STATE OF MICHIGAN IN THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR THE COUNTY OF CALHOUN PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, HON. JAMES C. KINGSLEY Plaintiff, v. Docket No. 1996-2562 FC ANDREW FRED BABICK JR, Defendant, Lauryl A. Scott P49860 Gregory J. Townsend P35857 Attorney for Plaintiff 3030 West Grand Blvd. Ste 10-350 Detroit, Ml 48202 (313) 456-0180 David Moran P45353 lmran J. Syed P75414 Attorney for Defendant 701 South State Street Ann Arbor, Ml 48109-1215 (734) 763-9353 FINDING This matter is before the court pursuant to the defendant's Motion for Relief from Judgment pursuant to MCR 6.501 et seq, filed March 31, 2014, seeking to vacate his conviction and order a new trial. The defendant was convicted of felony murder on November 14, 1996, the jury having found that the defendant committed an arson on September 9, 1995, resulting in the death of two small children. At trial, Assistant Attorney General Mark Blumer represented the people and Ms. Alma Mason-Thurmer represented the defendant. Defendant filed his first Motion for Relief from Judgment on May 14, 2001, in part claiming "An arson expert for the defense was also required to rebut the prosecution's assertion that this was an arson, and to support the accidental theory asserted by the defense, without which left no rebuttal evidence to support the defense." The motion was denied by this court and affirmed on appeal. MCR 6.502(G)(1) provides "one and only one motion for relief from judgment may be filed with regard to a conviction." Subsection (2) of the rule allows subsequent motions to be filed if "based on . . . a claim of new evidence that was not discoverable before the first such motion." The motion now pending before this court is based on such an assertion. An evidentiary hearing was held pursuant to defendant>s request to receive evidence regarding defendant's entitlement to relief from his conviction. Based on the evidence received during the hearing, this Court finds the motion now before the court should be allowed pursuant to MCR6.502(G)(2). According to 2 Gillespie, Michigan Criminal Law and Procedure, section 21 :36, "To entitle one to a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence, it must be shown that: • The evidence and not merely its materiality, is newly discovered; • The evidence is not merely cumulative; • The evidence would render a different result probable on a retrial; and • The party could not, with reasonable diligence, have produced the evidence at trial." See also People v Cress, 468 Mich 678 (2003). During the trial, Mr. Blumer called three expert witnesses regarding the cause and origin of the fire: Jeff Austin, the canine handler for the Lansing Fire Department, 2 Wayne Etue, a sergeant with the Michigan State Police Fire Marshall Division, and Joan Tuttle, a fire inspector with the Battle Fire Department. All three testified that the fire was an arson, relying on one or more of the following factors: the perceived use of accelerants, multiple points of origin, burn patterns and/ or dog sniffing hits. In support of his opinion, for example, Mr. Austin testified that his dog was "100 percent correct every time" (Trial transcript, vol. 4 p 81 ); and in response to the question "her nose is probably a thousand times more sensitive than the Crime Lab, is that correct?", he responded "That's true." (Trial transcript vol. 4 p 84) David M. Smith testified at the evidentiary hearing on behalf of the defendant that he was a certified fire investigator for the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) Technical Committee on Fire Investigations from 1992 to the present. That committee has authored every edition of "NFPA 921: A Guide to Fire and Explosion Investigations" since 1992. In his affidavit admitted as defendant's exhibit A, Mr. Smith wrote that NFPA 921 "now establishes the professional baseline standards for fire investigations." He further wrote: With the introduction of NFPA in 1992, the fire investigation profession began a movement toward the implementation of scientific principles in fire investigation. However, it would be many years - in some cases, up to a decade or more - before knowledge of NFPA 921 would percolate down to the relevant investigative communities in various parts of the country. See e.g. Lentini at 15 (noting that NFPA did not become 'generally accepted' by the fire investigation community until the year 2000). Ms. Mason-Thurmer testified she was not aware of NFPA 921 at the time of trial, and that it would have been "a miracle" and changed her whole focus during the trial 3 had she known of it. She conferred with at least four potential cause and origin witnesses for the defense, all of whom concluded it was an arson, but without having the benefit of scientific investigation advances and NFPA 921. She stated that the fire science in use by experts at the time caused everyone to believe the fire was an arson as opposed to being accidentally causea. Mr. Pat O'Connell was the appellate attorney for the defendant. He testified that he consulted with a possible cause and origin expert witness, but that person also concluded there was "no dispute it was arson" based on the then current standards of fire investigation. Mr. O'Connell said he could not properly argue on appeal whether it was an arson or not based on his own potential witness, so he had to focus on other issues. As a result, the Court of Appeals affirmed the defendant's conviction. Ms. Mason-Thurmer also testified that she was considered an arson specialist while employed as an assistant prosecutor for Calhoun County. She attended a seminar in 1994 on arson prosecutions but no mention was made by any presenter of the current scientific advancements in arson investigations or NFPA 921 . Because of her lack of success in finding cause and origin witnesses helpful to the defense, she had to focus on who committed the arson, rather than on whether it was an intentionally caused fire. Mr. Babick testified he did not become aware of such scientific developments and NFPA 921 until sometime between 2005 and 2007. Based on all of this evidence, it is the finding of the court that the evidence described is newly discovered and satisfies the first requirement for consideration. 4 Turning to the second requirement, there is no issue whether the newly discovered evidence would be cumulative. No evidence on cause and origin was presented by the defense. The prosecution expert witnesses were cross-examined as to the accuracy of their opinions, but nothing was presented to directly contradict such testimony. It is the finding of the court that the proposed evidence is not cumulative. It is also the finding of the court that the fourth requirement is established because reasonable diligence was used by trial and appellate counsel to discover this evidence. Both Ms. Mason-Thurmer and Mr. O'Connell tried repeatedly to find witnesses to contradict the prosecution witnesses but were unsuccessful. In his testimony and in his affidavit, Mr. Smith made clear that the scientific developments and NFPA 921 were not widely known "by the fire investigation community" until several years after the trial was held. In this case, the critical requirement for granting the relief requested is whether the presentation of such new evidence would render a different result probable on retrial. MCLA 600.2955 sets out the responsibilities of a trial court in determining whether expert opinion testimony will be admitted into evidence. In an action for the death of a person or for injury to a person or property, a scientific opinion rendered by an otherwise qualified expert is not admissible unless the court determines that the opinion is reliable and will assist the trier of fact. In making that determination, the Court shall examine the opinion and the basis for the opinion, which basis includes the facts, technique, methodology, and reasoning relied on by the expert, and shall consider all of the following factors: • Whether the opinion and its basis have been subjected to scientific testing and replication. 5 • Whether the opinion and its basis have been subjected to peer review publication. • The existence and maintenance of generally accepted standards governing the application and interpretation of a methodology or technique and whether the opinion and its basis are consistent with those standards. • The known or potential error rate of the opinion and its basis; • The degree to which the opinion and its basis are generally accepted within the relevant expert community. As used in this subdivision, 'relevant expert community' means individuals who are knowledgeable in the field of study and are gainfully employed applying that knowledge on the free market. • Whether the basis for the opinion is reliable and whether experts in that field would rely on the same basis to reach the type of opinion being proffered. • Whether the opinion or methodology is relied upon by experts outside of the context of litigation. (See also Barr v Farm Bureau, 292 MA 456 (2011) and Gilbert v Daimler Chrysler Corporation, 470 Mich 749 (2004)). In conjunction with MCLA 600.2955, MRE 702 requires the court to make what has been called a "searching inquiry" into these factors to assure expert opinion testimony presented to a jury is accurate and reliable. That was not done in this case because no one requested an evidentiary hearing before trial to establish such admissibility. Ms. Mason-Thurmer acknowledged she did not request a hearing pursuant to Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc, 509 US 579, 113 S Ct 2786 (1993) because all the opinions and advice she received during trial preparation was that it was an arson, and not accidental. As a result, the testimony of Mr. Austin and Mr. Etue was admitted without objection; the only objection to Ms. Tuttle was that her testimony would be cumulative. 6 Mr. Blumer testified in his opinion there was no reasonable probability of a different outcome if the case were to be tried again. He acknowledged that he was aware of the NFPA Council, but not necessarily of NFPA 921. He testified that had NFPA 921 been known, he would "not have used evidence that was suspect" such as the dog sniffing evidence. He believes there is sufficient circumstantial evidence to obtain a conviction, however, especially in view of the multiple points of origin, the time line and the defendant's statement to his wife according to the testimony of Holly Mony. Ms. Mason-Thurman testified that the multiple points of origin could have been caused by flashovers, that she could have used the time line in the defendant's favor, and that Ms. Mony recanted her statements at trial. A review of Ms. Mony's testimony reveals that she was 13 years old and offered the following responses to counsel: Q. Is there anything that they were saying that you couldn't here? (sic) Was it clear to you what they were saying? A. Well, I was tired, but I couldn't hear that much. Well, I woke up, I hear them arguing, and I went back to sleep. Q. What was your uncle arguing with ... your aunt about? A. Well, when I woke up I just . .. I think I heard them arguing about something about a fire and dropping a cigarette in a couch or something like that. Q. Isn't it true, Holly, that your uncle said to his wife in a way that you could hear that he thought he was responsible for - might be responsible for starting that fire? A. I'm not sure. Q. Didn't your uncle say to your aunt in a way that you could hear that he thought 7 he might have started that fire by dropping a cigarette in a couch or dropping a cigarette in the house somewhere and he might be responsible for starting that fire? A. They may have said that, but I'm not - - I can't actually remember what they really said. Q. Didn't your uncle say that two little kids died in that fire? A. No, I don't think so. (Trial transcript, volume 5 pages 22 - 24.) There are other instances where, when questioned by the prosecutor, the witness denied making a particular statement or could not remember what she overheard or later reported to the Fire Marshall and others. Mr. Smith testified the prosecution expert witnesses should not have been allowed to testify because of their failure to adhere to the protocol in NFPA 921, and, based on all the evidence, the cause and origin of the fire should be classified as "undetermined." He testified that Mr. Etue and Ms. Tuttle misread signs of postflashover burning as indicators of accelerants being poured. He also disputed the prosecution's theory that the couch could not have been the source of the fire. He concluded his affidavit by stating "In light of the state of knowledge and standard of care in the fire investigation profession today, there is simply no credible evidence that the fire at 264 Grove St. was intentionally set." In defense exhibit D, admitted into evidence because of difficulty with the audio portion of his later appearance by computerized face time, he stated "it's very obvious from the photos" the fire on the porch "flashed over" and damaged the interior of the 8 house. When asked if, once flashover occurs, "is it scientifically acceptable to rely on burn marks, pour patterns, depth of char to determine the origin, path, intensity, or duration of the fire" he responded "Absolutely not." In People v. Higginbotham, 21 Mich App 489 (1970), the defendant was convicted of breaking and entering with intent to commit larceny. A co-defendant filed an affidavit exonerating the defendant and alleging information was withheld from the trial which would have absolved the defendant. The trial judge denied a motion for a new trial based on this newly discovered evidence. The Court of Appeals affirmed, stating the defendant was seen leaving the building and was never out of the officer's sight. "In view of such testimony, it cannot be said that a different result would be probable. A new trial is not required.,, In People v. Lewis, 26 Mich App 290 (1970), defendant was convicted of znd degree murder. In his motion for a new trial, the defendant included an affidavit from a witness alleging the defendant acted in self- defense. The Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of a new trial on the alleged newly discovered evidence and stated "In light of the eight witnesses at the first trial, we are unable to say that one new witness telling a substantially different story renders a different verdict probable." In the case of People v. Mechura, 205 Mich App 481 (1994) the defendant was convicted of 1st degree murder. Defendant filed a motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence that alleged a witness had perjured herself on the stand. The trial judge denied the motion because he did not believe this new testimony would have 9 changed the result. The Court of Appeals reversed and granted a new trial. "The new testimony would have provided corroboration of defendant's theory of self-defense .. We cannot say that the newly discovered evidence probably would not have resulted in a different verdict." In the case of People v. McAllister, 16 Mich App 2317 (1969), defendant was convicted of damaging a safe and breaking and entering. He moved for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence which was an affidavit of another that he and an accomplice committed the crime. The trial judge denied the motion. Relying on the four factors set out in People v. Keiswetter, 7 Mich App 334 (1967) and set forth above, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision and remanded the case for a new trial, holding the statement in the affidavit "was newly discovered and is not cumulative. It goes to the heart of McAllister's defense which is that he did not commit the crime." In the case of People v. Clark, 363 Mich 643 (1961 ), the defendant killed her oldest child on June 8, 1957. She was charged with first degree murder. The defense was insanity. A "sanity commission" was ordered to examine the defendant. The doctors on the commission examined defendant on July 18, 1957, and filed their report the same day, finding that the defendant was sane at the time of the crime and was competent to stand trial. Trial by jury resulted, on Nov ember 1, 1957, in a verdict of first degree murder. An amended motion for a new trial was filed on September 25, 1959. Attached 10 to the motion were affidavits of a news reporter and the night superintendent of Detroit Receiving hospital containing their observations of the defendant's condition and conduct on the night of the murder, concluding "she definitely was not in her right mind" and "she definitely did not realize what had happened, that she was mentally unbalanced." The prosecution opposed granting a new trial arguing the facts in the affidavits were cumulative and that "it is highly improbable the mere substance of these affidavits would be sufficient to cause a different verdict on another trial." The Court reversed the conviction and ordered a new trial, stating "the newly-discovered evidence would not be cumulative but would constitute the only direct evidence as to her sanity on the date of her alleged commission of the crime . ... and it is reasonable to assume it might effect a different result on a retrial of the cause." There are a number of other cases dealing with the requirements of granting a new trial for newly discovered evidence, but the analysis in the above cases is sufficient for the purposes here. The scientific developments and NFPA 921 are newly discovered evidence in this case; they are not cumulative; diligent efforts were made to discover evidence contrary to that of the prosecution's experts. In their proposed finding, the People argue the question of whether flashover occurred is "of little value to the analysis at hand. Indeed, none of the evidence and arguments regarding the changes in fire science presented by the defense are dispositive enough to have rendered the jury's verdict BASELESS." (emphasis 11 supplied) That is not the test to be applied. The test is whether the newly discovered evidence would render a different result probable on a retrial. This court finds that because of (1) the prosecutor's acknowledgment that he would have changed his approach and not used certain portions of the evidence that he did use; (2) the adequate rebuttal of Mr. Smith which could be used by the defense to the time line and multiple points of origin theories; (3) Ms. Mony's actual testimony and, most importantly; (4) the body of scientific knowledge and expert opinion that now exists regarding cause and origin of arson fires, a different result on retrial is probable. A different result is not guaranteed but, as argued by Mr. Blumer, anything is possible. As the Supreme Court concluded in the Clark decision, however, uit is reasonable to assume it might effect a different result on a retrial of the cause.,, That is the situation in the case at bar. The motion is granted. The prosecution is given 90 days following the issuance of this Finding or the conclusion of the final appellate challenge, whichever last occurs, to determine whether to retry the defendant. Failure to do so will result in the case being dismissed and the defendant discharged from prison. Dated: ,.<!t>V. 7 , 2014 12
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