Resources and Infrastructure Babcock Marine Clyde
Resources and Infrastructure Babcock Marine Clyde Introduction to Babcock Marine (Clyde) Introduction to Clyde 1963 – 3rd Submarine Squadron - Dreadnought arrival 1967 – 10th Submarine Squadron – Resolution Class 1986 – New nuclear facilities construction 1992 – 1st Submarine Squadron – Vanguard & Swiftsure 1995 – Surface Ships Arrival 1999 – Nuclear Authorisation 2009 – Valiant Jetty Arrival, Astute Arrival 2009 – Explosives Handling Jetty mid-life update 2009 – Clyde confirmed as future Base Port for all submarines 2067 – Projected life of “Successor” submarine HMNB Clyde - Faslane HMNB Clyde - Coulport HMS Vanguard – 4 in class HMS Astute – 7 in class HMS Trafalgar – up to 4 (interim) Successor – up to 2067 Lodger Units Fleet Protection Group Faslane Flotilla Royal Marines Northern Diving Group & Bomb Disposal Flag Officer Sea Training (FOST) MoD Police What is it Babcock do at HMNB Clyde? Submarines Nuclear Operations Estates Waterfront Support Logistics SWS Hotel Business Mgt Design and Safety Ships Resources and Infrastructure Management System for Nuclear Installations IAEA GS-G.3.5 • Section 4.1 ‘Senior management shall determine the amount of resources necessary and shall provide the resources to carry out the activities of the organisation and to establish, assess and continually improve the management system’ Management System for Nuclear Installations IAEA GS-G.3.5 • Section 4.1 ‘Senior management shall determine the amount of resources necessary and shall provide the resources to carry out the activities of the organisation and to establish, assess and continually improve the management system’ • Human resources • Infrastructure and the working environment HMNB Clyde Site Safety Case The maintenance of nuclear and radiation safety standards requires that there shall be: •A structured and adequately manned organisation with clearly defined responsibilities for nuclear safety •Suitably trained and qualified personnel to carry out tasks having nuclear safety implications •Services and facilities essential to nuclear safety, properly designed, constructed, maintained and available when required Reflects principles of IAEA GS-G3.5 Human Resources provided by suppliers & partners 11/01/2017 16 Partnering at Clyde MoD Intelligent Customer • Babcock commercial partner • Principles include the maintenance of a sound safety culture • Babcock responsible to NBC(C) for service delivery to the required standards of safety, performance quality and cost • Service provision reflects competency • Shared management & information systems • Joint management boards Anomalies • Budget is set by customer • Budget is controlled by customer • Significant Capital projects are out-with the contract including setting of initial requirements • Investment is constantly pressurised • Budgets are on an annualised footing • Little opportunity/scope for company investment/return Human Resources Management System for Nuclear Installations IAEA GS-G.3.5 • Section 4.15 ‘Senior management shall determine the competence requirements for individuals at all levels and shall provide training…’ ‘….shall ensure individuals are competent to perform their assigned work and that they understand the consequences for safety of their activities….’ ‘Individuals shall have received appropriate education and training…..to ensure their competence.’ Human Resources SQEP, SqEP, SQeP, SqeP OR EVEN JUST sqeP! Maintaining & developing a competent workforce in a changing environment Human Resources 1980s – mid 1990s • Nuclear SQEP prescribed • General SQEP requirements less formal Late 1990s – mid 2000s • • • • Nuclear SQEP guidance (minimum requirements) NSQEP Allowances Line Managers’ influence prevalent Inconsistent definition of SQEP, over focus on Nuclear 2008 – • Capability Clyde – qualifications based approach • Succession Planning – addressing the “E” in SQEP Human Resources – How Many? Job Families and Norms Past Performance – sick, leave, training Master Schedule 400 350 201003 Production Aggregate - By Month 201002 201001 200912 200911 200910 200909 200908 200907 200906 200905 200904 200903 200902 200901 200812 200811 200810 200809 200808 200807 Headcount Forward Plan Aggregate NPF S,L,T Load Capacity 300 250 200 150 100 50 0 4 Fleet Maintenance Support - Surveyor 201003 4 201002 Fleet Maintenance Support - Metallurgist 201003 201001 200912 200911 200910 200909 200908 200907 200906 200905 200904 200903 200902 200901 200812 5 201002 201001 200912 200911 200910 200909 200908 200907 200906 200905 0 200904 5 200903 NPF 200902 10 200811 NPF 200901 20 200812 Fleet Maintenance Support - NDE Officer 200811 0 200810 2 200810 Capacity 200809 Load 200809 3 200808 4 Headcount S,L,T 200808 15 Headcount 25 201003 5 201002 Fleet Maintenance Support - Chem ist 201003 201001 200912 200911 200910 200909 200908 200907 200906 200905 200904 200903 200902 200901 200812 200811 200810 200809 200808 Headcount 6 201002 201001 200912 200911 200910 200909 200908 200907 200906 200905 200904 200903 200902 200901 200812 200811 200810 200809 200808 Headcount Forward Plan by Section NPF S,L,T Load Capacity 3 3 2 2 1 1 1 0 S,L,T 10 NPF S,L,T Load 9 Load Capacity 8 Capacity 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 Human Resources - Plugging Skill Gaps at Clyde How the capability Clyde project drives upskilling Introduction 1. Identifying required competence by role 2. Identifying competence of current role holder Capability Clyde Project 3. Identifying competence gap PDR/Training Planning 4. Prioritising competence gap 5. Filling competence gap Clyde Academy 6. Evolving competence database Job Evaluation Capability Clyde • Skills mapping project kicked around in various iterations for 2 years prior to January 2009 • Major NC resulting from LRQA surveillance audit April 2008 – NC downgraded IN October 2008 on basis of initial work done to identify – Scope of issue – Plan to address • Project passed to HR in January 2009 to inject ‘second wind’ ahead of April 2009 audit Why was this project important? • Fundamental to maintaining right to operate – Non-compliant with AC10 (training) – Risk of Regulator suspending operations – ‘Failure to address and resolve these issues will result in LRQA implementing its approval suspension procedures’ – LRQA approve ISO9001 certification – ISO9001 = essential for operating WSMi contract – Threat to SWS Alliance bid – Certainly not helpful in 2013 • Fundamental building block for future capability Scope • To ensure compliance with AC/regulatory requirements • To address and resolve the outstanding issues from the 2008 LRQA surveillance visits such that; – Minor NC remains a minor or is closed at April ’09 visit – Work completed by end June to close NC at next visit (October ’09) • To build a skill/competency map for BM (C) (roles not people/not just nuclear) that will support Resource Based Management • Areas to address; – – – – – Datum Organisation NTRP BMC-wide capability Induction PDR/Training Planning Deliverables • Datum Organisation – – – – • Clarify what’s in and what’s not Bring current up-to-date accordingly Clarify relationship with DO Create BMC equivalent in IFS Process that guarantees integrity and compliance including capture of new starts BMC-wide Capability – – – – As NTRP but for whole organisation Create ‘footprint’ for the skills, competency, qualifications and experience of BMC Construct to facilitate RBM Devise common language capability v planning to enable ‘automated’ RBM Assessment methodology – – • – – • Standardised assessment/verification methodology Training for on-site assessors Induction – NTRP – – – – – • Clarify what’s in and what’s not Bring current DO up-to-date Accurately reflect actual and remit Process that guarantees integrity and compliance with AC36 • Develop and implement ‘gateway’ induction programme Include; site/department roles and responsibilities, policy, objectives, CMS, management systems, safety, site tour Identify responsibility for maintaining ‘proof’/records of inductions PDR – – – – Re-engineered process that delivers high quality cascaded objectives that can be measured and monitored Identification of NTRP requirements by role to facilitate focused discussion Collation of training needs into consolidated training plan Booking methodology How? • Identify all roles (prioritise Datum/nuclear/other); bundle where possible • Define Capability Framework; skill, competency, experience, qualification • Determine what we want to assess – – – • Capture role profiles Capture ‘capability profile’ - SCEQ required per role (review existing info) Create a behavioural competency framework How do we assess capability? – – – Migrate non-industrial records from legacy systems + test results against ‘known’ capability of individuals Improve PDR process for non-industrials Create a standardised skills assessment process for industrials prior to PDR roll out in 2011 • Develop robust process to maintain integrity of capability & supporting data • So far – – – – Slide 34 1396 people evaluated vs 925 positions under Capability Clyde Project Job Evaluation completed for non-industrials (500 people), in train for remaining population Revised PDR process entering 3rd year of evolution 2 years of new training planning process completed ©2007 Babcock International Group PLC Plugging competence gaps SEARCH DATABASE FOR GAPS IDENTIFY SKILL NEED SET SKILL DELIVERY AS PRIORITY CONDUCT PDRs • NB not all gaps plugged by training • Graduate scheme covers 2 year programme of learning to grow future talent • Apprentice scheme recruits annually for 4-year programme; numbers based on attrition + workload • RN secondments provide – Competence ‘on tap’ for Company – Competence/experience development for RN AGREE TRAINING PLAN DESIGN TRAINING INTERVENTION DELIVER TRAINING INTERVENTION Training planning/prioritisation Competence requirement Current Competence Competence gap Competence surplus Babcock (Clyde) has visibility of the whole competence picture and can set priorities accordingly Integrated competence delivery model CAPABILITY CLYDE COMPETENCE DELIVERY MECHANISM JOB EVALUATION TRAINING PLANNING PDR CLYDE ACADEMY Human Resources Scenario for CQI NucSIG consideration: • Marine & Nuclear Engineering Company • 2 most senior Quality posts vacant at 2 locations – A – Chartered Engineer, no quality background – B – ACQI minimum, no engineering background Which one, if any, is correct? Infrastructure and the Working Environment Management System for Nuclear Installations IAEA GS-G.3.5 • Section 4.18 ‘Senior management shall determine, provide, maintain and re-evaluate the infrastructure and the working environment necessary for work to be carried out in a safe manner and for requirements to be met’ Management System for Nuclear Installations IAEA GS-G.3.5 • Section 4.18 • • • • ‘Senior management shall determine, provide, maintain and re-evaluate the infrastructure and the working environment necessary for work to be carried out in a safe manner and for requirements to be met’ Registers of significant material assets Appropriate inventories of consumables and spares Consideration of damage or theft Specific threats from certain assets (chemicals/gases etc) Register of Material Assets Company ERP System now hosts the Asset Register • Asset Register central to Asset Management – Asset Management Plan – EMIT Programme – EMIT & Trend Information • • • • Nuclear Safety Implicated, non Nuclear Safety Implicated assets Safety Case derived nuclear asset management plans Facility Life Plans (nuclear only) Periodic Review of Safety also used to inform plans Asset Management Facilities, Systems and Equipment • Old (pre-date safety cases) – operating restrictions – obsolete spares • Extended Life • Mid Life Upgrades & Stage Improvement Programmes • New & Commissioning Unregistered assets • Several “light touch” procurement routes • Significant inventory built up over time • Action taken to contain and recover situation Inventory Management • Currently historical spares levels have set themselves – High profile spares and consumables are managed according to lead times, historical data in terms of useage and failure rates (e.g Shiplift wire ropes). • Obsolescence issues are captured and understood but lack rigour and timely investment/action. • Generally spares kitting process for maintenance activities have improved under the maintenance management system further advances in stock management can be made in terms of auto replenishment. • Cost savings versus material spend – good in parts but isolated Management naivety exists – HPAC Event. Safety/Security of assets Safety/Security of assets Specific Materials Management Significant risk elements • Radioactive materials – controlled areas, operations etc. • Industrial gases – controlled storage & distribution • Bulk fuel oils – COMAH (MACR) site • Explosives (conventional) – controlled areas & quantities Risk management • • • • Risk Assessment primary mechanism used HAZOP/HAZID Analysis and FMEA reflected in Safety Cases Environmental Aspects & Impacts Assessment Authorised Persons in place for each significant entity Questions/debate
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