1. No category

Third round table discussion
of the Geneva Circle on Global Economic Governance
Exchange-rate and capital-account management for developing countries
Background note
by Detlef Kotte
The hazards of global finance remain a threat for financial stability and stable trading conditions
in developing countries, especially emerging-market economies, even if many of them have
taken a more prudent attitude with regard to capital inflows than in the 1980s and 1990s. After
the surge in capital flows to these countries that had begun in 2003 had come to a temporary
halt, a new wave of capital inflows to emerging markets set in after the global financial crisis.
There are now increasing concerns that low interest rates in the industrialized countries could
lead to a new boom-bust cycle for emerging markets with attendant negative consequences for
their economic development (see, for example, Akyüz 2011). In this context the debate about
adequate policies to reduce the vulnerability of developing and emerging economies to external
shocks emanating from international financial markets has again intensified.
One area of policy considered, and increasingly practiced in emerging-market economies, is the
use of capital controls, or more generally, capital account management. 1 While in the past the
debate was more on the justification and possible effects of controls over outflows in crisis
situations, the more recent debate has primarily focused on controls over capital inflows to avoid
undesired effects on the exchange rate and to prevent financial crises.
Another, but closely related, area of discussion is that about necessary of reforms of the
international reserve system and exchange-rate arrangements. A number of emerging countries
have responded to undesired capital inflows with intervention in the foreign-exchange market,
but such intervention has not always fully succeeded in avoiding repercussions of undesired
capital inflows on exchange rates and domestic financial systems. In light of these experiences
and the problems that the “corner solutions” of fully flexible or fixed currency have created for
external trade relations and financial and macroeconomic stability, exchange-rate management
has come to be reconsidered at the national, regional and global levels.
1
For a recent comprehensive review, see Gallagher, Griffith-Jones and Ocampo 2012.
1
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1. Finance-led globalization and financial instability in developing countries – where do we stand?
a. What are the risks of finance-led globalization for developing country trade and their
development objectives?
It is widely accepted that the expansion of capital flows to developing and emerging economies
that has followed widespread financial liberalization and capital-account deregulation has not led
to the increase of fixed capital formation in developing countries hoped for. Rather, it has
increased the vulnerability of these economies to speculative financial transactions. International
financial speculation has frequently led to exchange rate movements that are unrelated or even
counter to movements in economic fundamentals, with overshooting upwards in boom phases
and downwards in crisis situations. This generates additional uncertainty for firms, so that they
tend to invest less in real productive capacity, with negative repercussions on growth,
employment and structural change. Exchange rate movements that do not reflect inflation
differentials or current-account positions also undermine the international trading system
because they distort the competitive positions of producers from different countries in
international markets and give rise to protectionist pressures. The loss of competitiveness in
international markets for domestic firms tends to cause trade deficits and premature deindustrialization.
Moreover, private capital flows to developing countries behave in a highly pro-cyclical manner,
tend to feed speculative bubbles in domestic markets for financial assets and real estate, and
favour excessive credit creation. While the conduct of monetary policy and the level of interest
rates in the receiving countries is an important determining factor for capital inflows, the latter
also depend to a large extent on financial developments and policy decisions outside these
countries. Relatively small changes in interest rates, especially on dollar-denominated assets, can
thus lead to considerable shifts of private capital flows to emerging markets.
b. How have developing countries dealt with these risks?
In the 1980s and 1990s financial and capital-account liberalization were often undertaken with
the objective of attracting external capital flows, in the hope that these would spur investment
and growth. Authorities in many developing countries welcomed the rise in external capital
flows, taking them for a sign of strength of their economies.
However, with the experience of financial crises in many countries, the recognition grew that the
cost of surges of capital inflows might outweigh the benefits that such inflows could generate for
the domestic economy. As a consequence, governments of many emerging economies have
become increasingly prudent and tried to protect their economies against the vagaries of
international capital markets. They have done so by resorting to some form of control over
capital flows and/or by intervening in the foreign exchange market to prevent a revaluation of
their currencies as a result of surges of capital inflows.
Capital account management aimed at reducing the attractiveness to capital flows to the
recipient countries has relied on instruments ranging from outright bans or minimum-stay
requirements to tax-based instruments designed to offset interest rate differentials, such as
mandatory reserve requirements or taxes on fixed income and portfolio equity flows, on
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purchases of government bonds by foreigners, or interest income and capital gains on domestic
assets by foreigners.
Currency market intervention has become a frequent measure to avoid negative repercussions
of undesired capital inflows on the exchange rate and, thus on the international competitiveness
of domestic producers and the trade balance. It has also served to accumulate large amounts of
foreign exchange reserves as a cushion against a possible reversal of capital inflows.
c. What role are playing the international organizations ?
Although the IMF’s main task is to ensure the stability of the international monetary and
financial system, it did little to either prevent destabilizing capital flows by appropriate
international arrangements or by helping countries to introduce protective measures at the
national level.
Since the early 1980s the international financially institutions strongly advocated capital-account
liberalization in tandem with trade liberalization and used its influence on policymaking in
developing countries to advance this agenda. Although the Articles of Agreement explicitly
acknowledge the right of member States to exercise capital controls as are necessary to regulate
international capital movements (Art.VI), the discussion of such controls was almost a taboo. The
situation changed somewhat after the Asian financial crisis, when the IMF acknowledged that
temporary controls on outflows may be acceptable in severe crisis situations, and the 2008
global financial crisis prompted some further rethinking on the issue in the IMF. In 2011 the IMF
recognized that capital account regulations can be useful in certain situations to mitigate
financial instability and suggested a possible policy framework for discussion (IMF 2011a,b).
However, it still considers such regulations as measures to be deployed temporarily in
emergency situations rather than as a device of “normal counter-cyclical packages” to ensure
greater stability (Ocampo 2012:18). Moreover, some observers view the recent initiatives in the
IMF critically, interpreting them as an attempt by the IMF to gain more influence over the
conditions under which capital controls can be used, thereby imposing undesirable restrictions
on national autonomy in capital account management (Griffith-Jones and Gallagher 2011;
Nogueira-Batista 2012).
Despite the fact that undesired capital flows, through their impact on exchange rates, can
impede external trade, legal restrictions on capital controls are already part of the WTO General
Agreement of Trade in Services (GATS), under which a country that has granted market access in
financial services is bound to fully liberalize its capital account. 2
d. Are capital inflows to developing countries necessary to fill a “savings gap”?
Over many years, the international financial organizations and many influential economists
promoted financial liberalization markets and capital-account deregulation based on the belief
that such liberalization would enhance the allocation of capital around the world and accelerate
development by helping developing countries to close an alleged “savings gap”, i.e. a shortfall of
domestic saving in relation to domestic investment. According to the “savings gap”-theory
developing economies are constrained because low domestic savings do not allow for a rate of
investment that is sufficiently high to accelerate growth. The macroeconomic savings-investment
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identity is, thus, interpreted in the sense that higher investment follows from higher savings, and
when domestic savings cannot be raised due to low mass incomes, “external savings”, i.e. capital
inflows, are considered to be the way out.
In another view, however, the functional relationship between these two macroeconomic
variables, is just the other way around: higher savings are the result of, not the precondition for,
higher investment. While an individual firm may indeed finance part or all of its investment out
of savings (i.e. retained earnings), at the level of the economy as a whole investment in real
productive capacity can be financed by credit from the domestic banking system and this credit
can be generated without prior savings. What matters is therefore the capacity of the financial
system to generate the credit needed to finance additional investment. Resort to external
financing is necessary only to the extent that domestic investment requires the import of capital
goods that cannot be financed from export earnings. But foreign capital flows have mostly been
unrelated to such imports, and some of the countries with the highest rates of investment over
the past decades have actually been net exporters of capital. From this perspective, there is no
rationale for across-the-board capital-account liberalization inviting additional capital inflows.
2. Capital account management as a protection against financial destabilization
a. What are the objectives of capital controls and how effective are they ?
The main rationale behind capital account regulations is to make monetary policy more
independent, reduce real exchange rate pressures, alter the composition of capital flows towards
longer-term flows, and mitigate destabilizing effects from international capital markets for the
domestic financial system. In emerging economies with a fully liberalized capital account
monetary policy autonomy is constrained in two ways. On the one hand, a tightening of
monetary policy associated with higher domestic interest rates attracts short-term capital
inflows (the so-called “carry trade”). On the other hand, governments of countries that have
come to depend on private capital inflows to finance a current-account deficit are constrained in
loosening monetary policy when this would be required to stabilize the domestic economy,
because the associated reduction of domestic interest rates leads to a reversal of capital flows.
Moreover, measures to discourage speculative inflows or to prevent negative effects of such
flows were also taken with a view to avoid that monetary policy decisions in other countries, in
particular the reserve currency countries, or changes in “sentiment” or “risk appetite” among
actors in international financial markets have negative repercussions on the domestic economy.
It has been widely recognized, including by the IMF in recent years, that capital account
regulations used in emerging-market economies over the past 15 years have been fairly
effective, especially controls over inflows (Ostry et al. 2010; IMF 2011a; Magud et al. 2011).
Indeed, several of the developing countries that have been among the most successful in
catching up, such as South Korea, Taiwan, India and China have used highly articulated regimes
of capital account regulations (Epstein 2012; Chang and Grabel 2004).
2
For a discussion of this issue, see Gallagher (2012) and Raghavan (2011).
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b. Where are the limits for the use of capital controls ?
Apart from legal restrictions for countries that have signed liberalized trade in financial services
under GATS, the ability of developing countries to deploy capital controls has increasingly been
restricted by bilateral of plurilateral free trade agreements and bilateral investment agreements,
particularly those signed with the United States (Gallagher 2011).
Substantively, the limits for the use of capital controls are usually seen in the difficulty to
distinguish between desirable und undesirable capital inflows and the possibility of international
investors to circumvent such controls by linking capital account transactions with current
account transactions. It is also argued that such controls are difficult to implement and that
developing countries often lack the required administrative and control capacity.
Moreover, reliance on capital controls leaves the burden of dealing with the symptoms of
financial speculation entirely on the receiving countries, although it is an international
phenomenon and strongly influenced by monetary policies in other countries. The introduction
of capital controls in one country might also divert speculation towards other countries, making
the task of the latter more difficult.
c. What are the possibilities for international cooperation in capital account management?
It has therefore been suggested that capital account management requires international
cooperation between countries that are destinations of such flows and those countries from
where they originate. An international financial transaction tax, levied by all countries on capital
outflows could alleviate the task of individual governments to prevent destabilizing effects for
their economies from international financial markets. It would raise the cost of speculative
international financial transactions much more than the cost of long-term lending and financial
investment.
The idea of coupling capital account management in receiving countries with action in developed
countries from where speculative flows originate is a logical consequence of the international
nature of these flows. It is especially obvious at present as incentives to engage in carry trade are
particularly strong given the expansionary monetary policy stance and low interest rates in the
United States and many European countries. These developed countries should themselves be
interested in preventing excessive risk taking by domestic investors in foreign markets and
reducing the possibility of negative repercussions from financial crises in the emerging markets
on their own economy (Griffith-Jones and Gallagher 2012). The introduction of safeguards in
multilateral trade treaties allowing the deployment of prudential regulation would also serve
greater financial and exchange stability in all countries.
The international financial organizations, especially the IMF in its surveillance function, could go
further than just tolerating capital account regulations and encourage countries to strengthen
their administrative capacity for the management of international capital flows and advise on
their effective deployment in a way that suits their country-specific requirements.
It has also been suggested to establish an international regime for the regulation of capital
controls, because such measures can be used not only for the purpose of correcting a market
failure and avoid currency overvaluation, but also to artificially sustain currency undervaluation,
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i.e. for mercantilist purposes (Subramanian 2012).
d. Can capital controls address the cause of financial instability ?
Overall, capital controls deal with the symptoms of erratic private capital transactions in the
receiving countries rather than tackling their causes, which are mainly to be found in interest
differentials among countries. These are typically the result of diverging rates of inflation that are
not compensated or neutralized by exchange-rate adjustments. Moreover, when exchange rates
are not adjusted in line with such differentials, speculation becomes self-sustained: an initial
surge of capital inflows triggered by a positive interest rate differential tends to cause an
appreciation of the nominal exchange rate (although a depreciation would be required to reflect
the inflation differential) thereby attracting additional speculative inflows as gains can be had
not only from the interest differential but also from further exchange rate appreciation.
Against this background an increasing number of countries have chosen to protect their
economies against negative influences from international financial markets by managing their
exchange-rates. On the one hand, they have intervened in the foreign exchange market to
counter appreciation pressure resulting from capital inflows exceeding the need for currentaccount financing. On the other hand, they have accumulated foreign exchange reserves as a
“self-insurance” against possible undesired currency depreciation that may result from a sudden
stop or reversal of capital flows in the future. In this way, governments also aimed at avoiding
the need to have to turn to the IMF for support in crisis situations.
3. Reform of the exchange-rate system for greater stability in international trade and financial
relations
a. What are the limits of currency-market intervention and reserve accumulation?
The changed approach to exchange-rate management after the Asian financial crisis in the late
1990s has served not only as an instrument of financial policy inasmuch as it may reduce
exchange rate speculation, but also as a measure of trade policy as it helps to protect the
international competitiveness of domestic producers. However, countering undesired capital
inflows with currency market intervention and reserve accumulation is considered to be more
costly than capital controls because in most cases because the returns on the private capital
inflows that make the intervention necessary are higher than the interest rate earned from the
central bank’s investment of the reserves.
More importantly, currency market intervention of a single country is a viable instrument to
counter upward pressure on the exchange rate, whereas its scope to counter downward
pressure on the exchange rate is circumscribed by the – always – limited amount of foreign
exchange reserves accumulated in the past.
b. What is the rationale for a reform of the exchange-rate system?
It has therefore been suggested that a better way for tackling the problem of destabilizing capital
flows to emerging economies, and international financial instability more generally, is a reform
of the international currency system. While the reform debate gained some momentum after
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the global financial crisis, it has mainly focused on the issue of how the dollar could be replaced
as the main international reserve currency (see, e.g., UNPGA 2009; Akyüz 2009). In the current
agenda of the IMF for strengthening the international monetary system, exchange rate reform is
not even mentioned among the “reform paths”, although exchange rate misalignments and
volatility of capital flows and currencies are recognized as major shortcomings of the present
system (IMF 2011b).
However, UNCTAD (2009) has suggested that an appropriate reform of the international
exchange rate system would go a long way in avoiding these shortcomings. Such a reform would
have to depart from the recognition that overvaluation of one currency always implies
undervaluation of one or more other currencies, and that the exchange rate always depends on
policies in more than one country. A rational exchange-rate system would therefore oblige
central banks of all countries to intervene in a symmetric way to ensure a stable pattern of
exchange rates that reduces incentives for currency speculation and ensures fair trading
conditions.
c. How could a rule-based system for exchange-rate management achieve greater financial
stability?
In a highly integrated world economy a multilaterally agreed framework for exchange-rate
management is as important for a well-functioning international trading system as multilaterally
agreed trade rules. Against this background, UNCTAD (2009) has proposed to base the
international exchange-rate system on the principle of stable real exchange rates, under which
nominal exchange rates are systematically adjusted according to inflation or interest rate
differentials. Higher inflation and concomitantly higher interest rates would be compensated by
a devaluation of the nominal exchange rate, thereby reducing or eliminating possible gains from
carry trade. Financial instability generated by speculative capital flows would thus be tackled at
its source, and monetary factors would not impede international trade. The system would also
prevent exchange rate manipulation for mercantilist purposes and beggar-thy-neighbour
policies.
By definition, such a system implies symmetric intervention obligations, so that countries whose
currencies come under depreciation pressure would quasi-automatically be supported by other
countries in the system whose currencies would appreciate correspondingly. This means that the
need to hold foreign exchange reserves would be considerably reduced; such reserves would
only be needed to compensate for volatility of export earnings but no longer to defend the
exchange rate.
d. What is the “right” exchange rate − and is it the same for developed and developing countries?
While the indicators for adjustment of the nominal exchange rate in such a system are
straightforward (the differential in central banks’ policy interest rates, for instance) the
determination of the initial pattern of nominal exchange rates is likely to pose greater problems.
In principle, the “right exchange” rate would be the one that is consistent with a balanced
current account. However, in countries that are dependent on exports of raw materials primary
commodities the right exchange rate may the one that leads to balanced trade in manufactures
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(Bresser Perreira). Moreover, many poorer developing countries may only be in a position to
accelerate their economic development and industrialization process when the system allows
them to maintain a slightly undervalued exchange rate.
4. Towards an optimal policy mix to avoid destabilizing effects of international finance
a. How can developing countries best enlarge their macroeconomic policy space?
Capital account regulation can contribute to enlarging monetary policy space in developing
countries, especially when it can be adjusted speedily to close loopholes and to cover financial
innovations. Moreover, since private capital flows to developing countries are highly procyclical, capital controls are likely to be most effective when they can be deployed flexibly in
response to changing financial and macroeconomic conditions over time. In a regime that allows
for the counter-cyclical application of capital controls, controls over inflows would typically be
used during boom periods to avoid currency appreciation, while outflow controls would gain
importance during crisis periods to limit the impact of net capital outflows and capital flight.
Developing countries may therefore be well advised to strengthen their administrative capacity
to introduce such measures when they become necessary in light of unfavourable financial
developments.
In addition, as long as a new multilaterally agreed international exchange rate system with rules
for symmetric currency market intervention is not in place, intervention may also remain
necessary to correct currency market failures. But sterilization of large-scale currency market
intervention is often difficult in developing countries because the domestic market for
government paper that is suitable for this purpose is relatively small. Hence, creative ways of
sterilization may need to be explored. In this regard, countries may be benefit from the
experience of several emerging Asian economies (Kawai, Lamberte and Takagi 2012).
Macroeconomic policy space also depends on international monetary and financial
arrangements as well as the trade regime. Designing multilateral trade rules in a way that they
allow the application of capital account management techniques would not only protect policy
autonomy but also promote greater stability in international trade relations. Moreover,
developing countries should consider carefully the conclusion of regional trade and investment
agreements that constrain their macroeconomic and financial policy space more than
multilateral trade rules.
b. What role for an incomes policy in developing countries ?
While regaining a greater degree of autonomy in monetary policy is important, the task of
controlling inflation may also be pursued with other instruments. An incomes policy aimed at
avoiding that inflationary pressure that results from excessive wage increases would alleviate the
burden on monetary policy, reducing the likelihood that interest rate increases lead to surges of
capital inflows.
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c. What can the Geneva-based organizations contribute ?
WTO, in its efforts to create an international trading environment, has so far paid relatively little
attention to the repercussions on trade that result from international financial instability and
exchange rate misalignments, especially for developing and emerging economies. However,
these repercussions can lead to distortions in international trade relations that can be as harmful
as trade protection and jeopardize potential benefits that member States may have from trade
liberalization. In the face of finance-led globalization the design of international trade rules may
therefore have to pay greater attention to achieving better coherence between the international
trading and financial systems and to enable developing and emerging economies to deploy
measures that protect their position in international trade.
Regarding UNCTAD and the International Labour Organization it will be important to continue
their analytical work on the impact of financial instability for sustained growth and employment
creation, including in the context of the G-20’s Mutual Assessment Process. They also may
further strengthen their advocacy for international arrangements that reduce financial instability
and allow developing and emerging economies to accelerate structural change and the creation
of remunerative employment opportunities for their fast growing labour force. Similarly, UNRISD
may contribute to the international debate about appropriate policies that enhance social
development by taking up issues related to the implications of an adverse international financial
environment for the living conditions of large parts of the population in developing countries.
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