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Document of
The World Bank
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Report No. 59671-GN
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATION
INTERNATIONAL FINANCE CORPORATION
AND
MULTILATERAL INVESTMENT GUARANTEE AGENCY
INTERIM STRATEGY NOTE
FOR
THE REPUBLIC OF GUINEA
FOR THE PERIOD FY11-FY12
March 24, 2011
Western Africa Country Cluster
Africa Region
This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their
official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.
REPUBLIC OF GUINEA- FISCAL YEAR
January 1 - December 31
CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS
(as of March 1, 2011)
Currency Unit: Guinea Franc (GNF)
1US$ = GNF 7,250
WEIGHTS AND MEASURES
Metric System
ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
AAA
Analytic and Advisory Activities
ACE
Africa-Europe Submarine Fiberoptics Cable
ADF
AFD
AfDB
AU
CAS
African Development Fund
Agence Française de Développement (French Development Agency)
African Development Bank
African Union
Country Assistance Strategy
CDD
CG
Community Driven Development
Consultative Group
CPIA
Country Performance Institutional Assessment
CRD
CSO
ECOWAS
EITI
DB
DPs
Communautés rurales de développement
Civil Society Organization
Economic Community of Western African States
Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative
Doing Business Survey
Development Partners
DPO
DSA
EAPSP
ECF
Development Policy Operation
Debt Sustainability Analysis
Emergency Agricultural Productivity Support Project
Extended Credit Facility
EFA FTI CF
EMSP
Education For All Fast Track Initiative Catalytic Fund
Economic Management Support Project
EU
ESW
EUR
GDP
GEF
GET
GFDRR
European Union
Economic and Sector Work
Euro
Gross Domestic Product
Global Environment Facility
Global Experts Team
Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery
GFRP
Global Food Crisis Response Program
HIPC
Heavily Indebted Poor Countries
2
HIV/AIDS
HDI
Human Immunodeficiency Virus/Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
Human Development Index
ICT
Information and Communication Technologies
IDA
IDF
IFC
IFAD
IMF
INT
International Development Association
Institutional Development Fund
International Finance Corporation
International Fund for Agricultural Development
International Monetary Fund
Institutional Integrity Department
ISN
Interim Strategy Note
JSAN
Joint Staff Advisory Note
IsDB
Islamic Development Bank
KM
LICUS
LIPW
MDG
MDRI
M&E
Kilometers
Low Income Countries Under Stress
MIGA
Multilateral Investment Guaranty Agency
NPV
OECD DAC
Net Present Value
Development Assistance Committee of the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development
OMVS
PAP
PDO
Organisation pour la Mise en Valeur du Fleuve Sénégal
Priority Action Plan
Project Development Objectives
PER
Public Expenditure Review
PIU
Project Implementation Unit
PFM
Public Financial Management
PPP
Public Private Partnership
PRGF
PRSP
PRGSP
Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility
Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
Poverty Reduction and Growth Strategy Paper
RCF
Rapid Credit Facility (IMF)
SDR
Special Drawing Rights
SME
Small and Medium Enterprise
SPF
SSP
TA
TFSCB
TVET
State and Peace Building Fund
Services Support Project
Technical Assistance
Trust Fund for Statistical Capacity Building
UDP
UN
UNDP
VCSP
Labor Intensive Public Works
Millennium Development Goal
Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative
Monitoring and Evaluation
Technical and Vocational Education and Training
Urban Development project
United Nations
United Nations Development Program
WARCIP
Village Community Support Program
West Africa Regional Connectivity Project
WBI
World Bank Institute
WDR
World Development Report
3
World Bank
Vice President:
Obiageli K. Ezekwesili
Country Director:
Ishac Diwan
Country Manager:
Siaka Bakayoko
Country Program Coordinator/TTL: Sergiy Kulyk
INTERNATIONAL FINANCE CORPORATION
Vice President:
Thierry Tanoh
Country Director:
Yolande Duhem
Resident Representative :
Mary-Jean Lindile Moyo
Strategy Unit:
Frank Douamba
MULTILATERAL INVESTMENT GUARANTEE AGENCY
Vice President and Corporate
Secretary:
Executive Vice President:
Chief Operations Officer:
Finance and Risk Management:
Jorge Familiar Calderón
Izumi Kobayashi
James Bond
Thomas Hum, Conor Healy
4
INTERIM STRATEGY NOTE FOR THE REPUBLIC OF GUINEA FOR FY11-FY12
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Table of Contents
JOINT INTERIM STRATEGY NOTE FOR THE REPUBLIC OF GUINEA FY11-12 ..........7
I.
INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................... 7
II.
COUNTRY CONTEXT ................................................................................................... 8
A.
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS ..................................................................................... 8
B.
RECENT ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS ..................................................................... 9
C.
GOVERNANCE............................................................................................................ 11
D.
DELIVERING SERVICES ............................................................................................ 13
E.
SOURCES OF GROWTH ............................................................................................. 14
III.
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE WORLD BANK COUNTRY REENGAGEMENT .... 16
A.
GOVERNMENT STRATEGY ...................................................................................... 16
B.
MACROECONOMIC OUTLOOK AND DEBT SUSTAINABILITY ............................ 19
IV.
WORLD BANK INTERIM STRATEGY ................................................................... 20
A.
HISTORY OF BANK ENGAGEMENT......................................................................... 20
B.
LESSONS LEARNED................................................................................................... 21
C.
PROPOSED INTERIM STRATEGY ............................................................................. 22
a. Good Economic Governance and Macro Stabilization ........................................................ 26
b. A Big Push on Social Services ........................................................................................... 27
c. Creating Jobs ..................................................................................................................... 29
D.
PARTNERSHIP ............................................................................................................ 32
E.
RESULT MONITORING .............................................................................................. 34
F.
Risks and Mitigation ...................................................................................................... 35
Annex I. Portfolio Restructuring ............................................................................................ 37
Annex II. Results Matrix (1 January 2011 to 30 June 2012) .................................................... 39
Annex III – Guinea-at-a-glance .............................................................................................. 40
Annex IV: Guinea Map IBRD 33414 .................................................................................... 43
5
Tables
Table 1: Selected Macroeconomic Indicators, 2008-13............................................................... 18
Table 2: Government Priority Action Plan ................................................................................. 19
Table 3: Existing & Proposed Operations and ESW ................................................................... 25
Table 4. Republic of Guinea – Donor Mapping by Sector (2011-2012) ....................................... 34
6
JOINT INTERIM STRATEGY NOTE FOR THE REPUBLIC OF GUINEA FY11-12
I.
INTRODUCTION
1.
Guinea is one of the most well endowed countries in Africa with arable agriculture land,
rivers, and large deposits of bauxite and iron ore – it has been called the water tower of West
Africa, and also a geological “scandal”. Despite this large potential wealth, Guinea ranks among
the least developed countries in sub-Saharan Africa, for e.g. 156/169 countries on the UN Human
Development Index. The last two years, 2009-10 were especially tumultuous with a decline on the
security and economic front brought about by a Coup-d’état in 2009.
2.
With strong support from the international community, a first democratic
presidential election took place in September 2010, ushering a period of great hope for the
country. The goal of the new Government is to dramatically improve governance in order to bring
the country within a few years onto a rapid development path. The first phase of this program
focuses on addressing institutional and sectoral dysfunctions to prepare the stage for a subsequent
phase of reform and fast growth, and it is articulated around efforts to improve governance,
stabilize the economy, and initiate a recovery plan to deliver early wins in terms of better services
and more jobs.
3.
This Interim Strategy Note (ISN) outlines a Bank re-engagement strategy in Guinea
for the period FY11-12 that will support the Government‟s plan. The Bank will support
macroeconomic stabilization and help Government to reach the HIPC completion point rapidly by
providing budget support and technical assistance, with a special focus on the areas of public
financial management, public administration, the security sector, and mining. The Bank will
support a major push to boost the delivery of social services and the creation of jobs to help deliver
tangible quick wins to the citizens. We will do this by using the existing portfolio, creating a few
select new projects, and leveraging new sources of finance. The Bank will place emphasis on
strengthening civil society and social accountability mechanisms and on accelerating regional
integration. Significant progress under the ISN is expected to lead to a full Country Assistance
Strategy, at the end of the ISN period.
4.
The implementation of the strategy is associated with a number of risks, and while
some can be mitigated, others cannot be affected by actions by the Bank. But these risks are well
worth taking, given the existence of a unique critical moment in Guinea‟s history, brought about
by the confluence of a first ever Government with both national and international legitimacy, and
the coming together of civil society energies in support for democracy and development. It seems
imperative to take advantage of the window of opportunity to organize strong and quick
international support and try to make the current transition irreversible, so as to set the stage for
Guinea to enter a virtuous growth cycle in the future. Inaction or slow response on the other hand
carries the risk of a back-slide into a chaotic trap of poverty and insecurity, which would also
seriously destabilize the sub-region.
7
5.
The Bank’s strategy for Guinea is inspired by the important innovations developed by
the recent World Development Report 2011 1 and the new Africa Strategy2. Following the
WDR recommendations, the ISN takes the risk of inaction as a starting point and focuses on
building up state society relations, reforming the security sector, and anti-corruption initiatives by
providing immediate assistance to secure quick wins while initiating in parallel institutional
reforms to build confidence in the medium term. The Africa Strategy has shaped the ISN in two
important dimensions. First, by suggesting a focus not just on finance, but importantly, on the
provision of knowledge and partnerships, especially involving civil society and regional actors;
and second, in the selective selection of job creation and service delivery as central to rebuilding
citizens confidence.
II.
COUNTRY CONTEXT
A. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
6.
After years of military dictatorship and instability, and a disastrous transition under
military rule during 2009-10, Guinea’s first democratically elected president assumed power
in December 2010. Since it attained independence from France in 1958, Guinea has lived under a
succession of autocratic regimes. Under Sékou Touré, in power from 1958 until his death in 1984,
Guinea turned to central planning of the economy, resulting in disastrous development outcomes.
Political freedoms were also severely curtailed. Upon Sékou Touré‟s death, control was seized by
the military in a coup led by Lansana Conté, who remained in power until his death in December
2008. Although the economy was liberalized during the earlier part of Conté‟s regime, political
freedoms remained limited and the country‟s development was constrained by decaying
governance and occasional military unrest. During the past decade, Guinea became an important
transit point for the drug trade, leading to increased corruption in government and within the
security forces. Social unrest threatened the stability of the regime when the country was hit in
2007 by a wave of general strikes generated by an increasingly mobilized civil society, led by the
trade unions, demanding an end to mismanagement and impunity.
7.
The elections come on the heels of several failed attempts to reform the state. A
reform Government led by Prime Minister Kouyaté was appointed in February 2007 in response to
social unrest. He initiated a period of reforms, but this was short lived and he was dismissed in
May 2008. In December 2008, President Conté died following a long illness, and a military junta,
led by Captain Moussa Dadis Camara, seized power. Early in his rule, President Camara initiated
a robust anti-corruption drive, but when it became clear that he would be seeking the Presidency,
civil society groups got mobilized again. The protest movements grew, culminating in a mass
opposition rally in Conakry on September 28, 2009, which was violently attacked by security
forces, leading to dozens of deaths and injuries. Shortly after, Captain Camara was shot by one of
his associates, evacuated from Guinea, and replaced as the head of the junta by General Sékouba
Konaté. General Konaté presided over the transition to civilian rule and, with heavy support from
ECOWAS, the AU, and the international community, organized presidential elections, which were
1
WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2011, Conflict, Security, and Development The World Bank, Washington D.C.,
January 2011.
2
Africa Regional Strategy, The World Bank, Washington D.C., March 2011
8
held in June and November 2010. These elections were recognized as generally free and fair by
the international community, and are expected to be followed by legislative el ections during 2011.
Prof. Alpha Condé, a lifetime opponent of the previous régime, was elected and assumed power in
December 2010. Cellou Dalein Diallo, his opponent, accepted defeat, and by so doing, ensured a
peaceful transfer of power after a divisive election.
8.
Citizen power is at the heart of the ongoing historical transformation happening in
Guinea. The country has been led by autocratic rule for over five decades in the context of a
complex pattern of social and ethnic allegiance. Under Sékou Touré and Lansana Conté, the
Guinean State did not function in the public interest, but instead became a source of patronage and
private gain. The key stakeholders who benefited from this state of affairs were the President‟s
clan, as well as the top echelons of the armed forces. They resisted reforms throughout the past
decade, until popular pressure, led by the trade unions and civil society organizations managed to
force the appointment of a „reform Government‟ under Prime Minister Kouyaté in 2007, and again
in 2010, to force the holding of the first ever competitive election for the Presidency. The existing
window is thus largely a result of the resilience and cohesion of Guinean society which has
allowed the country to avoid the social breakdown and civil wars seen elsewhere in the region, in
spite of enormous tensions, and which has generated a powerful and ultimately successful
mobilization for change. The success of the movement was facilitated by divisions within the
military and the weakening of the traditional elites. In the future, the movement for change is
counting on its ability to push for both a political stabilization and a better management of the
country‟s natural resources, to get the country on a fast track to growth and development.
9.
The main challenge for the new Government will be to use the window of opportunity
created by the presidential elections in order to transform the nature of the State, from a
purveyor of private benefits to be shared between social and ethnic groups, to an organization
working for the benefit of the nation as a whole. To achieve this transition, the new Government
has to capitalize on its recent successes and find ways to initiate the governance reform agenda
rapidly. Both the Africa Strategy and the WDR2011 emphasize the importance of early wins to
demonstrate the potential for success and restore confidence in the potential of collective action.
The Government‟s hand is strengthened by the discredit of the notion that the military can govern
the state effectively, following the events of 2009 and the intervention of the International
Criminal Court, as well as the financial mismanagement during their rule. The recent political
gains need to be consolidated with rapid progress on the reform of the security forces to reduce
insecurity as well as the connected fiscal drain. The new Government benefits so far from the
support of a relatively wide social coalition, but this support is conditional on the holding of
Parliamentary elections in the near future, and the initiation of a national reconciliation process,
which are necessary conditions to reduce the tensions brought about by a very competitive
Presidential election. To prevent nepotism and guard against accusations of favoritism, deliberate
efforts at greater transparency and communication will be necessary, including on the causes of
past failures.
B. RECENT ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS
10.
On the economic front too, the new authorities have a difficult inheritance to contend
with, in the form of a massively mismanaged and unbalanced economy, rampant poverty and
9
social tensions, large accumulated debts and arrears, low growth, and an ineffective public service.
At the same time, the population expects a democracy dividend after years of impoverishment and
stagnation. Finding solutions will require a tight balancing act.
11.
Since 2008, economic growth strongly decelerated, to become negative in per capita
terms. Cumulatively, GDP per capita declined by 4.6 percent between 2008 and 2010. While
agriculture continued to grow modestly, the mining sector - historically a major driver of growth
contracted in real terms by 6 percent between 2008 and 2010 in spite of rising world commodity
prices. The regulatory business environment worsened with the cancellations of contracts in the
mining sector, changes of license terms and conditions in the telecommunications sector, on the
one hand and political uncertainty in the context of deteriorated security situation on the other. In
contrast, the construction sector benefited from the large fiscal expansion recorded in 2009-10.
12.
The Strategy for Africa identifies macroeconomic shocks as the main vulnerability
and threat to sustained resilience of the African countries. During the ISN period
macroeconomic stabilization will remain a central challenge for the new government. The
overall fiscal deficit deteriorated sharply both in 2009 and in 2010. From 1.3 percent of GDP in
2008, the fiscal deficit grew to 7.2 percent of GDP in 2009 and 14.2 percent in 2010. The fiscal
deterioration stemmed mostly from increased military spending as well as a surge in the civil
service wage bill (increased hiring and substantial pay rises). The resulting fiscal deficit was
mostly financed by advances from the Central Bank and by running up external arrears, vis-à-vis
IDA notably. As a result, broad money doubled during this period, and by 2010, inflation had shot
up to 20.8 percent, the Guinean Franc had depreciated by 12 percent against the Euro, and foreign
currency reserves had fallen to 0.5 months of imports.
13.
Poverty has increased, from a high base, as a result of macro instability and low
growth. The last household survey 3 undertaken in 2007 suggested that 53 percent of the
population was living below the poverty line, up from 49 percent in 2002. The proportion of the
rural population living below the poverty line was 63 percent, against 31 percent for the urban
population. Using the household 2007 survey and an estimated cumulative decline in average per
capita private consumption of 6.4 percent the poverty rate would have reached 58 percent in 2010.
Moreover, the poor are highly vulnerable to shocks. The consumption of essential food items
(rice, maize, oil, fish, meat and vegetables) in total consum ption is high (at about 45 percent)
across all income levels. As such, increases in the relative price of essential food commodities –
the result of global food prices increases, would significantly affect poor and near poor, as
observed in 2008. In contrast, the consumption of petroleum products (for lightning and transport)
is strongly differentiated between poor (2.5 percent of their total consumption) and non poor (5.7
percent of their total consumption). Guinea social safety net system is however very limited in
scope, coverage and effectiveness. The country has largely relied on informal solidarity, which
tends to work less well in periods of generalized shocks. Formal social safety net interventions are
small and driven by donors, and they include works program and school feeding programs.
14.
Guinea’s fiscal distress will continue until the country reaches the Completion Point
under the Enhanced HIPC Initiative and benefits from the Multilateral Debt Reduction
Initiative (MDRI). The stock of debt including arrears is equivalent to 71 percent of GDP at end3
Institut National de la Statistique, Enquête Légère pour l‘ Evaluation de la Pauvreté, 2007-08
10
2010, and 300 percent of exports. Of the debt service due in 2010, about US$145 million or 21
percent of Government revenue, about US$24 million were paid, the remainder giving rise to
arrears. Guinea reached the decision point under the Enhanced HIPC Initiative in December 2000 ,
but did not manage yet to reach the completion point. In the meanwhile, interim debt relief has
been provided by all main creditors including the IMF and IDA, and Guinea obtained several debt
rescheduling from its Paris Club creditors. HIPC‟s interim debt relief was suspended in 2007,
when Guinea reached the 50 percent ceiling of committed HIPC assistance. Since 2008, it has
accumulated arrears to the World Bank, which stood at US$75million, as of April 15, 2011.
Arrears to Paris Club partners at about US$37 million. Guinea did not run arrears with the IMF or
AfDB. By clearing its arrears to the World Bank and settling of all the project accounts, Guinea
would remove all the barriers for the full reengagement with the Bank.
C. GOVERNANCE
15.
The foundation of the new Africa Strategy is the work on poor governance and weak
institutional capacity of the client countries. These will be at the heart of the development
challenge in Guinea as well. Years of institutional neglect, authoritarian rule, predatory behavior
on the part of senior government officials and civil servants alike, ethnic tensions and armed
conflicts have clearly affected the governance situation in Guinea. The Ibrahim Index on African
Governance4 ranks Guinea 45 th out of 53 African countries, reflecting a judicial system that has
been weakened by political interference and corruption, and lacks independence from the
executive. Transparency International reports that Guinea, over the past several years, ranked at
the bottom of the scale in terms of perceptions of corruption -- in 2010, it was ranked 164 out of
178 countries5. These are related dimensions of a challenged authoritarian state with an oversized
military, the pernicious effects of the drug trade and the loss of financial controls, opaqueness of
the mining deals, especially during the junta in 2009-10, when governance effectiveness, which
had deteriorated over time, took a large dip.
16.
A central component of this state of affairs is the weakness of the state. The decaying
public administration has lost many of its core skills. After years of under-investment and
institutional neglect, the public administration requires significant attention in order to become an
effective agent for the country‟s rebirth. Much of the best talent, especially at the higher echelons
has left the civil service as the economic situation eroded the financial benefits associated with
public service. In the past few years, the exodus accelerated and the government was purged of its
best talent as political cronyism overtook meritocratic considerations in terms of appointments and
promotion. The civil service establishment has also been neglected. Serious inconsistencies
between the payroll and personnel data plague the public service pointing to the existence of large
abuse and irregularities in the payroll. Some of the problems leading to this situation include the
existence of multiple management centers; uncoordinated reform efforts amongst the various
actors involved in the management of human resources; a planning function which exists
structurally but is not used or implemented; management procedures (recruitment, training,
integration) which are not followed; and information applications which are obsolete and
dysfunctional.
4
5
The Ibrahim Index, The Mo Ibrahim Foundation, 2010
Corruption Perceptions Index, Transparency International, 2010
11
17.
Guinea’s public financial management was poorly performing prior to December
2008, but aggregate fiscal discipline was broadly maintained. A PEFA assessment finalized in
July 2007 showed that, overall, the performance of Guinea‟s public financial management system
placed it in the bottom league of African countries 6. Despite obvious and pervasive weaknesses in
the Guinean public financial management system, aggregate fiscal discipline was broadly
maintained: expenditure outturns remained in line with the approved budget up to 2007, and the
treasury kept a reasonable degree of oversight over cash flows. Since December 2008 however,
aggregate budget discipline has collapsed. Despite flat domestic revenues and a drop in external
funding, total government expenditures nearly doubled between 2008 and 2010. The predominant
cause of the collapse of budget discipline was that, following the military coup, the executive set
aside regular controls over budget commitments in order to enter into hundreds of mostly single source multi-year contracts. An audit undertaken with Bank support indicates that the contracts
signed in 2008 and 2009 were worth about US$2.2 billion. About 45 per cent of these benefited the
defense sector, for example for the construction of military barracks in cities and the purchase of
military equipment and vehicles. The remainder pertained to sectors such as road construction and
vehicle purchases.
18.
The security sector is central to the current crisis in Guinea and its transformation
will be critical in supporting legitimate and democratic rule. For decades, the military have
used their power and influence to control a disproportionate amount of the country‟s financial,
material and natural resources. From 2000 to 2010, the number of military personnel grew from
10,000 to over 45,000 and security expenditures represented 40 percent of the national budget in
2010. Although the army had entrenched its position since 2008, its leaders agreed to leave
political power with the understanding that security sector reform (SSR) as required by the
Ouagadougou Accord (January 15, 2010) will result in an improvement of its conditions. An
international team of experts conducted an evaluation of the state of the security forces and
submitted a wide range of recommendations on SSR in May 2010. The challenge ahead is to
bridge the gap between the Government‟s desire to adapt the size and role of the security forces to
the actual needs of the country, and the military which sees SSR as an opportunity to improve their
employment conditions. As a first step, the Government, with the support of ECOWAS and the
UN, will hold a seminar to establish a common approach to SSR in early April 2011.
19.
The bright spot in this picture, as alluded to earlier, is the awakening of civil society ,
which has played a central role in contesting the authoritarian model, in leading to the decision by
the military to withdraw from the electoral competition, and in ensuring that despite a high level of
ethnic tensions, the elections were conducted in an atmosphere of relative calm . The role of civil
society will be crucial in ensuring that Guinea is able to move forward in many of the important
agendas of the future, including national reconciliation, security sector reforms, the shaping of
national debates on reforms and development, and their participation in social accountability
mechanisms at all levels and in all sectors to eradicate corruption and establish good governance.
20.
Increased regional integration can greatly facilitate improvements in governance as
well as the reaping of gains from scope. Guinea had played a positive role in the past in the
6
Matt Andrews, How Far Have Public Financial Management Reforms Come in Africa? Harvard Kennedy School
Faculty Research Working paper 10-018, May 2010, p. 23.
12
ending of the civil wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone. ECOWAS and the neighboring countries of
Burkina Faso, Senegal, and Mali have played an important role in the process of democratization.
The Mano River Union has been less influential so far, with the exception of its civil society youth
arm which has been very vocal in the opposition to authoritarian rule in Guinea. Liberia, Sierra
Leone and Guinea are immediately affected when the security of one of them is threatened due to
long and porous borders, and also to the existence of ethnic groups divided by borders. A recent
example of cooperation involved Government and civil society groups in the three countries
developing a common approach to mining in order to present a more unified front in the face of
powerful mining corporations7. Economies of scope exist in the area of infrastructure (energy grid,
transport, ICT). Moreover, the small size of local markets taxes the competitiveness of local firms
and unduly favor imports8.
D. DELIVERING SERVICES
21.
As a result of the budget crunch, under-paid civil servants, and faltering
decentralization, the delivery of basic services has suffered.
22.
Heath services are in a serious state of decay. Government spending on health
(excluding external assistance) is dismally low, having decreased from less than 1 percent of GDP
in 1993 to 0.2 percent in 2010. Chronic malnutrition in 2007 was 36 percent up from the previous
survey in 2002. Less than 16 percent of the population consulted health care workers even thoug h
56 percent had access to services according to the same survey. Malaria remains the leading cause
of morbidity and mortality among children. The infant mortality rate is 101 per 1,000 (2004) and
the maternal mortality rate is one the highest in Africa at 740 per 100,000. Among those accessing
services, only slightly over half expressed satisfaction. The HIV prevalence rate is low relative for
the region, estimated at 1.6 percent. The government is pursuing a policy of free access to antiretroviral drugs but so far, public resources were not in place to finance this policy.
23.
The recent crisis also had negative effects on education. The gross enrolment rate has
stagnated at around 79 percent since 2007 (86 percent was expected in 2010), and for girls, at
around 70 percent. In the rural areas, the rate has remained at around 60 percent over the same
period. Dropout rate however shot up from 5.9 percent in 2007 to 11.6 percent in 2010, and as a
result, the primary completion rate fell to 57 percent in 2010. Enrolment in secondary schools has
also remained flat at about 44 and 25 percent GER respectively for secondary 1 and 2 since 2007.
The TVET including post-primary cycle is very weak: in 2008, the overall enrolment in this subsector was less than 6,000 students. Sector inefficiencies seem to have risen, especially in
expenditure management and planning with more than 90 percent of primary and secondary
education recurrent expenditures now spent on salaries. It is widely suspected that public
employment, especially in education, is rife with ghost workers and double dippers.
7
8
See West Africa Mineral Sector Strategic Assessment (WAMSSA), World Bank, 2010.
See Gains From Cooperation in the Mano River Union, World Bank, 2010.
13
24.
Local initiatives have been trying to restore the gap left behind by the failure of
central government but they have been limited by resource and capacity constraints. In
response to pressures from civil society and regions, past governments had undertaken important
reforms by passing on important functions, especially in the areas of social services, to local
governments. Political decentralization had progressed after the adoption of a new Electoral Code
in August 2005, and the holding of local government elections in December 2005. As a result, a
cadre of elected representatives became empowered to manage local affairs, and is poised to act as
champion for improved service delivery over the coming years. While this process so far has
promoted the development of local accountability and an increased presence of civil society at the
local level, it has however, been thwarted by the lack of devolution of financial and human
resources to the lower levels of government. The advent of democratic rule and the appearance of
regional specificities that need to be recognized point to the need to further this process.
25.
While some progress can be seen, Guinea is unlikely reach the MDG targets on
gender. The ratio of girls to boys in primary schools have improved from 0.76 in 2005 to about
0.92 in 2010 while the ratio in secondary schools has improved from 0.45 to about 0.59. The ratio
at the university level is about 0.30. The proportion of women in salaried formal sector positions
outside of agriculture remains low at 0.30 with the situation in the civil service being even worse at
0.26. Even in the education sector which is usually a major point of entry for w omen into the
formal sector, the ratio of women teachers in primary schools is only 0.35 while in secondary this
falls to a dismal 0.06. About 42 percent of women headed households are food insecure whereas
that percentage is 30 percent for male headed households. This is partly related to problems with
access to land. Special gender sensitive food security measures are needed especially in the current
situation of rising food prices. The general situation is reflected in the political and administrative
institutions with less than 20 percent of the members of the last parliament being women. Overall
only 17 percent of decision making positions in the administration are held by women with this
level falling to 4 percent for Secretary-Generals.
E. SOURCES OF GROWTH
26.
Guinea’s political and macroeconomic instability have long hobbled the development
of a vibrant private sector. The new Government is contending with one of the toughest climates
for business in the world: huge deficits exist in both the quantity and quality of economic and
administrative infrastructure; the legal enabling environment for business is one of the weakest
anywhere (Guinea ranks 179th in the 2011 Doing Business Report); access to finance is severely
constrained; and a history of poor governance, erratic policy, and inconsistent regulatory
enforcement have seriously undermined investor confidence in Guinea‟s institutions. Whether it is
in agriculture, mining, or services, Guinea is operating way below its potential and important
investments in both institutions and infrastructure will be needed to catch up.
27.
Agriculture is widely recognized to have considerable growth potential given Guinea’s
very favorable agro-ecological endowments. With about 70 percent of Guinea‟s population
living in rural areas, including 88 percent of the poor and 90 percent of the extreme poor,
increasing agricultural productivity is critical for providing jobs and higher incomes. To some
extent this is evidenced by the sector‟s growth performance over the period 1991-2004 which was
respectable in the regional context, reaching an average annual growth rate of 4.3 percent. Indeed,
14
Guinea ranked among the top 5 performing countries for the primary sector within a group of 15
best performing African countries9, although it should be noted that most of this growth occurred
in the 1990‟s. However, while agricultural potential is high, productivity remains low. Most land
use is for subsistence farming on small family farms (1-3 ha), which lack the technology and
capital to pursue intensive crop production. Increased production is primarily driven by area
expansion and often been at the expense of the environment, with erosion of mountain slopes due
to clearing for rain-fed rice. The dominance of subsistence production and the lack of market
linkages have so far limited the value-adding potential of the sector.
28.
In the past two years Guinea has participated in the ECOWAS –led Comprehensive
Africa Agriculture Development Program (CAADP) process. Building on the Government‟s
National Agricultural Development Policy – Vision 2015 document, and with analytical support
from the International Food Policy Research Institute, a series of briefs and strategy papers were
prepared, leading to a draft National Agricultural Investment Plan (NAIP) in September 2010. The
NAIP identifies five priority investment programs: (i) sustainable development of the rice sub sector; (ii) diversification for food security; (iii) promotion of agricultural exports and agro business; (iv) integrated natural resource management; and (v) institutional capacity building. It is
currently being revised to better define the priorities, sequencing of actions and costing for ea ch of
the investment programs. The revision process is an opportunity for the government to engage
with its development partners (DPs) over the issues and arrive at a medium and long program that
will allow Guinea to achieve a 6 percent growth rate in the sector and attain the MDGs. In terms
of immediate actions, the government has developed a priority action program with a focus on
food security issues. It has proposed a round table to discuss this program with DPs in early April.
29.
Guinea is also richly endowed in mineral resources. It has the world‟s largest reserves
of bauxite, as well as significant deposits of iron, gold, and diamonds, and good potential for oil
reserves in the Gulf of Guinea. In the past, poor governance and instability prevented the country
from leveraging these assets to stimulate growth. Still, the sector accounts for more than 90 percent
of exports, but only 20 percent of GDP and 25 percent of government revenues. Mining is capital
intensive and as a result, does not create a lot of jobs – it is estimated that the sector only employs
about 10,000 people. Planned multibillion dollar iron ore and alumina projects by some of the
world top corporations did not materialize over the past several years, despite favorable
commodity prices. In 2008, the Extractive Industries (EI) value chain work (EITI++) initiated by
the Bank identified the main constraints, which are governance related and include the lack of due
process and legal compliance, and low capacity to manage the sector. Reforms of the mining code
were started. During the military rule several large contracts were signed, some with obscure
corporations, but the secrecy surrounding these transactions has made it difficult to advise the
Government on how to make them developmentally sound. Going forward, the new Government
intends to finalize a reformed mining code, review and possibly revise existing mining contracts,
and develop a mining policy that would make the sector an engine for development.
30.
Both agriculture and mining are constrained by a lack of infrastructure. Road
infrastructure is poor and unevenly distributed, contributing to slow growth in most areas. Due to
the poor network of rural/feeder roads, large parts of rural areas are not adequately linked to
9
The 15 countries are Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Equatorial Guinea, Ghana, Lesotho, Mali, Mauritania,
Mauritius, Mozambique, Seychelles, Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda.
15
markets, which hinder producers from fully exploiting the opportunities offered by urban demand
and export possibilities. Rural communities are confronted with great hardships in accessing basic
social services, mainly due to their physical isolation during rainy seasons when roads become not
passable for days. Despite Government‟s efforts and donors commitments, effective road
management has been stymied by the lack of an overall network development and management
plan, and inadequate and irregular maintenance funding. A Road Maintenance Fund has been
established to collect user-fees for maintenance, but its annual budget is insufficient. This situation
has caused a considerable maintenance backlog and a continuous devaluation of the roads asset
value. Mobility in Conakry is a key challenge due to a combination of urban population growth,
lack of maintenance, poor traffic management, and an aging transport fleet.
31.
Overall electrification is estimated at only at 17 percent, with rural electrification at
mere 3 percent. The urban electricity sector is in a dire situation. Supply only covers about 40
percent of total demand, which leads to large scale load shedding. Generation, transmission and
distribution infrastructure is dilapidated due to lack of investment and maintenance. Technical
losses and fraud are high with total energy losses estimated at 47 percent, and the recovery of
billed energy is below 70 percent for private consumers. As a result, the utility only gets only paid
for about 1/3 of generated energy. Given that in addition, tariffs have been below average cost, the
state utility has been operating with a financial loss for many years, restricting its ability to raise
funds for rehabilitation.
32.
Despite significant growth in mobile penetration, the telecom sector faces numerous
challenges. Guinea is one of a handful of countries in the ECOWAS region which is not
connected to global broadband fiber optics infrastructure and relies on expensive satellite for
international connectivity. Broadband services are still very limited and expensive, with cost of
bandwidth between US$4,000-5,000 for 1 Mbit (compared with about, US$200 in the US, and
approximately US$400 in East Africa) resulting in high connectivity costs in general, and high
prices for international calls. A new regulatory authority (ARPT) was created in 2008 to regulate
the sector. The Authority is still in the establishment phase with significant needs for capacity
strengthening to play its role of ensuring fair completion in the market.
III.
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE WORLD BANK COUNTRY REENGAGEMENT
A. GOVERNMENT STRATEGY
33.
Medium and long term prospects for Guinea’s growth and poverty reduction are
bright. President Condé was elected on a platform of radical break with the practices of the
former military regime. The vision of the new Government is to transform Guinea‟s political and
economic governance in order to start reaping and sharing the benefits of its very rich agricultural
and geological endowment. The intent is to part with old habits in the area of economic and social
governance and create opportunities to rise above the dismal record of the past.
34.
The general aim of the immediate period is to reestablish a competent, transparent
government in order to be able to make progress in the future. Given the very difficult social
and economic situation that was inherited from the past, the goal of the new administration, in its
first two years, is to consolidate the new democratic order, stabilize the economic and security
16
situation, and lift up the economy onto a positive growth path. The main goals of this first phase
are: (i) Good governance: Parliamentary and local level elections; zero tolerance for corruption;
national reconciliation; and a big push to modernize the army; (ii) macro-economic stabilization,
including reducing fiscal deficits to sustainable levels, in ways that protect the poor, while
increasing revenues by increasing the tax base and renegotiating mining contracts; and a rapid
attainment of the HIPC completion point; and (iii) the implementation of an emergency recovery
plan with emphasis on agriculture, the rehabilitation of infrastructure, and the social services.
35.
The Government’s plan is outlined in the 2011-2012 Poverty Reduction Strategy
Paper, an extension to the 2007-10 PRS, whose preparation has involved consultations with
stakeholders and members of the Development Community in Guinea. The strategy articulates
government‟s actions necessary for recovery from crisis to laying the foundations sustained growth
and development. The PRS is complemented by a recently released detailed Priority Action Plan
(PAP), which defines in detail the reforms actions to be initiated in the next two years (see Table 2
for an outline). The PRS and PAP are organized around five priority areas (good governance,
poverty reduction, infrastructure, economic growth, and security). The PAP will also launch the
process of the preparation of the Guinea Vision 2035 and the next PRS.
36.
The good governance pillar puts emphasis on the consolidation of peace and
democracy, including initiating a process of national reconciliation, a reform and strengthening of
the electoral commission, a tightening of the rules for budget execution, procurement, and
financial management and the rehabilitation of public administration. It also proposes steps to
strengthen the decentralization system and to start the process of reforming justice.
37.
The government’s plans to fight poverty and improve living condition are articulated in
the PRS, and the PAP identifies priority actions to make a big push on job creation, especially in
agriculture and labor intensive rehabilitation of infrastructure, and support the most vulnerable
groups. The PAP also outlines short-term measures to substantially improve access to education
and health services and improve their quality. Other emergency actions seek to stabilize food
prices.
38.
The third pillar focuses on the rehabilitation of infrastructure and of basic service
delivery including water and electricity. There is an emphasis on delivering power on an urgent
basis in the main towns. The creation of the anti-corruption brigade and an inter-ministerial
committee for management and monitoring highlights the concern for good governance. Some of
the projects to be undertaken include the purchase and installation of new power grids in 22 rural
communities. Suspended road projects connecting agricultural centers will be reactivated and road
networks in Conakry will be improved. Unauthorized check points will be eliminated.
39.
To revitalize economic activity and growth, the government is stressing the improvement
of the investment climate, a big push on agriculture, and a reform of the mining sector. Policies are
outlined to attract investment (local and foreign) in mining and agriculture, with a particular focus
on micro and small-to-medium enterprises. The PAP proposes initiatives to improve the
investment climate, strengthen financial and non-financial support to the private sector, promote
entrepreneurship, and facilitate the integration and access of the Guinean private sector to regional
markets. Early priorities will be to revise the policy and legal framework for private sector
17
Table 1: Selected Macroeconomic Indicators, 2008-13
Real GDP growth
Real GDP per capita growth
Inflation, end of period
Broad Money (M2)
2008
2009
4.9
1.7
13.5
39.0
-0.3
-3.4
7.9
25.9
2010
2011
Annual changes (%)
1.9
4.0
-1.2
0.6
20.8
17.1
74.4
13.5
2012
2013
4.5
1.2
12.0
13.0
5.0
1.7
10.0
12.0
% of GDP
Revenue
Grants
15.6
0.5
16.2
0.4
15.6
0.4
16.6
5.2
16.8
4.3
17.0
4.0
Wage and salaries
Goods and services
Transfers
Due interest on domestic debt
Due interest on foreign debt
Domestically financed capital
expenditure
Foreign financed expenditure
4.1
4.8
1.9
1.3
1.3
5.0
6.2
3.3
1.5
0.6
5.8
9.5
3.5
1.3
0.7
6.2
4.4
3.4
0.9
0.9
6.2
4.2
3.4
1.0
0.4
6.2
4.0
3.4
1.0
0.3
1.9
2.1
5.8
1.3
8.2
1.0
3.5
3.4
3.0
6.0
3.5
5.6
Basic fiscal balance
Overall fiscal balance (commitment)
1.6
-1.3
-5.6
-7.1
-12.8
-14.2
-2.0
-1.1
-1.0
-3.1
-0.9
-2.8
Drawings
Due amortization on external debt
Net external arrears accumulation
Debt relief and rescheduling
Errors and omissions
Domestic financing (net)
1.6
-3.1
0.8
1.2
-0.3
1.1
0.9
-2.0
0.9
0.0
-0.3
7.6
0.7
-2.3
1.3
0.6
-0.3
14.2
1.7
-3.6
0.0
0.4
0.0
2.6
3.0
-1.2
-6.1
6.1
0.0
1.4
2.8
-0.2
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.2
4,562
493
73
Millions of US$
4,267
4,658 4,965
566
415
359
87
203
317
Gross Domestic Product
BOP Current account deficit
Gross Foreign Currency Reserves
4,520
339
68
5,317
375
463
Source: World Bank Staff Calculations based on Authorities and IMF.
40.
development (e.g. an overhauled investment code), as well as to modernize the institutional
framework for the private sector (e.g. Chamber of Commerce and Industry; private sector
associations; investment promotion agency; one-stop shop for enterprise formalities etc.) and
financial sector support mechanisms. Other actions outlined in the PAP include a reform of the
mining code, improved public-private dialogue, and measures to attract large investments in
agriculture and linking them with smallholders using out-growers schemes.
18
41.
The plans aim to start implementing the recommendations of a UN mission to reform
the security sector. An Inter-ministerial committee would be created to design the overall
security sector reform strategy and identify implementation structures. The national defense
strategy will be updated to reflect current security challenges, including preventing military
involvement in civilian affairs, rightsizing the security forces, and upgrading their capacity to
support construction and agriculture in inaccessible areas. Barracks will also be upgraded to house
military personnel. Overall, the PAP follows as measured approach to the thorny question of
reform of the army and stresses the need for consultations and dialogue on the reform of the army.
Table 2: Government Priority Action Plan
Pillar 1: GOOD GOVERNANCE
Objective 1: Improve Political Governance
1.1: Restored state authority and revived local
development process
1.2 Reinforced socio-political dialogue in preparation of
elections
1.3 Revamped public administration
1.4 Diplomatic Relations oriented towards development
Objective 2: Improve Economic Governance
2.1 Revived planning processes and improved
government transparency
2.2 Stabilized exchange rate
2.3 Reinforced control of public management and
significantly reduced corruption
Objective 3: Improve Judicial Governance
3.1 Established Judicial Sector Reform
Pillar 2: FIGHT AGAINST POVERTY
Objective 4: Reinforcing Food Security
4.1 Accessibility of Foodstuffs and primary products
4.2 Reinforced support for gender activities
Objective 5: Improve accessing basic social services by
the poor
5.1 Improved reproductive health and access to health
care
5.2 Improved quality of education
Object 6: Improving Sanitation
6.1 Secured and Stabilized Working Environment
Objective 7: Promoting Youth Employment
7.1 Created Youth Employment Framework
7.2 Strengthened Youth Sport
Pillar 3: INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT
Objective 8: Improving Access to Water & Electricity
8.1 Institutional Reform and fraud is reduced
8.2 Strengthened capacity in the electricity distribution
sectors
8.3 Strengthened potable water production and supply
Objective 9: Improving Transport and
Telecommunications Infrastructure
9.1 Improved transport infrastructure
9.2 Improved public transport
Pillar 4: ECONOMIC GROWTH & DEVELOPMENT
Objective 10: Promoting Mining Sector Development
10.1 Improved agriculture production
10.2 Improved Institutional and Legal Framework of the
Mining Sector
Objective 11: Upgrading the Market Mechanism
11.1 Launched private sector reform
Pillar 5: SECURITY AND DEFENSE
Objective 12: Reform of the Security Sector Initiated
12.1 Established Legal and Institutional Reform
Framework
12.2 Improved Civilian-Military Relations
Objective 13: Guaranteeing the Security of People and
Property
13.1 Reinforced living and working conditions of the
security forces
B. MACROECONOMIC OUTLOOK AND DEBT SUSTAINABILITY
42.
Due to the difficult inheritance from the past, the first year of the new Government
will be challenging. The authorities intend to move rapidly to restore macroeconomic stability in
2011 through fiscal consolidation in order to lower inflation and reach the HPIC completion point
rapidly. Measures retained by the authorities include in particular the re-instatement of the
Treasury Committee (chaired by the Prime Minister) for effective cash management, measures to
19
improve fiscal revenue, aggressive controls against fraud and corruption, a net hiring freeze in the
public sector, and the audit, cancellation, and/or postponement of most investment contracts signed
under the military junta regime in 2009-10. Under this budget, the overall deficit is expected to
reach 3 percent of GDP in 2011.
43.
The economic recovery is expected to initially remain modest. With compressed public
demand, a mining sector at full capacity, a poor and uncertain business environment, and a
looming deterioration in the terms of trade, economic growth is projected at 4 percent in 2011 (or 1
percent in per capita terms). The Government, with the assistance of Development partners,
intends to promote interventions and broad reforms aimed at improving the supply response from
the private sector.
44.
Inflation will continue in 2011 to exert strong pressure on households’ purchasing
power. Despite fiscal stabilization, inflation is expected to remain high in 2011 (peaking at 25
percent by mid-year before starting to decline), given the high level of liquidity, the lack of
sufficient foreign currency reserves to intervene on the foreign exchange market, looming terms of
trade pressures and the need to remove inefficient and costly subsidies for the budget. High
inflation will hurt the poor. Against these pressures, the Government intends with the assistance of
Development Partners to scale up safety nets, especially in cities where inflation pressures will be
mostly felt.
45.
Substantial external financing in 2011 will be critical to a successful m acroeconomic
stabilization and pave the way for meeting the HPIC completion point. Given identified
financing needs to cover current debt service and arrears clearance to multilaterals, substantial
financial support will be critical to limit resort to central bank financing and rebuild foreign
currency reserves, providing sufficient buffer against potential external shocks and the resumption
of arrears. Under favorable circumstances, the HPIC completion point could be achieved
sometime in 2012. Along with meeting structural HPIC triggers, most of which have already been
met, a satisfactory track record on macroeconomic management, especially containing the fiscal
deficit, would facilitate the early attainment of the completion point. This would in turn reduce the
debt service and allow reducing fiscal pressures in the future.
IV.
WORLD BANK INTERIM STRATEGY
A. HISTORY OF BANK ENGAGEMENT
46.
The World Bank ceased its engagement in Guinea after the military coup of
December 2008. Subsequently, a formal suspension of disbursements was declared in November
2009, when the country fell into arrears. The Bank has been operating under the auspices of
OP/BP 7.30, Dealings with De Facto Governments until January 2011. Prior to disengaging, the
Bank had maintained an active portfolio comprising eleven projects including three regional
operations. IDA commitments are currently US$360 million with an amount of about US$16 0
million available for disbursement.
47.
The 2003-2006 CAS was anchored on the three PRSP pillars of fostering growth,
improving access to basic services, and strengthening capacity. The Bank‟s objective was to
20
foster growth, improve access to social services and strengthen capacity. The program aimed at
assisting Guinea to reform its institutional and policy framework, by building its capacity for
service delivery and improving the management of public finances. Bank interventions focused on
community development, rural infrastructure, education, transport, electricity, health, HIV/AIDs,
Water Basin management and rural electrification. Most of these projects are still in the Bank‟s
portfolio and remain highly relevant areas for Bank support.
48.
During 2007-08, the Bank was also active developing a safety net and advising on how
to reform the mining sector and improve regional integration. The Bank financed elements of
a safety net in response to the food and fuel price shock of 2008, including works programs,
fertilizers subsidies, and budget support to cover the loss of revenue related to the elimination of
custom duties on food imports during the height of the crisis. It undertook studies on how to make
mining more pro-development (EITI++ approach), which was presented and discussed with the
Kouyaté Cabinet. The Bank also developed its relations with civil society, and maintained them
after the 2008 coup. It initiated ESW to strengthen regional cooperation, exploring the many
dimensions in which a Mano Union could benefit its members and hosting a regional mining
conference in Conakry focused on the regional harmonization of mining laws. During the recent
election period, the Bank prepared a series of sector notes, outlining diagnostics and options for
progress, and these were discussed with civil society and made available to the new leadership.
B. LESSONS LEARNED
49.
Prior to interruption of operations in 2008, the Bank had a mixed record of program
implementation in Guinea. Some of the lessons of the pre-military rule engagement will be
relevant during the ISN period:
50.
Strengthening accountability mechanisms has been a key element of ensuring some
level of impact to donor financed activities in an environment where traditional institutional
counterparts revealed themselves to be unresponsive. Those initiatives whose reach went beyond
the traditional institutional partners fared better than those who did not.
51.
Community participation has been central to reaching tangible results. Programs such
as the Community Support Program and the Urban Program that involved strong participation of
beneficiaries have been particularly successful in improving the quality of services and poor
people's access to these services. Such programs have also promoted gender equity, since many of
the community-identified priorities have involved measures improving the quality of women's
lives, such as maternal health services, better access to drinking water and agricultural services.
These efforts also allowed the Bank to have a decisive impact on governance at the local level.
Early investments in CDD activities were followed by political reforms in the late 80s, which
introduced district and municipal level elections. The Bank‟s close relationship with civil society
was also helpful in creating the momentum for change which ultimately led to the first free and
peaceful elections.
52.
The involvement of the private sector, including beneficiary and producer
organizations, in service delivery has increased the quality of services. For example, in a
recent survey, beneficiaries of the Community Support Program have expressed increased
21
satisfaction with services. Garbage collection in Conakry has improved under the Urban Program
through subcontracting of the services to private organizations. Working with the private sector
will be particularly important in the future given the very low level of capacity in the public sector.
53.
Donor coordination has been important in scaling up successful programs to national
coverage. Programs involving strong donor coordination, such as education and the Community
Support Program have made more progress in scaling up to national coverage than those in which
donor coordination was weak. The establishment of clear national strategies facilitates donor
support to a common program.
54.
The Bank’s investment in analytical work has supported national debates and the
emergence of evidence based policy and should continue. Recent ESW and technical assistance
have focused on the mining sector, decentralization, the political economy of change, the
effectiveness of safety nets, the benefit of regional integration, and more recently, the audits of
large contracts have all been influential in developing our contacts with regional organizations and
in supporting processes of evidence based reform. The effort has also proved useful in helping the
Bank to navigate the difficult environment of the past two years.
C. PROPOSED INTERIM STRATEGY
55.
The Bank’s strategy for Guinea is being inspired by the recent innovations proposed
by both the World development Report 2011 on Conflict, Security, and Development, and
the new Africa Strategy. Following the WDR recommendations, the ISN is taking the risk of
inaction as a starting point and is focusing on building bottom up state society relations, the
institutional transformation of security agencies, job creation, economic empowerment at all
levels, and anti-corruption initiatives along three tracks: (i) providing immediate assistance on jobs
and services to secure quick wins; (ii) start to reform internal agencies to build confidence for
medium term re-emergence; and (iii) acting regionally and globally to maximize impact. The
Africa Strategy suggests both the mode of interaction and the areas where the Bank is development
comparative advantages. This has shaped the ISN in two important dimensions. First, the approach
used will focus not just on finance, but importantly, on the provision of knowledge for
development – both to shape analysis in ways useful for policy, and to bring about social dialogue
necessary to build the basis for broad coalitions for change. It will also work in partnership with
the key actors in society, including not just the Government, but also society groups, local
government, the private sector, universities and the intellectual elite, and regional players. The
areas of selective focus of the ISN are areas that are both of strategic interest in Guinea and where
the Bank has developed comparative advantages.
56.
The main goal of the interim strategy is to deliver timely and adequate support to the
newly elected government in its effort to bring about a tangible improvement of the living
conditions of the population, including the restoration of the macro-economic stability, a
sharp improvement of governance, and the recovery of the economy and of social services. It
is in the vital interest of the international community and the neighboring West African countries
that the new government succeeds in delivering early wins to first consolidate the transition to
democratic rule and then embark on a path a fast growth and development. The Bank‟s support for
22
this first phase will be organized along three main axes: improved economic governance and
macro stability; big push on public services (including supporting social resilienc e to shocks); big
push on jobs. It also includes two cross cutting themes: social accountability and regional
integration.
57.
The ISN covers the period FY11 and FY12. In FY11, the last year of IDA15, the Bank
will still be able to utilize the unused IDA15 allocation (about US$84 million). In FY12, the first
year of IDA16 period, Guinea is estimated to receive about US$32 million in IDA allocation.10 In
addition, in FY12, Guinea would be eligible for frontloading up to 30 percent of its FY12
allocation (or US$10 million) from future years of IDA16, which would further increase the
resources available in FY12 to support its development needs. The total new commitments of IDA
resources available for the ISN period would thus be about US$125 million. The undisbursed part
of the existing portfolio stands at about US$160 million (IDA and TFs) and efforts will be devoted
to maximizing the disbursement rate during the ISN period. Support from additional regional IDA
would be available if Guinea participates in regional projects. These finances would be
complemented by the various trust funds, deploying support from the WBI, and leveraging the IFC
and MIGA resources.
58.
A key focus of Bank’s support will be devoted to stabilization and economic
governance. In order to fill the budget gap in 2011 without running into arrears and without
unduly hurting the poor, external support of the order of US$100-150 million will be needed. In
addition, a precondition to resuming our activities as well as that of the IMF and other donors for
Guinea is to clear its arrears to the Bank, now at US$74million. These requirements suggest that
the World Bank and other Development Partners will have to deliver important l evels of budget
support in 2011 and until HIPC completion point is reached. The Bank will deliver in April 2011 a
DPO for US$78 million, followed in FY12 by a second DPO. The IMF is planning in parallel to
start with an RCF program, to be followed with an ECF program when the Government
performance improves, probably during the Fall of 2011. HIPC CP could occur about six months
later, in early to mid 2012. Failure of the Government to stabilize its budget would delay this
process. Preliminary discussions with DPs suggest that the AfDB, EU, and possibly France will
also provide budget support. It is also expected that the bilateral debt service will be subject to
complete restructuring by the Paris Club.
59.
In parallel to budget support, the Bank will develop an Economic Management
Support Project (EMSP) to finance technical assistance and capacity building in the areas that
are crucial for good economic governance, such as PFM, PSR, and support for the mining and
security sectors. Other new projects include the creation of a safety net to shield the poor from the
negative impact of stabilization, support measures to speed up the growth recovery by improving
the investment climate, a project in agriculture, and 2 new regional projects in areas of high
priority (ICT and Mining). We will also be very involved in delivering several pieces of AAA and
TA to support evidence based policy change and social debates, and in developing partnerships
(with civil society, DPs, the private sector) to leverage gains from coordination.
10
The allocation figure is indicative only and actual allocation for IDA16 may vary, depending on (i) total IDA
resources available at the time of allocation; (ii) Guinea’s performance rating; (iv) the terms of IDA's assistance
(grants or credits) depending on the debt sustainability position; (v) the performance and assistance terms of other
IDA borrowers; and (vi) the number of IDA-eligible countries.
23
60.
The Bank will finance much of its support for the PAP, especially to boost services
and create more jobs, from its existing portfolio of projects. The resumption of our activities
will be sequenced in time, with the more urgent areas receiving more support in the early period.
This includes 9 projects that support improved service delivery in maternal health and basic
education, and stimulating agriculture and rural development. These are areas of traditional
support from the Bank with projects in place that were performing relatively well before the
breakdown in relations in 2008. Re-activating the portfolio will involve overall 11 retroactive
extensions of closing dates and six level 1 or 2 restructurings. The restructurings have been
devised in ways to improve disbursement rates, tighten fiduciary controls, make the projects more
participatory, and more generally, more adapted to the current circumstances. Following a
comprehensive fiduciary review of the portfolio, existing operations have been assessed as being
ready for a resumption of activities. All projects have also submitted the required audit reports and
identified ineligible expenditures are being reimbursed. The goal is to use the fact that the existing
projects have in-built capacity for delivery to disburse at least US$100 million during 2011-12.
Importantly, and during the ISN period, the portfolio will be simplified and organized around the
three key clusters of economic governance, jobs, and decentralized services. Working closely with
other DPs, the various vertical projects in this last theme will be combined over time into a single
program that would focus on the horizontal constraints to service delivery in health and education,
such as inter-governmental transfers, staff incentives, and social accountability.
61.
The two cross-cutting themes of citizen activism and regional integration were selected
based on consultations with the Government and civil society, and in line with perceived priorities
as well as Bank new directions under the Africa Strategy and the WDR2011. The relation between
the citizen and the state needs to be repaired, starting with opening up a constructive dialogue.
Citizen involvement will enrich social debates on priorities, national strategies, and the necessary
trade-offs. The Bank will support the development of the capacity of youth, women, and tradeunion groups and will involve them also in project design, implementation, and monitoring.
Analytical work will involve local research groups and universities. This will also help reach
some of the higher order goals of the new regime: to improve social cohesion, reduce corruption at
all levels, and achieve national reconciliation. Regional integration can support Guinea reintegration with its neighbors, after several years of isolation, which would strengthen the young
democracies of the Mano River Group, as well as start reaping organizational and efficiency gains
from cooperation with counties with whom Guinea shares borders, rivers, and mining deposits
including the Gambia, Mali, Senegal, Burkina, Sierra Leone, and Liberia.
24
Table 3: Existing & Proposed Operations and ESW
Sectors
1. Good Governance
Economic Governance
and public sector
management
Priority projects and ESW in
current Portfolio
$m
ESW: EITI++
TA: SME IFC Linkages
EMSP*
Mining Regional Project
ESW: Economic
Management Policy Notes
ESW: Political Economy
DPO FY11
DPO FY12
2. Basic services
Local development
and basic
infrastructure
Village Communities Support
Program -Phase II APL (VCSP-2)
Urban development &
basic infrastructure
Third Urban Development Project
(UDP-3) & AF
11.8
Education
Education for All FTI (TF)
45.2
Health
Health Sector Support Pr. (HSSP)
15.9
3. Creating Jobs
Agric. & Food
Security
Emergency Agricultural
Productivity Support Project
(EAPSP) TF
Water Management
and Environment
Regional Senegal River Basin
Regional Niger River Basin
Rural roads
PSD
Natl Rural Infrastructure Program
Safety net
ESW: Safety Net
Energy
Electricity Sec Efficiency Project
$m
10.0
15.0
78.0
30.0
13.9
3.0
ESW: Basic services strategy
EAPSP AF (GFRP)
Reg. WA Ag. Productivity
(WAAPP) (JSDF)
ESW: Agriculture
20.0
9.0
15.3
8.3
23.2
TA: PSD (wt IFC)
142.2
TOTAL
Safety net (GFRP)*
20.0
Regional APL1-B WARCIP
30.0
5.6
ICT


New Commitments and
ESW
232.0
* = available if TF approves request.
New financing is composed of: (i) IDA15: $84m ; (ii) IDA16 year 1, front-loaded: $40m; (iii) IDA regional:
$33m; (iv) GFRP: $20m in FY11 and $20m in 2012; (v) Trust funds: PBF $4m; JSDF $9 m; PHRD: $1m. See
also footnote 10, page 22.
25
a. Good Economic Governance and Macro Stabilization
62.
Assisting the Government in restoring civilian rule, consolidating macroeconomic
stability, improving the effectiveness and accountability of the civil service and state
institutions, and improving the governance of the mining sector are core priorities of the
ISN.
63.
An important instrument for Bank’s support of good economic governance is the
Guinea Re-engagement and Reform Support Grant DPO series (FY11 and FY12). Prior
actions of the DPO1 include important measures in the areas of PFM, Public Administration
Reform, revenues, and mining. The medium term agenda in these areas will be supported in the
second DPO in FY12 which will initiate improvements in the rules. In the area of PFM, the DPO2
would focus on priorities such as the new PFM legal framework, the revised procurement code, the
consolidation of the single treasury account, the production of financial statements and
strengthening external and internal oversight. In the area of state accountability and public
administration, it would support the reconstruction of a viable personnel database of public
employees which includes biometric information, the revitalization of control institutions for
public sector employment, a redefinition of the mandates and staffing structure of public entities. It
would support governance in the mining sector through the adoption of a new mining sector policy
and mining code.
64.
In parallel, an Economic Management Support project (EMSP, US$10 million) is
being developed to provide technical assistance and capacity building inputs to support the
policies delivered by the DPOs. The project will support technical reforms in these areas,
including for audits and the renegotiation of state contracts, the creation of a school of Public
Administration (Ecole Nationale d’ Administration), measures to rehabilitate the public
administration, a senior executive program to attract talent from the Diaspora, and possibly,
support for the security sector reform. In the area of mining, the EMSP as well as an established
Mining TF) will finance the audits of the large mining contracts and their renegotiation, along a
process that would e transparent and would follow due process. It will also support the building of
a shared vision for the management of the sector, including the development of a new policy, legal,
and regulatory frameworks; strengthening institutional capacity and accountability of the
ministries of mines, finance and environment to foster compliance. The World Bank possible
engagement in the security sector will be mindful of the limits of our mandate and comparative
advantage. Subject to other partners taking the lead around a coherent approach, two entry points
can be considered in the short term, public expenditures analysis of key security institutions, and
Public Financial Management support to increase accountability and transparency. In the longer
term, support for demilitarization may be considered. The EMSP will also strengthen transparency
and accountability systems by building capacity of CSOs, community organizations, media, and
other stakeholders to be active in debates and social accountability mechanisms on all these
important national issues.
65.
Guinea will also benefit from the planned West Africa Mineral Governance project
(US$15 million, Board in FY12). This regional project involves Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea
and focuses on improving the state of knowledge by these countries of their mining resources. The
26
project will provide a critical mass of geo-scientific information to allow the countries to properly
value their assets as they enter into contract with private companies. It will also set up a regional
mining observatory for the provision of valuable public goods (skills in audits and negotiations,
grievance mechanisms; design and monitoring of performance indicators; and the development of
cadastres for geo, economic, and financial data).
66.
Economic and sector work will be very important to develop in these areas in order to
provide a basis for good policies. A series of policy notes on economic management will focus on
providing the evidence base to implement the urgent reforms. For example, a key issue is how to
reduce inflation given the monetary overhang and rising international prices. Analysis will also be
needed in areas connected to PFM, PSR, increasing revenues, and reforming the mining sector.
Political analysis will also be necessary to help understand developments and manage risks.
67.
WBI will be focusing its support on supporting civil society in the area of Governance
through development dialogues, social accountability mechanisms, and the media, including using
cultural platforms that can appeal to the youth. It will provide support to the PRS secretariat to
enhance participation of key stakeholders in the validation/dissemination & monitoring of the
country PRS (through strengthening the capacity of media professionals and collaborating
strategically with national, rural, community and private radio stations; and including capacity
building for M&E). It will also engage citizens and civil society organizations to participate more
directly in the development and implementation the PRS process and movement on key HIPC
triggers by making innovative uses of ICTs as tools to enhance good governance and social
accountability in key strategic sectors, i.e. health and education. ICT facilitated engagement of
multi-stakeholders will integrate with e-government initiatives. It will also organize south-south
knowledge exchanges in Public Service Reform, and other areas.
b.
A Big Push on Social Services
68.
The restoration of health and education services, and the re-invigoration of the
capacity of the decentralized agencies in charge of delivering these services figure
prominently in the PAP, with measures to extent service and improve quality in the short term,
enhance decentralization, as well as parallel efforts to plan sectorally for the next phase. These are
sectors where the Bank has played traditionally an important role, and four projects in the portfolio
with sizable balances allow us to show results on the ground rapidly.
69.
Health. The revised PDO of the Health Sector Support Project is to improve health service
delivery to mother and child in the 18 poorest districts of Guinea and 22 health centers in the
commune of Conakry. The restructured project will finance medicines and support the national
vaccination campaign. The project has US$16.6 million of undisbursed funds of which US$11
million can be disbursed in the next 12 months, and the balance by end 2012. The project will help
increase the share of assisted deliveries in the 18 targeted districts from 21 percent in 2011 to 25
percent by end 2013, and the proportion of children immunized from 39 percent to 41 percent by
end 2013.
27
70.
Education. The objectives of the education pooled fund (US$78 million with AFD, KfW,
and EFA FTI CF managed by the WB) is to enhance equitable access to and quality of education
in basic education while also strengthening decentralized management of the education system.
The project will finance 2000 primary classrooms and 389 secondary classrooms in addition to
procurement of textbooks and school materials to all primary school children; block grants to
schools and prefectures in support of their annual plans; and targeted support to increase education
demand in the nine poorest prefectures with the lowest education indicators (school kits, little
materials..). The pooled fund is expected to disburse US$18.3 million in the six months after
recommencement, followed by US$37.4 million during the following six months and US$25.4
million in the subsequent twelve months. This is expected to increase gross enrolment in the nine
targeted prefectures from 47 percent to 55 percent and improve the 4 th grade math passing grade
from 51 percent to 58 percent. Another older IDA project is in its last year of operation with
US$5.2 million of funds that are expected to be disbursed within the next 12 months and focusing
on improving personnel/HR management.
71.
An important part of normalization and reconciliation is to empower decentralized
structures to play their role. The Bank had supported decentralization in the past decade through
CDD activities, urban and rural, with more focus on rules and capacity since the 1999 reform and
the subsequent direct election of local officials. Reactivating these projects will allow not only to
empower local authorities to play their legal roles, but will also inject liquidity at the local level,
generating quick impact in terms of new jobs as well as additional public services. The third
Urban Development Project (UDP3) targets cities as centers of opportunities to improve the
provision of infrastructure and services as well as the financial and organizational management of
municipalities in support of the decentralization process. The project will be re-activated and
restructured to increase its disbursement rate -- the remaining balance of US$11.8 million will be
fully disbursed by end 2012. The Village Communities Support Program – Phase 2 (VCSP-2)
focuses on rural areas, strengthening local governance and improving access to basi c
infrastructure. CRDs are enabled to fulfill their legal mandate by planning and implementing
inclusive local development activities, and improving revenue performance to sustain their
recurrent costs. Undisbursed amount is US$15 million IDA and US$9 million IFAD grants, which
can be fully disbursed by end 2012.
72.
Here too, the role of civil society groups will be important to improve policy-making
and results. The participation of CSOs in the national debates that will lead to the finalization of
health, education, and decentralization strategies will be important and needs to be supported. In
addition, and with the support of WBI, the Bank will pilot social accountability mechanisms at
various levels in these sectors in order to channel citizens energy in holding the state accountable
and improving the quality of social services all the way to the facility level.
73.
The Bank, working with other donors, aims to develop a more coherent approach to
supporting service delivery in a decentralized framework. As a follow up to the VCSP, UDP,
and health and education projects, we will work with the Government, DPs, and civil society on a
comprehensive program that would focus horizontally on the main constraints to service delivery,
such as the timing and extent of inter-governmental transfers, the incentives and skills of teachers
and nurses, and the positive feedback and pressures from civil society. Economic and sector work
28
will be initiated in this area to clarify which are the main constraints to service delivery.
Depending on the availability of IDA resources, the project would be delivered in FY13.
c.
Creating Jobs
74.
While stabilization efforts will push growth down in the short term, it is imperative to
exert efforts early on to encourage private sector activity to ensure a quick rebound of the
economy. Macro stability is necessary to a good business climate. But as the Africa Strategy
makes clear - it is not sufficient. The Bank, working closely with IFC, will support efforts to
quickly improve the investment climate and get Guinea back in business. This is particularly the
case for SMEs and for agriculture, for which the investment climate is so important, and where
growth would have a strong impact on job creation. The Bank will also support the Government‟s
efforts to entice the mining sector to contribute more to the development of the regions of the
country, including assisting in rehabilitation the power sector. To have a quick impact, work
programs in poor areas will be funded early on in the context of a scaling up of a national safety
net. Timely ESW, especially on the constraints to private activity and agriculture will help provide
the knowledge needed for good policies.
75.
The business community complains that it faces many constraints that reduce its
competitiveness and ability to create jobs. Guinea has one of the lowest DB rankings in the
world, and the Government and the private sector are keen to work on improving it. Constraints to
business seem to include rules that are overly complex, low access to credit, poor infrastructure,
and especially electricity, and scarce skills. In order to identify the key constraints, the Bank and
IFC will support the creation of a Public Private Dialogue to build confidence and foster dialogue
on reforms. This effort will also map the key private sector actors, and offer institutional support
to develop representative associations to promote PPD. The Dialogue would be supported to
develop an Investment Climate Assessment and Reform. The first step would be the development
of an action plan to help identify priority measures with quick and visible impacts. The effort
would also focus on the constraints to finance, especially to SMEs and through micro -credit, and
actions that would start unlocking the financing constraint. Finally, Guinea has large investment
needs in infrastructure, mining, agriculture, and services. Public Private Partnerships (PPPs)
represent an opportunity to leverage private sector capacity, finance, and innovation, provided that
a sound enabling environment is put in place. Initial efforts in this area would be geared at
supporting, with assistance of the IFC Advisory crevice, a diagnostic on the legal and regulatory
regime for PPPs.
76.
The Bank’s strategy for the agriculture sector supports the government priorities of
making farmers a key engine of job creation and growth. In terms of sequencing, we will
initially focus on smallholder rice and food crop productivity FY11 and FY12 and build in support
for market access, commercialization and non-food export crops in FY13 as part of a sector-wide
program supporting Guinea‟s National Agricultural Investment Program. The following is
proposed for the interim strategy period:
29



Emergency Agricultural Productivity Support Project (EAPSP) aims at increasing smallholder
productivity of rain-fed rice through increased access to improved inputs (seeds, fertilizers, and
pesticides) and technical advisory services. Funded by the GFRP, the US$3 million left is
already being used to support access to input for this cropping season and will be largely
disbursed within 6 months. To be followed by Additional Financing from GFRP for the
EAPSP to extend project support to the productivity of food crops other than rice and broaden
project activities to include (a) rehabilitation of smallholder water management infrastructure
and (b) post-harvest loss issues (storage / transformation) , in addition to increased access to
improved inputs. Funded by the GFRP, the US$ 20 million additional financing package is
currently under preparation, in consultation with other donors active in the sector, and is
scheduled for approval by June 15, 2011. It will be disbursed over a 3 year (2 cropping
seasons) period.
West Africa Agricultural Productivity Program (WAAPP) is a regional program that
encourages the regional sharing of improved technologies in ways that take advantage of
regional synergies to reduce costs and foster joint learning. Initial funding for Guinea‟s
participation in this program is provided by US$9 million PHRD grant for rice technology and
adoption. The grant is approved and financing agreement will be signed once arrears are
cleared.
In terms of AAA, an agricultural public expenditure review would lay the foundation for new
investment lending in FY13 as part of a sector-wide program supporting the National
Agricultural Investment Plan.
77.
Boosting agriculture will also require better transport. A strategy to bring more
efficiency in the provision of transport services in Guinea is badly needed, and will take some time
to be developed. But in the short term, the priorities of the Government are a few priority national
roads and a big push on rural roads to boost agriculture. The Bank‟s main support will be through
the Second National Rural Infrastructure Project which is being restructured so that the remaining
balance of US$22 million can be disbursed within 24 months and deliver the rehabilitation of 400
km of feeder roads and generating many jobs during the (labor intensive) construction period.
78.
Given the high poverty rates, more jobs will be needed in the short term. In the
Guinean context- high prevalence of poverty and high vulnerability to shocks- and the need for
urgent reforms to stabilize the economy, a two stage-approach make sense, with short term
measures to scale up existing instruments, and in parallel, efforts to lay the foundations for a more
effective safety net system. Such a system should be able to expand and shrink depending on the
need with clear exiting strategies to avoid long term dependence. A recent Bank study argued that
the safety net system should include works, school feeding, and fertilizers and public transport
subsidies in the short term, while moving towards a conditional transfer to household system in the
medium term. In both urban as rural areas there is now huge potential for labor intensive public
works to help meeting the expectations of the new government to show rapid and tangible results
on ground while contributing to create revenues for the poorest. 11 In the short term, there is support
11
WFP, UNIDO, and several NGOs have well established but modest programs in place. The Bank supported an emergency
program to mitigate the impact of the 2008 food and fuel crisis (US$2.5 million). Between 30 percent and 60 percent of the co st
were transferred as salary for works that included sanitation and rehabilitation of rural roads. The program has created the
equivalent of 40,000 man/month of work, a small amount to make a visible impact, but the institutional set up is now up and
running and activities can be scaled up.
30
for a safety net in the Guinean budget, and by the EU (€6 mil). The Bank will use existing
instruments in the short term (UDP3 and VCSP for works programs with US$1.25 remaining,12
and fertilizers subsidies under the VCSP with US$3 million remaining), while preparing a new
operation scale up the nascent safety net while drawing on lessons from implementation
experience (US$20 million, GFRP).
79.
The operations of mining companies can benefit national development more both in
terms of jobs and better infrastructure. Enhancement of benefits can occur through the
development of integrated economic development plans for the bauxite and iron ore districts and
corridors; the development of mining induced growth clusters, using initiatives such as IFC‟s
Linkages program to encourage SMEs to deliver the type of goods and services demanded by the
mining companies, including during the process of construction of their infrastructure. Moreover,
mining infrastructure can be also used for other purposes if planned right, instead of the old
enclave model, can also generate gains. The Bank will explore working with mining companies
around these ideas.
80.
The energy sector is now in total disarray, with the physical infrastructure in a state
of decay, and the institutional Bank structure in need of serious reform and capacity
building. Energy access is also a key to the mining sector development and SMEs growth. The
Bank will re-engage in the energy sector by restructuring existing operations first for urban and
then rural electricity (respectively US$5.7 million and US$1.7 million remaining), and leading
analysis and TA on utility recovery, reform, and investment planning. The Bank will work closely
with the AfDB, the IsDB, and other partners to get sector plans in place and to initiate the reforms
and the rehabilitation efforts. However, we do not plan at this stage to remain involved in the
sector directly in the future. In this context, the Bank team is coordinating a meeting between the
government, the donor community and other sector stakeholders, whose aim is to come up with a
common strategy for emergency sector recovery and longer term reform and development. In the
long term, it would be important to connect Guinea to the West African Power Pool grid,
especially given the country huge hydro-power potential.
81.
An immediate intervention in the area of ICT is needed to get Guinea connected to the
ACE submarine cable which is being constructed now to link the West Coast of Africa to
Europe. Failure to connect now will mean that Guinea will not be connected to a cable for many
years to come. Lack of reliable and affordable high speed internet access will also be jeopardizing
SMEs development. The Bank has supported the Government to put in place a PPP framework the
for governance, ownership and financing of the landing station as well as regulatory framework for
open and non discriminatory access to the cable capacity. Given the timing constraint, the
operation is being processed under the rapid response provisions of OP/BP8.00. The project will
also support the reforms of the ICT sector and capacity strengthening in key regulatory areas to
improve sector performance and lower prices for mobile and internet services. Access to improved
and affordable ICT services will also contribute to the efforts of creating demand side governance
initiatives in the health and education sectors.
12
The Coordination Unit for the UDP3 has developed skills in this area and the National Directorate for Rural Infrastructure has
also extensive experience in maintaining rural roads following similar approaches.
31
82.
There are 14 international rivers that have their source in Guinea, and regional
efforts are needed to harness their potential for agriculture and hydropower in a coordinated
manner. The Bank had initiated two ambitious programs in this respect (on the Niger and Senegal
rivers), which will be restarted. The Niger Basin project aims at enhancing regional coordination
to develop the potential of this river in a sustainable manner. Five countries are participating -Benin, Guinea, Mali, Niger, and Nigeria. The project is rehabilitating degraded ecosystems in the
basin and doing feasibility studies for the development of regional water infrastructure, including
the Fomi dam in Guinea. The Senegal River basin project involves Mali, Mauritania, Senegal, and
Guinea and it finances feasibility studies for the Koukotamba and Boureya dams in Guinea and
from which Guinea will directly benefit in terms of electricity, plus small investments such as
watershed protection, river bank rehabilitation and protection, and capacity building of OMVS
national entity in Guinea.
83.
IFC will play a catalytic role in accelerating private sector support in Guinea by
introducing innovative ways to mitigate risk, helping improve the investment climate, building
private sector capacity and mobilizing local and foreign investors. To do so, IFC plans to
proactively assist the Government of Guinea to overcome constraints to private sector dynamism
and to help create a broad public-private constituency for implementing the kind of improvements
in the business environment. IFC‟s strategy in Guinea is evolving, and will in clude advisory and
investment operations focused on: improving the investment climate; deepening and broadening
activities in the financial sector; proactive project development in infrastructure (power and
Telecommunication) and growth sectors (mining and agriculture); supporting capacity building
programs in both private and public sector; and increase investments and advisory services to
SMEs.
84.
Rich resources endowment and potentially fast growth of FDIs will create
opportunities for MIGA continued engagement. Currently, MIGA‟s gross exposure in Guinea
amounts to US$56.6 million focused in the telecoms, agribusiness and tourism sectors, with a net
exposure of US$51.2 million (1.1 percent of MIGA‟s total net portfolio). MIGA‟s product is fully
consistent with the Bank‟s goal of leveraging non-Bank funds and having a catalytic impact.
Support for Guinea is also fully consistent with MIGA‟s own strategic priorities. Moreover, the
political risk insurance product offered by MIGA may alleviate concerns for private investors who
are keen to invest in the country, but remain apprehensive because of outstanding political risks.
MIGA is currently considering several specific projects in the country, including a potential
expansion of its support for the telecoms sector.
D. PARTNERSHIP
85.
Donor coordination is an area of particular importance for the success of the ISN
implementation. The scope of needs the Government is facing can only be matched by a
constellation of donors and a multiplicity of efforts. Although there is a solid display of goodwill
by all DPs present in Guinea, the country has been an aid orphan in the past. The best way to
mobilize potentially committed resources is by having solid implementation which achieves results
on the ground; establish a firm linkage with the available, prioritized national budget framework.
In the immediate future, all donors are interested in having a good coordination structure at the
Government level to complement the donor structures and several DPs will be funding an
32
expanded coordination unit at Ministry of Finance. Sector roundtables are being organized to
agree on plans and on SWAPs, with workshops for energy, rural development, and the security
sector planned for the near term. Other areas which could benefit from sector roundtables include
health and safety nets. A Champions of Guinea meeting will be organized in Washington DC
during the Springs Meetings of 2011 to exchange views and mobilize efforts, and a CG is planned
for the summer of 2011. A challenge will be the integration of new donors, such as Brazil, India,
and China, plus large mining companies around the agreed priorities. The donor community is
looking to the Bank for leadership in the harmonization process.
86.
Donors have already given indications as to which sectors in the PAP they are
interested in supporting (see Table 4). The Government will need to lobby existing donors, seek
new donors or commit their own resources to address financing gaps in orphan areas. Initial
estimates indicate that DPs have either committed, or are about to commit a total of about US$1.5
billion of support for the period from 2011 to 2014, of which about US$850 million can be
disbursed during 2011-2012. Excluding funds for budget support the total availability of project
funds during 2011-12 has been estimated at US$650 million. This includes a large proportion of
ongoing projects which could only be redirected within a limited range of activities in line with
their approved objectives. The donors currently proposing budget support are the World Bank,
AfDB, EU, and the IMF with a possibility that France could join.
87.
There are some clear indications as to which areas donors are interested in supporting
and which sectors could experience financing gaps requiring the government to either try to
persuade donors to reallocate funds to where they are more needed, seek new donors, or commit
own resources.





There is a significant amount of donor interest in supporting the broad area of Governance with
donors interesting in providing 15 percent of the total non-budget support pool to this area
reflecting the government‟s wishes to move quickly to rehabilitate government institutions.
The Bank, as lead donor of the PFM thematic group, will continue to play its role and ensure
adequate monitoring of the matrix developed in 2010 and will participate actively and
constructively in the activities of other working groups.
The largest overall of donor interest appears to be transport (28 percent of funds). This
underscores the need to develop Guinea‟s infrastructure in order to unlock its agriculture
potential and to develop the minerals sector by supporting the transport infrastructure such a s
ports to allow export of minerals.
The energy sector could receive good support at 11 percent of the total. The Bank will try to
limit its role in the short term to technical support and a moderate amount of financing.
The amount for energy could increase as many donors appear willing to intervene further if
there is a credible plan of institutional reform in the sector.
Basic and technical education could get 15 percent, but donor interest in the health sector
appears is very low. The Bank will be working with other DPs to develop a better financed
more comprehensive approach to the expansion of basic services that is mo re suited to
Guinea‟s decentralized structure.
33
E. RESULT MONITORING
88.
The ISN proposes to assess progress towards the PDO against a set of 8 indicators and
23 milestones (see Annex II for details). Whereas the indicators measure output and outcomes,
the milestones are aligned with the concept of PAP and the need to account for deliverables that
support outputs and outcomes. This framework is closely aligned with the Africa Strategy
Monitoring Framework, directly contributing to its Tier 3 “Activities and Inputs in support of
Regional Results”. Selection of the indicators and their target values is based on short horizon of
the ISN (18 months), the current and low capacity in Guinea in terms of M&E and the need to
show immediate and viable results of the DPO and efforts in re -engagement and support to key
reform areas. Indicators and milestones have been developed to ensure focus on specific results
and tailored to assist the Government in implementation of their immediate plans and are hence in
line with the prior action for the DPO. They are articulated around the pillars of the PRSP.
Progress against these indicators will be assessed regularly through consultations with the
Government, donors and other key stakeholders, and will at the end be assessed and be part of the
ISN completion report.
Table 4. Republic of Guinea – Donor Mapping by Sector (2011-2012)
Sectors
EU
Budget Support
X
Germa
ny GIZ
Spain
AECID
Governance
Civil Service
Modernization Justice
decentralization
Security Sector
Health and Nutrition
Basic education &
vocational training
linked to mining sector
Urban Development
X
X
X
X
Japan
WB
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
China
X
X
X
US
AI
D
X
X
X
Energy
Transport
Franc
e AFD
X
X
X
X
AfDB
Is
DB
IMF
UNI
CEF
UNDP
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
x
Environment
x
x
Water and Sanitation
X
Agriculture
Rural Infrastructure
X
X
x
x
x
x
Youth Employment
Social Safety Nets
x
x
X
X
34
x
F. Risks and Mitigation
89.
The proposed strategy comprises high level of interrelated risks, some of which
cannot be fully mitigated. At the same time the team was guided by the WDR2011
recommendation suggesting that there is a need to be pragmatic to address immediate challenges
within political realities of the country, with approaches that can improve over time. Sometimes
these approaches will have second-best aspects associated with them.
90.
Security risks stemming from (i) insufficient progress in security sector reform, (ii)
spillover effects from the ongoing crisis in Cote d‟Ivoire (including the flow of refugees), and (iii)
arms and drug trafficking. The mitigation of this risk requires a continued commitment of the UN
and the international community to support the Government of Guinea in maintaining security. In
collaboration with other Development Partners (United Nations and ECOWAS in particular, given
their foreseen leadership in his area), the Bank EMSP (in preparation) will contribute to integrate
the reform of security services in the broader medium term fiscal framework, while improving
public financial management practices in the military for greater reform effectiveness and
efficiency. The ESW on political economy will allow the Bank to understand the challenges more
deeply, and the Bank‟s efforts to empower civil society groups to actively participate in these
national debates will support rapid change in these priority areas.
91.
Political economy risks stemming from delayed supply response or insufficient results
(against high expectations), or perceptions of corruption, which would the political feasibility of
reforms. There are also risks related to the upcoming Parliamentary elections, including risks of
ending up with a divided authority. Support to a strong and meaningful Poverty Reduction
Strategy participatory and consultative process, involving civil society groups, and the
strengthening of safety nets would mitigate these risks. By February 2011, this process had
already started, through regional and national consultations, involving CSOs and the National
Transition Council. Proactive communication through media (radio in particular), which proved
very effective to contain tension during elections, will be pursued to manage population
expectations.
92.
The prospects of a deterioration of Guinea’s macroeconomic performance, stemming
from a deterioration in the external environment (increased fuel, food, and petroleum prices,
against a stagnation of mining prices) or /and the materialization of important fiscal contingent
liabilities, represent an important risk, particularly if this causes a delay in the HIPC process. This
macroeconomic risk would be mitigated by close monitoring of the macroeconomic framework
elaborated by the Government jointly with the IMF and the World Bank, and an acceleration of the
HIPC timetable, provided that overall performance is fully satisfactory on the part of the
Government. There is also a risk of falling back into arrears with all creditors, given the scale of
the outstanding debt. This risk is mitigated by the provision of IDA budget support, which,
combined with the IMF RCF, will serve as a catalyst for external support from other Development
Partners. Future IDA assistance expected in FY12 to support Government‟s reform program will
ensure that overall IDA flows will remain positive. Importantly, the provision, in real time, of
analytical support for evidence based policy, and the involvement of civil society and the private
sector in discussions on the requirement for macroeconomic stability (how to reduce inflation, how
to manage public sector arrears) will play an important role in mitigating macro risks.
35
93.
Implementation risks stemming from poor capacity and coordination within the
Government, which could stall progress in delivering particular projects, developing sector
strategies, or implementing particular reforms which underpin some projects. The focus and
limited ambition of the proposed projects on a limited set of key reforms/institutions will mitigate
this risk, and will be complemented with direct technical assistance as needed (public financial
management, public sector reform, mining sector, health and education sector strategies,
electricity, and food security programs). The degree of coordination between Guinean institutions
will also be improved by the demonstrated strong ownership of the reform agenda by the
President. Revived coordination between Development Partners will also facilitate the overall
implementation of the reform agenda, and especially the Priority Action Plan.
94.
Fiduciary Risks. The key challenge will be to accelerate the pace of disbursements on the
existing investment lending portfolio while managing fiduciary risks. Prior to the recent coup,
Guinea was characterized by relatively weak public financial management controls. The overall
residual country financial management risk was substantial. Fiduciary arrangements reflected this
weak environment, with a traditionally strong reliance on project implementation units. During the
suspension, the implementation of financial management action plans contributed to maintain an
acceptable control environment at the PIUs‟ level. All major fiduciary requirements were met
(audit reports, interim financial reports). Nonetheless, specific FM challenges are foreseen over
the ISN implementation. They include improving external audit arrangements and addressing the
weakening of local capacity. To overcome these challenges and mitigate the underlying risks, the
Bank will, first following a risk assessment, shift eligible projects from transactions based
disbursement to report based disbursement. Second, a portfolio team comprising FM Specialists,
Procurement Specialist, Disbursement Officer and Operation Officer has been set up to identify
and address any bottlenecks in projects implementation and scrutinize significant procurement
contracts with the aim to provide timely no objections. The team will prepare a CPPR during the
summer of 2011 focusing on capacity building activities in PIUs. Third, while waiting for the new
CAS to perform an assessment leading to a Report on the Observance of Standards and Codes on
Auditing and Accounting (which aims at identifying and addressing the systemic weaknesses in
the external audit arrangements), the FM team will make use of the audit firms assessment
completed during the suspension.
36
Annex I. Portfolio Restructuring
Current
Credit/Grant/T
F
Undisbursed
Closing date
Commitment
Balance
Project
ID
Project name
P093826
Senegal River Basin *
Sept. 08, 2011
18,040,000.00
15,370,672.70
P077317
Guinea Electricity Sector
Efficiency **
Dec. 31, 2009
7,200,000.00
5,698,179.81
P065129
Village Communities Support
Program -Phase 2 (VCSP-2) **
June 30, 2012
17,000,000.00
13,900,000.00
P091297
Third Urban Development
Project – Phase 2 (UDP-3)**
Dec. 31, 2011
15,000,000.00
11,800,000.00
P093806
Niger River Basin Water
Resources**
Jan. 31, 2013
9,000,000.00
8,347,341.00
P083751
West & Central Africa Air
Transport *
Dec. 31, 2009
7,100,000.00
4,873,827.00
P065126
Health Sector Support Project *
Sept. 30, 2011
25,000,000.00
15,900,000.00
P065127
National Rural Infrastructure**
Dec. 31, 2009
30,300,000.00
23,293,000.00
P074288
Decentralized Rural
Electrification **
Dec. 31, 2009
5,000,000.00
1,920,868.60
P050046
Education for All Project **
Dec. 31, 2009
10,000,000.00
4,730,439.47
P050046
Education for All Project **
Dec. 31, 2009
70,000,000.00
213,093.61
37
Proposed Action
Resumption of
disbursements.
Retroactive
extension of the
closing date and
restructuring.
Unfunded financing
gap of $15 m. to
reach original
objectives.
Extension of closing
date and resume
disbursements.
Unfunded financing
gap of $15m. to
reach original
objectives
Extension of
closing date and
resumption of
disbursements
Unfunded financing
gap of $ 14m.to
reach original
objectives
Extension of closing
date for 23 months
for Kanji Power
Plant Rehabilitation.
Retroactive
extension of closing
date and resumption
of activities.
Extension of closing
date &
restructuring.
Retroactive
extension until June
30, 2013.
Restructuring to
adjust scope of
activities and merge
categories of
expenditures.
Retroactive
extension of closing
date.
Retroactive
extension of closing
date and 2nd order
restructuring.
Retroactive
extension of closing
date to use
outstanding balance.
TRUST FUNDS
P113608
UDP-3 Additional Financing for
Labor Intensive Public Works *
December 31,
2009
2,500,000.00
1,250,000.00
P113268
Emergency Agricultural
Productivity Support Project *
June 30, 2012
5,000,000.00
3,000,000.00
P111470
Education for All Fast Track
Initiative. **
June 30, 2010
117,800,000.00
40,000,000.00
P081297
Community-Based Land
Management Project **
June 30,
2011
7,000,000.00
6,183,393.90
P070878
Coastal Marine and Biodiversity
Project *
Dec. 31,
2011
5,000,000.00
4,383,801.77
P042055
Decentralized Rural Electrification
Project **
Dec. 31,
2009
2,000,000.00
1,664,944.91
P070256
Reversing Land Degradation *
Feb. 28, 2011
5,320,000.00
680,000.00
P073378
Multisectoral Aids Project *
Sept. 25,
2009
510,800.00
328,557.61
P098844
EITI Mining *
335,000.00
Sept. 29, 2009
P100958
Support to Accountancy *
Sept. 5, 2010
P098525
Improving Monitoring &
Evaluation *
Nov. 16,
2009
*Projects will be closed in FY11/FY12
**Projects will be restructured/closed in FY13/FY14
38
569,000
Retroactive
extension of closing
date completed.
(GFRP TF)
Retroactive
extension of closing
date completed
(GFRP TF)
Retroactive
extension of closing
date.
Extension of closing
date and resume
disbursements
Extension of closing
date and resume
disbursements.
Retroactive
extension of closing
date and resume
disbursements
Close
Retroactive
extension of closing
date.
Retroactive
extension of closing
date and
restructuring.
309,000
247,234
Close and cancel
balance.
498,000
169,045
Close
Annex II. Results Matrix (1 January 2011 to 30 June 2012)
Strategic Theme
Good
Economic
Governance
Improving
services
Indicators
Milestones
1.
Proportion of all signed contracts
that are single source decreases
from 91% (2010) to 45 (%)
-
2.
Net hiring into civil service
decreases from 5,211 (2010) to
less than 2,000 (in 2011)
-
12-23 months old children fully
immunized from 38.2 % (2007) to
40 % (2011)
Gross Enrolment Rate (GER) in
nine targeted prefectures
increases to 55 %
240,000 person-days of
employment created in rural road
maintenance and construction
-
3.
4.
5.
-
-
-
Creating
Jobs
6.
7.
8.
-
Doing Business Rank from 179
to 170
Proportion of mining revenue in
proportion to mining share in
GDP increases to 4 %
Rice yield of targeted
smallholders increase by 50 %
over 2009 baseline
-
-
39
Audit report on the legality, transparency and
budgetary effect of 2009 and 2010 single
source contracts sent to President
Report on census of all public sector bank
accounts in commercial banks published
The Recipient has adopted a joint arrêté
between Ministry of Finance and the Ministry
of Civil Service Reform to temporarily freeze
public sector hiring, with the exception of the
education and health sectors.
Increase in immunization by DPT3/Penta of
under-1 to 70 %
Annual report of the Ministry of Health
produced for 2008, 2009 and 2010
Construction of 500 primary education
classrooms and 100 secondary education
First joint audit by the Civil Service and
Education Ministry to assess the presence of
teachers in classrooms carried out
First joint audit by the Civil Service and
Education Ministry to assess the presence of
teachers in classrooms carried out
7.0 Billions GNF distributed to workers
under the LIPW program
470 km of prefectural roads using
conventional contracting methods maintained
450 km of prefectural rural roads using
labor-intensive methods maintained
3 rural bridges rehabilitated
Tombo thermal generation unit rehabilitated
15,000 new household connections
Access to the ACE submarine cable in 2012
Public-Private Sector Forum convened
Action plan on investment climate reform
developed
Diagnostic study on the legal and regulatory
regime public-private partnerships carried
out
EITI reports 2007 and 2009 published
Mining cadastre updating started
Mineral revenue collection capacity building
program started
90,000 smallholders received improved input
packets
2,300 t of improved seed produced,
purchased, certified and stocked
Annex III – Guinea-at-a-glance
Guinea at a glance
2/25/10
Guinea
SubSaharan
A frica
Lo w
inco me
9.8
246
2.3
34
818
24,242
2.5
36
973
19,310
2.1
29
3.5
350
1,190
885
1,082
1,991
510
524
1,407
4.7
2.4
5.0
2.5
6.4
4.2
P o verty headco unt ratio at $ 1.25 a day (P P P , %)
P o verty headco unt ratio at $ 2.00 a day (P P P , %)
Life expectancy at birth (years)
Infant mo rtality (per 1,000 live births)
Child malnutritio n (% o f children under 5)
70
87
58
93
23
51
73
52
89
27
..
..
59
78
28
A dult literacy, male (% o f ages 15 and o lder)
A dult literacy, female (% o f ages 15 and o lder)
Gro ss primary enro llment, male (% o f age gro up)
Gro ss primary enro llment, female (% o f age gro up)
43
18
98
84
71
54
103
93
72
55
102
95
A ccess to an impro ved water so urce (% o f po pulatio n)
A ccess to impro ved sanitatio n facilities (% o f po pulatio n)
70
19
58
31
67
38
Ke y D e v e lo pm e nt Indic a t o rs
Age distribution, 2008
(2008)
Male
P o pulatio n, mid-year (millio ns)
Surface area (tho usand sq. km)
P o pulatio n gro wth (%)
Urban po pulatio n (% o f to tal po pulatio n)
Female
75-79
60-64
45-49
30-34
GNI (A tlas metho d, US$ billio ns)
GNI per capita (A tlas metho d, US$ )
GNI per capita (P P P , internatio nal $ )
15-19
0-4
10
GDP gro wth (%)
GDP per capita gro wth (%)
5
0
5
10
percent of total population
( m o s t re c e nt e s t im a t e , 2 0 0 3 – 2 0 0 8 )
Under-5 mortality rate (per 1,000)
250
200
150
100
50
0
1990
1995
Guinea
N e t A id F lo ws
(US$ millio ns)
Net ODA and o fficial aid
To p 3 do no rs (in 2007):
France
Euro pean Co mmissio n
United States
A id (% o f GNI)
A id per capita (US$ )
19 8 0
19 9 0
2000
2008
89
292
153
224
9
21
8
87
33
0
20
16
26
55
31
25
..
19
11.6
47
5.0
18
5.8
23
Lo ng- T e rm E c o no m ic T re nds
2000
2007
Sub-Saharan Africa
a
Growth of GDP and GDP per capita (%)
6
4
2
0
-2
95
Co nsumer prices (annual % change)
GDP implicit deflato r (annual % change)
..
8.6
23.3
17.3
6.8
11.1
19.2
14.9
Exchange rate (annual average, lo cal per US$ )
Terms o f trade index (2000 = 100)
19.0
..
660.2
145
1,746.9
100
5,500.0
106
05
GDP
GDP per capita
19 8 0 – 9 0 19 9 0 – 2 0 0 0
2000–08
(average annual gro wth %)
P o pulatio n, mid-year (millio ns)
GDP (US$ millio ns)
4.6
6,684
6.1
2,667
8.4
3,112
9.8
3,799
2.8
3.2
3.1
4.4
2.0
3.2
..
..
..
..
23.8
33.3
4.6
42.9
20.3
32.5
4.0
47.2
24.8
46.4
4.5
28.8
..
..
..
..
4.3
4.9
4.0
3.6
9.9
4.0
3.1
-4.2
Ho useho ld final co nsumptio n expenditure
General go v't final co nsumptio n expenditure
Gro ss capital fo rmatio n
73.9
12.0
..
66.9
11.0
24.5
77.7
6.8
19.7
80.6
9.2
15.5
..
..
..
5.2
-0.5
0.1
3.9
-0.3
-3.7
Expo rts o f go o ds and services
Impo rts o f go o ds and services
Gro ss savings
31.2
28.1
..
31.1
33.4
14.6
23.6
27.9
13.3
33.2
38.4
1.7
..
..
0.3
-1.1
1.9
-0.8
(% o f GDP )
A griculture
Industry
M anufacturing
Services
No te: Figures in italics are fo r years o ther than tho se specified. 2008 data are preliminary. .. indicates data are no t available.
a. A id data are fo r 2007.
Develo pment Eco no mics, Develo pment Data Gro up (DECDG).
40
Guinea
B a la nc e o f P a ym e nt s a nd T ra de
2000
2008
Governance indicators, 2000 and 2008
(US$ millio ns)
To tal merchandise expo rts (fo b)
To tal merchandise impo rts (cif)
Net trade in go o ds and services
250
583
-133
807
703
-240
Voice and accountability
Current acco unt balance
as a % o f GDP
-200
-6.4
-395
-10.4
Regulatory quality
Political stability
Rule of law
Wo rkers' remittances and
co mpensatio n o f emplo yees (receipts)
1
Reserves, including go ld
207
151
Control of corruption
315
0
2008
C e nt ra l G o v e rnm e nt F ina nc e
2000
(% o f GDP )
Current revenue (including grants)
Tax revenue
Current expenditure
10.9
10.0
5.8
18.9
16.7
13.7
Overall surplus/deficit
-2.0
-0.8
25
50
..
..
100
higher values imply better ratings
Source: Kaufmann-Kraay-Mastruzzi, World Bank
T e c hno lo gy a nd Inf ra s t ruc t ure
Highest marginal tax rate (%)
Individual
Co rpo rate
75
Country's percentile rank (0-100)
P aved ro ads (% o f to tal)
Fixed line and mo bile pho ne
subscribers (per 100 peo ple)
High techno lo gy expo rts
(% o f manufactured expo rts)
..
..
2000
2008
16.5
9.8
1
21
0.1
..
E xt e rna l D e bt a nd R e s o urc e F lo ws
E nv iro nm e nt
(US$ millio ns)
To tal debt o utstanding and disbursed
To tal debt service
Debt relief (HIP C, M DRI)
To tal debt (% o f GDP )
To tal debt service (% o f expo rts)
Fo reign direct investment (net inflo ws)
P o rtfo lio equity (net inflo ws)
3,066
157
761
3,092
146
..
A gricultural land (% o f land area)
Fo rest area (% o f land area)
Natio nally pro tected areas (% o f land area)
98.5
21.3
81.4
9.7
Freshwater reso urces per capita (cu. meters)
Freshwater withdrawal (billio n cubic meters)
10
0
382
0
CO2 emissio ns per capita (mt)
50
28.1
..
51
27.4
6.1
25,959
1.5
23,505
0.15
0.15
..
GDP per unit o f energy use
(2005 P P P $ per kg o f o il equivalent)
..
..
Energy use per capita (kg o f o il equivalent)
..
..
2000
2008
IB RD
To tal debt o utstanding and disbursed
Disbursements
P rincipal repayments
Interest payments
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
IDA
To tal debt o utstanding and disbursed
Disbursements
To tal debt service
982
29
18
1,288
22
41
5
5
0
10
10
7
1
1
43
40
66
59
Composition of total external debt, 2008
Short-term, 192
IBRD, 0
Private, 30
Wo rld B a nk G ro up po rt f o lio
IDA, 1,288
(US$ millio ns)
Bilateral, 951
Other multilateral, 560
IMF, 71
US$ millions
P riv a t e S e c t o r D e v e lo pm e nt
Time required to start a business (days)
Co st to start a business (% o f GNI per capita)
Time required to register pro perty (days)
Ranked as a majo r co nstraint to business
(% o f managers surveyed who agreed)
Electricity
Transpo rt
Sto ck market capitalizatio n (% o f GDP )
B ank capital to asset ratio (%)
2000
–
–
–
2000
..
..
..
..
2008
41
135.7
104
IFC (fiscal year)
To tal disbursed and o utstanding po rtfo lio
o f which IFC o wn acco unt
Disbursements fo r IFC o wn acco unt
P o rtfo lio sales, prepayments and
repayments fo r IFC o wn acco unt
2008
61.0
9.5
41
..
..
M IGA
Gro ss expo sure
New guarantees
No te: Figures in italics are fo r years o ther than tho se specified. 2008 data are preliminary.
.. indicates data are no t available. – indicates o bservatio n is no t applicable.
2/25/10
Millennium Development Goals
Guinea
With selected targets to achieve b etween 1990 and 2015
(estimate clo sest to date sho wn, +/- 2 years)
G uine a
G o a l 1: ha lv e t he ra t e s f o r e xt re m e po v e rt y a nd m a lnut rit io n
P o verty headco unt ratio at $ 1.25 a day (P P P , % o f po pulatio n)
P o verty headco unt ratio at natio nal po verty line (% o f po pulatio n)
Share o f inco me o r co nsumptio n to the po o rest qunitile (%)
P revalence o f malnutritio n (% o f children under 5)
G o a l 2 : e ns ure t ha t c hildre n a re a ble t o c o m ple t e prim a ry s c ho o ling
P rimary scho o l enro llment (net, %)
P rimary co mpletio n rate (% o f relevant age gro up)
Seco ndary scho o l enro llment (gro ss, %)
Yo uth literacy rate (% o f peo ple ages 15-24)
G o a l 3 : e lim ina t e ge nde r dis pa rit y in e duc a t io n a nd e m po we r wo m e n
Ratio o f girls to bo ys in primary and seco ndary educatio n (%)
Wo men emplo yed in the no nagricultural secto r (% o f no nagricultural emplo yment)
P ro po rtio n o f seats held by wo men in natio nal parliament (%)
19 9 0
92.6
..
3.1
..
19 9 5
36.8
40.0
6.4
..
2000
..
..
..
21.2
27
19
9
..
..
20
12
..
48
33
16
..
74
64
38
47
..
61
..
9
76
185
111
42
150
93
71
..
35
6
910
38
9
45
..
..
34
7
G o a l 4 : re duc e unde r- 5 m o rt a lit y by t wo - t hirds
Under-5 mo rtality rate (per 1,000)
Infant mo rtality rate (per 1,000 live births)
M easles immunizatio n (pro po rtio n o f o ne-year o lds immunized, %)
231
137
35
210
124
61
G o a l 5 : re duc e m a t e rna l m o rt a lit y by t hre e - f o urt hs
M aternal mo rtality ratio (mo deled estimate, per 100,000 live births)
B irths attended by skilled health staff (% o f to tal)
Co ntraceptive prevalence (% o f wo men ages 15-49)
..
31
..
..
..
2
2008
70.1
..
5.8
22.5
..
19
G o a l 6 : ha lt a nd be gin t o re v e rs e t he s pre a d o f H IV / A ID S a nd o t he r m a jo r dis e a s e s
P revalence o f HIV (% o f po pulatio n ages 15-49)
0.2
Incidence o f tuberculo sis (per 100,000 peo ple)
119
Tuberculo sis cases detected under DOTS (%)
..
0.6
154
45
1.1
200
55
1.6
287
53
G o a l 7 : ha lv e t he pro po rt io n o f pe o ple wit ho ut s us t a ina ble a c c e s s t o ba s ic ne e ds
A ccess to an impro ved water so urce (% o f po pulatio n)
45
A ccess to impro ved sanitatio n facilities (% o f po pulatio n)
13
Fo rest area (% o f to tal land area)
30.1
Natio nally pro tected areas (% o f to tal land area)
..
CO2 emissio ns (metric to ns per capita)
0.2
GDP per unit o f energy use (co nstant 2005 P P P $ per kg o f o il equivalent)
..
53
14
29.1
..
0.2
..
61
16
28.1
..
0.2
..
70
19
27.4
6.1
0.1
..
0.1
0.0
0.0
0.1
0.3
0.5
0.1
0.3
0.5
26.4
0.9
0.5
G o a l 8 : de v e lo p a glo ba l pa rt ne rs hip f o r de v e lo pm e nt
Telepho ne mainlines (per 100 peo ple)
M o bile pho ne subscribers (per 100 peo ple)
Internet users (per 100 peo ple)
P erso nal co mputers (per 100 peo ple)
0.2
0.0
0.0
..
Education indicators (%)
Measles immunization (% of 1-year
olds)
ICT indicators (per 100 people)
100
100
30
75
75
20
50
50
25
10
25
0
2000
2002
2004
2006
2008
0
0
1990
1995
2000
2007
2000
2002
2004
2006
2008
Primary net enrollment ratio
Fixed + mobile subscribers
Ratio of girls to boys in primary & secondary
education
Guinea
Sub-Saharan Africa
42
No te: Figures in italics are fo r years o ther than tho se specified. .. indicates data are no t available.
Develo pment Eco no mics, Develo pment Data Gro up (DECDG).
Internet users
2/25/10
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To
To
Bafatá
Bafat
á
Doko
GUINEE
Kintinian
Kamsar
Dabola
Bissikrima
Dalaba
K
M A R I T I M oE
Fria
GUINEE
Télim
Télimélée
liméélée
GUINEE
ar
an
i
Niandankoro
r
Boké
Boké
HAUTE
Pita
Sangarédi
Sangaréédi
Sangar
Sansalé
Sansalé
Mandiana
Kouroussa
n k o ur é
To Bougouni
To
Siguiri
Tinkis so
so
Dinguiraye
Sa
nk
Labé
Labé
Nige
Ko
g
Tongue
Tongue
fin
go
n
Lélouma
Lélouma
er
ig
N
Gaoual
Ba
12°N
Foulamôri
Foulam
Foulamô
ôri
To Bamako
To
é
To m in
GUI N E A-B I S S AU
To
To
Kayes
To
To
Kayes
To
To
TTambacounda
ambacounda
Koundara
TTo
o
Tambacounda
Tambacounda
This map was produced by the Map Design Unit of The World Bank.
The boundaries, colors, denominations and any other information
shown on this map do not imply, on the part of The World Bank
Group, any judgment on the legal status of any territory, or any
endorsement or acceptance of such boundaries.
Mamou
Kankan
Faranah
TTo
o
Magburaka
14°W
G UINE A
an
i
Kissidougou
Sibiribaro
SIERRA LEONE
TTo
o
Freetown
Beyla
Guééck
Gu
Guéckédou
ckéédou
GUINEE
SELECTED CITIES AND TOWNS
Macenta
Boola
na
PREFECTURE CAPITALS
Ma
REGION CAPITALS
NATIONAL CAPITAL
To
To
Korhogo
Sokourala
Kérouane
Kérouane
TTo
o
Magburaka
ko
To
To
Séguéla
S
égu
guééla
FORESTIERE
8°N
GUINEA
Nzééré-kor
Nz
Nzéré-koré
-koréé
RIVERS
LIBERIA
MAIN ROADS
RAILROADS
Yomou
Yomou
0
20
40
60
80
100 Kilometers
im
ba
Mt
Lola
s.
Mt. Nimba
(1752 m)
CÔTE
D'IVOIRE
Dié
Di
Diéké
éké
REGION BOUNDARIES
INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARIES
0
12°W
20
40
60
10°W
80 Miles
TTo
o
Man
8°W
IBRD 33414
NOVEMBER 2004
PREFECTURE BOUNDARIES
N
OCEAN
Foréécariah
For
Forécariah
N
ent
é
CONAKRY
TTiro
iro
Coyah
Kol
AT L A N T I C
Moribaya
on
Di
Dubréka
10°N
tan
10°N
Sa
S
an
nkkarani
ni
Kindia
M il
o
Boffa
Boffa