Impact of Coalition Airstrikes against the Islamic State
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When US President Barack Obama announced that the US would start an air campaign against the Islamic State (IS) in Iraq and
Syria, he claimed that the US will “degrade and ultimately destroy IS”. The air campaign is a US-led coalition consisting of the US,
Canada, France, UK, Australia, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and the UAE, as well as varied military support from several other countries,
including Germany. Although an effective strategy in the short term, airstrikes uncoupled from a viable ground force will not lead to a
medium- or long-term solution to the underlying conditions that facilitated the rise of IS. Obama says that Iraq will ultimately bear
responsibility for defeating IS. However, inadequate security forces currently lack this capability. A Shi’a militias’ call to arms will trigger
further Sunni grievances and intensify the sectarian divide that has been a key driver of the IS advance in northern and western Iraq.
Meanwhile, blowback from the airstrikes will result in an increased terror threat in all coalition partner countries, further exacerbated by
the return of foreign fighters and a heightened risk of lone-wolf attacks, which are more difficult to detect and prevent than coordinated
bomb attacks.
Key Observations
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The Iraqi security forces are failing as an institution and are currently incapable of repelling IS from Iraq without significant
external support. Barring a change of approach from Shi’a political leaders in Baghdad, Iraqi security forces will remain vulnerable
in the medium term, facing an uphill struggle to purge corruption, extortion and incompetent political appointees from their ranks.
Airstrikes will be insufficient to eradicate the IS threat and the highly-flexible group will respond tactically. Meanwhile, IS will
further erode al-Qaeda’s dominance of the transnational jihadist landscape
Increased Sunni alienation will threaten the potential for a viable inclusive central Iraqi government, while growing sectarianism
will continue to characterise community relations
Kurdish authorities will continue to gain increasing autonomy, moving towards independence, depending on their performance on
the battlefield
Globally, the airstrikes may act as a rallying call for all militant Islamist groups, reducing inter-group hostility and producing new
alliances against the common enemy of the US and Europe
Coalition countries will face an increased terror threat at home, with lone-wolf attacks more likely. Increased terrorism monitoring
and legislative changes may push at-risk individuals into joining IS in the Iraq-Syria theatres or enacting radicalised fantasies of
Islamist violence in their home nations.
Domestic Impact
Sunni alienation and increased sectarianism
With the majority of US-led coalition airstrikes targeting Sunni areas of Iraq, with the inevitable result of civilian casualties, the air
campaign will bolster the broader narrative of Sunni victimisation. A key driver of IS’s initial success in capturing large swathes of
territory in the north and Anbar province is its alliances with other Sunni militant groups, particularly the Naqshabandi, and a
dissatisfied Sunni populace complaining of discrimination at the hands of the Shi’a dominated government. An alliance with the
Naqshabandi was a vital tactic in ensuring IS’s fast and effective advance on Mosul and Tikrit in June, due to the group’s superior
military strategy capacity and knowledge of the local terrain. Although airstrikes are aimed at liberating the Sunni areas, mass
casualties and demonising of the Sunni insurgency will do little to address Sunni grievances, particularly as feared Shi’a militias return
to the fray. Reports of Shi’a militias kidnapping and killing Sunni civilians have already emerged, with Amnesty International claiming
killings have been documented in Baghdad, Kirkuk and Samarra. Although fractures in the alliance of convenience with Sunni militant
groups and tribes have emerged in the north, the airstrikes will likely push the groups back together amid rising sectarianism if the
government offers only token Sunni representation.
IS continues as a strong force as security forces re-organise
IS ideologues are welcoming the airstrikes as a validation of the jihadist ideology of anti-Western victimisation. Meanwhile, IS is
proving extremely versatile in the face of airstrikes, losing some ground in the north, but making advances elsewhere, particularly in
Anbar. The airstrikes and the accompanying Iraqi forces are treating IS as a traditional armed force, rather than the flexible and highlymobile insurgency that it now is. IS has already changed its operating patterns in reaction to the airstrikes, reducing their impact. The
elevated morale and propaganda impact for IS is counter to low morale within the security forces. Vilified for fleeing the onslaught in
Mosul and outgunned and outfought on the battlefield, Prime Minister Abadi has moved to re-organise the military and police to make
them a more robust force. However, this will take years and the greater success of the Shi’a militias on the battlefield suggests the
government will be forced to rely on these domestic factions as their main line of defence, at a risk of exacerbating sectarian tensions.
Increased Kurdish autonomy
Despite the Kurdish Peshmerga forces’ mediocre performance on the battlefield, they remain the most viable frontline force against IS.
Military success will translate into increased political capital in Baghdad, with some Kurdish leaders seeing the crisis as a ripe time to
capitalise on the government’s weakness and push for greater autonomy. The IS advance has seen an attempt to form an “inclusive”
government in Baghdad. Although the Kurds have surrendered the influential foreign ministry, the appointment of the finance ministry
is a strategic advantage in the dispute between the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and Baghdad, which has long seen
relationships deteriorate over oil and budget issues. Avoiding a looming financial crisis in Kurdistan will strengthen the KRG’s position
in pursuit of greater autonomy, allowing it to wield greater political clout in central government, with many observers pushing for a
constitutional re-writing in the wake of increased Kurdish influence.
Issue Date: 20141028
Commercial in Confidence
For further G4S Risk Consulting analysis and advice or for general enquiries, please contact [email protected]
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Regional Impact
Increased alliance of militant groups
Although reports continue to emerge in northern Iraq of Naqshabandi and Sunni tribesmen being executed for their refusal to pledge
allegiance to IS, the US-led airstrikes may provide a unifying enemy to rally disparate militant groups. Evidence of this has already
emerged, with al-Qaeda-affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra reportedly already declaring an amnesty with IS and condemning the strikes as a
“war against Islam”, threatening to attack worldwide interests of coalition members. The airstrikes act as a rallying point for the groups
as anti-US sentiment trumps local divisions. International calls for unity by militant groups, including al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula
(AQAP) and the Taliban, highlights the symbolic strength of IS’s advances and the unifying force of the international coalition. The
airstrikes are seen as an attack on all Islamist militants, rather than just IS, heightening the threat to coalition-member interests in the
region. However, military cooperation does not necessarily equate to subjugation and loyalty to IS and tensions will continue to
simmer, with the greater enemy still perceived as the Syrian regime.
Shift in regional cold war
As IS’s advance plays out, the web of alliances in the MENA region grows ever more complicated and is testing established lines of
allegiance in the regional cold war between Saudi Arabia and Iran. Despite Iran also opposing IS, it has not been invited into the USled coalition, likely due to its ongoing poor relations with the US and other coalition members, namely Saudi Arabia, and particularly
over its support for the Syrian regime. Enemies and friends are increasingly complicated to untangle in the region, with anti-IS
countries prioritising their own national interests and therefore undermining any unified front against IS. Iran is seeking to position itself
as the regional power, with frequent pictures of Qassem Sulayman, head of the elite external unit of the Iranian Republican Guard
Corps, published with Kurdish Peshmerga forces and Shi’a militia fighters near the frontline. Iran appears to be seeking a new alliance
with the KRG, as well as supporting the government in Baghdad to further its sphere of influence in the region, curtailing Saudi
interests. Iran has the most lateral support network and therefore appears to be the most rational state; its condemning of IS does not
go against its support of the Assad regime in Syria, while Saudi Arabia’s support network is vastly more complicated and therefore
more likely to backfire. Saudi Arabia’s reputation has been damaged by reports of funding extremist groups and its growing support of
militant groups and non-state actors. The increasingly dominate narrative of Sunni alienation in the region will also see an erosion of
its regional power as it lacks the ability to influence regional governments’ decisions.
Kurdish insurgency threatens to resume
There is a serious threat of the PKK insurgency resuming in Turkey as Ankara fails to take a strong stand against IS, demanding US
assistance in setting up a no-fly zone and the toppling of the Syrian regime as its precondition for involvement. This has triggered
accusations of President Erdogan being a tacit ally of IS as he demands the Syrian Kurds drop their neutral stance with President
Bashar al-Assad in exchange for opening the border and sending weapons. Turkey’s hesitancy in joining the coalition and aiding the
US by allowing the use of its military bases is largely due to domestic Kurdish concerns, but has undermined Turkey’s position in
NATO and left the government’s rapprochement with the PKK in question.
Global Impact
Increased risk of terror attack in coalition countries
The most pertinent threat following the launching of the airstrikes is the increased terror threat in coalition countries. Several countries,
including the UK, Australia and Canada, have already increased their terror threat ratings over concerns of an increased domestic
threat posed by returning fighters. The US issued a warning in September for security agencies to be on alert for lone-wolf attacks in
the country as returnees and self-radicalised individuals increasingly seek to act alone in order to lessen the threat of interception by
authorities. Individuals in the West are likely to attempt lone-wolf, random attacks, despite amended legislation giving the security
services more authority to track, monitor and arrest returning fighters and domestic radicals. This threat manifested immediately with
recent attacks on soldiers of coalition member Canada, including a shooting at parliament by a self-radicalised individual suspected to
suffer from mental illness.
Increased Islamist recruitment
As a result of continued IS propaganda and advances, coupled with increasing crackdowns in coalition countries, the airstrikes will act
as a driver for militant recruitment. Viewed as an anti-Western force, they feed into a narrative of victimisation of many groups
marginalised through poor employment prospects and feelings of alienation, such as young Muslim men in the West. Reported arrests
have increased in the past two months, including in the UK, France and the US, indicating the growing draw of IS to alienated
individuals. Glorification of the jihad via social media strategies allows IS to reach a vast audience, gaining further attention.
Shift in transnational jihadist modus operandi
IS’s emergence as the leading international jihadist movement has triggered increased activities in conflict hotspots. Several groupings
have declared allegiance to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi as caliph of the Islamic State, including senior Pakistan Taliban commanders, but
the central al-Qaeda core remains less amenable to the group. IS’s ascent may lead to a shift in the modus operandi of transnational
jihadist groups, moving away from spectacular, mass-casualty attacks and towards insurgency tactics, territorial gains and attacks on
Shi’as. In September, Boko Haram declared a caliphate in northern Nigeria. Already, several militant groups have voiced support for
IS’s successes and have in turn upped their activities, including AQAP. Meanwhile, AQ’s announcement of al-Qaeda in the Indian
Subcontinent (AQIS) in the same month has led to a negligible reaction. IS’s advancement has given other groups a boost in morale
and offers an example of how capturing territory in ungoverned spaces is a more successful model than that of the increasingly
irrelevant and ageing AQ leadership.
Issue Date: 20141028
Commercial in Confidence
For further G4S Risk Consulting analysis and advice or for general enquiries, please contact [email protected]
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