OXFORD INTERNATIONAL MODEL UNITED NATIONS 12TH ANNUAL CONFERENCE 7TH – 9TH NOVEMBER 2014 DISARMAMENT AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY CONTENTS Topic A: Transition of security duties in Afghanistan - Introduction .......................... pg 3 -Topic History ......................... pg 4 -Discussion of the Problem ... pg 6 -The Future .............................. pg 10 -Points Resolutions Should Address .... ................... pg 10 -Bloc Positions ......................... pg 11 -Further Reading and Bibliography...................... pg 12 Topic B: International Collaboration on the management of non-state actors -Introduction............................ pg 13 -Topic History ......................... pg 13 -Discussion of the Problem ... pg 14 -The Future .............................. pg 16 -Bloc Positions ......................... pg 16 -Further Reading ..................... pg 17 -Bibliography............................ pg 17 Committee Director: Name Tagore Nakornchai [email protected] Assistant Directors: Name Kyle Chan [email protected] Beenish Saeed [email protected] [DISARMAMENT AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY COMMITTEE] Topic A: Transition of security duties in Afghanistan Topic B: International Collaboration on the management of non-state actors A Message from your Directors: Dear Delegates, Welcome to the Disarmament and International Security Committee. DISEC’s role is at the heart of the founding principles of the UN: the promotion of international peace and security through international cooperation and diplomacy. The topics to be discussed are, perhaps, two of the most relevant topics of our time, dealing with the rise of global terrorism, and how international cooperation can help combat this threat (Topic B), and the situation in Afghanistan after the withdrawal of ISAF forces.(Topic A) In keeping with the themes of the conference, both issues are of immense global importance, but are issues that www.oximun.org Page 2 must be tackled at their fundamental roots. contributing to much of the infrastructure that exists in Afghanistan today. Delegates are expected to be familiar with the study guide, but are also highly encouraged to further explore the topics, through the links provided as well as through their own reading. We expect engaging, lively and multifaceted, and most importantly, enjoyable debate, discussion and (hopefully), results! Afghanistan has been in a near-constant state of civil war since 1978, when a Soviet backed coup by the communist People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan broke out. Continuing instability contributed to a Soviet intervention and installation of a Soviet puppet government. An American-supported proxy war ended up driving Soviet troops out of Afghanistan, but this was soon followed by the warlords turning on themselves, and a takeover by the extremist Taliban. The Taliban were driven out of power, though still possess considerable resources and pose a continuing threat to the stability of the Afghan nation. Regards, Afghanistan is a highly diverse country with numerous ethnic and tribal groups despite the rebuilding process of the past 10 years, It is also incredibly poor; 40 years of civil war have devastated the country’s infrastructure, and the ongoing conflict deters foreign investment Beenish, Kyle and Tagore, DISEC Chairs. TOPIC A: TRANSITION OF SECURITY DUTIES IN AFGHANISTAN Afghanistan has always, to a certain extent, been the convergence point of various civilizations, thanks to its key position along the Old Silk Road, and its role as a centre of Islamic civilisation during the Islamic Golden age. Ruled by Persians, Greeks, Huns, and Mongols during various in history, an independent Afghan nation first emerged in the 18th century. Throughout the 19th century, it was a major site of the continuing Anglo-Russian conflicts for supremacy in Central Asia immortalised as “The Great Game” by Arthur Conolly and Rudyard Kipling. During the 20th century, Afghanistan gradually moved into the Soviet sphere of influence, with Soviet advisors and aid Afghanistan remains a continuing source of instability in the region, in particular of neighbouring Pakistan; directly across the border from current Taliban stronghold in South-eastern Afghanistan are the old North West Frontier Province, and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). These areas have large Pashtun populations, and their madrassas have long been fertile recruiting grounds for the Taliban. The focus of this conference will be on establishing a lasting peace to bring an end to a civil war that has spanned four decades, ensuring a well-governed and prosperous Afghan state, and safeguarding the rights of the various religious and ethnic minorities. Page 3 www.oximun.org TOPIC HISTORY Afghanistan since 1979 The infighting within the People’s Democratic Party PDPA in the aftermath of the coup resulted in the assassination of the Sovietbacked President Taraki, and his replacement by Hafizullar Amin, a man who eventually was considered unreliable by Moscow. Attempts to implement a more Communist system in Afghanistan, through land and legal reforms, resulted in an insurgency. As the situation deteriorated, the KGB believed that the uncompromising plans of the PDPA were a major cause of the instability. Soviet forces then launched their own operation to remove Amin, and installed a much more pliable leader. The Soviets now found themselves facing a renewed insurgency, not only against an unpopular government, but given extra fuel by perceptions of a Soviet “invasion”. Central government control of Afghanistan was now only nominal. Over the next 10 years, the Soviet Union would be embroiled in a long, devastating war against various irregulars in an attempt to re-establish control. This war would sap Soviet power and resources and is believed to have led to the conditions that forced Gorbachev to seek re-engagement with the West. The backbone of the insurgency during the Soviet era, were groups of Islamist fanatics called the Mujahadeen,. This movement attracted Islamist fighters from throughout the Islamic World, though a disproportionate number came from neighbouring Pakistan. One of the most infamous of these fighters was Osama Bin Laden who would later turn against his former sponsors. Cynically, the United States saw an opportunity to fight a proxy war against the Soviet Union, through support of anti-Soviet fighters, particularly the Mujahadeen. Pakistan, always resentful of Soviet influence in its neighbour, also contributed significantly to the anti-Soviet cause through facilitating American smuggling operations, and facilitating Mujahadeen recruitment in Pakistan. After ten years of long, devastating war, the Soviet army finally withdrew in 1989, leaving behind a weakened PDPA administration that would soon be toppled by the various Mujahadeens. Over a million people are believed to have been killed, and several million more fled the country during the conflict and the aftermath. Ironically, the American-trained and equipped Mujahadeen, including portable Surface-to-Air Stinger Missiles, which still plague allied air forces to this day. The Taliban Takeover In the aftermath of the Soviet withdrawal, the Communist government collapsed. Without a common enemy, the various warlords who had banded together to fight the Soviets began bickering among themselves. The abundance of abandoned ex-Soviet small arms and equipment allowed the warlords to continue fighting, even as American aid dried up. Figure 1 : The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan Page 4 www.oximun.org A disaffected warlord, with alleged support from the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence, formed the Taliban, a fundamentalist Islamist group with a hard-line interpretation of Islam. Several early victories gave the Taliban enough momentum to capture the national capital of Kabul in 1995, and established nominal rule over much of the country. The remaining warlords still resisting the Taliban were hemmed into an ever smaller portion of Northern Afghanistan. nominally under the control of anti-Taliban forces. Taliban rule was marked by oppression of ethnic and religious minorities, and the institution of Islamic Sharia law. The Taliban also harboured other Islamic fundamentalists, such as Osama Bin Laden’s then-fledgling AlQaeda. The Taliban were internationally not recognized as the legitimate government of Afghanistan, but a lack of appetite for intervention in the so-called “Graveyard of Empires” meant that Taliban power was left unchecked through the 1990s. In December 2001, the Bonn Conference was convened by the UN, where non-Taliban opposition groups gathered together to discuss the future framework. This led to a transitional government, and eventually to the first democratic elections held in Afghanistan, in 2004. Even after the fall of Kabul, many warlords continued the fight against the Taliban, forming the Northern Alliance. While the Taliban advance into Northern Alliance territory slowed, by early 2001, the Northern Alliance was clearly on the strategic defensive, and struggling to maintain ground. The Taliban was shattered and retreated to the south. Coalition forces then began deploying to Afghanistan, in a bid to root out and eliminate the remnants of Al-Qaeda. Early on, progress seemed very promising for the Government and the Coalition as the Taliban had melted away and reconstruction efforts began to get off the ground. United Nations supported in aiding Afghan reconstruction by passing UNSC Resolution 1386 to create the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to provide military support for the fledgling Afghan state. UNSC Resolution 1401, passed in 2002, created the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) to help coordinate UN aid. Coalition Involvement and the Bonn Agreement. In the aftermath of the September 11 attacks, the Bush Administration began seeking to find and root out Osama Bin Laden. An Americanled NATO intervention supported the Northern Alliance and other anti-Taliban forces as they counterattacked and recaptured swathes of Northern Afghanistan. Within three months, the Northern Alliance had captured Kabul, and by the end of the year, all of Afghanistan was Figure 2 - UN Talks in Bonn, 2001 The Taliban Resurgence Throughout 2002, the newly formed ISAF continued cracking down on the remnants of Page 5 www.oximun.org the Taliban forces. Large scale, highly publicised operations were conducted to root the Taliban out from their mountain strongholds. This pace would not be sustained, however, and the Iraq War would divert Western attention and resources away from Afghanistan, allowing the Taliban and other anti-government insurgents to lick their wounds. To a large extent, the Taliban retreated into Pakistan, where, shielded by members of various Pakistani Intelligence services, they recruited new fighters from madrassas. As Taliban numbers began to rise, they moved back into southern Afghanistan where they were able to blend into the Pashtun population. Most Taliban campaigns against ISAF were conducted indirectly, through attacking isolated outposts, roadside bombs, suicide bombings, terrorising the civilian population, or attacking Afghan army units, while avoiding direct confrontation with heavily armed Coalition troops. A combination of drone strikes, corrupt local government officials, and foreign Islamist fighters were a huge boon to the Taliban, and helped to replenish, and even grow their depleted numbers. Other Islamist groups, with similar goals and outlooks, such as the Haqqani network or the Party of Islam, are much smaller than the Taliban, but still represent significant threats. Coalition/ISAF counterinsurgency tactics often sought direct engagements with the Taliban, where the Coalition could bring its overwhelming firepower to bear. This was very successful in creating “body counts”. The United States also began increasing usage of unmanned drones for reconnaissance and targeted strikes against key Taliban leaders. Some drone strikes targeted Taliban leaders inside Pakistan. This, in combination with other violations of Pakistani sovereignty led to deteriorating American-Pakistani relations that further complicated Coalition cooperation to root out key Taliban forces. ‘Afghanisation’ By 2008, the Afghan war had been going on for 7 years. The Obama administration did not inherit its predecessor’s appetite for a sustained counter-insurgency in Afghanistan. Almost immediately, Obama began preparing an “exit strategy”, which would involve a gradual drawdown of American combat operations, and an increasing role for the Afghan forces. However, in order to stabilise the situation, the Obama administration authorised a large troop surge just prior to the withdrawal. This coincided with the height of the insurgency was in 2010 and 2011, and coalition casualties in those two years were far heavier than they were pre-2008. Troop levels continued to fall throughout 2012 and 13, and the last combat troops are projected to leave by the end of this year. The surge was supposed to pave the way for a permanent handover of the counterinsurgency to the ISAF-trained and assisted Afghan National Army. However, it was found that the ANA could often be wanting, with many units having insufficient training or poor morale. The Taliban, while bloodied, still remain a major threat in parts of the Southeast, and control large parts of the country outside of urban areas. DISCUSSION OF THE PROBLEM The Coalition leaves Afghanistan in a dire state. The pace of Afghan reconstruction and establishment of national institutions has also been disappointing. Institutions like the police are still ineffective, corruption and graft remain Page 6 www.oximun.org rife, and this year’s presidential elections have been plagued by allegations of ballot rigging. Security requires a multi-faceted approach, and Governance Post-2001, Afghanistan underwent a provisional and then transitional government where the underlying framework of the new Afghan state were laid. Afghanistan has a semi-presidential system with a president, and a ministerial cabinet which is appointed by the president but approved by the National assembly. The first elections in 2004 were won by Hamid Karzai, an old resistance fighter, who was subsequently reelected in 2009. New elections, held earlier this year, were controversial, with both leading candidates accusing the other of having attempted to stuff ballot boxes. Afghan governmental authority is very limited outside Kabul, with significant power lying with various local warlords and officials. Much of the power derives from the ability of members of the central government to deliver patronage to its local constituent. At this local level corruption and government mismanagement is rife. Cronyism and splits among tribal lines have fuelled resentment, and often leads to locals packing their bags and joining the Taliban. Figure 3 Afghan warlords and their territories, 2006 Dealing with graft, corruption, the patronage and lack of transparency will be key in ensuring that aid delivered to Afghanistan would be spent on reconstruction, rather than ending up in a local warlord’s pocket. The downfall of the Taliban also caused large numbers of Afghan refugees, many of them displaced since the Soviet invasion, to return to Afghanistan, with some estimates saying up to 5 million refugees had returned. These returnees have been significant in providing the Afghan economy with cash flow and valuable skills. At the time of writing, Afghanistan remains divided by a presidential election. Two leading candidates, Ashraf Ghani, and Abdullah Abdullah remain in a deadlock over a closer race, and allegations of electoral fraud threaten the fragile consensus that is the Afghan government. Finding an equitable solution that would leave both factions satisfied in a government of national unity, rather than marginalised, will be important in preventing a renewed civil war as one side decides to fight for what it believes should be its own. The Afghan Police and the Afghan Army As the ISIS mandate comes to an end, responsibilities are increasingly being transferred to the Afghan Armed forces. Recreated in 2002, the Afghan army has slowly assumed military responsibilities from withdrawing Coalition troops. American military advisors continue to play an important role in shaping a new, modern Afghan army that would cement central government control from warlords and insurgents. Afghan units have held well under fire, and cooperated well with Western support. Even post-withdrawal, up to 10,000 American troops are expected to remain in Afghanistan to train and advise. However, this depends on the signing of a comprehensive bilateral agreement with members of the coalition, the signing of Page 7 www.oximun.org which has been delayed, due to political disagreements. Despite the influx of modern aid, much of the equipment remains out of date, often barely being better than the equipment of the insurgents they are fighting. Soviet era vehicles and aircraft remain the mainstay of the force. They are highly dependent on US capabilities, particularly airlift, logistical, mobility and aerial reconnaissance. It is likely that, without American support, the already high levels of casualties being suffered by Afghan forces would rise exponentially Morale and the loyalty of troops can be a particular concern. The recent collapse of the similarly American-trained and equipped Iraqi army has highlighted deficiencies in those forces once American support is withdrawn. Afghan Army units do preform well with American support, but their operation independent of Western forces remains to be seen. It would be important to ensure the army Particularly egregious incidents where Afghan soldiers have opened fire on their Western counterparts highlight the questionable loyalty of some members of the armed forces, and highlights the risks of the army being split among tribal lines and simply being used as instruments by warlords. Equally important, however, is the role of the Afghan police. The police will play a role in securing cities and towns against various insurgent treats, but also, as the situation stabilises play a role in the more traditional roles in fighting crime and maintain order. The police have had a less than stellar track record with corruption, with many turning a blind eye to the opium trade, or even the Taliban, while others would abuse their position to demand bribes from the local population. Eliminating corruption in the police forces will be vital for creating trust and making a more efficient force. Ethnic groups Afghanistan has a large variety of ethnic groups. Four ethnic groups compromise the majority of the population; Pashtuns (or Pashtos), Tajiks, Hazaras and Uzbeks. However, there are also significant numbers of Turkmen, Balochs, and other ethnic groups with their own niches. The largest ethnic group are the Pashtuns/Pushtuns, comprising nearly half of the Afghan population. They speak Pashto, and are clustered around the southern half of the country. The Taliban is composed predominantly of Southern Pashtuns. While Pashtuns are a major source of Taliban support, there are also many Pashtuns who fought against the Taliban in the Northern Alliance, and, indeed, many members of the current Afghan administration, including Hamid Karzai himself, is a Pashtun. Notably, there are also significant Pashtun populations across the border in Pakistan in the federally administered tribal areas. Close behind the Pashtuns in numbers are the Tajiks, who tend to speak a variety of Persian languages. They tend to be very anti-Taliban, and mostly reside in the North. The other ethnic groups with significant Hazara were particularly badly persecuted during the Taliban control of the country, and it would be important to ensure that their minority rights are protected in the future Afghan state. Ensuring stability and equality in a multi-ethnic nation would be difficult, but necessary. The current method of divvying up various government offices between the ethnic groups has helped to maintain an uneasy peace, so far. Social and Economic Issues Despite the Coalition and the UN pouring billions of dollars into the Afghan economy via Page 8 www.oximun.org foreign aid and development programs, Afghanistan remains an incredibly poor and underdeveloped country. Much of the infrastructure around Kabul has been repaired, but the southern Pashtun provinces have been slightly neglected due to the ongoing instability Further, large proportions of the population remain un- or underemployed, and education and literacy are generally poor. Many girls, particularly in insurgent-contested areas, are also unable to attend school. Life expectancy remains low, and healthcare a luxury. the end of a Taliban insurgency, and less corruption and graft. Finally, a major part of the Afghan shadow economy consists of poppies and the opium trade. The underground trade provides jobs for numerous Afghans, but the proceeds have also played major roles in funding various warlords, and even the Taliban. While the Coalition have been keen to crack down on these, destroying opium fields tends to create resentment towards the government and leads to impoverished farmers joining the insurgents. Aid and Support Figure 4 - Floods in Afghanistan, 2014, an example showing the incapability of the state to handle disaster risks The Afghan economy retains a significant dependence on Agriculture, which employs a significant chunk of the population, and produces many of the country’s exports. This, while useful, leaves Afghanistan very vulnerable to price fluctuations or drought, and diversification away from this sector would be key. Afghanistan does have significant mineral and energy reserves, which have only just begun to be tapped. The continuing instability has made Western companies hesitant to invest in Afghan mines, though a few Chinese companies have started probing into opening mines. Extracting and harnessing these could be key to securing a better future, but would rely on more stability, It is clear that Afghanistan still requires significant foreign aid and support in order to help it progress. Joint agreements such as the US-Afghan Strategic Partnership promise the withdrawal of American combat troops, but retains American troops in an advisory rule to train the new Afghan army, and American civilian employees will continue to help organizing the reconstruction. It would be important to maintain and identify an aid plan through which other countries could hep Afghanistan in similar ways. The Taliban The elephant in the big Afghan room is, of course, the Taliban. Without a serious recommitment of coalition forces, which seems increasingly unlikely, given the situation in Eastern Syria-North-western Iraq, and in Ukraine, the Afghan National Army stands little hope of eliminating the insurgency. As Western forces continue to withdraw, and as Afghan forces have continued to be inadequate, Afghan government control of much of the Southeast continues to be tenuous. This has Page 9 www.oximun.org prompted the Afghan government and the coalition to open dialogues with various branches the Taliban to allow for a power sharing agreement where the Taliban would give up the insurgency n return for a meaningful place in Afghanistan’s future. Managing these negotiations, without compromising the rights and freedoms of Afghans, will be a huge step in finally ending the insurgency. While the Taliban are generally unpopular among the Afghan people, and few desire a return to Taliban-rule, the ongoing instability have caused THE FUTURE Ultimately, an unstable Afghanistan would continue to be a source of instability for the whole region, and even the world. During the 1980s many foreign Islamist fighters would learn their trade in Afghanistan and would then go on to spread their experience elsewhere around the world, and there is a high chance of history repeating itself in this case. Peace Talks Recently, Pakistan is trying to broker a peace deal between the Taliban and Afghanistan. The goal is no other than stabilizing the state prior to the withdrawal of coalition forces. Last year, Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar , a top Taliban prisoner was freed from Pakistan. The Afghan government saw Baradar as a figure to help move towards a peace solution with the Taliban. However, this move was met with severe public outrage, as Baradar was one of the founding members of the Taliban along with the group's leader Mullah Omar. The world is sceptical about the release of Taliban prisoners as there is always a worry that they will strike back once they are free. Pakistan’s role in the brokering of such a peace is also questioned as the state had historical ties with the Taliban. Yet how will the peace talks continue is still subject to many changes. Afghanistan will probably have to buy time from the peace talks but as well as keeping Taliban prisoners and conditions favourable for the stability of the state. Nation Building As a result of prolonged conflict since the Soviet Invasion in 1989, the nation has had little room to fabricate their infrastructure. Most of its infrastructure pre-dates the Soviet invasion, and not to mention most of these are destroyed during the years of wars and instability. To stabilize and develop Afghanistan, not only a military solution has to be arrived at , but also an economic and financial plan to improve life standards in the nation. The 2014 Presidential election in Afghanistan made it clear that and the political system has to be optimized to prevent post-electoral disputes and conflicts, which took place this year. The Afghan people should be better represented as well, in both the executive and legislative organs. The Coalition’s continuing role The Coalition’s continuing political and economic support would surely play a key role in the future Afghan state. To what extent the members of the current coalition, as well as other members of the UN are involved in the reconstruction will be key. POINTS RESOLUTIONS SHOULD ADDRESS - Afghan Nation Building and forging of an Afghan National identity Security Agreements between the outgoing coalition and the Afghan Page 10 www.oximun.org - - - - - government to ensure continued support for the development and operations of the Afghan Armed Forces Political reform to ensure proper representation and inclusion of the various minorities Steps to bring an end to Taliban de facto control of much of South-eastern Afghanistan Potential for continued talks with the Taliban? Ensuring the cooperation of Afghanistan’s neighbours in combatting threats to the Afghan state. Directions for enhancing Economic Growth, Development, and continuing aid and international investment Ensuring attainment of educational and health goals Diversification of the Afghan Economy, in particular, dealing with the Opium trade and exploitation of Afghanistan’s rich natural resources. BLOC POSITIONS Afghan stability is something everybody wants; It is in almost nobody’s interest to leave a festering civil war in Central Asia. The differences are in the details of what the nationbuilding should actually involve. How involved should other nations be, how much foreign support would be needed, and in particular, what reforms are required, what role should the Taliban play in Afghanistan’s future, if it should play a role at all? The Coalition The nations involved in the NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization)-led intervention want to create a stable, democratic Afghanistan, but in general, are balking at the costs required to do so. The last several years have seen a surge in troops being deployed into Afghanistan, followed by a gradual drawdown and handing over of equipment and responsibilities to Afghan security forces. While support for continuing combat operations is low, particularly in light of the threats in other parts of the world, members of the coalition generally remain committed to supporting the Afghan state through financial and advisory means. The coalition wants to be able to claim to have created a “stable”, legitimate Afghan government. Some members of the coalition, particularly the United States, want a permanent Coalition military presence, and continuing political influence, in a vital strategic area. However, the coalition’s diminishing role and slow withdrawal has drastically reduced the influence it has over Afghanistan’s government. The withdrawal of the last American combat forces in 2014 may also represent the end of direct western influence on afghan governance or even a sharp decline in aid. Increasing tensions between the coalition and the Afghan government have already resulted in a slashing this year’s aid budgets, and the risk is that the Afghan population could suffer from a spat between Kabul and the West. Pakistan Pakistan has a schizophrenic approach towards Afghanistan. While publically supportive of coalition efforts to help stabilise and rebuild the country, there have been many allegations raised that various elements within the Pakistani Intelligence Services have provided equipment and shelter to Taliban forces. Reconciling Pakistan’s responsibilities to the international community Pakistan is not unique in this position – many other Islamic nations have also, for a variety of ideological, political or religious reasons, also Page 11 www.oximun.org provided significant financial support to the Taliban. FURTHER READING BIBLIOGRAPHY 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. AND “The Bonn Agreement” , United Nations, http://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un. org/files/AF_011205_AgreementProvisionalArr angementsinAfghanistan%28en%29.pdf (accessed 31 Aug 2014); This framework, agreed by Afghan exiles and Anti-Taliban rebels, laid the framework for the new Afghanistan. Security Council Resolution 1386, http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3c4e945 71c.html <- UNSC 1386, Creating and defining the mandate for ISAF. Security Council Resolution 1401, http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3d5282 162.html <- UNSC 1401, Creating the UN AMA “Salvaging Governance Reform in Afghanistan, Council on Forein Relations http://www.cfr.org/afghanistan/salvaginggovernance-reform-afghanistan/p27778 (accessed 31 Aug 2014); A good piece on problems faced by the Afghan government Afghan People’s Dialoguse for Peace, United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, http://unama.unmissions.org/Portals/UNAMA /human%20rights/Eng_%20Report%20%20Afghan%20Peoples%20Dialogues.pdf (accessed 5 Sep 2014);<- <- A report on the peace process from The Website of the UNAMA (United Nations Assisstance Mission in Afghanistan) “Independent Assessment of the ANSF” CNA Corporation http://www.cna.org/sites/default/files/research /CNA%20Independent%20Assessment%20of% 20the%20ANSF.pdf (accessed 5 Sep 2014);<An assessment of the requirements and capabilities of Afghan security forces “So much for the Good War” Foreign Policy, www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/09/19/so _much_for_the_good_war (accessed 3 Sep 2014 – an assessment of the Obama surge “Clock Watching”, The Economist, http://www.economist.com/news/asia/216030 61-some-american-forces-will-stay-afghanistannot-long-clockwatching?zid=308&ah=e21d923f9b263c5548d5 615da3d30f4d (accessed 26 Aug 2014), a nice quick introduction to the politics of the withdrawal 9. “Misjudgements”, The Economist, http://www.economist.com/news/books-andarts/21600958-why-western-engagementafghanistan-has-failed-misjudgments(accessed 26 Aug 2014), review of a book arguing about the potential role of Pakistani Intelligence services in supporting the Taliban 10. “Talking to the Taliban”, The Eonomist, http://www.economist.com/news/asia/215798 74-peace-afghanistan-distant-not-impossibletalking-taliban (Accessed 4 Sep 2014) Particularly keen delegates can also attempt “A Distant Plan”, a political simulation of the Afghan conflict created by a CIA analyst Page 12 www.oximun.org TOPIC B: INTERNATIONAL COLLABORATION ON THE MANAGEMENT OF VIOLENT NON-STATE ACTORS In the 21st century the world has been shaken by rising incidents of unconventional warfare and attacks. In the past, security policies of countries were accustomed to state belligerents. However, as more and more attacks and threats arose from violent non-state actors, countries begun to adjust themselves against these new unconventional threats. Recent rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS) in Syria and Iraq, Boko Haram in Nigeria, AlQaeda , Taliban & etc. has threatened world peace. While many international operations have been carried out world-wide, their effectiveness is disputable. For instance, NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) deployed in Afghanistan is accompanied with rising number of incidents of insurgent attacks. This has forced the international community to shift their strategy to a milder, indirect approach towards these international violent non-state actors (IVNSAs). Entering the second decade of the new century, the Disarmament and International Security Committee (DISEC) will review the recent strategies of international collaboration on this matter, and what changes should be made to make remedies more effective. covert sabotage operations, which aimed to slow down German advancements in North Africa. These so-called “covert operations” involve no other than sabotages, assassinations and shootings that are so familiar to the scene of terrorism nowadays. In the 1950-60s, British forces began injecting political implications in these operations. British forces used this unconventional strategy the most in Malaya during the Malayan Emergency (1948-1960) and later the Confrontation with Indonesia (1963-1966). Here British forces began pacification operations with the locals. Meanwhile, these operations accompany with a determined anti-communist message. In the 1970s, the US begun involved with these operations when they begun negotiations with the opposition during the Iranian Revolution. It was at this period the US was accused of funding religious violent state actors such as the Afghan Mujahedeen against the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan (1979-1989). These beneficiaries later evolved into the most notorious IVNSA such as the Taliban and Al-Qaeda. The US Strategy in the Middle East continues this way. The US has had operations in Afghanistan and Iraq which are aimed to topple the local government. These operations created a power vacuum and IVNSAs took up the gap. It appears that ironically state governments invented the contemporary terrorist strategy and helped IVNSAs to learn and make use of it. Fire against Fire TOPIC HISTORY Global Terrorism: An invention by mistake? International Violent Non-State Actors (IVNSA) share heritage with the early change of national military strategies. As early as in World War Two, British forces were engaged in several In response to the rising violence carried out by the Taliban and Al-Qaeda , NATO forces were deployed to engage the militants. After almost a decade of operations , they have successfully reduced the scope of IVNSAs but they forced IVNSAs to relocate operations from one country and another. For instance , the Taliban relocated themselves to Northwest Pakistan. Page 13 www.oximun.org In the last decade , it appears that NATO-led operations against the IVNSA insurgencies have averted massive attacks but they did not improve security in countries which they were once based. Academic research showed there is an increasing trend of attacks instigated by insurgents in Afghanistan since 2010 and the presence of foreign troops have become a nuisance to the local populace. Capacity building and regulation are new approaches to the IVNSA question focuses more on creating an environment to weaken IVNSAs. While direct intervention could be done bilaterally, such as NATO on Afghanistan, capacity building and regulation requires closer international collaboration to realize. How should the international community coordinate itself on this matter? Changing Strategy DISCUSSION It has become clear that direct foreign military intervention does not effectively subdue IVNSAs. Sometimes they in turn supported the IVNSAs as they spark hatred against foreign intervention. Bilateral Actions In 2004, the UN Security Council passed resolution 1540 which prohibits proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) to nonstate actors. This resolution has formulated the a “1540 Committee” which is now dedicated to the capacity building for states which are having difficulties in preventing non-state actors from gaining access to these weapons. A bulletin of requests and offers in this regard has been established under this committee. In 2006, United Nations General Assembly Adopted the Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy. A huge part of the strategy involved building states’ capacity to prevent and combat terrorism. It appears the international community is shifting its strategy to tackling the IVNSA question by General disarmament is also a noticeable approach for the IVNSA question. The UN Office of Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) has found that much of the non-State actors ammunition and weapons are illicitly diverted from state security force. In this sense, prohibiting the development and transfer of arms would in turn weaken IVNSAs. Although the international community has recently shifted its attention to indirect approaches such as capacity building and regulation, bilateral agreements and direct foreign intervention is not entirely unnecessary. Sometimes when foreign intervention is requested by a state, for example, when Mali requested French military assistance in 2012 and was approved by the Security Council resolution 2085, bilateral actions in tackling IVNSA could be justified. Figure 5 : French military intervention in Mali However, if bilateral operations are not well planned or simply too narrow, IVNSAs might migrate to another country and affect more victims in another country. How the international community could tolerate bilateral actions as well as coordinate their efforts against IVNSA is up to the debate. Page 14 www.oximun.org Responsibility sharing and shouldering in capacity building Although these indirect approaches are identified it is always hard to realize them. Countries have different capacity handling these new regulatory frameworks or simply engaging IVNSAs. The 1540 Committee reported in 2011 that ”…implementation depends on national discretion in what States devise as appropriate and effective policies, the usefulness of sharing experience is limited, inter alia, by a lack of capacity or resources.” Some requests for assistance from the 1540 committee assistance bulletin dates back to a decade ago when the committee was firstly established in 2004, for instance, Albania’s request for legal assistance regarding EU standards, Bahamas’ request of training of police force & etc. While various member states have provided offers of assistance in the form of a point of contact, these requests appear to be left unattended. It appears that responsibilities and duties could be more clearly stated and listed in the assistance exchange regime. Some member states have committed themselves in the exchange of assistance, for Example , member states of the Community of African , Caribbean and Pacific Countries (ACP) , are obliged for the cooperation and provision of “ Financial and technical assistance in the area of cooperation to counter the proliferation of WMDs by … non-state actors” in the joint ACP-EU Cotonou Agreement. To what extent member states of these agreements have followed the agreement and exchange assistance is debatable. Ideologies of IVNSAs and their political implications As discussed above, IVNSAs utilized a military strategy that was once used by the UK and the US for political purposes. Today, IVNSAs also conveyed political messages in their operations. For example, the ISIS aims to unite all Muslims in the world and bring them under the rule of a single Caliph. The religiousness of the political message does not only move many of its believers, as well as putting certain Islamic countries in a difficult position as to decide how should they differentiate themselves from radical religious regimes. When IVNSAs are anti-government, some countries might be able to use them to confront other countries. For example, in 1980s-90s Afghanistan, the US funded the Mujahedeen against the Soviet Union. To certain countries, it might come into conflict with national interests to engage IVNSAs in this sense. Complication in Failing States Most IVNSAs have established operations in states that are, or once were instable. For instance, the recent Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS) insurgency found its roots in the civil-war-torn Syria and launched a surprise attack on Iraq. Figure 6 : ISIS Insurgent executing civilians Political instability in certain countries has accounted for a more conducive environment for illicit arms trade and eventually the strengthening of the combat ability of the IVNSAs, according to the UN Office for Drug and Crime (UNODC). The Office has emphasized coups found in Mali (2012) , Guinea-Bissau (2012) , Niger (2010) & etc. has contributed to the increase of arms trade. For Page 15 www.oximun.org instance, Niger currently did not have any regulatory programs in place according to their national report to the 1540 committee. States already prone to civil war is even more susceptible to infiltration of violent NSAs. According to a policy alert by an INGO, Violence among non-state actors could bring Sudan and South Sudan into war, further complicating the already difficult situation in the country to engage IVNSAs. Role of other armed NSAs While many NSAs discussed above are violent, not all NSAs are detrimental towards national security. Some other NSAs including private military companies (PMCs) , security contractors and mercenaries are also armed but not essentially hostile towards regimes. For example, Academi , previously known as Blackwater or Xe Services , is a major security contractor to the federal government of the United States. Cooperation with other NSAs is frequently mentioned in the UN regime. However, regulation of the arms used by these NSAs could be difficult as well. In what way the other NSAs should be incorporated into member states’ national policy against IVNSAs is still open for debate. THE FUTURE General Disarmament Projects and the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) One way to weaken IVNSAs is to prevent them from acquiring new weapons. Border Controls, Export Controls and Licensing were part of the 1540 Evaluation Matrix in determining a country’s implementation of the 1540 mandate. Member states could use this matrix as a guideline to improve these control mechanisms further. In 2013, the General Assembly has adopted the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) which aims to control the flow of arms from falling into instable regions or regions in conflict. The Treaty is not yet entered into force, as it requires more member states to sign and ratify it. Regional Capacity-building Certain regional bodies have begun their capacity-building projects. For example, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) of NATO is launching a series of training and assistance programs to the Afghan national army (ANA) as part of the transition of security duties from the ISAF to the ANA. However, whether capacity-building programs shall be done on a regional level or an international level is still up for the debate. BLOC POSITIONS Figure 7 : Canadian Police being trained by Academi It is reasonable to deduce that NATO countries would be interested in making use of traditional way of tackling the IVNSA question while other developing nations would prefer having the more indirect approach. Member states of regional intergovernmental organizations such as the EU, ASEAN, the African Union , MERCOSUR, CARICOM & Page 16 www.oximun.org etc. would be able to provide regional financial assistance when required , however how to maximize the effectiveness of the capital would be under debate. 3. UN Office for Disarmament Affairs – Small Arms POINTS RESOLUTIONS SHOULD ADDRESS 4. UN Office for Disarmament Affairs – Arms Trade Treaty http://www.un.org/disarmament/ ATT/ How should member states make use of bilateral agreements against IVNSAs; How should member states coordinate better in the exchange of capacity-building assistance; How should member states make use of general disarmament projects to weaken IVNSAs; How should member states help failing states (i.e. , those which are caught in civil wars and/or politically instable) engage IVNSAs; What are the roles other armed NSAs could play; Any other points necessary. FURTHER READING 1. UN 1540 Committee Website http://www.un.org/en/sc/1540/ 2. UN Global Counter-terrorism Strategy http://www.un.org/en/sc/ctc/act ion.html. http://www.un.org/disarmament/convar ms/salw/ 5. Security Council resolution 67/97, Report of the Committee established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1540 (2004), S/2011/579 (12 September 2011), available from undocs.org/S/2011/579. 6. General Assembly resolution C.1/67/L.21 , Assistance to States for curbing the illicit traffic in small arms and light weapons and collecting them A/C.1/67.L.21 (18 October 2012) , available from http://www.un.org/ga/search/vie w_doc.asp?symbol=A/C.1/67/L. 2 BIBLIOGRAPHY 1. “About Us – Global Operations” , Academi , http://academi.com/pages/ab out-us/global-operations (accessed 31 Aug 2014); 2. “Abyei: Renewed Violence Increases the Risk of War”, enough , http://www.enoughproject.org /news/abyei-renewed- Page 17 www.oximun.org 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. violence-increases-risk-war (accessed 31 Aug 2014); Cotonou Agreement, E.U.A.C.P., Nov. 04, 2010, 287 O.J.L. 2010. “Firearms Trafficking in West Africa,” UNODC, http://www.unodc.org/docum ents/toc/Reports/TOCTAWe stAfrica/West_Africa_TOC_F IREARMS.pdf (accessed 31 Aug 2014); O’Hanlon , M & Livingston , I.S. Afghanistan Index : Also including selected data on Pakistan. Brookings. 31 Jul 2014. P.9 Security Council resolution 67/97, Report of the Committee established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1540 (2004), S/2011/579 (12 September 2011), Security Council resolution AC.44/2004/(02)/159, Annex to the note verbale dated 23 October 2008 from the Permanent Mission of the Niger to the United Nations addressed to the Chairman of the Committee, (25 March 2010), available from http://www.un.org/Docs/jour nal/asp/ws.asp?m=S/AC.44/2 004/(02)/159 “Summary Offers of Assistance from Member States”. 1540 Committee, http://www.un.org/en/sc/154 0/assistance/offers-ofassistance/states.shtml (accessed 31 Aug 2014); 9. Taillon , J.P.B. (2001) The Evolution of Special Forces in Counter-Terrorism: The British and American Experiences. Westport , CT : Praeger. Page 18 www.oximun.org
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