state relations and
thus rendered the strategic triangle’s “amity-enmity dichotomy” increasingly hard to
maintain. In the US-China-Taiwan triangle, too, all three bilateral relations nowadays
show more and more evidence of both cooperative and confrontational behavior
across and even within different issue-areas and at the same time.7
Relations in Historical Comparison,” Issues & Studies 41, no. 1 (March 2005): 113-59, “Domestic Political Competition and Triangular Interaction Among Washington, Beijing, and Taipei: The US China
Policy,” Issues & Studies 42, no. 1 (March 2006): 1-46, and “Power Shift, Strategic Triangle, and Alliances in East Asia,” Issues & Studies 47, no. 4 (December 2011): 9-50; Tzong-Ho Bao, “Zhanlue sanjiao jiaose zhuanbian yu leixing bianhua fenxi—yi Meiguo han Taihai liang’an sanjiao hudong weili”
(An analysis of role transition and type change in a strategic triangle: the case of triangular interaction
between the United States and the two sides of the Taiwan Strait), in Zhengbian zhong de liang’an
guanxi lilun (Contending theories in the study of cross-Strait relations), ed. Tzong-Ho Bao and YuShan Wu (Taipei: Wunan, 1999), 337-63; Alan M. Wachman, “America’s Taiwan Quandary: How
Much Does Chen’s Election Matter?” in Taiwan’s Presidential Politics: Democratization and CrossStrait Relations in the Twenty-First Century, ed. Muthiah Alagappa (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe,
2001), 236-59; and Lowell Dittmer, “Bush, China, Taiwan: A Triangular Analysis,“ Journal of Chinese
Political Sciences 10, no. 2 (Fall 2005): 21-42. Besides, there exist several unpublished conference
papers that have not all been available to this author.
6
Tackling the question of asymmetry within the US-China-Taiwan triangle has been rather recent. Also
see below. Among the few examples are Brantly Womack and Yu-Shan Wu, “Asymmetric Triangles
and the Washington-Beijing-Taipei Relationship,” Paper presented at the 36th Taiwan-US Conference
on Contemporary China, Denver, Colorado, June 1-2, 2007 (unfortunately not available to this author);
Tuan Y. Cheng, “Changing US-China-Taiwan Triangular Relations,” Paper presented at the 38th Taiwan-US Conference on Contemporary China, Washington, DC, July 14-15, 2009; and Yu-Shan Wu,
th
“Power Transition, Strategic Triangle, and Alliance Shift,” Paper presented at the 39 Taiwan-US Conference on Contemporary China, Taipei, December 9-10, 2010.
7
At this point, it may also be not unimportant to highlight that, from a certain angle, the US-ChinaTaiwan triangle only represents a case study in a potentially broader attempt to fathom the weak
points of the strategic triangle approach as such. In the past, several other triangular relationships
were examined as well. Examples are the US-Japan-China triangle (see, for instance, Ming Zhang
and Ronald N. Montaperto, A Triad of Another Kind: The United States, China, and Japan (New York:
Palgrave 1999); and Go Ito, Alliance in Anxiety: Détente and the Sino-American-Japanese Triangle
(New York: Routledge, 2003)), the US-Japan-South Korea triangle (see, for instance, Victor D. Cha,
Alignment Despite Antagonism: The United States-Korea-Japan Security Triangle (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1999)), the US-France-Germany Triangle (see, for instance, Helga
Haftendorn and Michael Kolkmann, “German Policy in a Strategic Triangle: Berlin, Paris, Washington
... and What about London?” Cambridge Review of International Affairs 17, no. 3 (October 2004): 46780; and Helga Haftendorn, Geoges-Henri Soutou, Stephen F. Szabo, and Samuel F. Wells Jr., eds.,
The Strategic Triangle: France, Germany, and the United States in the Shaping of the New Europe
(Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press / Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006),
Do not cite without author’s permission.
3
Paper Presented at the 22nd IPSA World Congress
8-12 July 2012
Madrid, Spain
Sebastian Biba
PhD Candidate
National Chengchi University, Taiwan
As a consequence of these developments, the author also makes inroads into trying the applicability of another concept, namely the international system approach. It
is argued that due to the emerging constellation of the US and China representing
the world’s two most powerful states, the international system approach on the one
hand provides for similar starting positions as the strategic triangle when it comes to
the players involved (i.e. the US, China, and Taiwan) as well as their distribution of
power. On the other hand, though the international system approach also mends the
strategic triangle’s two weak points identified before since the international system
approach is fitter to reflect both asymmetry and dependence as well as state-to-state
relations beyond the point of a rigid black-white dichotomy.
The paper will proceed along the following lines: The first section will critically examine some important theoretical essentials of the strategic triangle approach. The
next two sections will briefly apply the strategic triangle framework to US-ChinaTaiwan relations of the past and the present. The fourth section will disclose in how
far the intrinsic weaknesses of the strategic triangle affect its accuracy in analyzing
current and future patterns of the U.S-China-Taiwan triangular relationship. The final
section ahead of a short conclusion will then test the international system approach
as an alternative option to dissect cross-Strait relations from an international perspective.
The Strategic Triangle from a Theoretical Perspective: A Critique
The “strategic triangle” may be considered as a sort of “transactional game among
three players,” originally designed by US scholar Lowell Dittmer in the early 1980s
and conventionally applied to the relationship between the US, the former Soviet Union, and the PRC during the Cold War era.8 Nonetheless, it is also applicable to any
other triangular relations as long as certain criteria are met: first, it must define the relations among three rational and sovereign actors; second, the bilateral relationship
between any two of them must be dependent on the relationship with the third; and,
finally, national security must be at stake.9 It has generally been accepted that the relations between Washington, Beijing, and Taipei have satisfied these preconditions.
On the whole, the strategic triangle approach constitutes a theory with only few
and very straightforward axiomatic principles. This used to be a strong point of the
strategic triangle and matched the time of its origin during the Cold War period. In
more recent years, however, the parsimony of the framework has become more of a
burden to the accuracy with which the strategic triangle approach is fit to describe
the Russia-China-India triangle (see, for instance, Thomas Ambrosio, “The Third Side? The Multipolar
Strategic Triangle and the Sino-Indian Rapprochement,” Comparative Strategy 24, no. 5 (December
2005): 397-414; and Harsh V. Pant, “The Moscow-Beijing-Delhi 'Strategic Triangle': An Idea Whose
Time May Never Come,” Security Dialogue 35, no. 3 (September 2004): 311-28). With the end of the
Cold War, at least some of these triangles – maybe unless they include formal or informal alliance
agreements – are nowadays likely to face similar problems in terms of “amity-enmity dichotomy.”
8
Lowell Dittmer, “The Strategic Triangle: An Elementary Game-Theoretical Analysis,” World Politics
33, no. 4 (July 1981): 485-515. Yet Dittmer was certainly not the first scholar to mention the “strategic
triangle” in combination with US-USS.R.-China relations at that time. Prior references go back to the
beginning of US-USS.R. rapprochement in the early 1970s. See for example Michel Tatu, The Great
Power Triangle: Washington-Moscow-Beijing (Paris: Atlantic Institute, 1970); Roger Glenn Brown,
“Chinese Politics and American Policy: A New Look at the Triangle,” Foreign Policy 23 (Summer
1976): 3-24; Michael Pillsbury, “US-Chinese Military Ties?” Foreign Policy 20 (Autumn 1975): 50-64;
and Banning Garrett, “China Policy and Strategic Triangle,” in Eagle Entangled: US Foreign Policy in a
Complex World, ed. Kenneth A. Oye, Donald Rothchild, and Robert Lieber (London and New York:
Longman, 1979), 228-64. Dittmer may be given credit for positing more explicit definitions as related to
the strategic triangle approach, though.
9
Ibid, 485.
Do not cite without author’s permission.
4
Paper Presented at the 22nd IPSA World Congress
8-12 July 2012
Madrid, Spain
Sebastian Biba
PhD Candidate
National Chengchi University, Taiwan
complex triangular relationships. More precisely, the increasing weakness of the approach is related to the two following aspects.
First, positions within a strategic triangle are ascertained by observing the nature
of three bilateral relations. Each is characterized as either in a state of amity (positive) or enmity (negative). Accordingly, one can think of exactly four different types of
triangles (also see figure 1): the first type is a ménage à trois, consisting of a triple
amicable relationship. Next is what is called a romantic triangle, with two positive bilateral relationships and one negative one. Third is a marriage, having one bilateral
amicable relationship and two enmities. Last, one can imagine a unit-veto, featuring
threefold negative relations.10 Problems with that whole pattern arise, however, when
any bilateral relationship no longer fits this clear-cut amity-enmity, or black-white, dichotomy. Shades of grey, in a figurative way of speaking, have not been incorporated
in the original conceptualization of the strategic triangle. Yet, it is exactly this tendency away from purely positive or purely negative inter-state contacts that has become more and more commonplace in today’s globalized world where rather complex state-to-state relations have gradually replaced the rigid alliance thinking of the
Cold War era.
Generally speaking, factors that affect and shape every single bilateral relationship
within a strategic triangle can be endogenous and exogenous.11 Endogenous factors
are those elements exclusively related to the two actors concerned, and not to any
third party. They can usually be classified in terms of national interest broken down
into security, economic gains, and ideological commitments. Yet, endogenous elements do not necessarily dictate bilateral relations as they may be overridden by
stronger exogenous factors that emerge from one actor’s relationship with a third
party, but nonetheless impact on the bilateral relations of the former two.12 This situation of external overlay was common during the Cold War when bilateral relations between countries were usually predetermined by their affiliation to the two superpowers, the US and the USSR.13 With the end of this period after the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, however, endogenous factors became dominant,
thereby heralding the start of inter-state relations that grew more multifarious across
issue-areas.
Even though this trend has been rather evident and widespread, literature on the
strategic triangle has so far missed out on identifying and trying to factor in these
changed circumstances. Only in his most recent contribution touching upon the strategic triangle framework, Wu Yu-Shan – talking about post-Cold War alliances in
10
Dittmer, “Bush, China, Taiwan,” 23. Moreover, within each of these four various triangles, every
player takes on particular roles. In a ménage à trois, all players are “friends.” In a romantic triangle,
two “wings,” being at each other’s throat, woo one “pivot,” being on good terms with both wings. In
marriage, the “married couple” are called “partners,” whereas the odd-man-out is seen as a “pariah” or
an “outcast.” Last but not least, all players are regarded as “foes” in a unit-veto triangle. In accordance
with the two determining criteria – first and foremost, amity with other players is better than enmity,
and, second and subordinate to first, enmity between the other players is better than if they are in amity – the ranking among the six different roles is (from best to worst): pivot, friend, partner, wing, foe,
outcast. See Wu, “From Romantic Triangle to Marriage,” 117-18. Additionally, the sustainability of a
triangular relationship depends on whether the number of negative bilateral relations is even or odd.
The whole structure of the triangle is more balanced if the number is odd, making the ménage à trois
and the marriage more stable settings than the romantic triangle and the unit-veto. See Wu, “Theorizing on Relations across the Taiwan Strait,” 420.
11
Wu, “Exploring Dual Triangles,” 32-33.
12
Ibid.
13
This is, of course, not to say that alliance partners could not have different opinions on or argue
about certain matters. It is to say, however, that at the end of the day, it was usually clear who was on
whose side.
Do not cite without author’s permission.
5
Paper Presented at the 22nd IPSA World Congress
8-12 July 2012
Madrid, Spain
Sebastian Biba
PhD Candidate
National Chengchi University, Taiwan
East Asia – makes at least an indirect reference to this problematique as he acknowledges that most bilateral relationships have entered a state of being “in flux.”14
While it was certainly not Wu’s intention to tackle the problem of amity-enmity dichotomy in his conference paper or draw any conclusions on that issue, this remark is still
tantamount to the recognition that bilateral relationships within strategic triangles are
no longer necessarily just positive or negative over a longer period of time. In the
past and its original – and current – set-up, though, the strategic triangle theory depended heavily on its ability to clearly indicate the state of the triangle as being in one
of the four modes mentioned earlier. This ability has become limited. Bilateral relations in constant flux or lying in between amity and enmity do no longer fit into any of
the four modes in an appropriate way and over a longer period of time. The consequences are inaccuracies and the need for the strategic triangle approach to be revamped – if possible.
One possibility that could help adapt the approach to increasingly frequent new
circumstances and, at the same time, also seems both feasible within the original
boundaries of the framework and yet promising to make up for decreasing viability
may be to introduce sector or area-specific triangles. This refers to the objective to
get away from one single triangle encompassing the whole array of bilateral relations
and instead create more than one triangle between the same actors, then covering
only particular sectors each and therefore potentially more homogeneous and easier
to be classified into an inflexible black-white scheme. Certainly, to keep track of the
overall situation, it would be important not to create too many different triangles,
which would only make things confusing. According to preliminary considerations,
two different triangles could already help improve the current and future practicability
of the strategic triangle: one of them should cover the politico-military realm while the
other one could deal with economic and financial issues. To be sure, however, such
an innovation would only approach the black-white problem in an indirect way. Hybrid
relationships in between amity and enmity would still not be allowed for. Rather, bilateral relations would be broken down into different issue-areas in the hope that this
facilitates the designation of relationships as amicable or hostile. In the end, only
empirics can show in how far such a remodeling would really be sufficient to regain
lost usefulness. However, a more direct reform approach that would finally incorporate hybrid bilateral relations seems much more difficult as it would mean to break
with fundamental principles of the theory. Other theories might then be better
equipped to explain (some) post-Cold War triangular relationships. The author will return to this reasoning later.
The second weak point of the strategic triangle approach may not be as fundamental as the first one. Also, it has recently been identified more readily and thus
partly been dealt with more elaborately. This aspect revolves around power asymmetries and dependence within the triangle. Every single relationship in a strategic triangle is not only denoted as being either positive or negative, but also as symmetrical or asymmetrical in terms of states’ relative power capabilities. In general, it is always easier to sustain positive symmetrical relations. Positive exchanges are more
stable because they supply both sides with their interests; symmetrical exchanges
are more stable since they do not sort out winners and losers.15
In practice, however, true power symmetry between all three players in a strategic
triangle has turned out to be rare and rather illusionary. Even the first and original object of interest, the triangular pattern between the US, the former Soviet Union, and
China, could hardly be perceived as equilateral, with two superpowers and one rather
14
15
Wu, “Power Transition,” 29.
Dittmer, “The Strategic Triangle,” 487.
Do not cite without author’s permission.
6
Paper Presented at the 22nd IPSA World Congress
8-12 July 2012
Madrid, Spain
Sebastian Biba
PhD Candidate
National Chengchi University, Taiwan
underdeveloped country involved. Again, however, the strategic triangle in its original
layout did not allow for asymmetry to be taken into account. Wu Yu-Shan has recently deemed this fact as “an inherent deficiency of the ST [strategic triangle] model
in approaching the real world.”16
As indicated above – and in contrast to the problem of a black-white dichotomy –
however, scholars have of late begun to recognize the flaw of assuming equilateral
triangles and sought ways to factor dissimilar state capabilities in. According to Wu
Yu-Shan, positive relations with strong states should be valued proportionately higher
than those with weak states while negative relations with weak states should be considered proportionately less costly than those with powerful states. Furthermore, Wu
has distinguished between military power as quantified by military expenditures and
economic capabilities as measured by GDP and brought all that in a complex
mathematical formula.17 In the end, each of the four triangles as shown in figure 1
can then be supplemented by adding a short note illustrating the power differentials
between the actors involved. One example could be A = B > C, meaning that states
A and B are equally powerful and have symmetrical relations while C is weaker than
both A and B and thus is in an asymmetrical relationship with the former two. Another
example could be A > B > C, signaling triple asymmetrical relations, with A being
stronger than both B and C, and B being stronger than C.18
On the one hand, these modifications seem reasonable and to some extent appropriate to fix the asymmetry issue of the strategic triangle framework. On the other
hand, the question that nevertheless arises is what happens when power ratios grow
divergent to an extent where the shape of the strategic triangle becomes totally distorted. When, in particular, A = B, but at the same time A >> C and B >> C,19 up to
which degree is it then both possible and useful to uphold the triangular pattern in
which every state is generally granted to function as an autonomous pole of its own?
At this point, this question does not need a quantifiable answer. Rather, it should be
seen as a kind of intellectual game that intends to draw attention to the possibility
that not every highly asymmetrical triangular relationship might best be analyzed by
making use of the strategic triangle approach.
Furthermore, the existence of power asymmetries now acknowledged does not
necessarily give an indication of (the degree of) dependence among the players involved. For one thing, dependence, i.e., the reliance on others for the provision of
certain goods, is one of the bases of power.20 Therefore, one could assume that existing power asymmetries in the strategic triangle might have at least partly sprung
from dependences. In that case, both aspects would be dealt with. For another thing,
however, the probability to really convert dependence into power is contingent on
three conditions: “size of the reliance relationship, importance of the good on which
one relies, and ease, availability, and cost of the replacement alternatives.”21 In other
words, only countries that are extremely vulnerable in the sense of not having alternatives for vital goods at bearable costs will also be in a position where they can be
influenced easily.22 The strategic triangle – even in its revamped form where asymmetries are taken into account by means of simple military expenditure and GDP figures – does not reflect whether one actor is dependent on another actor in such a
16
Wu, “Power Transition,” 6.
Ibid, 6-7.
18
Compare Cheng, “Changing Triangular Relations.”
19
The sign “>>” means “much greater than” as compared to “>,” which means just “greater than.”
20
James A. Caporaso, “Dependence, Dependency, and Power in the Global System: A Structural and
Behavioral Analysis,” International Organization 32, no. 1 (Winter 1978): 30.
21
Ibid., 22.
22
Ibid., 31
17
Do not cite without author’s permission.
7
Paper Presented at the 22nd IPSA World Congress
8-12 July 2012
Madrid, Spain
Sebastian Biba
PhD Candidate
National Chengchi University, Taiwan
way or not. Instead, the following two dissimilar triangular patterns – among several
others – are conceivable: First, A = B >> C, with C additionally showing a high degree of dependence on A and/or B. Second, A = B >> C, with C not dependent on A
and/or B but rather on another actor outside the triangle that is even more powerful
than A and B (A = B < D). This state makes the strategic triangle potentially imprecise.
Summing up, then, the strategic triangle framework has increasingly suffered from
two intrinsic weaknesses; one being the amity-enmity duality, the other one being the
assumption of only symmetrical relationships without dependences. Both issues –
and especially the black-white dichotomy – have in the post-Cold War period entailed
inaccuracies that negatively affect the viability and the usefulness of the strategic triangle theory. One case in point, as will be argued in the following, is the US-ChinaTaiwan strategic triangle.
The US-China-Taiwan Strategic Triangle I: The Past Record
Elaborating on current – and future – US-China-Taiwan relations, it makes sense to
first delineate the history of the strategic triangle between these three players. Only
then will the picture be complete and essential changes over time become visible. As
indicated before, the end of the Cold War functioned as a dividing line between two
main phases. This is because during the Cold War – when the triangular relationship
between the three players started off – the US-China-Taiwan so called “mini-triangle”
was not floating freely, but evolved along the conditions within the by far more important “great triangle” between Washington, Moscow, and Beijing. Only after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the simultaneous dissolution of the great triangle were
the relations among the US, China and Taiwan no longer predetermined by external
circumstances (also see table 1).23
Against this background, a preceding cursory glance at the situation within the
great triangle is helpful for the understanding of the status of the mini-triangle during
the Cold War. In the 1950s, Moscow and Beijing were staunch allies, leaving Washington the role of the odd-man-out. After the Sino-Soviet split, the 1960s witnessed a
decade of an all-enmity game. In the early 1970s, US President Nixon’s visits to
Moscow and Beijing in 1972 were representative for a progressing détente between
the two superpowers and an incipient US-Sino rapprochement – developments that
elevated24 Washington into the position of a pivot in a now romantic triangle. Later in
the 1970s, a rapid Soviet expansion brought the two remaining players closer together, manifesting itself in a marriage between Washington and Beijing, with the latter being the junior partner of the former. The 1980s, finally, first saw another elevation of Beijing’s position from partner to pivot due a renewed improvement in SinoSoviet relations, before, in the late 1980s, the triangle turned into a ménage à trois
and eventually dissolved, together with the USSR.25
Obviously, then, during the Cold War period, the single decisive bilateral relationship for the setting within the mini-triangle was the one between Washington and Beijing as this relation was where the dual triangles overlapped. Since this relationship
could not be different across the two triangles, and the great triangle was of paramount importance to the US, it became apparent that Washington’s stance toward
23
Wu, “From Romantic Triangle to Marriage,” 128-29.
Fn. 10 has briefly outlined the possible roles played by the actors in a strategic triangle and also
ranked them. Shifts of players’ positions into more desirable roles are called “elevation of role”, while
the opposite is referred to as “degradation of role.” See Wu, “Exploring Dual Triangles,” 31.
25
Wu, “Exploring Dual Triangles,” 38-45.
24
Do not cite without author’s permission.
8
Paper Presented at the 22nd IPSA World Congress
8-12 July 2012
Madrid, Spain
Sebastian Biba
PhD Candidate
National Chengchi University, Taiwan
Beijing within the great triangle concurrently predetermined its policy in the minitriangle.26
As just shown, at the outset of the two strategic triangles at the beginning of the
Cold War era, the US and China were not at all on good terms with each other. Correspondingly, as Beijing and Taipei also were at enmity, the mini-triangle presented
itself in the shape of a marriage between the US and Taiwan, with China being
placed in the same pariah position the US held within the great triangle at that time.
This pattern shifted dramatically and durably once the US-Sino relationship improved
in the early 1970s. Since then, the relations between Washington and Beijing within
the great triangle were either those between pivot and wing, partners, or friends. In
other words, from the 1970s time to the final collapse of the great triangle, US-Sino
relations could always be denominated as positive.27 This fact, in turn, had severe
consequences for Taiwan’s role within the mini-triangle: On the one hand, SinoTaiwan relations within the mini-triangle continued to be characterized by enmity. On
the other hand, the US could not afford to jeopardize its beneficial relations with
China – as this would certainly have had adverse effects on its favorable position
within the great triangle. As a result, exogenous factors militated against a Washington-Taipei rapprochement, a romantic mini-triangle with the US as pivot could not
materialize, and Taiwan’s role shifted from a junior partner to an outcast. Instead,
China became the new junior partner of the US while Taiwan’s participation in the
mini-triangle remained passive and seemingly impotent.28
After the end of the Cold War and the practical collapse of the great triangle, the
second main phase of US-China-Taiwan relations gradually set in. Washington’s
geostrategic position was no longer dictated by international balance-of-power considerations. Endogenous factors began to define the relations within the now
autonomous mini-triangle. And indeed, with the US fear of a Chinese tilt towards the
USSR declining, the Tian’anmen (天安門) incident of 1989 had soon dealt a temporary blow to the US-Sino relationship. While the “China card” had been rendered superfluous for the US, and the friendship with Washington redundant for China’s security, the US-Sino relations turned a bit sour, revealing strategic and ideological discrepancies. Concomitantly, Taiwan’s tremendous progress towards democracy appealed to Washington and gave the island some breathing space. Nevertheless, USChina economic exchanges promised huge benefits for American business due to
the rapid growth of the Chinese market. This led the US to follow a path of duality regarding its policy considerations toward the PRC that also bore on Taiwan. Taipei’s
position rose whenever Beijing was being bashed in Washington, yet fell whenever
there was an urgent need for the US to seek China’s cooperation.29
In sum, during the 1990s, the mini-triangle changed its structure and shifted from a
marriage into a more volatile and complex romantic triangle, with the US as pivot.
Beijing had lost its position as junior partner of the US, but – mainly thanks to its economic performance – could prevent to become the odd-man-out. Taipei, on the other
hand, managed to elevate its role from the decade-long pariah to a wing that Washington openly flirted with, but spoiled its chances (if it ever had any) to bind the US
more closely in a marriage. Another innovative trend was that the China-Taiwan wing
became more substantial than in the past – cross-Strait trade, investment, tourism,
26
Ibid., 39.
To be sure – and as already indicated in footnote 13 – this does not at all mean that US-China relations were without bumps during these years. For both parties, however, the USSR was clearly their
main opponent and that bound them together.
28
Wu, “Exploring Dual Triangles,” 39-45; Dittmer, “Bush, China, Taiwan,” 25-28.
29
Dittmer, “Bush, China, Taiwan,” 29-31; and Wu, “From Romantic Triangle to Marriage,” 129-30.
27
Do not cite without author’s permission.
9
Paper Presented at the 22nd IPSA World Congress
8-12 July 2012
Madrid, Spain
Sebastian Biba
PhD Candidate
National Chengchi University, Taiwan
and quasi-diplomatic links gathered speed.30 In the 1990s already, therefore, future
intricacies in the triangular pattern became emergent.
The US-China-Taiwan Strategic Triangle II: The More Recent Broad Trends
In 2005, two of the most distinguished advocates for applying the strategic triangle to
explain the international layer of cross-Strait relations voiced somewhat different assessments regarding the then situation and the road ahead. Lowell Dittmer stated the
following:
Since the Cold War, the mini-triangle has been highly stable, held in tow by the irresolvable contradiction between the “two Chinas.” The two wings’ best case scenarios are essentially incompatible, Beijing preferring that Taiwan becomes another Chinese SAR
[Special Administrative Region] under the one country two systems formula, Taipei in turn
preferring to become part of a loose Chinese confederation (at best) but only after the
PRC becomes more like the ROC.31
Dittmer then concluded that “[t]he most plausible candidate for transformation [of the
mini-triangle] is not the pivot but upgrading the bilateral relationship between the two
wings”, making it a ménage à trois.32
Wu Yu-Shan, in contrast, brought forth a varying estimation. He argued that, with
the establishment of a romantic triangle, Washington had found itself in awkward position. Throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, both wings had sought to convince US
policymakers to tilt to their own side. Washington had thus come under constant
cross-pressure and had had hard times in maneuvering itself through not only one
crisis. As a result, Wu dubbed the US an “unwilling” pivot and anticipated – albeit
provided with a question mark – an emerging marriage between the former pivot and
the weaker, but more congenial wing, namely between Washington and Taipei.33
Looking at the more recent developments, however, both alternatives offered in
2005 must be questioned. 34 Beginning with Wu’s envisioned marriage between
Washington and Taipei, it can be said that US actions over the last few years provide
evidence that this triangular pattern has not come into being. For one thing, during
US President Barack Obama’s state visit to China in November 2009, the US side
did not really dare – so the impressions – to bring the Taiwan issue to the fore. Also,
in the final US-China Joint Statement, the Taiwan Relations Act (台灣關係法) was not
mentioned, whereas the US side reaffirmed its respect for sovereignty and territorial
integrity of China.35 The Taiwan Relations Act was only referred to by President
Obama in his statement to a press conference after the issuance of the Joint Statement.36 During Chinese President Hu Jintao’s (胡錦涛) official visit to the US in January 2011, both sides reaffirmed their commitment to the 2009 Joint Statement and
30
Wu, “From Romantic Triangle to Marriage,” 130.
Dittmer, “Bush, China, Taiwan,” 39.
32
Ibid., 41.
33
Wu, “From Romantic Triangle to Marriage,” 130-31, 140.
34
In fact, Wu Yu-Shan’s more recent contributions to the topic show that he himself has clearly abandoned his former assessment. See for example, Wu, “Power Transition.”
35
“China-US
Joint
Statement”
(November
17,
2009),
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zzjg/bmdyzs/gjlb/3432/ 3434/t629497.htm (accessed January 12,
2010).
36
Shu-ling Ko, and Hsiu-chuan Shih, “DPP Unhappy with Obama Comments,” Taipei Times Online,
November 18, 2010, http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2009/11/18/2003458788 (accessed January 12, 2011).
31
Do not cite without author’s permission.
10
Paper Presented at the 22nd IPSA World Congress
8-12 July 2012
Madrid, Spain
Sebastian Biba
PhD Candidate
National Chengchi University, Taiwan
left the Taiwan Relations Act aside again.37 For another thing, however, Washington
approved arms sales to Taiwan in early January 2010, causing severe protests on
the part of the mainland as well as the suspension of US-China military talks.38 In
hindsight, these activities, taken together, imply that the US is still oscillating back
and forth between China and Taiwan – trying to exercise the pivot’s role tilting from
one wing to the other. In any case, a stable marriage between the US and one of the
wings – be it Taiwan or China – should certainly look different.
As regards the second alternative, that is Lowell Dittmer’s option of a ménage à
trois after an upgrade of China-Taiwan relations, the picture has become less unambiguous and more debatable – at least at first sight. This is because, on the one
hand, it is undeniable that relations between the mainland and Taiwan have seen a
perceptible – and likely even unprecedented – relaxation of tensions since the assumption of power of Kuomintang president Ma Ying-jeou in 2008. Among the tangible results of this recent cross-Strait thaw is, for example, the opening of Taiwan’s
first-ever office on the mainland on May 4, 2010. The office bears the name Taiwan
Strait Tourism Association’s Beijing Office (台灣海峽兩岸觀光旅遊協會北京辦事處)
and its purpose is to encourage more Chinese tourists to visit the island.39 The apogee of this positive trend over the last few years, however, has certainly been the
signing in June 2010 – and the coming into force three months later – of an Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (海峽兩岸經濟合作架構協議, ECFA) between the two sides that was widely “[h]ailed as the biggest change in cross-strait relations in 60 years.”40 In the process leading to the ECFA, which was proposed by
Taipei in early 2009,41 the resumption of direct cross-Strait talks in 2008 in form of
the so-called “Chiang-Chen Talks” between Chiang Pin-kung (江丙坤), chairman of
the Taiwanese Straits Exchange Foundation (海峽交流基金會, SEF), and Chen Yunlin (陳云林), president of the mainland-based Association for Relations across the
Taiwan Strait (海峽兩岸關係協會, ARATS) could be seen as a cornerstone, reflecting
the steady and remarkable progress in cross-Strait relations since 2008.42
37
“US-China Joint Statement,” January 19, 2011, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/2011/01/19/us-china-joint-statement (accessed January 20, 2011).
38
“US Approves Taiwan Missile Sales,” BBC News Online, January 7, 2010,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/8445408.stm (accessed January 12, 2011).
39
“Taiwan Opens First Office in China to Promote Tourism.” BBC News Online, May 4, 2010, http://
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/8658886.stm (accessed May 6, 2011).
40
Xinpeng Xu, “A Deal That Will Shape Taiwan’s Economic Future in Asia,” East Asia Forum, August
4, 2010, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2010/08/04/a-deal-that-will-shape-taiwans-economic-future-inasia/ (accessed January 10, 2011).
41
Terry Cooke, “Cross-Strait Matrix: The Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement,” China Brief,
May 27, 2009, 7-10. The main objectives for Taiwan to propose ECFA were to negotiate tariff concessions on major Taiwan export items to mainland China, raise Taiwan’s export competitiveness, and
create job opportunities. In addition, the proposal was triggered by the agreement between China and
ASEAN to form a China-ASEAN Free Trade Agreement (FTA) as well as the establishment of other bilateral FTAs in the region, which have threatened to marginalize Taiwan economically. See Mainland
Affairs Council of the Republic of China, “President Ma Makes Case for ECFA,” February 9, 2010,
http://www.mac.gov.tw/ct.asp?xItem=75140&ctNode= 5908&mp=3 (accessed May 5, 2011).
42
In four rounds of summits prior to the conclusion of ECFA (held in June 2008 in Beijing, in November
2008 in Taipei, in April 2009 in Nanjing, and in December 2009 in Taichung) nine preparatory and
other agreements were signed (the Cross-Strait Agreements on Charter Flights, Concerning Mainland
Tourists Traveling to Taiwan, on Food Safety, on Air Transport, on Sea Transport, on Postal Service
Cooperation, on Cooperation of Agricultural Product Quarantine and Inspection, on Cooperation in
Respect of Standards, Metrology, Inspection and Accreditation, and on Cooperation in Respect of
Fishing Crew Affairs). The fifth meeting in June 2010 then saw the signing of ECFA and of the CrossStrait Agreement on Intellectual Property Rights Protection and Cooperation. The sixth round of talks
was held after the entry into force of ECFA in December 2010. Both sides agreed on medical and
Do not cite without author’s permission.
11
Paper Presented at the 22nd IPSA World Congress
8-12 July 2012
Madrid, Spain
Sebastian Biba
PhD Candidate
National Chengchi University, Taiwan
On the other hand, though, it is the same Chiang-Chen Talks that also illustrated
the still deep-rooted difficulties of cross-Strait relations. The fourth round of talks, for
example, should originally see the signing of four documents. However, the only
agreement that slightly touched upon issues of sovereignty, an agreement on the
avoidance of double-taxation, was not concluded, but shelved.43 While the signing of
this document may only be a matter of time, this small mosaic nevertheless nicely
shows that, for the time being, political cross-Strait relations have not yet experienced any major breakthrough and that the respective understanding of both parties
of what constitutes “China” is still far from congruent. Moreover, the mainland has still
deployed destroyers, submarines, Type 022 missile fast attack craft, and more than
1,000 surface-to-surface missiles, all targeting Taiwan.44 China’s Anti-Secession Law
(反分裂國家法), enacted in 2005 to establish a legal basis to – among other things –
“employ non-peaceful means and other necessary measures”45 in case the other
Taiwan moves towards independence, remains in force as well.
Consequently, under these circumstances, it seems justified to pose the question
whether more recent broad trends in PRC-ROC relations really allow for this relationship to be termed amicable as this would be necessary to elevate the current triangular pattern previously perceived as a romantic triangle to the state of a ménage à
trois. Shaocheng Tang, for example, has answered in an affirmative way when he
contended that “the current status of the Taipei, Beijing and Washington trilateral relations had been transformed from Dittmer’s model of a ‘romantic triangle’ to a ‘ménage a trois’.”46 In the view of this author, however, this question is only a mirror image of as well as the point of origin for more broadly conceived theoretical problems
of the strategic triangle.
The US-China-Taiwan Strategic Triangle III: Fit for Now and the Future?
The elucidations on the recent broad trends of the US-China-Taiwan strategic triangle against the background of the predictions made by Yu-Shan Wu and Lowell Dittmer have to some extent already brought to light increasing complexities in each bilateral relationship since the end of Cold War era. This corresponds with aforementioned assessments that have put the strategic triangle approach in a trying situation.
In the following, it is time to analyze in more detail how the two inherent deficiencies
of the strategic triangle have affected – and will affect – the triangular relations between Washington, Beijing, and Taipei.
Increasing Asymmetries and Dependence
Beginning with the assumption of ever-symmetrical bilateral relations, it has already
become quite evident that the shape of any triangular pattern within this framework
health cooperation. During the seventh and up to now last round held in October 2011 both sides
signed a nuclear power safety agreement. See Mainland Affairs Council of the Republic of China,
“Dialogue and Negotiation,” http://www.mac.gov.tw/np.asp?ctNode=5891&mp=3 (accessed May 15,
2012);
and
“Cross-Strait
Talk
and
Interaction,”
http://www.mac.gov.tw/lp.asp?ctNode=6608&CtUnit=4591&BaseDSD=7&mp=3 (accessed May 15
2012).
43
Philip Liu, “Taiwan and China Shelve the Signing of Taxation Agreement,” CENS Taiwan Economic
News, December 22, 2009, http://www.cens.com/cens/html/en/news/news_inner_30460.html (accessed January 11, 2011).
44
Cheng-Yi Lin, “The Rise of China and Taiwan’s Response: The Anti-Secession Law as a Case
Study,” Issues & Studies 43, no. 1 (March 2007): 168.
45
“Anti-Secession Law,” May 14, 2005, http://www.china.org.cn/english/2005lh/122724.htm (accessed
on 8 January 2011).
46
Shaocheng Tang, “Relations Across the Taiwan Strait: A New Era,” UNISCI Discussion Papers, no.
21 (October 2009): 252.
Do not cite without author’s permission.
12
Paper Presented at the 22nd IPSA World Congress
8-12 July 2012
Madrid, Spain
Sebastian Biba
PhD Candidate
National Chengchi University, Taiwan
does not necessarily have to constitute an equilateral triangle. In fact, both within the
former great and mini-triangles, the distance between any three players as measured
in terms of the distribution of military power, economic strength, ideological attractiveness etc. has seldom to never been truly equilateral up to the present. Therefore,
as shown above, literature dealing with the strategic triangle has recently sought to
develop ways to account for power asymmetries. However, it is important to realize
that the current and persistent trend in the prevailing case, i.e. within the Washington-Beijing-Taipei triangular relationship, exceeds what has usually been witnessed
in terms of asymmetry.
When the US-China-Taiwan triangle started off in the 1950s, it was in a triple
asymmetrical shape: A > B > C.47 The US was by far the strongest among the three
actors, while China – by its size and influence – still overshadowed Taiwan’s power.
This pattern has begun to shift dramatically, though. More precisely, China’s undoubted rise has spawned a situation in which the country has already begun to
gradually close the gap to the US, particularly in economic terms. This tendency will
become ever more pronounced in the future, leading to what Tuan Y. Cheng has
dubbed a “twin-head dual triangle.”48 The victim of this emerging US-China power
symmetry is Taiwan, which is left behind by far as the single weak player in the triangle (US = China >> Taiwan).
Moreover, this huge power asymmetry to Taiwan’s disadvantage is aggravated by
the fact that it is exactly the US and China, on which Taiwan’s survivability and economic growth depend. On the one hand, Taiwan has since the 1950s always been
dependent on the US in terms of its military security. This manifests itself very clearly
when taking a look at the sources of Taiwan’s weapons imports, for instance. According to statistics by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, the US has
accounted for more than 80 percent of Taiwan’s total weapons imports since 1950.49
In most years, the US was even the only exporter of arms to the ROC.50 Equally important as the quantity of US weapons sales has also been the high quality of weaponry sold to Taiwan, which, for example, ensured Taiwanese air superiority over the
Strait for a long time. Since the military balance across the Strait has been tilting towards the mainland in recent years,51 US statements to protect Taiwan in case of an
(unprovoked) attack by the PRC, particularly in form of the Taiwan Relations Act, are
still and all the more vital to guarantee Taiwan’s continued existence.
On the other hand, Taiwan’s economic dependence on the mainland has become
ever more explicit over the last two decades, reaching critical levels by now. Back in
2001, Christopher Dent already argued for Taiwan being increasingly pulled into
China’s “economic orbit.”52 According to estimations by the ROC Mainland Affairs
Council (台灣行政院大陸委員會, also see table 2), in 2010, Taiwan’s export share to
the mainland accounted for 30.89 percent as compared to only 6.54 percent in 1990.
47
Cheng, “Changing Triangular Relations,” 6.
Ibid., 9.
49
Data provided by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) and presented in
SIPRI
Arms
Transfers
Database,
Imports
to
Taiwan,
1950-2011,
http://armstrade.sipri.org/armstrade/html/export_values.php (accessed on 13 May 2012).
50
Ibid. The data also show, however, that over the last couple of years, the amount of US arms transfers to Taiwan has decreased enormously as compared to previous years.
51
Chiehyu Lin, and Y. F. Low, “Cross-Strait Military Balance Tilting Toward China: US Report,” ROC
Central
News
Agency,
March
26,
2009,
http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/taiwan/2009/taiwan-090326-cna02.htm
(accessed
January 14, 2011).
52
Christopher M. Dent, “Being Pulled into China’s Orbit? Navigating Taiwan’s Foreign Economic Policy,” Issues & Studies 37, no. 5 (September/October 2001): 1-34.
48
Do not cite without author’s permission.
13
Paper Presented at the 22nd IPSA World Congress
8-12 July 2012
Madrid, Spain
Sebastian Biba
PhD Candidate
National Chengchi University, Taiwan
Over the same period, imports rose from a mere 1.4 percent to almost 14 percent.
For the first time, Taiwan’s 2010 overall cross-Strait trade percentage almost reached
more than 23 percent of its total foreign trade in comparison to 4.23 percent in
1990.53 It remains to be seen whether the ECFA can somehow alleviate this dependence. Especially as Taiwan’s foreign direct investment (FDI) in China also amounted
to enormous 79.1 percent of the total during the first nine months of 2011 and the accumulated FDI since 1991 has by now run up to more than 62 percent,54 the future
trend in trade patterns is unlikely to be reversed.55
Finally, there is another factor that contributes to Taiwan’s eroding position in the
triangle, namely the island’s widely unacknowledged diplomatic status as a sovereign
and independent state (mainly due to PRC pressure on the international community).
After all, it is this situation that has so far largely precluded Taiwan from participating
in the East Asia regional economic integration processes. Efforts to catch up and
break through the regional marginalization have generally failed so far. Similarly,
Taiwan’s international status has hampered its membership in (most) international
organizations, thereby further downgrading Taipei’s powerbase.56
All this has led to the fact that Taiwan is being drawn into the respective orbits of
the US and China, while the bilateral relationship between the latter two is additionally becoming more and more prominent. Even though asymmetry can meanwhile be
somewhat accounted for in the strategic triangle, it remains questionable whether the
concept is still the most appropriate for the current (and future) constellation, which is
certainly unprecedented to some extent. Historical examples of the twin-head dual
triangle, such as the US = USSR > China formation, differed from the prevailing USChina-Taiwan triangle in that China – albeit the single weak actor in the great triangle
– was never dependent on the US to guarantee its survival and only at times depending on the Soviet Union, especially for technical support in various sectors. Taiwan in
the mini-triangle, however, can hardly any longer be perceived of as an independent
and emancipated actor in this triangular pattern. Instead, as shown above, Taipei has
become massively dependent on both the other two players, whose own relationship
has grown increasingly interdependent. Such dependence is also not mirrored by the
strategic triangle’s new approach towards asymmetry.
Between Amity and Enmity
The second intrinsic problem of the strategic triangle emerged gradually in post-Cold
War era. It revolves around the fact that all relationships are generally painted either
black or white, i.e. defined as either amicable or hostile. This worked (relatively) well
during the Cold War period, when relations among the three countries of concern
here were not floating freely, but predetermined by external circumstances of the
great triangle between Washington, Moscow, and Beijing. It continued to work in a
short phase of restructuring in the immediate aftermath of the collapse of the great
triangle. However, looking at the contemporary bilateral relations within the US
53
Data provided by the ROC Mainland Affairs Council and presented in Cross-Strait Economic Statistics Monthly, no. 228 (April 2012), Table 8, http://www.mac.gov.tw/public/Attachment/2459162466.pdf
(accessed May 17, 2012).
54
Ibid., Table 13, http://www.mac.gov.tw/public/Attachment/245943761.pdf (accessed May 17, 2011).
55
Certainly, Taiwan’s FDI to the mainland also breeds dependences for the latter. Yet, it is widely acknowledged that economic cross-Strait relations are on the whole skewed in favor for the mainland,
with rising tendency.
56
Elizabeth Freund Larus, “Taiwan’s Quest for International Recognition,” Issues & Studies 42, no. 2
(June 2006): 23-52.
Do not cite without author’s permission.
14
Paper Presented at the 22nd IPSA World Congress
8-12 July 2012
Madrid, Spain
Sebastian Biba
PhD Candidate
National Chengchi University, Taiwan
China-Taiwan triangle – and projecting them onto the future – this classification has
become oversimplified and outdated.
Beginning with the US-Sino bilateral relationship, it is no secret that both countries
show a high and further growing degree of economic interdependence, which, in a
sense, forces them to work together on a variety of issues. Besides the economic
arena, it becomes ever more evident that key problems of our time, such as climate
change, nuclear proliferation, and transnational terrorism need the cooperation of the
US and China in order to be tackled successfully. Realizing this situation, the wellknown national security advisor to former US President Jimmy Carter, Zbigniew
Brzezinksi, in early 2009 voiced a geopolitical call for Washington and Beijing to set
up an informal Group of Two (G-2), involving only the US and China, in a leadership
bid to jointly address a wide range of global challenges of bilateral interests.57 Nevertheless, both players also stand for almost opposite ideological values and have frequently been perceived – or even seen themselves – as strategic competitors, both
of which at times make Washington-Beijing relations leave shallow waters. So far,
Washington and Beijing have had a dramatically different view on sovereignty and
human rights, tangible cooperation on the mitigation of climate change has not yet
materialized, arguments over international property rights and the value of the Chinese currency, in particular, have been common. All these issues have motivated
Elizabeth Economy and Adam Segal to speak of a “G-2 Mirage.”58 Different comments in the immediate run-up to Hu Jintao’s recent state visit to the US in January
2011 confirmed this assessment. Willy Lam, for example, collected several statements of Chinese military officers and commentators who, on the one hand, conceded the mutual economic dependence between both countries while, on the other
hand, still regarding the bilateral relationship as a “zero-sum game in the military
sphere” and maintaining that “the US has not changed its hegemonic logic.”59 For the
US side, David Shambaugh summarized nicely the complex situation between both
countries, once more revealing the existence of many contentious matters on the one
hand, but also the will not to let any of them escalate on the other hand:
Until the past month or so, when both sides have tried to improve the atmosphere, there has been
a progressive hemorrhaging in ties across the board, caused by a series of economic frictions
(over currency, trade, investment, intellectual property, hidden subsidies, exports controls, protectionism); regional tensions (over North Korea, Iran, India, Japan, South China Sea); military confrontations (over US surveillance in China’s exclusive economic zone and exercises in the Yellow
Sea) and concerns (over China’s air, naval, and ballistic missile development); diplomatic disagreements (over Taiwan arms sales, the Dalai Lama, the Nobel Peace Prize for Liu Xiaobo and
60
China’s human rights record).
For the near to mid-term future, it seems unlikely that the sheer amount of contentious issues will ease off durably. Rather, interdependence and points of contention
will continue to determine the rules of the game and in doing so contribute to the fact
that the US-China relationship does and will not accurately fit into the black-white
categorization provided for under the strategic triangle framework.
57
Henry Liu, “Brzezinski’s G-2 Grand Strategy,” Asia Times Online, April 22, 2009,
http://www.atimes.com/ atimes/China_Business/KD22Cb01.html (accessed January 12, 2011).
58
Elizabeth Economy, and Adam Segal, “The G-2 Mirage,” Foreign Affairs 88, no. 3 (May/June 2009):
14-23.
59
Willy Lam, “Hu’s State Visit Exposes Rift in Chinese Foreign Policy,” China Brief, January 28, 2011,
5.
60
David Shambaugh, “Of US-China Summits, Past and Present,” New York Times, January 18, 2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/18/opinion/18iht-edshambaugh18.html?_r=1&ref=china
(accessed
January 20, 2011).
Do not cite without author’s permission.
15
Paper Presented at the 22nd IPSA World Congress
8-12 July 2012
Madrid, Spain
Sebastian Biba
PhD Candidate
National Chengchi University, Taiwan
Coming to the next dyad, US-Taiwan relations are certainly not characterized by
the same huge number of controversies as US-China relations. Washington and
Taipei have basically been talking the same language in terms of ideology ever since
Taiwan’s democratization. Nevertheless, the US was not amused about the DPP’s
past activities of pushing the envelope in its relations with the mainland.61 A repeated
DPP victory in presidential elections – even though this topic will not be on the table
for at least another four years – combined with a renewed push for de jure independence (who knows), could still lead to increased tensions in US-Taiwan relations.
Moreover, relations have not been immune from discrepancies under the incumbent
KMT administration, either. Two issues are particularly noteworthy in this regard,
namely US beef exports and arms sales to Taiwan. Imports of US beef have been a
sore point in trade ties between Taipei and Washington for many years. Taiwan first
banned US beef imports in 2003 reflecting Taiwanese health concerns and causing
disappointment in Washington. While some imports were resumed in 2006 and 2009,
the US has pressured for a wider opening. Since Ma’s reelection in January 2011,
the issue has flared up again, with domestic contentions in Taiwan going on between
ruling and opposition parties as to whether or not completely lift the ban. Over those
domestic quarrels, the US even called off bilateral trade talks under the Trade and
Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA) and linked the bilateral trade dispute to
Taiwan’s overall trade liberalization and its engagement with regional trade partners
(for example a future participation in the Trans-Pacific Partnership, TPP) – something
that is seen essential in Taiwan to maintain economic competitiveness.62 Moreover,
the US has in the more recent past several times rejected the sale of more sensitive
equipment, such as F-16C/D fighter aircraft, submarines or Blackhawk helicopters,
long desired by Taiwan.63 Admittedly, the US-Taiwan relationship seems less prone
to serious deteriorations than those between Washington and Beijing. Nonetheless,
the recent past also provides reminders that US-Taiwan relations should not (or no
longer) be considered as a one-way street in the positive sense.
Finally, as for China-Taiwan relations, it has already been outlined above that, on
the one hand, contacts have improved a lot since 2008 and that the signing of the
ECFA in June 2010 certainly marked the climax of this thaw until now. Yet, several
contentious issues remain. To begin with, the trade deal was by no means undisputed in Taiwan as its parliament witnessed an actual brawl between different camps
during the ratification process.64 This shows the continued disunity of domestic Taiwanese politics towards the mainland. Also, it continues to be questionable whether
both sides will now be able to also get over their sovereignty dispute in the foreseeable future and, in doing so, resolve the entire Taiwan Strait issue. So far, the realization of Taiwan’s more broadly conceived hopes as associated with the signing of
ECFA have not materialized. This means that, first, as of now, it cannot be said for
61
Gang Lin, “US Strategies in Maintaining Peace across the Taiwan Strait,” Issues & Studies 43, no. 2
(June 2007): 228-29.
62
“Motion to Halt US Beef Imports Fails Legislature,” Taipei Times, May 12, 2012,
http://www.taipeitimes.com/ News/taiwan/archives/2012/05/12/2003532624 (accessed 24 May 2012);
and
“Ma
Vows
to
Resolve
Beef
Issue,”
Taipei
Times,
May
16,
2012,
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2012/05/16/2003532941 (accessed 24 May 2012).
63
Compare, for example, a statement made by US Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia Kurt
Campbell in early February 2011. See William Lowther, “US Diplomat Noncommittal on Arms ‘Breakthrough’,”
Taipei
Times,
February
4,
2011,
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2011/02/04/ 2003495135 (accessed February 8,
2011).
64
“Taiwan Lawmakers Brawl over China Trade Pact,” Agence France Press, July 8, 2010,
http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5hppoXHm8okGD95TJIaYvBegq_gxA
(accessed February 10, 2011).
Do not cite without author’s permission.
16
Paper Presented at the 22nd IPSA World Congress
8-12 July 2012
Madrid, Spain
Sebastian Biba
PhD Candidate
National Chengchi University, Taiwan
sure whether Beijing will “allow” Taipei to establish FTAs with other countries in Taiwan’s pursuit to overcome its perceived economic marginalization in East Asia.65
Second, Taiwan’s opportunities to join multilateral activities in the region, such as becoming an observer to ASEAN, remain likewise unclear. Furthermore, the continuous
“war without gunfire,”66 i.e. the unabated cross-Strait intelligence war that flared up
once again in early 2011 with Taiwan arresting a general on accusations of spying for
China,67 may serve as another example of the continuous deep distrust between both
sides. Accordingly, Taiwan has several announced that military confidence-building
measures between both sides of the Strait are not currently desired.68 President Ma
has also been evasive on a political cross-Strait dialogue in the near future.69
What the above makes clear then is that, taken as a whole, any of three bilateral
relationships between the US, China, and Taiwan boasts characteristics that actually
lie in between enmity and amity. As has previously been shown, the strategic triangle
approach, however, is not fit to illustrate such hybrid relationships – at least not in its
current set-up.
Sector-specific Triangles?
In the theoretical part of this paper, the introduction of sector-specific triangles has
been suggested as a potential means to indirectly overcome the black-white dichotomy of the strategic triangle approach. The rationale behind this idea was the hope
that the hybrid character of current relations could be broken up by looking at particular issue-areas separately when forming triangular patterns. In the prevailing empirical case, initial observations could be considered supportive of those sector-specific
triangles. While contacts between the US and Taiwan can be regarded the closest to
an overall friendship even without different triangles and therefore are least affected
by the amity-enmity duality problem, it is particularly dividing the China-Taiwan relationship into a politico-military sphere and an economic one that reveals a clearer picture than before: in broad terms, as has been illustrated above, whereas the political
and military relations across the Strait used to be and have stayed on rather cool and
could thus well be designated as negative, economic exchange has gathered enormous speed and could be considered positive.
In the end, however, nuances not reflected also remain within the distinct issueareas. Less pronounced in China-Taiwan relations (even though overall economic
cross-Strait relations are skewed in favor of the mainland while Taiwan has been reluctant to liberalize certain trade goods and investment), they are all the more
marked in the US-China relationship. Repeating just a few of the previously mentioned examples shows that – first speaking for the politico-military realm – there is
the global war on terrorism making both sides cooperate on the one hand, while human rights issues, on the other hand, make them fall out with each other again. In
65
Taiwan has been in talks about economic cooperation agreements with Singapore and New Zealand
– two non-major trading partners – but agreements have not yet been reached. Plans for promoting
economic integration agreements with major partners like the US, Japan, the EU, and ASEAN have
been slow. Much of Beijing’s attitude towards possible future agreements may hinge upon the official
name/title of those agreements as well as whether Beijing’s consent will be sought in advance.
66
Russell Hsiao, “’War without Gunfire’: China's Intelligence War with Taiwan,” China Brief, November
5, 2010, 1-2.
67
Edward Wong, “Taiwan General Charged in Spy Case,” New York Times, February 9, 2011, http://
www.nytimes.com/2011/02/10/world/asia/10taiwan.html?_r=1&ref=china (accessed February 11,
2011).
68
Wang Jianwei, “Is the Honeymoon Over? Progress and Problems in Cross-Strait Relations,” American Foreign Policy Interests 32 (2010): 155.
69
Ibid.
Do not cite without author’s permission.
17
Paper Presented at the 22nd IPSA World Congress
8-12 July 2012
Madrid, Spain
Sebastian Biba
PhD Candidate
National Chengchi University, Taiwan
economic terms, both sides rely heavily on their huge bilateral trade, yet there have
been heated debates and repeated struggles over trade imbalances and the value of
the Chinese currency, for instance. Consequently, it is not possible to clearly denominate either politico-military contacts or economic ones between Washington and
Beijing as purely friendly or hostile, respectively. Again, the reality lies in between.
Without much further ado then, it is evident that innovative sector-specific triangles – at least in the prevailing case and with only two them – cannot to a sufficient
degree live up to theoretical expectations and fix the strategic triangle’s problem of
amity-enmity dichotomy. Rather, the post-Cold War world has increasingly been witness to bilateral relations that do no longer frequently show features that could be
easily classified into a black-white scheme – even within the same issue-area. Additionally, in contrast to the Cold War era, alliance thinking is not usually any more a
source of external overlay that could prevent those tensions from manifesting themselves.
Better Ways into the Future? Trying the International System Approach
Dissecting the recent US-China-Taiwan relations using the strategic triangle has
demonstrated that this concept is no longer necessarily the best alternative to approach this triangular relationship. The framework has lost – and is almost certain to
further lose – its attractiveness and accuracy to reflect the whole array of the trilateral
situation between the US, China, and Taiwan properly. The reasons can primarily be
found in continuously increasing complexities in the relationships of the three parties
concerned. Moreover, effective remodeling has proven difficult – at least for the prevailing case. As a consequence, it seems expedient to search for and test different
approaches that might be better equipped to describe and analyze current and future
US-China-Taiwan relations. One concept that appears promising in this regard is the
so called “international system approach,” particularly because it can mend the problems previously identified for the strategic triangle.70
Importantly, the international system approach – just like the strategic triangle –
originates in the realist tradition of International Relations theory and therefore holds
national security and state survival as predominant goals for any nation or state under an anarchic environment.71 The first important step in this concept is to define
what the current international system – i.e., more precisely, the arrangement and distribution of power within the international system, or polarity72 – looks like and what
its likely future trajectory is. In this respect, varying estimations have been brought
forth since the end of the Cold War, depending on what kinds of capabilities (only
70
As stated in Fn. 3, the international system approach – just like the strategic triangle – is also one of
the nine contending approaches outlined by Wu, “Theorizing on Relations across the Taiwan Strait,”
422-25. Apparently, however, it has been applied far less to elaborate on the international layer of
cross-Strait relations than the strategic triangle. The main advocate of the approach has been Chucheng Ming. See for example Chu-cheng Ming, “Guoji tixi lilun yu liang’an guanxi” (International systems theory and cross-Strait relations), in Zhengbian zhong de liang’an guanxi lilun (Contending theories in the study of cross-Strait relations), ed. Tzong-Ho Bao and Yu-Shan Wu (Taipei: Wunan, 1999),
365-86; and “Guoji tixi cengci lilun yu liang’an guanxi: jianshi yu huigu” (International system theory
and cross-Strait relations: inspection and review), in Chongxin jianshi zhengbian zhong de liang’an
guanxi lilun (Revisiting the contending theories in the study of cross-Strait relations), ed. Tzong-Ho
Bao and Yu-Shan Wu (Taipei: Wunan, 2009), 305-34.
71
Wu, “Theorizing on Relations across the Taiwan Strait,” 424.
72
Compare Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979).
Ming, “Guoji tixi lilun yu liang’an guanxi,” also refers to other scholars elaborating on the international
system, but then follows Waltz’s approach. This author follows Ming.
Do not cite without author’s permission.
18
Paper Presented at the 22nd IPSA World Congress
8-12 July 2012
Madrid, Spain
Sebastian Biba
PhD Candidate
National Chengchi University, Taiwan
military, plus economic, plus still others?) should be included.73 In purely military
terms, the US still by far outdoes any other country. Once economic capabilities are
added to the equation, however, the international system is no longer unipolar; China
is more and more catching up to the US74 As of today, it can be argued that China is
emergent as the single most important international player next to the US.75 Therefore, despite a distinct procedure, the starting position of the international system approach is comparable to the US-China-Taiwan strategic triangle: the US, China, and
Taiwan remain the most decisive actors involved in cross-Strait relations (Taiwan because it is obviously an intrinsic part of cross-Strait relations; the same applies to
China, which has also become a center of power; and the US as the still most powerful country in the world). No other party is likely to have sufficient resources and the
interest to play a significant role. Moreover, just like the discussion on the strategic
triangle has revealed, the US and China are perceived as gradually approaching an
equal footing and being far more powerful than Taiwan.
These initial findings lead straight over to the first advantage the international system approach has over the strategic triangle in portraying and helping understand
current and future cross-Strait relations from an international perspective. This advantage revolves around the aspects of asymmetry and dependence. It has been
shown that the strategic triangle has been developed further in order to be more sensitive for asymmetrical relationships. Yet, it has also been detected that problems
remain, particularly with regard to factor in concomitant dependences among the actors involved. The international system approach, in contrast, is capable of illustrating
both the asymmetries and dependences given in the prevailing case rather clearly:
first, the fact that there are maximally a few states (or entities) that function as distinct
poles – that is centers of power – in the international system (here: primarily the US
and China) while many other states (or entities) are not considered poles of their own
(here: Taiwan) unmistakably signifies power asymmetry between poles and nonpoles. Also, the differentiation between poles and non-poles already provides for a
“conceptual power asymmetry” non-existent in the strategic triangle where each vertex is initially assigned the same status. Second, under anarchy, non-poles are usually dependent on poles for their security – albeit to varying degrees. For Taiwan, as
Ming already argued in 1999, the actual constellation of the international system then
means the existence of the following options indicating the island’s dependence: first,
tilt towards the US pole; second, tilt towards the China pole; third, straddle between
both camps.76 Besides, the relationship between poles can be defined as independent (e.g. the US and the former Soviet Union), dependent (e.g. the US as Japan’s
security guarantor), and inter-dependent (e.g. the US and China nowadays).
The second advantage focuses on the previously outlined black-white dichotomy
of the strategic triangle. The international system approach, in contrast, does not require bilateral relations to be strictly categorized as either amicable or hostile. Unlike
73
Wu, “Theorizing on Relations across the Taiwan Strait,” 422-23, gives a concise overview of those
different alternatives.
74
In the second half of 2010, China already surpassed the nominal GDP of Japan, making the former
the second-biggest economy worldwide. See “China Overtakes Japan as World’s Second Biggest
Economy,” Bloomberg, August 16, 2010, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-08-16/chinaeconomy-passes-japan-s-in-second-quarter-capping-three-decade-rise.html (accessed September 28,
2010). According to recent predictions by Goldman Sachs, China is even expected to overtake the US
in terms of GDP by 2027. See Kim Jae-kyoung, “China to Overtake US by 2027,” Korea Times, October 27, 2009, http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/ www/news/nation/2010/09/288_54391.html (accessed May
28, 2011). The recent global financial crisis may additionally have accelerated this process.
75
The aforementioned idea of G-2 has already echoed this trend.
76
Ming, “Guoji tixi lilun yu liang’an guanxi,” 382.
Do not cite without author’s permission.
19
Paper Presented at the 22nd IPSA World Congress
8-12 July 2012
Madrid, Spain
Sebastian Biba
PhD Candidate
National Chengchi University, Taiwan
the strategic triangle, which only knows four narrowly conceived modes (ménage à
trois, romantic triangle, marriage, and unit veto), the international system approach –
following Kenneth Waltz, again – recognizes three far more broadly conceived
modes, namely unipolarity, bipolarity, and multipolarity. Under each system (unless it
is bipolar with two completely inimical powers like during the zenith of the Cold War;
here inter-bloc relations are highly limited), it is principally possible for any dyad to
cooperate on particular issue-areas, or even single issues, of common interest while
taking divergent or even confrontational stances on other issue-areas. 77 Consequently, there is also much room for bilateral relationships to lie in between amity and
enmity, and to even be in constant flux. This complexity exactly reflects the current
situation in the US-China-Taiwan triangular relationship.
Summarizing, thanks to the fact that the US and China appear very likely to constitute the two most powerful poles in the international system – and particularly in East
Asia as one regional complex of this system – over the next decades, the international system approach provides a similar basis for analysis as the strategic triangle.
It has always been a key strength of the strategic triangle that it only involved those
three entities most concerned with the cross-Straits issue. That the US and China
have ranked and will rank at predominant positions in the international system only
continues to make sure that no other country is likely to intervene. Beyond that common basis, however, the international system approach is particularly able to mend
those two weaknesses inherent to and growing within the US-China-Taiwan strategic
triangle pointed out earlier. Thus, subject to further and more detailed elaborations,
this alternative option may be more accurate in analyzing the international level of
current – and most likely future – cross-Strait relations.78
Conclusion
The objective of this paper was to show increasing problems of the strategic triangle
theory in explaining cross-Strait relations on the international theatre while at the
same making first cautious inroads into probing the applicability of the international
system approach as an alternative concept. It has been shown that growing complexities in the relations between the US, China, and Taiwan can no longer be accurately displayed by the strategic triangle. Especially its ill-equipped tools to portray intra-triangular dependence and, even more so, bilateral relations beyond the dichotomy of amity and enmity need to be mentioned in this regard. The international system approach, in contrast, has been found as a potentially more viable alternative as
it particularly mends the two grave shortcomings of the strategic triangle. Nevertheless, two things are well possible at this point: first, there may be yet another concept
that is even more appropriate to analyze current cross-Strait relations from an international perspective. (Also because further elaborations on the international system
77
To be sure, there may be something like alliances of two or more countries that may or may not be
directed against one or more specified other countries. Alliances – and similar formations – may influence and/or predetermine states’ interactions. The point, however, is that under the international system approach there is the general possibility of states to be neither just friends nor foes because polarity does not principally dictate inter-state relationships a priori.
78
The international system approach in this form, i.e. with its emphasis on polarity to determine the distribution of power on the global theater, might, however, have weak points itself. Compare Edward D.
Mansfield, “Concentration, Polarity, and the Distribution of Power,” International Studies Quarterly 37,
no. 1 (March 1993): 105-28. In International Relations theory, no single theory is capable of explaining
everything. Furthermore, the findings for the US-China-Taiwan triangular pattern do not mean either
that all strategic triangles are necessarily better replaced by the international system approach. Finally, some time in the future, we might hopefully reach a crossroads where realist traditions per se
lose ground against more optimistic liberal or constructivist thoughts in analyzing cross-Strait relations.
Do not cite without author’s permission.
20
Paper Presented at the 22nd IPSA World Congress
8-12 July 2012
Madrid, Spain
Sebastian Biba
PhD Candidate
National Chengchi University, Taiwan
approach might show that this concept equally has grave shortcomings.) Second,
there may be still other possibilities than those this author could think of in terms of
reforming the strategic triangle and thereby fixing its weak points. Ultimately, the important aspect is that scholarship remains attentive to changing empirics and their
repercussions for theory. This work will hopefully contribute to and stimulate further
evaluations on the prevailing topic.
Do not cite without author’s permission.
21
Paper Presented at the 22nd IPSA World Congress
8-12 July 2012
Madrid, Spain
Sebastian Biba
PhD Candidate
National Chengchi University, Taiwan
Annex
Figure 1: Strategic Triangles
Figure 2: The Great Triangle and the Mini Triangle
Do not cite without author’s permission.
22
Table 1: Evolution of the Great Triangle and the Mini-Triangle
Great Triangle
U.S.
PRC
USSR
Mini-Triangle
U.S.
PRC
ROC
1950s
Marriage
Pariah
Junior partner
Senior partner
Marriage
Senior partner
Pariah
Junior partner
1960s
Unit-veto
Foe
Foe
Foe
Marriage
Senior partner
Pariah
Junior partner
Early 1970s
Romantic
Pivot
Wing
Wing
Marriage
Senior partner
Junior partner
Pariah
Late 1970s
Marriage
Senior partner
Junior partner
Pariah
Marriage
Senior partner
Junior partner
Pariah
Early 1980s
Romantic
Wing
Pivot
Wing
Marriage
Senior partner
Junior partner
Pariah
Late 1980s
Ménage à
trois
Friend
Friend
Friend
Marriage
Senior partner
Junior partner
Pariah
Early 1990s
Collapse
---
---
---
Romantic
Unwilling pivot
Wing
Wing
Since 2008
---
---
---
---
Ménage à trois
(?)
Friend (?)
Friend (?)
Friend (?)
Source: Adapted from Wu, “From Romantic Triangle to Marriage,” 120.
Table 2: The Share of Cross-Straits Trade in Taiwan’s Total Foreign Trade (%)
1984
1990
1995
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
Export Share
1.40
6.54
17.15
16.46
20.27
23.30
25.43
26.83
28.36
28.27
30.09
28.94
30.48
30.89
Import Share
0.58
1.40
2.97
4.43
5.47
7.04
8.61
9.95
11.00
12.23
12.77
13.04
13.98
14.31
Total Trade Share
1.06
4.23
10.36
10.67
13.45
15.89
17.70
18.72
20.04
20.65
21.94
21.22
22.87
22.97
Source: Estimates by ROC Mainland Affairs Council in Cross-Strait Economic Statistics Monthly, no.
228 (April 2012), Table 8, http://www.mac.gov.tw/public/Attachment/12149433186.pdf (accessed May
17, 2012).