1. business and industrial
2. energy
3. nuclear power

Understanding & Analyzing Iran’s Nuclear Intentions
–
Testing Scott Sagan’s Argument of “Why do States build
Nuclear Weapons”
Dissertation by Oliver Schmidt
Master of Arts in International Relations
Department of Politics and International Relations, Lancaster University
Academic Year 2007/ 2008
01. September 2008
Oliver Schmidt: Dissertation – MA International Relations – Lancaster University
2
Table of Contents
Abstract.......................................................................................................................................................... 4
1.
2.
Introduction .......................................................................................................................................... 5
1.1
The case of Iran............................................................................................................................. 7
1.2
Concept & Methodology.............................................................................................................. 9
Scott Sagan and “Why do States Build Nuclear Weapons?” .......................................................12
2.1
3.
The Security Model .....................................................................................................................12
2.1.1
Basic Concepts of Neo-Realism........................................................................................13
2.1.2
The Concept of Deterrence...............................................................................................14
2.1.3
The Security Model .............................................................................................................16
2.2
The Domestic Politics Models ..................................................................................................18
2.3
The Norms Model.......................................................................................................................20
2.4
Applying the Hypotheses to the Case of Iran.........................................................................22
2.4.1
The Security Model .............................................................................................................22
2.4.2
The domestic politics model..............................................................................................22
2.4.3
The Norms Model...............................................................................................................23
2.4.4
Thesis ....................................................................................................................................23
Testing Sagan – Does Iran want to build nuclear weapons? .......................................................25
3.1
Assessing Iran’s nuclear capabilities .........................................................................................25
3.1.1
Technical aspects of Iran’s nuclear program...................................................................28
3.1.2
Iran’s ballistic and cruise missile program .......................................................................35
3.2
International reactions and concerns........................................................................................39
3.3
First indications for Iran’s nuclear intentions?........................................................................45
3.4
The Security Model .....................................................................................................................47
3.4.1
The International Level ......................................................................................................47
3.4.2
The Regional Level..............................................................................................................50
3.4.3
Preliminary Conclusion ......................................................................................................53
Oliver Schmidt: Dissertation – MA International Relations – Lancaster University
3.5
The Domestic Politics Model....................................................................................................56
3.5.1
International & Regional Aspects .....................................................................................57
3.5.2
Domestic Aspects................................................................................................................59
3.5.3
Preliminary Conclusion ......................................................................................................62
3.6
4.
3
The Norms Model.......................................................................................................................63
3.6.1
International Aspects ..........................................................................................................64
3.6.2
Regional Aspects..................................................................................................................66
3.6.3
Domestic Aspects................................................................................................................67
3.6.4
Preliminary Conclusion ......................................................................................................69
Conclusion...........................................................................................................................................71
4.1
How helpful are Sagan’s three models in assessing the case of Iran?..................................71
4.2
Does Iran, according to Sagan’s models, intend to build nuclear weapons?......................75
4.3
Is Iran’s nuclear program a threat for ‘the west’? ...................................................................77
4.4
What are the dangers of the Iranian case? ...............................................................................78
Appendix .....................................................................................................................................................80
1.
Map: Nuclear Weapons Status 2005 ...........................................................................................80
2.
Map: Iran’s Nuclear Facilities 2005.............................................................................................81
3.
Map: Satellite Images of Iran’s Nuclear Sites ............................................................................82
4.
Map: Iran’s planned nuclear fuel cycle .......................................................................................83
5.
Map: Ballistic Missile Proliferation 2005 ....................................................................................84
6.
Map: Estimated Ranges of Current and Potential Iranian Missiles........................................85
7.
Map: Iran’s missile facilities..........................................................................................................86
8.
Map: Iran’s Political System .........................................................................................................87
Bibliography ................................................................................................................................................88
Oliver Schmidt: Dissertation – MA International Relations – Lancaster University
4
Abstract
This dissertation: Understanding & Analysing Iran’s Nuclear Intentions – Testing Scott Sagan’s Argument
of “Why do States build Nuclear Weapons”, focuses on three questions: first, does Sagan’s argument
provide a helpful tool to analyse a state’s nuclear intention; second, does Iran want to build
nuclear weapons, and third, does Iran pose a threat to ‘Western’ interests or security.
Therefore, these works outlines Sagan’s theoretical approach briefly, before deriving hypotheses
and apply it to the case of Iran. Scott Sagan offers three analytical categories: the ‘security model’,
the domestic politics model’, and the ‘norm model’ to assess a state’s nuclear intention.
Additionally, this work provides a brief survey of technical aspects and the current status of
Iran’s civil nuclear, and military missile program. A brief history shows the political development
of the case until June 2008.
Scott Sagan’s approach provides a helpful tool to assess the nuclear intentions of the Islamic
Republic of Iran. Although the models provide a good analytical framework, it is difficult to
provide prognoses, rather than explanations in retrospect. Nevertheless, it is possible to conclude
that Iran does not pose an immediate threat for US and European security and interests. At the
same time, Iran’s case does provide plenty of reasons for concern, especially regarding the future
of nuclear non-proliferation and regional security.
Oliver Schmidt: Dissertation – MA International Relations – Lancaster University
5
Understanding & Analyzing Iran’s Nuclear Intentions
–
Testing Scott Sagan’s Argument of “Why do States build
Nuclear Weapons”
1. Introduction
Believing that the proliferation of nuclear weapons would seriously enhance the danger of nuclear war,
[…]1,
190 states signed the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The treaty
entered into force in 1970, after it was opened for signature two years prior. In the year 1995 the
signatories of the non-proliferation treaty decided in favour of the indefinite extension of the
possibly most successful tool of nuclear non-proliferation.2 The NPT forms the core of
international nuclear non-proliferation efforts. The basic idea of the agreement is that every
country should have the opportunity to use nuclear energy for civil purposes, but the military use
should be prohibited and exclusively allowed to the five countries that detonated a nuclear device
before January 1, 1967 namely the USA, Russia, United Kingdom, China and France. The IAEA
forms the control and verification body for the compliance of the NPT member states. Its
founding dates back to the beginning of nuclear non-proliferation, with the Atoms for Peace
Program initiated by US President Dwight D. Eisenhower in 1953. 3
The NPT has faced a severe crisis since the last Review Conference in 2005.4 While the countries
of the European Union (EU) and the United States (US) demanded more commitment regarding
1
The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT),
http://disarmament.un.org/wmd/npt/npttext.html, (10.05.08).
2
NPT/Conf.1995/32 (Part I), Annex: Decision 3 Extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons, http://disarmament.un.org/wmd/npt/1995dec3.htm, (10.05.08).
3
Joseph Cirincione: Bomb Scare – The History & Future of Nuclear Weapons, Columbia University Press, New
York, 2007, pp. 21 – 35.
4
Speech by: Sergio Duarte, High Representative for Disarmament Affairs United Nations: The Nuclear-NonProliferation Regime – Debilitation and the Risk of Collapse, at: Nuclear Weapons – The greatest Peril to
Civilization - A Conference to Imagnie a World without them, Yale University, 21 February 2008.
Also:
Joseph F. Pilat: The end of the NPT regime?, in: International Affairs 83: 3, 2007, pp. 469 – 482.
Oliver Schmidt: Dissertation – MA International Relations – Lancaster University
6
the topic of non-proliferation, the non-aligned, non-nuclear weapon states demanded a
significant step towards the disarmament of the nuclear arsenal owned by the five nuclear
weapon states, in accordance with article 6 of the NPT. Moreover, they demanded and
underlined each member’s right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy, including the development
of a domestic enrichment capability, according to Article III and IV NPT.5
During the Cold War only two nations became nuclear-armed states, which are not recognised as
nuclear weapon states in accordance with the NPT, namely Israel and India. On the 14th of May
1974 India conducted a nuclear weapons test after their nuclear program started in the mid
1950.6 Israel never publicly announced the possession of nuclear weapons but it has been
recognised as nuclear armed by the United States since 1975.7 Since the end of the Cold War four
cases of proliferation have gathered enormous attention. On October 9, 2006 North Korea
detonated a nuclear device and affirmed suspicions about a military nuclear program.8 The
country is also known to develop multi-stage ballistic missiles and it has conducted several missile
flight tests over the last few years.9 The second case of proliferation was Pakistan, which
successfully conducted a nuclear test in 1998 as a response to growing tensions between India
and Pakistan. Pakistan also possesses a medium and intermediate ballistic missile capability.10 An
alerting case of nuclear proliferation was detected in the aftermath of the Gulf War in 1990 –
1991. Iraq surprised the world with a highly developed nuclear weapons program and limited
means to deliver weapons of mass destruction as the United Nations Special Commission could
reveal after the war of 1990 - 1991.11 The final case tht has resulted in urgent debates among the
members of the United Nations (UN) Security Council (UNSC) the Islamic Republic of Iran12,
5
Harald Müller: A Treaty in troubled Waters – Reflections on the Failed NPT Review Conference, in: The
International Spectator, 3/2005, pp. 34 – 44.
Also:
U.S. Concerns about Declining Effectiveness of Nonproliferation Regime, in: The American Journal of
International Law, Vol. 99, No. 4. October, 2005, pp. 917-918.
6
The Federation of American Scientists: India – Nuclear Weapons,
http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/india/nuke/index.html, (10.05.08).
7
The Federation of American Scientists: Israel – Nuclear Weapons,
http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/israel/nuke/index.html, (10.05.08).
8
Daniel A. Pinkston, Center for Nonproliferation Studies Monterey Institute of International Studies: North
Korea Conducts Nuclear Test, 10.10.2006, http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/week/pdf/061010_dprktest.pdf, (10.05.08).
9
Daniel A. Pinkston, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College: The North Korean Ballistic Missile
Program, February 2008, http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB842.pdf (10.05.08).
10
Arms Control Association Fact Sheet: Arms Control and Proliferation Profile: Pakistan, November 2007,
http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/pakistanprofile.asp, (10.05.08).
11
International Atomic Energy Agency: Iraq Nuclear File – Key Findings,
http://www.iaea.org/OurWork/SV/Invo/factsheet.html#assessment, (10.05.08).
12
BBC News: Un approves new Sanctions on Iran, March 4 2008,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/7274902.stm, (10.05.08).
Oliver Schmidt: Dissertation – MA International Relations – Lancaster University
7
suspected of developing a military nuclear capability since 2003.13 Iran is developing medium and
intermediate ballistic missiles, capable of carrying a nuclear warhead.14 Several reports indicating a
cooperation between Iran and North Korea regarding the development of ballistic and cruise
missiles.15
The famous warning note by Henry Kissinger, George P. Shultz, William J. Perry and Sam Nunn
reminds of the urgency and dangers of nuclear proliferation:
The accelerated spread of nuclear weapons, nuclear know-how and nuclear material has brought us
to a nuclear tipping point. We face a very real possibility that the deadliest weapons ever invented
could fall into dangerous hands.16
1.1
The case of Iran
The Islamic Republic of Iran is in the centre of international attention. There are multiple reasons
for the increased interest in the foreign and security policy of the country. Among others, Iran’s
support for ‘political militant groups’17 in Lebanon and the Palestinian Territory and more
recently in the conflict areas of its neighbours Afghanistan and Iraq provides plenty of reasons
for concern, and Iran has a place on the US Department of States list as state sponsor of terror.18
13
The International Atomic Energy Agency: In Focus IAEA and Iran,
http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Focus/IaeaIran/index.shtml, (10.05.08).
14
Anthony H. Cordesman, Center for Strategic and International Studies: Iran’s Nuclear and Missile Programs
– A Status Report, November 2007, http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/071126irannukewmd.pdf, (10.05.08).
See also: Andrew Feickert, CRS Report for Congress: Iran’s Ballistic Missile Capabilities, August 23, 2004,
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/39332.pdf, (10.05.08).
15
Paul Kerr, Arms Control Association: Iran, North Korea Deepen Missile Cooperation, January/ February
2007, http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2007_01-02/IranNK.asp, (10.05.08).
16
George P. Shultz/ William J. Perry/ Henry A. Kissinger/ Sam Nunn: Towards a Nuclear-Free World, in: The
Wall Street Journal, 15. January 2008, p. 13.
17
The term is used in accordance with:
Doron Zimmermann/ Andreas Wenger (Editor): Tangled Skein or Gordian Knot? – Iran and Syria as State
Sponsors of Political Violence Movements in Lebanon and in the Palestinian Territories, in: Züricher Beiträge
zur Sicherheitspolitik und Konfliktforschung, Nr. 70, Center for Security Studies (CSS), ETH Zurich, 2004,
http://se1.isn.ch:80/serviceengine/FileContent?serviceID=PublishingHouse&fileid=791FF2CA-F43C-F83A1BB3-4160FD357B79&lng=en, (10.05.08).
18
US Department of State: Country Report on Terrorism, Chapter 3, State Sponsors of Terrorism Overview, 30
April 2007, http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2006/82736.htm, (10.05.08).
See also:
Doron Zimmermann/ Andreas Wenger (Editor): Tangled Skein or Gordian Knot? – Iran and Syria as State
Sponsors of Political Violence Movements in Lebanon and in the Palistinian Territories, in: Züricher Beiträge
zur Sicherheitspolitik und Konfliktforschung, Nr. 70, Center for Security Studies (CSS), ETH Zurich, 2004,
http://se1.isn.ch:80/serviceengine/FileContent?serviceID=PublishingHouse&fileid=791FF2CA-F43C-F83A1BB3-4160FD357B79&lng=en, (10.05.08).
Oliver Schmidt: Dissertation – MA International Relations – Lancaster University
8
Additionally, Iran has caused an ongoing and intense debate about its nuclear program and
following, the future of nuclear non-proliferation. This debate has been triggered by irregularities
regarding Iran’s duty to declare nuclear activities to the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA), according to Iran’s IAEA Safeguards Agreement19 and the concern about the purpose of
Iran’s ballistic missile program.20
While the case of Iraq has illustrated the importance of arms control and disarmament, the case
of North Korea but even more the case of Iran endangers the future of nuclear non-proliferation
and the NPT in particular. Additionally, Iran is considered to be hostile against the US and its
interest, particularly in the region of the Greater Middle East. Therefore, President George W.
Bush named the country in the Axis of Evil Speech and claims that Iran poses a threat to the
region of the Greater Middle East and beyond.21 The US President pointed out that generally:
The gravest danger to freedom lies at the crossroads of radicalism and technology. When the spread of
chemical and biological and nuclear weapons, along with ballistic missile technology—when that
occurs, even weak states and small groups could attain a catastrophic power to strike great nations.
Our enemies have declared this very intention, and have been caught seeking these terrible weapons.
And:
Daniel Bayman: Iran, Terrorism, and Weapons of Mass Destruction, in: Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 31:3,
pp. 169 – 181.
And:
Anthony H. Cordesman: Iran’s support for Hezbollah in Lebanon, CSIS, 15 July 2006,
http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/060715_hezbollah.pdf, (10.05.08).
19
IAEA Information Circular INFCIRC/ 214, 13. 12.1974: The Text of the agreement between the Agency fort
he application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,
www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/Others/infcirc214.pdf, (16.05.08).
20
Policy Department External Policies Study: Missile Defence and European Security, The European
Parliament, November 2007, pp 9 – 10,
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/activities/expert/eStudies/download.do?file=18359#search=%20missile%20def
ence%20>, (10.05.08).
See also:
US National Air and Space Intelligence Center: Ballistic And Cruise Missile Threat, March 2006,
<http://www.nukestrat.com/us/afn/NASIC2006.pdf>, (10.05.08).
And:
US National Intelligence Council: Foreign Missile Development and the Ballistic Missile Threat through 2015,
December 2001, <http://www.dni.gov/nic/PDF_GIF_otherprod/missilethreat2001.pdf>, (10.05.08).
For a very precise assessment:
Robert H. Schmucker: Iran and its Regional Environment, The Nuclearization of the Broader Middle East as a
Challenge for Transatlantic Policy Coordination Panel 1, Second Transatlantic Conference, Berlin, March 27,
2006, <http://www.hsfk.de/downloads/Panel%201%20-%20Schmucker.pdf>, (10.05.08).
And:
Anthony Seaboyer/ Oliver Thränert: What Missile Proliferation Means for Europe, in: Survival, Vol. 48, No. 2,
Summer 2006.
21
The President's State of the Union Address, January 29, 2002 The United States Capitol, Washington, D.C.
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-11.html#>, (14.05.08).
Oliver Schmidt: Dissertation – MA International Relations – Lancaster University
9
They want the capability to blackmail us, or to harm us, or to harm our friends—and we will
oppose them with all our power.22
The assessment that Iran constitutes a threat is only partly shared by the states of the EU the
threat analysis is considerably different and less urgent regarding Iran’s capabilities to deploy
ballistic missiles, which could threaten Europe and the development of a nuclear device.23 A
research paper for the EU Parliament concludes:
We can detect a difference in perception about the nature and immediacy of the ballistic missile
threat, and in how best to meet it, between the US Administration and most of Europe (to varying
degrees). This involves differences over how quickly certain states – particularly Iran - might develop
long-range missiles capable of targeting European and US populations, and also the likelihood of
such capability becoming a real threat. It is also partly the manifestation of a historical/cultural
phenomenon. Europeans are more familiar with having to live with geographically proximate threats
than is the US.24
1.2
Concept & Methodology
The question of how to stop nuclear proliferation is linked to the task of understanding why
states seek nuclear weapons in the first place? Only the understanding for a states motivation to
acquire a nuclear arsenal can provide proper proposals to halt the spread of nuclear weapons.
The reasoning for behind states acquiring military nuclear capability can vary, but one argument
that is prominent among rational theorists of International Relations and the Realist School of
International Relations in particular is that states tend to develop nuclear weapons if they are
facing an external security challenge and a nuclear deterrent would enhance their security. With
the words of professor John M. Deutch:
22
President Bush, West Point, New York, 01.06.2002, in: The National Security Strategy of the United States of
America, September 2002, p 17, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/2002/nss.pdf>, (14.05.08).
23
Regarding the capability based threat assessment, it is necessary to know that it is one thing to develop a
nuclear device and to conduct a successful test, but it constitutes a serious technical challenge to build a nuclear
device in size and weight that could be delivered by ballistic missiles.
24
Policy Department External Policies Study: Missile Defence and European Security, The European
Parliament, November 2007, p 39,
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/activities/expert/eStudies/download.do?file=18359#search=%20missile%20def
ence%20>, (14.05.08).
Oliver Schmidt: Dissertation – MA International Relations – Lancaster University
10
The fundamental motivation to seek a weapon is the perception that national security will be
improved.25
This argument is challenged, or extended by Scott D. Sagan26, who argues in his article Why do
States build Nuclear Weapons27, that in addition to the security aspect two other factors have to be
considered in order to explain a state’s motivation to acquire nuclear weapons. Sagan claims that
next to security aspects, domestic and prestigious or norms factors can trigger military nuclear
proliferation and restrain. Focusing merely on security issues to explain the proliferation of
nuclear weapons cannot elucidate all cases. The example of France’s decision to develop nuclear
weapons will demonstrate the importance of Sagan’s multifaceted approach. The decision of
France to build nuclear weapons, even though France already has joined the North Atlantic
Treaty Organisation (NATO), which includes extended security guarantees by the United States
for the western states of Europe. It could be argued that after the Suez Crisis in 1956, France
decided to develop an independent nuclear arsenal because of reasonable doubt towards US
security guarantees. However, France decision to develop nuclear weapons was not based entirely
on security aspects, because France’s program was initiated prior to the Suez Crisis, in December
1954.28 If the reason for France’s nuclear program was based on its doubts towards the US
‘nuclear umbrella’, why did not other European states followed France’s example? Scott Sagan
offers a strong explanation, which highlights the importance of prestigious aspects in France’s
calculation, the raison d'être is to re-establish France as a world great power.
29
With Sagan’s
words:
France emerged from World War II in an unusual position: it was a liberated victor whose military
capabilities and international standing were not at all comparable to the power and status it had
before the war. It should therefore not be surprising that the government of both the Fourth and the
Fifth Republic vigorously explored alternative means to return France to his historical great power
status.30
25
John Deutch: The Nuclear Threat, in: Foreign Affairs, Vol. 71, No. 41, Fall 1992, pp. 124 – 125.
Scott D. Sagan is Associate Professor of Political Science and a faculty associate of the Center for
International Security and Arms Control at Stanford University. He functions as advisor for the US Congress
Commission of Strategic Posture and the US National Intelligence Council.
27
Scott D. Sagan: Why do States Build Nuclear Weapons – Three Models in Search of a Bomb, in: International
Security, Vol. 21, No. 3, Winter 1996/1997, pp. 54 – 86.
28
Joseph Cirincione: Bomb Scare – The History of Nuclear Weapons, Columbia University Press, New York,
2007, pp. 59 – 61.
29
Scott D. Sagan: Why do States Build Nuclear Weapons – Three Models in Search of a Bomb, in: International
Security, Vol. 21, No. 3, Winter 1996/1997, pp. 76 – 80.
30
Scott D. Sagan: Why do States Build Nuclear Weapons – Three Models in Search of a Bomb, in: International
Security, Vol. 21, No. 3, Winter 1996/1997, p. 78.
26
Oliver Schmidt: Dissertation – MA International Relations – Lancaster University
11
Sagan’s explanation seems to provide a viable approach especially considering the Iranian case,
which cannot be understood by mono-causal explanations, addressing only an increased Iranian
need for security. As the latest US National Intelligence Estimate assesses, Iran’s motivation to
develop nuclear weapons might be a mixture of national security, prestige, and regional
influence.31 Considering these aspects, it is seems to be the logical consequence to use Sagan’s
approach to understand and analyse Iran’s nuclear intentions, combining his three strong
explanatory approaches, rather then only focusing on one.
Professor Scott Sagan is an expert on the subject of the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction, he wrote several fundamental articles on nuclear safety and security and the famous
debate with Kenneth N. Waltz The Spread of Nuclear Weapons – A Debate Renewed.
This dissertation aims to test Sagan’s theory by testing it against the case study of Iran, answering
the question: Does Iran, according to Sagan, want to build a military nuclear capability?
After applying Sagan’s framework to the case, it will be interesting to see whether the theory
provides enough coverage to explain and predict Iran’s policy without gaps or contradictions. In
order to execute this test the work will introduce Sagan’s theoretical argument and derive
verifiable hypotheses from Sagan’s approach. Before the next step a technical evaluation of Iran’s
nuclear and missile program will provide an elaborated common base of knowledge regarding
Iran’s capabilities. In the next step it is necessary to compare his claims with the case of Iran in
detail, splitting Sagan’s three explanatory approaches in three levels of analysis, the international,
the regional, and the domestic level. Finally, it is necessary to conclude whether, according to
Sagan, Iran wants to build nuclear weapons and evaluate if Sagan’s theory is helpful to assess the
Iranian case. This part of the work is also where the usefulness of Sagan’s work in regards to the
case study of Iran will be evaluated. In the end, this work will try to provide an insight in the
essential problems of nuclear non-proliferation caused by the case of Iran and to provide an
answer to the question: Does Iran pose a threat?
31
US National Intelligence Council: National Intelligence Estimate - Iran: Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities,
November 2007, [see: Key Judgements – E.], <http://www.dni.gov/press_releases/20071203_release.pdf>,
(14.05.08).
2. Scott Sagan and “Why do States Build Nuclear
Weapons?”
The central purpose of this article is to challenge the conventional wisdom about nuclear proliferation.
I argue that the consensus view, focusing on national security considerations as the cause of
proliferation, is dangerously inadequate because nuclear weapons programs also serve other, more
parochial and less obvious objectives. Nuclear weapons, like other weapons, are more than a tool of
national security; they are political objects of considerable importance in domestic debates and
internal bureaucratic struggles and can also serve as international normative symbols of modernity
and identity. 32
The quote above indicates Sagan’s three motives for states to develop a military nuclear
capability. Traditionally, the argument of security is put forward to explain a state’s motives to
build nuclear weapons. Sagan offers two additional explanations: He refers to as “the domestic
politics model “and “the norms model.33 Sagan claims that a long tradition in scholarship explains
cases of nuclear weapon proliferation by security interests only. This explanation fits into certain
schools of International Relations as an academic discipline but oversimplifies reality and ignores
possible additional explanatory factors. The following chapter will provide an overview of
Sagan’s three models to explain nuclear proliferation. This chapter will also formulate revised
hypotheses, by applying Sagan’s theory to the case of Iran in order to be able to test the validity
of the theory.
2.1
The Security Model
In order to understand Scott Sagan’s security model of proliferation it is important to clarify the
theoretical background of his claims. Therefore, this work will briefly illustrate the basic
principles of Neo-Realism (also known as Structural Realism) as a school of International
Relations and the basic concepts of deterrence in an application of Neo-Realism regarding the
use of nuclear weapons.
32
Scott D. Sagan: Why do States Build Nuclear Weapons – Three Models in Search of a Bomb, in: International
Security, Vol. 21, No. 3, Winter 1996/1997, p. 55.
33
Scott D. Sagan: Why do States Build Nuclear Weapons – Three Models in Search of a Bomb, in: International
Security, Vol. 21, No. 3, Winter 1996/1997, p. 55.
Oliver Schmidt: Dissertation – MA International Relations – Lancaster University
13
2.1.1 Basic Concepts of Neo-Realism
To understand the broader implications of nuclear weapons in the international system, it is
necessary to reveal the basic assumptions of Structural-Realism as a theory of International
Relations.34 One basic postulate of Neo-Realism is that the international system is anarchic,
which means that there is no international institution with a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence35,
which could sanction state behaviour.36 Therefore the international system could be compared
with the state of nature in Thomas Hobbes Leviathan.
Among states, the state of nature is the state of war.37
Within this state of nature all states are concerned with survival. To maximize their security in
order to survive, states act rationally. This leads to the assumption that the international system is
a self-help system in which states constantly compete for security. In their efforts to secure their
survival states are always uncertain about the intentions of other actors and this means that
prospects for cooperation are low and states constantly have to act under the logic of the Security
Dilemma.38 Because states can never be certain about the intentions of other states, they try to
maximize their security. This means that they try to be self-sustaining and powerful, measured in
economic and military terms. Weak states are more likely to be involved in armed conflicts than a
relatively powerful state. The reason for this is that a powerful state is able to deter any possible
aggression by signalising that the expenses of an aggression would exceed the benefits.39
Two different opinions exist on the question of how to maintain a relatively powerful state
among competitors. One option is constantly trying to increase one’s relative power with the aim
of achieving regional or even world hegemony.40 The other option is keeping the balance of
power by trying to keep the status quo; in this case states have to be very sensitive for relative
gains.41
34
I will mainly focus on the work of Kenneth N. Waltz and John J. Mearsheimer.
The term is used in reference to Max Weber: Politics as a Vocation (Politik als Beruf).
36
John J. Mearsheimer: The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, W.W. Norton & Company, New York, 2001, p
30.
37
Kenneth N.Waltz: Theory of International Politics, McGraw-Hill Higher Education, Mass., 1979, p 102.
38
John J. Mearsheimer, in: Tim Dunne/ Milja Kurki/ Steve Smith (Editor): International Relations Theory Discipline and Diversity, New York, Oxford University Press, 2007, p 74 – 75
39
The amount of literature concerned with deterrence is immense. Therefore I will not follow that discussion in
detail, but show important aspects whenever necessary.
40
John J. Mearsheimer, in: Tim Dunne/ Milja Kurki/ Steve Smith (Editor): International Relations Theory Discipline and Diversity, New York, Oxford University Press, 2007, p 74 – 75.
41
John J. Mearsheimer, in: Tim Dunne/ Milja Kurki/ Steve Smith (Editor): International Relations Theory Discipline and Diversity, New York, Oxford University Press, 2007, p 74 – 75.
35
Oliver Schmidt: Dissertation – MA International Relations – Lancaster University
14
The theory of Structural Realism gives clear expectations about state intentions and state
behaviour. Now, it is time to highlight the impact of nuclear weapons and its specific
implications for states in the international system.
2.1.2 The Concept of Deterrence
In the early days after the invention of the nuclear bomb, it was seen as a tactical weapon of
increased firepower that leads to superiority on the battlefield. Later, the idea of nuclear weapons
as tactical weapons became less important but remained and was addressed in so called limited
wars scenarios.42 However, over time nuclear weapons were regarded less as tool for fighting
wars than as a political tool.
As a result, in these areas the role of armed forces, and in particular nuclear forces, must not be
considered from the point of view of their possible employment in war, as has been our habit, but
from that of the prevention of war, in other words of deterrence.43
Until the end of the Cold War, the concept of deterrence was the leading military strategy to
secure peace between the Soviet Union and the USA. Along with other political approaches and
reforms of military doctrines based on the logic of deterrence, the Cold War ended without a
major war, including nuclear exchanges. To sum that up deterrence can be defined as,
Influencing the action of another party in order to restrain them from doing something unacceptable
by presenting them with the prospect that you will respond with something equally unacceptable. In
short using threats and, if necessary, punishment to change another’s behavior.44
But, there are several preconditions, to make deterrence work.
Deterrence requires the ability to inflict unacceptable damage on another country.45
42
Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, 2nd Edition, 1989, London, pp 68 – 69 and 106 110.
43
Andre Beaufre, in: Lawrence Freedman (Editor): War, 1994, Oxford University Press, Oxford, New York, p
238.
44
Klaus-Dieter Schwarz: The Future of Deterrence, German Institute for International and Security Affairs,
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP), SWP Research Paper, June 2005, p 5. <http://www.swpberlin.org/en/common/get_document.php?asset_id=2356> (19.07.2008).
45
Kenneth N. Waltz, in: Sagan, Scott D./ Waltz, Kenneth N.: The Spread of Nuclear Weapons – A Debate
Renewed, W.W. Norton & Company, New York, London, 2nd Edition, 2003, p 21.
Oliver Schmidt: Dissertation – MA International Relations – Lancaster University
15
First, it is necessary to have the capabilities to retaliate; secondly, the threat to use them must be
credible.46 That means that, within the logic of deterrence, it is necessary to possess a survivable
second-strike capability which offers the option to retaliate after a first strike that aims to
disarm.47 Furthermore, the command and control structure must be able function after a first
strike, too.48
To explain the difference between deterrence and coercion, Klaus-Dieter Schwarz refers to
Thomas Schelling, who defines ‘coercion’ or coercive diplomacy as a way to force someone to do
something, in contrast to deterrence, which aims to keep someone from doing something.49 In
order to specify the concept of deterrence in greater depth, it is possible to distinguish several
different types of deterrence. Klaus-Dieter Schwarz offers three groups as ideal types of
deterrence. He differentiates immediate and general deterrence as one pair, punishment and
denial, and central and extended deterrence.50 Schwarz refers to immediate deterrence as a threat
to cause harm in an ongoing conflict. Therefore, it is necessary for the addressee to be explicitly
aware of the threat and is aware of the possible significant impact on him. In contrast to
immediate deterrence, Klaus-Dieter Schwarz explains the term ‘general deterrence’ as a latent
threat, which needs not to be explicit. Its effect should be to deter possible rivals from even
trying to challenge another state. The credibility is purely based on military capabilities. Schwarz
describes the punishment and denial strategies as options to strike against civilian structures
(punishment), which was the basic concept of the ‘Massive Retaliation’-Strategy51 during the Cold
War. The denial strategy, in contrast, aims to strike against military targets to paralyse the
opponent’s capabilities and military options. The concept of central deterrence describes the idea
that deterrence works when a state’s ‘vital interests’ are threatened. The important aspect is that it
is possible to doubt the credibility of a retaliatory response when only minor interests are at stake.
That is exactly the problem with the concept of extended deterrence, which means that a country
uses its capabilities to deter possible rivals from launching any aggression against other countries
46
Joseph Nye: Understanding International Conflicts – An Introduction to Theory and History, 6th Edition,
Pearson/ Longman, New York, San Francisco, Boston, London, et al., 2007, p. 144.
47
James Writz in: Alan Collins (Editor): Contemporary Security Studies, Oxford University Press, Oxford, New
York, 2007, p. 276.
48
Kenneth N. Waltz, in: , Scott D. Sagan/ Kenneth N. Waltz: The Spread of Nuclear Weapons – A Debate
Renewed, W.W. Norton & Company, New York, London, 2nd Edition, 2003, p 20.
49
Klaus-Dieter Schwarz: The Future of Deterrence, German Institute for International and Security Affairs,
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP), SWP Research Paper, June 2005, p 10, <http://www.swpberlin.org/en/common/get_document.php?asset_id=2356> (19.07.2008).
50
Klaus-Dieter Schwarz: The Future of Deterrence, German Institute for International and Security Affairs,
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP), SWP Research Paper, June 2005, pp 9 – 10. <http://www.swpberlin.org/en/common/get_document.php?asset_id=2356> (19.07.2008).
51
US NSC 162/2 Basic National Security Policy, 30. October 1953,
<http://www.jan.vandercrabben.name/nsc/index.php>, (19.07.2008).
Oliver Schmidt: Dissertation – MA International Relations – Lancaster University
16
or spheres of interest in other parts of the world. The best example is the US security guarantee
for Western Europe in accordance with Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty52, which was
doubted repeatedly by the European allies during the Cold War and eventually led to the shift in
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation’s (NATO) military doctrines from ‘massive retaliation’ (MC
14/2)53 to ‘flexible response’ (MC 14/3)54.
Following the logic of deterrence, it is possible to conclude that the possession of nuclear
weapons could enhance the security of a state by enhancing its deterrence capability. Using the
words of Kenneth N. Waltz:
Peace has become the privilege of states having nuclear weapons, while wars have been fought mainly
by those who lack them.55
And:
The likelihood of war decreases as deterrent and defensive capabilities increase. Nuclear weapons
make wars hard to start. […] Because they do, the gradual spread of nuclear weapons is more to be
welcomed.56
2.1.3 The Security Model
Sagan explains that according to the security model states, which all exist in a self-help system,
must ensure their survival and protect their sovereignty and interests. The author then
differentiates between strong states that are able to pursue a credible deterrent force on its own
and weak states which seek an alliance and hope to benefit from extended deterrence
guarantees.57 This model, as an explanation for nuclear weapon proliferation, leads to an
international system that forces states to a policy of balance of power and status quo, while the
security dilemma heightens the risk of arms races and conflicts.
52
Washington D.C., 4 April 1949, < http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/treaty.htm> , (19.07.2008).
North Atlantic Military Committee MC 14/2, <http://www.nato.int/docu/stratdoc/eng/a570523a.pdf >,
(19.07.2008).
54
North Atlantic Military Committee MC 14/ 3, <http://www.nato.int/docu/stratdoc/eng/a680116a.pdf >,
(19.07.2008).
55
Kenneth N. Waltz, in: Scott D. Sagan/ Kenneth N. Waltz: The Spread of Nuclear Weapons – A Debate
Renewed, W.W. Norton & Company, New York, London, 2nd Edition, 2003, p. 41.
56
Kenneth N. Waltz, in: , Scott D. Sagan/ Kenneth N. Waltz: The Spread of Nuclear Weapons – A Debate
Renewed, W.W. Norton & Company, New York, London, 2nd Edition, 2003, p 45.
57
Scott D. Sagan: Why do States Build Nuclear Weapons – Three Models in Search of a Bomb, in: International
Security, Vol. 21, No. 3, Winter 1996/1997, p. 57.
53
Oliver Schmidt: Dissertation – MA International Relations – Lancaster University
17
Whenever a new state is seen to be developing nuclear weapons, it is likely that its rivals will consider
preventive war under this ‘better now than later’ logic.58
According to the zero-sum logic, the increase of security for one state will reduce the security of
another in its perception. According to John Herz, this will set the security dilemma in place,
which bears the great danger of war.59 The uncertainty about the intentions of other states makes
cooperation to overcome the dilemma very unlikely.60 This leads to the assumption that the
emergence of new nuclear powers additional to the existing ones could lead to a dangerous arms
race, which increases the likelihood of war. According to Structural Realism the logic of the state
actor within the self-help system cannot guarantee the decline of arms races. The incentive to
increase its own security at the cost of the security of others will remain even among nucleararmed states.
Sagan considers the option for states to overcome the collective action problem and refers to the
NPT as an international institution that provides the transparency, and control which are needed
to reduce the incentives to acquire a nuclear deterrent.61 But according to Mancur Olson, there
remains the incentive to gain additional benefit by being the only one who defects and not
comply with the treaty obligations62.
Each state would prefer to become the only nuclear weapons power in its region, but since that is an
unlikely outcome if it develops a nuclear arsenal, it is willing to refrain from proliferation, if and only
if, its neighbours remain non-nuclear.63
Additionally, Sagan names to two strong structural incentives for nuclear weapons proliferation.
First, he claims that, since the end of the Cold War the world has become more uncertain and
therefore security guarantees have become less credible.64 Second, Sagan cites George Shultz with
the words:
58
Scott D. Sagen, in: Scott D. Sagen/ Kenneth N.Waltz: The Spread of Nuclear Weapons – A Debate Renewed,
W.W. Norton & Company, New York, London, 2nd Edition, 2003, p 61.
59
John H. Herz: International politics in the atomic age, Columbia University Press, New York, 1965.
60
John J. Mearsheimer: The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, W.W. Norton & Company, 2001, p. 53.
61
For an explanation how international institutions can reduce the problems of collective action see:
Robert O. Keohane: After Hegemony – Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy, Princeton
University Press, Princeton, 1984.
62
Mancur Olson: The Logic of Collective Action – Public Goods & Theory of Groups, Harvard University Press,
Cambridge, 1965.
63
Scott D. Sagan: Why do States Build Nuclear Weapons – Three Models in Search of a Bomb, in: International
Security, Vol. 21, No. 3, Winter 1996/1997, p. 62.
64
Scott D. Sagan: Why do States Build Nuclear Weapons – Three Models in Search of a Bomb, in: International
Security, Vol. 21, No. 3, Winter 1996/1997, p. 62.
Oliver Schmidt: Dissertation – MA International Relations – Lancaster University
18
Proliferation begets proliferation.65,
referring to the problem that states have an increased incentive to develop nuclear weapons when
another state in region has done so before.66 Kenneth N. Waltz has described this with the
words:
Nuclear states have tended to come in hostile pairs.67.
Finally, it is important to consider that the incentive to build a nuclear weapon decreases when a
threat or security challenge decreases. That is Sagan’s way of explaining nuclear restraint with
Structural Realism.68
In short, from a realist’s perspective, nuclear restraint is caused by the absence of the fundamental
military threats that produce positive proliferation decisions.69
2.2
The Domestic Politics Models
Scott Sagan introduces three main domestic actors in connection with a nation’s decision to go
nuclear: first, the nuclear energy establishment of a country, including scientific institutions and
companies; second, the military as domestic bureaucratic actor; and third politicians who whish
to use the topic of nuclear weapons for their political party or their personal standing regarding
public opinion and public support.70 According to Sagan, in order to understand cases of nuclear
proliferation or nuclear restraint, it is very important to pay attention to the domestic debate. The
aspect of emerging or diminishing threats can be used in the internal debate to create a window
of opportunity in favour of or against nuclear weapons.71 This leads Sagan to argue that decisions
regarding nuclear armament or disarmament are not only made in accordance with emerging or
65
George Shultz, cited in: Scott D. Sagan: Why do States Build Nuclear Weapons – Three Models in Search of a
Bomb, in: International Security, Vol. 21, No. 3, Winter 1996/1997, p. 57.
66
Scott D. Sagan: Why do States Build Nuclear Weapons – Three Models in Search of a Bomb, in: International
Security, Vol. 21, No. 3, Winter 1996/1997, p. 62.
67
Kenneth N. Waltz, in: Scott D. Sagan/ Kenneth N. Waltz: The Spread of Nuclear Weapons – A Debate
Renewed, W.W. Norton & Company, New York, London, 2nd Edition, 2003, p. 41.
68
Scott D. Sagan: Why do States Build Nuclear Weapons – Three Models in Search of a Bomb, in: International
Security, Vol. 21, No. 3, Winter 1996/1997, p. 61.
69
Scott D. Sagan: Why do States Build Nuclear Weapons – Three Models in Search of a Bomb, in: International
Security, Vol. 21, No. 3, Winter 1996/1997, p. 61.
70
Scott D. Sagan: Why do States Build Nuclear Weapons – Three Models in Search of a Bomb, in: International
Security, Vol. 21, No. 3, Winter 1996/1997, pp. 63 – 64.
71
Scott D. Sagan: Why do States Build Nuclear Weapons – Three Models in Search of a Bomb, in: International
Security, Vol. 21, No. 3, Winter 1996/1997, p. 65.
Oliver Schmidt: Dissertation – MA International Relations – Lancaster University
19
diminishing threats but also for reasons of internal political changes and struggles.72 Sagan also
stresses the importance of non-nuclear sources of prestige for domestic actors in order to secure
a future for nuclear non-proliferation. The argument is simple: Sagan says that pro-nuclear
weapons actors gain additional influence if nuclear weapons represents a positive symbol in the
domestic debate. An example of his, as already mentioned in the introduction, is that the NPT
nuclear weapon states are reluctant to effectively disarm, that the US refuse to ratify the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)73, and that they still relay on nuclear first-use doctrines.
Therefore, the non-nuclear weapon states have to ask themselves why they should comply with
the treaty obligations if states still relay heavily on nuclear weapons. This is a simplified but
effective argument; however, it needs to be mentioned that the purpose of the NPT is subject of
ongoing discussions. While the ‘western’ states, including the nuclear states underline the nonproliferation aspect of the treaty, some groups of states demand more commitment to
disarmament and civil cooperation.74
But to summarise Sagan’s main arguments of the Domestic Politics Model, in his own words:
[…], nuclear weapons programs are not obvious or inevitable solutions to international security
problems; instead, nuclear weapons programs are solutions looking for a problem to which to attach
themselves so as to justify their existence.75
Security threats are therefore not the central cause of weapons decisions according to this model: they
are merely windows of opportunity through which parochial interests can jump.76
72
Scott D. Sagan: Why do States Build Nuclear Weapons – Three Models in Search of a Bomb, in: International
Security, Vol. 21, No. 3, Winter 1996/1997, p. 69.
73
UN Resolution 50/245: http://disarmament.un.org/wmd/ctbt/res%2050%20245.htm, (26.06.2008);
The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty: http://disarmament.un.org/wmd/ctbt/A-50-1027-CTBT-English.pdf,
(26.06.2008).
74
Scott D. Sagan: Why do States Build Nuclear Weapons – Three Models in Search of a Bomb, in: International
Security, Vol. 21, No. 3, Winter 1996/1997, p. 73.
And:
Harald Müller: A Treaty in troubled Waters – Reflections on the Failed NPT Review Conference, in: The
International Spectator, 3/2005, pp. 34 – 44.
75
Scott D. Sagan: Why do States Build Nuclear Weapons – Three Models in Search of a Bomb, in: International
Security, Vol. 21, No. 3, Winter 1996/1997, p. 65.
76
Scott D. Sagan: Why do States Build Nuclear Weapons – Three Models in Search of a Bomb, in: International
Security, Vol. 21, No. 3, Winter 1996/1997, p. 65.
Oliver Schmidt: Dissertation – MA International Relations – Lancaster University
2.3
20
The Norms Model
Sagan’s Norms Model focuses on the functions nuclear weapons serve besides pure security
reasons. He uses the word ‘norms’ with respect to Constructivism as a school of International
Relations.77 Karsten Frey discusses the role of norms in nuclear policy making, referring to Scott
Sagan’s work. Frey describes that most countries oppose the development of nuclear weapons
because of a negative attitude towards nuclear weapons, which is referred to as the ‘nuclear
taboo’.78 This normative predisposition can vary among different countries or change over time,
affecting a country’s nuclear policy. The opposite of the ‘nuclear taboo’ is the ‘nuclear myth’,
which describes the attachment of symbolic meanings to a states identity and desired
international prestige.79
Scott Sagan points out that many scholars refer to a vague linkage between pro-nuclear decisions
and the enhancement of international prestige, defined as international influence and security. 80
In contrast, Sagan identifies nuclear weapons as symbols of national and international politics,
while norms can affect a state’s decision-making. According to Sagan pro- or anti- nuclear
weapon decisions are:
77
Scott Sagan refers for example to:
Martha Finnemore: Norms, Culture, and World Politics – Insights from Sociology’s Institutionalism, in:
International Organization, Vol. 50, No. 2, (Spring 2006), pp. 325 – 348.
And:
Robert Jervis: The Meaning of Nuclear Revolution, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, New York, 1989, pp.174 –
225.
See also:
Tim Dunne/ Milja Kurki/ Steve Smith (Editor): International Relations Theories – Discipline and Diversity,
Oxford University Press, New York, 2007, chapter six and chapter nine.
For the term ‘norms’ in the context of nuclear weapons decisions see:
Nina Tannenwald: Stigmatizing the Bomb – Origins of the Nuclear Taboo, in: International Security, Vol. 29,
No. 4, 2005, p. 8.
Also:
Karsten Frey: Of Nuclear Myths and Nuclear Taboos, in: Peace Review – A Journal of Social Justice, Vol. 18,
pp. 341 – 347.
78
Karsten Frey: Nuclear Weapons as Symbols – The Role of Norms in Nuclear Policy Making, The Institute
Barcelona d’Estudies Internationales (IBEI) Working Paper, October 2006.
See also:
Karsten Frey: Of Nuclear Myths and Nuclear Taboos, in: Peace Review: A Journal of Social Justice, Vol. 18,
No. 3, pp. 341–347.
79
Karsten Frey: Nuclear Weapons as Symbols – The Role of Norms in Nuclear Policy Making, The Institute
Barcelona d’Estudies Internationales (IBEI) Working Paper, October 2006.
80
Scott D. Sagan: Why do States Build Nuclear Weapons – Three Models in Search of a Bomb, in: International
Security, Vol. 21, No. 3, Winter 1996/1997, p. 76.
Oliver Schmidt: Dissertation – MA International Relations – Lancaster University
21
[…] shaping and reflecting a state’s identity.81
It is possible that a pro-nuclear decision can be the prestigious symbol for a state to belong to the
highly developed states.82 Sagan refers here to the example of the 1960s, where it was prestigious
and legitimate to conduct nuclear tests.83
From the sociological perspective, military organizations and their weapons can therefore be
envisioned as serving functions similar to those of flags, airlines, and Olympic teams: they are part of
what modern states believe they have to possess to be a legitimate, modern state.84
The acceptance of the development of nuclear weapons depends on norms and international
norms can change and states might tend to decide accordingly to new established norms. The
NPT is good example to show the effect of changing norms concerning the prestige of
possessing nuclear weapons. Since the treaty entered into force, several cases have occurred
where states refrain to build nuclear weapons or disarm their arsenal. States like the Ukraine that
handed back its nuclear arsenal after the collapse of the Soviet Union decided that they would
benefit from the decision not to possess atomic weapons. The incentives can vary but Sagan
indicates that the accepted norms of that time have not linked the possession of nuclear weapons
to the status of a modern state.85 Additionally, not only economic incentives but also the fear of
becoming an outlaw, or worse, a ‘rouge state’ in the international system have influenced such
decisions.86 Sagan concludes that compliance with the NPT strengthens the norm of nonproliferation and is de-legitimises the possession of nuclear weapons.87
81
Scott D. Sagan: Why do States Build Nuclear Weapons – Three Models in Search of a Bomb, in: International
Security, Vol. 21, No. 3, Winter 1996/1997, p. 73.
82
Scott D. Sagan: Why do States Build Nuclear Weapons – Three Models in Search of a Bomb, in: International
Security, Vol. 21, No. 3, Winter 1996/1997, pp. 74 – 75.
83
Scott D. Sagan: Why do States Build Nuclear Weapons – Three Models in Search of a Bomb, in: International
Security, Vol. 21, No. 3, Winter 1996/1997, p. 76.
84
Scott D. Sagan: Why do States Build Nuclear Weapons – Three Models in Search of a Bomb, in: International
Security, Vol. 21, No. 3, Winter 1996/1997, p. 74.
85
Scott D. Sagan: Why do States Build Nuclear Weapons – Three Models in Search of a Bomb, in: International
Security, Vol. 21, No. 3, Winter 1996/1997, p. 76.
86
Scott D. Sagan: Why do States Build Nuclear Weapons – Three Models in Search of a Bomb, in: International
Security, Vol. 21, No. 3, Winter 1996/1997, p. 81.
87
Scott D. Sagan: Why do States Build Nuclear Weapons – Three Models in Search of a Bomb, in: International
Security, Vol. 21, No. 3, Winter 1996/1997, pp. 76, 83 – 84.
Oliver Schmidt: Dissertation – MA International Relations – Lancaster University
2.4
22
Applying the Hypotheses to the Case of Iran
In this paragraph, hypotheses will be derived from Sagan’s three models in order to be able to
apply his theory to the case in a way that allows a testing of the strength of the approach.
Therefore, this chapter will sum up each ‘bundle’ of motives for anti- or pro-nuclear decisions
and the predicted outcome. After that, the approach will be applied to the case of Iran by
formulating a hypothesis regarding the circumstances under which Iran would likely pursues a
nuclear weapon development or refuse to do so.
2.4.1 The Security Model
[…] States build nuclear weapons to increase national security against foreign threats, especially
nuclear threats.88
According to the security model a state decide to develop nuclear weapons or seek security
guarantees when it faces a severe security threat that could possibly be reduced by central or
extended deterrence.89 This means for the case of Iran that if Iran faces a security threat that
endangers its sovereignty and national interest, the country could decide to develop an
independent nuclear weapons capability to enhance its security or search for alliances which
provides security guarantees. Conversely, that means that if Iran is not or no longer facing an
external threat which challenges its sovereignty and national interest, the country would be likely
to refrain from acquiring nuclear weapons.
2.4.2 The domestic politics model
The domestic politics model, […] envisions nuclear weapons as political tools used to advance
parochial domestic and bureaucratic interests.90
Sagan claims that decisions about nuclear weapons always serve the interests of some domestic
actors and specifically names the military, scientific and business actors as well as politicians.91
88
Scott D. Sagan: Why do States Build Nuclear Weapons – Three Models in Search of a Bomb, in: International
Security, Vol. 21, No. 3, Winter 1996/1997, p. 55.
89
Scott D. Sagan: Why do States Build Nuclear Weapons – Three Models in Search of a Bomb, in: International
Security, Vol. 21, No. 3, Winter 1996/1997, p. 57.
90
Scott D. Sagan: Why do States Build Nuclear Weapons – Three Models in Search of a Bomb, in: International
Security, Vol. 21, No. 3, Winter 1996/1997, p. 55.
Oliver Schmidt: Dissertation – MA International Relations – Lancaster University
23
For the case of Iran, this means that Iran would be likely to decide in favour of nuclear weapons
procurement if strong interest groups can successfully influence the decision-making process.
Sagan’s model also means that politicians currently in power could use a pro-nuclear decision to
enhance their political standing if the public favours a pro-nuclear decision. By the same token,
an anti-nuclear decision could be made in Iran if a strong anti-nuclear lobby can influence the
decision-making process or a decision in favour of nuclear weapons would harm politicians’
standing and public support.
2.4.3 The Norms Model
[…] Nuclear weapons decisions are made because weapons acquisition, or restrain in weapons development,
provides an important normative symbol of a state’s modernity and identity.92
According to Scott Sagan, a state would consider developing nuclear weapons if this enhances its
international standing and provides a symbol for the country’s modernity and identity. If in
contrast, the acquisition of nuclear weapons represents a negative symbol, internationally or
domestically, a state would be likely to decide not to go nuclear. For the case of Iran, this means
that Iran is likely to decide in favour of nuclear weapons, if the acquisition is seen as a symbol for
Iran’s modernity and therefore the country’s perceived identity. Conversely, this means that Iran
would not go nuclear if the atomic bomb is not seen to represent a symbol for the state’s identity
and modernity.
2.4.4 Thesis
Now, it is possible to formulate the thesis that Sagan’s three models provide a helpful tool to
assess the nuclear intentions of the Islamic Republic of Iran. But, it is difficult to use the three
models to predict Iran’s nuclear intentions, and not to explain them in retrospect. The three
given models seem to provide a good analytical framework but it is difficult to avoid
interferences of the norm-model and the domestic-model. Nevertheless, it is possible to claim
that it would be going too far to consider Iran, currently, or in short-term future, a threat for US
91
Scott D. Sagan: Why do States Build Nuclear Weapons – Three Models in Search of a Bomb, in: International
Security, Vol. 21, No. 3, Winter 1996/1997, pp. 63 – 64.
92
Scott D. Sagan: Why do States Build Nuclear Weapons – Three Models in Search of a Bomb, in: International
Security, Vol. 21, No. 3, Winter 1996/1997, p. 55.
Oliver Schmidt: Dissertation – MA International Relations – Lancaster University
24
and European security and interests. At the same time, Iran’s case does provide plenty of reasons
for concern, especially regarding the future of nuclear non-proliferation and regional security.
3. Testing Sagan – Does Iran want to build nuclear
weapons?
The prior chapter introduced Sagan’s theory and offered hypotheses to analyse the case of Iran
and test the theory. This chapter provides the synthesis of Sagan’s theoretical framework with the
case study of Iran’s nuclear program and nuclear intentions. In order to do so it is necessary to
apply each of the three models to the three levels of analysis. According to Christopher Pang it is
necessary to analyse the case on the international, regional, and domestic level in order to be able
to understand relevant aspects regarding Iran’s nuclear program and nuclear intentions.93 The
following chapter is divided into three sections: ‘the security model’, ‘the domestic politics model’
and ‘the norms model’.94 Within each section, international, regional, and domestic level factors
will be examined with regard to the respective models in order to find out their explanatory
relevance and strength for the case of Iran. Before analysing Iran’s nuclear intentions, however, it
is necessary to assess Iran’s nuclear, and relevant military capabilities. Only the combination of
capability and intensions allows an assessment as to whether Iran constitutes a threat.95
Furthermore, a capability assessment is necessary because, although Iran’s military and nuclear
capabilities are repeatedly discussed, the results show a huge variety of estimations. Therefore,
the first part of the chapter will provide an assessment of Iran’s nuclear, ballistic and cruise
missile programs before illustrating international concerns and reactions.
3.1
Assessing Iran’s nuclear capabilities
Historically, Iran obtained the first nuclear assistance for a civil nuclear program from the US
under the Atoms for Peace Program96 in the late 1960s and signed in return the NPT in 1968.97
Iran’s interest and investment in nuclear energy increased after the oil crisis of 1973. Under the
93
Interview with Dr. Christopher Pang, Head of the Research Unit Middle East at the Royal United Service
Institute for Defence and Security Studies (RUSI), conducted on the 24.04.08.
94
Scott D. Sagan: Why do States Build Nuclear Weapons – Three Models in Search of a Bomb, in: International
Security, Vol. 21, No. 3, Winter 1996/1997, p. 55.
95
Threat is here defined and used as capability and intend, see also for example:
“Threat: The capabilities, intentions, and actions of actual or potential enemies to prevent or interfere with the
successful fulfilment of national security interests or objectives.”
In: Wolfram F. Hanrieder/ Larry V. Buel: Words and Arms – A Dictionary of Security and Defence Terms,
Westview Press/ Boulder 1979, p.128.
96
Address by Mr. Dwight D. Eisenhower, President of the United States of America, to the 470th Plenary
Meeting of the United Nations General Assembly, Tuesday, 8 December 1953,
http://www.iaea.org/About/history_speech.html, (28.05.2008).
97
The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) – IISS Dossier: Iran’s Strategic Weapons Programmes
– a net assessment, Routledge Taylor and Francis Group, Abingdon, New York, 2005, pp. 9 – 10.
Oliver Schmidt: Dissertation – MA International Relations – Lancaster University
26
Shah, the country signed contracts with US, German, and French companies between 1974 and
1977 on the construction and supply of nuclear power reactors.98 After the construction of a five
mega-watt (MW) light-water research reactor at the Tehran Nuclear Research Center (TNRC) in
1967, the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) engaged a German company in 1976 to
build two light water reactors with a capacity of 1.200 – 1.300MW per reactor near the city of
Bushehr.99 (See Appendix Maps 2 & 3) Iran has planned to gain a nuclear capacity that generates
23.000MW, produced by 22 reactors delivered by the US, Germany, and France.100 However,
India’s ‘peaceful nuclear explosion’101 on 14, May 1974 led to a shift in international nuclear nonproliferation efforts and consequently to restrictions regarding nuclear cooperation with Iran.
The US was then able to convince Germany and France not to deliver uranium enrichment and
nuclear reprocessing facilities to Iran prior to the events of 1979.102 With the Islamic Revolution
in Iran in 1979 the nuclear ambitions in Iran came to a halt because leading scientists left the
country in reaction to the revolution and the supreme leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini was
not interested in nuclear energy. Moreover, most Western companies stopped the cooperation,
mainly because of political efforts by US President Ronald Regan to impose an international
embargo on any nuclear cooperation with Iran.103 However, during 1983 and 1985 Iran
completed with French support a facility for uranium conversion and fuel fabrication at the
Esfahan Nuclear Technology Center (ENTC) (See Appendix Map 2) and bought key technology
designs for the enrichment process from the A.Q. Khan104 network in 1987.105 With the death of
98
Morton Bremer Mærli/ Sverre Lodgaard (Editor): Nuclear Proliferation and International Security,
Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, London, New York, 2007, p. 97.
99
The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) – IISS Dossier: Iran’s Strategic Weapons Programmes
– a net assessment, Routledge Taylor and Francis Group, Abingdon, New York, 2005, pp. 10 – 11.
Also:
Morton Bremer Mærli/ Sverre Lodgaard (Editor): Nuclear Proliferation and International Security, Routledge,
Taylor & Francis Group, London, New York, 2007, p. 96.
100
The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) – IISS Dossier: Iran’s Strategic Weapons Programmes
– a net assessment, Routledge Taylor and Francis Group, Abingdon, New York, 2005, p. 11.
101
The Federation of American Scientists: India – Nuclear Weapons,
http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/india/nuke/index.html, (30.05.08).
102
The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) – IISS Dossier: Iran’s Strategic Weapons Programmes
– a net assessment, Routledge Taylor and Francis Group, Abingdon, New York, 2005, p. 11.
103
The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) – IISS Dossier: Iran’s Strategic Weapons Programmes
– a net assessment, Routledge Taylor and Francis Group, Abingdon, New York, 2005, p. 12.
104
See for details about the A.Q. Khan network:
Bruno Gruselle: Proliferation Networks and Financing, Research and Documents – Fondation pour la Recherche
Stratégique, Paris 3, March 2007, pp. 8 – 15, http://www.frstrategie.org, (18.05.08).
Also:
Gordon Corera: Shopping for Bombs – Nuclear Proliferation, Global Insecurity and the Rise and Fall of the
A.Q. Khan Network, Hurst & Company, London, 2006.
And:
Oliver Schmidt: Dissertation – MA International Relations – Lancaster University
27
supreme leader Ayatollah Khomeini in 1989 Iran’s attitude towards the use of nuclear energy
changed again. Under the new supreme leader Ayatollah Sayyid Ali Khamenei and the
presidencies of Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani and Mohammed Khatami the country renewed its
nuclear ambiguous and resumed the acquisition of nuclear related technology.106 Under US
pressure, India, Argentina and Germany refused to become involved in nuclear cooperation with
Iran; instead China became a new supplier and provided the needed technology after several
China-Iran agreements between 1990 and 1992. China delivered small research reactors, essential
enrichment and fuel production equipment, and over one ton of natural uranium.107 The Chinese
engagement declined in 1997 when China ended its nuclear technology transfer to Iran because
of a US-China agreement.108 Additionally, Russia showed its willingness to assist Iranian nuclear
aims by signing an nuclear cooperation agreement in 1992, followed by the offer in 1995 to
complete the Bushehr nuclear power plant, which had not been completed by Iran’s German
contractors. In an additional secret protocol to the Bushehr contract, Russia offered to deliver
large research reactors and a complete civilian fuel cycle, consisting of a fuel fabrication, and
enrichment facility.109 Again, after US complaints by US President Clinton to Russia’s President
Boris Yeltsin, Russia cancelled the fuel cycle assistance to Iran. However, by 1998 Russian
companies and institutes were providing unauthorised assistance to Iran, by helping to build a
heavy-water production plant and a heavy-water reactor at Arak, plus uranium milling facilities at
Ardakan.110 As Western intelligence agencies gathered the first indications for Iranian nuclear
activities, Iran offered voluntary visits by the IAEA to its facilities in 1992 and 1993, which
brought no evidence for a violation of Iran’s NPT and IAEA Safeguards obligations.111 By 1999,
Iran reportedly had begun to test its enrichments facilities, which were moved to the newly
William Langewiesche: Atomic Bazaar – Dispatches from the Underground World of Nuclear Trafficking,
Penguin Books, London, New York, 2007.
105
The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) – IISS Dossier: Iran’s Strategic Weapons Programmes
– a net assessment, Routledge Taylor and Francis Group, Abingdon, New York, 2005, p. 12.
106
The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) – IISS Dossier: Iran’s Strategic Weapons Programmes
– a net assessment, Routledge Taylor and Francis Group, Abingdon, New York, 2005, p. 12.
107
The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) – IISS Dossier: Iran’s Strategic Weapons Programmes
– a net assessment, Routledge Taylor and Francis Group, Abingdon, New York, 2005, p. 13.
108
The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) – IISS Dossier: Iran’s Strategic Weapons Programmes
– a net assessment, Routledge Taylor and Francis Group, Abingdon, New York, 2005, p. 13.
109
The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) – IISS Dossier: Iran’s Strategic Weapons Programmes
– a net assessment, Routledge Taylor and Francis Group, Abingdon, New York, 2005, p. 13.
110
The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) – IISS Dossier: Iran’s Strategic Weapons Programmes
– a net assessment, Routledge Taylor and Francis Group, Abingdon, New York, 2005, p. 13.
111
The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) – IISS Dossier: Iran’s Strategic Weapons Programmes
– a net assessment, Routledge Taylor and Francis Group, Abingdon, New York, 2005, p. 14.
Oliver Schmidt: Dissertation – MA International Relations – Lancaster University
28
constructed pilot and industrial scale enrichment facility at Natanz by the year 2002.112 (See
Appendix Map 2 & 3) 2002 was the same year in which Iran’s secret nuclear activities were
uncovered for the first time and the international debate began.
3.1.1 Technical aspects of Iran’s nuclear program
The following paragraph will describe the different nuclear facilities and their functions including
hypothetical options for misusing them for military purposes. Before going into the details of
Iran’s nuclear program it might be helpful to briefly introduce the basic concepts of nuclear
energy usage. In order to generate electricity with nuclear power plants Iran has decided to use a
light-water reactor design and a heavy-water reactor design. A light-water reactor needs lowenriched uranium (LEU)113 and therefore an enrichment facility while the heavy-water reactor
works with natural uranium but depends on a supply of heavy water. Iran is persuing both
options, building the means for a domestic and independent fuel cycle to maintain light- and
heavy-water reactors.114 (For a short overview about Iran’s nuclear fuel cycle see Appendix Map
4)
Now, as a last step before going into the details of the program it is necessary to mention some
general aspects of using nuclear energy militarily. Although it is not intended to create the
impression that Iran is definitely pursuing the military option, this information is necessary to be
able to recognise the difficulties of dual-use technologies. Generally, there are two designs for a
nuclear weapon, the gun-type and the implosion device. Creating an implosion device with a yield
of 20 kilotons of TNT, it requires 20 – 25kg of highly enriched uranium (HEU)115 or 6 – 8kg of
112
The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) – IISS Dossier: Iran’s Strategic Weapons Programmes
– a net assessment, Routledge Taylor and Francis Group, Abingdon, New York, 2005, p. 14.
113
Low enriched uranium (LEU): “Uranium containing over 0,71 and less than 20% uranium-235. Most modern
light-water reactors use 3 – 5% LEU. LEU is insufficiently enriched in uranium-235 to be used for nuclear
explosives.”
In: The Institute for Science and International Security: E-Book Glossary,
www.exportcontrols.org/print/glossary.html, (29.05.08).
114
For a detailed description of Iran’s nuclear activities, see:
IAEA Board of Governors, GOV/2003/75, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic
Republic of Iran, 10 November 2003, http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2003/gov2003-75.pdf,
(03.06.08).
115
Highly enriched uranium (HEU): “Uranium in which the percentage of uranium-235 is raised (enriched)
from a natural level of 0,71% to greater than 20% - usually 90%. All HEU can be raised to make nuclear
explosives, although a very large quantity is required for HEU enriched to only 20%.”
In: The Institute for Science and International Security: E-Book Glossary,
www.exportcontrols.org/print/glossary.html, (29.05.08).
Oliver Schmidt: Dissertation – MA International Relations – Lancaster University
29
plutonium, which, according to the IAEA, is considered as a ‘significant quantity’.116 The guntype device can only be built with highly enriched uranium and it requires the triple amount of
HEU for the same yield.117
Iran is developing a nuclear fuel cycle that starts with mining and milling of natural uranium
(U238) at the facilities of Saghand and Gchine (for Saghand see Appendix Map 2).118 The Atomic
energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) has claimed in 2002 that the country holds uranium reserves
of 3.000tons119; this might include the 531tons of yellowcake120 imported from South Africa, and
potential overall resources of 20.000 – 30.000tons.121 It is currently not clear whether the facilities
are fully operational, but they have been reportedly under construction since 2005 and should
have been completed by 2006.122 It is noteworthy that Iran’s nuclear power plants in Bushehr
would require 235tons of yellowcake annually, which is far more than what the two mining
facilities can provide per year with their production of 83 – 94tons.123 After the milling process
the uranium conversion and reduction process begins, in which the yellowcake is purified and
converted to uranium hexafluoride (UF6), which is a gas that is needed for the next steps in the
fuel cycle.124 By November 2004, Iran began operating a uranium conversion facility at the
116
Cited in: Cirincione, Joseph/ Jon B. Wolfsthal/ Miriam Rajkumar: Deadly Arsenals – Tracking Weapons of
Mass Destruction, Washington D.C., 2002. S 256; from: Theran Domestic Service, Hashemi-Rafsanjani Speaks
on the Future of the IRGC Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps, October 6, 1988, in FBIS-NES, October 7,
1988, p. 37.
117
The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) – IISS Dossier: Iran’s Strategic Weapons Programmes
– a net assessment, Routledge Taylor and Francis Group, Abingdon, New York, 2005, p. 63.
118
IAEA Board of Governors: GOV/2004/83: Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic
Republic of Iran – Annex 1, 15 November 2004.
119
IAEA Country Nuclear Power Profile: Iran Nuclear Power Profile – 2002 Edition,
www.pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/cnpp2003/CNPP_Webpage/PDF/2002Documents/Documetns/Isla
mic%Republic%20Iran%202002.pdf, (16.05.08).
120
Yellowcake: „A concentrate produced during the milling process that contains about 80% uranium ore
concentrate (U3O8). In preparation for uranium enrichment, the yellowcake is converted to uranium hexafluoride
gas (UF6). In the preparation of natural uranium reactor fuel, yellowcake is processes into purified uranium
dioxide. Sometimes uranium hexafluoride is produced as an intermediate step in the purification process.“
In: The Institute for Science and International Security: E-Book Glossary,
www.exportcontrols.org/print/glossary.html, (29.05.08).
121
The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) – IISS Dossier: Iran’s Strategic Weapons Programmes
– a net assessment, Routledge Taylor and Francis Group, Abingdon, New York, 2005, p. 35.
122
Compare:
The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) – IISS Dossier: Iran’s Strategic Weapons Programmes – a
net assessment, Routledge Taylor and Francis Group, Abingdon, New York, 2005, p. 37.
And:
The Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) Country overviews: Iran – Nuclear Facilities,
www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/Iran3119_3182.html, (20.05.08).
123
The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) – IISS Dossier: Iran’s Strategic Weapons Programmes
– a net assessment, Routledge Taylor and Francis Group, Abingdon, New York, 2005, p. 38.
124
Cirincione, Joseph/ Jon B. Wolfsthal/ Miriam Rajkumar: Deadly Arsenals – Tracking Weapons of Mass
Destruction, Washington D.C., 2002, pp. 38 – 39.
Oliver Schmidt: Dissertation – MA International Relations – Lancaster University
30
Esfahan Nuclear Technology Centre (see Appendix Map 2).125 According to the IAEA, the
facility produced 320tons of uranium hexafluoride between 2004 and 12 May 2008.126 The next
step in the fuel cycle is the uranium enrichment process, which is necessary to provide the
needed low enriched uranium for the use in light-water reactors. Iran has two facilities for the
enrichment process in Natanz, the pilot fuel enrichment plant and the fuel enrichment plant (see
Appendix Map 2&3).127 From the non-proliferation perspective the enrichment technology is
critical for the ability to produce weapons-grade uranium128.129 Iran has been developing large gas
centrifuge cascades for the purpose of uranium enrichment, and has only recently admitted to the
installation of 6.000 new centrifuges in addition to the 3.000 existing ones.130 The efforts to build
gas centrifuges for uranium enrichment date back to 1985. Iran acquired the first centrifuge
technologies in 1987 through the A.Q. Khan network,131 including drawings, samples, and
materials of the Pakistani-made P1 gas centrifuge, which is based on the Dutch design of the
Scientific Nuclear Obreptitious Rotor (SNOR) and the advanced Commercial Nuclear
Obreptitious Rotor (CNOR) and represents a supercritical centrifuge, which provides the
technical means to produce highly enriched uranium. During 1994 and 1996, Iran received
drawings of P2 centrifuges by the A.Q. Khan network, which operate with twice the capacity of
the P1 centrifuges and are based on a German design called G2.132 It remains unclear whether
Iran is secretly developing P2 centrifuges; however, these suspicions have been expressed
repeatedly because of contradictions and a lack of information about Iran’s P2 activities between
1995, the year of first acquisitions, and 2002.133
125
IAEA Board of Governors: Report GOV/2004/83: Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the
Islamic Republic of Iran – Annex 1, 15 November 2004. (Accessible at www.IAEA.org)
126
IAEA Board of Governors: Report GOV/2008/15: Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and
relevant provisions of Security Council resolution 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007) and 1803 (2008) in the Islamic
Republic of Iran, 26 May 2008. (Accessible at www.IAEA.org)
127
IAEA Board of Governors: Report GOV/2004/83: Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the
Islamic Republic of Iran – Annex 1, 15 November 2004. (Accessible at www.IAEA.org)
128
Weapons-grade uranium: Uranium enriched to more than 90% uranium-235.
In: The Institute for Science and International Security: E-Book Glossary,
www.exportcontrols.org/print/glossary.html, (29.05.08).
129
The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) – IISS Dossier: Iran’s Strategic Weapons Programmes
– a net assessment, Routledge Taylor and Francis Group, Abingdon, New York, 2005, p. 43.
130
BBC News: Iran installing new centrifuges, 08.April 08, http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr//2/hi/middle_east/7336089.stm, (29.05.08).
131
A.Q. Khan stole the designs of centrifuges during his time at URENCO.
132
Morton Bremer Mærli/ Sverre Lodgaard (Editor): Nuclear Proliferation and International Security,
Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, London, New York, 2007, p. 97.
133
The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) – IISS Dossier: Iran’s Strategic Weapons Programmes
– a net assessment, Routledge Taylor and Francis Group, Abingdon, New York, 2005, p. 52.
See also:
Oliver Schmidt: Dissertation – MA International Relations – Lancaster University
31
Depending on the assessment of the status of Iran’s enrichment facilities, there are different
estimations about when Iran will be technically able to possess the means to build a bomb
(break-out options). It might be helpful to consider that, throughout the whole process,
approximately 5tons of uranium hexafluoride are needed to produce the significant quantity of
25kg HEU.134 If Iran possessed enough LEU, about 700 – 800kg of 4% enriched uranium-235, it
could technically produce a significant quantity (20 – 25kg) of weapons-grade uranium within two
to three months, given the capacity of 2.000 – 3.000 P1 centrifuges at Natanz.135 It should be
noted that, according to the IAEA’s last report 3970kg of uranium hexafluoride has been
enriched up to 4,7% of uranium-235 in the cascades of Natanz between February 2007 and 6
May 2008.136 Another estimation of the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) in
London from 2005 illustrates that Iran could produce 25kg of 93% HEU, using 5% low enriched
uranium and 3.000 P1 centrifuges within 36 – 48 days and 190 – 253kg of HEU per year.137
According to the IAEA report of May 2008, the Iranian enrichment program at the Natanz
facility remains under the surveillance of the IAEA.138
The final step in the fuel cycle is the fuel fabrication. In Esfahan, Iran is developing a fuel
manufacturing capability in order to supply the light- and heavy-water reactors of Bushehr and
Arak after their completion. Iran began the development fuel fabrication capabilities in 1984 with
French support and later with Chinese support in accordance with a 1990 agreement. In 2003,
Iran informed the IAEA of its early manufacturing activities between 1985 and 1993 announced
its intention to build a commercial scale fuel manufacturing plant to meet the requirements of its
research reactors and the power plant projects.139
David Albright, Jacqueline Shire, and Paul Brannan: May 26, 2008 IAEA Safeguards Report on Iran: Centrifuge
Operation Improving and Cooperation Lacking on Weaponization Issues, Institute for Science and International
Security (ISIS) Report, May 29, 2008, http://www.isisonline.org/publications/iran/ISIS_Iran_IAEA_Report_29May2008.pdf, (01.06.08)
134
The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) – IISS Dossier: Iran’s Strategic Weapons Programmes
– a net assessment, Routledge Taylor and Francis Group, Abingdon, New York, 2005, p. 57.
135
David Albright/ Jacqueline Shire: A Witches’ Brew? Evaluating Iran’s Uranium-Enrichment Progress, in:
Arms control today, Vol 37, No. 9, November 2007, Arms Control Assocition.
136
IAEA Board of Governors: Report GOV/2008/15: Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and
relevant provisions of Security Council resolution 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007) and 1803 (2008) in the Islamic
Republic of Iran, 26 May 2008. (Accessible at www.IAEA.org)
137
The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) – IISS Dossier: Iran’s Strategic Weapons Programmes
– a net assessment, Routledge Taylor and Francis Group, Abingdon, New York, 2005, p. 55.
138
IAEA Board of Governors: Report GOV/2008/15: Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and
relevant provisions of Security Council resolution 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007) and 1803 (2008) in the Islamic
Republic of Iran, 26 May 2008. (Accessible at www.IAEA.org)
139
The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) – IISS Dossier: Iran’s Strategic Weapons Programmes
– a net assessment, Routledge Taylor and Francis Group, Abingdon, New York, 2005, p. 59.
Oliver Schmidt: Dissertation – MA International Relations – Lancaster University
32
Currently, Iran operates four research reactors, three of which are light-water reactors, while one
is a heavy-water reactor using natural uranium. None of these reactors pose a proliferation threat
because of the small quantities of nuclear fuel used and waste produced. However, Iran’s decision
to build an additional heavy-water research reactor in Arak, including a heavy-water production
facility, has caused more concern, because of the size of the 40 mega-watt (MW) reactor and its
claimed purpose. While the reactor itself is of an Iranian design, with some help from Russian
nuclear institutes, the heavy-water production plant has been constructed with technical
assistance from Russia until it became operational in 2004.140 Concerns have been raised because
the reactor would produce 11 – 14kg of plutonium per year while only 6 – 8kg are needed for an
atomic weapon using the implosion model.141 Nevertheless, the heavy-water reactor is far from
completion, so that the plutonium based break-out options are, in the short-term, minor risks
because Iran’s current source of plutonium, the research reactors, produce only insignificant
quantities. After its completion, the light-water reactor in Bushehr would theoretically produce
enough spent fuel per year to be able to get a significant quantity of 6 – 8kg of plutonium,
though, the production of weapons-grade plutonium from spent light-water reactor fuel normally
requires a large industrial facility, which is hard to conceal. For one thing, the production from
light-water reactor fuel causes several severe technical difficulties; for another, it would be very
complicated to hide such activities from the IAEA surveillance.142
After nuclear reactor fuel is spent, the reprocessing process extracts plutonium and uranium from
the spent reactor fuel. In 2003 Iran has declared that it has carried out several reprocessing
experiments at the Tehran Nuclear Research Center between the years of 1988 and 1993. By
2005 Iran acknowledged having carried out additional experiments between 1995 and 1998. The
reprocessing of nuclear fuel in small quantities, according to the IISS assessment, is a task which
can be accomplished by any small research facility with adequate equipment, so it does indicate
that Iran is able to extract some kilograms of plutonium from tons of spent nuclear fuel, a task
which, to be sure, poses a severe technical challenge. Iran currently seems not to intend to build a
large-scale reprocessing facility.143
140
The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) – IISS Dossier: Iran’s Strategic Weapons Programmes
– a net assessment, Routledge Taylor and Francis Group, Abingdon, New York, 2005, p. 60.
141
The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) – IISS Dossier: Iran’s Strategic Weapons Programmes
– a net assessment, Routledge Taylor and Francis Group, Abingdon, New York, 2005, p. 60.
142
The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) – IISS Dossier: Iran’s Strategic Weapons Programmes
– a net assessment, Routledge Taylor and Francis Group, Abingdon, New York, 2005, p. 62 – 63.
143
The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) – IISS Dossier: Iran’s Strategic Weapons Programmes
– a net assessment, Routledge Taylor and Francis Group, Abingdon, New York, 2005, pp. 61 – 62.
And:
Oliver Schmidt: Dissertation – MA International Relations – Lancaster University
33
In a final step it is now necessary to assess Iran’s military facilities which might be involved in the
nuclear program. The Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) reports that there are three military
facilities where nuclear weapon related research is suspected to take place, namely an Iranian
Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) facility in the northwest of Tehran (Moallem Kaleyah) and
a second and third one in Gorgan (Gorgan al-Kabir Center) and Parchin.144 The latest IAEA
report indicates several suspicious military activities which need further clarification. The report
mentions:
Procurement and R&D [research and development] activities of military related institutes and
companies that could be nuclear related; the production of nuclear equipment and components by
companies belonging to defence industries145
The report also mentions military activities regarding the research and testing of high explosives
(the Green Salt Project), detonators and underground testing arrangements, which all could be
used for the development of a nuclear explosive device. The non-proliferation expert Mark
Fitzpatrick names seven additional connections between the military and the nuclear program.146
Furthermore, the IAEA expresses its concerns regarding Iran’s development of the Shahab-3
medium-range ballistic missile, especially with respect to the modifications of the missile cone as
a re-entry vehicle, which would make it applicable for nuclear warheads.147 The Iranian response
from 14 May 2008 is cited in the report:
IAEA Board of Governors: Report GOV/2008/15: Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and
relevant provisions of Security Council resolution 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007) and 1803 (2008) in the Islamic
Republic of Iran, 26 May 2008. (Accessible at www.IAEA.org)
144
The Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) Country overviews: Iran – Nuclear Facilities,
www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/Iran3119_3130.html, and www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/Iran3119_3132.html
(20.05.08).
And: IAEA Board of Governors: Report GOV/2008/15: Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and
relevant provisions of Security Council resolution 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007) and 1803 (2008) in the Islamic
Republic of Iran, 26 May 2008. (Accessible at www.IAEA.org)
145
IAEA Board of Governors: Report GOV/2008/15: Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and
relevant provisions of Security Council resolution 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007) and 1803 (2008) in the Islamic
Republic of Iran, Section E. Paragraph 14., 26 May 2008. (Accessible at www.IAEA.org)
146
See for details:
Mark Fitzpatrick: Assessing Iran’s Nuclear Programme, in: Survival, Vol. 18, No. 3, Autumn 2006, pp. 5 – 26.
147
IAEA Board of Governors: Report GOV/2008/15: Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and
relevant provisions of Security Council resolution 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007) and 1803 (2008) in the Islamic
Republic of Iran, Section E. Paragraph 16 & 17, 26 May 2008. (Accessible at www.IAEA.org)
Oliver Schmidt: Dissertation – MA International Relations – Lancaster University
34
The documents do not show any indication that the Islamic Republic of Iran has been working on
nuclear weapons. The Islamic Republic of Iran has not had and shall not have any nuclear weapon
program.148
In assessing Iran’s nuclear program, it is necessary to mention that since the discovery of the
clandestine parts of the program the surveillance by the IAEA has been intensified, which
increases the difficulties in using the nuclear technology for military purposes, whether in still
hidden facilities or in the known ones. However, a proper assessment depends heavily on the
accessible information, which is limited in its accuracy and not quite up-to-dat; even the May
report of the IAEA declares that several questions remain before Iran’s nuclear program can be
properly assessed.149 So far no ‘smoking gun’ has been found.
The technical assessment by the IISS concludes that if Iran wants to develop a nuclear weapon it
would likely uses the implosion technique, for which a smaller amount of nuclear material is
needed, and the research on high explosives and simultaneous detonations would fit in the
picture. An additional benefit of the implosion technique is that the nuclear device can more
easily be designed for missile delivery.150 Theoretically, Iran possesses the ability to produce a
significant quantity of HEU, but it also has to be considered that the danger of detection by the
IAEA or other intelligence agencies is considerably high if Iran were to decide in favour of
nuclear weapon procurement.151 The latest assessment of the US United Intelligence Council
concludes that Iran tried to develop nuclear weapon until 2003. Current military nuclear activities
have not been discovered but are not unfeasible; and there are activities which could be related to
a nuclear weapon program.152 The National Intelligence Estimate of November 2007 concludes:
We assess with high confidence that Iran has the scientific, technical and industrial capacity
eventually to produce nuclear weapons if it decides to do so.
148
IAEA Board of Governors: Report GOV/2008/15: Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and
relevant provisions of Security Council resolution 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007) and 1803 (2008) in the Islamic
Republic of Iran, Section E. Paragraph 18, 26 May 2008. (Accessible at www.IAEA.org)
149
IAEA Board of Governors: Report GOV/2008/15: Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and
relevant provisions of Security Council resolution 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007) and 1803 (2008) in the Islamic
Republic of Iran, Section F, 26 May 2008. (Accessible at www.IAEA.org)
150
The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) – IISS Dossier: Iran’s Strategic Weapons Programmes
– a net assessment, Routledge Taylor and Francis Group, Abingdon, New York, 2005, p. 63.
151
The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) – IISS Dossier: Iran’s Strategic Weapons Programmes
– a net assessment, Routledge Taylor and Francis Group, Abingdon, New York, 2005, pp. 63 – 64.
152
US National Intelligence Council: National Intelligence Estimate - Iran: Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities,
November 2007, [see: Key Judgements – E.], <http://www.dni.gov/press_releases/20071203_release.pdf>,
(14.05.08).
See also:
Mark Fitzpatrick: Assessing Iran’s Nuclear Programme, in: Survival, Vol. 18, No. 3, Autumn 2006, pp. 7 – 12.
Oliver Schmidt: Dissertation – MA International Relations – Lancaster University
35
We judge with moderate confidence that the earliest possible date Iran would be technically capable of
producing enough HEU for a weapon is late 2009, but that this is very unlikely.
We judge with high confidence that Iran will not be technically capable of producing and reprocessing
enough plutonium for a weapon before about 2015.
We also assess with high confidence that since fall 2003, Iran has been conducting research and
development projects with commercial and conventional military applications—some of which would
also be of limited use for nuclear weapons.
We assess with moderate confidence Tehran had not restarted its nuclear weapons program as of
mid-2007, but we do not know whether it currently intends to develop nuclear weapons.153
3.1.2 Iran’s ballistic and cruise missile program
Surface-to-surface ballistic missiles are the most common delivery systems for weapons of mass
destruction, especially nuclear weapons. They are categorised by their range: missiles with a range
up to 600km are defined as short-range ballistic missiles (SRBM).154 Medium range ballistic
missiles (MRBM) have a range up to 1300km, whereas intermediate ballistic missiles (IRBM) can
hit targets in a distance of 3500km. All ballistic missiles with range beyond that are called
intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM).155
Ballistic missiles are defined as:
Any missile, which does not rely upon aerodynamic surfaces to produce lift and consequently follows a
ballistic trajectory when thrust is terminated.156
Their trajectory can be divided into a boost phase of a few minutes, when the missile engine
accelerates the missile during its launch, a midcourse phase, when the missile is no longer
accelerated and, depending on the missile type, the warhead is separated from the missile
153
US National Intelligence Council: National Intelligence Estimate - Iran: Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities,
November 2007, [see: Key Judgements – E.], <http://www.dni.gov/press_releases/20071203_release.pdf>,
(14.05.08).
154
Artillery rockets are not included.
155
UK Ministry of Defence: Missile Defence – a public discussion paper, December 2002, p 8,
http://www.mod.uk/NR/rdonlyres/9DA4A026-DB01-466D-B5B3-EA6C64A2D85F/0/missiledef.pdf,
(02.06.08).
156
US Department of Defense: The Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Term, 12.
April 2001, as Amended Through 17 October 2007, p 58, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp1_02.pdf,
(02.06.08).
Oliver Schmidt: Dissertation – MA International Relations – Lancaster University
36
stages.157 This is the longest flight period which, of course, depends on the range of the missile.
After that, the terminal phase begins, which usually does not last longer than one minute; during
this phase, the warhead seeks its target. It is important to consider that there are different
characteristic trajectories for short-, medium-, intermediate- and long-range missiles.
Iran’s acquisition of ballistic missiles began prior to the Islamic revolution in 1979 but has been
intensified as a result of the Iran-Iraq War (1980 – 1988) and especially the so-called ‘war of the
cities’ (1985, 1987, 1988).158 Iran’s ballistic missile inventory includes a wide range of short-range
ballistic missiles; well-known are the SCUD missile variants named Shahab-1 (SCUD-B) and
Shahab-2 (SCUD-C), which are now autonomously produced by Iran after having imported
knowledge and technology from North Korea, the world largest proliferators of missile
technology, and having received early assistance from Libya, Syria, Russia, and China.159 These
missiles are capable of transporting a payload of 800 – 1000kg up to 300 – 500km.160 Currently,
Iran is developing ballistic missiles with a medium to intermediate ranges. The Shahab-3 missile is
based on the North Korean No-Dong missile, and its first successful flight test was conducted
on 15 July 2000 and on 23 May 2002.161 Current assessments estimate that Iran possess 25 – 100
liquid fuelled ballistic missiles with a range of 1300 – 1500km, carrying a 750kg payload.162
157
Usually, only the warheads of missiles with ranges of at least medium-range, separates from the missile
stages.
158
Kamran Taremi: Beyond the Axis of Evil – Ballistic Missiles in Iran’s Military Thinking, in: Security
Dialogue vol. 36, no. 1, March 2005, pp. 93 – 108.
159
The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) – IISS Dossier: Iran’s Strategic Weapons Programmes
– a net assessment, Routledge Taylor and Francis Group, Abingdon, New York, 2005, p. 103.
And:
Mark Fitzpatrick: Iran and North Korea: The Proliferation Nexus, in: Survival, Vol. 48 No. 1, Spring 2006.
Greg J. Geradi/ James A. Plotts: An Annotated Chronology of DPRK Missile Trade and Developments, in: The
Nonproliferation Review, Fall 1994.
160
The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) – IISS Dossier: Iran’s Strategic Weapons Programmes
– a net assessment, Routledge Taylor and Francis Group, Abingdon, New York, 2005, p. 89.
161
The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) – IISS Dossier: Iran’s Strategic Weapons Programmes
– a net assessment, Routledge Taylor and Francis Group, Abingdon, New York, 2005, p. 102.
162
Arms Control Association: Fact Sheet – Worldwide Ballistic Missile Inventories, September 2007,
<http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/missiles.asp>, (02.06.08).
And:
Steven A. Hildreth: Iran’s Ballistic Missile Programs – An Overview, November 8, 2007,
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/95050.pdf, (02.06.08)
Also:
The Institute for International Strategic Studies (IISS): The Military Balance 2008 – Middle East and North
Africa, Routledge, London, 2007, p.243.
Jane’s Intelligence Review, 14 March 2008: Smoke and mirrors – Analysing the Iranian missile test.
Robin Hughes: Iran’s Ballistic Missile Developments – Lang Range Ambitions, in: Jane’s Defence Weakly,
September 13, 2006.
Oliver Schmidt: Dissertation – MA International Relations – Lancaster University
37
Consequently, the Shahab-3 missile is capable of reaching Israel, NATO and EU countries (see
Appendix Map 6). Estimations about the specifications of the Shahab-3 missile are showing a
huge variety, according to official Iranian statements, the missile and its variants Shahab-3A
already has a range of 2000 – 2500km. Some US and Israeli estimations confirm this, while other
sources have much more moderate and conservative findings.163 Still, it has been confirmed that
Iran is developing the national infrastructure to develop and enhance the missiles. Currently,
attempts are being made to improve the payload, the engine – to switch from liquid to solid
propellant – and the design of the warhead.164 The Shahab-3 is designed to deliver warheads with
conventional high explosives, but it could theoretically be turned into a weapon of mass
destruction if Iran acquires the technical means to assemble a warhead within this category of
size and weight.165
Additionally, Iran possesses twelve land attack cruise missiles (LACM) AS15 KENT. This highly
sophisticated weapons system was designed by the Soviet Union in the 1980s and was delivered
to Iran by the Ukraine without the nuclear warheads.166 This cruise missile was designed to carry
a 200kt nuclear warhead over a range of 2000 – 3500km.167 Land attack cruise missiles in general
are very difficult to intercept because of their characteristic trajectory; therefore they constitute a
serious challenge to missile defence systems. But the spread of LACM technology is far smaller
Athony H. Cordesman: Iran’s Nuclear and Missile Programs - A Status Report, Center for Strategic and
International Studies (CSIS), Washington D.C., 4th December 2007,
<http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/071126irannukewmd.pdf>, (02.06.08).
163
For Details on the Shahab-3 missile see: Athony H. Cordesman: Iran’s Nuclear and Missile Programs - A
Status Report, Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), 4th December 2007,
<http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/071126irannukewmd.pdf>, (02.06.08).
And:
Robert H. Schmucker: Iran and its Regional Environment, The Nuclearization of the Broader Middle East as a
Challenge for Transatlantic Policy Coordination Panel 1, Second Transatlantic Conference, Berlin, March 27,
2006, <http://www.hsfk.de/downloads/Panel%201%20-%20Schmucker.pdf>, (02.06.08).
164
The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) – IISS Dossier: Iran’s Strategic Weapons Programmes
– a net assessment, Routledge Taylor and Francis Group, Abingdon, New York, 2005, pp. 98 – 103.
Also:
Jane’s Intelligence Review, 14 March 2008: Smoke and mirrors – Analysing the Iranian missile test.
165
The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) – IISS Dossier: Iran’s Strategic Weapons Programmes
– a net assessment, Routledge Taylor and Francis Group, Abingdon, New York, 2005, pp. 98 – 103.
166
The Financial Times, Ukraine admits it exported cruise missiles to Iran and China, 18.03.2005.
167
Athony H. Cordesman: Iran’s Nuclear and Missile Programs - A Status Report, Center for Strategic and
International Studies (CSIS), Washington D.C., 4th December 2007,
<http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/071126irannukewmd.pdf>, (02.06.08).
And:
Globalsecurity.org: Weapons of Mass Destruction – AS 15 Specifications,
<http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/russia/as-15-specs.htm>, (02.06.08).
Oliver Schmidt: Dissertation – MA International Relations – Lancaster University
38
than the spread of ballistic missiles. It is unlikely that Iran is capable of operating this weapons
system, but it is reasonable to suggest that it will be used for reverse engineering.168
Iranian plans to develop a long-range ballistic missile capability that could reach the US
homeland are, according to different sources, in progress but will last until 2015.169 So far, Iran is
suspected of participating in the North Korean ballistic missile program Taepo-Dong-1, -2, and
is developing the Shahb-4 and -5 with ranges of 3000 – 5500km, though this information remains
vague.170 (The United Kingdom has an approximate distance to Iran of 3750km.171) In order to
develop these capabilities, however, it would be necessary to accomplish the solid fuel and multistage missile technology first; neither North Korea nor Iran have shown these capabilities so far.
In the end, Iran does possess the capabilities to threaten ‘Western’ interests in the region of the
Greater Middle East and beyond. Additionally, Iranian forces can threaten the critical shipping
routes of the Persian Gulf and other major oil-hubs.172 Already, Israel and territories of EU and
168
Oliver Schmidt: Iranische Raketen und Marschflugkörper - Stand und Perspektiven (Iranian Missile and
Cruise Missiles – German Text only), Working Paper, the German Institute for International and Security
Affairs, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP), <http://www.swpberlin.org/de/common/get_document.php?asset_id=3531>, (02.06.08).
169
US National Intelligence Council: Foreign Missile Development and the Ballistic Missile Threat through
2015, December 2001, p 9, <http://www.dni.gov/nic/PDF_GIF_otherprod/missilethreat2001.pdf>, (02.06.08).
Also:
Robin Hughes: Iran’s Ballistic Missile Developments – Lang Range Ambitions, in: Jane’s Defence Weakly,
September 13, 2006.
170
Mark Fitzpatrick: Iran and North Korea: The Proliferation Nexus, in: Survival, Vol 48 No 1, Spring 2006.
And:
Anthony H. Cordesman and Khalid R. Al-Rodhan: The Gulf Military Forces in an era of asymmetric war: Iran,
The Center for Security and International Studies (CSIS), Washington D.C., July 28, 2006,
<http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/060728_gulf_iran.pdf>, (02.06.08).
Also:
Steven A. Hildreth: Iran’s Ballistic Missile Programs – An Overview, November 8, 2007,
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/95050.pdf, (02.06.08)
WMD Insights: http://www.wmdinsights.com/I9/I9_ME1_ChallengesofIran_1.htm, (02.06.08).
Greg J. Geradi & James A. Plotts: An Annotated Chronology of DPRK Missile Trade and Developments, in: The
Nonproliferation Review, Fall 1994.
US Official Says Iranians Witnessed North Korean Missile Test, Deborah Tate, 20.07.06, in: Globalsecurity.org:
http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/dprk/2006/dprk-060720-voa01.htm (02.06.08).
The Korea Herald, Iran present at North Korea missile launches, 21.07.2006.
The Korea Herald, N.K. Iran collaborating on missiles, Think Tank reports, 4.8.2006.
Paul Kerr, Arms Control Association: Iran, North Korea Deepen Missile Cooperation, January/ February 2007,
http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2007_01-02/IranNK.asp, (29.05.08).
171
UK Ministry of Defence: Missile Defence – a public discussion paper, December 2002, p 11,
<http://www.mod.uk/NR/rdonlyres/9DA4A026-DB01-466D-B5B3-EA6C64A2D85F/0/missiledef.pdf >,
(02.06.08).
172
Anthony H. Cordesman: Iran, Oil, and the Strait of Hormuz, The Center for Security and International
Studies (CSIS), Washington D.C., 26th March 2007,
<http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/070326_iranoil_hormuz.pdf>, (02.06.08).
Oliver Schmidt: Dissertation – MA International Relations – Lancaster University
39
NATO member states are within range of Iranian missile assets, and it is likely that this range will
increase over the years. However, it is necessary to consider the huge technical difficulties of
designing and building a nuclear warhead with the size and weight to be delivered by ballistic
missiles.173 Though Iran seems to have been investing some effort in developing the technical
means of nuclear weapons delivery174, according to the analysis of Iran’s latest ballistic missile
flight test on 4 February 2008, no significant progress has been made.175
3.2
International reactions and concerns
During a press conference in Washington D.C. on 14 August 2002, the spokesman of the
National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI) Alireza Jafarzadeh revealed Iran’s secret
development of an uranium enrichment facility in Natanz and the construction of a heavy-water
reactor in Arak. This announcement has led to an international debate, which still keeps the
IAEA, the United Nations (UN), and politicians all over the world occupied.
The IAEA report of the Board of Governors in June 2003 gives first insights in Iran’s noncompliance with its obligations from the Safeguards Agreement. The report declares that:
Iran has failed to meet its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement with respect to the reporting of
nuclear material, the subsequent processing and use of that material and the declaration of facilities
where the material was stored and processed.176
The IAEA Board of Governors Resolutions in September calls for a clarification of Iran’s
nuclear activities and a suspension of all enrichment related activities; it mentions for the first
time the option of referring the case to the UNSC.177 On October 21, 2003, the foreign ministers
173
Policy Department External Policies Study: Missile Defence and European Security, The European
Parliament, November 2007, p 4,
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/activities/expert/eStudies/download.do?file=18359#search=%20missile%20defen
ce%20, (02.06.08).
174
IAEA Board of Governors: Report GOV/2008/15: Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and
relevant provisions of Security Council resolution 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007) and 1803 (2008) in the Islamic
Republic of Iran, Section F, 26 May 2008. (Accessible at www.IAEA.org)
175
Jane’s Intelligence Review, 14 March 2008: Smoke and mirrors – Analysing the Iranian missile test.
176
IAEA Board of Governors, GOV/2003/40: Implementation of the NPT safeguards agreement in the Islamic
Republic of Iran, 6 June 2003 pp. 7 – 8, http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2003/gov200340.pdf, (03.06.08).
177
IAEA Board of Governors, GOV/2003/69, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic
Republic of Iran, 12 September 2003, http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2003/gov2003-69.pdf,
(03.06.08).
Oliver Schmidt: Dissertation – MA International Relations – Lancaster University
40
of the EU-3, United Kingdom, France, and Germany declared in a joint statement in Tehran
that:
The Iranian government has decided to engage in full cooperation with the IAEA to address and
resolve, through full transparency, all requirements and outstanding issues of the Agency, and clarify
and correct any possible failure and deficiencies with the IAEA.178
The agreement includes a voluntary suspension of all enrichment-related activities and Iran’s
intention to sign the Additional Protocol on Nuclear Safeguards.179 Iran signed the Additional
Protocol on December 18th 2003.180 IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradai declared in
November 2003 that:
to date, there is no evidence that the previously undeclared nuclear material activities were related to a
nuclear weapons program.181
After statements by the IAEA welcoming Iran’s cooperation, relations between the IAEA and
Iran suffered because of ambiguities concerning Iran’s suspension of enrichment activities and
reporting obligations. In September 2004 the IAEA Board of Governors again demanded a
complete suspension of Iran’s enrichment activities and a report of its activities to the IAEA,
implicitly threatening to refer the case to the UNSC.182 In reaction to these urgent calls by the
IAEA the Paris Agreement was signed, in which the EU-3 and Iran agreed on a comprehensive
suspension of enrichment activities as basis for negotiations for a long term solution.183 The next
178
Agreed Statement at the end of a visit to the Islamic Republic of Iran by the Foreign Ministers of Britain,
France and Germany, Tehran, 21 October 2003,
http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Focus/IaeaIran/statement_iran21102003.shtml, (03.06.08).
179
Agreed Statement at the end of a visit to the Islamic Republic of Iran by the Foreign Ministers of Britain,
France and Germany, Tehran, 21 October 2003,
http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Focus/IaeaIran/statement_iran21102003.shtml, (03.06.08).
180
IAEA Staff Report: Iran Signs Additional Protocol on Nuclear Safeguards, 18 December 2003,
http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/News/2003/iranap20031218.html, (03.06.08).
See for the Protocol:
IAEA INFCIRC/540:Model Protocol, Additional to the Agreement(s) between State(s) and the IAEA for the
application of Safeguards, http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/1997/infcirc540c.pdf,
(03.06.08).
181
IAEA Board of Governors, GOV/2003/81: Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic
Republic of Iran, 26 November 2003, http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2003/gov2003-81.pdf,
(03.06.08).
182
IAEA Board of Governors, GOV/2004/79: Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic
Republic of Iran, 18 September 2004, http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2003/gov2004-79.pdf,
(03.06.08).
183
IAEA Information Circular INFCIRC/637: Communication dated 26 November 2004 received from the
Permanent Representatives of France, Germany, the Islamic Republic of Iran and the United Kingdom
concerning the agreement signed in Paris on 15 November 2004, 26. November 2004,
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/2004/infcirc637.pdf, (03.06.08).
Oliver Schmidt: Dissertation – MA International Relations – Lancaster University
41
IAEA resolution again welcomed the results, and the EU-3 approach finally found support from
the US for the first time.184 Following the Paris agreement, the EU-3 began negotiations with Iran
in December 2004, trying to convince the country to permanently abstain from the production of
nuclear fission material of any kind and to abandon its heavy-water reactor plans. In return, the
EU-3 offered a package of incentives covering the fields of nuclear energy, technology and
cooperation, as well as political and security issues.185 Rejecting the EU-3 demands for a complete
closure of enrichment related activities, the Foreign Minister of Iran Kamal Kharrazi declared
Iran’s right based on Article IV NPT to develop peaceful nuclear technology, symbolically during
the NPT Review Conference, on 3 May 2005 in New York.186 However, Iran accepted the
temporarily suspension of its enrichment related activities until the presentation of the final
proposal of the EU-3 on August 8, 2005. In reaction to the EU-3 proposal, Iran declared the end
of the negotiations because the proposal would allegedly violate international law, the Charta of
the UN, the NPT and the commitments of the Paris Agreement; therefore Iran restarts its
enrichment activities in Esfahan.187 In the subsequent IAEA Board of Governors Resolution on
11 August, the IAEA urged Iran to suspend its nuclear enrichment and to meet the IAEA
requirements fully in order to proof to the peaceful intentions of the nuclear program.188 After
the presidential elections in the Islamic Republic, Iran’s new President Mahmud Ahmadinejad
announced on 17 September 2005 that Iran sought to install a nuclear fuel cycle, in accordance
184
IAEA Board of Governors, GOV/2004/90: Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic
Republic of Iran, 29 November 2004, http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2003/gov2004-90.pdf,
(03.06.08).
And:
The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) – IISS Dossier: Iran’s Strategic Weapons Programmes – a
net assessment, Routledge Taylor and Francis Group, Abingdon, New York, 2005, pp. 26 – 27.
185
IAEA Information Circular INFCIRC/651, Communication dated 8 August 2005 received from the Resident
Representatives of France, Germany and the United Kingdom to the Agency: Framework for a long-term
agreement between the Islamic Republic of Iran and France, Germany & the United Kingdom, with the support
of the High Representative of the European Union, 8 August 2005,
http://www.bits.de/public/documents/iran/EU_3_Framework_infcirc651.pdf, (04.06.08).
186
Statement by H.E Dr. Kamal Kharrazi, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the
Seventh NPT Review Conference, New York, May 03, 2005,
http://www.un.org/events/npt2005/statements/npt03iran.pdf, (03.06.08).
187
Response of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the Framework Agreement by EU3/EU, August 2005,
http://www.bits.de/public/documents/iran/IranonEU3-0805.pdf, (03.06.08).
188
IAEA Board of Governors GOV/2005/64:
Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran and related Board resolutions
Resolution adopted on 11 August 2005, 11 August 2005,
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2005/gov2005-64.pdf, (03.06.08).
Oliver Schmidt: Dissertation – MA International Relations – Lancaster University
42
with its rights based on the NPT, and rejected ‘Western’ demands for permanent suspension.
However, he stated that Iran would continue to cooperate with the IAEA.189
Some powerful states practice a discriminatory approach against access of NPT members to material,
equipment, and peaceful nuclear technology, and by doing so, intend to impose a nuclear apartheid.
[...] What needs our particular attention is the fact that peaceful use of nuclear energy without
possession of nuclear fuel cycle is an empty proposition.190
In the same month, the IAEA reported that the continued non-compliance with the Safeguards
Agreement now constituted a violation of the NPT, which fell under the competence of the
UNSC.191 The last IAEA report of 2005 provided an overview of the recent developments and
addressed unresolved issues.192 After Iran’s non-compliance with the IAEA demand to halt all
enrichment-related activities, the Board of Governors adopted a resolution in February 2006,
demanding that Iran report its activities to the UNSC.193 Iran’s reaction was the withdrawal from
the voluntary fulfilment of the Additional Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement. In reaction to
the IAEA report from February 2006, the UNSC released a first statement, calling for
compliance with IAEA demands, including the suspension of all conversion and enrichment
activities.194 What followed were IAEA reports in April and June assessing that Iran is not
189
Address by H.E. Dr. Mahmood Ahmadinejad President of the Islamic Republic of Iran Before the Sixtieth
Session of the United Nations General Assembly New York — 17 September 2005,
http://www.un.org/webcast/ga/60/statements/iran050917eng.pdf, (03.06.08).
190
Address by H.E. Dr. Mahmood Ahmadinejad President of the Islamic Republic of Iran Before the Sixtieth
Session of the United Nations General Assembly New York — 17 September 2005,
http://www.un.org/webcast/ga/60/statements/iran050917eng.pdf, (03.06.08).
191
IAEA Board of Governors GOV/2005/67 2 September 2005: Implementation of the NPT Safeguards
Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran Report by the Director General,
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2005/gov2005-67.pdf, (03.06.08).
And:
IAEA Board of Governors GOV/2005/77, 24 September 2005: Implementation of the NPT Safeguards
Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran Resolution adopted on 24 September 2005,
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2005/gov2005-77.pdf, (03.06.08).
192
IAEA Board of Governors GOV/2005/87, 18 November 2005: Implementation of the NPT Safeguards
Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran Report by the Director General,
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2005/gov2005-87.pdf, (03.06.08).
193
IAEA Board of Governors GOV/2006/14, 4 February 2006: Implementation of the NPT Safeguards
Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran Resolution adopted on 4 February 2006,
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2006/gov2006-14.pdf, (03.06.08).
194
Security Council SC/8679, 5403rd Meeting (PM), 29 March 2006: Security Council, in Presidential
Statement, underlines importance of Iran’s re-establishing full sustained suspension of uranium-enrichment
activities, calls on Iran to take steps required by IAEA Board of Governors,
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/sc8679.doc.htm, (03.06.08).
Oliver Schmidt: Dissertation – MA International Relations – Lancaster University
43
actively cooperating and complying with the obligations stemming from the IAEA resolutions.195
Finally, after three year of investigations and repeated non-compliance by Iran, the UNSC
adopted its first resolution regarding the case of Iran and its nuclear program, demanding Iran’s
full compliance with the stipulations of the IAEA resolution GOV/2006/14.196 By 31 August,
the IAEA delivered a new report to the UNSC, assessing Iran’s implementation of the NPT
Safeguards Agreement on which the UNSC would decide:
to adopt appropriate measures under Article 41 of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United
Nations to persuade Iran to comply with this resolution and the requirements of the IAEA. 197
As Iran did not meet the terms of UN Resolution 1696, which was confirmed by the IAEA
Reports of August198 and November 2006199, the UNSC adopted Resolution 1737, imposing the
first trade sanctions on Iran, which encompassed nuclear- and missile-related technology
companies and personnel.200
By 2007, Iran was still not completely cooperating and fulfilling its obligations laid down in the
IAEA and the UNSC resolutions, according to the IAEA report of February 2007.201 On 24
195
IAEA Board of Governors, GOV/2006/27, 28 April 2006: Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement
in the Islamic Republic of Iran Report by the Director General,
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2006/gov2006-27.pdf, (03.06.08).
And:
IAEA Board of Governors, GOV/2006/38, 8 June 2006: Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in
the Islamic Republic of Iran Report by the Director General
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2006/gov2006-38.pdf, (03.06.08).
196
United Nations Security Council, S/RES/1696 (2006), 31 July 2006, Resolution 1696 (2006), Adopted by the
Security Council at its 5500th meeting, on 31 July 2006,
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N06/450/22/PDF/N0645022.pdf?OpenElement, (03.06.08).
197
United Nations Security Council, S/RES/1696 (2006), 31 July 2006, Resolution 1696 (2006), Adopted by the
Security Council at its 5500th meeting, on 31 July 2006,
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N06/450/22/PDF/N0645022.pdf?OpenElement, (03.06.08).
198
IAEA Board of Governors GOV/2006/53, 31 August 2006: Implementation of the NPT Safeguards
Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran Report by the Director General,
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2006/gov2006-53.pdf, (03.06.08).
199
IAEA Board of Governors GOV/2006/64, 14 November 2006: Implementation of the NPT Safeguards
Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran Report by the Director General,
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2006/gov2006-64.pdf, (03.06.08).
200
United Nations Security Council S/RES/1737 (2006), 27 December 2006: Resolution 1737 (2006), Adopted
by the Security Council at its 5612th meeting, on 23 December 2006,
http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Focus/IaeaIran/unsc_res1737-2006.pdf, (03.06.08).
201
IAEA Board of Governors GOV/2007/7, 9 February 2007: Cooperation between the
Islamic Republic of Iran and the Agency in the light of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1737 (2006)
Report by the Director General, http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2007/gov2007-07.pdf,
(04.06.08).
And:
Oliver Schmidt: Dissertation – MA International Relations – Lancaster University
44
March, the UNSC adopted a resolution calling on Iran again to comply with UN resolutions and
IAEA demands; the Resolution 1747 intensified the already imposed sanctions.202 The Annex
named possible incentives for a long-term agreement with Iran.203 The following IAEA report of
May 2007 summed it up:
As previously stated, unless Iran addresses the long outstanding verification issues, and implements the
Additional Protocol and the required transparency measures, the Agency will not be able to fully reconstruct
the history of Iran’s nuclear programme and provide assurances about the absence of undeclared nuclear
material and activities in Iran or about the exclusively peaceful nature of that programme.204
But even though Iran and the IAEA reached agreements on specific technical cooperation plans
in August and November, the message remains: Iran is not fully complying.205
The IAEA report of February 2008 concludes that Iran has intensified its effort to cooperate and
provide the requested access to selected facilities; however, the report also stated that Iran is not
complying with the UNSC Resolution demand to halt nuclear enrichment.206 The UNSC reacted
and adopted Resolution 1803 on the 3rd of March:
IAEA Board of Governors GOV/2007/8, 22 February 2007: Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement
and Relevant Provisions of Security Council Resolution 1737 (2006) in the Islamic Republic of Iran Report by
the Director General, http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2007/gov2007-08.pdf, (04.06.08).
202
United Nations Security Council S/RES/1747 (2007), 24 March 2007: Resolution 1747 (2007) Adopted by
the Security Council at its 5647th meeting on 24 March 2007,
http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Focus/IaeaIran/unsc_res1747-2007.pdf, (04.06.08).
203
United Nations Security Council S/RES/1747 (2007), 24 March 2007: Resolution 1747 (2007) Adopted by
the Security Council at its 5647th meeting on 24 March 2007,
http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Focus/IaeaIran/unsc_res1747-2007.pdf, (04.06.08).
204
IAEA Board of Governors GOV/2007/22, 23 May 2007 Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement
and Relevant Provisions of Security Council Resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran Report by the Director
General http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2007/gov2007-22.pdf, (04.06.08).
205
IAEA Information Circular INFCIRC/711, 27 August 2007: Communication dated 27 August 2007 from the
Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the Agency concerning the text of the "Understandings of
the Islamic Republic of Iran and the IAEA on the Modalities of Resolution of the Outstanding Issues",
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/2007/infcirc711.pdf, (04.06.08).
And:
IAEA Board of Governors GOV/2007/48, 30 August 2007: Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in
the Islamic Republic of Iran Report by the Director General,
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2007/gov2007-48.pdf, (04.06.08).
And:
IAEA Board of Governors GOV/2007/58, 15 November 2007: Implementation of the NPT Safeguards
Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions 1737 (2006) and 1747 (2007) in the Islamic
Republic of Iran Report by the Director General
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2007/gov2007-58.pdf, (04.06.08).
206
IAEA Board of Governors GOV/2008/4, 22 February 2008: Implementation of the NPT Safeguards
Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions 1737 (2006) and 1747 (2007) in the Islamic
Republic of Iran Report by the Director General
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2008/gov2008-4.pdf, (04.06.08).
Oliver Schmidt: Dissertation – MA International Relations – Lancaster University
45
Noting with serious concern that, as confirmed by the reports of 23 May 2007 (GOV/2007/22), 30
August 2007 (GOV/2007/48), 15 November 2007 (GOV/2007/58) and 22 February 2008
(GOV/2008/4) of the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Iran has
not established full and sustained suspension of all enrichment related and reprocessing activities and heavy
water-related projects as set out in resolution 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), and 1747 (2007), nor resumed
its cooperation with the IAEA under the Additional Protocol, nor taken the other steps required by the
IAEA Board of Governors, nor complied with the provisions of Security Council resolution 1696 (2006),
1737 (2006) and 1747 (2007) and which are essential to build confidence…207
The resolution reiterates the demand that Iran suspend all nuclear enrichment and calls for a
tightening of financial restrictions on selected Iranian companies and persons while at the same
time encouraging further negotiations in order to find a long-term settlement.208 This is the
current state of the dispute over Iran’s nuclear program. What becomes obvious is the slow and
not necessarily steady progress, which is marked by Iranian attempts to hide certain aspects and
to comply only after enormous pressure is exerted by the ‘international community’.
3.3
First indications for Iran’s nuclear intentions?
The permanent members of the UNSC and Germany share the belief that Iran should not
develop a military nuclear capability, as the UNSC resolutions have shown. They assume critical
consequences for the regional balance of the Middle East and for the future of nuclear nonproliferation.209 The process of negotiations, verifications and investigations reveals the dual-use
risks posed by civil nuclear proliferation. Technically, the same abilities that are needed for a
peaceful nuclear program provide the basis for the development of nuclear weapons. The only
possible solution is close surveillance by the IAEA, the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and
207
United Nations Security Council S/RES/1803 (2008), 3 March 2008: Resolution 1803 (2008) Adopted by the
Security Council at its 5848th meeting, on 3 March 2008,
http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Focus/IaeaIran/unsc_res1803-2008.pdf, (04.06.08).
208
United Nations Security Council S/RES/1803 (2008), 3 March 2008: Resolution 1803 (2008) Adopted by the
Security Council at its 5848th meeting, on 3 March 2008,
http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Focus/IaeaIran/unsc_res1803-2008.pdf, (04.06.08).
209
Speech by Pierre Goldschmidt at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace: Verifying Iran’s Nuclear
Program – Is the International Community up to the task?, Lamont Lecture at the Belfer Center, Harvard
University, October 30, 2007, www.carnegieendowment.org/files/lamontlecture_goldschmidt.pdf, (05.06.08).
And:
George Perkovich/ Jessica T. Mathews/ Joseph Cirincione/ Rose Gottemoeller/ Jon B. Wolfsthal: Universal
Compliance a strategy for nuclear security, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, D.C.
2007, p. 169.
Oliver Schmidt: Dissertation – MA International Relations – Lancaster University
46
other sources, or the denial of access to certain technologies as uranium enrichment, in
contradiction to the NPT.
In the case of Iran, the investigations by the IAEA and recent intelligence agencies could not
prove that Iran is or is not pursuing nuclear weapons. The US Intelligence Estimate of
November 2007 concluded that Iran has had a nuclear weapons program until 2003, since then,
the publicly accessible report cannot provide any information about an active Iranian nuclear
weapon program.210 Iran possesses the technical means to develop a nuclear explosive device and
means to deliver a nuclear warhead. The nuclear enrichment facility in Natanz could theoretically
be used for a nuclear weapons break-out, using highly enriched uranium. The heavy-water
production plant and reactor in Arak could offer a second break-out option, using plutonium for
the design of a nuclear weapon. The mentioned ‘green salt project’ could indicate first research
concerning the design of an implosion-type nuclear device. The involvement of Iran’s military in
the nuclear program is still a matter of investigation and is not clear by June 2008.211 It is clear
that Iran is developing the infrastructure to indigenously design and manufacture ballistic and
cruise missiles, which could be used for the delivery of a nuclear warhead. The repeated
announcement of an Iranian space launch project could indicate the attempt to build
intercontinental ballistic missiles, as other nations have used this way to develop long-range
capabilities.212 But, it remains unclear whether Iran really intends to build a nuclear weapon. If
Iran really would do so, it would be very difficult to conceal a complete nuclear weapons and
missile program. It would take years until first tests could be conducted and additional time to
build and integrate a nuclear warhead into a ballistic or cruise missile.213
210
US National Intelligence Council: National Intelligence Estimate - Iran: Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities,
November 2007, <http://www.dni.gov/press_releases/20071203_release.pdf>, (14.05.08).
See also:
Graham Allison: New Iran IAEA Report – Reading between the lines, 28. February 2008, Belfer Center for
Science and international Affairs, Harvard University,
http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/18075/new_iran_iaea_report.htm, (05.06.08).
And:
Shahram Chubin: Iran’s Nuclear Ambitions, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington D.C.,
2006, p. 10.
211
Mark Fitzpatrick: Can Iran's Nuclear Capability Be Kept Latent?, in: Survival, 49:1, March 2007, pp. 33 –
58.
212
Robin Hughes, Jane’s Defence Weakly: Iran’s Ballistic Missile Development – Long-range Ambitions, 13.
September 2006.
213
US National Intelligence Council: National Intelligence Estimate - Iran: Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities,
November 2007, <http://www.dni.gov/press_releases/20071203_release.pdf>, (14.05.08).
Oliver Schmidt: Dissertation – MA International Relations – Lancaster University
47
Assessing the capability side it has to be concluded that Iran possesses the technical means to
develop a nuclear weapon capability in the medium to long-term future and therefore can be
categorized as a risk, because theoretically the intentions of governments can change.
3.4
The Security Model
After the technical evaluation of Iran’s nuclear program it is time to assess Iran’s intentions with
the help of Scott Sagan’s three models. As described earlier, according to the security model a
state would likely develop nuclear weapons if it would enhance the country’s security. This means
for the case of Iran that if the country faces a security threat that endangers its sovereignty and
national interest, the country could decide to develop an independent nuclear weapon capability
to enhance its security. Vice versa that means, if Iran is not or no longer facing an external threat,
which is challenging its sovereignty and national interest, the country would likely refrain to
acquire nuclear weapons.
3.4.1 The International Level
Assessing Iran’s geopolitical neighbourhood it is worth mentioning that Iran is ‘surrounded’ by
nuclear-armed states, including Russia, Pakistan, India, Israel and US forces in the region.214 To
balance these nuclear capabilities could be one incentive for Iran to develop nuclear weapons.215
While former Cold War tensions with Russia have disappeared, provocations, frictions and some
military conflicts mark Iranian – US relations since the Islamic Revolution.216 In particular, the
US led intervention in Kuwait and Iraq in 1990 – 1991 and the presence of US military at the
Persian Gulf and the whole Middle East ever since has raised Iranian concerns.217 Especially,
since the ‘Axis of Evil’ speech by US President George W. Bush in 2002 and the invasion of Iraq
in 2003, Iranian concerns have intensified.
214
Cirincione, Joseph/ Jon B. Wolfsthal/ Miriam Rajkumar: Deadly Arsenals – Tracking Weapons of Mass
Destruction, Washington D.C., 2002. S 256.
215
Anthony H. Cordesman/ Khalid R. Al-Rodhan: Iran’s Weapons of Mass Destrcution – The Real and
Potential Threat, The CSIS Press, Washington D.C., 2006, p. 12.
216
The tanker-war of 1984 – 1988 and the Iranian hostage crisis of 1979 – 1981, are examples of military
confrontations.
217
Hadi Semati: Iran’s Priorities, in: Sean McNight/ Neil Patrick/ Francis Toase (Editor): Gulf Security –
Opportunities and Challenges fort he new Geration, Whitehall Paper Series, No. 51, Royal United Service
Institute for Defence Studies and the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, London, 2000, p. 39.
Oliver Schmidt: Dissertation – MA International Relations – Lancaster University
48
The US has three major interests in the region. The first one can be directly traced back to the
history of US – Iranian relations since the Islamic Revolution – to contain the regime in Tehran,
and since 2001 change it, if possible, according to the US National Security Strategy.218 A second
interest of the US is the security of the free flow of oil from the Middle East through the Persian
Gulf, as the major shipping route. This has been a central US objective since the presidency of
Richard Nixon and Jimmy Carter, with the latter saying:
Any attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Golf region will be regarded as an
assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by
any means necessary, including military force.219
The necessity of a free oil flow through the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz becomes even
more important for the US, considering the topic if energy supply and energy security. A nucleararmed Iran would pose a major challenge for the US sphere of interest and US military
predominance at the Persian Gulf and beyond.220 A third US interest in the region is the security
of its major ally Israel, which benefits from US security and economic assistance. As a result, the
US pursues a containment, possibly a regime change strategy in order to prevent a nuclear-armed
Iran which would endanger US policy objectives in the region of the Greater Middle East.221
Iran’s perception of a US threat has increased significantly after US President George W. Bush
held his state of the union address in 2002. Even though Iran and the US have cooperated during
the US military campaign in Afghanistan, which has began in 2001 Iran perceives a US threat.222
The consequences for Iraq in 2003, to be a state on the ‘Axis of Evil’, have shown the US
willingness to change regimes by force.
218
For a detailed description and analysis of the US – Iranian Relations see:
Ali M Ansari: Confronting Iran – The Failure of American Foreign Policy and the ext crisis in the Middle East,
Basic Books, New York, 2006.
And:
Kenneth M Pollack: The Persian Puzzle – The Conflict between Iran and America, for the Saban Center,
Brookings Institution, Random House, New York, 2004.
219
US President Jimmy Carter State of the Union Address 1980, www.thisnation.com/library/sotu/1980jc.html,
(06.06.08).
This commitment has been proven during the tanker-war of 1984 – 1988 as a part of the Iran – Iraq war, when
the US Navy escorted oil tanker through the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz.
220
Morton Bremer Mœrli/ Sverre Lodgaard: Nuclear Proliferation and International Security, Routledge, New
York, 2007, p. 105.
221
Morton Bremer Mœrli/ Sverre Lodgaard: Nuclear Proliferation and International Security, Routledge, New
York, 2007, p. 106.
222
Ali M. Ansari: Confronting Iran – The Failure of American Foreign Policy and the next Great Crisis in the
Middle East, Basic Books, New York, 2006, pp. 186 – 195; 212 – 221.
Oliver Schmidt: Dissertation – MA International Relations – Lancaster University
49
Our second goal is to prevent regimes that sponsor terror from threatening America or our friends
and allies with weapons of mass destruction. […] Iran aggressively pursues these weapons and
exports terror, while an unelected few repress the Iranian people's hope for freedom. […] States like
these, and their terrorist allies, constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world.
By seeking weapons of mass destruction, these regimes pose a grave and growing danger. They could
provide these arms to terrorists, giving them the means to match their hatred. They could attack our
allies or attempt to blackmail the United States. In any of these cases, the price of indifference
would be catastrophic.223
In Addition to the Axis of Evil speech the US declared in September 2002 its new
National Security Strategy, which includes the pre-emptive use of force against any
possible aggressor and the promotion of regime change even by military means.224
Iran has realised that a US intervention cannot be deterred by conventional means, because even
the possible possession of chemical weapons has been demonstrated as not sufficient against the
US. Furthermore, the US was able to overthrow the regime of Saddam Hussein in twenty-one
days. Therefore, the Iranian calculus could be that only the possession of a nuclear deterrent
would guarantee its sovereignty and security.225
The increasing US military presence and show of force in the Persian Gulf – Iran’s vital trade
route and necessary for Iran’s economic stability – might even intensify Iran’s feeling of
insecurity and concerns regarding encirclement in preparation for the next regime change.226 This
perception is again confirmed by the US National Security Strategy of 2006, which claims that
223
US President George W. Bush: The President’s State of the Union Adress, The United States Capitol,
Washington D.C., January 29, 2002, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/2002012911.htmlhttp://www.whitehouse.gov/march11/timeline/sixb.html, (06.06.08).
224
The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, September 2002,
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/2002/nss.pdf>, (09.06.08).
The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, March 2006,
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/2006/nss2006.pdf>, (09.06.08).
225
James A Russel (Editor): Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East: Directions and
Policy Options in the New Century, Palgrave, 2006, New York, p. 55.
226
IISS Strategic Survey – the annual review of world affairs: Middle East / Gulf, 107:1, p. 217.
And:
Anthony H. Cordesman: Iran, Oil, and the Strait of Hormuz, CSIS, Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy, March
26, 2007. (available at www.csis.org/burke)
Also:
James A Russel (Editor): Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East: Directions and
Policy Options in the New Century, Palgrave, 2006, p. 55.
Oliver Schmidt: Dissertation – MA International Relations – Lancaster University
50
Iran presents the single greatest threat to the US.227 However, it becomes more and more obvious
that the US engagement in Afghanistan and Iraq does not allow any further military engagement
with ground forces, which would be essential for an occupation and regime change.228
3.4.2 The Regional Level
Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, as speaker of the Iranian parliament and commander-in-chief of
Iran’s armed forces, said in 1988:
With regard to chemical, bacteriological, and radiological weapons training, it was made very clear
during the [Iran – Iraq] war that these weapons are very decisive. It was also made clear that the
moral teachings of the world does not respect its own resolutions and closes its eyes to the violation
and all the aggressions which are committed in the battlefield. We should fully equip ourselves both
in the offensive and defensive use of chemical, bacterial, and radiological weapons. From now on you
should make use of the opportunity and perform this task.229
Describing Iran’s threat perception, it is important to note that the Iran – Iraq war of 1980 –
1988, still has a major impact on Iranian security thinking.230 Iraq’s use of weapons of mass
destruction against Iran and the lack of an adequate international response have increased the
227
The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, March 2006,
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/2006/nss2006.pdf>, (09.06.08).
Morton Bremer Mœrli/ Sverre Lodgaard: Nuclear Proliferation and International Security, Routledge, New
York, 2007, p. 105.
228
James A. Russell: Regional Threats and Security Strategy – The troubling case of today’s Middle East,
Strategic Studies Institute (SSI), Carlisle, November 2007, p. 7. (available at
http://www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil/).
For assessments of military strike options see:
Paul Rogers: Iran - Consequences of a War, Oxford Research Group Briefing Paper, Oxford, 2006.
Anthony H. Cordesman Khalid R. Al-Rodhan: Iranian Nuclear Weapons? The Options if Diplomacy Fails, CSIS
Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy April 7, 2006.
Anthony H. Cordesman Khalid R. Al-Rodhan: Iranian Nuclear Weapons? Options for Sanctions and Military
Strikes, CSIS Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy, August 30, 2006.
Stephen Blanchette, Jr.: Military Intervention in Iran – Why and How, The Institute of Land Warfare, The
Association of the United States Army, Arlington, 2007.
229
Cited in: Cirincione, Joseph/ Jon B. Wolfsthal/ Miriam Rajkumar: Deadly Arsenals – Tracking Weapons of
Mass Destruction, Washington D.C., 2002. S 256; from: Theran Domestic Service, Hashemi-Rafsanjani Speaks
on the Future of the IRGC Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps, October 6, 1988, in FBIS-NES, October 7,
1988, p. 52.
230
Kamran Taremi: Beyond the Axis of Evil – Ballistic Missiles in Iran’s Military Thinking, in: Security
Dialogue, 2005; Vol. 36, No. 93, pp. 93 – 108.
Also:
Christin Marshall: Iran’s Persian Gulf Policy, Routledge Curzon, London, New York, 2003, pp. 98 – 100.
Oliver Schmidt: Dissertation – MA International Relations – Lancaster University
51
perception that the Islamic Republic faces no support on the international level.231 Since then the
most immediate and emerging threat has been Iraq, followed by instabilities in Iran’s regional
neighbourhood, namely Afghanistan and Central Asia.232 While Israel, as a nuclear-armed state, is
perceived as a challenge to Iran’s security and interests, the main rival until 2003 has remained
Iraq.233 Until the regime change in Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq by US and allied forces in 2003,
Iraq was the main threat perceived in Iran.234 Now, there are several regional challenges for Iran’s
security even after two sources of insecurity have disappeared. The close ties to the US of Iran’s
neighbours like Georgia, Uzbekistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Bahrain and
Iraq is what concerns the country, as it lives a long tradition of rivalry to the US and its regional
interests.235 It is remarkable that even though Iran’s de-facto security has improved since the US
engagement in 2001 in Afghanistan and 2003 in Iraq, the perceived threat has increased.236
231
Shahram Chubin: Iran’s Nuclear Ambitions, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington D.C.,
2006, pp. 18 – 19.
232
James A Russel (Editor): Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East: Directions and
Policy Options in the New Century, Palgrave, New York, 2006, p. 53.
Also:
Shahram Chubin: Whither Iran? Reform, Domestic Politics and National Security, in: Adelphi Paper 342, The
International Institute for Strtegic Studies (IISS), Oxford Univeristy Press, London, New York, 2002, pp .43 –
48.
233
James A Russel (Editor): Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East: Directions and
Policy Options in the New Century, Palgrave, New York, 2006, p. 53.
Also:
Hadi Semati: Iran’s Priorities, in: Sean McNight/ Neil Patrick/ Francis Toase (Editor): Gulf Security –
Opportunities and Challenges fort he new Geration, Whitehall Paper Series, No. 51, Royal United Service
Institute for Defence Studies and the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, London, 2000, p. 38.
Daniel Byman/ Shahram Chubin, Anoushiravan Ehteshami/ Jerrold Green: Iran’s Security Policy in the PostRevolutionary Era, RAND National Defense Research Institute, Santa Monica, 2001.
234
Hadi Semati: Iran’s Priorities, in: Sean McNight/ Neil Patrick/ Francis Toase (Editor): Gulf Security –
Opportunities and Challenges fort he new Geration, Whitehall Paper Series, No. 51, Royal United Service
Institute for Defence Studies and the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, London, 2000, p. 38.
235
Walter Posch (Editor): Iranian Challenges, European Union Institute for Security Stuides, Chaillot Paper No.
89, May 2006, pp. 62 – 64.
Also:
Patrick Clawson/ Michael Rubin: Eternal Iran – Continuity and Chaos, Palgrave McMillan, New York,
Houndmills, 2005.
And:
Ali M Ansari: Confronting Iran – The Failure of American Foreign Policy and the ext crisis in the Middle East,
Basic Books, New York, 2006.
And:
Kenneth M. Pollack: The Persian Puzzle – The Conflict between Iran and America, for the Saban Center,
Brookings Institution, Random House, New York, 2004.
236
James A Russel (Editor): Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East: Directions and
Policy Options in the New Century, Palgrave, New York, 2006, p. 55.
Oliver Schmidt: Dissertation – MA International Relations – Lancaster University
52
With Saddam gone, America has emerged as the foremost strategic problem for Iran and the
primary driver of its nuclear weapons policy.237
But, it is necessary to acknowledge that Iran has become a more powerful actor in region since
the collapse of Iraq under Saddam Hussein, consequently its regional neighbours perceive Iran as
one major source of insecurity.238 In reaction to Iran’s increasing influence in the Gulf region, the
Arab nations rely more on US security assistance, which becomes obvious in multi-billon US
Dollar arms trade agreements between Saudi Arabia and the US.239
It is essential to realise that perceived threats in the region of the Persian Gulf have two main two
possible sources. The first is the classical military risk of invasion and occupation, which is still a
beneficial option because of the oil and gas revenues that would come along with new territory.
Consequently, the focus lies on a balance-of-power approach to assess and deter possible risks
and threats.240 The second source of insecurity is the cross-border linkage of ethnicity, religion, or
ideology, which could cause internal destabilisation.241 Examples are growing tensions between
Sunni and Shiite groups in states like Lebanon or Bahrain, or ideological conflicts, for example
the idea to spread Iran’s Islamic Revolution throughout the Middle East in the early phase of the
revolution.242 Thinking about security challenges beyond the inter-state level, it is interesting to
237
James A Russel (Editor): Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East: Directions and
Policy Options in the New Century, Palgrave, New York, 2006, p. 54.
238
Shahram Chubin: Iran’s Nuclear Ambitions, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington D.C.,
2006, p. 16.
Also:
Marina Ottaway/ Nathan J. Brown/ Amr Hamzawy/ Karim Sadjadpour/ Paul Salem: The New Middle East,
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington D.C., 2008, p. 8.
And:
Sammy Salama & Heidi Weber: Arab nuclear envy, in: Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, September/ October
2007, pp. 44 – 63.
Also:
IISS Strategic Comments: Iran and its neighbours, 11:6, 01 August 2005, pp. 1 – 2,
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1356788051163, (08.06.08).
239
Helene Cooper/ Mark Mazzetti, The New York Times: Rice Outlines Saudi Arms Package, July 30, 2007,
www.nytimes.com/2007/07/30/world/europe/30cnd-weapons.htm, (09.06.08).
And:
Thomas R. Mattair: Mutual Threat Perceptions in the Arab/ Persian Gulf – GCC Perceptions, in: Middle East
Policy, Vol. 14, No. 2, Summer 2007, pp. 133 – 140.
And:
Barry Rubin (Editor): Crisis in the Contemporary Persian Gulf, Frank Class, London, Portland, 2002, pp. 163 181.
240
F. Gregory Gause, III: Threats and Threat Perceptions in the Persian Gulf Region, in: Middle East Policy,
Vol. 14, No. 2, Summer 2007, pp119 – 124.
241
F. Gregory Gause, III: Threats and Threat Perceptions in the Persian Gulf Region, in: Middle East Policy,
Vol. 14, No. 2, Summer 2007, pp119 – 124.
242
F. Gregory Gause, III: Threats and Threat Perceptions in the Persian Gulf Region, in: Middle East Policy,
Vol. 14, No. 2, Summer 2007, p. 121.
Oliver Schmidt: Dissertation – MA International Relations – Lancaster University
53
see that former sources of insecurity have disappeared, for instance in Afghanistan. In addition,
Iran is actively supporting Shiite groups in Bahrain and the Hezbollah in Lebanon to enhance its
regional influence.
Because of the complexity of the political relations among the states of the greater Middle East
regarding security policy it is impossible to address all, important aspects. Please see a selection of
very helpful literature addressing the politics of the Middle East.243
3.4.3 Preliminary Conclusion
To sum up security factors which could influence Iran’s decision to build nuclear weapons, it can
be concluded that Iran’s main foreign policy interests is, as defined in the constitution of 1979:
Also:
Preamble of the translated constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, at the International Constitutional Law
Project at the University of Bern, http://www.servat.unibe.ch/law/icl/ir00000_.html, (09.04.08).
Also:
Jalil Roshandel: Iran’s Foreign and Security Policies – How the Decisionmaking Process Evolved, in: Security
Dialogue, 31:1, 2000, p. 106.
243
See for instance:
Marina Ottaway/ Nathan J. Brown/ Amr Hamzawy/ Karim Sadjadpour/ Paul Salem: The New Middle East,
Carnegei Endowment for International Peace, Washington D.C., 2008.
House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, Fith Report of Session 2007 – 08: Global Security – Iran, The
House of Commons, 20 February 2008, chapter 3,
www.prliament.uk/parliamentry_committees/foreign_affairs_commettee.cfm, (30.07.08).
Thérèse Delpech: Iran and the Bomb – The Abdication of International Responsibility, Columbia University
Press New York, in association with the Centre d’Études et de Recherches Internationales, Paris, 2007.
Robert Lowe/ Claire Spencer (Editor): Iran, its Neighbours and the Regional Crisis – A Middle East Programme
Report, Chattam House, London, 2006.
Eugene Whitlock (Editor): Iran and its Neighbours – Diverging Views on a Strategic Region – Vol. II, German
Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP), Berlin, March 2004.
Eugene Whitlock (Editor): Iran and its Neighbours – Diverging Views on a Strategic Region, German Institute
for International and Security Affairs (SWP), Berlin, July 2003.
William Cleveland: A History of the Modern Middle East (3rd Edition), Westview Press, Boulder, Oxford, 2004.
Beverly Milton-Edwards: Contemporary Politics in the Middle East (2nd Edition), Polity Press, Malden,
Cambridge, 2007.
Deborah J. Gerner/ Jilian Schwedler: Understanding the Contemporary Middle East (2nd Edition), Lynne
Rienner Publishers, Boulder, London, 2004.
Louise Fawcett: International Relations of the Middle East, Oxford University Press, Oxford, New York, 2005.
Anoushiravan Ehteshami/ Raymond A. Hinnebusch: Syria and Iran – Middle powers in a penetrated regional
system, Routledge, London, New York, 1997.
Raymond A. Hinnebusch/ Anoushiravan Ehteshami (Editor): The Foreign Policies of Middle East States, Lynne
Rienner Publishers, Boulder, London, 2002.
Farhang Jahanpour: Iran’ Nuclear Programme and Regional Security, Oxford Research Group, April 2007.
Nicole Stracke: Nuclear Non-Proliferation from a Gulf Perspective, FES Briefing Paper, April 2008.
Oliver Schmidt: Dissertation – MA International Relations – Lancaster University
54
The foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran is based upon the rejection of all forms of
domination, both the exertion of it and submission to it, the preservation of the independence of the
country in all respects and its territorial integrity, the defence of the rights of all Muslims,
nonalignment with respect to the hegemonist superpowers, and the maintenance of mutually peaceful
relations with all non-belligerent States.244
That means for the current situation, Iran’s biggest security challenge is the US influence in the
region of the Persian Gulf. Militarily, Iran’s major rival, Iraq has vanished and new security
cooperation between these to former hostile states is about to develop.245 The US and Israel are
perceived as possible military threats, because of their opposition to Iran’s nuclear program and
their military capability that provides the option to act on their behalf. As a lesson of Iran’s
history, it might be a conclusion to believe that only nuclear weapons, in combination with
ballistic missiles would provide the credible deterrent needed to stop the US or Israel from
attacking. However, from a theoretical viewpoint, both the US and Israel are developing ballistic
missile defence systems, which could dissuade Iran to acquire ballistic missiles and weapons of
mass destruction, because the capability to actively defend against missiles reduces their political
value as a possible deterrent.246 The US argument is:
We aim to convince our adversaries that they cannot achieve their goals with WMD, and thus deter
and dissuade them from attempting to use or even acquire these weapons in the first place.247
And,
Rogue states such as Iran, Iraq, Libya and North Korea are less likely to invest in missiles as a
weapon of choice if they know they will face effective defenses.248
Considering the regional balance, the risk remains that one case of proliferation causes the next,
which increases the risk of an arms race. Additionally, the incentive remains to strike preemptively against possible rivals, before they can develop a deterrent or before they have a
244
Article 152 of the translated constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, at the International Constitutional
Law Project at the University of Bern, http://www.servat.unibe.ch/law/icl/ir00000_.html, (09.04.08).
245
Thomas Erdbrink/ Amit R. Paley, The Washington Post: Iran Urges Closer Defense Ties With Iraq, June 9,
2008.
246
William Schneider Jr.: Missile Defence as an Instrument of Non-Proliferation Policy, in: Robin Ranger,
David Wiencek, Jeremy Stocker (ed.): International Missile Defence? Opportunities, Challenges and
Implications for Europe, The Royal United Institute for Defence Studies, Whitehall Paper 55, Stephen Austin &
Sons Ltd., London, 2002, pp 72 – 82.
247
The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, March 2006, p 23,
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/2006/nss2006.pdf>, (08.06.08).
248
US Departement of State, Bureau of Nonproliferation: Fact Sheet, 1. September 2001,
<http://www.state.gov/t/isn/rls/fs/2001/4932.htm>, (08.06.08).
Oliver Schmidt: Dissertation – MA International Relations – Lancaster University
55
leading position in the arms race.249 The introduction of another nuclear-armed state in the region
however, would increase security tensions in the Gulf region, which could lead to military nuclear
proliferation by states like Egypt, Saudi Arabia and possibly even Turkey.250 Although, in contrast
to this opinion, an Iranian nuclear deterrent could also contain US and Israel’s regional ambitions
and therefore provide a political benefit for other regional states.251 In the case of Iran it can be
concluded that even tough old rivals have disappeared the US presence causes the most urgent
security challenge. Alongside this, Iran is pursuing its new role as regional hegemon.252 As a
result, the possession of a nuclear deterrent would enhance Iran’s regional position against the
US and Israel, it could deter any attempted by these states to strike against Iran’s nuclear program
(like Israel did it on June 7, 1981, when it destroyed the Iraqi Osirak reactor), or to conduct a
regime change by force, as has happened in Iraq. The IISS Strategic Dossier notes in this context:
Officially, Iran declared that its nuclear programme was entirely peaceful. Privately, however, some
Iranians acknowledged that the enrichment programme would create a nuclear weapons option,
249
Kenneth N. Waltz, in: Scott D. Sagen/ Kenneth N. Waltz: The Spread of Nuclear Weapons – A Debate
Renewed, W.W. Norton & Company, New York, London, 2nd Edition, 2003.
And:
John H. Herz: International politics in the atomic age, Columbia University Press, New York, 1965.
Also:
Scott D. Sagen: The Perils of Proliferation: Organization Theory, Deterrence Theory and the Spread of Nuclear
Weapons, in: International Security 18, no. 4, Spring 1994, pp. 66 – 107.
Scott D. Sagen: The Limits of Safety – Organizations, Accidents, and Nuclear Weapons, Princeton University
Press, Princeton, 1993.
250
The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) – IISS Strategic Dossier: Nuclear Programmes in the
Middle East – In the Shadow of Iran, The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), London, 2008.
And:
Sammy Salama & Heidi Weber: Arab nuclear envy, in: Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, September/ October
2007, pp. 44 – 63.
And:
IISS Strategic Comments: Iran and its neighbours, 11:6, 01 August 2005, pp. 1 – 2,
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1356788051163, (08.06.08).
Also:
Henry Sokolski/ Patrick Clawson (Editor): Getting Ready for a Nuclear-Ready Iran, The Strategic Studies
Institute (SSI), Carlisle, 2005, pp. 29 – 35.
And:
Tariq Khaitous: Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists: Why Arab leaders worry about Iran’s nuclear program, 23.
May 2008, www.thebulletin.org/node/2655, (02.06.08).
251
Expressed in: Henry Sokolski/ Patrick Clawson (Editor): Getting Ready for a Nuclear-Ready Iran, The
Strategic Studies Institute (SSI), Carlisle, 2005, p. 25.
252
Shahram Chubin: Iran’s Nuclear Ambitions, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington D.C.,
2006, pp. 16.
Also:
Oliver Thränert: Ending Suspicious Nuclear Activities in Iran – Discussing the European Approach, Working
Paper, the German Insitute for International and Securtiy Affairs, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP), 18.
November 2004, <http://www.swp-berlin.org/en/common/get_document.php?asset_id=1758>, (08.06.08).
Oliver Schmidt: Dissertation – MA International Relations – Lancaster University
56
which, they said, was necessary to assure Iran’s status and security in a rough neighbourhood of
nuclear-armed powers, including Israel, Russia, India and Pakistan, as well as US forces.253
However, the time of the acquisition process – from developing all necessary components of
nuclear weapons and its delivery systems, to the final deployment of the weapon systems – is a
very critical situation. If a state detects a nuclear weapons program, the state could be attempted
to strike against nuclear facilities before a deterrent and a second-strike capability can be
deployed. Currently, such plans are discussed by factions in the US and Israel, which currently
represents the greatest security challenge to Iran.254
More than any other nation, Iran has always perceived itself as the natural hegemon of its
neighbourhood. […] Yet Iran’s nationalistic hubris is married to a sense of insecurity derived from
persistent invasion by hostile forces.255
It cannot be ruled out that Iran perceives severe security challenges that could be a motivation
for the Islamic Republic of Iran to develop a military nuclear capability for deterrence, although
the continuation of a military nuclear program increases or poses the most significant threat for
Iran’s territorial integrity.
3.5
The Domestic Politics Model
[The domestic politics] model of nuclear weapons proliferation focuses on the domestic actors who
encourages or discourages governments from pursuing the bomb.256
Scott Sagan argues that nuclear weapons decisions always serve the interests of some domestic
actors, in particular from the military, or scientific and business actors, and politicians.257 The
253
The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) – IISS Dossier: Iran’s Strategic Weapons Programmes
– a net assessment, Routledge Taylor and Francis Group, Abingdon, New York, 2005, p. 26.
254
See for example:
Haaretz: Defense offical – Mofaz remrk on Iran strike is not state policy, 08.06.08,
www.haaretz.com/hasen/objects/pages/PrintArticleEn.jhtml?itemNo=991145, (08.06.08).
And:
BBC News: US Iran attack plans revealed, 20.October 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/uk/go/pr/fr//2/hi/middle_east/6376639.stm, (08.06.08).
255
Ray Takeyh: Hidden Iran – Paradox and power in the Islamic Republic, A Council on Foreign Relations
Book, Times Books, New York, 2006, p.63.
256
Scott D. Sagan: Why do States Build Nuclear Weapons – Three Models in Search of a Bomb, in: International
Security, Vol. 21, No. 3, Winter 1996/1997, p. 55.
257
Scott D. Sagan: Why do States Build Nuclear Weapons – Three Models in Search of a Bomb, in: International
Security, Vol. 21, No. 3, Winter 1996/1997, pp. 63 – 64.
Oliver Schmidt: Dissertation – MA International Relations – Lancaster University
57
model also explains that politicians use a nuclear decision to enhance their political standing.
Karsten Fry refers to this aspect and enhances Sagan’s model by saying:
The parochial interest of certain actors within the policy making process strongly influences the
country’s nuclear choice. Those actors interested in the acquisition of nuclear weapons commonly
belong to the military, the military-industrial complex, the nuclear scientific establishment, and the
political class. Frequently, the common interest of these actors leads to the formation of a collation, a
‘strategic elite’, which seeks administrative as well as communicative power by controlling public
opinion.258
Consequently, an anti-nuclear decision would be made in Iran when a strong anti-nuclear lobby
can influence the decision-making process or a decision in favour of nuclear weapons would
harm a politicians standing and public support. That means a pro-nuclear weapon decision is
likely if a strong group of political actors can influence the political debate and/or the current
government gain support in case of a pro-nuclear weapon decision. As a result, the question is
whether there are political actors in Iran in favour of nuclear weapon procurement and how
President Ahmadinejad uses the debate for his political purposes? Karsten Frey notes:
By controlling public opinion, the strategic elite is able to create a positive public disposition towards
nuclear weapons by building up threat perceptions, and, more significantly, by attaching symbolic
values to nuclear devices: national pride, collective dignity, or their negative counter-values such as
collective defiance and insult.259
In this chapter about the ‘domestic politics model’, international and regional aspects are
addressed together as external factors.
3.5.1 International & Regional Aspects
President Ahmadinejad has been very clever at using external international pressure against his
policy on nuclear questions. He has used that to fly the Iranian flag and stir up nationalist feelings
within Iran.260
258
Karsten Frey: Nuclear Weapons as Symbols – The Role of Norms in Nuclear Policy Making, The Institute
Barcelona d’Estudies Internationales (IBEI) Working Paper, October 2006, p. 14.
259
Karsten Frey: Nuclear Weapons as Symbols – The Role of Norms in Nuclear Policy Making, The Institute
Barcelona d’Estudies Internationales (IBEI) Working Paper, October 2006, p. 14.
260
Dr. Kim Howells MP, Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, cited in: House of Commons
Foreign Affairs Committee, Fifth Report of Session 2007 – 08: Global Security – Iran, The House of Commons,
Oliver Schmidt: Dissertation – MA International Relations – Lancaster University
58
During the current presidency of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad a shift in Iran’s foreign and security
policy has occurred. The current president of the Islamic Republic was elected in 2005 as the
successor of Mohammed Khatami. Compared to his predecessor, he has a more aggressive
rhetoric towards the West and Israel. Internationally, Ahmadinejad seeks allies among sates
opposing the United States, like Venezuela and Cuba. He also tries to strengthen diplomatic
relations with Muslim countries in the greater Middle East and Sub-Sahara Africa, and maintains
contacts with states like Sudan that is considered to be a rouge state. Ahmadinejad opposes any
pro-western or pro-Israel policy of his regional neighbours, and despite ongoing Persian – Arab
tensions he has tried to find acceptance among the Arab states with an intensified anti-Israel
rhetoric.261 It seems that the current presidency conducts its ‘policy of confrontation’ with the
support from various factions within the governmental, clerical and military system.262 It is
important to consider that President Ahmadinejad uses his offensive speeches to unify Iran’s
population and gather support. This is especially the case for Iran’s nuclear program.
Ahmadinejad presents the nuclear program as question of national sovereignty, pride and dignity,
while stressing the urgency of external security challenges posed by the US and Israel.263 This
policy is interpreted as the president’s strategy to secure the influence and power of his
conservative, hardliner fraction in the Iranian political system.264
For all the importance of international affairs to the Ahmadinejad presidency, it should be
kept in mind that the central consideration was always the establishment of domestic
hegemony. The international stage was an arena in which domestic political rivalries could be
played out – a reality frequently overlooked by observers in the West – as well as the vital
20 February 2008, p. 36, www.prliament.uk/parliamentry_committees/foreign_affairs_commettee.cfm,
(30.07.08).
261
Anoushiravan Ehteshami/ Mahjoob Zweiri: Iran and the Rise of its Neoconservatives – The Politics of
Tehran’s Silent Revolution, I.B. Tuaris, London, New York, 2007, pp. 105 – 110.
262
Ali M. Ansari: Iran under Ahmadinejad – The Politcs of Confrontation, in: Adelphi Papers, 47:393, October
2007.
263
Mehran Kamrava: Iranian National Security Debates – Factionalism and lost Opportunities, in: Middle East
Policy, Vol XIV, No. , Summer 2007, pp. 95 – 97.
264
House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, Fifth Report of Session 2007 – 08: Global Security – Iran,
The House of Commons, 20 February 2008, p. 36,
www.prliament.uk/parliamentry_committees/foreign_affairs_commettee.cfm, (30.07.08).
And:
Jochen Kleinschmidt: Iranian Geopolitics, the Nuclear Issue and Emerging Counterstrategies, NATO School
Polaris Paper, Special Issue July 2008, p. 5,
www.natoschool.nato.int/internet_multimedia/multimedia_polaris/2008/Polaris_Special_July_2008.pdf,
(01.08.08).
Also:
Babak Ganji: Iranian Strategy – Factionalism & Leadership Politics, Conflict Studies Research Centre, Middle
East Series 07/06, Defence Academy of the United Kingdom, March 2007, pp. 3 – 5.
Oliver Schmidt: Dissertation – MA International Relations – Lancaster University
59
means for consolidating domestic control.265
3.5.2 Domestic Aspects
At the same time, these Iranians gave assurance that only a small minority of ‘hard liners’ in Iran
actually wanted to build nuclear weapons. … .266
In Iran foreign policy decisions in Iran are discussed among a close circle of decision makers.
Mehran Kamrava refers in his article to Iran’s former IAEA negotiator Hassan Rowhani, who
says that the domestic discussion on the nuclear question takes place at four different levels, first
the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the supreme national security council, thirdly a ministerial
committee and finally, a close circle consisting of the supreme leader, the president, former
president and current head of the assembly of experts Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, and the head
of the supreme national security council, currently Saeed Jalil.267 The supreme leader Ayatollah Ali
Khamenei is the highest authority regarding the formulation of foreign policy.268
The high public profile of the president and other representatives of the executive in the media and at
international conferences encourages the false belief that the executive plays a dominant role in setting
the domestic and foreign policy of Iran.269
The president is the most powerful actor in the executive branch and the second most powerful
in the country. Among his tasks is the appointment of the cabinet; he is also the central figure in
the planning and budget organisation, and the chairman of the supreme national security
council.270
The domestic political level in Iran is currently divided along two conservative fractions.
President Ahmadinejad is the leading figure of the conservative hardliners, who have lost
265
Ali M. Ansari: Iran under Ahmadinejad – The Politcs of Confrontation, in: Adelphi Papers, 47:393, October
2007, p.67.
266
The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) – IISS Dossier: Iran’s Strategic Weapons Programmes
– a net assessment, Routledge Taylor and Francis Group, Abingdon, New York, 2005, p. 26.
267
Mehran Kamrava: Iranian National Security Debates – Factionalism and lost Opportunities, in: Middle East
Policy, Vol XIV, No. , Summer 2007, p. 96.
268
Wilfired Buchta: Who Rules Iran? – The Structure of Power in the Islamic Republic, The Washington
Institute for Near East Policy, Washington D.C., 2000, pp. 48 – 50.
269
Wilfired Buchta: Who Rules Iran? – The Structure of Power in the Islamic Republic, The Washington
Institute for Near East Policy, Washington D.C., 2000, p. 23.
270
Wilfired Buchta: Who Rules Iran? – The Structure of Power in the Islamic Republic, The Washington
Institute for Near East Policy, Washington D.C., 2000, pp. 22 - 23.
Oliver Schmidt: Dissertation – MA International Relations – Lancaster University
60
influence compard to the pragmatic conservatives, whose leading figure is Akbar Hashemi
Rafsanjani. The reformist movement, under Mohammed Khatami, has lost influence since the
last presidential and parliamentary elections.271 Initially, President Ahmadinejad has the support
of the Supreme Leader but according to a Crisis Group Briefing from 2007:
he is increasingly uncomfortable with the president’s style.272
Furthermore, it is hard to determine the importance and significance of the Islamic Revolution
Guards Corps (IRGC) regarding Iran’s nuclear policy decision making. The IRGC is
subordinated to the supreme leader and is divided into an army, air force and navy branch; it also
includes an intelligence service and various smaller branches.273 The IRGC air force controls the
majority of Iran’s developing ballistic and cruise missile arsenal.274 Currently, the IRGC gains
growing influence over the defence industry and the national industry in general and therefore
expanded its economic role and influence.275 The IRGC supported Ahamdinejad’s election
campaign and still has close ties to the president, who served with the IRGC during the Iran –
Iraq war (1980 – 1988).276
The current president speaks in favour of the civil use of nuclear energy in execution of Iran’s
general right from the NPT. However, it is nearly impossible to find any proof for domestic
271
House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, Fifth Report of Session 2007 – 08: Global Security – Iran,
The House of Commons, 20 February 2008, p. 35,
www.prliament.uk/parliamentry_committees/foreign_affairs_commettee.cfm, (30.07.08).
And:
BBC News: Conservatives win Iran election, 16 March 2008,
www.news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/7297923.stm, (01.08.08).
There are two explanations for the declining influence of the reformist movement in Iran. First, during the
presidency of Khatami the reformer suffered losses in their popularity because of the accusation of corruption
and favouritism. Second, since the presidency of Ahmadinejad the Iranian Assembly of Experts have repeatedly
declined reformist candidates who stand for elections.
272
International Crisis Group, Middle East Policy Briefing No 21: Iran – Ahmadi-Nejad’s Tumultuous
Presidency, Tehran/ Brussels, 6. February 2007, p. 21.
And: Anoushiravan Ehteshami/ Mahjoob Zweiri: Iran and the Rise of its Neoconservatives – The Politics of
Tehran’s Silent Revolution, I.B. Tuaris, London, New York, 2007, pp. 105 – 119.
273
The Institute for International Strategic Studies (IISS): The Military Balance 2008 – Middle East and North
Africa, Routledge, London, 2007, p.243.
And: Anthony H. Cordesman, CSIS: Iran’s Revolutionary Guards, the Al Quds Force, and Other Intelligence
and Paramilitary Forces, August 16, 2007, http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/070816_cordesman_report.pdf,
(10.04.08).
274
Anthony H. Cordesman, CSIS: Iran’s Revolutionary Guards, the Al Quds Force, and Other Intelligence and
Paramilitary Forces, August 16, 2007, http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/070816_cordesman_report.pdf,
(10.04.08).
275
International Crisis Group, Middle East Policy Briefing No 21: Iran – Ahmadi-Nejad’s Tumultuous
Presidency, Tehran/ Brussels, 6. February 2007, p. 12.
276
The International Crisis Group, Middle East Briefing No 18: Iran – What Does Ahmadi-Nejad’s Victory
Mean?, 4 August 2005, pp. 5 – 6.
Oliver Schmidt: Dissertation – MA International Relations – Lancaster University
61
actors actively lobbying for a nuclear-armed Iran. Altough, Shahram Chubin concludes in one of
his recent reports that Iran is very likely developing a military nuclear capability.277 The only
indication for a connection of constitutional actors to a military nuclear program is the claim that
military sights are used for parts of the civil nuclear program.278 Mehran Kamrava points out that
all political fractions in Iran, the hardliner, the pragmatic conservatives, and the reformer agree
on the necessity to develop a civil nuclear program, they only differ to the extend they are willing
to sacrifice on behalf of the goal.279 Ahmadinejad and the hardliner fraction highlight the
importance of the nuclear program to enhance Iran’s regional and international status.280
Additionally, the current government under President Ahmadinejad has a strong incentive to
make use of foreign policy issues to compensate the failures of the government’s domestic
politics record. Ahmadinejad ran his presidential campaign with a focus on domestic issues;
important aspects were economic justice, protecting the Islamic way of life, and fighting
corruption. The policy outcome, however, was an economy at risk, increasing unemployment
rates, inflation, a lack of investments in central branches of Iran’s economy and state
interventions in the free market. The protection of the Islamic way of life has led to the
repression of political activists and the control of the media. Under Ahmadinejad’s presidency
favouritism has not disappeared either. The IRGC profits from its close relations to the president
and expands its business activities from the domestic defence industry into the broader national
industry and therefore expands its economic role and influence.281
Assessing the public discourse, two sources report that a majority of Iran’s population supports
the civil nuclear program, but this does not automatically implicate the same public opinion on
277
Shahram Chubin: Iran’s Risk-Taking in Perspective, The Insitute Francais des Relations Internationales (ifri)
– Proliferation Papers, Winter 200[7], pp. 23 – 27.
278
Mark Fitzpatrick: Assessing Iran’s Nuclear Programme, in: Survival, Vol. 18, No. 3, Autumn 2006, pp. 5 –
26.
279
Mehran Kamrava: Iranian National Security Debates – Factionalism and lost Opportunities, in: Middle East
Policy, Vol. XIV, NO. 2, Summer 2007, p. 95.
280
Mehran Kamrava: Iranian National Security Debates – Factionalism and lost Opportunities, in: Middle East
Policy, Vol. XIV, NO. 2, Summer 2007, p. 95.
281
International Crisis Group, Middle East Policy Briefing No 21: Iran – Ahmadi-Nejad’s Tumultuous
Presidency, Tehran/ Brussels, 6. February 2007.
And:
The International Crisis Group, Middle East Briefing No 18: Iran – What Does Ahmadi-Nejad’s Victory Mean?,
4 August 2005.
House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, Fifth Report of Session 2007 – 08: Global Security – Iran, The
House of Commons, 20 February 2008, chapter 4,
www.prliament.uk/parliamentry_committees/foreign_affairs_commettee.cfm, (30.07.08).
Helene Rang (Editor): Near and Middle East Economic Handbook 2006, German Near and Middle East
Association, Berlin, Hamburg, 2006, pp. 62 – 72.
Anoushiravan Ehteshami/ Mahjoob Zweiri: Iran and the Rise of its Neoconservatives – The Politics of Tehran’s
Silent Revolution, I.B. Tuaris, London, New York, 2007, pp. 73 – 93.
Oliver Schmidt: Dissertation – MA International Relations – Lancaster University
62
pro- nuclear weapons decisions. Especially, the possible costs and dangers of a nuclear weapon
program might lead to a negative attitude among a majority of Iran’s population.282 Concerning
the topic of public opinion it has to be acknowledged that Iran’s government monitor and
sanctions the media; and finally, for foreign policy decisions, public opinion is not necessarily
relevant in Iran.283
3.5.3 Preliminary Conclusion
It can be concluded that the president and his hardliner fraction do not have the last choice on
foreign policy issues and it is hard to assess the positions of each group within the political
system. One reason is that the close circles of the decision-making bodies are non-transparent
and positions are in a flux because of power rivalries between the different bodies and groups.284
Secondly, because foreign policy decisions are not dependant on public opinion, but foreign
policy is used to shape public opinion, it is hard to determine the public support for pro-nuclear
weapon choices.285 Only the suspected connection of the IRGC and other parts of the military
establishment to the civil nuclear program and the IISS Strategic Survey provide a sign indicating
that there are fractions in Iran’s political system in favour of nuclear weapons.286
At the same time, these Iranians gave assurance that only a small minority of ‘hard liners’ in Iran
actually wanted to build nuclear weapons. The majority, they argued, recognised that building
nuclear weapons would harm Iran’s national interests because this would make Iran the target of
282
House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, Fifth Report of Session 2007 – 08: Global Security – Iran,
The House of Commons, 20 February 2008, chapter 4,
www.prliament.uk/parliamentry_committees/foreign_affairs_commettee.cfm, (30.07.08).
And:
Michael Herzog: Iranian Public Opinion on the Nuclear Program – A Potential Asset for the International
Community, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Policy Focus No. 56, June 2006.
283
International Crisis Group, Middle East Policy Briefing No 21: Iran – Ahmadi-Nejad’s Tumultuous
Presidency, Tehran/ Brussels, 6. February 2007, http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=4647&l=1,
(14.04.08).
284
Mehran Kamrava: Iranian National Security Debates – Factionalism and lost Opportunities, in: Middle East
Policy, Vol. XIV, NO. 2, Summer 2007.
285
Michael Herzog: Iranian Public Opinion on the Nuclear Program – A Potential Asset for the International
Community, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Policy Focus No. 56, June 2006.
286
Mark Fitzpatrick: Assessing Iran’s Nuclear Programme, in: Survival, Vol. 18, No. 3, Autumn 2006, pp. 5 –
26.
And:
The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) – IISS Dossier: Iran’s Strategic Weapons Programmes – a
net assessment, Routledge Taylor and Francis Group, Abingdon, New York, 2005.
Oliver Schmidt: Dissertation – MA International Relations – Lancaster University
63
international pressure and arouse hostility and fear in the region, which would create more
opportunities for the US to entrench its security presence in the Persian Gulf 287
Finally, it cannot be shown that any constitutional body or actor speaks in favour of nuclear
weapon procurement. Additionally, it cannot be verified that the current president of Iran would
gain additional public support or legitimacy from the bomb. Ahmadinejad uses the conflict and
tensions to secure domestic power and influence for himself and his fraction, but this does not
mean he really wants Iran to be nuclear armed. In this context Dr. Ali Ansari reported to the
British Foreign Affairs Committee:
The nuclear progrmme and its development in Iran is a highly sensitive and very nationalistic issue. I
think that, in some ways, it has been exploited very effectively by the Government of Mr.
Ahmadiejad in order, perhaps, to disguise other failings in his Administration.288
3.6
The Norms Model
The normative disposition of a country towards nuclear weapons is rooted in the identity of its society.
The conception of identity in the context of foreign policy choices reflects the idea a society has about
what the country stands for in the world in comparison to other states. […] The concept of identity
translates into norms as behavioural patterns determining foreign and nuclear policy choices.289
According to Scott Sagan nuclear weapons can serve additional functions to security related
issues. They can also be symbols of technological progress and modernity and reflect the identity
of a nation.290 For example, the development of the atomic bomb in the US and Russia in the
early years of the Cold War was celebrated as a symbol of progress and modernity, the entrance
to the first nuclear age.291 Great Britain, France and China followed with their own nuclear
programs. In particular, France provides a good example for a pro-nuclear armament decision,
287
The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) – IISS Dossier: Iran’s Strategic Weapons Programmes
– a net assessment, Routledge Taylor and Francis Group, Abingdon, New York, 2005, p. 26.
288
House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, Fifth Report of Session 2007 – 08: Global Security – Iran,
The House of Commons, 20 February 2008, p 36,
www.prliament.uk/parliamentry_committees/foreign_affairs_commettee.cfm, (30.07.08).
289
Karsten Frey: Nuclear Weapons as Symbols – The Role of Norms in Nuclear Policy Making, The Institute
Barcelona d’Estudies Internationales (IBEI) Working Paper, October 2006, p. 6.
290
See also:
Barry O’Neil: Nuclear Weapons and National Prestige, Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1560, Yale
University, February 2006.
291
John Baylis/ James Wirtz/ Colin S. Gray/ Elliot Cohen: Strategy in the Contemporary World – An
Introduction to Strategic Studies, Second Edition, Oxford University Press, New York, 2007, pp. 209 – 214.
Oliver Schmidt: Dissertation – MA International Relations – Lancaster University
64
which is only partially a response to emerging security threats. France decision to develop nuclear
weapons can be explained by political and prestigious ambitions.292 In the case of Iran this means
it is likely that Iran desires to develop nuclear weapons if positive norms or attributes are
connected to the possession of nuclear arms. On the contrary it is likely that Iran refrain to
develop nuclear weapons if a negative normative predisposition is associated with the
development.
This section provides arguments to answer the question: which factors could affect the Iranian
public and decision-makers to a positive normative predisposition towards the development of
nuclear weapons?
3.6.1 International Aspects
According to the 1979 constitution of the Islamic republic of Iran, one major aspect of its foreign
policy is the rejection of any foreign domination or hegemony.
The foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran is based upon the rejection of all forms of
domination, both the exertion of it and submission to it, the preservation of the independence of the
country in all respects and its territorial integrity, the defence of the rights of all Muslims,
nonalignment with respect to the hegemonist superpowers, and the maintenance of mutually peaceful
relations with all non-belligerent States.293
Therefore, the possession of nuclear weapons could be the ultimate sign of independence and the
rejection of foreign intervention in domestic and regional affairs. Karsten Frey refers to ‘a desire
for immunity’ as one major motivation for the acquisition of nuclear weapons, combined with a
need for prestige. He adds:
292
Joseph Cirincione: Bomb Scare – The History of Nuclear Weapons, Columbia University Press, New York,
2007, pp. 59 – 61.
Also:
Scott D. Sagan: Why do States Build Nuclear Weapons – Three Models in Search of a Bomb, in: International
Security, Vol. 21, No. 3, Winter 1996/1997, pp. 76 – 80.
293
Chapter 10, Article 152 of the translated constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, at the International
Constitutional Law Project at the University of Bern, http://www.servat.unibe.ch/law/icl/ir00000_.html,
(29.07.08).
Oliver Schmidt: Dissertation – MA International Relations – Lancaster University
65
The likelihood of states wanting nuclear weapons is high if […] b) their normative predisposition
favors an independent, ‘sovereign’ foreign policy, and c) they display a pronounced perception of the
nation’s relative potential power.294
Frey also introduces the argument that in the case of Iran strong anti-colonialist aspect could
increase the ‘us-against-them’ antagonism, referring to Iran’s political relations with the west,
which might increase Iran’s incentive to obtain nuclear weapons.295
Furthermore, the ongoing crisis of the NPT might increase the incentive for pro-nuclear
weapons decisions.296 The reluctance of the nuclear-armed states to fully comply with the
disarmament obligation of the treaty and the remaining first-strike doctrine increases the
perception among the non-nuclear armed states of a ‘nuclear apartheid’.297 The dispute focuses
on the question: what is the main task of the treaty, is it the non-proliferation aspect, or
disarmament, or technological cooperation. Currently, the five nuclear weapon states – China,
France, the United Kingdom, Russia and the US – do not show their willingness to reduce their
arsenals significantly, or their dependence on nuclear weapons in regard of their military strategy.
This attitude could lead to the conclusion that nuclear weapons remain an important aspect of a
states power and prestige.298 The fact that the five permanent members of the UNSC are the only
legitimate nuclear weapon states in accordance with the NPT, might create the perception that in
order to become a globally important actor nuclear weapons are needed, as it is or has been the
case with the world’s leading technological and economic powers.
Within the identity conception of states, the nuclear myth turns the bomb into a particularly
prestigious device, and as such, provides the perfect trajectory for increasing the reputation of power.299
In case of Iran, the development of civil nuclear energy infrastructure has become a question of
national prestige, the reluctance of ‘western states’ to cooperate with Iran could increase the need
for independence or ‘immunity’ and prestige.300
294
Karsten Frey: Nuclear Weapons as Symbols – The Role of Norms in Nuclear Policy Making, The Institute
Barcelona d’Estudies Internationales (IBEI) Working Paper, October 2006, p. 5.
295
Karsten Frey: Nuclear Weapons as Symbols – The Role of Norms in Nuclear Policy Making, The Institute
Barcelona d’Estudies Internationales (IBEI) Working Paper, October 2006, p. 6.
296
Morton Bremer Mœrli/ Sverre Lodgaard: Nuclear Proliferation and International Security, Routledge, New
York, 2007, pp. 50 – 68.
297
Speech of President M. Ahmadinejad at the sixtieth session of the United Nations General Assembly, 17.
September 2005, New York, www.un.org/webcast/ga/60/statements/iran050917eng.pdf, (29.07.08).
298
Joseph Cirincione: Bomb Scare – The History & Future of Nuclear Weapons, Columbia University Press,
New York, 2007, pp. 106 – 107.
299
Karsten Frey: Nuclear Weapons as Symbols – The Role of Norms in Nuclear Policy Making, The Institute
Barcelona d’Estudies Internationales (IBEI) Working Paper, October 2006, p. 9.
Oliver Schmidt: Dissertation – MA International Relations – Lancaster University
66
While the signatories of the NPT have agreed not to develop nuclear weapons, the four countries
which have not signed the treaty or have left the treaty, are now nuclear armed. Today, Israel,
India, Pakistan and North Korea possess some military nuclear capability. In reaction to their
nuclear arsenals Israel, India, and Pakistan can benefit from their new political and military
weight in the international system. The US – India deal even seems to prove that once a state has
acquired a nuclear deterrent, it is welcome among the world’s ‘superpowers’.301
There appears to be growing acceptance of the nuclear status of Pakistan and India, with each
country accruing prestige and increased attention from leading nuclear weapon states, including the
United States.302
Even the rogue state, and former state on the ‘Axis of Evil’, North Korea has been made a
beneficial proposal as incentive for their nuclear disarmament.303 This might influence the costs
and benefits analysis of nuclear weapon procurement and change the normative predisposition.
These developments could lead to a change of existing norms regarding the disposition towards
nuclear weapons or intensify the ‘nuclear myth’ and as a result increase the incentive to acquire
nuclear weapons in the Islamic Republic.
3.6.2 Regional Aspects
In the Middle East Israel is the only nuclear-armed state, while the US military represents another
nuclear-armed nation in the region. Considering the whole Greater Middle East, Pakistan is the
only Islamic state possessing nuclear weapons. As described in the paragraph before, the
acceptance of the nuclear status of states like Pakistan might affect the nuclear calculus and
perception of various states in the region. Given the nature of nuclear weapons as symbolic
elements of political power, they provide a tool to increase international prestige, which might be
helpful for the implementation of a regional hegemony or dominance.
300
Michael Herzog: Iranian Public Opinion on the Nuclear Program – A Potential Asset for the International
Community, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Policy Focus No. 56, June 2006, p. 3.
301
Esther Pan: Iran’s New Position – How will recent developments in US – India relations affect Iran?, Council
on Foreign Relations, 20. September 2005, www.cfr.org/publication/8881/irans_new_position.html#4,
(29.07.08).
302
Joseph Cirincione: Bomb Scare – The History & Future of Nuclear Weapons, Columbia University Press,
New York, 2007, p.107.
303 Roland Hiemann: In the Shadow of the Six Party Talks – Europe and the Non-proliferation Process in North
Korea, AICGS Advisor, John Hopkins University, January 10, 2008.
Moon Ihiwan: US – North Korea Nuclear Deal: Who Wins?, in: Business Week, June 30, 2008,
http://www.businessweek.com/globaliz/content/jun2008/gb20080630_879728.htm, (30.07.08).
Oliver Schmidt: Dissertation – MA International Relations – Lancaster University
67
Again, a closer look at Iran’s constitution reveals the claim to represent all Muslims, which
historically have led to tensions with the Sunni Arab nations because of the fear that Iran is
striving for regional dominance.304 The development of a military nuclear capability would
enhance Iran’s position and demand for regional dominance, representing the Muslim states and
to ensure the Shiite stance in the Muslim world.
More than any other nation, Iran has always perceived itself as the natural hegemon of its
neighbourhood.305
3.6.3 Domestic Aspects
Domestically, it is hard to assess the Iranian decision-makers normative stance on nuclear
weapons, and even more complicated to get information about the public opinion. However,
what can be observed are public protests in favour of Iran’s civil nuclear program.306 An
304
Preamble and Article 152 of the translated constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, at the International
Constitutional Law Project at the University of Bern, http://www.servat.unibe.ch/law/icl/ir00000_.html,
(30.07.08).
Febe Armanois: Islam – Sunnis and Shiites, CRS Report for Congress, 23. February, 2004,
www.fas.org/irp/crs/RS21745.pdf, (30.07.08).
Maximilian Terhalle: Are the Shia Rising?, in: Middle East Policy Vol.: XIV, No. 2, Summer 2007, pp. 69 – 83.
International Crisis Group, Middle East Policy Briefing No 21: Iran – Ahmadi-Nejad’s Tumultuous Presidency,
Tehran/ Brussels, 6. February 2007, pp. 1 – 2.
Ray Takeyh: Hidden Iran – Paradox and power in the Islamic Republic, A Council on Foreign Relations Book,
Times Books, New York, 2006, p.61.
Shahram Chubin: Iran’s Nuclear Ambitions, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington D.C.,
2006, p. 16.
Marina Ottaway/ Nathan J. Brown/ Amr Hamzawy/ Karim Sadjadpour/ Paul Salem: The New Middle East,
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington D.C., 2008, p. 8.
Sammy Salama & Heidi Weber: Arab nuclear envy, in: Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, September/ October
2007, pp. 44 – 63.
IISS Strategic Comments: Iran and its neighbours, 11:6, 01 August 2005, pp. 1 – 2,
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1356788051163, (30.07.08).
Anoushiravan Ehteshami/ Mahjoob Zweiri: Iran and the Rise of its Neoconservatives – The Politics of Tehran’s
Silent Revolution, I.B. Tuaris, London, New York, 2007, pp. 101 – 110.
Ray Takeyh: Hidden Iran – Paradox and Power in the Islamic Republic, Council on Foreign Relations, New
York, pp. 10 – 12.
Doron Zimmermann/ Andreas Wenger (Editor): Tangled Skein or Gordian Knot? – Iran and Syria as State
Sponsors of Political Violence Movements in Lebanon and in the Palistinian Territories, in: Züricher Beiträge
zur Sicherheitspolitik und Konfliktforschung, Nr. 70, Center for Security Studies (CSS), ETH Zurich, 2004, p.
57, http://se1.isn.ch:80/serviceengine/FileContent?serviceID=PublishingHouse&fileid=791FF2CA-F43C-F83A1BB3-4160FD357B79&lng=en, (30.07.08).
305
Ray Takeyh: Hidden Iran – Paradox and power in the Islamic Republic, A Council on Foreign Relations
Book, Times Books, New York, 2006, p.61.
306
Frances Harrison: Iran Students in Nuclear Protest, BBC News, 1. November 2004,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle _east/3972711.stm, (30.07.08).
Oliver Schmidt: Dissertation – MA International Relations – Lancaster University
68
assessment by the Washington Institute for Middle East Policy concludes that generally the
public opinion supports the civil nuclear program.307 The report concludes further that the
program has become a subject of national pride and honour and is perceived as an important
step to advance Iran’s position in the international system.308
Historically, Iran has sent mixed signals concerning its attitude towards nuclear weapons.
Anthony Cordesman concludes that Iran’s nuclear activities under the Shah had military
elements, due to the situation of the Cold War and Iran’s close ties to the US.309 However, with
the end of the Shah regime and the inauguration of the first Ayatollah Ruhollah Musavi
Khomeini the nuclear activities of the young Islamic Republic came to a halt, mainly because of
religious and economic reasons and a lack of adequate personnel.310 Anthony Cordesman
indicates that the resumption of military nuclear activates in the Islamic Republic has been the
reaction to Iraq’s use of chemical weapons during the Iran – Iraq War.311
Addressing normative aspects of nuclear policy decision-making, it is important to mention a
religious decree or fatwa, claiming that:
“…that the production, stockpiling, and use of nuclear weapons are forbidden under Islam and that
the Islamic Republic of Iran shall never acquire these weapons.“312
This would imply that the Islamic Republic would not develop a military nuclear capability
because of a law issued by the highest political and religious authority of the state, the Ayatollah.
Nonetheless, the impact of this decree has to be put into question, because the document itself
has not been published and attempts to pass a legislative initiative to prohibit nuclear weapon
development failed in 2005. Iranian legislator Hojatoleslam Mohammad Taqi Rahbar has
furthermore been quoted saying that the development and possession of nuclear weapons would
307
Michael Herzog: Iranian Public Opinion on the Nuclear Program – A Potential Asset for the International
Community, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Policy Focus No. 56, June 2006, p. 3.
308
Michael Herzog: Iranian Public Opinion on the Nuclear Program – A Potential Asset for the International
Community, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Policy Focus No. 56, June 2006, p. 3.
309
Anthony H. Cordesman/ Khalid R. Al-Rodhan: Iran’s Weapons of Mass Destruction – The Real and
Potential Threat, The Center for Strategic and International Studies, CSIS Press, Washington D.C., 2006, p. 100.
310
The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) – IISS Dossier: Iran’s Strategic Weapons Programmes
– a net assessment, Routledge Taylor and Francis Group, Abingdon, New York, 2005, p. 12.
311
Anthony H. Cordesman/ Khalid R. Al-Rodhan: Iran’s Weapons of Mass Destruction – The Real and
Potential Threat, The Center for Strategic and International Studies, CSIS Press, Washington D.C., 2006, p. 107.
312
Iran's Statement at IAEA Emergency Meeting, August 10, 2005, Source: Mehr News Agency,
http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/iran/nuke/mehr080905.html, (14.04.08).
Oliver Schmidt: Dissertation – MA International Relations – Lancaster University
69
not conflict with the religious law, the Sharia. Reportedly, Ayatollah Khamanei has issued the
decree during a Friday-prayer in September 2004.313
In the end, it is hard to make any conclusions about the Iranian nuclear norm setting on a
domestic level. What has been shown is that to some degree the public opinion in Iran supports a
nuclear program because the program is perceived as an important symbol for the development
and role of the Islamic Republic. On the legislative side, there are no barriers to the development
of a nuclear device except for the anti-nuclear fatwa, whose juristic status cannot be clarified
sufficiently. Consequently, it could be possible that for prestigious reasons decision-makers and
the public would support the development of nuclear weapons and have a positive normative
attitude towards nuclear weapons, in accordance with the concept of the ‘nuclear myth’.
3.6.4 Preliminary Conclusion
To conclude, Iran’s strategic environment does not create the insecurity driving Iran’s nuclear
program, which is driven more by frustration over status and the ambition to be taken more seriously
and to play a larger, more global role.314
It is difficult to assess Iran’s nuclear calculus by analysing the norm setting of it decisionmakers and public opinion. What can be concluded is that that it is likely that Iran tends
more towards the ‘nuclear myth’ than the ‘nuclear taboo’. Possible reasons are Iran’s
emphasise of its sovereignty, the perceived potential power compared to its regional
neighbours and its claim to represent all Muslims. Another aspect, which could result in a
positive perception of nuclear weapons, is the crisis of the non-proliferation regime, the
nuclear policy of the five nuclear-weapon states, and the acceptance of the nuclear powers
India, Pakistan, and Israel. This development might signals that the possession of nuclear
weapons remains an important symbol for power and prestige. On a regional level, Iran
could use the nuclear symbol to increase its regional influence, importance and acceptance.
Finally, it is undoubted that the majority of the Iranian population supports the civil
nuclear program as a symbol for progress and modernity, and the exercise of its rights
according to the NPT. The impact of the anti-nuclear fatwa cannot be assessed because of
313
Federation of American Scientists: Iran’s Missing Anti-Nuclear Fatwa,
www.fas.org/sgp/news/secrecy/2005/08/081105.html#1, (30.07.08).
314
Shahram Chubin: Iran’s Nuclear Ambitions, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington D.C.,
2006, p. 16.
Oliver Schmidt: Dissertation – MA International Relations – Lancaster University
the unknown status of this verdict, which has only been cited in interviews and an IAEA
document.
It cannot be ruled out that prestigious motives could be a motivation for the Islamic
Republic of Iran to develop a military nuclear capability.
70
4. Conclusion
So far, this work has provided a brief theoretical introduction to Sagan’s three models to explain
nuclear weapon procurement. These three models have been used to generate verifiable
hypotheses concerning the case of Iran’s nuclear intentions. Following a technical evaluation of
Iran’s nuclear program and relevant military capabilities, all three models have been used to
assess Iran’s nuclear intentions. Now, this conclusion will answer the three questions raised in the
introduction: first does Scott Sagan’s models offer a helpful analytical tool to assess the nuclear
intentions of the Islamic Republic; second does Iran, according to Sagan plans to build nuclear
weapons and third, does Iran constitute a threat for ‘the west’.
4.1
How helpful are Sagan’s three models in assessing the
case of Iran?
In order to assess a threat it is necessary to analyse the capabilities to inflict harm and the
intention to really do so.315 Scott Sagan’s article ‘Why do States build Nuclear Weapons’ focuses on
the assessment of the intentions, by offering three different categories of motivation. First pure
security concerns, second interest groups, which support the development and third, normative
and prestigious reasons for nuclear weapons development.
The Security Model:
With the ‘security model’ Sagan offers an explanation for nuclear weapons proliferation in
accordance with the tradition of Realism and Structural Realism as theories of International
Relations. The basic argument is that a state will probably consider developing nuclear weapons if
the security of the state is endangered and/or nuclear weapons would enhance the state’s
security. Applied to the case of Iran this means, if Iran faces a severe security challenge, a
decision in favour of nuclear weapons procurement, in order to enhance its security, is likely. The
assessment of the Iranian case with the ‘security model’ came to the conclusion that, while
security challenges caused by Iraq and the instable regions in Central Asia have disappeared, Iran
still perceives a high threat to its interests in the region and the survivability of the regime. This
threat perception now, is caused by the US and Israel.
315
Wolfram F. Hanrieder/ Larry V. Buel: Words and Arms – A Dictionary of Security and Defence Terms,
Westview Press/ Boulder 1979, p.128.
Oliver Schmidt: Dissertation – MA International Relations – Lancaster University
72
According to Sagan’s ‘security model’ three conclusions are possible: first, Iran had an incentive
to acquire nuclear weapons prior to the regime change in Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003.
Second, it is likely that Iran intents to develop nuclear weapons in order to deter a US and Israeli
engagement. According to US and Israeli statements, a military campaign against Iran is still a
viable option.316 Third, it is possible to draw the conclusion that Iran does not intent to build a
nuclear deterrence because the activities needed to do so might be detected and would very likely
cause an immediate pre-emptive strike by an opposing force and consequently, greatly endangers
the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and regional interest of Iran.
In the Iranian case, the ‘security model’ provides reasonable arguments for pro and anti- nuclear
weapons decisions. Therefore, the first model alone cannot provide a sufficient explanation of
Iran’s nuclear intentions. But nonetheless, as many scholars have concluded before, security is a
strong motivation for the acquisition of nuclear weapons, and therefore cannot be ignored or
ruled out.
The Domestic Politics Model:
The ‘domestic politics model’ focuses on actors or interest groups on the domestic level with a
strong incentive to lobby in favour of or against nuclear weapons. This model is closely related to
Sagan’s writings on bureaucratic politics, where he describes that groups in the scientific
community or the military establishment have a strong incentive to support pro-nuclear weapon
procurement choices.317 Sagan argues that these groups have an interest in increasing budgets,
which includes an increase in prestige, influence and long-term job security, especially in the
scientific sector. The ‘domestic politics model’ also includes the argument that governments
might use the popularity of pro- or anti- nuclear weapons decisions to improve their standing in
the public opinion. In public, the topic of nuclear weapon procurement is therefore often
316
Roula Khalaf/ Daniel Dombey/ Tobias Buck: Fear over Israel’s threat to strike Iran, Financial Times, July 2,
2008, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/a2f72732-4862-11dd-a851-000077b07658.html?nclick_check=1, (15.08.08).
Michael R. Gordon/ Eric Schmitt: US says exercise by Israel seemed directed at Iran, in: The International
Herald Tribune, June 20, 2008, http://www.iht.com/articles/2008/06/20/america/20iran.php, (15.08.08).
Symour M. Hersh: Preparing the Battlefield – The Bush Administration steps up its secret moves against Iran,
in: The New Yorker, July 7, 2008.
The Washington Times: Mullen – US can strike Iran, 19 October 2007,
http://washingtontimes.com/news/2007/oct/19/mullen-us-can-strike-iran/, (15.08.08).
317
See:
Scott D. Sagan: The Limits of Safety – Organizations, Accidents, and Nuclear Weapons, Princeton University
Press, Princeton, Sussex, 1995.
And:
Scott D.Sagen/ Kenneth N.Waltz: The Spread of Nuclear Weapons – A Debate Renewed, W.W. Norton &
Company, New York, London, 2nd Edition, 2003.
Oliver Schmidt: Dissertation – MA International Relations – Lancaster University
73
connected to questions of external threats, the national dignity or prestige. Accordingly, this
means that a pro-nuclear weapons decision is likely when: a) strong interest groups can influence
the decision makers or, b) are able to influence the public debate, and c) when the governments
could enhance its popularity, and thus support and legitimacy.
Referring to the case of Iran it is possible to conclude that President Ahmadinejad uses the
international debate on Iran’s civil nuclear program to secure the power of his government and
political fraction. He utilises the debate to create the perception of an existing external threat in
order to generate public support and a ‘rally behind the flag’ effect. Ahmadinejad also raises the
issue to a question of national dignity and prestige.
Examining the nuclear issue in a domestic politics context, it is important to note that the central
authority on Iran’s nuclear policy lies with the supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamanei. He
partially supports the president’s claim that Iran has the right to build a civil nuclear program.
The Supreme leader, however, is cited to prohibit the use and stockpiling of nuclear weapons.
Moreover, no evidence could be found that links a political actor or group in Iran to a pronuclear weapon statement in public.
The public support for Iran’s civil nuclear program does not provide sufficient proof of a public
support for the development of nuclear weapons. Therefore, it remains unresolved whether the
current government could benefit from a pro-nuclear weapons decision and as a result, really
have the incentive to develop nuclear weapons.
It seems that the analysis of political actors on the domestic level can provide information about
the nuclear intentions of a country, if the country does have an open debate addressing these
issues. In Iran, however, no governmental official can publicly speak in favour of a pro-nuclear
weapons decision, for instance because the county’s obligations from the NPT. Statements
regarding the opinion of officials from the executive branch like the military, the IRGC, or
business and scientific groups are very difficult to obtain and can therefore not be used in this
assessment. It can be finally concluded that the ‘domestic politics model’ cannot provide helpful
indications for Iran’s nuclear intentions, but remains a valid aspect for explaining nuclear
decision-making.
The Norms Model:
The ‘norms model’ provides a strong analytical category for the analysis of nuclear weapon
decision-making, as it focuses on possible reasons for or against the development of nuclear
Oliver Schmidt: Dissertation – MA International Relations – Lancaster University
74
weapons. According to Scott Sagan and also the work of Karsten Frey the term ‘norm’ refers to
normative predispositions, which determine an actor’s behaviour. According to the
predisposition an actor refers to the ‘nuclear myth’ or the ‘nuclear taboo’. In order to understand
and predict possible nuclear weapons policy decisions it is necessary to know the predisposition
of the specific actor. If an actor associates nuclear weapons as a symbol for modernity, progress
or power and independence (‘nuclear myth’) it is likely that a pro-nuclear weapon decision is
supported. The ‘nuclear taboo’, on the other hand, would affect a decision maker not to acquire
nuclear weapons, because in this case nuclear weapons are perceived as illegitimate and
abhorrent.318 In the case of Iran the current president links the issue of Iran’s civil nuclear
program with the question of national dignity, sovereignty and prestige, supported by the
supreme leader. Therefore the civil nuclear program has also a strong public support. However, it
is not possible to conclude automatically that a military nuclear program would gather the same
support.
Historically, after the Islamic Revolution, Iran claimed to represent all Muslims and to defend
their interest. Additionally, Iran’s constitution underlines the state’s desire for self-determination.
According to Karsten Frey it is more likely that states a willing to build nuclear weapons if they:
The likelihood of states wanting nuclear weapons is high if […] b) their normative predisposition
favors an independent, ‘sovereign’ foreign policy, and c) they display a pronounced perception of the
nation’s relative potential power.319
That could mean that the normative predisposition of Iranian decision-makers and possibly the
public tends towards to ‘nuclear myth’ and therefore support a nuclear weapon program.
The ‘norm model’ raises an interesting aspect of nuclear decision-making and in the case of Iran
it really can be used to indicate possible normative dispositions and therefore nuclear intentions.
What remains is the difficulty to deduce from official remarks concerning the civil nuclear
program of Iran and then “guess-/ estimate” the linkage to a possible military nuclear program.
At least the work of Karsten Frey provided some helpful categories of analysis to assess Sagan’s
‘norm model’.
318
Nina Tannenwald: Prepared Remarks o the 2005 Carnegie Endowment Nonproliferation Conference,
November 7, 2005, p. 3, Washington D.C.,
www.carnegieendowment.org/static/npp/2005conference/presentations/tannenwald_remarks.pdf, (15.08.08).
319
Karsten Frey: Nuclear Weapons as Symbols – The Role of Norms in Nuclear Policy Making, The Institute
Barcelona d’Estudies Internationales (IBEI) Working Paper, October 2006, p. 5.
Oliver Schmidt: Dissertation – MA International Relations – Lancaster University
75
Sagan’s three models:
Conclusively, it has become obvious that it is very difficult to assess Iran’s nuclear intentions
using Sagan’s three models. All of them provide plausible arguments that could apply to the case
and explain Iran’s possible nuclear calculus, but finding prove is impossible in a prognostic
assessment. Scott Sagan’s three models provide the maximal explanatory strength for assessments
in retrospect. Finally, all three models are relevant and viable for the analysis of nuclear decisionmaking. A real problem is to gather relevant information that could apply for each model.
4.2
Does Iran, according to Sagan’s models, intend to build
nuclear weapons?
Sagan’s three models have offered ways to analyse Iran’s nuclear intentions, but in the end it
cannot provide a clear and final answer to the question raised in the introduction: does Iran want
to have the bomb or not? This paragraph will compare possible indications for a pro- or contranuclear weapon decision in Iran, considering the technical aspects of the nuclear program and the
analysis of Iran’s nuclear intentions according to Sagan’s three models.
Pros:
An assessment of the technical side of Iran’s nuclear program and military developments, allow
to conclude that the ‘green salt project’, Iran’s ballistic and cruise missile program, and the
inefficiency of an entire domestic fuel circle, in spite of a lack of enough natural uranium provide
clues in favour of a suspected military nuclear program.
Looking at the political track record, the fact that the nuclear enrichment program was initially
clandestine, and Iran’s reluctance to fully comply with the IAEA Safeguards Agreement
obligations, the hesitation to allow on-sight inspections, the unresolved influence of the military
establishment in the current nuclear program, and, the unsteady cooperation with the IAEA and
the UN give additional hints for a military nuclear program.
Now, focusing on the assessment of Iran’s intentions, according to the ‘the security model’ it is
possible to draw the conclusion that Iran probably intends to develop nuclear weapons for
deterrence because of its fear of a US or Israeli led invasion or air strike, and Iran’s ambition of
regional predominance.
Oliver Schmidt: Dissertation – MA International Relations – Lancaster University
76
The ‘domestic politics model offers the pro-argument that the public support for the
government, in case of a successful development of atomic weapons, would increase, which also
would be an incentive for nuclear weapons procurement.
The ‘norm model’ provides the following explanation for a nuclear weapons program: because of
the perception of nuclear weapons as symbols for sovereignty and modernity, Iran could develop
nuclear weapons intending to gain international prestige.
Consequently, Iran has good reasons to use its civil nuclear program to develop nuclear weapons
or at least to develop a nuclear weapons option. However, all these aspects cannot be proven, but
they all indicate that Iran might be interested in nuclear weapons.
Cons:
In order to provide some arguments against the suspicion of an Iranian nuclear weapons
program, it could be argued, according to the technical and political track record, Iran slowly but
steadily adapts to IAEA demands and resolutions, and the current civil nuclear program is in
accordance to Iran’s rights from the NPT and does not violate the treaty obligations.
Following the ‘security model’ that Iran possibly had the intention to develop a nuclear deterrent
but has stopped its ambitions, because Iraq, as a major source of insecurity, has disappeared.
Additionally, an Iranian nuclear program would currently represent the greatest security risk for
the country, because of possible pre-emptive military strikes from the US, Israel, or other
regional states in reaction, in case a secret nuclear weapons program would be uncovered in Iran.
Referring to the ‘domestic politics model’ it has to be noted that publicly, only the civil nuclear
program finds the support of a majority and therefore nuclear weapons could weaken the
government. Public support for Iran’s nuclear policy can additionally be affected by international
pressure and sanctions, which could lead to domestic pressure on the current government to act
in accordance with international obligations and commitments.
With regard to the ‘norms model’ it could be argued that possibly, only the civil nuclear program
is perceived as legitimate, and a prestigious symbol for modernity. Therefore Iran would not
intend to develop nuclear weapons. If an anti-nuclear fatwa really exists, which prohibits the
production and stockpiling of nuclear weapons, it would provide a very strong norm against
nuclear weapons procurement.
Oliver Schmidt: Dissertation – MA International Relations – Lancaster University
77
Resume:
Balancing pros and cons it remains difficult to determine Iran’s nuclear ambitions. Obviously,
Iran could benefit from the decision to develop nuclear weapons, so could the current
government. On the contrary, if international suspicions cannot be successfully dissolved more
sanctions are imposed, which might degrade public support for the current Iranian government.
An Iranian nuclear weapons program could lead to a military campaign against Iran’s military and
industrial installations, which would cause further loss of domestic support. If an anti-nuclear
fatwa would exist, and this cannot be ruled out, this would provide the strongest argument
against an Iranian nuclear weapon program, as it would be a decision of the highest political and
religious authority in the Islamic Republic.
In order to answer the question: does Iran intend to build nuclear weapons, it can be concluded
that even though no evidence or ‘smoking gun’ for an Iranian nuclear program can be found, the
given clues and arguments suggest that Iran is pursuing a nuclear weapons option or nuclear
weapons. Following the technical account of Iran’s nuclear, ballistic and cruise missile program,
and after the assessment of Iran’s nuclear intentions according to Scott Sagan’s three models, it
seems likely that Iran pursues nuclear weapons. There are several arguments, which would
suggest that it is in Iran’s interest to develop nuclear weapons for security, domestic political, and
prestigious reasons. In possession of nuclear weapons Iran could deter an US or Israeli attack, it
would further improve Iran’s regional and international power and prestige as the second Islamic
nation with nuclear weapons and the tenth nuclear armed state in the world. This prestige and
power could be utilised to gain public support on the domestic level.
4.3
Is Iran’s nuclear program a threat for ‘the west’?
Considering ‘the west’ as the countries of the European Union and NATO – including the
United States, it can be concluded that currently the Islamic Republic of Iran does not constitute
a threat. This means that, currently Iran does not have the capability to inflict harm to any of the
countries mentioned above and there is no indication that Iran is planning to do so. Iran’s
ballistic missiles can reach EU and NATO territory but so far it is not capable to deliver weapons
of mass destruction with these delivery systems. Iran does not possess the capability to strike
against the US homeland, but US forces are within the reach of Iranian weapon systems.
Currently, Iran can threaten states and US military forces within the region of the Greater Middle
Oliver Schmidt: Dissertation – MA International Relations – Lancaster University
78
East, including the Strait of Hormuz (See Appendix Map 6).320 The analysis of military scenarios
of a US – Iranian confrontation at the Persian Gulf has shown that Iran does not possess the
military capabilities to withstand durably.321
A considerable risk, caused by Iran, is its influence on proxy groups like the Hamas or Hezbollah.
Even though Iran is not in command of these groups, they can be induced to represent Iranian
interests in the Middle East. But in reaction to President Ahmadinejad’s anti-Israel rhetoric in
2005 the supreme leader Ayatollah Khamenei has declared:
…the Islamic Republic has never threatened and will never threaten any country322,
and so far this seems to be the case.
4.4
What are the dangers of the Iranian case?
Looking at the Iranian case several concerning aspects of nuclear technology proliferation can be
revealed. First of all, it is hard to imagine that a spread of nuclear technology, which is more then
sixty years old, can be completely prevented. The concept to develop rules for the use of nuclear
technology offers a good option to utilise it for civil purposes and to prevent the military use of
nuclear technology. However, the NPT, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the IAEA, and additional
treaties, initiatives and organisations cannot guarantee that no misuse for military purposes will
take place. The dual use character of nuclear technology makes it difficult to control the correct
usage. The availability of nuclear know-how and materials on ‘nuclear black-markets’ has
intensified the risk of undetected nuclear weapon programs. Unfortunately, it is unrealistic that
the non-proliferation norm would be so internalised by all countries that no country, except for
the five nuclear weapon states, would have an incentive to pursue nuclear weapons. Historically,
it can be argued that there has been a time when the ‘nuclear taboo’ was a strong norm that have
320
Caitlin Talmadge: Closing Time – Assessing the Iranian Threat to the Strait of Hormuz, in: International
Security, Vol. 33, No. 1, (Summer 2008), pp. 82 – 117.
And:
CNN: Iran denies confrontation at sea with US navy, April 12, 2008,
http://edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/meast/04/12/iran.us/index.html, (13.08.08).
321
Sascha Lange/ Oliver Schmidt: Military capabilities of the Iranian Armed Forces and the Consequences of a
military strike against Iran, in: European Security and Defence (Europäische Sicherheit), 56/ 12, December
2007, pp. 34 – 38, (German text only), <http://www.swpberlin.org/common/get_document.php?asset_id=3531>, (10.08.08).
322
Cited in: Abbas Edalat, The Guardian: The US can learn from this example of mutual respect – The outcome
of the crisis between Iran and Britain provides a lesson on how to deal with the wider international standoff,
April 5 2007, http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2007/apr/05/comment.military, (14.08.08).
Oliver Schmidt: Dissertation – MA International Relations – Lancaster University
79
led to anti-nuclear weapons decisions in states like South Africa, Argentina, the Ukraine, but also
in Japan and Germany. Today, the crisis of the NPT causes an erosion of the ‘nuclear taboo’.
While the five nuclear weapon states still relay on nuclear weapons and strategies, the
proliferation case of North Korea has shown the weaknesses of the treaty. Additionally, the
acceptance of nuclear-armed states outside of the NPT, and even more the benefits of a nuclear
force for some states have possibly increased the incentive for further nuclear proliferation. The
only recently published strategic dossier of the IISS points out the risk of further nuclear weapon
programs in the Middle East as a reaction to the suspected Iranian program. If a spread of
nuclear weapons in the Middle East really occurs, the danger of arms races, pre-emptive and
preventive strikes increases drastically. It also increases the likeliness of nuclear accidents,
thievery, or access to nuclear material by non-state actors, meaning terrorists. In his many works
on nuclear proliferation and security, Scott Sagan warns of the dangers that come with it.323
Finally, if Iran wants to develop nuclear weapons it would cause an imbalance of power in the
region of the Greater Middle East and a change of the status quo, which increases the risk of preemptive strikes, and additional nuclear weapon programs in the region, bearing the danger of
nuclear arms races. The short distances between the countries in the region and the number of
relevant actors makes it unlikely that a status of peaceful co-existence, or balance of power can be
achieved like in the bi-polar situation during the Cold War. If the Islamic Republic of Iran really
pursues the nuclear weapons option or nuclear weapons, the crisis of the NPT would intensify
and possibly lead to the collapse of the treaty, because of a complete erosion of its norms.
It is far from obvious, which future direction Iran will take in its nuclear policy. The constant
attempts for negotiations and the upcoming election in the Islamic Republic and the United
States possibly provides some options for a peaceful settlement of the dispute. The upcoming
NPT review conference in 2010 should be used to enhance the damaged state of the treaty.
A lot depends on the Iranian case, the stability of the Greater Middle East and the future of
nuclear non-proliferation.
323
Scott D.Sagen: The Limits of Safety – Organizations, Accidents, and Nuclear Weapons, Princeton University
Press, Princeton, 1993.
Scott D.Sagen: The Perils of Proliferation: Organization Theory, Deterrence Theory and the Spread of Nuclear
Weapons, in: International Security 18, no. 4, Spring 1994, pp. 66 – 107.
Scott D. Sagen/ Kenneth N.Waltz: The Spread of Nuclear Weapons – A Debate Renewed, W.W. Norton &
Company, New York, London, 2nd Edition, 2003.
Oliver Schmidt: Dissertation – MA International Relations – Lancaster University
Appendix
1. Map: Nuclear Weapons Status 2005
Source: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
80
Oliver Schmidt: Dissertation – MA International Relations – Lancaster University
2. Map: Iran’s Nuclear Facilities 2005
Source: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
81
Oliver Schmidt: Dissertation – MA International Relations – Lancaster University
82
3. Map: Satellite Images of Iran’s Nuclear Sites
Source: James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International
Studies, with courtesy of the Near East Report.
Oliver Schmidt: Dissertation – MA International Relations – Lancaster University
4. Map: Iran’s planned nuclear fuel cycle
Source: http://www.payvand.com/news/07/may/Iran-Nuclear-Technology.jpg, (29.05.08).
83
Oliver Schmidt: Dissertation – MA International Relations – Lancaster University
5. Map: Ballistic Missile Proliferation 2005
Source: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
84
Oliver Schmidt: Dissertation – MA International Relations – Lancaster University
6. Map: Estimated Ranges of Current and Potential Iranian
Missiles
Source: Federation of American Scientists.
85
Oliver Schmidt: Dissertation – MA International Relations – Lancaster University
7. Map: Iran’s missile facilities
Source: The Nuclear Threat Initiative.
86
Oliver Schmidt: Dissertation – MA International Relations – Lancaster University
8. Map: Iran’s Political System
Source: BBC News.
87
Oliver Schmidt: Dissertation – MA International Relations – Lancaster University
88
Bibliography
Primary Sources
•
Address by H.E. Dr. Mahmood Ahmadinejad President of the Islamic Republic of Iran
Before the Sixtieth Session of the United Nations General Assembly New York — 17
September 2005, http://www.un.org/webcast/ga/60/statements/iran050917eng.pdf,
(03.06.08).
•
Address by Mr. Dwight D. Eisenhower, President of the United States of America, to the
470th Plenary Meeting of the United Nations General Assembly, Tuesday, 8 December
1953, http://www.iaea.org/About/history_speech.html, (28.05.2008).
•
Agreed Statement at the end of a visit to the Islamic Republic of Iran by the Foreign
Ministers of Britain, France and Germany, Tehran, 21 October 2003,
http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Focus/IaeaIran/statement_iran21102003.shtml,
(03.06.08).
•
The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty: http://disarmament.un.org/wmd/ctbt/A-50-1027CTBT-English.pdf, (26.03.2008).
•
House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, Fifth Report of Session 2007 – 08: Global
Security – Iran, The House of Commons, 20 February 2008,
www.prliament.uk/parliamentry_committees/foreign_affairs_commettee.cfm, (30.07.08).
•
IAEA Information Circular INFCIRC/ 214, 13. 12.1974: The Text of the agreement between
the Agency fort he application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons, www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/Others/infcirc214.pdf,
(16.05.08).
•
IAEA Country Nuclear Power Profile: Iran Nuclear Power Profile – 2002 Edition,
www.pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/cnpp2003/CNPP_Webpage/PDF/2002
Documents/Documetns/Islamic%Republic%20Iran%202002.pdf, (16.05.08).
•
IAEA Board of Governors, GOV/2003/40: Implementation of the NPT safeguards agreement
in the Islamic Republic of Iran, 6 June 2003 pp. 7 – 8,
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2003/gov2003-40.pdf, (03.06.08).
•
IAEA Board of Governors, GOV/2003/69, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement
in the Islamic Republic of Iran, 12 September 2003,
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2003/gov2003-69.pdf, (03.06.08).
•
IAEA Staff Report: Iran Signs Additional Protocol on Nuclear Safeguards, 18 December 2003,
http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/News/2003/iranap20031218.html, (03.06.08).
•
IAEA INFCIRC/540:Model Protocol, Aadditional to the Agreement(s) between State(s) and the
IAEA for the application of Safeguards,
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/1997/infcirc540c.pdf,
(03.06.08).
Oliver Schmidt: Dissertation – MA International Relations – Lancaster University
89
•
IAEA Board of Governors, GOV/2003/81: Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement
in the Islamic Republic of Iran, 26 November 2003,
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2003/gov2003-81.pdf, (03.06.08).
•
IAEA Board of Governors, GOV/2003/75, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement
in the Islamic Republic of Iran, 10 November 2003,
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2003/gov2003-75.pdf, (03.06.08).
•
IAEA Board of Governors, GOV/2004/79: Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement
in the Islamic Republic of Iran, 18 September 2004,
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2003/gov2004-79.pdf, (03.06.08).
•
IAEA Board of Governors: Report GOV/2004/83: Implementation of the NPT Safeguards
Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran – Annex 1, 15 November 2004. (Accessible at
www.IAEA.org)
•
IAEA Information Circular INFCIRC/637: Communication dated 26 November 2004 received
from the Permanent Representatives of France, Germany, the Islamic Republic of Iran and the United
Kingdom concerning the agreement signed in Paris on 15 November 2004, 26. November 2004,
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/2004/infcirc637.pdf, (03.06.08).
•
IAEA Board of Governors, GOV/2004/90: Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement
in the Islamic Republic of Iran, 29 November 2004,
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2003/gov2004-90.pdf, (03.06.08).
•
IAEA Information Circular INFCIRC/651, Communication dated 8 August 2005
received from the Resident Representatives of France, Germany and the United
Kingdom to the Agency: Framework for a long-term agreement between the Islamic Republic of Iran
and France, Germany & the United Kingdom, with the support of the High Representative of the
European Union, 8 August 2005,
http://www.bits.de/public/documents/iran/EU_3_Framework_infcirc651.pdf,
(04.06.08).
•
IAEA Board of Governors GOV/2005/64: Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement
in the Islamic Republic of Iran and related Board resolutions Resolution adopted on 11 August 2005,
11 August 2005, http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2005/gov200564.pdf, (03.06.08).
•
IAEA Board of Governors GOV/2005/67 2 September 2005: Implementation of the NPT
Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran Report by the Director General,
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2005/gov2005-67.pdf, (03.06.08).
•
IAEA Board of Governors GOV/2005/77, 24 September 2005: Implementation of the NPT
Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran Resolution adopted on 24 September 2005,
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2005/gov2005-77.pdf, (03.06.08).
•
IAEA Board of Governors GOV/2005/87, 18 November 2005: Implementation of the NPT
Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran Report by the Director General,
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2005/gov2005-87.pdf, (03.06.08).
•
IAEA Board of Governors GOV/2006/14, 4 February 2006: Implementation of the NPT
Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran Resolution adopted on 4 February 2006,
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2006/gov2006-14.pdf, (03.06.08).
Oliver Schmidt: Dissertation – MA International Relations – Lancaster University
90
•
IAEA Board of Governors, GOV/2006/27, 28 April 2006: Implementation of the NPT
Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran Report by the Director General,
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2006/gov2006-27.pdf, (03.06.08).
•
IAEA Board of Governors, GOV/2006/38, 8 June 2006: Implementation of the NPT
Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran Report by the Director General,
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2006/gov2006-38.pdf, (03.06.08).
•
IAEA Board of Governors GOV/2006/53, 31 August 2006: Implementation of the NPT
Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran Report by the Director General,
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2006/gov2006-53.pdf, (03.06.08).
•
IAEA Board of Governors GOV/2006/64, 14 November 2006: Implementation of the NPT
Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran Report by the Director General,
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2006/gov2006-64.pdf, (03.06.08).
•
IAEA Board of Governors GOV/2007/7, 9 February 2007: Cooperation between the Islamic
Republic of Iran and the Agency in the light of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1737
(2006) Report by the Director General,
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2007/gov2007-07.pdf, (04.06.08).
•
IAEA Board of Governors GOV/2007/8, 22 February 2007: Implementation of the NPT
Safeguards Agreement and Relevant Provisions of Security Council Resolution 1737 (2006) in the
Islamic Republic of Iran Report by the Director General,
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2007/gov2007-08.pdf, (04.06.08).
•
IAEA Board of Governors GOV/2007/22, 23 May 2007: Implementation of the NPT
Safeguards Agreement and Relevant Provisions of Security Council Resolutions in the Islamic Republic of
Iran Report by the Director General
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2007/gov2007-22.pdf, (04.06.08).
•
IAEA Information Circular INFCIRC/711, 27 August 2007: Communication dated 27
August 2007 from the Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the Agency concerning the
text of the "Understandings of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the IAEA on the Modalities of
Resolution of the Outstanding Issues",
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/2007/infcirc711.pdf, (04.06.08).
•
IAEA Board of Governors GOV/2007/48, 30 August 2007: Implementation of the NPT
Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran Report by the Director General,
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2007/gov2007-48.pdf, (04.06.08).
•
IAEA Board of Governors GOV/2007/58, 15 November 2007: Implementation of the NPT
Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions 1737 (2006) and 1747
(2007) in the Islamic Republic of Iran Report by the Director General,
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2007/gov2007-58.pdf, (04.06.08).
•
IAEA Board of Governors GOV/2008/4, 22 February 2008: Implementation of the NPT
Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions 1737 (2006) and 1747
(2007) in the Islamic Republic of Iran Report by the Director General,
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2008/gov2008-4.pdf, (04.06.08).
Oliver Schmidt: Dissertation – MA International Relations – Lancaster University
91
•
IAEA Board of Governors: Report GOV/2008/15: Implementation of the NPT Safeguards
Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolution 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007) and 1803
(2008) in the Islamic Republic of Iran, 26 May 2008. (Accessible at www.IAEA.org)
•
Interview with Christopher Pang, Head of the Research Unit Middle East at the Royal
United Service Institute for Defence and Security Studies (RUSI), conducted on the
24.04.08.
•
The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, September 2002,
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/2002/nss.pdf>, (09.06.08).
•
The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, March 2006,
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/2006/nss2006.pdf>, (09.06.08).
•
The North Atlantic Treaty, Washington D.C., 4 April 1949, <
http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/treaty.htm>, (25.08.2008).
•
North Atlantic Military Committee MC 14/2,
<http://www.nato.int/docu/stratdoc/eng/a570523a.pdf >, (25.08.2008).
•
North Atlantic Military Committee MC 14/ 3,
<http://www.nato.int/docu/stratdoc/eng/a680116a.pdf >, (25.08.2008).
•
NPT/Conf.1995/32 (Part I), Annex: Decision 3 Extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation
of Nuclear Weapons, http://disarmament.un.org/wmd/npt/1995dec3.htm, (10.05.08).
•
Policy Department External Policies Study: Missile Defence and European Security, The
European Parliament, November 2007,
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/activities/expert/eStudies/download.do?file=18359#s
earch=%20missile%20defence%20>, (10.05.08).
•
President Bush, West Point, New York, 01.06.2002, in: The National Security Strategy of the
United States of America, September 2002,
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/2002/nss.pdf>, (14.05.08).
•
The President's State of the Union Address, January 29, 2002 The United States
Capitol, Washington, D.C.
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-11.html#>, (14.05.08).
•
Response of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the Framework Agreement by EU3/EU,
August 2005, http://www.bits.de/public/documents/iran/IranonEU3-0805.pdf,
(03.06.08).
•
Statement by H.E Dr. Kamal Kharrazi, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic
Republic of Iran to the Seventh NPT Review Conference, New York, May 03, 2005,
http://www.un.org/events/npt2005/statements/npt03iran.pdf, (03.06.08).
•
Speech of President M. Ahamadinejad at the sixtieth session of the United Nations
General Assembly, 17. September 2005, New York,
www.un.org/webcast/ga/60/statements/iran050917eng.pdf, (29.07.08).
•
The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT),
http://disarmament.un.org/wmd/npt/npttext.html, (10.05.08).
Oliver Schmidt: Dissertation – MA International Relations – Lancaster University
92
•
The Translated constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, at the International
Constitutional Law Project at the University of Bern,
http://www.servat.unibe.ch/law/icl/ir00000_.html, (09.04.08).
•
UK Ministry of Defence: Missile Defence – a public discussion paper, December 2002,
http://www.mod.uk/NR/rdonlyres/9DA4A026-DB01-466D-B5B3EA6C64A2D85F/0/missiledef.pdf, (02.06.08).
•
United Nations Resolution 50/245:
http://disarmament.un.org/wmd/ctbt/res%2050%20245.htm, (26.03.2008);
•
United Nations Security Council SC/8679, 5403rd Meeting (PM), 29 March 2006: Security
Council, in Presidential Statement, underlines importance of Iran’s re-establishing full sustained
suspension of uranium-enrichment activities, calls on Iran to take steps required by IAEA Board of
Governors, http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/sc8679.doc.htm, (03.06.08).
•
United Nations Security Council, S/RES/1696 (2006), 31 July 2006, Resolution 1696
(2006), Adopted by the Security Council at its 5500th meeting, on 31 July 2006,
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N06/450/22/PDF/N0645022.pdf?Ope
nElement, (03.06.08).
•
United Nations Security Council S/RES/1737 (2006), 27 December 2006: Resolution
1737 (2006), Adopted by the Security Council at its 5612th meeting, on 23 December
2006, http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Focus/IaeaIran/unsc_res1737-2006.pdf,
(03.06.08).
•
United Nations Security Council S/RES/1747 (2007), 24 March 2007: Resolution 1747
(2007) Adopted by the Security Council at its 5647th meeting on 24 March 2007,
http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Focus/IaeaIran/unsc_res1747-2007.pdf, (04.06.08).
•
United Nations Security Council S/RES/1803 (2008), 3 March 2008: Resolution 1803
(2008) Adopted by the Security Council at its 5848th meeting, on 3 March 2008,
http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Focus/IaeaIran/unsc_res1803-2008.pdf, (04.06.08).
•
US Department of Defense: The Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated
Term, 12. April 2001, as Amended Through 17 October 2007,
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp1_02.pdf, (02.06.08).
•
US Department of State: Country Report on Terrorism, Chapter 3, State Sponsors of Terrorism
Overview, 30 April 2007, http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2006/82736.htm, (10.05.08).
•
US Departement of State, Bureau of Nonproliferation: Fact Sheet, 1. September 2001,
<http://www.state.gov/t/isn/rls/fs/2001/4932.htm>, (08.06.08).
•
US National Air and Space Intelligence Center: Ballistic And Cruise Missile Threat, March
2006, <http://www.nukestrat.com/us/afn/NASIC2006.pdf>, (10.05.08).
•
US National Intelligence Council: Foreign Missile Development and the Ballistic Missile Threat
through 2015, December 2001,
<http://www.dni.gov/nic/PDF_GIF_otherprod/missilethreat2001.pdf>, (10.05.08).
Oliver Schmidt: Dissertation – MA International Relations – Lancaster University
93
•
US National Intelligence Council: National Intelligence Estimate - Iran: Nuclear Intentions and
Capabilities, November 2007,
<http://www.dni.gov/press_releases/20071203_release.pdf>, (14.05.08).
•
US NSC 162/2 Basic National Security Policy, 30. October 1953,
<http://www.jan.vandercrabben.name/nsc/index.php>, (25.11.2007).
•
US President Jimmy Carter State of the Union Address 1980,
www.thisnation.com/library/sotu/1980jc.html, (06.06.08).
•
US President George W. Bush: The President’s State of the Union Address, The United States
Capitol, Washington D.C., January 29, 2002,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/2002012911.htmlhttp://www.whitehouse.gov/march11/timeline/sixb.html, (06.06.08).
Oliver Schmidt: Dissertation – MA International Relations – Lancaster University
94
Secondary Sources
•
David Albright, Jacqueline Shire, and Paul Brannan: May 26, 2008 IAEA Safeguards Report
on Iran: Centrifuge Operation Improving and Cooperation Lacking on Weaponization Issues, Institute
for Science and International Security (ISIS) Report, May 29, 2008, http://www.isisonline.org/publications/iran/ISIS_Iran_IAEA_Report_29May2008.pdf, (01.06.08)
•
David Albright/ Jacqueline Shire: A Witches’ Brew? Evaluating Iran’s Uranium-Enrichment
Progress, in: Arms control today, Vol. 37, No. 9, November 2007, Arms Control
Association.
•
Graham Allison: New Iran IAEA Report – Reading between the lines, 28. February 2008,
Belfer Center for Science and international Affairs, Harvard University,
http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/18075/new_iran_iaea_report.htm,
(05.06.08).
•
Ali M. Ansari: Iran under Ahmadinejad – The Politcs of Confrontation, in: Adelphi Papers,
47:393, October 2007.
•
Ali M. Ansari: Confronting Iran – The Failure of American Foreign Policy and the next Great Crisis
in the Middle East, Basic Books, New York, 2006.
•
Febe Armanois: Islam – Sunnis and Shiites, CRS Report for Congress, 23. February, 2004,
www.fas.org/irp/crs/RS21745.pdf, (30.07.08).
•
John Baylis/ James Wirtz/ Colin S. Gray/ Elliot Cohen: Strategy in the Contemporary World
– An Introduction to Strategic Studies, Second Edition, Oxford University Press, New York,
2007.
•
Daniel Bayman: Iran, Terrorism, and Weapons of Mass Destruction, in: Studies in Conflict &
Terrorism, 31:3, pp. 169 – 181.
•
Daniel Byman/ Shahram Chubin, Anoushiravan Ehteshami/ Jerrold Green: Iran’s Security
Policy in the Post-Revolutionary Era, RAND National Defense Research Institute, Santa
Monica, 2001.
•
Andre Beaufre, in: Lawrence Freedman (Editor): War, Oxford University Press, Oxford,
New York, 1994.
•
Stephen Blanchette, Jr.: Military Intervention in Iran – Why and How, The Institute of Land
Warfare, The Association of the United States Army, Arlington, 2007.
•
Wilfired Buchta: Who Rules Iran? – The Structure of Power in the Islamic Republic, The
Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Washington D.C., 2000.
•
Shahram Chubin: Iran’s Risk-Taking in Perspective, The Insitute Francais des Relations
Internationales (ifri) – Proliferation Papers, Winter 2007.
•
Shahram Chubin: Iran’s Nuclear Ambitions, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,
Washington D.C., 2006.
Oliver Schmidt: Dissertation – MA International Relations – Lancaster University
95
•
Shahram Chubin: Whither Iran? Reform, Domestic Politics and National Security, in: Adelphi
Paper 342, The International Institute for Strtegic Studies (IISS), Oxford Univeristy
Press, London, New York, 2002.
•
Joseph Cirincione: Bomb Scare – The History & Future of Nuclear Weapons, Columbia
University Press, New York, 2007.
•
Joseph Cirincione/ Jon B. Wolfsthal/ Miriam Rajkumar: Deadly Arsenals – Tracking
Weapons of Mass Destruction, Washington D.C., 2002.
•
Patrick Clawson/ Michael Rubin: Eternal Iran – Continuity and Chaos, Palgrave McMillan,
New York, Houndmills, 2005.
•
William Cleveland: A History of the Modern Middle East (3rd Edition), Westview Press,
Boulder, Oxford, 2004.
•
Athony H. Cordesman: Iran’s Nuclear and Missile Programs - A Status Report, Center for
Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Washington D.C., 4th December 2007,
<http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/071126irannukewmd.pdf>, (02.06.08).
•
Anthony H. Cordesman, CSIS: Iran’s Revolutionary Guards, the Al Quds Force, and Other
Intelligence and Paramilitary Forces, August 16, 2007,
http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/070816_cordesman_report.pdf, (10.06.08).
•
Anthony H. Cordesman: Iran, Oil, and the Strait of Hormuz, The Center for Security and
International Studies (CSIS), Washington D.C., 26th March 2007,
<http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/070326_iranoil_hormuz.pdf>, (02.06.08).
•
Anthony H. Cordesman: Iran’s support for Hezbollah in Lebanon, CSIS, 15 July 2006,
http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/060715_hezbollah.pdf, (10.05.08).
•
Anthony H. Cordesman/ Khalid R. Al-Rodhan: Iran’s Weapons of Mass Destrcution – The
Real and Potential Threat, The CSIS Press, Washington D.C., 2006.
•
Anthony H. Cordesman and Khalid R. Al-Rodhan: The Gulf Military Forces in an era of
asymmetric war: Iran, The Center for Security and International Studies (CSIS), Washington
D.C., July 28, 2006, <http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/060728_gulf_iran.pdf>,
(02.06.08).
•
Anthony H. Cordesman Khalid R. Al-Rodhan: Iranian Nuclear Weapons? Options for
Sanctions and Military Strikes, CSIS Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy, August 30, 2006.
•
Anthony H. Cordesman Khalid R. Al-Rodhan: Iranian Nuclear Weapons? The Options if
Diplomacy Fails, CSIS Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy April 7, 2006.
•
Gordon Corera: Shopping for Bombs – Nuclear Proliferation, Global Insecurity and the Rise and
Fall of the A.Q. Khan Network, Hurst & Company, London, 2006.
•
Alan Collins (Editor): Contemporary Security Studies, Oxford University Press, Oxford, New
York, 2007.
•
Helene Cooper/ Mark Mazzetti, The New York Times: Rice Outlines Saudi Arms Package,
July 30, 2007, www.nytimes.com/2007/07/30/world/europe/30cnd-weapons.htm,
(09.06.08).
Oliver Schmidt: Dissertation – MA International Relations – Lancaster University
96
•
John Deutsch: The Nuclear Threat, in: Foreign Affairs, Vol. 71, No. 41, Fall 1992, pp. 124 –
125.
•
Thérèse Delpech: Iran and the Bomb – The Abdication of International Responsibility, Columbia
University Press New York, in association with the Centre d’Études et de Recherches
Internationales, Paris, 2007.
•
Sergio Duarte, High Representative for Disarmament Affairs United Nations: The
Nuclear-Non-Proliferation Regime – Debilitation and the Risk of Collapse, at: Nuclear Weapons –
The greatest Peril to Civilization - A Conference to Imagine a World without them, Yale
University, 21 February 2008.
•
Anoushiravan Ehteshami/ Mahjoob Zweiri: Iran and the Rise of its Neoconservatives – The
Politics of Tehran’s Silent Revolution, I.B. Tuaris, London, New York, 2007.
•
Anoushiravan Ehteshami/ Raymond A. Hinnebusch: Syria and Iran – Middle powers in a
penetrated regional system, Routledge, London, New York, 1997.
•
Thomas Erdbrink/ Amit R. Paley, The Washington Post: Iran Urges Closer Defense Ties
With Iraq, June 9, 2008.
•
Louise Fawcett: International Relations of the Middle East, Oxford University Press, Oxford,
New York, 2005.
•
Andrew Feickert, CRS Report for Congress: Iran’s Ballistic Missile Capabilities, August 23,
2004, http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/39332.pdf, (10.05.08).
•
Martha Finnemore: Norms, Culture, and World Politics – Insights from Sociology’s Institutionalism,
in: International Organization, Vol. 50, No. 2, (Spring 2006), pp. 325 – 348.
•
Mark Fitzpatrick: Can Iran's Nuclear Capability Be Kept Latent?, in: Survival, 49:1, March
2007, pp. 33 – 58.
•
Mark Fitzpatrick: Iran and North Korea: The Proliferation Nexus, in: Survival, Vol. 48 No. 1,
Spring 2006.
•
Mark Fitzpatrick: Assessing Iran’s Nuclear Programme, in: Survival, Vol. 18, No. 3, Autumn
2006, pp. 5 – 26.
•
Lawrence Freedman (Editor): War, 1994, Oxford University Press, Oxford, New York.
•
Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, 2nd Edition, 1989, London.
•
Karsten Frey: Of Nuclear Myths and Nuclear Taboos, in: Peace Review – A Journal of Social
Justice, Vol. 18, pp. 341 – 347.
•
Karsten Frey: Nuclear Weapons as Symbols – The Role of Norms in Nuclear Policy Making, The
Institute Barcelona d’Estudies Internationales (IBEI) Working Paper, October 2006.
•
Babak Ganji: Iranian Strategy – Factionalism & Leadership Politics, Conflict Studies Research
Centre, Middle East Series 07/06, Defence Academy of the United Kingdom, March
2007.
Oliver Schmidt: Dissertation – MA International Relations – Lancaster University
97
•
Michael R. Gordon/ Eric Schmitt: US says exercise by Israel seemd directed at Iran, in: The
International Harald Tribune, June 20, 2008,
http://www.iht.com/articles/2008/06/20/america/20iran.php, (15.08.08).
•
F. Gregory Gause, III: Threats and Threat Perceptions in the Persian Gulf Region, in: Middle
East Policy, Vol. 14, No. 2, Summer 2007, pp119 – 124.
•
Greg J. Geradi/ James A. Plotts: An Annotated Chronology of DPRK Missile Trade and
Developments, in: The Nonproliferation Review, Fall 1994.
•
Deborah J. Gerner/ Jilian Schwedler: Understanding the Contemporary Middle East (2nd
Edition), Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder, London, 2004.
•
Pierre Goldschmidt at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace: Verifying Iran’s
Nuclear Program – Is the International Community up to the task?, Lamont Lecture at the Belfer
Center, Harvard University, October 30, 2007,
www.carnegieendowment.org/files/lamontlecture_goldschmidt.pdf, (05.06.08).
•
Bruno Gruselle: Proliferation Networks and Financing, Research and Documents – Fondation
pour la Recherche Stratégique, Paris 3, March 2007, http://www.frstrategie.org,
(18.05.08).
•
Wolfram F. Hanrieder/ Larry V. Buel: Words and Arms – A Dictionary of Security and Defence
Terms, Westview Press/ Boulder 1979.
•
Frances Harrison: Iran Students in Nuclear Protest, BBC News, 1. November 2004,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle _east/3972711.stm, (30.07.08).
•
John H. Herz: International politics in the atomic age, Columbia University Press, New York,
1965.
•
Symour M. Hersh: Preparing the Battlefield – The Bush Administration steps up its secret moves
against Iran, in: The New Yorker, July 7, 2008.
•
Michael Herzog: Iranian Public Opinion on the Nuclear Program – A Potential Asset for the
International Community, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Policy Focus No.
56, June 2006.
•
Roland Hiemann: In the Shadow of the Six Party Talks – Europe and the Non-proliferation Process
in North Korea, AICGS Advisor, John Hopkins University, January 10, 2008.
•
Steven A. Hildreth: Iran’s Ballistic Missile Programs – An Overview, November 8, 2007,
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/95050.pdf, (02.06.08)
•
Raymond A. Hinnebusch/ Anoushiravan Ehteshami (Editor): The Foreign Policies of Middle
East States, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder, London, 2002.
•
Robin Hughes: Iran’s Ballistic Missile Developments – Lang Range Ambitions, in: Jane’s Defence
Weakly, September 13, 2006.
•
Moon Ihiwan: US – North Korea Nuclear Deal: Who Wins?, in: Business Week, June 30,
2008,
http://www.businessweek.com/globaliz/content/jun2008/gb20080630_879728.htm,
(30.07.08).
Oliver Schmidt: Dissertation – MA International Relations – Lancaster University
98
•
International Crisis Group, Middle East Policy Briefing No 21: Iran – Ahmadi-Nejad’s
Tumultuous Presidency, Tehran/ Brussels, 6. February 2007.
•
The International Crisis Group, Middle East Briefing No 18: Iran – What Does AhmadiNejad’s Victory Mean?, 4 August 2005.
•
The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) – IISS Strategic Dossier: Nuclear
Programmes in the Middle East – In the Shadow of Iran, The International Institute for Strategic
Studies (IISS), London, 2008.
•
The Institute for International Strategic Studies (IISS): The Military Balance, Routledge,
London, 2007.
•
The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) – IISS Dossier: Iran’s Strategic
Weapons Programmes – a net assessment, Routledge Taylor and Francis Group, Abingdon,
New York, 2005.
•
The Institute for International Strategic Studies (IISS): IISS Strategic Survey – the annual
review of world affairs, 107:1, 2007.
•
The Institute for International Strategic Studies (IISS): IISS Strategic Comments: Iran and its
neighbours, 11:6, 01 August 2005, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1356788051163, (08.06.08).
•
Farhang Jahanpour: Iran’ Nuclear Programme and Regional Security, Oxford Research Group,
April 2007.
•
Robert Jervis: The Meaning of Nuclear Revolution, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, New
York, 1989.
•
Mehran Kamrava: Iranian National Security Debates – Factionalism and lost Opportunities, in:
Middle East Policy, Vol XIV, No., Summer 2007.
•
Paul Kerr, Arms Control Association: Iran, North Korea Deepen Missile Cooperation, January/
February 2007, http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2007_01-02/IranNK.asp, (10.05.08).
•
Robert O. Keohane: After Hegemony – Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy,
Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1984.
•
Tariq Khaitous: Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists: Why Arab leaders worry about Iran’s nuclear
program, 23. May 2008, www.thebulletin.org/node/2655, (02.06.08).
•
Roula Khalaf/ Daniel Dombey/ Tobias Buck: Fear over Israel’s threat to strike Iran, Financial
Times, July 2, 2008, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/a2f72732-4862-11dd-a851000077b07658.html?nclick_check=1, (15.08.08).
•
Jochen Kleinschmidt: Iranian Geopolitics, the Nuclear Issue and Emerging Counterstrategies,
NATO School Polaris Paper, Special Issue July 2008,
www.natoschool.nato.int/internet_multimedia/multimedia_polaris/2008/Polaris_Special
_July_2008.pdf, (01.08.08).
•
Sascha Lange/ Oliver Schmidt: Military capabilities of the Iranian Armed Forces and the
Consequences of a military strike against Iran, in: European Security and Defence (Europäische
Sicherheit), 56/ 12, December 2007, pp. 34 – 38, (German text only), <http://www.swpberlin.org/common/get_document.php?asset_id=3531>, (10.08.08).
Oliver Schmidt: Dissertation – MA International Relations – Lancaster University
99
•
William Langewiesche: Atomic Bazaar – Dispatches from the Underground World of Nuclear
Trafficking, Penguin Books, London, New York, 2007.
•
Robert Lowe/ Claire Spencer (Editor): Iran, its Neighbours and the Regional Crisis – A Middle
East Programme Report, Chattam House, London, 2006.
•
Christin Marshall: Iran’s Persian Gulf Policy, Routledge Curzon, London, New York, 2003.
•
Thomas R. Mattair: Mutual Threat Perceptions in the Arab/ Persian Gulf – GCC Perceptions, in:
Middle East Policy, Vol. 14, No. 2, Summer 2007, pp. 133 – 140.
•
John J. Mearsheimer: The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, W.W. Norton & Company, New
York, 2001.
•
John J. Mearsheimer, in: Tim Dunne/ Milja Kurki/ Steve Smith (Editor): International
Relations Theory - Discipline and Diversity, New York, Oxford University Press, 2007.
•
Sean McNight/ Neil Patrick/ Francis Toase (Editor): Gulf Security – Opportunities and
Challenges fort he new Geration, Whitehall Paper Series, No. 51, Royal United Service
Institute for Defence Studies and the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, London, 2000.
•
Beverly Milton-Edwards: Contemporary Politics in the Middle East (2nd Edition), Polity Press,
Malden, Cambridge, 2007.
•
Harald Müller: A Treaty in troubled Waters – Reflections on the Failed NPT Review Conference, in:
The International Spectator, 3/2005, pp. 34 – 44.
•
Morton Bremer Mærli/ Sverre Lodgaard (Editor): Nuclear Proliferation and International
Security, Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, London, New York, 2007.
•
Joseph Nye: Understanding International Conflicts – An Introduction to Theory and History, 6th
Edition, Pearson/ Longman, New York, San Francisco, Boston, London, et al., 2007.
•
Mancur Olson: The Logic of Collective Action – Public Goods & Theory of Groups, Harvard
University Press, Cambridge, 1965.
•
Barry O’Neil: Nuclear Weapons and National Prestige, Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper
No. 1560, Yale University, February 2006.
•
Marina Ottaway/ Nathan J. Brown/ Amr Hamzawy/ Karim Sadjadpour/ Paul Salem:
The New Middle East, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington D.C.,
2008.
•
Esther Pan: Iran’s New Position – How will recent developments in US – India relations affect Iran?,
Council on Foreign Relations, 20. September 2005,
www.cfr.org/publication/8881/irans_new_position.html#4, (29.07.08).
•
George Perkovich/ Jessica T. Mathews/ Joseph Cirincione/ Rose Gottemoeller/ Jon B.
Wolfsthal: Universal Compliance a strategy for nuclear security, Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, Washington, D.C. 2007.
•
Joseph F. Pilat: The end of the NPT regime?, in: International Affairs 83: 3, 2007, pp. 469 –
482.
Oliver Schmidt: Dissertation – MA International Relations – Lancaster University
100
•
Daniel A. Pinkston, Center for Nonproliferation Studies Monterey Institute of
International Studies: North Korea Conducts Nuclear Test, 10.10.2006,
http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/week/pdf/061010_dprktest.pdf, (10.05.08).
•
Daniel A. Pinkston, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College: The North Korean
Ballistic Missile Program, February 2008,
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB842.pdf (10.05.08).
•
Kenneth M Pollack: The Persian Puzzle – The Conflict between Iran and America, for the Saban
Center, Brookings Institution, Random House, New York, 2004.
•
Walter Posch (Editor): Iranian Challenges, European Union Institute for Security Stuides, Chaillot
Paper No. 89, May 2006.
•
Helene Rang (Editor): Near and Middle East Economic Handbook 2006, German Near and
Middle East Association, Berlin, Hamburg, 2006.
•
Robin Ranger, David Wiencek, Jeremy Stocker (ed.): International Missile Defence?
Opportunities, Challenges and Implications for Europe, The Royal United Institute for Defence
Studies, Whitehall Paper 55, Stephen Austin & Sons Ltd., London, 2002.
•
Paul Rogers: Iran - Consequences of a War, Oxford Research Group Briefing Paper, Oxford,
2006.
•
Jalil Roshandel: Iran’s Foreign and Security Policies – How the Decisionmaking Process Evolved, in:
Security Dialogue, 31:1, 2000.
•
Barry Rubin (Editor): Crisis in the Contemporary Persian Gulf, Frank Class, London, Portland,
2002.
•
James A. Russell: Regional Threats and Security Strategy – The troubling case of today’s Middle
East, Strategic Studies Institute (SSI), Carlisle, November 2007. (Available at
http://www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil/).
•
James A Russel (Editor): Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East:
Directions and Policy Options in the New Century, Palgrave, New York, 2006.
•
Scott D. Sagen/ Kenneth N. Waltz: The Spread of Nuclear Weapons – A Debate Renewed,
W.W. Norton & Company, New York, London, 2nd Edition, 2003.
•
Scott D. Sagan: Why do States Build Nuclear Weapons – Three Models in Search of a Bomb, in:
International Security, Vol. 21, No. 3, Winter 1996/1997, pp. 54 – 86.
•
Scott D. Sagen: The Perils of Proliferation: Organization Theory, Deterrence Theory and the Spread
of Nuclear Weapons, in: International Security 18, no. 4, Spring 1994, pp. 66 – 107.
•
Scott D. Sagen: The Limits of Safety – Organizations, Accidents, and Nuclear Weapons, Princeton
University Press, Princeton, 1993.
•
Sammy Salama & Heidi Weber: Arab nuclear envy, in: Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,
September/ October 2007, pp. 44 – 63.
•
Robert H. Schmucker: Iran and its Regional Environment, The Nuclearization of the Broader
Middle East as a Challenge for Transatlantic Policy Coordination Panel 1, Second
Oliver Schmidt: Dissertation – MA International Relations – Lancaster University
101
Transatlantic Conference, Berlin, March 27, 2006,
<http://www.hsfk.de/downloads/Panel%201%20-%20Schmucker.pdf>, (10.05.08).
•
Oliver Schmidt: Iranische Raketen und Marschflugkörper - Stand und Perspektiven (Iranian Missile
and Cruise Missiles – German Text only), Working Paper, the German Institute for
International and Security Affairs, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP),
<http://www.swp-berlin.org/de/common/get_document.php?asset_id=3531>,
(02.06.08).
•
Klaus-Dieter Schwarz: The Future of Deterrence, German Institute for International and
Security Affairs, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP), SWP Research Paper, June
2005, <http://www.swp-berlin.org/en/common/get_document.php?asset_id=2356>
(19.07.2008).
•
Anthony Seaboyer/ Oliver Thränert: What Missile Proliferation Means for Europe, in:
Survival, Vol. 48, No. 2, Summer 2006.
•
George P. Shultz/ William J. Perry/ Henry A. Kissinger/ Sam Nunn: Towards a NuclearFree World, in: The Wall Street Journal, 15. January 2008, p. 13.
•
Naveed S. Sheikh: The New Politics of Islam – Pan-Islamic Foreign Policy in a World of States,
Routledge Curzon, London, New York, 2003.
•
Henry Sokolski/ Patrick Clawson (Editor): Getting Ready for a Nuclear-Ready Iran, The
Strategic Studies Institute (SSI), Carlisle, 2005.
•
Nicole Stracke: Nuclear Non-Proliferation from a Gulf Perspective, FES Briefing Paper, April
2008.
•
Caitlin Talmadge: Closing Time – Assessing the Iranian Threat to the Strait of Hormuz, in:
International Security, Vol. 33, No. 1, (Summer 2008), pp. 82 – 117.
•
Ray Takeyh: Hidden Iran – Paradox and power in the Islamic Republic, A Council on Foreign
Relations Book, Times Books, New York, 2006.
•
Nina Tannenwald: Stigmatizing the Bomb – Origins of the Nuclear Taboo, in: International
Security, Vol. 29, No. 4, 2005.
•
Nina Tannenwald: Prepared Remarks on the 2005 Carnegie Endowment Nonproliferation
Conference, November 7, 2005, Washington D.C., p. 3,
www.carnegieendowment.org/static/npp/2005conference/presentations/tannenwald_re
marks.pdf, (15.08.08).
•
Kamran Taremi: Beyond the Axis of Evil – Ballistic Missiles in Iran’s Military Thinking, in:
Security Dialogue vol. 36, no. 1, March 2005, pp. 93 – 108.
•
Maximilian Terhalle: Are the Shia Rising?, in: Middle East Policy Vol.: XIV, No. 2, Summer
2007, pp. 69 – 83.
•
Oliver Thränert: Ending Suspicious Nuclear Activities in Iran – Discussing the European
Approach, Working Paper, the German Insitute for International and Securtiy Affairs,
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP), 18. November 2004, <http://www.swpberlin.org/en/common/get_document.php?asset_id=1758>, (08.06.08).
Oliver Schmidt: Dissertation – MA International Relations – Lancaster University
102
•
U.S. Concerns about Declining Effectiveness of Nonproliferation Regime, in: The American Journal
of International Law, Vol. 99, No. 4. October, 2005, pp. 917-918.
•
Kenneth N.Waltz: Theory of International Politics, McGraw-Hill Higher Education, Mass.,
1979.
•
Kenneth N. Waltz, in: Sagan, Scott D./ Waltz, Kenneth N.: The Spread of Nuclear Weapons
– A Debate Renewed, W.W. Norton & Company, New York, London, 2nd Edition, 2003.
•
Max Weber: Politics as a Vocation (Politik als Beruf).
•
Eugene Whitlock (Editor): Iran and its Neighbours – Diverging Views on a Strategic Region –
Vol. II, German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP), Berlin, March
2004.
•
Eugene Whitlock (Editor): Iran and its Neighbours – Diverging Views on a Strategic Region,
German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP), Berlin, July 2003.
•
Doron Zimmermann/ Andreas Wenger (Editor): Tangled Skein or Gordian Knot? – Iran and
Syria as State Sponsors of Political Violence Movements in Lebanon and in the Palistinian Territories,
in: Züricher Beiträge zur Sicherheitspolitik und Konfliktforschung, Nr. 70, Center for
Security Studies (CSS), ETH Zurich, 2004,
http://se1.isn.ch:80/serviceengine/FileContent?serviceID=PublishingHouse&fileid=791
FF2CA-F43C-F83A-1BB3-4160FD357B79&lng=en, (10.05.08).
Oliver Schmidt: Dissertation – MA International Relations – Lancaster University
103
Online Sources
•
Arms Control Association Fact Sheet: Arms Control and Proliferation Profile: Pakistan,
November 2007, http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/pakistanprofile.asp, (10.05.08).
•
Arms Control Association: Fact Sheet – Worldwide Ballistic Missile Inventories, September
2007, <http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/missiles.asp>, (02.06.08).
•
BBC News: Iran installing new centrifuges, 08. April 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr//2/hi/middle_east/7336089.stm, (29.05.08).
•
BBC News: Conservatives win Iran election, 16 March 2008,
www.news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/7297923.stm, (01.08.08).
•
BBC News: Un approves new Sanctions on Iran, March 4 2008,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/7274902.stm, (10.05.08).
•
BBC News: US Iran attack plans revealed, 20.October 2007,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/middle_east/6376639.stm, (08.06.08).
•
CNN: Iran denies confrontation at sea with US navy, April 12, 2008,
http://edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/meast/04/12/iran.us/index.html, (13.08.08).
•
The Federation of American Scientists: India – Nuclear Weapons,
http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/india/nuke/index.html, (10.05.08).
•
The Federation of American Scientists: Israel – Nuclear Weapons,
http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/israel/nuke/index.html, (10.05.08).
•
Federation of American Scientists: Iran’s Missing Anti-Nuclear Fatwa,
www.fas.org/sgp/news/secrecy/2005/08/081105.html#1, (30.07.08).
•
The Financial Times, Ukraine admits it exported cruise missiles to Iran and China, 18.03.2005.
•
Globalsecurity.org: Weapons of Mass Destruction – AS 15 Specifications,
<http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/russia/as-15-specs.htm>, (02.06.08).
•
US Official Says Iranians Witnessed North Korean Missile Test, Deborah Tate, 20.07.06, on:
Globalsecurity.org: http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/dprk/2006/dprk060720-voa01.htm (02.06.08).
•
Haaretz: Defense offical – Mofaz remrk on Iran strike is not state policy, 08.06.08,
www.haaretz.com/hasen/objects/pages/PrintArticleEn.jhtml?itemNo=991145,
(08.06.08).
•
The International Atomic Energy Agency: Iraq Nuclear File – Key Findings,
http://www.iaea.org/OurWork/SV/Invo/factsheet.html#assessment, (10.05.08).
•
The International Atomic Energy Agency: In Focus IAEA and Iran,
http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Focus/IaeaIran/index.shtml, (10.05.08).
•
The Institute for Science and International Security: E-Book Glossary,
www.exportcontrols.org/print/glossary.html, (29.05.08).
Oliver Schmidt: Dissertation – MA International Relations – Lancaster University
104
•
Jane’s Intelligence Review, 14 March 2008: Smoke and mirrors – Analysing the Iranian missile
test.
•
The Korea Herald: Iran present at North Korea missile launches, 21.07.2006.
•
The Korea Herald: N.K. Iran collaborating on missiles, Think Tank reports, 4.8.2006.
•
Iran's Statement at IAEA Emergency Meeting, August 10, 2005, Source: Mehr News Agency,
http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/iran/nuke/mehr080905.html, (14.04.08).
•
The Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) Country overviews: Iran – Nuclear Facilities,
www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/Iran3119_3182.html, (20.05.08).
•
The Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) Country overviews: Iran – Nuclear Facilities,
www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/Iran3119_3130.html, and
www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/Iran3119_3132.html, (20.05.08).
•
The Washington Times: Mullen – US can strike Iran, 19 October 2007,
http://washingtontimes.com/news/2007/oct/19/mullen-us-can-strike-iran/, (15.08.08).