Economic Research Week in Focus 9 January 2015 Greece: Answers to the main questions There are many questions surrounding the current situation in Greece What is likely to happen politically in the coming weeks? Will the elections delay ECB government bond purchases? Is the government about to run out of money? How likely is a second haircut? Will Grexit happen? We give some answers to the main questions on investors’ minds at present. Page 2 The Week in Focus in 100 seconds Please follow this link for a video summary. Greek election: SYRIZA is in the lead Share in votes according to polls 38 36 34 32 30 28 26 24 22 20 1–3 Dec 8–9 Dec 9–10 11–12 11–14 10–17 17–18 19–21 20–23 26–28 29–30 03-Jan Dec Dec Dec Dec Dec Dec Dec Dec Dec Nea Dimokratia (N.D.) SYRIZA Source: Polls by Pro-Olympic Circles, Voice, Palmos Analysis, Interview, Rass, PaMak; Commerzbank Research Forecast changes: At our monthly forecast meeting, we have lowered our oil price forecast. The price of Brent oil should mark new lows in the spring and climb towards 75 dollars (previously: 85) in the second half of the year amid increasingly unprofitable US shale oil production. We have reduced our inflation forecast for 2015 accordingly. For the euro zone, we now expect a negative inflation rate of -0.1% (previously: +0.1%). This fuels speculation that the ECB will loosen monetary policy further and we therefore predict more weakness for EUR-USD (year-end: 1.12; previously 1.15). Page 15 Product Idea: Knock-into forward EUR-NOK. Uncertainty surrounding the oil price trend and its impact on the Norwegian economy and monetary policy are putting depreciation pressure on the NOK. We recommend a knock-into forward to NOK sellers to hedge against this risk. Page 5 Outlook for the week of 12 to 16 January 2015 Economic data: The US data releases due in the week ahead should underpin the economic recovery. However, we can expect weak December figures for retail sales and industrial production although the underlying trends remain positive. Page 8 Bond market: Ongoing €QE speculation and uncertainty surrounding Greece should keep Bunds supported over the coming weeks and we expect new yield lows. Peripherals, on the other hand, are likely to remain under pressure. Page 11 FX market: The euro is currently trading like a commodity currency since the oil price decline runs the risk of triggering long-term euro zone deflation, which might prompt ECB expansion measures beyond those already priced in. Page 12 Equity market: Equities are likely to perform relatively well in 2015, primarily as a result of attractive dividend yields but also due to decent earnings growth. Page 13 Commodity market: We look for the collapse in the oil price to level out next week, partly due to the fact that the EIA is likely to trim its expectations for US oil output. Page 14 For important disclosure information please see page 17. research.commerzbank.com / Bloomberg: CBKR / Research APP available Chief economist Dr Jörg Krämer +49 69 136 23650 [email protected] Editor: Peter Dixon +44 20 7475 4806 [email protected] Economic Research | Week in Focus Greece: Answers to the main questions Dr Jörg Krämer Tel. +49 69 136 23650 Christoph Weil Tel. +49 69 136 24041 There are many questions surrounding the current situation in Greece: What is likely to happen politically in the coming weeks? Will the elections delay ECB government bond purchases? Is the Greek government about to run out of money? How likely is a second haircut? Will Grexit happen? We give some answers to the main questions on investors’ minds at present. How long will the political uncertainty last? As the Greek election campaign reaches fever pitch, all eyes are on the opinion polls. The final ones will be published on 23 January, just two days before the election (Table 1). Even so, the outcome of the election remains uncertain. For one thing, polls have not proven very reliable in the past. Furthermore, it is unclear whether the small parties will gain the 3% of the vote required for them to enter parliament (Table 2, page 3). What is relatively certain though is that no party will achieve an absolute majority of parliamentary seats. In the days after the election, the Greek President will call on the leader of the largest party to form a coalition. The pressure will be intense as he has only three days to do so. If he fails to form a government, the President can transfer the mandate to another party leader. If no government is formed, new elections will be held within 30 days, as was the case in 2012. In the best case, Greece would have a new government by mid-February, in the worst case new elections will be held in mid-March. On the other hand, there is little risk that Greece will fail to elect a new President; unlike the failed presidential election in December, the election ultimately cannot fail as in the event of a third ballot the candidate securing the majority of MPs votes is considered elected. ECB: Will the Greek problems delay QE? The Greeks will elect a new parliament on 25 January. Three days before, on 22 January, the ECB Governing Council will meet. Should it decide – as many expect – in favour of broad-based government bond purchases (QE), the radical left party SYRIZA could convince Greek voters that such purchases lower the risk of turmoil if a SYRIZA government were to embark on a collision course with the EU. It cannot be in the ECB’s interests for SYRIZA to hold such carte blanche. To avoid this problem, the ECB Governing Council could postpone the QE decision to a later date. But one argument against this is that further parliamentary elections in Greece could take place in mid March if it is not possible to form a new government after the election on 25 January, which implies that the ECB would also not be able to decide on QE at its meeting on 5 March. The ECB will not want to have the timing of its decisions dictated by the vagaries of Greek politics. The ECB will therefore presumably announce QE on 22 January. TABLE 1: Key political dates Date Event 23 January Publication of final election polls 25 January Parliamentary elections In the days thereafter President calls upon the winner of election to form a government. The election winner has three days to do so. Mid-February New government or dissolution of parliament and new elections within 30 days. Extension of the second adjustment program which expires at end-February. The agreement of the German parliament is needed. 24 February Latest date for constituent meeting of new parliament Election of President by the new parliament as soon as it is constituted as a body. 28 February End of current rescue programme Mid-March Should no government coalition be formed: new parliamentary elections Source: Commerzbank Research 2 9 January 2015 Economic Research | Week in Focus TABLE 2: Possibly eight parties in the new parliament Party Average of all published polls since 29 December N.D. 29.3 25.0 SYRIZA 34.5 35.0 PASOK 4.7 2.2 KIDISO - 4.8 First poll after division of PASOK1) Votes in per cent Independent Greeks 3.0 2.5 Golden Dawn 6.4 8.6 DIMAR 0.9 - KKE 5.7 5.0 Potami 6.0 4.0 1) Survey of Pro-Olympic Circles, Source: Voice, Palmos Analysis, Interview, Rass, PaMak, Commerzbank Research However, to avoid the impression of a carte blanche for SYRIZA, the ECB could decide that any losses from the purchase of government bonds will not be allocated to national central banks according to the capital key, as usual, but that every national central bank would buy the bonds of its own country at its own risk. The Greek taxpayer would ultimately be liable if bonds bought under QE were to default. ECB chief economist Praet has called this a feasible solution, which is significant given that he is seen as belonging to the inner decision-making circle around ECB president Draghi. Less likely in our view is the scenario in which the ECB Governing Council solves the problem of the carte blanche by buying only bonds from countries with a high credit rating. This would contradict its unstated target of supporting countries with high debt. The proposal not to buy bonds from countries which are under the supervision of the troika (comprised of the EU, IMF and ECB), the so-called programme countries, is also unlikely in our opinion as Portugal and Ireland would then be disadvantaged relative to other countries. Is the country about to run out of money? Some observers fear that the Greek state will run out of money if it takes a considerable time to form a government; as long as no effective government is in power, there is unlikely to be any fresh financial aid. The last tranche of the EFSF loan (€1.8bn) and the yet-to-be-paid tranche of the IMF (€3.5bn) will only flow when the Troika has reached agreement with the Greek government on the 2015 budget and the implementation of further reforms. Before then, euro finance ministers will have to further extend the rescue programme, due to expire at the end of February; otherwise the last tranche and the €10bn remaining in the bank rescue fund would be forfeited. That said, the Greek state would not go bankrupt in the near term even without the financial aid. In the first three months of the year expenditures (ex. debt servicing costs) are more or less covered by current revenues. Greece’s finance minister should be able to scrape together the funds for the interest payments and repayments (€4.5bn; Chart 1, page 3) that are due in the first quarter. At the end of September, he still had around €2bn in the till. The rest of the money can be borrowed on the money market and from Greek banks. If need be, the finance minister will delay paying current bills to suppliers. Larger debt repayments are then not due until July (around €3.5bn) and August (around €3bn). How likely is a further haircut? Irrespective of the election outcome, a new government will demand further relief from the euro countries on Greece’s public debt, which currently stands at over 175% of GDP. The government can refer to assurances made by euro finance ministers to consider further relief if the budget is running a primary surplus, which is currently the case. It is likely that agreement will be reached to further extend the maturities of the loans from the EFSF and euro countries, although these already exceed 30 years on average. Moreover, interest could be reduced – symbolically – by another few basis points although Greece already does not have to pay interest on EFSF loans (141bn euros) until 2022. However, euro finance ministers will not agree to a formal waiver of debt as politicians in creditor countries such as Germany would then have to explain to their voters that the assistance loans have been lost, contrary to what has always 9 January 2015 3 Economic Research | Week in Focus been maintained. This would be very unpopular and would strengthen euro sceptic parties such as AfD (Alternative for Germany). In the case of private creditors, we believe a second haircut is unlikely (Chart 2). The damage this would cause would be much higher than the actual savings; private creditors currently only hold government bonds worth slightly over €36bn (just over 10% of public debt), for which Greece has to pay an average interest of only 3% until 2020. Will there be a further rescue programme? The additional debt relief will probably be a part of a new rescue programme which is likely to have a three-year term and a volume of €10bn. To this end, the unused funds of the bank rescue fund will be reallocated. This has the advantage that no new loan assurances will be needed from euro finance ministers. Furthermore, the creditworthiness of the Greek state will be strengthened by a so-called Enhanced Conditions Credit Line (ECCL) of the ESM rescue fund. This presupposes, however, that Greece undertakes to maintain its reform course. In return, a softer austerity course is likely to be agreed. A lower primary surplus will ensure a slow reduction of the public debt ratio, but will give the new government more scope with expenditure. And this is precisely what the SYRIZA leader Tsipras wants. The residual risk of Grexit In our base scenario (likelihood of 75%) we expect Greece to remain within the Monetary Union, even under a government led by SYRIZA. Firstly, Greece will not want to lose the support of the EU. Secondly, the governments of creditor countries are prepared to reach a compromise with Greece because they do not want to have to explain to their voters that assistance loans have been lost in the case that Greece leaves the Monetary Union. That said, the possibility cannot be ruled out that negotiations on a new rescue programme will break down and Greece will leave the Monetary Union (likelihood of 25%). If savers in Greece expect an exit, they will immediately withdraw their euro credit from Greek banks. Without ECB support, banks would very quickly become illiquid and would have to close their counters. In this case, the only option left for the Greek state would be to refloat banks swiftly with an own currency. But they could not prevent the Greek economy from collapse. CHART 1: Debt service totals 3.6bn euros in Q1 CHART 2: Public creditors hold 80% of Greece’s 322bn public debt Repayment and interest payments in € bn in € bn, grey bars: public creditors 0.8 150 0.7 125 0.6 100 0.5 75 0.4 0.3 50 0.2 25 0.1 0 0.0 EFSF 13 Jan 1 Feb 12 Feb 24 6 Mar 13 Feb Mar Source: Bloomberg, IMF, Commerzbank Research 16 Mar 20 Mar 20 Mar euro countries IMF ECB PSI & new GGBs T-bills others Source: IMF, ESM, Greek Finance Ministry, Bloomberg, Commerzbank Research 4 9 January 2015 Economic Research | Week in Focus Product idea: Knock-into forward EUR-NOK Thu Lan Nguyen Tel. +49 69 136 82878 Hedging with additional participation in rising prices The Norwegian krone was strongly hit by the rapid slide in oil prices last month. Uncertainty surrounding the oil price trend and consequently also the Norwegian economy and monetary policy pose high depreciation risks for the NOK in the near-term. We recommend a knock-into forward to NOK sellers to hedge against this risk. With the petroleum sector generating around one quarter of Norwegian GDP, the slump in oil prices is a considerable drag on the economy. Although a combination of krone weakness, the Norges Bank’s surprise rate cut last month and more expansionary fiscal policy have reduced economic woes, there are several reasons to believe that the Norwegian economy is not yet out of the danger zone. Given that – contrary to Norges Bank expectations – the oil price has fallen further since the start of the year, the central bank is very likely to lower its key rate once again. A rate cut of 25 basis points over the course of the year is already priced into the market. Yet there is the risk that the economic outlook might deteriorate in a way that will prompt the Norges Bank to cut its key rate more aggressively. After all, it is still unclear to what extent the lower oil price will dampen the mainland economy which has so far benefited from oil sector-driven demand. Moreover, ongoing low, or even further declines in, oil prices threaten to weigh further on investment in the Norwegian oil sector than assumed so far. Central bank governor Øystein Olsen has indicated that it would take a Brent oil price recovery to over USD 70 $/barrel to reduce the pressure on the central bank. Owing to these economic risks and thus the risk of more aggressive rate cuts by the Norges Bank we believe the risk of the krone depreciating further remains high near-term. Medium- to long-term, however, the NOK should strengthen again against the EUR. For one, the ECB – potentially as soon as at its next meeting – is likely to decide on broad-based government bond purchases, which will weigh on the EUR. For another, our commodities analysts are looking for oil prices to recover considerably over the course of the year. We advise NOK sellers to hedge against another strong near-term krone depreciation through a knock-into forward which also allows for a certain participation in any appreciation of the krone. Product idea: European knock-into forward with ratio for an exporter in EUR-NOK Spot rate (example) 9.0400 Hedging rate (worst case) 9.1000 Lower barrier (knock-in) 8.5500 Hedging nominal EUR 100,000 Leverage ratio 1:2 Term 6 months Costs Zero cost The European knock-into forward guarantees a fixed hedging rate of 9.10 (worst case). If EUR-NOK trades above the worst case at the expiry date, settlement will take place at this rate. If, at the expiry date, the fixing trades between the worst case and the knock-in (8.55), the investor may participate in favourable spot performance or potentially refrain from the currency exchange. If, at maturity, EUR-NOK touches or falls below the knock-in rate (8.55), a leveraged foreign currency sale will take place at the worst case rate (9.10). 9 January 2015 5 Economic Research | Week in Focus Major publications from 5 – 8 January 2015 Economic Insight: Will Grexit happen? The likelihood of Greece exiting the Monetary Union has increased. However, a government led by the radical leftish party SYRIZA is not certain. Furthermore, after gruelling negotiations, it will still be in the interests of both Greece and EMU countries to reach a compromise. Greece could then still get help and the EMU countries would not have to explain to their voters that the assistance loans have been lost. We rate the likelihood of Greece leaving the Monetary Union at less than 25%. more Economic Insight: ECB – Meeting schedule, rotation, minutes, and what else is new in 2015 At the start of 2015, the ECB Council will likely not only announce broad-based purchases of government bonds. There will also be several formal changes at the central bank. Probably the most important of them are that the ECB will only make monetary policy decisions every six weeks and that there will be a rotation of voting rights on the Council. The latter should cause the doves’ lead on the Council to shrink to some extent, but without jeopardising their majority. How helpful the written accounts of the ECB meetings will be may only become clear after the first release in mid-February. more Credit Note: EU Banks – Basel attempts to revive trust in RWAs Late in 2014 the Basel Committee proposed a new methodology for banks to calculate their riskweighted assets (RWAs). The purpose of this step is to remedy existing shortcomings and to improve confidence in banks’ RWA calculations. The crucial point of the overhaul is the Standardised Approach banks use to measure their credit exposure aiming to become more risk sensitive and comparable. A change could have material consequences for banks’ capital requirements, lending practices and even business strategies. more Credit Note: Hallo, Servus and welcome, BRRD! The implementation of the BRRD by 31 December 2014 is another milestone in breaking up the nexus between banks and their sovereign. Rating agencies now plan to remove or reduce government support assumptions included in ratings, which could lead to substantial rating downgrades. However, the aggregate rating impact should be limited due to simultaneous favourable rating methodology adjustments that work in the opposing direction. more FX Hotspot: GBP: What does Brexit mean for sterling? The prospect of the UK leaving the European Union could come into sharp relief later this year. Should the Conservatives retain power following the general election, they have promised to hold an in/out referendum on EU membership. Assuming that the UK votes in favour of leaving the EU, we outline the steps that European companies should take now in order to hedge sterling exposures. more FX Hotspot: ARPI² update – Falling oil price continues to unsettle markets Compared to last week, the ARPI² rose by 0.5 points. In particular, commodity and money market risks increased. Falling oil prices due to news about supply increases in Russia and Iraq continued to unsettle markets. Uncertainty on money market increased due to QE expectations. more 6 9 January 2015 Economic Research | Week in Focus Preview – The week of 12 to 16 January 2015 Time Region Indicator Period Forecast Survey Last Monday, 12 January 2015 07:30 FRA Business confidence (Bank of France) Dec 97.0 – 97.0 Tuesday, 13 January 2015 09:30 GBR CPI Dec yoy 0.8 0.8 1.0 CPI CPI ex. Tobacco Industrial production Dec Dec Nov yoy -0.2 125.4 0.4 – – 0.3 0.3 125.7 0.1 Retail sales Retail sales excl. autos Machinery orders Dec Dec Nov -0.3 -0.4 4.0 -5.7 0.1 0.2 5.0 -6.7 0.7 0.5 -6.4 -4.9 Wednesday, 14 January 2015 07:45 FRA 10:00 EUR • 13:30 USA 23:50 JPN mom, sa yoy mom, sa mom, sa mom yoy EUR: European Court of Justice gives non-binding assessment on ECB’s OMT mechanism US: Federal Reserve releases Beige Book (19:00) Thursday, 15 January 2015 13:30 USA 15:00 Empire State Index PPI final demand Initial claims Philadelphia Fed Index Jan Dec 10 Jan Jan sa mom, sa sa sa 5.0 -0.4 290 15.0 5.0 -0.4 – 20.0 -3.58 -0.2 294 24.5 Dec Dec Dec Dec Dec Jan. yoy yoy mom, sa mom, sa mom, sa sa -0.2 0.8 -0.4 0.1 -0.1 95.0 -0.2 0.8 -0.3 0.1 0.0 94.0 -0.2 (p) 0.8 (p) -0.3 0.1 1.3 93.6 Friday, 16 January 2015 10:00 EUR 13:30 USA 14:15 15:00 HICP, final HICP excl. food and energy CPI CPI excl. food and energy Industrial production Consumer confidence (University of Michigan), preliminary Source: Bloomberg. Commerzbank Economic Research; *Time GMT (subtract 5 hours for EST; add 1 hour for CET). # = Possible release; mom/qoq/yoy: change to previous period in percent. AR = annual rate. sa = seasonal adjusted. wda = working days adjusted; (p) = preliminary; • = data of highest importance for markets 9 January 2015 7 Economic Research | Week in Focus Dr Christoph Balz Tel. +49 69 136 24889 Economic data preview: USA: Gasoline price slide depresses inflation and retail sales The US data releases due in the week ahead should underpin the economic recovery, but only at a second glance. The focus will likely be on the slide in gasoline prices, which dampens the inflation rate and retail sales considerably. In industrial production, a decline also seems to be on the cards due to special factors. But the underlying trend remains positive, both in US retail sales and in manufacturing. In the euro zone, we forecast a slight rise in industrial production. The collapse of the oil price is reflected in numerous US economic indicators. On a monthly average, gasoline prices, after adjustment for seasonal factors, fell by 10% in December relative to November (chart 3). First and foremost, this dampens inflation. In December, consumer prices probably fell by 0.4% on November (consensus: -0.3%). This would cause the inflation rate to drop from 1.3% to 0.6%. Excluding energy and food, prices are rising, though. The core inflation rate presumably rose from 1.7% to 1.8%, mainly because of rents. It is to be assumed that the gasoline price also had a notable impact on retail sales. On one hand, its decline lowered the value of sales at the gas pump. As a result, the total sales figure understates the underlying momentum in retail. On the other hand, consumers had more money left in their wallets. Accordingly, they probably increased their purchases of other items to some extent, though this does not apply to automobiles, where manufacturers have already reported a slight sales decline. But since it follows strong auto sales growth in November, this moderation is hardly surprising. On balance, we expect retail sales to fall by 0.3% on the month (consensus: +0.1%). As for industrial production, a special effect concerning utilities leads us to expect a decline of 0.1% for December compared to the previous month (consensus: 0.0%), which masks the encouraging underlying trend: An exceptionally cold November was followed by a relatively mild December (chart 4). For this reason consumers this winter turned on the heating earlier than usual. Energy production, adjusted for the usual seasonal pattern, therefore rose by 5% in November and probably came down sharply in December. This weather impact masks the encouraging underlying trend in industrial production, which would probably have come in higher in December if not for this temporary special factor. Euro zone: Slight improvement in industry Industrial production in the euro zone presumably rose in November by 0.4% (consensus: 0.3%). Although this is largely a countermovement to the decline in October, the rise in the purchasing managers’ index in December gives hope that the trend in this sector will point slightly up again in the next few months. CHART 3: USA – gasoline price in free fall Gasoline price, in dollars per gallon, seasonally adjusted according to consumer price index 4.0 CHART 4: USA – exceptionally cold November followed by mild December Deviation of national average temperature from normal level, weekly figures, in degrees Fahrenheit 8 6 3.8 4 3.6 2 0 3.4 -2 3.2 -4 3.0 -6 -8 2.8 2011 2012 2013 Source: Global Insight, Commerzbank Research 8 2014 Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Source: Global Insight, Commerzbank Research 9 January 2015 Economic Research | Week in Focus Central Bank Watch (1) Fed As expected, the minutes of the FOMC meeting on 16/17 December confirmed what was already known about sentiment within the Fed. It turned out that the interpretation of the new wording, i.e. the Fed being 'patient' in normalising monetary policy, presented by Janet Yellen at the press conference is shared by the FOMC members. The chairwoman had said that the Fed would not hike interest rates at the ‘next couple of meetings’. This implies that the earliest possible dates for this step to be taken are the meetings in April and June. We expect to see the first rate hike at the June meeting, accompanied by a press conference where Janet Yellen may comment in detail on the policy change and remove potential misunderstandings. Moreover, the minutes illustrate that FOMC members largely agreed that the labour market improved on a broad basis and that the slack has been reduced further. Consequently, they remained confident that the rate of inflation would approach the 2% target again in the medium term once the temporary effects of the low oil price peter out. At the same time, FOMC members stressed that future decisions would depend on data. Dr Christoph Balz +49 69 136 24889 CHART 5: Expected interest rate for 3-month funds (USD) 2,5 2,0 1,5 1,0 0,5 0,0 current Mrz 15 Jun 15 Sep 15 Dez 15 Mrz 16 Futures 08.01.15 02.01.15 Commerzbank TABLE 3: Consensus forecasts Fed funds rate Q1 15 Q2 15 Q4 15 Consensus 0.25 0.25 1.00 High 0.50 0.75 1.75 Low 0.25 0.25 0.25 Commerzbank 0.25 0.50 1.50 Source: Bloomberg, Commerzbank Research ECB Comments from ECB officials suggest that the ECB could opt for government bond purchases (QE) at its next meeting. ECB Chief Economist Peter Praet said that in an environment of negative inflation rates and fragile inflation expectations one cannot simply look through the fall in the oil price. He pointed out that there is also a risk of growth pessimism becoming more entrenched. He sees a risk of an “economic vicious cycle”. Regarding the two contingencies for further monetary policy action – that the measures taken so far have not had the intended effect and that the inflation outlook has deteriorated – he said: “Now we have a little bit of both”. The ECB will reassess this early in 2015. Generally, asset purchases in impaired markets would have a bigger effect in this context than purchases of bonds with AAA rating, he added. Buying bank bonds could raise concerns, given the ECB’s role of supervisor, but theoretically, the central bank could also buy indices where it has no control of the composition. For ECB President Draghi the risk of the central bank not fulfilling its mandate is higher than it was six months ago. The ECB is therefore making technical preparations “to alter the size, pace and composition of our measures in early 2015, should it become necessary to further address risks of a too prolonged period of low inflation”. Dr Christoph Balz +49 69 136 24889 9 January 2015 CHART 6: Expected interest rate for 3-month funds (EUR) 1,0 0,8 0,6 0,4 0,2 0,0 current Mrz 15 Futures Jun 15 08.01.15 Sep 15 02.01.15 Dez 15 Mrz 16 Commerzbank TABLE 4: Consensus forecasts ECB minimum bid rate Q1 15 Q2 15 Q4 15 Consensus 0.05 0.05 0.05 High 0.05 0.05 0.05 Low 0.05 0.05 0.05 Commerzbank 0.05 0.05 0.05 Source: Reuters, Bloomberg, Commerzbank Research 9 Economic Research | Week in Focus Central Bank Watch (2) Bank of England (BoE) The first MPC meeting of 2015 produced no changes but the backdrop against which the UK monetary debate is taking place has changed over the last month. Most notably, the inflation picture continues to weaken in the face of falling crude oil prices. The pump price of motor fuel last month posted one of its strongest declines in 25 years, which will be enough to push the December inflation rate (due for release next week) below 1%. The growth position is also less robust. Downward revisions to past data now suggest that the UK will post a growth rate closer to 2.6% in 2014 rather than the 3% which previously appeared likely, and the PMIs have shown signs of less dynamic growth at year-end. In this environment, the position of the two MPC dissenters pushing for a rate hike looks less tenable, particularly since there is more spare capacity in the labour market than suggested by the unemployment rate. Market pricing currently suggests that the probability of even one 25bps rate hike this year is little better than a 50-50 shot. Since the MPC is unlikely to take any risks against the backdrop of low inflation; a weak euro zone and less momentum in the domestic economy, this currently looks a reasonable assessment. CHART 7: Expected interest rate for 3-month funds (GBP) 2,0 1,5 1,0 0,5 0,0 current Mrz 15 Jun 15 Sep 15 Dez 15 Mrz 16 Futures 08.01.15 02.01.15 Commerzbank Source: Bloomberg, Commerzbank Research Peter Dixon +44 20 7475 4806 SNB (Switzerland) On 18 December, in a surprise move, the SNB lowered the deposit rate and the Libor target range in order to push threemonth Libor into negative territory. Its intention was to mitigate the appreciation pressure on the Swiss franc. But it did not work. Following temporary gains up to 1.2080, the euro-franc rate dropped back to 1.2005 at times. We assume that the SNB resumed currency market interventions on Tuesday to keep the exchange rate from sliding below 1.20. We stick to our view that the SNB will defend the 1.20 mark. For one, a stronger franc would undermine the SNB’s fight against deflation risks. For another, it would trigger book losses on the currency reserves accumulated so far, with the SNB – similar to 2010 – again at risk of being accused of gambling at the expense of the taxpayer. In hindsight, however, saying that the surprise rate cut was justified in order to defend the exchange rate probably was an error – one that the SNB will have to pay for with higher intervention volumes going forward. CHART 8: Expected interest rate for 3-month funds (CHF) 0,6 0,4 0,2 0,0 -0,2 -0,4 -0,6 current Mrz 15 Jun 15 Futures 08.01.15 Sep 15 02.01.15 Dez 15 Mrz 16 Commerzbank Source: Bloomberg, Commerzbank Research Christoph Weil +49 69 136 24041 10 9 January 2015 Economic Research | Week in Focus Michael Leister Tel. +49 69 136 21264 Bond market preview: The record hunt goes on! European bond markets keep chasing records. Ongoing €QE speculation and uncertainty surrounding Greece should keep Bunds supported over the coming weeks and we expect new yield lows. Peripherals, on the other hand, should remain under pressure as the likely €QE compromise could raise doubts regarding the effectiveness of the ECB purchases and issuance activity picks-up markedly. TABLE 4: Weekly outlook for yields and curves Bunds US Treasuries Yield (10 years) Moderately lower Moderately lower Curve (2 - 10 years) Moderately flatter Moderately flatter Source: Commerzbank Research Outlook for the Bund future, 12-16 January Economy ↓ Inflation ↑ Monetary policy ↑ Trend ↑ Supply ↓ Risk aversion ↑ Bond markets have got off to an excellent start in 2015. Yields in the euro zone, in particular, marked new record lows: Ten-year Bund yields dropped below 0.45% (chart 9) and the German yield curve is trading in negative territory up to the 2020 maturity segment. At the same time, ten-year US Treasuries fell below the psychologically important 2% mark again. The rapid slide in oil prices, as well as renewed uncertainty over Greece, have been the major drivers, with the unexpectedly low flash estimate of euro zone inflation in December implying that the collapse in energy prices will be reflected in consumer prices more quickly than assumed so far. Combined with the ongoing decline in market-based inflation expectations, the latest developments provide the €QE proponents around ECB President Draghi and Chief Economist Praet with further arguments for imminent action, especially with the ECB's Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF), due on 20 January, set to reveal a marked fall in survey-based inflation expectations and therefore likely to support recent market trends. Consequently, we expect the ECB to vote for government bond purchases on 22 January. The details of the purchase programme are becoming increasingly important though. To onboard internal critics, Draghi is likely to act solely on the basis of "whatever is politically feasible" this time around. The most likely compromise would be national central banks buying only their own domestic government bonds at their own risk. Such dilution is likely to weaken the effectiveness of €QE, as also illustrated by the significant widening of peripheral yield spreads this week (chart 10). Ultimately, investors hesitate to further expand their peripheral exposure at already historically low yield levels – especially with uncertainty surrounding Greece and the resulting risk of a political accident lingering on. The latest market dynamics look set to extend next week. Ongoing €QE speculation as well as uncertainty surrounding Greece should further support Bunds. By contrast, peripherals should remain under pressure for now, especially since the next few weeks will see heightened primary market activities as usual at the start of the year. CHART 9: Bund yields at new record lows again CHART 10: Yield of ten-year Bunds, in percent p.a. Peripheral countries under pressure Yield pick-up of ten-year Spanish government bonds versus Bunds, in basis points 1.4 240 1.3 1.2 215 1.1 190 1.0 0.9 165 0.8 140 0.7 0.6 115 0.5 0.4 Jul-14 Aug-14 Sep-14 Oct-14 Source: Bloomberg, Commerzbank Research 9 January 2015 Nov-14 Dec-14 Jan-15 90 Jan-14 Apr-14 Jul-14 Oct-14 Jan-15 Source: Bloomberg, Commerzbank Research 11 Economic Research | Week in Focus Ulrich Leuchtmann Tel. +49 69 136 23393 FX market preview: Why the euro is trading like a commodity currency With falling oil prices weighing on EUR-USD, the euro is currently trading like a commodity currency. The reason is that the oil price decline is seen as potentially triggering long-term deflation, which might induce the ECB to launch further expansionary measures beyond those already priced in. We have adjusted our forecast for EUR-USD to the new oil prices. TABLE 5: Expected weekly trading ranges Range EUR-USD Tendency Range 1.1550-1.2000 EUR-GBP 0.7700-0.7950 EUR-JPY 138.00-144.00 GBP-USD 1.4850-1.5300 USD-JPY 117.00-122.00 EUR-CHF 1.2000-1.2060 Tendency Source: Commerzbank Research In line with declining oil prices, long-term inflation expectations in the euro area are also on a downtrend (chart 11). This ought to set the alarm bells ringing at the ECB, as the market is signalling that the likelihood is increasing of a scenario in which the present oil price decline will catapult the euro area into a long-term deflation. The ECB believes that it has to act soon in order to avoid Japan-style conditions. After all, no central bank has a remedy once its economy has fallen into the deflation trap. The ECB’s problem is that the announcement of another QE programme (namely, broad-based purchases of sovereign bonds) is generally expected for January 22, after ECB President Mario Draghi clearly signalled such a move in a newspaper interview at the beginning of the year. Despite his indications, however, falling oil prices are still fully weighing on long-term inflation expectations. Apparently, markets believe that the expected QE programme is unlikely to substantially alleviate the deflation risks. Draghi has clearly indicated which effect the ECB aims to achieve, namely an extension of its balance sheet by around 1 trillion euro. Hence, one might have assumed that the FX marketrelevant benchmarks of the looming programme would be essentially public and should have been priced into EUR exchange rates. With deflation risks mounting against the backdrop of lower oil prices, there is a risk that the ECB might loosen its policy even further than expected, if oil prices continue to decline or if a recovery is not in sight. At present, the euro is consequently highly sensitive to falling oil prices and has dropped below the levels we expected for the beginning of the year. We have therefore lowered our EUR-USD forecast trajectory, particularly for the upcoming months (chart 12). CHART 11: Falling oil prices are weighing on long-term inflation expectations CHART 12: Forecast revision: EUR weakness to come earlier Market expectations of average inflation in the euro area between 2020 and 2025 (5Y×5Yof inflation swaps, ex tobacco); oil price: Brent in euro per barrel EUR-USD: historical comparison, our previous and new forecast up until year-end 2016 90 1.5 80 1.4 1.9% 70 1.3 1.8% 60 1.2 50 1.1 40 1.0 2012 2.2% 2.1% 2.0% 1.7% 1.6% 1.5% Apr-14 Jun-14 Aug-14 inflation exp. (lhs) Oct-14 Source: Bloomberg, Commerzbank Research 12 Dec-14 oil price (in €, rhs) 2013 EURUSD 2014 2015 old 2016 new Source: EBS, Commerzbank Research 9 January 2015 Economic Research | Week in Focus Ulrich Urbahn Tel. +49 69 136 41842 Equity Market preview: Corporate earnings to rise globally by 4-5% in 2015 We see a number of reasons why equities should continue performing well in 2015: Many businesses will probably pay higher dividends. We forecast a relatively attractive global dividend yield of 3 percent. Also, global corporate earnings should rise by 4 to 5 percent. This increase would support the equity market. In the new year, the environment remains favourable for equities. Our equity strategists expect the dividends of DAX companies in 2014 to rise by more than 12% on the previous year. In all, the 30 largest listed German companies should distribute more than €30bn in dividends – the estimate for the Allianz dividend alone amounts to €3.185bn for 2014. As for developed markets equities, the benchmark MSCI World, for example, offers a dividend yield of 3 percent. Moreover, increasingly widespread share buyback programmes and M&A activities should support equity markets. Equities are thus still (and despite the rapid rise over recent years) attractive compared to other asset classes such as bonds. We regard the macroeconomic framework as moderately positive. The global economy looks set to grow in 2015 at a similar pace to last year. Our economists forecast 3.2% growth, up from 3.1% in 2014, which is mainly attributable to stronger momentum in the US. Historical experience suggests that global GDP growth of 3.2% correlates with nominal earnings growth of around 5% (chart 13). But since prices are rising more slowly than in past years with comparable economic growth, our forecast for global earnings growth is for a somewhat more conservative 4-5%. Earnings are thus likely to rise, though less than the consensus expects (+8.3%), and so earnings expectations for the financial year 2015 will probably be revised further down in the coming months (chart 14). So, is the glass half full or half empty? We view the moderate earnings growth that seems to be on the cards as positive. Should the weakness in the oil market continue, there is, furthermore, potential to the upside for our earnings forecast, especially for businesses in the consumer sector, which will likely profit from the second-round effects of the low oil price. Given the shareholder-friendly policy of many businesses and the lack of alternative investments, we therefore maintain our positive view on equities. CHART 13: 3.2% global economic growth suggests 5% global earnings growth for 2015, … CHART 14: … and so negative earnings revisions look set to continue Simple correlation between global real GDP growth and global nominal earnings growth (historical correlation since 1980) Consensus earnings estimates for the MSCI World, in index points 40 135 30 130 20 125 10 120 0 115 -10 110 2015E -20 105 -30 100 +8.3% 2012 2013 2014 -40 0 1 2 3 4 5 Source: Datastream, Thomson Reuters I/B/E/S, IMF, Commerzbank Research 9 January 2015 2014 2015 Source: Datastream, Thomson Reuters I/B/E/S, Commerzbank Research 13 Economic Research | Week in Focus Barbara Lambrecht Tel. +49 69 136 22295 Commodities market preview: The oil market should take a breather The plunge on the oil market is expected to slow in the coming week; the US Energy Information Administration should trim its expectations of future US oil production. Sentiment on base metal markets risks remaining gloomy despite China’s rising metal imports. The wheat price could recover, though, if not only the quality of winter wheat is disappointing but also US acreage. TABLE 6: Trends in important commodities Per cent change 8 Jan. 1 week 1 month Tendency Commodity specific events 1 year short-term Brent (USD a barrel) 50.1 -10.6 -22.6 -52.2 EIA (13th), OPEC (15th), IEA (16th) Copper (USD a ton) 6135 -2.6 -4.2 -16.5 China: Trade balance Dec (13th) Gold (USD a troy ounce) 1206 1.7 0.2 -1.7 Wheat (USD a bushel) 5.77 -2.1 -3.5 -2.0 Estimate US winter wheat acreage (12th) Source: Bloomberg, Commerzbank Research The nosedive on the oil market continued at the start of the new year. In the first few days, the price of Brent dropped by 10% to 50 USD per barrel. Further price discounts by Saudi Arabia and a rising supply in Russian and Iraq at the end of the year weighed on prices. Once more, it is a question of when the price slump will curb supply. The three energy agencies publish their monthly reports next week. The most interesting will be the outlook of the US Energy Information Administration, which presents its first forecasts for 2016. In the past few months, the EIA has already markedly reduced its expectations for US production in 2015. In October, it was still expecting supply to be expanded by 700,000 barrels per day in the course of the year, while two months later, this had been trimmed to 260,000 barrels per day (chart 15). In 2016, supply should show a stronger reaction to the lower prices. Should the EIA hold out the prospect of stagnating or even falling US supply next year, this should lend support to prices, especially as demand should rise at a sharper rate than in the present year, partly because of the stimulus for the overall economy given by the price slump. We therefore expect the oil market to take a breather next week, especially as China’s oil imports should have risen sharply as buyers wanted to take advantage of the low prices. That said, we still fear further setbacks in the weeks ahead, not least amid an adjustment of high speculative net long positions, and we have therefore reduced our Brent price forecast from 67 to 50 USD per barrel in the first half of the year. However, against the backdrop of lower oversupply in the medium term, we expect prices to pick up considerably in the second half of the year. Base metal prices have also fallen as the new year gets underway. China’s trade data should give little impetus, although copper imports are likely to have posted a strong rise again. Indeed, the link seems to be a reverse one: the lower the price, the higher the imports (chart 16). We expect higher copper prices in the medium term. CHART 15: EIA first more optimistic, then more pessimistic Estimate of US monthly oil production, million barrels per day CHART 16: China’s import pull rises due to lower prices of late Thousand tons, USD per tonne 9.8 9.7 9.6 9.5 9.4 9.3 9.2 9.1 9.0 8.9 600 500 7000 400 8000 300 9000 200 Jan 15 Apr 15 Dec-14 Source: EIA, Commerzbank Research 14 6000 Jul 15 Oct-14 Oct 15 Jan-14 100 Jan-10 10000 Jan-11 Jan-12 Copper imports, l Jan-13 Jan-14 Copper price, r Source: Chinese customs authorities, LME, Bloomberg, Commerzbank Research 9 January 2015 Economic Research | Week in Focus Commerzbank forecasts TABLE 7: Growth and inflation Real GDP (%) USA Canada Inflation rate (%) 2014 2015 2016 2014 2015 2.4 2.9 2.8 1.6 0.2 2016 2.0 2.4 2.5 2.5 2.0 1.0 2.0 Japan 0.3 1.0 1.5 2.7 0.7 0.7 Euro area 0.8 0.8 1.0 0.4 -0.1 1.2 - Germany 1.5 1.1 1.5 0.9 0.7 2.4 - France 0.4 0.5 0.7 0.5 -0.1 0.7 - Italy -0.3 0.1 0.5 0.2 -0.4 0.7 - Spain 1.4 2.3 2.3 -0.1 -0.7 0.5 - Portugal 1.0 1.5 2.0 -0.4 -0.9 0.5 - Ireland 5.2 3.5 3.5 0.4 0.3 1.4 - Greece 0.0 1.0 2.0 2.5 -1.2 -1.5 United Kingdom 2.6 2.4 2.4 1.5 0.8 1.6 Switzerland 1.9 1.7 1.6 0.0 -0.6 0.5 China 7.3 6.5 6.5 2.3 2.0 2.0 India 5.8 6.2 6.2 6.5 6.2 6.0 Brazil 0.3 0.9 2.3 6.3 6.5 6.0 Russia 0.6 -3.7 1.6 7.8 11.3 7.2 World 3.1 3.2 3.5 • The ultra-expansionary Fed policy is boosting the US economy. At the same time, fiscal policy is at least no longer a headwind. We expect US growth to markedly accelerate. • Growth in China is decelerating on decreasing house prices and gradual policy adjustment. • The recovery in the euro zone will only continue at a slow pace. GDP growth will remain markedly lower than that of the USA. • EMU has survived the sovereign debt crisis, but is gradually evolving into an “Italian-style monetary union”. • Despite its current weakness, the German economy looks set to continue outperforming the rest of the euro area – partly because ECB target rates are much too low for Germany. • High unemployment in most countries is keeping inflation low for the time being. In the long term, however, inflation is likely to rise, as central banks have given up some of their independence. • •We cut our GDP forecast for Russia on lower oil prices and continued sanctions. TABLE 8: Interest rates (end-of-quarter) 08.01.2015 Q1 15 Q2 15 Q3 15 Q4 15 Q1 16 Federal funds rate 0.25 0.25 0.50 1.00 1.50 2.00 3-months Libor 0.25 0.30 0.75 1.25 1.75 2.15 2 years* 0.63 0.90 1.30 1.80 2.25 2.65 5 years* 1.50 2.20 2.60 2.90 3.10 3.30 10 years* 1.98 2.50 2.75 2.90 3.05 3.20 Spread 10-2 years 136 160 145 110 80 55 Swap-Spread 10 years 12 10 10 15 15 15 USA Euro area Minimum bid rate 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 3-months Euribor 0.07 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 2 years* -0.11 -0.10 -0.10 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 5 years* 0.00 0.10 0.15 0.15 0.20 0.20 10 years* 0.49 0.70 0.80 0.90 1.00 1.10 Spread 10-2 years 60 80 90 95 105 115 Swap-Spread 10 years 27 25 30 35 35 35 United Kingdom Bank Rate 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.75 0.75 3-months Libor 0.56 0.60 0.60 0.80 0.85 1.00 2 years* 0.43 0.65 0.80 1.00 1.20 1.35 10 years* 1.63 2.30 2.50 2.70 2.70 2.80 • Fed interest rate hikes are on the cards from 2015Q2, due to a continuously decreasing US unemployment rate and the expectation that inflation will gradually rise once the oil price has stabilised. • Since the Eurosystem balance sheet will probably not expand as expected by the central bank, and as inflation expectations are likely to fall further, we expect the ECB to announce broad-based government bond purchases during the first half of 2015. • 10y Bund yields are likely to stabilise around 1% later this year when the Fed communication changes but mark new record lows when the ECB announces QE in 2015. Thereafter, yields should rise gradually. The structurally low interest rate environment remains intact. • The focus on the Fed’s lift-off will put upward pressure on US$ rates. A return to 3% for 10y USTs is only on the cards for end-2015, though. The curve is in for a textbook-style flattening via the short-end in the coming quarters. • Risk premiums of peripheral government bonds are set to decline further. TABLE 9: Exchange rates (end-of-quarter) 08.01.2015 Q1 15 Q2 15 Q3 15 Q4 15 Q1 16 EUR/USD 1.18 1.16 1.14 1.12 1.12 1.11 USD/JPY 120 117 120 122 125 127 EUR/CHF 1.2010 1.2010 1.2020 1.2040 1.2050 1.2050 EUR/GBP 0.79 0.78 0.77 0.76 0.77 0.77 EUR/SEK 9.39 9.20 9.10 9.00 9.10 9.15 EUR/NOK 9.09 9.50 9.60 9.40 9.30 9.20 EUR/PLN 4.30 4.24 4.15 4.12 4.10 4.05 EUR/HUF 318 310 315 317 317 318 EUR/CZK 27.89 27.50 27.40 27.40 27.20 27.00 AUD/USD 0.81 0.82 0.81 0.79 0.77 0.78 NZD/USD 0.78 0.75 0.73 0.71 0.70 0.69 USD/CAD USD/CNY 1.18 1.19 1.21 1.20 1.19 1.19 6.21 6.22 6.22 6.17 6.13 6.08 • USD should further profit from the expectations of Fed interest rate normalization. Current USD rates have not priced in the speed of rate hikes that we expect. • The discussion about an ECB QE programme will not put much pressure onto the euro for the time being because the overall volume of ECB liquidity measures is already known. • CEE currencies are benefiting from a dovish ECB backdrop, meaning central banks have room to cut rates further. HUF remains the more vulnerable currency, while PLN and RON trade range-bound, and EUR/CZK continues to float above the 27.0 floor set by the CNB. Source: Bloomberg. Commerzbank Economic Research; bold change on last week; * Treasuries. Bunds. Gilts. 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