PDF - The EUI Times Online

T I MES
Summer 2014
times.eui.eu
Governing
Europe
not for
the fainthearted
Changing
climate,
changing
markets
Is money
ruining
sport?
PROFILES
OPINIONS
PUBLICATIONS
|
ntroduction
Welcome to the fifth edition of EUI Times, the quarterly electronic
magazine produced by the European University Institute in Florence.
In this issue’s feature section we interview Professor Brigid Laffan,
Director of the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, in the
wake of the May European Parliamentary elections. We also speak with
Vanessa Valero and Aleksandar Zaklan from the EUI's Climate Policy
Research Unit concerning environmental regulation and the economy.
In our final feature, Law Professor Petros Mavroidis and Political
Science Professor Sven Steinmo weigh in on money in sports.
The EUI Times Profiles feature Professor Richard Bellamy, the new Director
of the Max Weber Programme for Postdoctoral Studies. We also speak
to Economist Dr. Matthias Sutter about his work on the 'economics of
patience.' Finally, Dr. Ludivine Broch, Max Weber Fellow, describes her
historical work on French railway workers during the Second World War.
The Opinion section features contributions from three distinguished
EUI professors. Dr. Denny Ellerman, former director of the Florence
School of Regulation's Climate Policy Unit, examines recent American
efforts on climate policy. Professor Carlos Closa Montero, Director
of the Global Governance Programme's (GGP) research area on
European, Transnational and Global Governance, evaluates potential
consequences of secession or withdrawal vis-à-vis the EU in Spain
and Scotland. Finally, Professor Anna Triandafyllidou, Director of the
GGP Research Strand on Cultural Pluralism at the Robert Schuman
Centre for Advanced Studies advocates for greater cooperation among
member states in EU asylum policy.
As ever your thoughts and comments are welcome and can be sent to
[email protected]
I hope you enjoy the Summer 2014 issue of EUI Times.
Stephan Albrechtskirchinger
Director, Communications Service
T I MES
Summer 2014
 Features
4
GOVERNING EUROPE
NOT FOR THE
FAINT-HEARTED
RSCAS Director Brigid Laffan
discusses the political landscape
following the EU Parliamentary
elections in May
 Profiles
12Faculty
BELLAMY NEW DIRECTOR OF
MAX WEBER PROGRAMME
 Opinions
POLICY:
A FRAGILE AMERICAN
PRECEDENT
Denny Ellerman
15
CLIMATE
 Features
6 CHANGING CLIMATE, 9 IS MONEY RUINING
CHANGING MARKETS
 Profiles
THE ECONOMICS OF
PATIENCE
Ordinary Workers
SPORT?
Jean Monnet Fellows Vanessa Valero and Aleksandar Zaklan suggest economic solutions to environmental problems.
13Faculty
Richard Bellamy
 Features
Matthias Sutter
 Opinions
SYMPTOMS
Carlos Closa Montero
16
WITHDRAWAL
A look at money in sports from a
regulatory point of view
 Profiles
14Fellow
Ludivine Broch
 Opinions
SOLIDARITY AND
COOPERATION IN EU ASYLUM
MANAGEMENT
Anna Triandafyllidou
17
PROMOTING
18Publications
T I MES
Summer 2014
times.eui.eu
EUI TIMES
Summer 2014
Director: Stephan Albrechtskirchinger
Editor: Jackie Gordon
Writing: Mark Briggs, Nicholas Barrett
Web: Francesco Martino, Raul Pessoa, Federico Gaggero
Online: times.eui.eu
Email: [email protected]
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twitter: @europeanuni
Published in Summer 2014
by the European University Institute
© European University Institute, 2014
Governing
Europe
not for
the fainthearted
Changing
climate,
changing
markets
Is money
ruining
sport?
PROFILES
OPINIONS
PUBLICATIONS
on the cover: 2014 Conferring Ceremony
F
eatures
GOVERNING EUROPE NOT FOR
THE FAINT HEARTED
After delivering her State of the Union address,
Brigid Laffan, Director the Robert Schuman Centre
for Advanced Studies and the Global Governance
Program, watched closely as Europe redrew the
political maps with radical colours. In Britain,
France, Greece and Denmark populist parties
stormed to victory while the established order
floundered. Meanwhile, Brussels looks set to endure
weeks of negotiations between the Council and
the Parliament to appoint a new president of the
European Commission, testing the significance of
the Spitzenkandidat. So how does Laffan analyse the
new political landscape?
In the parliament, Laffan expects the established parties to be hemmed into a “grand coalition” to keep
the machine alive. “A majority in the parliament is
376 votes, the two largest parties alone will have 398
and if you add the liberals it’s 468. These are very
comfortable majorities.” Laffan calls this “the only
option” but is keen to stress that this is not going to
be ‘business as usual’. A coalition could easily provide the populist newcomers with a political and
rhetorical opportunity to further juxtapose themselves against the status quo, “It leaves all the rest of
the political space to the anti-establishment eurosceptic parties and they’re going to use this space.”
Since 2009, the eurosceptics have reached new levels of influence in their own countries and they will
all be keen to translate this into political power and
move beyond the status of the protest vote. This time,
according to Laffan, MEPs with domestic ambitions
will be under pressure to achieve more than remonstration at home and disruption in Brussels, “La Pen
wants to appear as if she could govern France and so
Brigid Laffan
whatever she does has to appear serious. Nigel Farage wants to have seats in Westminster, whatever he
does has to be serious. I don’t think they have the
luxury any longer of being the exotic additions to the
hemicycle.”
In the meantime the EU must resolve the problem
of the Spitzenkandidat and decide how best to juggle
the will of the Parliament with the priorities of the
European Council. Live televised debates were held
throughout the campaign between the candidates
representing the main groups in the European Parliament, with the implied notion of the triumphant
emissary becoming president of the European Commission. That would clear a path for Jean-Claude
Juncker, put forward by the victorious European
People’s Party and supported by Angela Merkel and
Brigid Laffan is Director and Professor at the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, and Director
of the Global Governance Programme, European University Institute. The text of her State of the Union
Address may be read here.
4
EUI TIMES | Summer 2014
the German press. But some critics are describing
this as a power grab by the parliamentary groups,
who would need to see Juncker approved by the European Council before seeing him assume office. Laffan considers Juncker’s appointment highly unlikely,
because it would represent a remarkable surrender
of power by the European Council, “If they concede
now they’ve conceded forever.”
Major obstacles for the ‘old school federalist’ Juncker, include the figure of David Cameron, the British
Prime Minister, who has promised to reform and
redefine the relationship between Britain and Brussels. He is strongly opposed to Juncker, who is firmly
in favour of greater integration, said to represent
the status-quo and unlikely to be enthusiastic about
Cameron’s vision for Europe. Speaking a few hours
after the election results were announced, the British Prime Minister loudly lamented the EU as “too
big, too bossy and too interfering”. French President,
Francois Hollande wasn’t far behind, describing
Brussels as “remote and incomprehensible.” The two
leaders, each recently stunned by electoral humiliation at the hands of eurosceptic MEPs, will now want
to be considered as opposed to any further integration. The European Council has a blocking minority, meaning they can keep Juncker locked out of
the commission and hire someone else, if enough of
5
EUI TIMES | Summer 2014
The major protagonists
“
might not have changed
but the chairs in
Brussels aren’t quite as
comfortable as they used
to be. Incumbency has
become more challenging
than ever before
”
them want to do so. At the same time the European
Council needs the Parliament’s approval, which creates a recipe for political stalemate. According to Laffan, this would mean that the parliament would have
to be compensated with a right wing appointment, at
the head of either the Council or the Commission, if
Juncker were to be rejected.
Laffan knows that whoever takes the big jobs at the
EU isn’t going to be able to relax, certainly not in the
political climate left behind by the elections in May.
The major protagonists might not have changed but
the chairs in Brussels aren’t quite as comfortable as
they used to be. Incumbency has become more challenging than ever before, “the question is, how do
you govern today in Europe without the electorate
kicking you? It’s not for the faint hearted.”
F
eatures
CHANGING CLIMATE,
CHANGING MARKETS
Scientists, political leaders and some business leaders have named climate change as “the biggest challenge we face”.
Extreme weather and rising sea levels, potentially
caused by climate change, pose threats to life and
property. But any serious response to this phenomena
is likely to change the economy. So why does an environmental problem require an economic solution?
Since the industrial revolution, increasingly cost efficient methods of harnessing natural resources have
gone hand in hand with economic growth. But we
are now looking to break that link.
As the US biologist E.O.Wilson put it: “destroying a
rainforest for economic gain is like burning a Renaissance painting to cook a meal.”
Tragedy of the
commons
We may put fences around our property and border
guards at national boundaries but some of the planet’s
resources, water and air are considered to be common
property and that can make them vulnerable.
This theory of the ‘Tragedy of the Commons’ was first
described by Garrett Hardin. After observing farmers grazing their cattle on public land, he suggested
that individuals acting independently and rationally
in their own self-interest behave in contradiction to
the group’s long term interest resulting in the depletion of common resources.
In the case of climate change, the extensive use of
fossil fuels damages the environment we live in, a
common resource. “It is essentially a problem of the
commons,” says Aleksandar Zaklan, a Jean Monnet
Fellow associated with the Climate Policy Research
Unit (CPRU) at the EUI. The CPRU works to gather
reliable statistics and analysis regarding EU climate
polices to assist and enable policy makers across the
continent and Zaklan has specialised environmental
economics, “You have a common resource that you
can’t punish people for using.”
With no charge and no individual responsibility,
there is no motivation to ensure its upkeep. When
the effect on the atmosphere isn’t taken into account
you are free to seek the most effective means of producing energy, for example, regardless of its impact
on that resource.
There is evidence from behavioural experiments
suggesting that under certain circumstances some
people will act in the common good but especially in
Vanessa Valero
Vanessa Valero and Aleksandar Zaklan are Jean Monnet Fellows at the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced
Studies where they are currently researching topics in environmental economics, including the EU’s Emissions
Trading System.
6
EUI TIMES | Summer 2014
large groups such behaviour cannot be expected. According to Zaklan, “You have way too many players
for this sort of behaviour.”
Regulation time
There is a cost to damaging the environment, but
it doesn’t appear on the balance sheet, even though
such activity is to the long term detriment, not only
to the abuser, but to all who use the resource.
“There is a clear market failure,” explains Vanessa
Valero, also a Jean Monnet Fellow associated with
the CPRU. “We don’t take into consideration the
negative externalities.”
“The free market is efficient only when there is no
market failure. As soon as market failure is identified
you have to regulate,” says Valero.
According to Valero there are two ways to regulate
emissions. “You can either regulate on price or quantity.” Regulating on price requires the imposition of
taxes, something the European Union is barred from
doing. Therefore a cap and trade system to regulate
quantity was introduced in 2005.
The European Union Emission Trading System places
an upper limit on the amount of carbon that can be
emitted in the EU. This amount is then divided up into
allowances each representing an amount of carbon. Allowances were divvied up among member states and
industries roughly in line with historic emissions levels.
The free market is
“
efficient only when
there is no market
failure. As soon as
market failure is
identified, you have to
regulate.
”
Essentially permits to pollute, these can be traded
between firms or saved for future use. Each year the
number of allowances available decreases creating a
scarcity. In 2013, for the first time, electricity companies had to buy their entire allowance rather than
receive free permits as was the case when the scheme
was first established.
The plan is to reduce the amount of carbon emissions
by 20 percent by 2020. Accompanying policies seek
to ensure 20 per cent of the EU’s electricity comes
from renewable energy and there is also a 20 per cent
improvement in energy efficiency, both by 2020.
The idea is spreading. US President Barack Obama
recently announced plans to dramatically cut carbon
pollution from power plants, and promote a cap and
trade policy. The move has been hailed as the most
significant step the US has taken towards tackling
climate change.
However, costs of reducing CO2 emissions are a definite concern. Additionally, its opponents continue to
doubt the scientific evidence.
The bottom line
Aleksandar Zaklan
7
EUI TIMES | Summer 2014
“It is natural that those who are negatively impacted by
climate policy are mobilising against it,” says Zaklan.
This is the natural consequence of regulation readjusting for market failure. Such policies are monetising the previously negative externalities, raising the
question: Who is going to foot the bill?
When companies were free to pollute, society paid
the cost in terms of damage to its resources. Now
People are myopic. You
“
need a public authority
that has a longer view.
If the question is
can the market selfregulate to take into
consideration climate
change; the answer is
definitely no.
”
companies are internalising that cost. It is appearing
on their balance sheets as a cost of production. The
price of raw materials, labour and facilities now sits
alongside how much they pay for the right to pollute.
However, the cost of production may be passed on to
the consumers.
“The big [energy] producers have less than perfect
competition,” says Zaklan. “They may charge the
consumer for the entire cost of regulation.”
But after years of running up bills for the abuse of
common, someone has to account for the damage.
Either we pay now, or we pass the cost onto the next
generation.
8
EUI TIMES | Summer 2014
“It is hard for those coming in 20, 50, 100 years to
argue with us,” says Zaklan. “We make the decisions.
If we decide to put the costs on them there is nothing
they can do about it.”
“The question is to what extent are you trying to be
fair to your grandchildren. Or to what extent are you
saying I maybe don’t care so much and I just want to
maximise my output, consumption, everything that I
can possibly get and they can deal with it.”
If we do delay, those who follow us will have a steeper bill to pay says Valero: “It might be much more
expensive in the future. The safest reply is we have to
do it as soon as possible.”
However little doubt remains in the scientific community, such certainty is not matched in the general
public. A perception has developed that we are sacrificing definite reward now to potentially solve possible problems later.
“People are myopic,” states Valero. “You need a public authority that has a longer view. If the question
is can the market self-regulate to take into consideration climate change; the answer is definitely no.
Regulation is something that is needed.”
Zaklan agrees and suggests such an approach is not
unusual. “Most markets are regulated. The idea that
the economy is totally free is a bit of a myth.”
“Without regulation we will never be able to solve
this problem.”
F
IS MONEY RUINING SPORT?
eatures
Bucking the trend of the global recession, the sports
industry has continued to go from financial strength
to strength over recent years. According to auditors
PricewaterhouseCoopers, the global sports industry
will generate €106bn in revenue in the period between 2010 and 2015.
It is increasingly easy to watch any match, in any
sport, from any league wherever you are in the world
either on television or online. Sports are breaking
out of their traditional national markets and ploughing new furrows, seeking new fan bases and markets.
Money is pouring into the industry. Yet two of 2014’s
showpiece sporting events have threatened to be
over shadowed by the cost of hosting.
February’s Winter Olympics in Sochi cost €38bn,
three times the price of the London Olympics two
years before and more than all previous Winter
Olympics combined. The games were widely accused
of being a vanity project by the Russian government,
and suffering from large scale corruption.
Meanwhile this summer’s World Cup in Brazil saw
protests throughout the ‘carnival of football’ over the
cost of the event and failure to deliver on planned
infrastructure projects for the benefit of the country
after the finals have finished.
Has sport become a plaything of the super rich? Do
investments raise standards, or isolate games from
their traditional fan base, losing what makes them
special in the process? Is money ruining sport?
Back home
The amount of money currently in football is growing
at a phenomenal rate. This year the English Premier
League awarded the team who came bottom of the
league 60 million pounds in prize money. The same
amount awarded to last year’s winners. Last summer
Real Madrid paid 100 million euros for Gareth Bale,
and this year Lionel Messi signed a new contract with
Barcelona reported to be worth €20m a year.
Europe’s most prestigious club competition is being
increasingly dominated by the super-rich. Since 2007
there has never been more than one team per year in
the semi-finals of the Champions League which has
never been there before.
“For me Europe is like the Wild West when it comes to
sports regulation,” says Petros Mavroidis who on top
of his work with the Global Governance Programme
at the EUI is also on UEFA’s (Union of European Football Associations) Club Financial Control Board.
The National Football League, (NFL) the top American Football league in the US is one of the most heavily regulated of any league in the world. Salary caps,
revenue sharing, and player drafts didn’t stop the
league making profits last year of €6bn. In fact it may
have helped. Over the past 30 years 27 of the NFL’s
32 teams have played in the Super Bowl (the league’s
final) at least once. There is genuine unpredictability
Europe is like the Wild West when it comes to
“
sports regulation.”
9
EUI TIMES | Summer 2014
about results each week, which keeps fans interested.
In contrast the National Basketball Association was
less regulated and the league became dominated by a
few major teams. Between 1978 and 2011 only 8 different teams won the championship. Games between
these teams drew large television audiences, but the
rest of the league lost fans and the majority of the
teams were in debt. In 2010 the league adopted revenue sharing similar to the system used in the NFL.
Market share has increased, and now the majority of
teams generate a profit.
Financial fair
play
Money doesn’t guarantee success, at least not immediately. However the gap between those who spend
vast sums on players, wages, and facilities and those
who do not is becoming increasingly difficult to
bridge as the money involved goes up and is increasingly concentrated at the top.
Yet at the same time many other teams in lower
leagues struggle to pay their bills. In 2010 Portsmouth
Football Club faced a winding up order from the UK
tax office despite playing in one of the most lucrative
leagues in the world – The English Premier League.
The club only avoided closure by entering into administration with debts estimated to be over 100 million
pounds. They have since dropped to the third tier of
English football. A host of Spanish football clubs have
overspent and incurred large outstanding tax bills despite the country’s dire economic circumstances.
UEFA is currently implementing a new set of Financial Fair Play rules aimed at stopping, as UEFA President Michel Platini described it “financial doping”.
The idea is clubs are prevented from making huge losses
in pursuit of glory, at the risk of their financial stability.
However, the rules have been accused of endangering competitive balance, further entrenching the division between the rich and the poor clubs.
“What are the rules saying? They are saying ‘don’t
behave like a sugar daddy’,” says Mavroidis. “The
statutory objective is clearly financial stability. It has
nothing to do with competitive balance.”
Petros Mavroidis
“You won’t have the new kid on the block, the next
Manchester City,” who received massive investment
in 2008. They’ve since own the Premiership and the
FA Cup and are now regarded as the one of the richest clubs in the world.
The established elite have the infrastructure in place to
generate further income through global sponsorship
because of international television exposure. Clubs
lower down the league don’t have such opportunities.
“I think many of us are happiest when the underdog
wins,” says Professor Sven Steinmo, an expert in politics
and evolutionary theory. “As more and more money
comes into the game that becomes less and less plausible, and as more and more money comes into the game
the leaders at FIFA (world football’s governing body)
have fewer incentives to make the game a fair game.”
There seems little doubt the vast sums invested by
so called sugar daddies distort the market. But general investment can benefit sport in general, raising
standards on the field and improving the experience
of the viewing public off it.
“There is a lot of money in sport. I don’t think it
ruins it. At every level sport is practiced in the US
and the quality goes up year on year,” says Mavroidis. “Money is a means. You can use money to make
sport very attractive. We just need the proper regulatory framework within which cash injections have a
happy marriage with sport.”
Petros Mavroidis is Joint Chair Professor in the Law Department and at the Robert Schuman Centre for
Advanced Studies. He is Professor of Global and Regional Economics.
10
EUI TIMES | Summer 2014
As in sport so too
in life
Sven Steinmo
Teetering on the
edge
However the warnings signs of money’s corrupting
influence are stark. Last year Lance Armstrong faced
global revulsion when it was revealed the record
holding cycling had been involved in what was called
‘the most sophisticated doping programme ever.’
“Lance Armstrong didn’t ruin cycling,” states Steinmo. “It was the amount of money involved that made
it worth taking the risk. Worth being corrupted for.”
Corruption in its more traditional guise is also increasingly encroaching on to the playing field. Italian
football is still recovering from the extensive match
fixing revelations that saw the country’s biggest club
Juventus, relegated to the second tier and stripped of
two titles for their part in the scandal.
Sports such cricket, lower league football and rugby are
increasingly susceptible to so called spot fixing. Spot fixing involves betting on the timing or quantity of minute
details of a match, such as the timing of a throw in or
yellow card. Vast sums of money are then bet on the
event, raising suspicions of money laundering.
Ultimately whether you feel the amount of money in
sport has a detrimental effect depends on how you
view sport. If you regard its activities as the same as
any other entertainment then increased investment
helps to create a greater end product which will ultimately attract more fans which in turn generates
more income to even further enhance the product.
With the concentration of funds at the top of the
game the quality of games between those teams
would improve, but the local teams are likely to be
squeezed out. “There is something about having a local team and being a fan of that team, a shared local
identity that I think is valuable,” says Steinmo. “It is
hard to put a monetary value on that, but it is there.”
Research in the social sciences continues to show
equality rather than wealth is a more accurate indicator of happiness in societies. “We all want more
money, but the correlation between GDP per capita
and happiness is almost non-existent,” says Steinmo.
Those places with higher levels of inequality tend
to be unhappier. Similarly it is more fun to watch a
match, league or tournament where more competitors have a chance to win, where there is an element
of unpredictability about results.
Ultimately the sports industry’s commodity is competition. Once genuine competition is lost, so is the
appeal.
“It is not the money that is the problem, it’s the inequality. Inequality is ruining our society. Football
and sport is just one of the places you see it happening,” says Steinmo. “A tiny elite has a disproportionate amount of power. Sport should be the ultimate
place where a talented kid who works hard should be
able to make it.”
“Sport should be fair, and I don’t think it is anymore.”
Sven Steinmo is Professor of Public Policy and Political Economy in the Department of Political and Social
Sciences. He is currently running the large European Research Council project “Willing to Pay? Testing
Institutional Theories with Experiments”.
11
EUI TIMES | Summer 2014
P
rofiles
Richard Bellamy is the new Director of the Max Weber Programme. He joins the EUI after
seven years at University College
London during which time he established their Political Science
Department and European Institute. With his boxes of books still
unpacked, he discusses what lies
ahead for him and the programme
over the next five years.
“I was looking for a new challenge,” says Bellamy. “Something
different but that would also complement my academic interests as
well as my administrative capacities. I like building institutions.”
Despite these ambitions, he remains at heart an academic. Bellamy is hoping to establish thematic
groups of fellows, stimulating research and publications to which
Faculty
Director of the Max
Weber Programme for
Postdoctoral Studies
Bellamy hopes to contribute. “I
feel as though part of my identity
is being someone who is engaged
in ongoing academic research.” It
is an identity that compliments
the culture of the Max Weber Programme.
“If you are trying to encourage
people to enhance their research
profiles then you should have one
of your own.”
Bellamy is hoping to expand the
programme so that all fellows are
able to stay for two years if they
wish to. Currently only fellows
from the Department of Economics can automatically stay for longer than one year, and only because
they accept half the number of fellows as the other departments.
This would require an increase in
the programme’s funding, something Bellamy hopes will come
in part from the EUI’s member
states. While EUI member countries currently fund the Institute’s
PhD researchers, the budget for
fellows comes from the European
Union.
“The big challenge is for the member states to see funding the post
doc programme as important as
funding the PhD programme.”
One way to meet that challenge
is to further enhance the Max
Weber Programme as a mark of
excellence. “It’s about developing
all aspects of an academic career “
making it evident that completion
of the programme is not simply a
sign of a high achiever but ensuring employers want former Max
Weber Fellows because of what
the programme offers: “I want
people who are looking to hire
to think ‘we are getting an excellent researcher with an expanded
skill set.’ I hope this becomes the
programme that potential fellows
choose above all others.”
Bellamy was a PhD researcher at
the EUI in the 1980s, and feels
that now is a great time to return
to his alma mater.
“I suspect everyone who has been
here leaves a little bit of themselves in Florence.”
“There is a new president, new
director of the Robert Schuman
Centre, it is obviously going to be
a time of change and it feels good
to be a part of that.”
Richard Bellamy is Director of the Max Weber Fellow Programme for Postdoctoral Studies. He is on
exceptional leave from his position as Professor of Political Science at University College, London (UCL).
12
EUI TIMES | Summer 2014
P
Faculty
The economics of patience
rofiles
Matthias Sutter joined the EUI
last September as Professor of Applied Economics. His work as an
experimental economist explores
the behaviour of children and
teenagers. His latest book looks at
the correlation between patience
and life time achievement.
“The idea is to study how human
behaviour responds to incentives.
That is what experimental economics is,” explains Sutter.
Unlike in the animal kingdom,
humans form complex societies
cooperating with genetically unrelated strangers. “Of course we
care about our offspring, but on
top of this we are able to reach levels where get along in cooperative,
efficiency minded and sometimes
even vaguely altruistic ways.”
Many other experimental economists use undergraduate students
as participants in their experiments. By using young children
Sutter hopes to be able to ask fundamental questions about human
behaviour such as at what age
does the foundation for cooperation in society emerge?
Sutter’s research with children led
to his new book Die Entdeckung
der Geduld : Ausdauer schlägt
Talent. (The Discovery of Patience: Perseverance Beats Talent)
In a famous experiment at Stanford University children were offered the option of one reward
(such as a marshmallow) instantly,
or were given the option to wait 15
minutes to receive two rewards.
“Longitudinal studies have shown
children who were able to be patient have a higher probability
of being better educated, having
higher income, better health conditions.” The characteristic of being able to delay gratification increases the probability of greater
gratification in the long term.
In his original research for the
book, Sutter worked with teenagers and found the more impatient
ones were more likely to drink,
smoke and less likely to save money. “These are correlations, but
can go quite far in seeing how per-
sonality traits affect life chances.”
The marshmallow experiment
also showed that if the experimenter didn’t reward those who
waited with additional reward
the children would be unlikely to
show patience next time around.
“Patience depends on your personal perception of the probability of future rewards.” Patience is
a virtue, but not a steadfast rule to
be adhered to at all costs. “In some
cases it is rational not to wait.”
“What this book says is that, ultimately, those who have patience
are more likely to be successful in
the long term.”
Sutter’s interest in experimental
economics came about from a
quirk of his PhD research on voting in the excessive deficit procedure in the European monetary
fund. “I ran some analysis and my
supervisor said ‘I trust you calculations, but it would be interesting
is to see if people actually behave
like this. I ran an experiment and
found it fascinating to see how
people make decisions. It’s 15
years later and I still enjoy it.”
Matthias Sutter is Professor of Economics at the EUI. His research areas include Game Theory, Competition
and Markets, Decision Making, Experimental Economics, Microeconomics and Competition policy and theory.
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EUI TIMES | Summer 2014
P
Researcher
Ordinary Workers
rofiles
Ludivine Broch
is a Max Weber Fellow at
the EUI. Using
written and oral
testimonies, official and unofficial documents, national and local
archives, it challenged traditional
narratives of resistance and deportation in Nazi occupied France, and
unveiled lesser known aspects of
cheminot histories to give a more
nuanced narrative.
Why didn’t French railway workers
sabotage Jewish deportation trains
during the Second World War? This
is the question that drove Ludivine
Broch to her PhD and into her current research on the experiences of
being from ethnic minorities in Vichy France.
“This question has come on the
scene in France in the last couple of
decades,” says Broch. “There have
been questions of complicity of
railways and railway workers in the
Holocaust.”
From the outside it would appear
an obvious thing for workers in an
occupied country to attempt. Especially in hindsight with the horrors
of the Holocaust laid bare. In real-
ity there are more complex practical
and ideological considerations.
For a start sabotaging a huge 1940s
locomotive is extremely difficult. If
you did manage to stop the train the
logistics needed to free and hide the
number of people on the train also
proved prohibitive.
The workers also needed the functioning railway for their livelihoods,
and, according to Broch, had the reconstruction of post-war France in
their minds, again, for which they
would need the railways.
Broch’s work developed to explore
the relationships between the workers, Vichy, the state, the Germans,
German railway workers and themselves.
This work has been turned into the
book Ordinary workers: French railwaymen, Vichy and the Holocaust
due out next year in French and
English.
Broch’s next project seeks to greater
understand what life was like as part
of other ethnic minorities at a time
of great racial hatred across Europe.
France in the 40s and 50s is widely
regarded as a welcoming Republic where assimilation is encouraged. However Broch’s research is
revealing black immigrants from
the French colonies where both accepted and kept on the periphery of
society.
“The idea of France during the Second World War contrasts with the
racism of Germany and US, but actually if you look underneath, at railway workers for example, it was very
xenophobic.”
Many of the laws enforced by the
Nazis against Jews in occupied
France were also used against the
black minority. They were forced
to ride in the last carriage of trains;
were barred from certain jobs and
couldn’t cross the Demarcation line
between the Occupied North and
the Free Zone.
Despite her research focusing on an
extreme period in terms of race relations, Broch sees relevance between
her work and today.
“I think these questions about assimilation and integration in a republic
and its limits continue to be relevant
today, especially in France.”
“In Britain and France there is still
an obsession with the Second World
War and in that case my work is extremely relevant to public history,
memory studies, and commemorations.”
Ludivine Broch is a Max Weber Fellow affiliated with the Department of History. She completed her D.Phil in
2010 at the University of Oxford, and is a specialist on Vichy France.
14
EUI TIMES | Summer 2014
O
pinions
In early June,
the Obama Adm inist r at ion
issued its long
awaited ‘Existing Power Plant
Rule’ to address climate change by
reducing CO2 emissions from existing power plants by 30% by 2030 (as
measured from 2005) to kudos from
most environmentalists and foreign
observers but promises of opposition from important players in the
US political process. The proposal
is bold in its assertion of regulatory authority, but it also provides
extraordinary flexibility to states in
achieving differing, mandatory carbon intensity limits set by the federal authority. These intensity targets
are established by simulating reasonable improvements in coal plant
efficiency, increased use of existing
natural-gas-fired generating capacity, and modest increases in renewable energy generation and demand
side management. While the modeling underlying these targets presumably reflects an implicit carbon
price, states have complete flexibility in deciding how they will achieve
their targets. Moreover, the intensity
target can be converted into a massbased limit to enable the adoption of
CLIMATE POLICY: A
FRAGILE AMERICAN
PRECEDENT
a cap-and-trade program or joining
existing programs in the Northeastern states or California.
The timeline for implementation
is ambitious. After receiving public
comment, the final rule is to be
issued in June 2015 so that states
can submit their implementation
plans by June 2016 for review and
approval by the still incumbent
Obama Administration. In the best
of all worlds, everything would be
in place by January 2017 when a
new Administration will take over;
however, this is highly improbable.
In fact, the proposed rule itself
allows for requests from the states
for a one or two-year delay in the
submission of their implementation
plans.
While well thought-out and a
considerable achievement, the rule
has many hurdles to clear. They
are time and the always present,
fundamental legal and political
issues concerning the limits of
administrative discretion and
executive prerogative under the
U.S. Constitution. The legal issue
concerns the limits of administrative
discretion: How much latitude
does the Administrator of the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency
have in interpreting legislative
authority…in this case the now
nearly 50-year-old Clean Air
Act and a heretofore unused and
therefore judicially untested section
of the law. Recently, the Supreme
Court has tended to uphold the
EPA’s exercise of its discretion, but
not always and, in a recent case, the
court explicitly cautioned against
too wide-ranging an interpretation.
The political problem is closely
related and the same one that the
President is using to promulgate
the rule: executive prerogative. In
general, the Obama Administration
has taken the stance that if Congress
will not (or cannot) act, the executive
branch is justified in acting alone
to promote the public interest.
The problem is that if the political
vicissitudes return the Republicans
to the White House in 2016, the
same argument and precedent
will allow for greater prerogative
and discretion in hobbling if not
disabling the rule. Several years will
be required to resolve these issues.
Denny Ellermann was formerly a Senior Lecturer at MIT’s Sloan School of Management, and for many years
executive director of the Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research and the Joint Program on the
Science and Policy of Global Change. He has also been a part time professor at the EUI and director of the
Florence School of Regulation’s Climate Policy Research Unit, from which he recently retired.
15
EUI TIMES | Summer 2014
O
WITHDRAWAL SYMPTOMS
pinions
Secession and
withdrawal have
become highly
topical European issues due
to the processes
under way in Scotland and Catalonia and the debate triggered by UK´s
Prime Minister David Cameron,
suggesting a possible British withdrawal from the EU. These debates
concentrate on the position of withdrawing states and seceding territories vis-à-vis the EU.
In parallel to their support for independence, supporters of secession in
both Catalonia and Scotland reiterated their commitment to remain
within the EU. Some argue that
this should happen naturally without having to go through accession
negotiations, as mandated for new
members by article 49 of the Lisbon Treaty of the European Union.
However, new independent territories cannot claim an automatic right
to membership, although they may
construct a strong moral claim to
it. The emerging consensus among
scholars is that seceding territories
will become non-members and will
have to renegotiate their relationship
with the EU. An alternative would
be to negotiate the accommodation
of these new territories via treaty reform (i.e. article 48). This represents
an heterodox way to deal with the
inclusion of a new state (meaning
inter alia, its share in EU institutions
and bodies) which depends, first and
foremost, on the political good will
of the 28 members and, not least,
the succeeding state. In other words,
it is difficult to imagine that an EU
reform created for the sake of accommodating a seceding state can
be activated without the consent of
the succeeding state: in purely formal terms, the seceding territory
cannot be a party to reform negotiations. This ‘good will’ requisite places
seceding territories in different starting positions, depending on whether
the secession initiative is consensual
or unilateral.
Two other obstacles add difficulties
to the path of an internal treaty reform. First, the reform agenda may
not be dictated exclusively by the
withdrawing state: there may be payoffs to negotiate and compensation
to award to the members of the EU
club (as happened during negotiation of past treaties on enlargement).
Second, reform (as accession) has to
be unanimously approved by all EU
member states. In some cases, this
may imply referendums and the risk
of a failure during ratification cannot
be ruled out.
EU provisions on withdrawal create a similarly weak position for the
retiring state. Withdrawal is truly
an unconditional, unilateral right.
However, once exercised, the withdrawing state is left on its own: it
may remain a member for a twoyear period and negotiate its future
relationship with the Union. But if
no agreement is reached, nothing
will oblige the EU to grant a withdrawing state a privileged relationship and the “moral” case for right to
membership is also fairly weak. The
withdrawing state cannot exercise a
veto and EU member states may be
tempted to extract large concessions
in return for, say, a free trade agreement. These scenarios suggest that
withdrawal, rather than offering a
real option for independent membership, puts withdrawing states in a
worse position than before for renegotiating their relationship with the
EU. This is the real game. Whether it
will pay off remains to be seen (and
discussed in a future piece).
Carlos Closa Montero is the Director of the Research Area European, Transnational and Global Governance at
the Global Governance Programme.
16
EUI TIMES | Summer 2014
O
pinions
Asylum is a
common concern for both
Northern
and
Southern European countries.
Southern countries are exposed to
pressures at their borders because of
their geographical proximity to zones
of instability and conflict. Meanwhile,
Northern European countries have
traditionally been the preferred destinations of asylum seekers from all
over the world. Thus both groups of
countries have a common concern to
share this burden, and to look at the
problem from different perspectives:
Southern European countries simultaneously face the pressure of irregular
migration and asylum seeking and
have to find ways to effectively filter
applications. This pressure however,
leads countries like Greece to use detention as a standard measure with the
goal of deterring people from crossing
the country’s borders (regardless of
whether they are irregular migrants or
asylum seekers), holding people in appalling detention conditions without
respect for their fundamental rights,
thus seeking to pressurise the European Union to take responsibility.
Northern European countries are
better ‘protected’ from irregular migration because of their geographical
position and hence face mostly the
problem of properly processing ap-
PROMOTING MEMBER
STATE SOLIDARITY AND
COOPERATION IN THE
MANAGEMENT OF ASYLUM
plications rather than that of filtering
them at their borders. During the first
quarter of 2014, asylum applications
in the EU rose by 30% (compared with
the same period in 2013). Germany
accounts for more than 60% of this
increase while Sweden is the country
with the highest number of asylum applicants per million inhabitants.
Italy has stood out recently for its
policy on the matter: Operation
Mare Nostrum, costing over €10 million per month, has saved the lives of
tens of thousands of people traveling
from the Middle East, Africa and Asia
crossing the Mediterranean in search
of protection or better job prospects.
At the same time, during the first three
months of 2014 Italy has registered the
second highest increase in asylum applications within the EU (compared to
the same period in 2013).
There is an important gap though in
the asylum acquis: while rejections are
valid throughout the EU (the asylum
seeker cannot apply again in another
country), positive decisions do not
provide for an EU status. There is no
obligation for member states to recognize positive decisions by another
member state.
It is crucial therefore to promote
(through the European Asylum Support Office work) cooperation with
the southern member states that facing
the pressures of mixed migration and
asylum flows, whereby experts form
other member states work together
with national forces to sort and process asylum applications. Such joint
operations can lead not only to better
and faster processing but also build
trust among member states and thus
pave the way for mutual recognition of
positive asylum decisions. In addition,
creating a common EU status of refugee or person benefiting of subsidiary
protection is necessary so that asylum
seekers processed and recognised in
one country may move freely within
the EU and, if they wish to do so, relocate to another member state.
Mutual recognition of positive decisions would be the necessary incentive
and ‘reward’ for southern European
countries to put more effort and resources to improving their asylum
systems. At the same time, it would
ensure a proper implementation of
Dublin III and hence avoid the scenario whereby some member states in
northern Europe have to temporarily
interrupt the Dublin III provisions (i.e.
interrupting the so called “Dublin returns” to a southern country) because
of the inhumane and degrading treatment suffered by migrants in parts of
Southern Europe. This would allow
both groups of member states to feel
that their needs were being listened to
and addressed by the European asylum regime.
Anna Triandafyllidou is Director of the GGP Research Strand on Cultural Pluralism at the Robert Schuman
Centre for Advanced Studies (RSCAS). She is also the Scientific Coordinator of the Accept Pluralism project,
which looks into the concept, policies and practices of non-tolerance, tolerance and acceptance of cultural
and religious diversity in 15 European countries.
17
EUI TIMES | Summer 2014
P
ublications
Populism and Crisis Politics in Greece
Takis Pappas
Palgrave, 2014
Over the course of 2011 and 2012, Athens became the
flaming jewel in the crown of the Eurozone sovereign
debt crisis. A climate of punitive austerity measures
and near daily rioting brought the systematically dysfunctional nature of Greek politics to the world’s attention. The country had run a budget deficit every single
year since 1973 and the toxic debt to GDP ratio that
has existed ever since was hardly even addressed until
the outbreak of the recent global financial crisis. How
could democratically accountable leaders fail to address
the country’s unsustainable finances year after year and
decade after decade until it was all too late?
Professor Takis S. Pappas points the finger squarely at
populism. In his new book Populism and Crisis Politics in Greece, Pappas charts the historic proliferation
of irresponsible spending commitments following the
fall of the military junta in 1974 and the transition to
democracy that followed.
According to Pappas, the emergence of two highspending populist parties, each taking turns in power,
created and maintained an uncontrollable precedent of
excess. And because each party was able to effectively
satisfy its own political constituency with more spend-
ing, there was nobody left with an incentive to speak
out. In an interview with EUI Times, Pappas explains
that “The state, far from being an impartial promoter
of public welfare, became a resource to be appropriated
by individuals eager to enhance their own private wellbeing. Yet, because of the alternation in power of the
major parties, the system was anything but a zero-sum
game. In reality, all members of society gained when it
was their turn.”
This, says Pappas, is how the party managed to roll on
uninterrupted for decades before the titanic hangover
of 2012. One might be forgiven for wondering if Pappas
is lamenting the lack of a Thatcherite/Reaganite figure
to reign in a culture of big government, but that is far
from the picture being painted here. For Pappas, Greek
spending was usually closer to bribery than it was to socialism and represents a stark warning that “when voter
behaviour is motivated by populist (illiberal) values,
systematic prejudices, and the pursuit of short-term
self-interests at the expense of the public good, society
is eventually left worse off – and prone to crisis.”
With populist parties now gaining ground across the
continent, Professor Pappas could become a vital and
controversial authority regarding the future of European democracy.
Takis S. Pappas is associate professor of comparative politics in the Department of Balkan, Slavic & Oriental
Studies of the University of Macedonia, Greece, and, currently, a Visiting Fellow at the Department of Political
and Social Sciences of the EUI.
18
EUI TIMES | Summer 2014
P
SELECTED
EUI BOOKS
cadmus.eui.eu
ALCALDE
FERNÁNDEZ,
Ángel. Los
excombatientes
franquistas: la
cultura de guerra
del fascismo
español y la Delegación Nacional
de Excombatientes
(1936-1965) (Prensas Universitarias,
Zaragoza, 2014)
BELLAMY, Richard. Croce, Gramsci, Bobbio and
the Italian political
tradition (ECPR
Press, 2014)
FERRARA, Pasquale. La politica
inframondiale: le
relazioni internazionali nell’era
post-globale (Citta
Nuova Editrice,
2014)
RUBIO MARIN,
Ruth (ed.)
Human rights
and immigration
(Oxford University
Press, 2014,
Collected courses
of the Academy
of European Law ;
Vol. XXI/2)
19
EUI TIMES | Summer 2014
ARAJÄRVI,
Noora Johanna.
The changing
nature of customary international
law (Routledge,
2014)
CLARKE, Lisa.
Public-private
partnerships and
responsibility
under international
law : a global health
perspective (Routledge, 2014)
HOEKMAN,
Bernard M.
Supply chains,
mega-regionals and
multilateralism: a
road map for the
WTO (CEPR Press,
2014)
STOECKL,
Kristina. The
Russian Orthodox
Church and
Human Rights
(Routledge, 2014)
ublications
ELECTIONS
IN EUROPE
IN TIMES
OF CRISIS
Contributions from the
2013 EUDO DISSEMINATION CONFERENCE
Edited by
LUCIANO BARDI,
HANSPETER KRIESI &
ALEXANDER H. TRECHSEL
BARDI, Luciano;
KRIESI, Hanspeter; TRECHSEL
Alexander H. (eds)
Elections in Europe
in times of crisis:
contributions from
the 2013 EUDO
dissemination
conference (EUI,
2014)
DI BARTOLOMEO,
Anna; MAKARYAN, Shushanik;
WEINAR, Agnieszk
a (eds). Regional
migration report :
Russia and Central
Asia (EUI/RSCAS
Migration Policy
Centre; CARIMEast, 2014)
MICKLITZ, HansWolfgang (ed.)
Constitutionalization of European
private law (Oxford
University Press,
2014, Collected
Courses of the
Academy of European Law, XXII/2)
ZERVAKI,
Antonia. Resetting
the political
culture agenda:
from Polis to
international
organisation
(Springer, 2014)
QM-AJ-12-001-EN-N
ISSN: 1977-799X