1. No category

PHIL10131: Metaphysics of Mind
2014-15
Course Organizer:
Prof Jesper Kallestrup - [email protected]
Course Lecturers:
Prof Jesper Kallestrup
Dr Chris Ranalli - [email protected]
Course Secretary:
Sue Richards - [email protected]
Contents
1.
(Course) Aims and Objectives
2.
Intended Learning Outcomes
3.
Lecture Times and Locations
4.
Lecture Content
5.
PPLS Undergraduate Student Handbook
6.
MSc Programme Handbook
7.
Readings
8.
MSc Tutorials
9.
Assessment Information
10.
Learn
11.
Autonomous Learning Groups
12.
Useful Information
13.
Common Marking Scheme
Department of Philosophy
School of Philosophy, Psychology and Language Sciences
University of Edinburgh
1. Course Aims and Objectives
This course examines some central questions at the intersection of Metaphysics and the
Philosophy of Mind: questions that concern the fundamental kind of thing that minds are; how to
find a place for them in a physical world; and how they can have behavioural effects if they are
not themselves fully physical. The first part of the course will survey various historical views of
what minds are such as dualism, the mind-body identity theory and functionalism. Secondly, we
will then expound physicalism, and examine a causal argument to the effect that mental states
must be identical with physical states. In the last part of the course we deal with various
conceivability arguments against physicalism such as Chalmers’s zombie argument and
Jackson’s knowledge argument.
2. Intended Learning Outcomes
By the end of this course students should:

Have an in-depth understanding of core arguments in the metaphysics of mind.

Understand central issues in contemporary philosophy of mind, e.g. non-reductive and a
priori physicalism; functionalism and the multiple realizability of the mental, problems
about mental causation and various conceivability arguments.

Be able to analyse these arguments and offer their own evaluations of their strengths and
weaknesses

Be able to clearly explain these arguments in a written format.

Gain transferable skills in research, analysis, argumentation and presentation.
3. Lecture Times and Locations
The class meets weekly on Mondays 2.10 - 4.00 p.m. in the Dugald Stewart Building, room 1.20.
4. Lecture Content
Week 1
15 September
Introduction
Kallestrup/Ranalli
Week 2
22 September
Substance Dualism
Ranalli
Week 3
29 September
The Causal Pairing Problem
Ranalli
Week 4
6 October
The Mind-Body Identity Theory
Ranalli
Week 5
13 October
Varieties of Functionalism
Ranalli
Week 6
20 October
Physicalism I: Defining the View
Kallestrup
Week 7
27 October
Physicalism II: Reduction and the A Priori
Kallestrup
Week 8
3 November
The Causal Exclusion Argument
Kallestrup
Week 9
10 November
Kripke's Argument against the Identity Theory
Kallestrup
Week 10
17 November
Chalmers' Zombie Argument
Kallestrup
Week 11
24 November
Jackson's Knowledge Argument
Kallestrup
5. PPLS Undergraduate Student Handbook
The PPLS Undergraduate Student Handbook has more information on Student Support and
academic guidance; late coursework and plagiarism; illness and disability adjustments, and
useful sources of advice.
The Handbook can be found here:
http://www.ppls.ed.ac.uk/students/undergraduate/documents/PPLS_Student_Handbook-Master_Copy.pdf
6. MSc Programme Handbook
MSc students can find information about our postgraduate policies regarding late submission,
essay extensions, assessment deadlines and so on in our MSc Programme Handbook. The
handbook can be found here:
http://www.ppls.ed.ac.uk/students/postgraduate/taught_research_masters.php#Handbooks
Lists of MSc specializations and postgraduate courses in Philosophy can be found here:
http://www.philosophy.ed.ac.uk/phil_students/postgraduate/current_postgraduates/mSc_dip_stud
ents.php
7. Readings
Recommended textbooks include Danial Stoljar’s Physicalism, Routledge 2010 [P], Tom
Crane’s Elements of Mind, Oxford University Press, 2001 [EOM], and Jaegwon Kim’s
Philosophy of Mind, Westview Press, 2006 [POM]. Several of the class readings will be taken
from Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind, edited by Brian McLaughlin and Jonathan
Cohen, Blackwells, 2007 [CDPM]. We will also make extensive use of the Oxford Handbook of
Philosophy of Mind, edited by Ansgar Beckermann, Brian P. McLaughlin and Sven Walter,
Oxford University Press 2009 [OHPM]. All of these books are on reserve in the main library.
Copies are also are available in the Blackwells Bookshop on South Bridge.
Week 1: Introduction
We will begin with a quick overview of the central topics to be covered in the course, and
discuss class structure and assessment. We will also review some of the main positions that have
been defended in the philosophical literature on the metaphysics of mind.
Required Readings:
1. Jesper Kallestrup (2009) ‘The Mind-Body World-Knot’, Think 8, 37-51.
2. Tim Crane, EoM, Chapter 2 ‘Body’.
Optional Readings:
1. David Chalmers Ted talk:
http://www.ted.com/talks/david_chalmers_how_do_you_explain_consciousness#t-666059
2. Jaegwon Kim, POM, Chap. 1.
Week 2: Substance Dualism
We will look at substance dualism, the view that we are composed of an extended, non-thinking,
material substance and a non-extended, thinking mental substance. We will also examine
Descartes’ conceivability arguments for this view.
Required Readings:
1. Rene Descartes, Meditations II and VI.
The prescribed translation of Descartes’ Meditations is John Cottingham’s. This is available in at
least three formats, the following from Cambridge University Press: Descartes: Selected
Philosophical Writings, The Philosophical Writings of Descartes Vol. II, and Meditations on
First Philosophy, with Selections from the Objections and Replies, translated by J. Cottingham
with an introduction by B. Williams.
2. Jaegwon Kim, POM, Chapter 2 “Substance Dualism”.
3. Tim Crane, EoM, Chapter 9 and 10.
4. E. J. Lowe, ‘Dualism’ in OHPM.
Optional Readings:
1. John A. Foster (1989). “A Defense of Dualism.” In J. Smythies & John Beloff (eds.), The
Case for Dualism. University of Virginia Press.
2. William Lycan (2009). “Giving Dualism its Due.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87
(4):551-563.
Week 3: The Causal Pairing Problem
If substance dualism is true then it becomes problematic how the mental, being located outside
space-time, can causally interact with physical objects at particular times and places. We will
scrutinize this so-called causal pairing problem.
Required Readings:
1. Jaegwon Kim, PoM, Chapter 6 “Mind as a Causal System” and Chapter 7 “Mental Causation”.
2. Jaegwon Kim (2005), ‘The Rejection of Immaterial Minds: A Causal Argument’ in
Physicalism, or Something Near Enough, Princeton University Press.
3. Tim Crane, EoM, Chap 11.
Optional Readings:
1. Jaegwon Kim, ‘Mental Causation’ in OHPM.
2. Tim Crane, ‘The Mental Causation Debate’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society. suppl.
Vol. 69, 1995, 211-36.
3. Frank Jackson, ‘Mental Causation: The State of the Art’, Mind, 105, 1996, 377-413.
Week 4: The Mind-Body Identity Theory
This week we will look at the mind-body identity theory, as advocated by Place, Smart,
Davidson and others, both as a claim about psychophysical types and as a claim about
psychophysical tokens. We will also assess some of the objections that were made against this
theory.
Required Readings:
1. Tim Crane, EoM, Chap 14.
2. Jaegwon Kim, PoM, Chap 4.
3. Place, U. T. (1956) “Is Consciousness a Brain Process?”, in W. G. Lycan (Ed.) (1999) Mind
and Cognition: A Reader. (2nd. Ed.) Cambridge: Basil Blackwell, pp. 14-19
Optional Readings:
1. Smart, J.J.C., (1959) ‘Sensations and Brain Processes’, Philosophical Review 68: 141-156.
Available online at:
http://philosophyfaculty.ucsd.edu/faculty/rarneson/Courses/SMARTJACKphil1.pdf
2. Davidson, D. (1980) “Mental Events”, in W. G. Lycan (Ed.) (1999) Mind and Cognition: A
Reader. (2nd. Ed.) Cambridge: Basil Blackwell, pp. 35-45.
3. Lewis, David (1970). “An Argument for the Identity Theory.” Journal of Philosophy 63
(2):17-25.
Week 5: Varieties of Functionalism
Functionalism says that to be in a mental state is to be in a state that plays a certain causal role.
We will survey and evaluate different types of functionalism, such as analytic functionalism and
the distinction between role-functionalism and filler-functionalism.
Required Readings:
1. Kim, PoM, Chapters 5 and 6.
Week 6: Physicalism I: Defining the View
Physicalism says that ultimately there is nothing over and above the physical. To properly define
this view we need to know what is meant by ‘physical’. If we are confined to what current
physics tells us then physicalism is most certainly false, but if we also include properties, etc., in
a future, complete physics then physicalism seems trivial. This problem is called Hempel’s
Dilemma.
Required Readings
Stoljar, P, Chap 2-5.
Recommended Readings
Crane, EoM, Chap 12.
Barbara Montero, ‘What is the Physical?’ in OHPM.
Daniel Stoljar (2001) ‘Two Conceptions of the Physical’, Philosophy and Phenomenological
Research, LXII, 253-281.
Week 7: Physicalism II: Reduction and the A Priori
We continue to explore disagreements within the physicalist camp. In particular, some physicalists
hold that mental and other special science properties are reducible to physical properties, and some
physicalists claim that all the truths of our world are in principle a priori deducible from the
physical truths. We will look at various objections to both of these claims.
Required Readings
Stoljar, P, Chap 6-8.
Recommended Readings
Crane, EoM, Chaps 12, 14 and 15.
Chaps 9 and 10 (on reductive physicalism) and chaps 11 and 12 (on a priori physicalism) in
CDPM.
Jaegwon Kim (2005), ‘Reduction, Reductive Explanation and Closing the “Gap” and “Explanatory
Arguments for Type Physicalism and Why They Don’t Work” in his Physicalism or Something
Near Enough, Princeton University Press.
Julie Yoo, ‘Anomalous Monism’ in OHPH.
Lynne Rudder Baker, ‘Non-Reductive Materialism’ in OHPH.
Week 8: The Causal Exclusion Argument
The causal exclusion argument presents a challenge to non-reductive physicalism according to
which mental states are distinct from, yet metaphysically necessitated by, physical states. How
can mental states cause behavioural states if no effect has more than one cause and those
behavioural effects have distinct physical causes?
Required Readings
Jaegwon Kim, ‘The Supervenience Argument Motivated, Clarified, and Defended’ in his
Physicalism Or Something Near Enough, Princeton University Press, 2005.
Kim, PoM, Chap 6/7.
Recommended Readings
Crane, EoM, Chaps 17, 18 and 19.
Stoljar, P, Chap 11.
Chaps 13 (Kim’s ‘Causation and Mental Causation’) and 14 (Loewer’s ‘Mental Causation, or
Something Near Enough’) in CDPM.
Jaegwon Kim, ‘Mental Causation’ in OHPM.
Jesper Kallestrup (2006), ‘The Causal Exclusion Argument’, Philosophical Studies 131, 459-485.
David Papineau, ‘The Causal Closure of the Physical and Naturalism’ in OHPM.
Yablo, S. ‘Mental Causation’, The Philosophical Review, Vol. 101, No. 2, 1992.
N. Block, ‘Can the mind change the world?’ in Meaning and Method: Essays in Honor of Hilary
Putnam, ed. G. Boolos, Cambridge University Press, 1990, 137-170.
T. Horgan, ‘Kim on Mental Causation and Causal Exclusion’, Philosophical Perspectives 11
(1998), 165-84.
Week 9: Kripke's Argument against the Identity Theory
We now turn to arguments against physicalism. The first is Kripke’s conceivability argument
against the mind-body identity theory. In order to assess this argument, we shall examine
underlying issues in philosophy of language such as the putative rigidity of phenomenal terms as
well as the distinctive way in which such terms have their reference fixed.
Required Readings
S. Kripke, Naming and Necessity, Lecture III, Oxford: Blackwell, 1980.
Recommended Readings
Stoljar, P, Chap 10.
Jesper Kallestrup (2008), ‘Three Strands in Kripke's Argument against the Identity Theory’,
Philosophy Compass 3, 1255-1280.
Week 10: Chalmers' Zombie Argument
If physicalism is true, then zombie worlds, i.e. worlds that are void of consciousness despite
being physically identical to our world, are metaphysically impossible. We will look at
Chalmers’ anti-physicalist argument that such worlds are metaphysically possible, because they
are conceivable and conceivability entails metaphysical possibility.
Required Reading
David Chalmers, ‘The Two-Dimensional Argument Against Materialism’ in OHPM.
Recommended Readings
Kim, PoM, Chapter 7.
Crane, EoM, Chapter 3, Sec. 29, 30.
D. Chalmers, Chapter 4 in his The Conscious Mind, Oxford University Press, 1996.
S. Shoemaker, ‘Functionalism and Qualia’ in his Identity, Cause and Mind, Cambridge
University Press, 1984.
C. Hill, ‘Imaginability, Conceivability, Possibility and the Mind-Body Problem’, Philosophical
Studies 87, 1997, 61-85.
R. Stalnaker, ‘What is it Like to Be a Zombie?’, in Gendler, T., and J. Hawthorne (eds.),
Conceivability and Possibility, Oxford University Press, 2002.
D. Stoljar, ‘The Conceivability Argument and Two Conceptions of the Physical’, in
Philosophical Perspectives 15, (ed.) J. E. Tomberlin, Blackwell, 2001, 393-413
Week 11: Jackson's Knowledge Argument
After presenting Jackson’s knowledge argument against physicalism, based on his thought
experiment about black-and-white Mary, we will examine some influential responses, e.g. to do
with the distinction between propositional knowledge and know-how, and the possibility of
acquiring new knowledge of a fact that one already knew in some other way.
Required Readings
F. Jackson, ‘What Mary didn't know’, Journal of Philosophy 83, 1986, 291-295.
D. Lewis, ‘What Experience Teaches’, in his Papers in Epistemology and Metaphysics,
Cambridge University Press, 1999.
Recommended Readings
J. Kim, PoM, Chapter 7.
T. Crane, EoM, Chapter 3, Sec. 26, 28.
F. Jackson, ‘Consciousness’, in the Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy, (eds.) F.
Jackson and M. Smith, Oxford University Press, 2007.
8. MSc Tutorials
MSc students will meet with Prof Kallestrup on 16th October 3.00 - 5.00, 6th November 3.00- 5.00
and 27th November 3.10 - 5.00 in the Dugald Stewart Building, room 401.
9. Assessment Information
The UG version of this course is assessed by two essays:
1st Essay (1,500 words) 40%; due Thursday 23rd October 2014, by 4pm.
2nd Essay (2,500 words) 60%; due Thursday 11th December 2014, by 4pm.
The MSc students will write one essay (2,500 words); due Monday 15th December at 12 noon.
Essay Questions
Essay one:
(1)
(1) Present the causal pairing problem for substance dualism, and discuss how
the substance dualist might respond.
(2) Is it the case, as stated by Block (1978), that functionalism is guilty of liberalism?
(3)
(3) Is it plausible that mental states can be identified with physical states of the brain if mental
states are multiple realisable?
Essay two:
(1)
(1) Present the causal exclusion problem for non-reductive physicalism, and discuss how the nonreductive physicalist might respond.
(2) How might one argue that Zombies are conceivable but not possible?
(3) Does the ability hypothesis satisfactorily answer the knowledge argument?
Notes on referencing for an essay
A clear referencing system is essential for any good essay. As this is a relatively easy thing to
achieve, there should be no excuse for poor referencing.
Quotations
Quotations must be accompanied by the author, date and page number. E.g.
‘Mirror neuron activation can easily be interpreted as part of the neuronal processes that underlie
social perception.’ (Gallagher, 2008a, p. 541)
Some of the articles we use are pre-prints. When possible, use the page number from the actual
publication (if this is a journal article, then you can find it online). If this is not possible, then
write ‘quote’ (forthcoming) or ‘quote’ (on-line source).
Bibliography
References should be in alphabetical order by author, and, if there is more than one entry for an
author, in date order for that author (using 'a', 'b' etc, if there is more than a single reference for
that author in a given year) . Below are some examples of difference types of reference.
Burge, T. (1979) Example of a journal article reference. Synthese, 40, 265-81.
Csibra, G. (2005, January 2). Example of an online paper or forum discussion. Retrieved from
http://www.interdisciplines.org/mirror/papers/4.
Dummett, M. (1973) Example of a Book Reference. London: Duckworth.
Kripke, S. (1979) Example of an article in an edited collection. In A. Margalit (ed.), Meaning and
Use. Dordrecht: Reidel, 32–56.
Hutto, D.D. (2010a) Example of a journal article reference. Philosophical Explorations, 32, 5690.
Hutto, D.D. (2010b) Example of a journal article reference. Philosophical Quarterly, 25, 1 - 11.
Margolis, E. and Laurence, S. (eds) (1999) Example of an Edited Book Reference. Cambridge,
MA.: MIT Press.
Please note: do not use the format of the course readings as your template for the bibliography, as
I’ve collated them from different sources so they are not uniform.
Word Count Penalties
Essays must not exceed the word limit, which includes footnotes but excludes bibliography. The
precise word count must be written on the coversheet. Overlong essays will be penalised
according to the following rule: 5% will be deducted for every 100 words, or part thereof, over
the word limit. So, 1-100 words over lose 5%; 101-200 words over lose 10%; 201-300 words
over lose 15%; and so on.
Penalties for Late Submission of Essays
Unless an extension has been granted, essays must be submitted by the dates shown in the table
of Submission Dates below. Essays submitted late without an extension may not be marked, but,
if marked, will incur a penalty (in accordance with section 3.8 of the University Undergraduate
Assessment Regulations at:
http://www.ed.ac.uk/schools-departments/academic-services/policiesregulations/regulations/assessment
For each working day that the work is late there will be a reduction of the mark by 5% of the
maximum obtainable mark (e.g. a mark of 65% on the common marking scale would be reduced
to 60% up to 24 hours later). This penalty applies for up to five working days, after which a mark
of zero will be given.
Plagiarism
Essays will be checked for plagiarism using Turnitin.
The University treats plagiarism by honours students as a disciplinary offence, and anyone caught
plagiarising will be referred to the College’s Academic Misconduct Officer. If you are unsure
what constitutes plagiarism or need further guidance, you should consult the University’s
guidelines:
http://www.ed.ac.uk/schools-departments/academicservices/students/undergraduate/discipline/plagiarism
Students can read more about plagiarism and proper referencing practices, and use Turnitin on a
trial copy of their essays, in the Philosophy Tools course on LEARN.
Extensions
Students are expected to monitor their workload, be aware of all deadlines, and organise
themselves accordingly.
Extension requests should be submitted before the submission deadline. They must be submitted
to the Teaching Office for approval, and must include details of the assessment(s) affected and
the length of extension requested, together with supporting evidence if required.
Other than in exceptional circumstances, extensions will only be granted in cases of illness or
family emergency. If students are seeking extensions for more than one week, they must provide
medical evidence and/or discuss the request with the Student Support Officer.
Extension requests due to time mismanagement, personal computing/printing problems or
ignorance of deadline will not be accepted.
The Teaching Office will email the student to tell them whether the extension has been granted.
The decision conveyed in this email is final; if students feel that they have been unfairly denied
an extension they should make a case to the special circumstances committee for the removal of
late submission penalties at the examination board.
Retrospective extensions will not be granted.
However, late submission penalties may be waived if a student requests an extension on the day
of the deadline but cannot get medical evidence until some days later.
Students with Adjustment Schedules.
Extension requests from students with adjustment schedules that allow ‘short notice extensions’
will be treated sympathetically where possible. Students should however be prepared to give a
reason for the extension request; simply citing an adjustment schedule is not an adequate reason.
If students are seeking extensions for more than one week, they must provide medical evidence
and/or discuss the request with the Student Support Officer.
Special Circumstances.
Students may apply for consideration of special circumstances if they feel that events out with
their control have resulted in poor exam performance in comparison to their previous coursework
record or even missing an exam. These circumstances most commonly include illness or
bereavement but can be submitted for a variety of issues. It is the student’s responsibility to
complete a Special Circumstances form giving as much detail as possible and providing
supporting evidence. All submissions must be accompanied by medical or other documentation.
Please note - Regulation 14 Assessment deadlines: Student responsibilities
It is a student’s responsibility to ascertain and meet his or her assessment deadlines, including
examination times and locations.
Feedback
You will get many feedback or feedforward opportunities in your courses. Feedback could be in
the form of an essay, a draft write-up, self-generated or peer feedback, small group discussions or
quizzes within lectures etc. Feedforward might include a discussion of how to write an essay, or
prepare for an exam.
Feedback is essential to learning and it takes many forms. We strongly encourage you to use all
forms of feedback, including:
 Asking and answering questions in lectures or classes
 Asking questions of your Course Organiser or lecturer in their office hours
 Discussing your work with lecturers and examiners on Philosophy's dedicated Feedback
Days (Honours students)
 Actively participating in your tutorials (pre-Honours students)
 Actively participating in Autonomous Learning Groups (Honours students)
 Talking about your ideas outside class with fellow Philosophy students
 Taking your essay to PhilSoc essay surgeries
 Participating in PhilSoc discussion groups and study-skills events
 Participating in PhilSoc debates and talks: http://euphilsoc.weebly.com/
 Participating in the British Undergraduate Philosophy Society, including undergraduate
conferences: http://www.bups.org
If you have any suggestions on how to improve feedback further, please contact either:
 Your Tutor (pre-Honours students)
 Your Course Organiser
 Your Personal Tutor
 Sarah Nicol, PPLS Student Support Officer ([email protected])
 Dr Mark Sprevak, Director of Undergraduate Teaching ([email protected])
10. Learn
This year the majority of courses will use electronic submissions for Honours coursework. For
essay submission instructions please see the instructions on LEARN. Please note you should not
include your name or matriculation number on coursework, only your exam number.
11, Autonomous Learning Groups
One of the best ways to learn, and get feedback, is from talking to each other. In order to facilitate
this, each of your Honours courses now has dedicated Autonomous Learning Groups. In week 2,
you will receive an email from our Student Support Officer (Sarah Nicol, [email protected])
asking if you would like to be part of an Autonomous Learning Group (ALG) for each of your
Honours courses. If you agree, Sarah will form the ALGs for you and email you with details of
which group you are in, and the email addresses of the other members of the group.
It is up to you, the members of the ALG, to organize the meetings. You decide how often to meet
and what to do in your ALG. ALGs are designed to help you learn and get to know your
classmates; they are not a formal requirement of the course. It is important to note that assessment
in your courses is non-competitive: you are not competing against your classmates, only against
the general grade criteria. It is in your interests to help each other.
As a rough guide, we suggest your ALG meets every 2-3 weeks. You could use the meetings to:






Read and discuss the papers together
Discuss essay-writing and time-management techniques
Constructively critique each other's draft essays or plans
Read some of the further readings or related papers
Work on presentations or discussion posts that the class may involve
Share tips on career advice
Sarah will be able to help you with room booking (you can also do this yourself through MyEd).
Please email the CO of the course if you feel that it would be useful for the group if she or he
joined one of your sessions.
Please contact Sarah if you find it necessary during the semester to transfer into a different group.
ALGs are a new initiative by Philosophy and we appreciate your thoughts. If you feedback on
how to make ALGs even better, please email Sarah Nicol ([email protected]) or the Director
of Undergraduate Teaching, Dr. Mark Sprevak ([email protected]).
12. Useful Information
Office Hours
Prof Kallestrup’s office hour is Thursday 2.00pm - 3.00pm or by email appointment.
Dr Ranalli’s office hour is by email appointment only.
Office hours are a good time for you to come and discuss ideas for your essays. Please don’t
think you need a ‘problem’ to come to office hours. We are always willing to use this time to chat
through any thoughts you may be having about topics covered in the course, or topics for your
essays.
Attendance by ALL students at University classes, seminars and tutorials etc
The University expects all students to attend all their University classes, lectures and tutorials etc,
whether or not these are described as “compulsory” by the School. This includes participating
fully in the requirements of all courses, including submitting assignments, contributing to
tutorials and workshops or laboratories, attending meetings with Personal Tutors and sitting
examinations.
Your attendance will be monitored by the School, so that staff can help you to manage your
progress through the courses. We will do this so we can be quickly alerted to any additional
pastoral or academic support needs any student might require, and so that the School can provide
advice, guidance or support in a timely and useful manner.
WEEK 6 INNOVATIVE LEARNING WEEK (16-20 February 2015). Normal teaching slots
will be suspended and in their place will be a range of other activities such as master classes, a
research day, a science fair, and guest lectures. More information will follow nearer the time so
please check the School website where details will be available on the PPLS Events
page: http://www.ed.ac.uk/staff-students/students/academic-life/studies/innovative-learning
13. Common Marking Scheme
http://www.ed.ac.uk/schools-departments/registry/exams/regulations/common-marking-scheme
A1 90100
Excellent
Outstanding in every respect, the work is well beyond the level expected of a competent student a
of study.
A2 80-89
Excellent
Outstanding in some respects, the work is often beyond what is expected of a competent student a
level of study.
A3 70-79
Excellent
Very good or excellent in most respects, the work is what might be expected of a very competent
B
60-69
Very Good
Good or very good in most respects, the work displays thorough mastery of the relevant learning
C
50-59
Good
The work clearly meets requirements for demonstrating the relevant learning outcomes.
D
40-49
Pass
The work meets minimum requirements for demonstrating the relevant learning outcomes.
E
30-39
Marginal fail
The work fails to meet minimum requirements for demonstrating the relevant learning outcomes
F
20-29
Clear fail
The work is very weak or shows a decided lack of effort.
G
10-19
Bad fail
The work is extremely weak.
H
0-9
Bad fail
The work is of very little consequence, if any, to the area in question.
The Philosophy Department has also adopted a set of grade-related marking criteria which are
worth bearing in mind when writing essays:
Grade Bands
Fail (less than 40)
Third Class (40–49):
• Writing is generally unclear. Frequent spelling or grammar mistakes, incorrect language, and/or
excessively convoluted sentence structure.
• Neglects clearly to state a thesis or position and/or fails to support this with arguments. Contains
irrelevant material, or material whose relevance is not adequately explained.
• Demonstrates a barely adequate understanding of central issues. Contains several errors in
exposition or in explanation of concepts.
• No evidence of independent thought or critical engagement. Merely rehashes arguments from
readings or lectures.
• Where arguments are given, these are weak, depend on invalid inferences or implausible
premises. Fails to anticipate obvious objections.
Lower Second Class (50–59):
• Writing is generally clear, but there are occasional spelling/grammar infelicities and/or poorly
constructed sentences.
• A thesis/position is indicated but not clearly defined. Some arguments given, but their structure
often unclear.
• Demonstrates a basic grasp of key concepts, but occasional inaccuracies in
exposition/explanation.
• Little evidence of independent thought. Some suggestion of original ideas, but these are underdeveloped and/or expressed unclearly.
• Arguments generally weak or unconvincing.
Upper Second Class (60–69):
• Writing is generally clear, marred only by the rare spelling/grammar infelicity or poorly
constructed sentence.
• A thesis/position is indicated and clearly defined. Arguments are given with relatively clear
structure. It is generally clear what is going on in each section, why one section follows on from
the previous one, and how the essay as a whole hangs together.
• Demonstrates a solid understanding of the key concepts, and the exposition is generally accurate
and thorough.
• Substantial evidence of original thought – either an original argument of some kind for a
familiar position or an original argument for a novel position. In either case, the argument should
be reasonably well developed.
• The author’s original arguments are interesting and promising, but fairly central or glaring
problems with the argument are not discussed or addressed in any way, or are given only a highly
cursory treatment.
Low First Class (70–79):
• Writing is very clear and engaging throughout. Where examples are used they are both relevant
and memorable. The writing will also be concise.
• The essay’s structure is not only clear and well defined; it also provides a satisfying narrative
arc.
• Demonstrates a deep understanding of the key concepts. Explains other philosopher’s ideas in
the author’s own terms, clearly presenting those ideas in a way that indicates that the author has
“made them his/her own.” Where technical terms are used they are always carefully defined.
• Highly original thought, with well developed arguments. The exegesis will generally be
sufficiently concise as to allow the author to develop his or her own arguments in considerable
detail.
• The author very carefully considers the most central and obvious problems with his/her original
argument(s) and has interesting things to say about them.
Mid-First Class (80–89):
• Writing is crystal clear and highly engaging throughout. Memorable examples are used to
underscore key points. The writing is concise without coming across as terse or stilted.
• The essay’s structure is clear and well defined, with a highly satisfying narrative arc.
• Demonstrates a deep understanding of key concepts. Not only explains the ideas of other
philosophers in a way that shows he/she has “made them his/her own,” but that actually casts new
light on how we might charitably understand the ideas of those philosophers.
• Very original thought, above and beyond what we would normally expect from an
undergraduate. These original ideas will be developed in great detail.
• The author very carefully considers the most central and obvious problems with his/her original
argument(s) and has prima facie convincing rejoinders. Author may also consider more subtle
objections to his/her argument(s)/view(s).
High First Class (90–100):
• Writing is extremely clear, concise, and engaging — of a publishable quality.
• The essay’s structure is extremely clear and well-defined, with a highly satisfying narrative arc.
• Demonstrates a deep understanding of key concepts. Not only explains the ideas of other
philosophers in a way that shows he/she has “made them his/her own,” but that actually casts new
light on how we might charitably understand the ideas of those philosophers.
• A highly original and well developed line of argument and/or novel view, such that the essay is
publishable, at least in an undergraduate or postgraduate journal, perhaps bordering on being
publishable in a mainstream professional journal.
• The author considers the most important objections to his/her arguments/views. The replies are
generally convincing and subtle. If space allows, less obvious objections may also be discussed in
interesting ways.
2. Robert Van Gulick, ‘Functionalism’ in OHPM.
3. Putnam, H. (1967) “The Nature of Mental States”, in W. G. Lycan (Ed.) (1999) Mind and
Cognition: A Reader. (2nd. Ed.) Cambridge: Basil Blackwell, pp. 27-34.
Optional Readings:
1. J. Searle, “Minds, Brains and Programs”, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3:417-57:
Available online at: http://members.aol.com/NeoNoetics/MindsBrainsPrograms.html
2. A. M. Turing (1950) “Computing Machinery and Intelligence”, Mind 49: 433-460:
Available online at: http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00000499/00/turing.html
3. Block, N. “The Mind as the Software of the Brain”
Available online at: http://www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/philo/faculty/block/papers/msb.html
4. Horgan, T. 1984. “Functionalism and Token Physicalism”. Synthese 59:321-38.
5. Jackson, F., Pargetter, R. & Prior, E. W. 1982. “Functionalism and Type-Type Identity
Theories”. Philosophical Studies 42:209-25.
6. David Lewis, “Mad Pain and Martian Pain”, in Problems in Mind, J. Crumley, ed., Mayfield
Publishing Company, 2000, pp. 110-117. Originally published in Readings in the Philosophy of
Psychology, Vol. I, N. Block, ed., Harvard University Press, 1980, pp. 216-222.