The Philosophy of Karl Popper (1902-1994)
FFDI Zagreb, 31 March – 4 April 2014
1. Preview: some key points
of Popper’s philosophy
2. Karl Popper: life and works
3. Influences & intellectual backgrounds
4. The methodology of the
empirical sciences
Prof.Dr.Dr. Winfried Löffler
University of Innsbruck
Department of Christian Philosophy
Karl-Rahner-Platz 1
A-6020 Innsbruck, Austria
[email protected]
www.uibk.ac.at/philtheol/loeffler
5. Popper’s social philosophy
6. “Critical Rationalism” and its ethics
[7. Popper on evolution, world-3 and mind]
[8. Popper’s influence]
9.
Critical Evaluation
(ch.7-8 were skipped and are hence not relevant for the exam)
1. Preview: some key points of
Popper’s philosophy
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The central role of criticism:
Conjectures & Refutations
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Falsificationism: scientific claims are open to test &
refutation (unlike ideologies, vague prophecies etc.)
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“I know that I know nothing” (Socrates): science is not a growing body of
knowledge, but a hypothetical, unstable building on unstable foundations
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“We are erring upward”: science develops closer-to-the truth, by
elimination of false theories. Popper is a realist concerning theories
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The “open society”: political proposals and holders of political power
should be kept open to criticism
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Preference for democracy and anti-collectivism
1. Preview: some key points of
Popper’s philosophy
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Most main works available in Croatian!
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What to read by & about Popper in FFDI library:
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Bookshelf with some books by K.P. (right side, soon after the
entrance door!)
Selection of other books on the first table after the door
About 30 articles in Journals, see FFDI electronic catalogue (type in
“Popper” as keyword!)
Entries on Popper in Handbooks, Companions, Guides etc. on
Philosophy of Science, Political Philosophy, History of Philosophy
etc.
2. Karl Popper: Life and Works
1902
1918
born in Vienna
quits grammar school
engages in social work and communist movement
interest in Freud, Adler, Marx
1919
„key year“:
- turns away from Marxism (riots)
- turns away from psychoanalysis (discontent with Adler/Freud)
- fascination of Einstein (light-bending experiment 1919)
1922-24 carpenter-apprentice; education as elementary school-teacher
1925-29 studies mathematics, physics, psychology, philosophy, education as
secondary school-teacher
1928
Doctor of Philosophy, Vienna University
1929- critically distanced guest of the „Vienna Circle“ (Schlick, Carnap, Neurath
and others)
1934
Logik der Forschung / Logika naučnog otkrića
2. Karl Popper: Life and Works
1935/36
1937
1944
1945
1946
1949
1961
1965
1971
1976
1994
meets Tarski, Gombrich, Moore,
Russell, Schrödinger,Bohr
Christchurch / New Zealand
The Poverty of Historicism /
Bijeda historicizma
The Open Society and its Enemies /
Otvoreno društvo i njegovi neprijatelji
London School of Economics, conflict with Wittgenstein
Professor of Logic and Scientific Method at the LSE
Popper’s paper at the meeting of German Sociologists
Association starts the „positivism debate“ (Positivismusstreit);
Critical Rationalism (Popper) versus Critical Theory (Adorno,
Horkheimer, Habermas)
Nobilitation, „Sir“
Emeritus
member of the „Royal Society“
died in London
2. Karl Popper: Life and Works
Other important books:
1963
1972
1974
1977
1982
1990
1994
Conjectures and Refutations
Objective Knowledge
Schilpp (Ed.), The Philosophy of Karl Popper (LLP)
The Self and its Brain (with J. Eccles)
The Open Universe. An Argument for Indeterminism
A World of Propensities
Knowledge and the Body-Mind-Problem
Prominent pupils („critical rationalists“):
Joseph Agassi, [Imre Lakatos], Alan Musgrave, William Bartley III., etc.
Influence on: Hans Albert, Thomas S. Kuhn, Paul Feyerabend, etc.
3. Influences and Intellectual Backgrounds
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WW I and the collapse of 19th century world; “the social question”
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The Einsteinian Revolution in Physics
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The foundational crisis in mathematics (late 19th/20th cent.): realism
versus intuitionism
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Neo-Kantianism (J. Fries, L. Nelson etc.): any scientific activity, any
reference to “experience” makes certain presuppositions, but they are
not provable. Vicinity to Hans Vaihinger’s fictionalism: “The
Philosophy of As-If”
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Gestalt theory and Karl Bühler’s philosophy of language; every
observation is a “seeing-as-x”, no “theory-free” experience
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The “Vienna Circle”: Verificationism, Anti-metaphysical stance
4. The Methodology of the Empirical Sciences
4.1 Two problems and one solution: Falsificationism!
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The demarcation problem: “science”  “pseudoscience”,
“metaphysics”
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The induction problem: According to a common methodology,
science proceeds “inductively”, via (1) collecting evidence and (2)
generalizing it to a theory.
But, according to Hume, induction is unreliable (our belief in
uniformity of nature is psychological only; and we do not know
whether our experience so far represents the whole world correctly)
4. The Methodology of the Empirical Sciences
4.1 Two problems and one solution: Falsificationism!

Solution of the “Vienna Circle”: Verificationism!
 verification principle (a criterion for cognitively meaningful
sentences): „a sentence is meaningful if and only if there is an
empirical method for its verification“
 Verification: testing and stating that it is true.
 Meaningful are: (a) logical sentences, (b) simple empirical
sentences, (c) constructions out of (a) and (b); e.g. theories
 All beyond that: meaningless! (Hence: anti-metaphysical stance!)
 Demarcation between science and non-science: verifiability!
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Induction: general theories can at least “partially be verified” by
an “induction principle”, they get a certain probability; later on:
Carnap’s book “Inductive logic and probability” (1950)
4. The Methodology of the Empirical Sciences
4.1 Two problems and one solution: Falsificationism!
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Popper’s solution: Falsificationism!
 Falsification: testing and stating that it is false
 Asymmetries between verification and falsification: all-sentences
hard to verify, easy to falsify; there-is-sentences easy to verify,
hard to falsify
 Disastrous consequence for Vienna C.: even simplest laws of
nature are meaningless („all copper conducts electricity“, … !)
 Falsifiability: empirical data can be described which would refute
the theory. Example: “water freezes at 0°C” is falsifiable!
 background: Marx and Freud/Adler, theories compatible with any
data, „explanations“ for anything and everything, no interesting
predictions, not falsifiable!
 Notice: not a criterion of meaning, but of demarcation!
 Demarcation problem: scientific sentences = falsifiable sent.s!
 Induction problem: disappears… - see following page
4. The Methodology of the Empirical Sciences
4.1 Two problems and one solution: Falsificationism!
Popper’s account of the progress of science: trial and error!
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hypotheses = creative ideas, not conclusions from experience
risky hypotheses = those with high content, likely to get refuted
science = testing hypotheses, exposition to criticism, attempt to
eliminate falsified hypotheses
established theories: „well-corroborated“, but not dogmas
Well-corroborated hypotheses are not more probable, they just
“survive” longer!
in the long run: verisimilitude increases; Popper is a „realist“
Induction problem: disappears, since hypotheses are not derived
from exper., and corroborated hypotheses do not get more probable.
4. The Methodology of the Empirical Sciences
4.2 Once again: Popper versus “naïve inductivism”:
(Naïve) inductivism:
– hypotheses are „deduced“ from observations by induction
– hypotheses can be confirmed/justified by „matching“ observations,
– their probability increases with matching observations
Popper: Naïve inductivism is logically and psychologically wrong!
Logically:
– general theories are never totally verifiable
– hence, they are not confirmable ( partially verifiable)!
– The argument „but up to now, induction has worked well, hence
induction cannot be an illegitimate process“ is itself inductive, hence
question-begging / petitio principii
– theories can only be corroborated in experience (survive many
severe empirical tests), but: they do not get „more probable“ by this
corroboration!
Psychologically: Theory/idea first, then experiment / observation
4. The Methodology of the Empirical Sciences
4.3 A closer look at “falsification”
When is a hypothesis falsified?
– A popular, but wrong cliché: “According to Popper, a hypothesis is
falsified when one of its predictions fails, when there are nonmatching observations…”
– Unrealistic; do we really abandon a well-established hypothesis just
because of a few irritating data?
Logically, modus tollens:
IF (H is true & our OBServations etc. are correct), THEN E occurs
BUT
E does not occur
HENCE something in the “package” (H & OBS & …) is false!
Popper: “Falsification” only if a) there is falsifying observation + b) there
is a testable (or at least criticizable) and better hypothesis to
explain this observation! non-E alone is not enough!
4. The Methodology of the Empirical Sciences
4.4 What are the falsifiers?
First question: Experiences / observations or sentences?
Popper:
theories/ hypotheses are (sets of) sentences, and
only sentences can refute sentences!
Hence, the falsifiers are sentences, so-called basic statements.
There is no “pure experience” / “theory-free experience” / “simply given”
 Hence, what is acknowledged as a “basic statement” is also a
matter of hypothesis / agreement / convention! And open for
critical discussion: did we really measure what we wanted to? etc.
 Science is an unstable construction on swampy fundaments.
4. The Methodology of the Empirical Sciences
4.5 What is the empirical content of a hypothesis?
Remember Eddington’s solar eclipse experiment: a risky forecast
that could have failed in many ways (e.g. no bending-effect
observed, much too big/small effect observed).
Einstein’s theory was an interesting, non-trivial hypothesis. It had
high empirical content.
“Empirical content” of a hypothesis: = its “forbidden basic
statements”, its “potential falsifiers” (paradoxically!)
The more empirical outcomes a hypothesis forbids, the more
empirical content it has! (Then, a “highly falsifiable hypothesis”!)
[+ some other definitions by Popper, omitted here]
“Degree of corroboration” of a hypothesis: equals empirical content.
I.e., if a highly falsifiable hypothesis de facto survives testing, then it
has a high degree of corroboration.
4. The Methodology of the Empirical Sciences
4.6 The ultimate goal of science
– … is truth! = Realism. However, not decidable / measurable “how
close to truth we have come yet”.
– “Verisimilitude”: closeness to the truth. Falsified theories may still
have high verisimilitude, e.g. Newton’s physics.
– Popper, later: “Degrees of verisimilitude” (a very technical issue,
related with degree of corroboration; omitted here)
4. The Methodology of the Empirical Sciences
4.7 Popper on probability theory
Interestingly: Popper rejects inductivism and its idea that hypotheses
may rise/fall in probability, due to new evidence.
But: huge chapter in Logika naučnog otkrića, 1934. (Pioneering
synthetic work, Kolmogorov’s axiomatization was 1933!)
Popper: Degrees of corroboration do not follow the mathematical
probability calculus (intuitively unsatisfying)
4. The Methodology of the Empirical Sciences
4.7 Popper on probability theory
Later Popper: the “propensity interpretation” of probability
– Since 19th century: objectivism versus subjectivism in probability
theory: when we talk about probabilities, do we talk about objective
tendencies in nature (objectivism), or degrees of belief in the
observer (subjectivism / personalism)? Open till today.
– Problem of objectivism: if – as it is mostly said – probabilities are
frequencies in large series of repeatable events (e.g., coins or dice),
would singular events not have probabilities?
– Problem of subjectivism / personalism: too subjective / irrational?
Propensity theory: an objectivist theory that can also handle singular
events (examples). Objects have propensities / inclinations.
A rather metaphysical account (what are probabilities, ultimately?);
no epistemological guide how to find them. ( frequencies, beliefs!)
Important for indeterminism: Objective propensities, open future
4. The Methodology of the Empirical Sciences
4.8 Science and metaphysics
Against ordinary language philosophy: there are genuine
philosophical problems!
Remember: The falsification criterion is a demarcation criterion
science/non-science, but not a meaning criterion.
Hence, there might be non-scientific, but meaningful statements!
Three Arguments for the admissibility of metaphysics:
(1) metaphysics is heuristically useful, e.g. Greek atomism
(2) met. clarifies hidden presuppositions behind any observation
(3) realism, regularity of nature as metaphysical assumptions
Hence, science de facto in intertwinement with metaphysical claims
(later: Lakatos’ “research programs”, “Kuhn’s paradigms”!)
5. Popper’s Social Philosophy
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Not simply an application of theoretical philosophy, Logika naučnog
otkrića did not yet provide a complete philosophy of science.
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“Critical Rationalism” only after the 1944/45 books on social philosophy
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Two motivations:
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Philosophy of science: Historicism, totalitarianism is scientifically defective
(especially in The Poverty of Historicism)
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Popper’s divergent moral-political preferences: Individualism, autonomy,
egalitarianism, avoiding of suffering (especially in The Open Society)
Overall impression: not fully coherent, tensions to theor. philosophy
5. Popper’s Social Philosophy
5.1
The Poverty of Historicism: Popper on Laws of History
and Society
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“Historicism”: general laws and essences determine history
Two versions:
(1) anti-naturalistic: social science is unlike natural science, not
formalizable, no mathematical approach, hidden “essences”: Plato!
(2) naturalistic: laws studied in science, predictions: Comte, Marx!
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Popper on “social laws and predictions”: somewhat ambiguous;
- technical predictions, social planning: possible and necessary
- prophetic predictions, inevitable fatum: highly problematic
- small-scale social “laws”: e.g. “no full employment without inflation”
- but no comprehensive laws describing whole society (Marx!)
- however, there are large-scale trends; may turn around.
5. Popper’s Social Philosophy
5.1
The Poverty of Historicism: Popper on Laws of History
and Society
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Problematic about “Historicism”: Holism and defective evidence-base
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Holism: (1) Individuals are not separable, (2) the collective’s interests
are prioritized, (3) social structures have their own dynamics
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Interestingly, Popper shares (1) and (3) in theoretical philosophy!
(“there is no subject in epistemology”; science is being done within
traditions and institutions)
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Hence: Popper primarily opposes (2), collectivism.
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Holistic versus piecemeal social engineering
%
5. Popper’s Social Philosophy
5.1
The Poverty of Historicism: Popper on Laws of History
and Society
Holistic versus Piecemeal Social Engineering
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Examples of s.e.: new social security system (Obamacare), new form
of taxation, reform of penal law and criminal persecution, etc.
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Holists make plans without experience and evidence-base. But there
are people who are affected by them!
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Plea for responsibility and evidence-based social experiments
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No irreversible experiments
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Social engineers may well have vague target-ideas, but not holistic
overall-conception
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Negative utilitarianism: reducing suffering, not making people happy
5. Popper’s Social Philosophy
5.2
The Open Society
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Initially no publishers for the book (harsh on Plato and Aristotle);
its value as exegesis of Plato contestable
5.2.1 Why is Plato a “historicist”??? No history; eternal ideas &
essences??
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But Plato interpreted social change (depravation from “golden age”,
should be stopped; Marx: conversely!)
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And Plato wanted to be politically influential, tried it in Syracuse
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Eternal ideas & essences prevent us from empirical correction &
learning
5. Popper’s Social Philosophy
5.2
The Open Society
Central criticism: Plato’s totalitarian – authoritarian thought!
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Irreversible class-distinctions
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Interest of leading class = interest of the state
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Only leading class has a right to education, virtues, military instruction,
arms, earning money
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Censorship and propaganda
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Economic independence & autarky, isolationism
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“Justice” according to Plato: not equality, but “suum cuique”, fulfilling
natural duties & role
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The “wise leaders” / philosopher kings may apply all means for the sak of
the state, including lies (“persuasion”!) and betrayal, neglect of individual
human interests in favor of the system and its ideas
In sum: not his history of philosophy, but his anti-individualism, antiegalitarianism and group-bias which blames Plato a “historicist”.
5. Popper’s Social Philosophy
5.2
The Open Society
5.2.2 Hegel and Marx, “the false prophets”
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Critique of dialectics: true contradictions destroy logic and science,
falsification
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Fallible claims are better than Hegels “absolute knowledge” (by the
way, many of Hegel’s “absolute” claims turned out empirically wrong!)
A differentiated view on Marx’ economism:
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Valuable for the development of social science! (Econ. factors!)
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But cultural products are not only “Überbau”, overlay, superstructure.
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Politics has more room to act & engineering than Marx believes
5. Popper’s Social Philosophy
5.2
The Open Society
5.2.2 Hegel and Marx, “the false prophets”
Popper’s (normative) alternative proposal (OS, ch. 17):
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Protection of the weakest
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We need structures against limitless capitalism (the paradox of freedom:
limitless freedom defeats itself!)
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Economic interventionism instead of limitless capitalism. (Social market econ.)
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I.e., Popper by that widely shares Marx’ moral standpoints
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(that may explain “everybody’s Popper”, i.e. everybody finds “his” quotations.
Interestingly, Popper is today often presented primarily as a prophet of
libertarian capitalism. Influence of F.A.v. Hayek?)
5. Popper’s Social Philosophy
5.2
The Open Society
5.2.3 On Revolution, Reform and Democracy
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Marx’ prophecies false and unsafe
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No guarantee that after a revolution there will be no privileged groups
any more
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But if the targets are unsafe, then revolution as a means is illegitimate,
since it causes victims
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Revolution/violence perhaps only for the sake of installing democracy!
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Democracy:
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History as such has no meaning – we should be designers/engineers
of it, not prophets.
 rule of the majority,
 “the majority is always right”
= control of power-holders, esp. elections
= removability of bad power-holders
5. Popper’s Social Philosophy
5.2
The Open Society
5.2.4 The basic problem of political philosophy (OS 7)
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… is not: “what is the best form of state?” / “who should rule?” (since
Plato’s Politeia, Aristotle’s Politika, 2300 years of tradition)
(Reason for this: even if we have the optimal form of state, we have no
guarantee for good & competent persons!)
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But it is: “how could bad holders of political power be removed from
their position before causing big damage?”
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Of course: preference for democracy & open society, the best known
system for that task.
5. Popper’s Social Philosophy
5.2
The Open Society
5.2.5 Against “Sociology of Knowledge” (OS 23)
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Sociology of knowledge (SOK): “knowledge” is just a product of social,
historical, psychological, biographical and other contextual factors.
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Popper: A “doubly reinforced / doubly entrenched dogmatism”:
(1) SOK Makes unfalsifiable claims
(2) The opponent’s criticism is declared a case of the SOK theory
(“you just oppose because you…”)
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importance of the subjects, their minds, their freedom to choose
between ideas! Importance of ideas (world-3!) which are available.
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However: at some points, Popper comes close to SOK: the way
towards “objectivity” only by collaboration of many scientists, public
criticism and its institutions; crazy ideas will be singled out, correction
of too-subjective standpoints.
6. Critical Rationalism and its Ethics
6.1 “Critical Rationalism”
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a sort of general, comprehensive theory of sciences (comprising
natural & social science, humanities etc.) and of political agency
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methodological standpoint: conjectures & refutations
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„scientific“ theories: open to criticism!
(otherwise: dogmas, „immunized“ theories)
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a stable mid-position between irrationalism and
uncritical / general rationalism
%
6. Critical Rationalism and its Ethics
6.1 “Critical Rationalism”
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uncritical rationalism: any idea/assumption/theory/proposal is acceptable on
if defendable/provable by experience or conclusive argument
•
Popper’s assessment: (1) U.R. refutes itself, not defendable/provable by
experience/conclusive argument; (2) Any scientific/political activities make
some presuppositions – no problem, they must just be criticisable!
•
irrationalism: not reason, but emotions and passions are the ultimate powers
of human activity; appeals to reason are unrealistic.
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Examples: existentialist politics; group-driven policies (nationalism, racism…)
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Popper: (1) logically stable, but ends up in violence; (2) tendency to inequality
(nobody can love all people!); (3) even „humanitarian“ irrationalism tends to
paternalism and violence (Open Society ch. 24: “The attempt to make heaven
on earth invariably produces hell.”)
6. Critical Rationalism and its Ethics
6.1 The ethics behind “Critical Rationalism”
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In sum: irrationalism is unrefutable, but morally defect.
Crit.Rat. not ultimately justifiable, „irrational belief in reason“
Hence a question of decision; all in all, with more human
consequences (Popper sees a strong tie between critically-rational
procedure and humanitarian moral standpoint!)
The moral convictions/options behind CR:
- universal equality and egality in rights
- fight against anybody’s suffering is a moral duty
- but fight for well-being of others is reserved for friends
- tolerance against anybody who is himself not intolerant
Epistemological aspect: - impartiality, anyone’s criticism might be useful
- phantasy as important tool of criticism, dogmatism
suppresses phantasy
7. Popper on Evolution, world-3 and mind
7.1 Popper on evolution and evolutionary epistemology
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Superficial similarity: evolution/variation/struggle for existence/natural selection
 Popper’s idea of scientific progress/creative new ideas/competing
hypotheses/test & falsification
However: early Popper: Evolutionary biology is untestable, close to a circular
claim: “survival of the fittest / best-adapted”: but who are the best-adapted?
Those who survive. I.e., “those who survive, survive”.
Popper later: Evolutionary biology as a promising metaphysical research
program. Popper is interested in singling out the testable components of
evolutionary biology.
•
Attention: to the present day, Popper is taken as a “witness” by anti-evolutionists (“Evolutionary
biology is not science!”); however, these claims are highly exaggerated.
•
Evolutionary epistemology: Popper generalizes his “theory-ladenness of any
observation” claim. Any observation/thinking/… is a highly complex decoding
of signals from our environment, “anticipating theories are built into our senseorgans etc.”
Critical evaluation: (1) These (rather constructivist) claims are in tension to
Popper’s realism! (2) Problematic comparison: theories, product-ideas etc. 
mutation of genetic information. Mutation is unguided, theorizing is deliberate!
•
7. Popper on Evolution, world-3 and mind
7.2 World-3 and mind
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•
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•
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World-1: Physical phenomena, world-2: Psychical/mental phenomena (wishes,
beliefs, thoughts, …), world-3: contents of wishes, beliefs, thoughts.
Examples: theories, hypotheses, arguments, conjectures, refutations,
problems, book-contents, stories, interpretations, myths, ideologies,
mathematical objects, objects of art, tools, etc. – (similarities to Dawkins’
“memes”!)
World-3 objects are created by humans (not eternal!), even the natural
numbers. (Popper is no “Platonist” in that point). But: they have objective
logical properties, connections between them. Example: there are more
natural numbers than were originally thought of, there might be logical
consequences or contradictions between theories that nobody intended or
thought of, etc. The system of contents might have surprising properties.
World-3 objects (e.g. the idea of a washing machine) causally influence world2 objects (e.g. my wish to possess one), and the latter influence world-1
objects (e.g. allocation of energy and raw materials to build one).
w-2 emerges evolutionarily from w-1, and w-3 from w-2.
Problems: how is “causality” to be explicated here? Inflation of w-3 “objects”, if
we don’t constrain them to theories? Do mathematical objects “begin to exist?”
7. Popper on Evolution, world-3 and mind
7.2 World-3 and mind
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•
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Popper & Eccles: The Self and Its Brain
Dualist position, w2 in interaction with w1, w2 not just an epiphenomenon.
Mind & language-acquisition develops in interaction with w1, w2, w3-objects;
self-consciousness presupposes language (and as such w3).
Minds as partially independent of physical hardware, important role of
freedom.
Problem of downward causation from w2 to w1 without violation of
fundamental laws of thermodynamics. Popper and Eccles propose rather
speculative answers…
8. Popper’s influence
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Popper 1934 as key book. Forced the Vienna Circle to retract and
modify important ideas (e.g. Carnap 1936, Testability and Meaning:
liberalization of verification principle to confirmation principle!)
Thomas Kuhn: Popper and Vienna Circle agree in misconception of
science as totally rational enterprise, neglect of factual history of
science (“historiographic revolution in the philosophy of science”).
Exaggeration of falsification and role of anomalies (unfitting results).
Kuhn turns to a more sociological view of science (“normal science”
and its “paradigms”, anomalies get more and more pressing, “scientific
revolution”/ “paradigm shift”.
Imre Lakatos: Sophisticated falsificationism, “Scientific research
programs”: in their core “hard” convictions similar to Kuhn’s paradigms,
on the periphery belt of protective hypotheses similar to Popper’s
falsifiable claims. Progress by new hypotheses which explain the
anomalies and have some new, additional testable consequences.
Political philosophy: Open Society as source of ideas and quotations
for conservative as well as mid-left political parties, part of popular
political philosophy. OS-institutes in many former communist countries,
vague connection to Popper’s ideas.
9. Critical Evaluation
9.1 On the Philosophy of Science
•
Attention: some critiques of Popper are overly simple and unfair. “A
theory is not falsified just because of some unfitting evidence!” – right!
And this was also Popper’s opinion, see ch. 4.3 above)
•
This problem of holism of testing (“what exactly in our building is
false?”) was well-known to Popper. He just has no good purely logical
solution. (Logically, you can always blame some background
assumption to be false, and defend your hypothesis).
Popper’s answer: “...but a good, critical scientist would not do that!”.
OK, but then Popper has moved from describing scientific/falsifiable
theories to good scientific behavior. (Godfrey-Smith, Theory & Reality)
•
9. Critical Evaluation
9.2 On the Philosophy of Science
•
The blind spot: no probability and confirmation (I): Probabilistic
theories with unlikely outcomes are not easily falsifiable. Are they
hence unscientific?? “How improbable is too improbable?”
•
The blind spot: no probability and confirmation (II): The bridge-building
example: when building bridges, why do we prefer an old, wellcorroborated to a newly invented, highly falsifiable, but untested and
unfalsified theory? Is not the old one “more probable”, how can this
intuition be covered?
•
Analogies between science, market-ideas and evolution are
problematic metaphors only: in science and marketing, people search
for something and consciously adapt ideas; mutation is an unguided
process.
Ideas can arbitrarily be combined, genes cannot, etc.
9. Critical Evaluation
9.2 On Political Philosophy
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Interesting questions of coherence: is there an internal link between
falsificationism and Popper’s moral-political stance, or are these 2
independent motives?
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Advocate of undue conservatism? Some problems seem to huge and
urgent for piecemeal treatment.
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(A problem for which Popper perhaps should not be blamed; factual
change of realities): Popper’s machinery of political deliberation is
focused on states and smaller local communities. But some problems
have become global. Almost no institutions yet to handle them (UN,
Kyoto protocols, …).
(A problem for which Popper perhaps should not be blamed; hits
almost any political philosophy): the implementation problem. What if
people don’t want to participate?
Negative criticism on others, no very concrete positive proposals.
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Repetition questions
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16.
Important: Go to the library and browse some of Popper´s texts (in Croatian).
Without going into exact year details: In which epochs in Popper´s life did he develop his main
theses?
What are neo-Kantian traits in Popper‘s philosophy?
Get clear about the Vienna Circle philosophy, e.g. by using some external text-source in the
library.
What is an important difference in scope / role between the Vienna Circle‘s verification principle
and Popper‘s falsification principle?
Which lethal problem did Popper discover in the Vienna Circle‘s verificationism?
What is the difference between falsification and falsifiability?
Are there (falsifiable and false) hypotheses?
According to Popper, when may scientists regard a hypothesis as falsified? Contrast this to a
widespread misunderstanding of Popper.
Summarize the two problems that Popper regarded as central for the philosophy of science. How
does he think his falsificationism solution works?
What is wrong with the oft-heard claim: „scientists derive hypotheses from the data…“?
How does science develop according to Popper?
What is the differen ce between confirmation and corroboration?
What is verisimiltude?
Can a hypothesis be falsifiable, falsified and verisimilar at the same time? If so, can you think of
an example? If not, why not?
How do new hypotheses emerge?
17. Why should scientis ts be willing to risky claims?
18. Sketch Popper‘s target called „naive inductivism“; why is it wrong?
19. Which points of naive inductivism do sound most plausible for you, and why?
20. What is a basic statement according to Popper and how do we find them?
21. Why is it not simply observation that falsifies hypotheses?
22. Explain the notion of a „highly falsifiable hypothesis“! What other important notions are
related with it?
23. Why are „degrees of corroboration“ not to be confused with probabilities?
24. What do scientific realists (such as Popper) claim? What would be the opposite opinion?
25. Sketch the difference between objectivists and subjectivists in probability theory.
26. Sketch keypoints and limits of Popper‘s account of probability.
27. The Vienna Circle was much more intolerant towards metaphysics than Popper. Why?
And why was he tolerant in this point?
28. What is a „historicist“, what a „sociologist of knowledge“ in Popper‘s terminology?
29. Why does Popper reject historicism?
30. What is „piecemeal social engineeri ng“ and what is problematic about it?
31. Explain „positive“ and „negative utilitarianism“.
32. Who is entitled to try to make people happy? Why?
33. Explain „positive“ and „negative utilitarianism“.
34. Summarize the main points of Popper‘s critique of Plato.
35. What are the ultimate driving forces behind Popper‘s political philosophy – is it rather an
application of his theoretical thought or some independent moral-political standpoints?
36. What is Popper‘s stance towards economic interventions by the state? Search quotations of OS 17
in the library or also on the www.
37. What is Popper‘s verdict about Marx?
38. What is Poppers opinion about violent interventions in political system, even for humanitarian
reasons? Also browse the internet on that and see whether Popper is correctly quoted.
39. Why is the basic problem of political philosophy not the question for the optimal form of state?
40. All in all, in theoretical and practical philosophy: who is the bearer of knowledge and decision
according to Popper, rather the individual or the group/society/scientific community.
41. What would „uncritical rationalism“ be and why is it misguided?
42. Why is political irrationalism so dangerous? Give examples.
43. Sketch the ethics behind critical rationalism. Is it provable/deducable from somewhere?
44. Is the objection „but we do not test single hypotheses, but always a network of hypotheses; hence
Popper‘s falsificationism is misguided“ correct in your opinion?
45. Sketch some objections against Popper‘s political thought. What do you think?
46. What is your personal summary of Popper‘s thought („Popper in a nutshell)?