The ⇒ OF FACT, PROCEDURE, Gist of Hindu AND PRINCIPLE The practice followed by the collegium of the higher courts, before a candidate is recommended for elevation and a panel of names is sent to the government for appointment, is as follows. The Chief Justice initiates a consultation with the legal fraternity. Speaking in confidence to senior advocates and fellow judges, to both the bar and the bench, a long list of possible candidates for elevation is prepared. Based on these recommendations the Chief Justice then invites the candidates to determine their willingness to be considered. If the candidates are willing then they are required to furnish details about themselves, such as their contributions to the law especially with respect to important cases, the extent of their legal practice, their annual income, their legal history, etc. These details are then processed by the court administration, during which time, I suppose, the court gets inputs from relevant investigating agencies about whether they have any legal proceedings against the candidate, etc. other inputs that may make them ineligible for consideration. Based on (i) the recommendations of the leg al fraternit y, (ii) the willingn ess of the candidate, and (iii) the hard data relating to the legal practice and public standing of the individual, the file is placed before the collegium. The collegium then scrutinises the information on record and, based on the highest standards of judicial scrutiny, arr ives at a decision on whom to recommend and whom to ignore, from the names before it. Not every name that comes up through this process gets the approval of the collegium. The shortlist prepared by the collegium is then sent up to the government for its approval. This I am told is the standard process that is followed. Gopal Subramanium’s ca se , I suppose, went through the same process. The principle for such empanelment was enunciated by the Supreme Court in the case of P.J. Thomas, nominee for the Central Vigilance Commission (CVC), whose candidature was rejected in 2011 when it described in detail the process to be followed in the appointment to a positi on of author it y. Appointments to the Supreme Court, I expect, fall into this category. Here is what the judgment said — (vi) The empanelling authori ty, while forwarding the names of the empanelled officers/persons, shall enclose complete information, material and data of the concerned officer/person, whether favourable or adverse. Nothing relevant or material should be withheld from the Selection Committee. It will not only be useful but would also serve larger public interest and enhance public confidence if the contemporaneous service record and acts of outstanding performance of the officer under consideration, even with adverse remarks is specifically brought to the notice of the Selection Committee. (vii) The Selection Committee may adopt a fair and transparent process of consideration of the empanelled officers. Assuming complete information was available to the collegium, we now have to consider the contrasting positions of the collegium and the government. Based on the same facts considered by the collegium, the government is at liberty to give an alternative reading and argue for the unsuitability of a particular candidate. This is legitimate since the political lens of the government may be at variance with that of the collegium. The disagreement, at this stage, has to be on political grounds and not on facts. The procedure then requires the government to place its disagreement before the collegium which can either restate its earlier recommendation or revise it in the light of the arguments made. This second stage is constitutionally sacrosanct since contained in it is the core principle of the separation of powers. The colleg ium has to deliberat e on this con trary opinion of the government and decide whether, by accepting or rejecting it, the independence of the judiciary is eroded or enhanced. Both parties must give clear reasons for their positions so that the final decision taken can educate the public on the core issue of separation of powers. The government’s reasons and the collegium’s views, as well as the facts of the matter, should be made public to serve, as the Supreme Court in the P.J. Thomas case said, the larger public interest. Three basic issues for our democracy emerge from this controversy. The first is the issue of public attitude. Are we prepared to let it lie, to blow over because another headline has grabbed its place or are we prepared to interrogate it further? This is not a partisan issue, of UPA versus NDA, since it perhaps points to a growing disregard for our constitutional culture. When the confi dent iality of the colleg ium’s recommendation is treated lig htly, wh en the intelligence reports are leaked, when the President’s confidenti al acti ons are public knowledge, we have reason to be concerned about the disregard for constitutional propriety. Will those who leaked information be punished to restore the sanctity of the process? Or are we moving toward what Paulo Friere calls the “culture of silence”? The second issue concerns the doctrine of separation of powers. By segregating the names, did the President give primacy to the executive over the judiciary? Was this a question of political expediency trumping constitutional principles? With whom should the final decision, on who should be elevated, lie? The executive or the judicial fraternity? Since the Emergency, when it had touched its nadir, our democracy has been struggling to restore the balance between the executive and judiciary. We hope that the moment has not passed for the collegium to enunciate on the principle of finality. Mr. Subr amanium’s withdrawal also highlights one of the knottiest problems of political philosophy. Should he have been pragmatic, and withdrawn to fight another battle, or principled, since a foundational principle was at stake? Is the cost of standing up for the principle too high, undermining other values that are also important, or is it necessary to stand up for them regardless of the cost since it would take society to new and higher morality? ⇒ LAYING OUT SPACE GOALS The Polar Satellite Launch Vehicle (PSLV), in its twenty-sixth consecutive successful flig ht and the fourth wholly commercial launch, put the French earth observation satellite, SPOT-7, as well as four tiny satellites from Germany, Canada and Singapore, into orbit with characteristic élan. On hand at Sriharikota to witness the launch was Prime Minister Narendra Modi. In a forceful speech immediately afterwards, the Prime Minister lauded the space programme and held it up as an example of what the country could achieve, observing that “our space scientists have made us global leaders in one of the most complex areas of modern technol ogy.” India must, he said, share “the fruits of our technological advancement with those who do not enjoy the same .” He calle d for the development of a “SAARC [South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation] satellite” that would provide useful applications and services to neig hbouring countries. China, it should be noted, already uses its space capa bilit ies for soft -power diplomacy, one example being an agreement with Brazil to jointly build earth observation satellites. Mr. Modi clearly intends to deploy India’s space technology as part of the country’s diplomatic outreach. However, before turning the prime ministerial suggestion into hardware, ISRO would do well to get inputs from the other South Asian nations about their pressing needs that could be effectively addressed with space technology. The Indian space agency is well-placed to provide the sort of assistance that the Prime Minister envisages. From its inception, the raison d’ê tre of the Indian space programme has been the harnessing of space technology to meet the day-to-day necessities of a developing nation. Today, India is able to build and launch satellites for met eorolog y, earth observati on and communications. Mr. Modi paid a tribute to the vision with which the space programme was established, pointing out how modern communications, space imaging and disaster management capabilities provided by Indian satellites had benefited the common man and transformed policy planning and implementation. The Prime Minister was emphatic about enhancing these capabilities, as well as maximising their utilisation for governance and development. Apart from developing more advanced satellites, he wanted to see India become “the la unch servi ce provider of the world.” Turning these goals into reality will not be easy; at present, the country is able to cater to only a small segment of the international launch market and must launch its own heavy communications satellites abroad. But ISRO has risen to challenges before, and can do so again. ⇒ MINIMUM DETERRENT LARGE ARSENAL AND It is well-known that the BJP lays great importance on national security, of which nuclear policy forms an important component. Sooner or later the new government will undertake, perhaps quietly, a review of our nuclear doctrine. The current official nuclear doctrine, released by the Cabinet Committee on Security on January 4, 2003, summarises our nuclear policy in eight succinct points. Of these, only a few of them really call for significant modification, because in recent years things have been relatively stable on the South Asian nuclear front. This is despite the fact that both India and Pakistan continue to produce weapons-usable Plutonium at the Dhruva reactor and the Khushab reactors respectively. Pakistan may also be continuing to produce some weapons-grade Uranium at its centrifuge plants, despite its overall Uranium ore constraints. All this fissile material is presumably being assembled into warheads. So both arsenals have been growing, as have all the attendant dangers of maintaining a nuclear force. Nevertheless the situation has, by and large, just been “more of the same.” Therefore there is no call for any radical change of our nuclear doctrine. But a few features do need to be clarified and others underlined. No First Use Maintaining a doctrine of NFU, apart from being generally in tune with India’s nonaggressive ethos, has considerable diplomatic value. After our 1998 nuclear tests elicited the anticipated international opprobrium, the inclusion of NFU thereafter in the 1999 Draft Nuclear Doctrine helped soften the criticism, especially in comparison to Pakistan, which till today retains the option of a first strike. However, although NFU has moral and diplomatic value, there should be no illusions about its impact on hard strategic decision makers on the other side. What matters to them is not any statement of intentions (like NFU) but the actual capabilities of the adversary. Pakistani colleagues one meets in Track II invariably say they set little store in our NFU. It makes no operational difference in their nuclear plans. What matters more for nuclear confidence building is the actual state of alert. India has been sensibly following a system of keeping its warheads de-mated from their missiles and delivery aircraft . This introduces a minimum built-in delay in launching an attack after the decision to do so has been made. It greatly reduces the risk of an accidental or hastily decided launch. The new government should continue our policy of a de-mated de-alerted posture. One clause currently in the Doctrine merits some revision. It states that “ ....[our] nuclear weapons will only be used in retaliation against a nuclear attack on Indian terr it or y or on Indian for ces anywhere...retaliation to a first strike will be massive.” Now, threatening retaliation “against a nuclear attack on Indian territory” is one matter. It is the basic component of nuclear deterrence and should apply whether the attack on our terr itor y is small or big , as long as it is nuclear. However, a battlefield nuclear attack will place India in a dilemma. Having threatened in our Doctrine to inflict a “massive ” nucle ar retaliation, can we really go ahead and kill lakhs of their civilians in response to a much smaller attack, that too on their own soil? It would be a disproportionate response, which would go against our national sensibilities and attract widespread criticism from around the world. Surely, there are more proportionate non-nuclear ways of inflicting punitive retaliation. Yet, if we do not counter attack after having threatened to do so, that would invite derision that we are “a soft state” incapable of hard nuclear decisions and would erode the credibility of our future deterrence, not only against Pakistan, but also against China. It may therefore be better to limit massive nuclear retaliation only against nuclear attacks on our country and say nothing in the Doctrine, one way or the other, about attacks “on Indian forces anywhere.” Should the latter take place, we always have the option of some appropriate, measured retaliation. Next, consider the characterisation in our Doctrine of our nuclear force as a “credible minimum deterrent (CMD)”, where the requirement of “minimum” has been spelt out as what is needed to “inflict unacceptable damage” to the adversary. These represent a very judicious choice of words selected, in fact, by the last BJP administration. It is designed in part to temper over-zealous weapon enthusiasts from going on an endless spree of building nuclear bombs. It recognises the dangers of possessing an unnecessarily large arsenal of nuclear weapons, beyond what is essential for deterrence. The new government must ensure that the agencies concerned respect CMD in spirit and substance. Unfortunately, our arsenal of nuclear bombs has already gone way over the minimum required to “inflict unacceptable damage” on any rational government, be it Pakistan or China. (Should Pakistan someday be taken over by irrational extremists to whom death of lakhs of civilians is “acceptable”, then no arsenal, however large, will deter them anyway. With respect to China, what 6 VOL–22 deterrence needs is not more bombs than what we already have, but longer range missiles capable of reaching major Chinese cities.) As to credibility, larg e arsenals, beyond a point, do not enhance it. What does is a show of determination and toughness on other nonnuclear fronts, such as terrorism or border incidents. ⇒ THE GEOPOLITICS ISLAMIC STATE OF THE Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi welcomed this Ramadan by declaring the formation of the Caliphate, with him as the Caliph — namely the successor of the Prophet Mohammed. It is the first return of a Caliphate since Kemal Atatürk’s Turkish National Assembly abolished it in 1924. Al-Baghdadi, the nom de guerre for the leader of the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), has now announced that borders inside the dar alIslam , the world of Islam, are no longer applicable. He has been able to make this announcement because his fighters have now taken large swathes of territor y in northern Syria and in north-central Iraq, breathing down on Baghdad, the capital of the Abbasid Caliphate (750-1258). Al-Baghdadi’s declaration comes after ISIS threatened to make its presence felt outside the terr itor y it now controls. Bomb blasts in Beirut, Lebanon, hinte d at ISIS ’ rea ch. Jord anian authorities hastened to crack down on “sleeper cells” for ISIS as soon as chatter on social media suggested that there would be a push into Zarqa and Ma’an. Private Kuwaiti funding had helped ISIS in its early stages, but now Kuwait hinted that it too is worried that ISIS cells might strike the oil-rich emirate. When ISIS took the JordanSyria border posts, Saudi Arabia went into high alert. There is no substantive evidence that ISIS GIST OF THE HINDU is in touch with al-Qaeda in Yemen, but if such coordination exists (now that al-Baghdadi has fashioned himself as the Caliph) it would mean Saudi Arabia has at least two fronts of concern. “All necessary measures,” says the Kingdom, are being taken to thwart the ISIS advance. While it is true that Assad’s government released a number of jihadis in 2011, there is no evidence to suggest that he created ISIS. ISIS is a product of the U.S. war on Iraq, having been formed first as al-Qaeda in Iraq by the Jordanian militant Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. Deeply sectarian politics, namely an anti-Shia agenda, characterised al-Qaeda in this region. Funded by private Gulf Arab money, ISIS entered the Syr ian war in 2012 as Jabhat al-Nusra (the Support Front). It certainly turned a civic rebellion into a terrorist war. Political support from the West and logistical support from Turkey and the Gulf Arab states allowed it to thrive in Syria. The West has been consistently naive in its public assessment of events in West Asia. U.S. policy over Syria was befuddled by the belief that the Arab Spring could be understood simply as a fight between freedom and tyranny — concepts adopted from the Cold War. There was a refusal to accept that the civic rebellion of 2011 had morphed quite decisively by late 2012 into a much more dangerous conflict, with the radical jihadis in the ascendancy. It is of course true, as I saw first-hand, that the actual fighters in the jihad groups are a ragtag bunch with no special commitment to this or that ideology. They are anti-Assad, and they joined Jabhat al-Nusra or Ahra¯r ash-Sha¯m because that was the group at hand with arms and logistical means. The West’s backing of the rebellion provided cover for Turkey’s more enthusiastic approach to it. Intoxicated by the possibility of what Turkey ’s Forei gn Minister Ahmet DavutogØlu favoured as “neo-Ottomanism,” the Turkish government called for the removal of Assad and the emergence of a pro-Istanbul government in Damascus. Turkey opened its borders to the “rat-line” of international jihad , with planeloads of fighters from Libya and Chechnya flying into Turkey to cross into Syria to fight for ISIS and its offshoots. ISIS spat in Turkey’s salt. ISIS struck Turkey in 2013 with car bombs and abductions, suggesting to Ankara that its policy has endangered its citizens. In March, the Governor of Hatay province, Mehmet Celalettin Lekesiz, called upon the government to create a new policy to “prevent the illegal crossing of militants to Syria.” His repor t was met with silence. Saudi policy vis-à-vis Syria and Iraq repeats the Afghan story. Funds and political support for jihadis in the region came from the Kingdom and its Gulf allies. Saudi Arabia tried to stop its youth from going to the jihad — a perilous mistake that it had made with Afghanistan. On February 3, the King issued a decree forbidding such transit. But there is no pressure on Saudi Arabia and its Gulf allies to stop their tacit support of ISIS and its cohort. Nor is there pressure on it to stop its financing of the harsh repression in Eg ypt, sure to fuel more conflict in the near future. The Arab world, flush with hope in 2011, is now drowning in a counter-revolution financed by petrodollars. Meanwhile, sectarian lines are being hardened in the region. The battle now does not revisit the ancient fight at Karbala. This is not an age-old conflict. It is a modern one, over ideas of republicanism and monarchy, Iranian influence and Saudi influence. Shadows of sectarianism do shroud the battle of ordinary people who are frustrated by the lack of opportunities for them and by the lack of a future for their children. What motivates these fights is less the petty prejudices of sect and more the grander ambitions of regional control. Al-Baghdadi has announced that his vision is much greater than that of the Saudi King or the government in Tehran. He wants to command a religion, not just a region. Of such delusions are great societies and cultures destroyed. A significant visit French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius has concluded a substantial India visit which can help lift some of the barriers that may be blocking the emergence of a full-blown strategic partnership between the two countries. Free from verbiage, Mr. Fabius’ visit had a hard-nosed businesslike feel to it. Cash-strapped France seemed focussed on trading some of the blue-chip kernels of its hi-tech industry. India, on its part, looking to bolster its military preparedness, energ y security and international profile, was prepared to calibrate a hard bargain. The recognition by New Delhi and Paris that a winwin outcome was indeed possible seemed to have yielded significant progress during the visit towards clinching the multibillion dollar Rafale aircraft deal, and the stalled contract for two French nuclear reactors. With a capacity to generate 1,650 megawatts of power each, a breakthrough in the deal for the two reactors could clear the path for the establishment of four additional reactors of similar capacity at the Jaitapur site in Maharashtra. An installed capacity of nearly 10,000 megawatts would not only boost French nuclear commerce, but also make a vital contribution to satisfying India’s energ y hunger. In dealing with the French, the Indian side has made it clear that it is not interested in a pure buyer-seller relationship with France in the hitech domain. As a result, complex negotiations are under way — both on the Rafale and the European Pressurised Reactors (EPR) — that would not only give India the final product, but also impl ant fronti er technolog y within the country throug h transfers of state-of-the-art know-how. The inducti on of the 126 Rafale fighter jets would also help cement the airdominance doctrine of the Indian Air Force (IAF), which has already benefited from the inductions of the Russian Su-30 MKI multi-role planes and other advanced platforms. Mr. Fabius’ arrival in New Delhi has provided an opportunity to quickly finalise the Indo-French nuclear deal, which is possible if the two parties arrive at a formula that would lower the costs of atomic power generation at Jaitapur. During talks, India has demanded g reat er “localisati on,” which would expand involvement of domestic industry in the project, as well as provide greater scientific and technical exposure to Indian personnel to Light Water Reactor (LWR) technology that the French have mastered. At a political level, the Minister’s visit has provided New Delhi an opportunity to advance its ties with continental Europe, which revolves around a Franco-German core. This is significant, as Europe, despite undergoing a rapid political and economic transition, would continue to remain a major player in a multipolar world, which India needs to engage vigorously. ⇒ CONTROLLING RISING PRICES Onion prices more than doubled in the last two weeks and retail food inflation rose to 9.5 per cent in May as against 8.64 per cent in April, giving the new government more reason to worry. As the urban working class bears the brunt of the r ising and f luctuat ing food pr ices, Finance Minister Arun Jaitley quickly announced measures to stem the price rise of onions. These included fixing a minimum export price (MEP) of U.S. $500 per MT, distributing onions through the Public Distribution System, and advising State governments to delist fruits and vegetable from the Agricultural Produce Market Committee (APMC) Act.As much as these short-run measures are necessary, the problem is more deep-rooted. Several interrelated determinants such as low agricultural productivity and yield, global price changes, scarcity of resources such as land and water, domestic price policies such as Minimum Support Prices, and stocking and trade policies (both international and domestic) have played a role in the increase of prices. Food pr ice infla tion in India cl early underscores the need for understanding the heterogeneities across food commodities. This knowledge could be important to inform macr oeconomic policy. For example , the assumption in standard macroeconomic models — that changes in relative prices of food and fuel represent supply shocks — may not hold for many commodities as we see them rig ht now. Further, with a persistent upward trend in inflation, taking a long-term view rather than focusing only on recent inflation episodes seems imperative. In all this, one thing that is reasonably clear is that it may not be sufficient to identify the sources for high prices at a broad le vel. Both macro p olicies like mone tary tightening by the RBI as well as commodityspecific measures implemented by different branches of the government (trade policies and domestic interventions in food markets) have to be used to deal with inflation. Faced with the current scenario, what are the remedial options? For one there seems to be little reason to not liquidate excessive wheat and rice stocks. In distributing released stocks, the government should think about an incentive overhaul along the lines of what was done in Chhattisgarh. The small State is a leading example of a well-functioning PDS system where leakages have been checked because of measures like colour coding of transport vehicles and raising the commission of PDS shopkeepers. Over time, there must be a gradual movement toward a cash transfer system. This depends on development of backend facilities such as bank outlets. In food items with a high value, a case- bycase approach is needed. While onions could be facing a problem of excessive hoarding due to expectations of inf lati on, in commodities like milk the cost push might be playing a role. Dairy products such as oil cake and molasses are increasingly being diverted to alternative uses or markets. Milk has been the prime driver of inflation for many years and though its demand has been rising substantially (different estimates show that it is the food item with the highest income elasticity), there are supply side issues that need to explored for finding the right policy mix. Given the current government’s paradigm of accepting short-term pains to incur long-term gains, it should seize this opportunity of high food prices. Investing in the private sector in cold chain or processing units needs to be encouraged. This will create rural jobs that are not farmrelated, and create more efficient value chains, giving a better deal to farmers and consumers alike. Over the long run, streamlining wholesale markets under Agricultural Produce Market Committees, reducing limitations on privatesector procurement and storage, and checking on double taxation in interstate movement, need to be considered. Finally, as a weak monsoon is being predicted, we must think of the long run. It is about time we gear up toward climate-smart agriculture (drought-resistant crops, conservation agriculture, etc.) to increase yields and income of farmers. This will increase farmers’ productivity while providing the much-needed price stability to consumers. The promise of acche din for consumers and the agricultural industry need not be a far cry. ⇒ GOVERNORS IN THE FIRING LINE The controversy over the removal of Governors has receded into the background only because the issue which has hogged the limelight recently is the government’s rejection of the name of Mr. Gopal Subramanium, recommended by the Supreme Court collegium for appointment as a judge of the Supreme Court, on account of adverse reports by the Intelligence Bureau. The Governor is appointed by the President of India on the advice of the Council of Ministers for the period of five years. Unlike the President of India, there is no procedure for the impeachment of a Governor, but he/she could be removed by the President on the advice of the Prime Minister on grounds of gross delinquency, namely cor ruption, bribery and violation of the Constitution. But the practice has been different from what is laid down in the Constitution; Governors have been removed only due to a change of government without citing any substantial reason. There is precedent. Even in the past, Governors appointed by previous governments have been removed by the new government on assuming office after elections. The new governments have expended energy on removing Governors and appointing their own men as new Governors. The practice of dismissing Governors with the change of guard at the Centre began in 1977 when the Janata Party came to power after routing the Congress and took a decision to replace Governors appointed by the previous re gime. Inci dentally, in 1977, the decision/ recommendation of the then Prime Minister, Morarji Desai, and his Cabinet to dismiss Governors was sent back by then acting President B.D. Jatti without signing it. Though the government managed to remove the Governors, as the acting President Jatti was constitutionally bound to sign the order when it was again sent back to him, it came as an embarrassment for the Janata Party government which had just assumed office. After coming to power in 2004, the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government initiated the process of removal of four Governors, Vishu Kant Shastri (Uttar Pradesh), Babu Parmanand (Hary ana), Ki dar Nath Sahani (Goa) and Kailashpati Mishra (Gujarat), which BJP leaders Mr. Lal Krishna Advani and Mr. Atal Bihari Vajpayee opposed and forced a discussion in the House under Rule 193. The UPA’s move wa s described by Mr. Va jpaye e as a “bi g bl ow to democra cy ” while Mr. Advani called it “dangerous.” Now, Union Home Minister Rajnath Singh is keen on the removal of Governors appointed by the previous UPA government. Is this not a blow to democracy? Is this not unethical? We know that there is a change in generation, from Mr. Advani to Mr. Rajnath Singh, but does such a generational change also mean a change in the party ’s ideology? If this is the case, why is the removal of Governors being done using the backdoor approach rather than the government being actively involved in this effort? Five-judge bench of the Supreme Court, headed by Chief Justice K.G. Balakr ishnan, in May 2010 on the issue of the removal of the Governor of a State. The judgment emphasised that “The Governor cannot be removed on the ground that he is out of sync with the policies and ideologies of the Union government or the party in power at the Centre. Nor can he be removed on the ground that the Union government has lost confidence in him.” It is tru e tha t the same judgment also provided an exception that the government can initiate the process of removal of the Governor by first building a case file citing reasons for the removal of the Governor. Does the new BJP government want to use that clause of exception to remove a Governor? If the government wants to exercise this exception clause, the least it would have to do is to write to the President spelling out the reasons for wanting his/her (Governor ’s) removal. But it seems the government is try ing to bypass all these steps, remove the Governor by an indirect method and initiate moves to come out clean in case there are issues over the move, as no letters have been exchanged or notices sent. But I am sure there is still potential for the government to face embarrassment as such a file/request for the removal of the Governor can be sent back by the President to the government in the first instance though, the President is bound to sign it if the file is re-sent to him — as it happened in 1977. Though most previous governments have indulged in such practice, the new BJP government could have easily refrained from such a move and set an example of good governance. It has certainly missed a golden opportunity to present itself before the people as being a government with a difference. ⇒ ON THE MYTHOLOGY OF SOCIAL POLICY One reason why important facts tend to be forgotten is that they are at odds with the mytholog y of social policy cultivated by some sections of the media. This mythology involves a number of fallacies. First, India is in danger of becoming a nanny state, with lavish and unsustainable levels of social spending. Second, social spending is largely a waste — unproductive “handouts” that don’t even reach the poor due to corruption and inefficiency. Third, this wasteful extravaganza is the work of a bunch of oldfashioned Nehruvian socialists and assorted jholawalas who led the country down the garden path during the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) years. Fourth, the electorate has rejected this entire approach — people want growth, not entitlements. Fifth, the BJP-led government is all set to reverse these follies and rollback the welfare state. These five claims have acquired an aura of plausibility by sheer repetition, yet they have no factual basis. Let us examine them one by one. The idea that social spending in India is too high would be amusing if it were not so harmful. Accor ding to the latest World Development Indicators (WDI) data, public spending on health and education is just 4.7 per cent of GDP in India, compared with 7 per cent in sub-Saharan Africa, 7.2 per cent in East Asia, 8.5 per cent in Latin America and 13.3 per cent in OECD countries. Even the corresponding figure for “least developed countries,” 6.4 per cent, is much higher than India’s. The WDI database does not include social security spending, but the recent Asia Development Bank report on social protection in Asia suggests that India is also an outlier in that respect, with only 1.7 per cent of GDP being spent on social support compared with an average of 3.4 per cent for Asia’s lower-middle income countries, 5.4 per cent in China, 10.2 per cent in Asia’s highincome countries and a cool 19.2 per cent in Japan. If anything, India is among the world champions of social underspending. The view that social spending is a waste has no factual basis either. The critical importance of mass education for economic development and the quality of life is one of the most robust findings of economic research. From Kerala to Bangladesh, simple public health interventions have brought down mortality and fertility rates. India’s midday meal programme has well-documented effects on school attendance, child nutrition and even pupil achievements. Social security pensions, meagre as they are, bring some relief in the harsh lives of millions of widowed, elderly or disabled persons. The Public Distribution System has become an invaluable source of economic security for poor households, not just in showcase States like Tamil Nadu but even in States like Bihar and Jharkhand where it used to be non-functional. Of course, there is some waste in the social sector, just as there is much waste in (say) universities. In both cases, the lesson is not to dismantle the system but to improve it — there is plenty of evidence that this can be done. The expansion of public services and social support in India, such as it is, has little to do with any nostalgia of Nehruvian socialism. It is a natural development in a country with a modicum of democracy. A similar expansion, on a much larger scale, happened during the 20th century in all industrialised democracies (with the partial exception of the United States). It also happened in communist countries, for different reasons. Many developing countries, especially in Latin America and East Asia, have gone through a similar transition in recent decades. So have Indian States where the underprivileged have some sort of political voice, such as Kerala and Tamil Nadu. Many other States, including Gujarat, are now learning from these experiences at varying speed. Coming to the fifth claim, there is little evidence that a rollback of social programmes is part of the BJP’s core ag enda. As menti one d earlier, many BJP leaders (including Mr. Modi as well as the new Finance Minister, Mr. Arun Jaitley) have vociferously demanded a more ambitious National Food Security Act. Some of this is posturing of course, but the BJP’s willingness to support food security initiatives is already well demonstrated in Chhattisgarh. Nothing prevents it from doing the same at the national level. Similar remarks apply to the National Employment Guarantee Act: some BJPled State governments did a relatively good job of implementing it, and the late Gopinath Munde clearly expressed his support for the Act as soon as he was appointed Minister for Rural Development. Having said this, there are also ominous signs of a possible backlash against these and other social programmes. Some overenthusiastic advisers of the new government have already put forward explicit proposals to wind up the Employment Guarantee Act and the Food Security Act within 10 years, along with accelerated pr ivatisation of health and education services. As if on cue, Rajasthan Chief Minister Vasundhara Raje recently sent a letter to the Prime Minister questioning the need for an Employment Guarantee Act. The corporate sector also tends to be hostile to social spending, if only because it means higher taxes, or higher interest rates, or fewer handouts (“incentives” as they are called) for business. Corporate lobbies, already influential under the UPA government (remember the person who said that the Congress was his dukaan ?) are all the more gung-ho now that their man, Mr. Modi, is at the helm. Even a casual reading of recent editorials in the business media suggests that they have high expectations of devastating “reforms” in the social sector. That is what the my tholog y of social policy is really about. This is not to deny the need for constructive reform in health, education and social security. If one thing has been learnt in the last 10 years, it is the possibility of improving public services, whether by expanding the right to information, or introducing eggs in school meals, or computerising the Public Distribution System, or ensuring a reliable supply of free drugs at primary health centres. But these small steps always begin with an appreciation of the fundamental importance of social support in poor people’s lives. The forthcoming budget is an opportunity for the new government to clarify its stand on these issues. Without enlightened social policies, growth mania is unlikely to deliver more under the new government than it did under the previous one. ⇒ END TO ILLEGAL FATWAS Personal laws ought to be administered by the regular law courts and cannot be enforced in derogation of fundamental rights by religious courts that lack legal sanctity. This is the broad import of the Supreme Court’s thoughtful ruling on the legality of Dar-ul-Qazas, or Sharia-based courts, established in different parts of the country to adjudicate disputes among Muslims. Fatwas issued by Sharia courts are not legally binding on individuals averse to submitting to their authority, the Court has ruled. However, it has declined to ban these adjudicatory bodies, holding that Muslims desirous of obtaining the expert opinion of Islamic scholars in Dar-ul-Qazas can continue to invoke their jurisdiction voluntarily. The ruling ha s thus clarified the correct status of these Sharia courts. They can exist and issue opinions, but are limited in their scope and applicability to individuals who approach them voluntarily, and not at the instance of third parties to a dispute. These rules will hopefully protect individual Muslims, especially women, from possible persecution through controversial adverse orders, often issued without regard to their fundamental rights. Fatwas on religious issues are acceptable, but no fatwa that violates fundamental rights may be issued; they may not be issued at the instance of third parties on issues that concern individuals, and more importantly, they must not be issued to punish the innocent. Th e Supr eme Court ha s preserved the religious character of these Sharia courts, noting that they do not constitute a parallel judici ary, but an “informal justice delivery system with the objective of bringing about amicable settlement between parties.” It is important that the Supreme Court’s interventi on, at the instance of a petitioner who wanted Sharia courts to be banned, is understood in the correct perspective. The All India Muslim Personal Law Board (AIMPLB), which has set up most of these Darul-Qazas, has a duty to regulate their functioning and restrain them from issuing edicts that violate fundamental rights. It is true that in the Imrana case, one of the three instances the Supreme Court has referred to, the controversial fatwa dissolving a marriage and ordering a woman to leave her husband after she was raped by her father-in-law was not issued by a Sharia court but by a Muslim panchayat. However, an Islamic seminary endorsed the fatwa initially, and the AIMPLB claimed that the incident of rape did not occur at all. In some parts of the country, Muslim women have formed women’s Sharia courts for themselves, contending that orders of Sharia courts are invariably adverse to women. It is up to bodies like the AIMPLB to reform the functioning of the Sharia bodies. ⇒ KEY ISSUES IDENTIFIED The Economic Survey 2013-14, the flagship annual document of the Ministry of Finance which reviews the performance of the economy over the previous 12 months, released a day before the Union Budget, facilitates a better appreciation of the mobilisation of resources and their allocation in the Budget. Experience suggests that the Surve y, while fl agg ing the key econ omic issues of the day, can offer advice and suggestions, which the Finance Minister may or may not incorporate in the Budget. The point has also been made that it is for the first time that the Surve y ha s been prepared wi thout the guidance of a Chief Economic Adviser. For all its limitations, however, the Economic Survey 201314 has done a commendable job in delineating the contours of an economy that has been struggling for more than two years to grow at more than 5 per cent. A change in government has certainly brought about a sharp variation in sentiment, but it is too early to assess the impact on the real economy. Joining the Reserve Bank of India and many professional forecasters, the Survey expects GDP growth during the current year (2014-15) to be above 5 per cent. However, poor monsoons, a deteriorating external environment, persistent inflation and a poor investment climate pose major risks to growth and macroeconomic stability. In the event, GDP growth is likely to be at the lower end of a 5.4 to 5.9 per cent band. Economic growth during 2013-14 was dragged down by industry, which grew at just 0.4 per cent. A deceleration in manufacturing output and contraction in mining activities have been primarily responsible for the sluggishness. Reversing the serious downward trend in industry ha s been a top pr i or it y for the government. The budget is sure to take note of ongoing initiatives and also bring in new ones in this vital area. Inflation has come down but is still above the RBI’s comfort zone. Food prices have shot up very recently. The balance of payments position has improved considerably on top of a vastly improved current account. However, much of the improvement in the matter of the trade deficit is due to lower imports of non-petroleum products, a sure sign of the slowdown. A bigger challenge lies in the area of fiscal consolidation. The Survey has sug gested a new FRBM legislation as well as rationalisation of subsidies, among other measures. The previous UPA government’s claims of pegging the deficit at 4.5 per cent in 2013-14 and targeting an ambitious 4.1 per cent for the current year have become controversial, and at the very least cast doubts on the quality of fiscal estimates. These are pitfalls which the new Finance Minister will do well to avoid. ⇒ A THE BLUEPRINT FOR DEFENCE INDUSTRY There are reports that the Department of Industri al Policy and Promoti on (DIPP) is pushing to allow 49 per cent FDI without transfer of technology, 74 per cent with transfer of technolog y, and even 100 per cent in cases involving the transfer of state-of-the-art technology and equipment, while the Defence Ministry would like it to be restricted to 49 per cent. This debate is sterile because merely liberalising FDI will not help. What is needed is an appreciation of the characteristics of the defence industry and coordination among the multiple stakeholders who drive, and have often distorted the decision-making process. The twin objectives of self-sufficiency and self-reliance have been articulated, sometimes interchangeably and at times separately, since the early 1950s. In 1947, India inherited the Ordnance Factories (OF) Organisation, which today consists of 41 OFs, nine Defence Public Sector Undertakings (DPSU) and 50 or so defence R&D laboratories under the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO). The model followed was “production of technologies conceptualised by the DRDO; projects nominated by MoD [Ministry of Defence] after consulting the Services; and assembly and production of platforms under licence from foreign OEMs (Orig inal Equipment Manufa cturers).” A task force set up in 1998 concluded that the public sector alone could not deliver; licensed production had fostered neither indigenisation nor innovation; and frequent blame games between the Services, the DRDO and the DPSUs were leading to delays in acquisition. The first instance of opening up of the defence sector came in 2001, with the domestic private sector being allowed to produce defence items with FDI up to 26 per cent, subject to industrial licensing and security clearances. This was followed by the announcement of a Defence Procurement Procedure in 2002, a Defence Offsets Policy in 2006, a Long Term Integrated Perspective Pl an (LTIPP) in 2009, a Defence Production Policy in 2011, and eight committees/ task forces set up to look into various aspects of national defence, including defence production and self-reliance, since 2000. Clearly, the issue remained a priority for various governments, but the outcome has been meagre. Certainly, some responsibility rests with former Defence Minister A.K. Antony’s tendency to avoid decision-making if it could be postponed, but there are underlying structural reasons too. Consequently, forward movement during the last decade has lacked purpose. Since 2001, the total FDI received in the defence sector is below $5 million. Meanwhile, India’s defence expenditure has been growing every year; today, India has the eig hth largest defence budget in the world, accounting for 3 per cent of global defence expenditures and, in recent years, has also emerged as the largest defence importer, with nearly 10 per cent of global defence imports. With growing obsolescence and a 10 per cent annual rise in the capital budget for equipment procurement, a conservative estimate indicates that India will spend nearly $100 billion over the next eight years to modernise and equip its armed forces. During the 12th Five Year Plan, the defence capital account budget is expected to go up from $15.9 billion to $25.6 billion. By the end of the 14th Five Year Plan, the cumulative capital expenditures over 2012–27 are projected to exceed $235 billion. Assuming that 80 per cent is meant for platform acquisitions, of which 60-70 per cent is earmarked for committed liabilities, this still leaves 30-40 per cent for new schemes. To meet the target of 70 per cent self-reliance by 2020 requires an indigenous defence industry worth $80-$100 billion, with a direct employment potential of 1.25 lakh skilled workers and indirect support to a workforce of another five lakh. In addition are investments via the Defence Offsets Policy. This policy, announced in 2005, requires the foreign company to invest 30 per cent of the indicative cost in the request for proposals when the indicative cost is Rs.300 crore or more. Initially, the offsets were for the defence sector, but in 2009, the policy was diluted to permit offsets to civil aviation and internal and coastal security sectors too. Its objectives are to improve the domestic defence R&D base; develop an internationally competitive defence industry, and an industrial base covering dual use technologies (i.e. having both civilian and defence applications). Offsets are implemented by raising domestic procurement, generating exports, bringing FDI into related services and building local supply chains, transferring technology/equipment to Indian entities, etc. In the Defence Procurement Policy, special incentives to encourage the domestic private sector, including government R&D funding for product development, were announced. Some of the larger enterprises (including TCS, Tata Power, Godrej, HCL, L&T, Mahindra, Kirloskar) are to be classified as Raksha Udyog Ratnas to enable them to be treated on a par with DPSUs. In addition there are about 6,000 Small and Medium Enterprises (SME), many of whom feel that they are nimbler and better suited to innovate in niche areas. In fact, they oppose limiting FDI to 49 per cent, the position supported by domestic majors and the MoD. To make a new beg inning, the Modi government needs to take charge by setting up a na tional defence industry committee which should resolve turf battles between various government agencies, reconcile competing interests of SMEs and industry majors, set targets (including for SRI, intellectual property rights (IPR) generation, integration of SMEs, technology acquisition through offsets), monitor implementation, and coordinate policy approaches by: a) creating uniform lists of defence products and related technologies; b) enabling the harmonisation of Indian lists with the Munitions List and Dual Use Technology List of the Wassenaar Arrangement, with the eventual aim of securing India’s membership. An enabling framework alrea dy exists with India’s Special Chemicals, Organisms, Materials, Equipment and Technologies (SCOMET) export control lists; c) amending the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act to bring defence and dual-use technology-related Industrial Licensing into sync with the above; d) amending the terms of the production licence for defence items to ensure that control of the entity cannot be transferred without Government of India (GoI) approval, that all exportable items and services will be available domestically, and that exploitation of IP generated will not be denied in India. These conditions would render the debate of FDI levels irrelevant; e) promoting the clustering of SMEs with industry majors through targeted policies; f) changing the role of the Department of Defence Production, whose structure limits it to a mere administrative unit for OFs and DPSUs; g) integ ra ting the working of the LTIPP wi th defence R&D, production, procurement and offsets policies; h) providing a degree of continuity and predictability in the policy framework for the next 10 years instead of the annual revisions that have afflicted the sector in recent years. Go for it now The target year of 2015 that was fixed to achieve universal primary education will not be met, the United Nations said at the recently held second Global Partnership for Education Replenishment Pledging Conference in Brussels. An estimated 58 million children, a large proportion of them from sub-Saharan Africa, are still out of school. The announcement merely confirms Unesco’s own admission last year on the odds ahead in the task of realising this Millennium Development Goal. That admission was based on its finding that the top six donors had substantially cut back on their aid commitments since 2011. Two of the donor countries slashed their allocations in this sector by 30 per cent; reductions made by the European Union were to a similar extent. Unesco observed that the momentum with respect to achieving this target was lost since 2007, implying that as in the case of several other basic human development indicators, the global economic meltdown may have contributed to the situation. But the movement to improve rates of retention in schools and to enhance quality of teaching seems to be gathering steam again, as most of the donor states promised at the Brussels conference to step up spending. But more significant, as many as 60 developing countries that were present in Brussels — India was not among them — agreed to boost allocations in their domestic budgets for pr imary education. Abolition of tuition fees, cash transfers, teaching in the local language, increased financial outlays and appropriate curriculum are among measures that have helped developing countries reduce the out-of-school population among children, according to the Education For All report. Clearly, then, there are diverse ways and means to realise the goal of universal education. Governments found wanting in the requisite will to invest in the future of their youngsters may be complicit in allowing children to be weaned away by armed militias that have already wreaked much economic havoc and caused political instability in many regions. A welcome new dimension to the Replenishment Pledging Conference is the focus on the needs of disabled children. Addressing this segment is both a moral and practical imperative, considering tha t 15 per cent of the world ’s population has some for m of disability, as per figures from a 2011 report on disability brought out jointly by the World Health Organization and the World Bank. Around the world, about a third of those that are not in school have a disability, says the Global Campaign for Education UK. Given such a large proportion of such children, the relevant goal cannot be accomplished without special provision being made to achieve it. Thus, there is a case to set separate targets factoring in disability in the post-2015 development agenda. ⇒ A ‘SMART IDEA FOR URBAN ILLS? The government has provided Rs.7,060 crore to build 100 smart cities as satellite towns on the outskirts of large cities to accommodate the burgeoning urban population. Foreign direct investment norms have been relaxed to attract investors to build them. Indian cities are in need of investment and innovation, and the government’s attenti on to these issues is welcome. The question is whether smart satellite cities would offer a panacea for urban ills and whether the money allocated is adequate. There is no firm definition of what constitutes smart cities. The broad agreement is that places that mobilise information and communication technologies to deliver better services, reduce carbon foot pr int , cre ate sustainable environments and improve living conditions are considered intelligent. Many cities abroad, realising that existing urban systems cannot cope with new challenges, have already taken this route. As a result, they are far ahead in terms of innovation. Rio de Janeiro has invested about U.S. $14 million to monitor the city in real time. Data from 30 agencies stream into an operation centre from where responses to emergencies and accidents are efficiently coordinated. Madrid plans to invest about U.S. $20 million in a technology platform to manage a range of public services such as street maintenance, lighting and waste management. Using a sophisticated supplier management model, it pays each service provider according to the level of services provided. Many cities have focussed on reducing energ y consumption and offering convenient transport service. Some like Tokyo are experimenting with technolog y to help the visually challenged to move safely. Special white canes with embedded sensors, which pick up signals from electronic tags and markers placed at strateg ic places in the ci ty, help the disabled navigate. Such smart city programmes require large investments and a thorough integration of various systems. Industry and cities have to come together and introduce innovative products. Against these complex demands, how will the proposal to set up smart cities fare? First, the sum allocated in the budget for the programme — about Rs.70 crore a city — is grossly inadequate. Unless the amount provided is only seed money to kick-start the programme, and more funds are to be sanctioned later, the smart city project would be a non-starter. Second, without the promise of good central funds, the State governments, too, may not take this initiative seriously. Since land development is a State subject, enthusiastic participation of the States is crucial. If the plan is to enable the private sector to participate in a big way, then the State has to put in place a detailed framework to guide investment and demarcate responsibilities. Funds are only one part of the problem. The key challenge would be to overhaul urban governance and infrastructure, both physical and digital. If the state overlooks the existing city and privileges new enclaves, the cities will be split into two unequal halves, and the smart city project would turn out to be an expensive real estate meant to serve a few. Smart cities cannot only be about disp laying technol og y and delivering services; fundamentally, they have to be inclusive and equitable places to live in. The urban future depends on making cities intelligent, and that applies equally to both new and old parts of the city. Given the fact that the existing cities, which accommodate a bulk of the population, waste a lot of resources and are energy-inefficient, they urgently require smart solutions. It would be better to treat the smart city proposal by the government as a kind of urban experiment or a prototype, whose lessons and experience could be used to develop cities in general. ⇒ MEAN AND PETTY LABOUR REFORMS The National Democratic Alliance government, on June 5 and June 17, notified the proposed amendments to the Factories Act, 1948 and the Minimum Wages Act, 1948. Given that the process of amendments began in 2008 and went through a number of expert committees, one would have expected the amendments to be carefully thought-out. On the contrary, they are petty, anti-labour and poorly conceived. Given also that these are the Narendra Modi-led government’s first pronouncements on labour, one can only lament the absence of a vision that a global power ought to have: that increased productivity comes from having satisfied workers, who produce quality products. The Commonwealth Games case decided by the Delhi High Court found workers living in conditions akin to bondage — without safety equipment, sleeping in sheds without mattresses and fans, and using toilets without doors and water. This is the reality of labour in India. So what do the amendments to the Factory Act suggest? Instead of suggesting that in globalised India, where workers ought to work for eight hours as per the international norm, they suggest that Section 56 be amended to increase the working day to spreadover 10{+1}/{-2}hours to 12 hours; that under Section 65(2), compulsory overtime be increased from 50 hours per quarter to 100 hours, and that under Section 66, women not be allowed to work after 7 p.m., unless a specific notification is issued qua a particular factory that is capable of demonstrating that it has facilities in place to guarantee the safety of women workers. Thus, instead of statutorily making it the norm that men and women work equal hours, women have been penalised. Though the Supreme Court has laid down that storage in factories of hazardous substances attracts strict liability or no excuse standard for liability, Section 7(b) lays down that the employer must ensure — “as far as practicable” — that the substance is safe. Section 99 enables an employer to employ children. The Minimum Wa ges Act, 1948, wa s enacted to progressively introduce minimum wages in a situation where industries were gradually being established. Thus, it did not cover all workers, but only workers in notified industries — only a part of the workforce. Domestic workers, for example, are not covered. In a globalised economy one needs to shift to universal coverage. What was needed was a simple amendment saying that those not covered by the existing notifications would be covered by a residual notification. This seems to be coming in by amendment. However, this residual minimum wage will be the lowest of all the minimum wages notified. There is also nothing to indicate that the widespread non-implementation of this Act will be corrected, or that the endless litigation in courts, at the end of which a petty fine is levied for non-payment of minimum wages, will be replaced by a different procedure. The exclusion of contract workers, who now cover 75 per cent of the workforce, from the minimum wages enforcement seems destined to continue. The failure of the Act to effectively cover home-based and other forms of unorganised labour will also continue. The labour movement also has its agenda for reform. Labourers demand the introduction of a ‘secret ballot’ for determination of trade union recognition. It is unfortunate that even decades after independence, this simple democratic right remains elusive. They also demand that their right to go to court should not be restricted by the requirement that they take permission from the government under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act. Seeking such permission delays litigation by years. They also demand that, by amendment, the two anti-labour judgments of the Supreme Court in the Umadevi case and the SAIL case be reversed, so that non-permanent workers who have put in long years in government services are entitled to regularisation, and that when the contract labour system is abolished by the Board, the contract workers will be regularised. The Supreme Court had condemned these categories of workers to permanent servitude. They demand that child la bour be abolished. These are some of the long-standing democratic reforms pending consideration of the government. Boost for infrastructure The maiden budget of the Narendra Modi Government has allowed banks to raise long-term funds from the market to finance infrastructure projects. For funds thus raised, banks are freed from requirements with respect to Statutor y Liquidity Ratio (SLR), Cash Reserve Ratio (CRR) and Priority Sector Lending. The move is in tune with the recommendations of the Nachiket Mor Committee on Comprehensive Financial Services for Small Businesses and Low-Income Households. The panel had suggested the gradual pha se-out o f SLR, and recommended CRR application only on demand deposits. The budget proposal has a two-fold objective. For one, it seeks to address concerns over the asset-liability mismatch in banks’ lending to infrastructure projects, which have long gestation periods. By freeing banks of statutor y obligations on those funds, on the other hand, the budget aims to bring down the financing cost for them. With projects facing overruns on cost and time fronts due to assorted reasons in the wake of economic slowdown, the banking system as a whole has come under heavy stress. So much so that banks have been forced to restructure a substantial portion of their lending to infrastructure projects. The failure of infrastructure projects on a large scale ha s seen non-performing assets (NPA) piling up in this sect or . A funds-star ve d government needs private enterprises to give a big push to infra growth. Private enterprises will move into the infra space only if long-term funds are available at affordable rates and near-term worries on repayment do not weigh on them. Viewed against this backdrop, the budget proposal is a twice-blessed move. For, it benefits banks as well as private enterprises. There is, however, a huge risk in looking at the proposal from a micro prism alone. Is nonavailability of long-term funds the sole reason for the present predicament in the infrastructure space? A host of factors — ranging from land acquisition to green clearance and poor credit appraisal — have combined to derail the infrastructure sector. Is the monetary regulator — the Reserve Bank of India – on the same page with fiscal bosses on the issue of letting banks go free on statutory obligations for money raised to fund infrastructure projects? Even if it is in sync with the fiscal bosses, the RBI may yet be keen to ensure that its ability to exercise control over the mon etary aspects of the economy is not compromised. The RBI may do well to ensure that such selective exemptions from statutor y obligations do not compromise the viability of the banking system. The budget proposal must be taken forward in a composite way by all the stakeholders so that infrastructure development is facilitated. ⇒ DAMS WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY The devastation in Uttarakhand had already happened much before the cataclysmic events of June 2013. The unprecedented rainfall and floods and loss of life drew attention to the alarming situation in a State known for its pristine forests and rivers. It also drew attention belatedly to the “bumper to bumper” dams in the mountains. Construction on all dams in Uttarakhand was halted by the Supreme Court in August 2013 and on its instruct ions, the Ministry of Environment and Forests (MoEF) appointed an expert body which said that 23 hydropower projects out of the 24 it was asked to examine would have an irreversible impact on the biodiversity of the Alaknanda and Bhagirathi basins and should not be constructed. In May, the Supreme Court reiterated its orders stopping work on the 24 hydropower projects examined by the body. While all this amounts to shutting the stable door after the horse has bolted, it is a measure of recognition of the man-made destruction wrought by unplanned hydel power projects in a sensitive and fragile ecosystem. The State of Uttarakhand is a part of the Ganga basin and rivers suffer from several depradations apart from dams in high places, including extensive pollution from untreated sewage. Despite huge amounts of money being spent, plans to clean up the river have failed miserably. An IIT-led consortium has been set up to prepare a master plan for the National Ganga River Basin Authority (NGRBA), to restore its “wholesomeness,” as the extended summary of a draft Ganga River Basin Management plan says. Citing anthropogenic activities, it says dams and barrages have snapped her “longitudinal connectivity.” In its report of March 2013, the InterMinisterial Group (IMG) on Issues Relating to River Ganga says that the development of new hydro power projects has an impact on the environment, the ecology, the biodiversity, both terrestrial and aquatic, and economic and social life. Crucially, it says that in the upper reaches of the river — where the oxygenating abilities of the river are the highest — there are growing signs of contamination. This suggests that even here, water withdrawal for hydroelectricity is endangering the health of the Ganga. Implementation of the 69 hydro power projects will lead to 81 per cent of the Bhagirathi and 65 per cent of the Alaknanda getting affected. The IMG had considered the need to have portions of the river free of hydro projects and recommended that six rivers should be kept in pristine form. In the Alaknanda and Bhagirathi basins, the report said that 17 dams have been commissioned with a total installed capacity of 1,851 MW. Fourteen projects of 2,538 MW capacity are in different stages of construction and 39 projects with an installed capacity of 4,644 MW are in different stages of planning. The expert body report said that if all the 450 dams in the State are completed, about 252 projects will each have an installed capacity of 5MW or more. The vast majority of them will divert rivers through tunnels to power houses downstream. Their combined impact will affect the landscape of Uttarakhand. The environment management plans of individual projects do not address the cumulative impacts of multiple projects in a river valley. With dams proposed on major rivers for every 20 to 25 kilometre stretch, large fragments of these rivers could be left with minimal flow as almost all the river water is extracted for producing hydroelectricity, the body’s report has said. Prof. Ravi Chopra, chairperson of the body said that tunnelling is also controversial and leads to damage with natural springs being diverted and homes developing cracks. The government has only looked at the need to generate power and not the impact on the environment. On field visits, the body noticed scarred landscapes, dry river beds and a complete disappearance of riverine ecosystems due to submergence at existing and under construction large hydropower projects such as Tehri Stage I and Koteshwar on the Bhagirathi basin and the Srinagar dam in the Alaknanda basin. Extensive deforestation and diversion of forest land too has posed problems. The body found that 80,826.91 hectares of forests have been diverted for non-forest use in Uttarakhand since 1980. The diversion for hydropower production is 5,312.11 ha. Most of the diversion for roads and hydropower has been in Uttarkashi, Rudraprayag, Chamoli and Pithoragarh districts, the areas most affected in the June 2013 disaster. People have been agitating against dams for years in the region, notably Tehri. In 2010-11, and for the first time for any project, there were three public hearings on the Devsari hydel project on the Pinder. After two hearings, the third one was accepted by the government, according to Vimalbhai of the Matu Jansangthan which led protests along with the Bhu-Swami Sangharsh Samiti. He says this was the first major protest after the ones against Tehri. A public hearing was also organised where many voiced their opposition to the dams and on the need to keep the undammed tributary of the Ganga that way. He referred to the pathetic status of the catchment area, and the lack of studies on water flows and climate change impacts. The people displaced by the Tehri dam are still to get land rights or basic amenities in their relocated homes, he added. Local people who have borne the brunt of the devastati on due to dams and fl oods and environmental groups have questioned the feasibility of dams. By all accounts there is cause for concern as reflected in many repor ts. Even as the Uttarakhand government proposes to approach the Supreme Court in a bid to get a green signal for dam construction, it must remember this. It has to ensure that the quest for hydropower cannot come without a responsibility to preserve a reg ion that is limping back to life after a calamity aggravated by unplanned human interventions neither scientifically assessed nor endorsed by the people of the region. ⇒ BREAKTHROUGH FOR THE BLIND India under the Narendra Modi government has become the first country in the world to ratify the Marrakesh Convention that codifies exemptions to copyrights to benefit blind and vision-impaired readers. The government should now build on this momentum and enact the comprehensive and path-bre aking law, now before a Parliamentary Standing Committee, that could transform the lives of millions of people with various disabilities. This is imperative also because seven long years have elapsed since New Delhi ratified (it was one of the earliest to do so) the United Nations Convention for the Disabled. The current trea ty of the World Intellectual Property Organization removes legal restrictions on the conversion of published works into any one among a range of alternative formats which the blind and vision-impaired may access. Ratifying countries are required to enact domestic laws to overcome their own copyright limitations to further this objective. The treaty also eases hurdles for cross-country exchange of books in different formats so as to overcome the cost of duplication. This is a genuine concern, as nongovernmental organisations are by and large the principal service-providers for the disabled. India amended its copyright law in 2012 broadly on the lines of the Marrakesh Treaty. Hence, the most direct benefit from its ratification of the latter would be the access to literature that is converted overseas. WIPO has just launched the Accessible Books Consortium to provide technical support for the production of suitable formats and to create a global database of such transcriptions and to encourage publishers to participate in this initiative. All of the above potentially add up to vast improvements on the present situation where published works are out of the reach of an overwhelming majority of the blind. The exception to this rule is the extremely limited availability of educational material. The worstaffected are people in developing countries, which are home to 90 per cent of the world’s blind popula tion, accor ding to the World Health Organization. Moreover, barely 15 countries world-wide have copyright exemptions as per a WIPO finding, and these are mostly in the advanced economies. The full potential of this convention will be realised ultimately when large numbers of blind people have full access to quality education, which is still a distant dream. The treaty will not enter into force internationally unless it is ratified by at least 20 countries. The lack of backing from the United States from the beginning of the negotiations could prove to be a handicap in canvassing wider support. The world has indeed come a long way since WIPO began to contemplate copyright exemptions some three decades ago. ⇒ BRICS FOR A NEW BANK What might have been dismissed as an impossibility just five years ago is now a reality. Defying sceptics and critics, five countries that between them account for 40 per cent of the world’s population and 20 per cent of its GDP have signed an agreement to create a development bank to provide financial assistance to developing countries and emerging market economies, mainly for infrastructure projects. As its name implies, the agreement for the New Development Bank, signed by Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa at their sixth BRICS summit in Brazil, signals the start of a new global financial order that aims to be more inclusive than the Western-focussed International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. The $100 billion bank will have an initial subscribed capital of $50 billion. The five members managed to iron out their differences to agree on an equal share for each in the bank, so no one member dominates the institution. India and South Africa both wanted to host the headquarters. The eventual decision to locate it in Shanghai was an acknowledgement that China’s is the big gest economy in the grouping. The Bank will also have an African Regional Centre in South Africa and India will assume the first presidency of the bank. First mooted at the fourth BRICS summit in New Delhi in 2012, the Bank will certainly have an impact on the existing arrangements put in place by the Bretton Woods institutions, and will give more say to smaller countries. But BRICS also appears to recognise that the NDB cannot replace the IMF, the World Bank or the re gi onal development banks. Thus, the Fortaleza Declaration describes the NDB as a “supplement to the efforts of multilateral and regional financial institutions for global development.” A second financial instrument, the Contingency Reserve Ar rangement of $100 billion, has been set up to help developing economies tide over “short-term liquidity pressures, promote further BRICS cooperation, strengthen the global financial safety net and complement existing international arrangements.” In its sixth year, BRICS has a new confidence, and it was more than apparent at the summit. The only world grouping that is not region, security or trade-based, its members have come together with the determination to create a more multilateral global order. China and Russia have backed the other three BRICS members on the issue of UN reform and Security Council expansion. But the grouping needs to find a stronger political voice. The Declaration came in the midst of the bombardment, even if under grave provocation, of Gaza by Israel, but it is silent on this while calling for Israel and Palestine to resume negotiations towards a twostate solution. ⇒ REVAMPING THE PPP FRAMEWORK In both the railway budget and the general budget, the BJP-led NDA government has made it clear that Public Private Partnership (PPP) is the preferred mode for driving major infrastructure development projects. Finance Minister Arun Jaitley even announced the decision to set up an institution named 3P India with a corpus of Rs.500 crore, to provide support to mainstreaming PPPs. This ‘Triple-P’ mode was a common thread in Mr. Jaitley’s speech as he went through several proposed initiatives of the Modi government in sectors such as urban renewal, urban transportation, real estate, and even gas pipelines. Railway Minister D.V. Sadananda Gowda too held out the hope that major passenger and consumer initiatives such as development of railway stations, terminals, or even connectivity to ports could be taken up through the PPP route. To achieve the projected 8 per cent growth in GDP, infrastructure development is of critical importance, and this calls for huge doses of investment across sectors. Successive governments have tried to parcel major projects through this route. The greenfield airports, private ports and real estate projects have been some of the noteworthy instances on this front. But there has also been a chain of problems and allegations in the implementation of such projects, or in terms of the concessions offered to promoters in the private sector or to foreign investors. No doubt, PPPs represent a valuable device to leverage scarce public funds with private funding to finance critical infrastructure projects. Prime Minister Narendra Modi has been a votary of the PPP model, and prides himself on including a fourth ‘P’ — ‘people’. This puts the focus on a major problem. If only the people of the area are taken on board in its planning, much of the opposition and hurdles will disappear. More often than not, land acquisition and compensation payable for it emerge as the biggest problems, invariably leading to public agitations or protest. Mr. Jaitley spoke of “the weaknesses of [the] PPP framework, the rigidities in contractual arrangements, the need to develop [a] more nuanced and sophisticated model of contracting and develop quick dispute redressal mechanisms.” The other side of the issue relates to user charges. These projects, notably those related to national highway development, are based on certain user projections. When the numbers do not add up on the ground, the investor becomes frustrated because the projected return on investment may not materialise. The government and its agencies must work on a new framework for PPPs to make them attractive to investors, and at the same time affordable to the users or consumers. ⇒ TOWARDS A COMPREHENSIVE JUVENILE JUSTICE LAW The Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 (JJ Act) has been amended twice: in 2006 and in 2011. More demands to amend the Act have been in the reckoning. There was, for instance, a public outcry demanding more stringent punishment for the prime accused, a juvenile, in the Delhi gang rape case of 2012. Besides crimes committed by juveniles, violence against them is also emerging as an important issue which needs to be redressed by strengthening the existing provisions. Protracted inter-country adoption procedures in the existing JJ Act need urgent legislative resolution. While personal laws allow specific communities to adopt, other persons can become guardians only under an archaic Guardians and Wards Act, 1890. A secular gender-neutral adoption law for all people is required. The apex court in a public interest litigation decided on March 28, 2014, in Dr. Subramanian Swamy and others v. Raju and others , refused to read down the provisions of the JJ Act, 2000, in order to account for the mental and intellectual competence of a juvenile offender and refused to interfere with the age of a juvenile accused, in cases where juveniles were found guilty of heinous crimes. It was held by the Court that the provisions of the Act are in compliance with Constitutional directives and international conventions. The Court further stated that the classification of juveniles as a special class stood the test of Article 14 of the Constitution, and that the Court should restrict itself to the legitimacy and not certainty of the law. In this backdrop, the Government of India is now contemplating re-enacting a new JJ Act, 2014, for which a review committee has been constituted under the Ministry of Women and Child Development. The baton has been passed on to Parliament to enact a new law. The JJ Bill, 2014, seeks to enact a law by consolidating and amending the law relating to children who are in need of care and protection. It seeks to cater to their developmental needs through proper care, protection and treatment by adopting a child-friendly approach in the adjudication and disposal of matters, and for rehabilitation through processes provided and institutions established under the proposed new enactment. The Women and Child De velopm ent Ministry has posted on its website a proposed draft of The Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Bill, 2014, suggesting broad amendments. The draft states that the increase in reported incidents of abuse of children needs urgent legislative action; that there are inadequate facilities, quality of care and rehabilitation measures in private and government-run children homes; delays in various processes under the JJ Act ; delays in inter-country adoption process under CARA; and inadequate provisions to deal with offences against children, among others. The draft incorporates the principles of the Hague Convention on Protection of Children and Coopera tion in Res pect of Inter-Country Adoption (1993) which was absent in the original JJ Act, 2000. The new JJ Bill, 2014, provides for application of the proposed Act in: cases involving detention, prosecution or penalty of imprisonment; matters relating to apprehension, production before court, disposal orders and restoration, procedures and decisions related to adoption of children, and rehabilitation and reinteg ration of children who are in conflict with law or, as the case may be, in need of care and protection under other such law. The word ‘juvenile’ has been replaced with the word ‘child’ and the expression ‘juvenile in conflict with the law’ has been changed to ‘child in conflict with law.’ While in the JJ Act, 2000, juveniles in conflict with the law are defined as the ‘accused’, the draft Bill identifies a ‘child in conflict with law’ to be one who has been found by the Juvenile Justice Board to have actually committed an offence. It also defines an ‘abandoned child’ as well as ‘aftercare’. Chapter two is the most noteworthy characteristic of the proposed Bill, providing for ‘Fundamental Principles for Care, Protection, Rehabilitation and Justice for Children’. It incorporates internationally accepted principles of presumption of innocence, dignity and worth, family responsibility, non-sti gma tising semanti cs, privac y and confi dent iality, repatriation and restoration, equality and nondiscrimination, and diversion and natural justice, among others. Institutionalisation is suggested as a measure of last resort — juveniles are to institutionalised only if no other family-based care option is possible or available. CARA has been made a statutory body vested with functions of in-country and inter-country adoptions. Section 58 of the draft Bill lays down special emphasis on inter-country adoptions, stating that all applications for adoption shall be filed before a Principal Magistrate of the concerned jurisdiction where the registered adoption agency is located. However, the proposed provision for adoption orders to be passed by the Principal Magistrate on the first date of hearing itself, or within a period of two weeks, failing which it will be construed by the higher authority of the Principal Magistrate, “as dereliction of duty ”, does not seem to be practical for actual implementation. Judicial proceedings have to be regulated by the Code of Civil Procedure and no fast-track procedure that bypasses rules of evidence can be proposed in contravention of law. Likewise, transgenders need adoption rights. The JJ Bill must encompass these issues. The proposed Bill also prohibits the media from disclosing the identity of children or propagating any such information which would lead to identifying them. All reports relating to children are to be treated as confidential. Corporal punishment and ragging, cruelty to children, employment of children for begging, adoption without proper procedure, and sale or procurement of children for any purpose are all acts that are punishable under the draft Bill. The draft Bill therefore provides a comprehensive mechanism to deal with children in conflict with law as well as children who are in need of care and protection. However, only a stringent implementation can provide a meaningful disposition to make it a true letter of law. ⇒ A NEW INDEX TO MEASURE SOCIAL PROGRESS Is Gross Domestic Product (GDP) an adequate measure of a country’s development across many dimensions? This has been debated vigorously in recent years. The discontent with GDP stems from the fact that it focusses exclusively on economic growth. Even there, it does not capture the level of inequity which can exist in a society despite overall economic growth. The inequity can in fact even be exacerbated by it. More importantly, it pays no attention to the social and environmental measures of development which are as important as economic development. Indeed, the United Nations has identified three pillars on which the post- 2015 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) must rest: economic, social and environmental. Several alternative measures have been proposed to capture the social dimension of development, combined with or independent of economic indices. Bhutan has embraced and espoused the concept of Gross National Happiness. A World Happiness Report is now periodically published from the Columbia University which compares self-reported levels of happiness of people from different countries. A composite Wellness Index was proposed by noted economists Stiglitz, Sen and Fitoussi in response to a request from the then President of France, Nicolas Sarkozy, for a measure of development that looks beyon d GDP. A Global Multidimensional Poverty Index was developed at Oxford to gauge inequity within and across societies. However, none of these has really caught on because economists, industrialists and politicians alike are conditioned to place a high premium on economic development as the measure of progress and do not like to see the clarity of a single measure like GDP cluttered by a host of other indicators they view as imprecise or even irrelevant. So, an index of social progress is needed which does not try to displace GDP (not yet anyway) but has additive value. Such an index can be used to remind political leaders that their bifocal vision must accommodate both economic and social progress as being important for a country, recognising, of course, that these two tracks are closely interlinked and sometimes inseparable. Such an index of social progress has recently been created by a group of academics and institutions constituting the Social Progress Imperative (www.socialprogressimperative.org). This index has three major domains: Basic Human Need s, Foundat ions of Wellbeing and Opportunity. Each of these has several clusters of specific indicators (as shown in the table). The environmental dimension is partly incorporated into the Social Progress Index (SPI) as a cluster of indicators related to ecosystem sustainability. While there can be debates on which other indicators could have been included in any of the clusters, the SPI does provide a list of key areas which need to be tracked and acted upon to ensure a higher level of social progress. The index is still evolving, with validation studies being conducted on data from different countries. The authors have extended an open invitation to groups from anywhere in the world to use their data sets for validation and suggest refinements. The designers of this index draw our attention to three overarching findings of their study so far: social progress is distinct from economic development, though correlated with it; some aspects of social progress are more closely related to the level of economic development than others; countries have relative strengths and weaknesses in social progress, both across the major dimensions and across components within the dimensions. Of the three domains, Basic Human Needs is best cor relate d wi th per capi ta GDP, Foundations of Wellbeing being intermediate and Opportunity the least so. However, in each domain there is variability in the degree of correlation between the individual components and per capi ta GDP. As the developers of SPI affirm, the index offers a new tool to explore the complex two-way relationship between economic and social progress. At the same time, it provides a metric for comparison of countries, and States within a country. Even as the country commits itself to move on the fast track of economic growth, it must be mindful of the need to invest in improving the social indicators as well. We may continue to measure GDP if that is still considered the talisman of economic progress by the worlds of politics and finance, but we must also simultaneously measure social progress lest we end up as a soulless society characterised by gaping inequality and glaring social backwardness despite gaining wealth. Let GDP and SPI be the inseparable Gemini twins that herald our ascent to higher levels of balanced development. ⇒ TRIALS AND REGULATIONS The promise and performance of genetically modified crops in agriculture is once again under the spotlight, with the sanction given by the Genetic Engineering Approval Committee for confined field trials of several food crops. In its last days, the UPA government decided to end the moratorium on trial cultivation of these engineered varieties, and to allow experiments aimed at generating biosafety data. The GEAC has now taken further steps to allow field trials of rice, brinjal, mustard, chickpea and cotton, and import of GM soyabean oil. Clearly, there can be no credible argument against scientific experiments in agriculture that advance the goal of developing plant varieties that can withstand drought, resist pests and raise yields to feed the growing world population. But this should be done through a transparent regulatory process that is free of ethical conflicts. Proponents of GM crops funding research in agricultural universities represents one such conflict. To aid transparency, research findings should be made available in the public domain for independent study. But India has taken only halting steps towards establishing a strong regulatory system; the Biotechnology Regulatory Authority of India Bill, 2013, which provided for multi-level scientific assessments and an appellate tribunal, has lapsed. While the Central government has not permitted the commercial cultivation of Bt brinjal in India, the recent case of neighbouring Bangladesh shows that regulatory mechanisms must be put in place before such crops are grown, whether for research or for the market — and they must be functional. Although the licence to produce the crop in Bangladesh required that the GM variety be isolated from indigenous ones to prevent genetic contamination, the condition was not followed. Field trials in India, in which the State governments have a say, must ensure that there are sufficient safeguards against such violations. If GM food is allowed to be sold to consumers, they must have the right to know what they are buying, and labelling should be made mandator y. Here again, the Bangladesh experience shows that such a condition may be difficult to enforce. There is no consensus on the performance of GM crops and the results have been mixed. They have had some beneficial impact on tillage practices and in terms of curbing the use of insecticides, but as the Union of Concerned Scientists in the U.S. points out, they have created monocultures and may be affecting birds and bees. All this underscores the need for a cautious approach — one that fosters scient ific inquiry, allows for scrutiny and is underpinned by regulation. Enacting a comprehensive law that covers all aspects of GM crops should be a priority. ⇒ THE BUDGETS ECOLOGICAL BANKRUPTCY “While 2015 will be a landmark year for sustainable development and climate change policy, 2014 is the last chance for all stakeholders to introspect to be able to wisely choose the world they want post 2015.” Th e survey con tains (for the third year running) an independent chapter on ‘Sustainable Development and Climate Change’, which contains a few more pearls of wisdom like the one quoted earlier. It recounts in detail several goals set by the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government (without mentioning it of course), especially as part of the National Action Plan on Climate Change (NAPCC). Of significance is the goal to reduce “emissions intensity of GDP” quite substantially, meaning moving towards a lower carbon emissions economy. The budget too has a few provisions to gladden the hearts of “sustainable development” and “green economy” advocates, such as cleaner energ y technologies, a big fund for cleaning the Ganga, a boost to watershed development and provisions for water purification in areas badly affe ct ed by toxic wa stes. Solar energy get s Rs.1,000 crore, including for agriculture pump sets and water pumping stations. A doubling of the Clean Energy Cess (from Rs.50 per tonne to Rs.100 per tonne of coal) is aimed at financing “clean environment” initiatives. Unfor tunately, as in the case of previous budg ets and economic survey s, the fe w concessions given to securing our environmental future are overwhelmingly submerged by what is missing and, worse, what is contradictor y. The survey’s chapter on ‘Sustainable Development and Climate Change’ appears to exist in isolation of the other chapters; indeed, if the government was serious about “sustainable development,” sustainability would run like a thread through all the sectoral chapters. A few examples will suffice to show that it does not. Th e survey ’s chapt er on industry acknowledges that it is a cause of “natural resource depletion (fossil fuel, minerals, timber), water, air, coastal and marine, and land contamination, health hazards, degradation of natural ecosystems, and loss of biodiversity.” Yet, neither in this chapter nor anywhere else is there an indication of how this is to be tackled. The chapter on agriculture and food has no mention of the enormous health implications of the use of chemical fertilizers and pesticides, nor does the ‘Sustainable Development and Climate Change’ chapter say anything about the need to reduce emissions from fertilizer use. Indeed, the Union budget makes an increased allocation for the fertilizer subsidy, ignoring the repeated advice from both within and outside government to begin moving towards organic, ecological fertilization measures (it does have a token provision of Rs.100 crore for organic farming in northeast India, peanuts when compared to the Rs.70,000 crore plus subsidy for chemical fertilizers). Nowhere in the survey are the issues of dryland farming or the impor tance of reviving millets for the health of soils and people mentioned. A lot more could be said about the ecological bankruptcy of the Economic Survey; for instance, how can anyone gauge whether we are moving any closer to sustainability in the complete absence of any indicators to measure this? Tribal welfare does get a substantial allocation, but there is no indication whether it will be allocated to continuing the intricate nature-culture relationship of such peoples; thus far it has not, and the NDA is unlikely to be any different. And what appears to be good news on the solar energy front pales into insignificance when one realises that the allocation is only 0.6 per cent of the total energy budget, with the lion’s share still going to dirty sources like coal and big hydro and nuclear. The “Key Features of Budget 2014-2015” document has no section on the environment. Mr. Jaitley’s speech mentions the environment only in respect of coal, clean energy cess and mining. The promise of sustainability in the mining sector has been made for many years, but no government has taken serious measures to implement it. We need to see whether the NDA does any better. It will be surprising given the other measures it is already taking or proposing, such as faster environmental clearances and even self-monitoring by companies which have shown scant regard for even mandator y provisions. trashes the ecological pie on which all of us depend for our very lives, appears to be of little consequence. Not even the World Bank’s 2013 study showing that environmental damage annually knocks off 5.7 per cent of GDP growth, seems to have made a dent in such thinking. The budget lays great stress on industrial corridors. If Gujarat’s model is anything to go by, this will mean massive amounts of forcible or induced land acquisition and pollution. This is a recipe for conflicts and social disruption. Early July has seen massive farmer protests in Raigad district of Maharashtra, against the proposed acquisition of 67,500 acres for a part of the Mumbai-Delhi Industrial Corridor. The NDA’s first budg et has thrown a few sops in the direction of the environment and the millions dependent on it. But much like its predecessors, in painting the big picture it remains embarrassingly devoid of innovative ideas on how to move India towards ecological sustainability and justice. The budget also initiates the River Linking project (Rs.100 crore for Detailed Project Reports), which has been under discussion for many years. Mr. Jaitley’s speech lamented that India was “not uniformly blessed with perennial rivers.” Both the UPA and the NDA are ignoring expert opinion that warns of the enormous ecological disruption and social displacement that such a massive engineering project would cause; equally important, they are turning a blind eye to the hundreds of initiatives that have shown how water security can be achieved through decentralised solutions even in the driest of regions. The focus is on growth through making it easier for industry and commerce , with the assumption that a larger economic pie will help the poor rise above the poverty line. The fact that despite a blistering pace of growth through much of the 1990s and 2000s, the employment situation worsened (latest figures show nearly 15 per cent unemployment), and 70 per cent of Indians remained deprived of one or more basic needs, appears lost on the proponents of such an agenda. And the fact that such growth actually ⇒ THE FALLACY OF AUTONOMY There can be good arguments for and against a four-year undergraduate degree. In any case, for the time being the debate is settled, in our very own messy sty le. Th e new National Democratic Alliance government has used the same steamrolling tactics to reverse the decision that the earlier United Progressive Alliance government had used to push FYUP. Now we have a controversy about the Chairman of the Indian Council of Historical Research (ICHR). Tomorrow we can expect something else. The real issue is how we take big decisions on higher education that affect the future of millions of students. Governments change but the ways of power do not. Two years of a ringside view of big decisions on higher education taught me something: governance is not about procedures, committees, rules and regulations; it’s all about winks and nods of the powers that be. This applies as much to ‘autonomous bodies’ like the UGC as it does to public sector undertakings or departments of the government. This was as true of the UPA government as it is of the current NDA government, or the various State governments. The story of how FYUP was introduced and then withdrawn serves to illustrate how power operates. The move to shift from the conventional three-year graduate course to FYUP began in late 2012. Usually the university takes a couple of years to deliberate and decide about any major change in syllabi. Last time the DU overhauled the syllabi of the existing three-year course, it took about three years to do so. But this time, the vice-chancellor wanted the entire process — from brainstorming to the announcement of the new course — to be completed within six months or less. Everyone in the academic community was aghast. Even teachers who were willing to look at the idea of a four-year degree favourably thought it was crazy to push the idea at this pace. However, the vice-chancellor was determined to go ahead. It was said that he was the blue-eyed boy of the then Minister of Human Resource Development. It was also said that the FYUP has the Minister’s nod. And everything fell in place. All the formalities of consultation within the university were completed with lightning speed. Protests by teachers and departments were set aside. Ministry officials were keen to assist in any which way and were unwilling to lend an ear to anyone who protested. The President of India, the Visitor to DU, refused to intervene. The funny thing was the alibi used: everyon e from Minister down wards said they were respecting the autonomy of the university. Now the new government has nodded the other way. Th e tide ha s turn ed, so has the Ministry and the UGC. Interestingly, the same persons continue to occupy key positions such as Chairman of the UGC and Se cre tary (Hig her Education). But they have suddenly discovered all the arguments against FYUP that they had dismissed last year. Those who could not bear the thought of interfering with the autonomy of the university are now issuing diktats and ultimatums with 24-hour deadlines. The rolling back of FYUP was as whimsical and arbitrary as its rollout. The world of higher education is divided into those who applaud one or the other. This stor y is wor th remembering in the days to come, as the BJP would extend its control over one institution after another: UGC, then ICHR, then Indian Council of Social Science Research, and of course the National Council of Educational Research and Training. Scores of well meaning, secular academics will cr y foul and protest against violation of institutional autonomy by the BJP or the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh. Such protests will be justified and necessary. But they would also beg a series of questions: do we have legacy of safeguarding institutional autonomy? Has the academic community shown the courage to defend its autonomy? What is our record of using academic autonomy as and when we get it? Can academic autonomy be equated with selfindulgence of the ivory tower, secular or otherwise? How do we look firmly into the future, unperturbed by nods and winks? ⇒ A MINIMUM WAGE DEBATE Echoes of the statutor y universal minimum wage legislation adopted by Germany’s governing grand coalition seem to reverberate beyond Berlin, in the European Union and across the Atlantic. Europe’s largest economy is to enforce a national minimum pay of •8.5 an hour from January. Such a guarantee would extend cover to the millions of workers — mainly in the eastern region — who remain outside the negotiated wage settlement that defined post-War Germany’s industrial model. Britain has had a national minimum wage law since 1998. But ahead of the 2015 general election, the opposition Labour Party, which was the architect of the legislation, wants changes so that those at the bottom of the workforce may share the fruits of the economic recovery. Neighbouring France codified a legal guarantee in 1950, amended since in 1970. But Paris has recently floated the idea of a minimum wage across the European Union, although a panEuropean measure may not materialise any time soon given the legal prohibition in this area. The idea may well influence the remaining six EU states — founder-member Italy, Austria, Cypr us, and the three Nordic countries — to stipulate their respective basic floor. Although the Swiss rejected a proposal that would have given the country the world’s highest minimum pay, the plebiscite in May occasioned a lively debate. U.S. President Barack Obama’s bid to raise the federal minimum wage was blocked by Congress. But there is evidence of growing support among the Republicans, who are anxious not to antagonise voters. The implications of a minimum-wage floor on employment generation and growth continue to divide opinion. This is true equally of Germany which is set to introduce the new law in January, or Bri tain and the U.S. which have put for th proposals to effect an increase in the existing amount. But growing support on this contentious issue cutting across traditional party lines perhaps means there is greater recognition that minimum wages ought to keep pace with inflation, average wages and productivity growth. The imperative need to mitigate the impact of the 2007-08 economic meltdown on large sections of the population in the advanced economies has also strengthened support. A legal minimum pay remains a vital tool for the workforce in mature democracies, even though these are already underpinned by vibrant trade unions and high levels of social protection measures. However, for the bulk of the wage-earners in the developing world that is outside the organised sector of the economy, a leg al guarantee of a minimum subsistence pay seems morally non-negotiable. This is true even from the standpoint of the physical and mental capacities that are paramount to enhance overall productivity. ⇒ FOR THE BRICS BANK, A TOUGH ROAD AHEAD The announcement of a new BRICS Bank displays the desire of emerging economies to move away from Washington D.C.-style lending institutions. But between India’s bureaucratic ef ficiency and China ’s indifference to humanitarian, environmental and regional concerns, they resemble John F. Kennedy’s tart characterisation of the very place they hope to leave behind. Much work lies ahead for the creators of these new multilateral financial institutions before the first loan can be made. Simply reaching sufficient agreement to announce the new BRICS Bank represents a significant achievement for the six-year-old BRICS group. While it may seem silly to organise a serious international grouping based on a clever acronym, the BRIC countries are the four largest economies in the developing world. They have economic heft, but do they have much in common? What they most need to succeed is trust. Russia and India have long histor ies of conflict with China. Brazil and Russia are not famous for being creditworthy. South Africa is a solid neutral party, but also, frankly, a lot less significant than the other members. So apparently their joint desire to pl ant a fl ag on the global econ omy sufficiently overcame mutual differences. The preponderance of the friction on lending policy at the International Financial Insti tutions (IFIs) ref lects ty pical lenderbor rower conflict. Developed countries, most often net lenders, want high standards to make sure money is used responsibly and repaid. The developing countries, most often net borrowers, resent outsiders imposing conditions on the use of money inside their own country. Any lender must pay attention to prudential concerns to survive. But given business practices in the BRICS — especially where government is involved — this cannot be taken for granted. The BRICS governments have not always been enthusiastic about World Bank scr utiny and transparency in the past. They must be vigilant to ensure that BRICS Bank money is used wisely and gets repaid. Developed countries have also imposed high-minded lending values, the benefit of which can be more reasonably debated. High environmental standards, for instance, may feel like a luxury that poor borr owing countri es cannot afford. Some Western-imposed mandates feel more like development fads. Most are legitimate values that the BRICS should aspire to follow. If the BRICS are comfortable with lowering their lending standards I do not doubt they will find plenty of projects to fund. But if they are, it is best that the existing IFIs are not affiliated with it.From what has been announced, the BRICS Bank will take a very democrati c approach to governance by giving each member equal voting rights. Undoubtedly there is value in such an equal arrangement for symbolic solidarity, as well as to avoid concerns about Chinese domination. Despite its shortcomings, this arrangement may be the only way to overcome their mutual trust deficit. Mihir Sharma has already pinned the BRICS Bank as a vehicle for the Chinese to commandeer the friendlier public image of the three southern BRICS as a front for China ’s foreign economic policy. On the other hand, can an institution survive being funded pr imarily by China and Russia, the only two BRICS with excess reserves, when their influence is no greater than any other member? If adequate checks are put in place to prevent Chinese dominance, will China remain interested in this project? This works as long as they see long-term value in the institution. U.S. taxpayers would not accept such a bargain, but China and Russia have less need to answer to their own taxpayers. The BRICS clearly want something tangible to demonstrate their global prominence and the power of non-Western values. Yet the new BRICS Bank faces two critical tensions. The first pits the desire to be free of Western-imposed constraints on lending, versus the need for prudential lending. The second sets the high-minded desire for equality of governance against the reality that lack of Chinese dominance may result in institutional neglect by its pr imary benefactor. While the BRICS Bank project was put together in an impressively short two years, most of the difficult questions remain unanswered. These tensions — critical to the bank’s viability — will not be easily resolved. I expect it will be several years before the details are sufficiently ironed out for the BRICS Bank to open its doors. Keep talking Peace The four-month extension of talks to halt Tehran’s bid to make an atomic bomb is an indication of the positive if limited fallout from the historic late-2013 interim agreement. Beneath that was well-founded and deep scepticism — in the United States, Europe and even among the Israeli intelligence — of any resort to brute force as a means to restrain Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons. The five permanent members on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and Germany accordingly decided to ease sanctions worth $7 billion for six months. The readiness of the latter to relent on Iran’s cont inuati on of uranium enrichment up to the level necessary for power generation was in sharp contrast to past UNSC resolutions requiring Tehran to freeze all enrichment. In return, Iran agreed to limit its nuclear programme and permit vigorous multilateral inspections of its facilities. Whereas U.S. President Barack Obama insisted that such relief was conditional and reversible, the Republican hard-liners and Israel decried the November agreement as a huge mistake. It is significant that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) should have acknowledged in June that Iran was cooperating with investigations into the so-called Possible Military Dimensions to its nuclear programme. The IAEA had also observed that such inspections could necessarily proceed in a step-by-step manner — a possible case to extend the deadline for negotiations. There is evidently no guarantee that the November deadline would yield the outcome that all parties envisage. Tehran has offered to freeze the country’s operations at current levels over the next three to seven years and thereafter resume uranium production as per its own requirements. Conversely, Washington and its partners insist that Iran dismantle major aspects of its uranium enrichment facilities and that current restrictions should continue for well over a decade. The real force behind these stated positions may also be influenced considerably by ge opolitics in the Middle East. A foremost factor is the election last year of Iran’s moderate President Hassan Rouhani, which almost coincided with the interim nuclear ag reement. A thaw in Br itain’s relations with Tehran could prove to be a vital channel for the European powers and the U.S. to exert pressure on the radical Sunni Islamic groups in Iraq and Syria. These are factors with a strong potential to influence the course of nuclear talks. The road to long-term peace lies in eschewing hard positions; one that goes to the root of the global Nuclear non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Nuclear weaponstates championing disarmament ought to tread a delicate line vis-à-vis potential aspirants in order to strengthen world peace.
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