1. No category

NON STANDARD USES O F IF
D.S. B r e e & R.A. Smit
R o t t e r d a m School o f M a n a g e m e n t
Erasmus University
P.O. Box 1738
3000 DR R o t t e r d a m
The N e t h e r l a n d s
f e a t u r e t h a t r e l a t e s the d i f f e r e n t m e a n i n g s of if. The
s t a n d a r d use and t h e non s t a n d a r d uses using the s t a n d a r d
m e a n i n g (1,2,3,4) require, in addition, t h a t t h e r e is an
i n f e r e n c e r e l a t i o n from the p r o t a s i s (the if sub clause) to
the apodosis (the main c l a u s e in which the if c l a u s e is
embedded).
ABSTRACT
The p r e s e n t study e x a m i n e s the s e m a n t i c p r o b l e m s
involved in c o m p u t i n g the m e a n i n g o f t h e non s t a n d a r d
uses of if. The c e n t r a l q u e s t i o n is w h e t h e r or not it is
n e c e s s a r y to i n t r o d u c e d i f f e r e n t m e a n i n g s of if.
So we p r o p o s e t h a t t h r e e d i f f e r e n t m e a n i n g s of if a r e
required: i n f e r e n c e (including t h e s t a n d a r d use), m a t e r i a l
i m p l i c a t i o n (uses 6,7) and just d o u b t i n g the t r u t h value of
t h e following proposition (uses 5,9). Each of t h e s e t h r e e
uses may be e x p e c t e d to be t r a n s l a t e d by d i f f e r e n t words
in o t h e r languages, e,g. in D u t c h by als, zo and o f ( e x c e p t
for use 8) r e s p e c t i v e l y .
Austin p r o p o s e d two non s t a n d a r d m e a n i n g s for if. We
show t h a t t h e s e can be a c c o u n t e d for by the s t a n d a r d
meaning t o g e t h e r with s h i f t s in the position o f the s p e e c h
a c t within the s e n t e n c e . T h e s e uses of if a r e a m o n g the 9
d i f f e r e n t non s t a n d a r d uses which we found in a s a m p l e of
if s e n t e n c e s taken from the Brown U n i v e r s i t y corpus:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
Counterfactuah
If E had stuck to his plan h e ' d still be famous.
Factual:
If R was a liar, he was also a canny g e n t l e m a n .
Conditional s p e e c h act:
You may c o m e back to S t r a s b o u r g , now, if you wish.
P e r f o r m a t i v e s p e e c h act:
He vowed v e n g e n c e on L, if e v e r the c h a n c e c a m e
his way.
Noun clause:
He w o n d e r e d if the a u d i e n c e would let him finish.
Doubtful presupposition
P e r f e c t e n t i t i e s , if they m o v e at all, d o n ' t move to
INTRODUC'TION
T h e r e has long been, and s t i l l is, a c o n t r o v e r s y about
the meaning of i f (e.g. Grice, 1967; S t a l n a k e r , 1975;
H a r p e r et al, 1981). Much o f this discussion presupposes
t h a t t h e r e is indeed one meaning of if.
Is this
presupposition j u s t i f i e d ?
A t one level the answer is c l e a r l y 'no', e.g. i f can be
used to i n t r o d u c e a noun clause f o l l o w i n g an i l l o c u t i o n a r y
verb:
John asked if he could c o m e in now.
Such e x a m p l e s do not c o n f o r m to the c o n d i t i o n a l use of i f
as in:
If John asked he could c o m e in now.
This is so d i f f e r e n t a use o f if t h a t one might c l a i m it
should be set aside from the c o n d i t i o n a l if. Thus t h e r e
would be two ifs: if' for s u b o r d i n a t e c l a u s e s and it~ for
noun clauses.
7. " ' R e s t r i c t i v e
Social r e l a t i o n s impose c o u r t e s y , if not s y m p a t h y ,
8. "'Concessive
9. Protasis only
" I f you want to see -" " N e v e r mind", she said
sternly.
Each use was e x a m i n e d to see w h e t h e r it could be
a c c o u n t e d for by the standard meaning of if, t o g e t h e r
with o t h e r f e a t u r e s of the sentence. S i m i l a r d i f f e r e n c e s
in usage should then be found w i t h o t h e r SCs. This was
the case for the first four uses.
In t h r e e uses (6,7,8) i f
m a y / m u s t occur in a phrase r a t h e r than in a full clause.
The hypothesis that these uses can be d e r i v e d from the
standard meaning of i f in an e q u i v a l e n t clause was
e x p l o r e d and r e j e c t e d . T w o of these uses (6,7) r e q u i r e a
m a t e r i a l i m p l i c a t i o n i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of if, also necessary
for a few of the s t a n d a r d c o n d i t i o n a l sentences.
Our question should be r e f o r m u l a t e d as: is t h e r e only
one m e a n i n g of if'? A u s t i n (1961) c l a i m e d t h a t the answer
was 'no', p r o v i d i n g e x a m p l e s t h a t did not c o n f o r m to t w o
l o g i c a l p r o p e r t i e s t h a t are associated w i t h if% T h e r e is a
s t i p u l a t i v e use of i f ' which does not contrapose, e.g. from
1. I promise to m a r r y him if he asks me.
one does not c o n c l u d e t h a t
If I do not promise to m a r r y him, he does not ask
me.
T h e r e is also an i f o f d o u b t o r h e s i t a t i o n w h i c h not only
fails to contrapose, but which also asserts the p r o p o s i t i o n
u n d e r l y i n g the main clause (the 'apodosis p r o p o s i t i o n ' ) ,
e.g. from
2. T h e r e are biscuits on the t a b l e i f you w a n t some.
fails to contrapose, but also we are w i l l i n g to a c c e p t the
apodosis s i m p l i c i t e r , Can this c l a i m be r e b u t t e d ?
Two uses (5,9) require only t h a t the t r u t h value of the
following c l a u s e / p h r a s e is u n s p e c i f i e d . This is a p r o p e r t y
t h a t all the uses have in c o m m o n (with the e x c e p t i o n of
the f a c t u a l use w h e r e the t r u t h of the p r o t a s i s is used to
e m p h a s i s e the truth of the apodosis) and is thus the
218
A TAXONOMY OF NON STANDARD IF
We believe that i t can be. Austin's fault lies in
working w i t h the surface s t r u c t u r e r a t h e r than w i t h the
underlying propositions. He thus fails to take account of
the scope of i f and of the scope of the speech act
involved. With c o n d i t i o n a l if', the condition falls w i t h i n
the scope of the speech act. When there is a p e r f o r m a t i v e
verb in the apodosis, then the c o n d i t i o n a l is w i t h i n the
scope of the p e r f o r m a t i v e ; so the p e r f o r m a t i v e i t s e l f is
not w i t h i n the conditional, just as w i t h AustiWs e x a m p l e
of s t i p u l a t i v e i f t. Thus I is paraphrasable as:
l promise that I w i l l m a r r y him i f he asks me.
in which the promise is contraposable:
[ promise that he does not ask me i f 1 w i l l not m a r r y
him.
In the case of an i f of doubt or hesitation it is the speech
act that falls w i t h i n the scope of the conditional. Thus 2
is:
[f you want biscuits, accept the d e c l a r a t i o n t h a t
there are some on the table.
This act of speech is to be noticed only when the
proposition underlying the protasis (the i f clause) holds; it
is NOT made s i m p l i c i t e r .
To consider the possibility t h a t some meanings of i f
d i f f e r from the c o n d i t i o n a l , we need some way of
classifying the 69 non standard sentences in our sample.
The t a x o n o m y we chose is based on t w o features that are
present in the c o n d i t i o n a l uses of if: i f enables a
proposition to be r e f e r r e d to or e n t e r t a i n e d w i t h o u t being
asserted as being (possibly) t r u e or false, and i f signals an
inference r e l a t i o n from the protasis proposition to the
apodosis proposition. . By an i n f e r e n c e r e l a t i o n we mean
t h a t the apodosis proposition may be i n f e r r e d from the
protasis
proposition,
together
with
the
context
propositions. (See the c r i t i q u e of Bree (1973) on Wason
and Johnson-Laird's (1972) proposal for the d i f f e r e n t
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s o f if.)
In the non standard uses of i f one or the o t h e r o f these
t w o features is e i t h e r absent or altered. Thus we propose
that there are t w o m a j o r categories of non standard if:
A. in which the i n f e r e n c e r e l a t i o n is present but the
protasis proposition is NOT in doubt, being e i t h e r true
or false;
B. in which the t r u t h status of the protasis proposition is
in doubt, but the i n f e r e n c e r e l a t i o n does not run from
the protasis to the apodosis proposition.
This last class is divided i n t o t w o subclasses:
BI. in which the i n f e r e n c e r e l a t i o n is present but w i t h a
d i f f e r e n t scope from the standard use;
B2. in which the i n f e r e n c e r e l a t i o n is absent.
The c o m p l e t e c l a s s i f i c a t i o n o f the sample of i f sentences
according to t h e i r d i f f e r e n t uses is shown in Table 1.
We w i l l now consider each of the d i f f e r e n t uses in
turn, in order to d e t e r m i n e w h e t h e r the use requires a
d i f f e r e n t meaning o f i f from the standard c o n d i t i o n a l . We
w i l l check w h e t h e r or not the non standard use is to be
found w i t h o t h e r SCs, so t h a t it can be accounted for
w i t h o u t postulating a new meaning; w h e t h e r it is r e l a t e d
to a n o t h e r non standard use, so that both uses are based
on the same non standard meaning; or w h e t h e r it requires
its own i d i o s y n c r a t i c non standard meaning of if.
This e x p l a n a t i o n of the reading of Austints two ifs,
based on the r e l a t i v e scopes of the speech act and if, can
be extended to o t h e r subordinating conjunctions (SC's),
e.g.
I promise to m a r r y him unless~provided~when he's
rich.
The case for the n o n - r e s t r i c t i v e use, w i t h the speech act
falling w i t h i n the scope of the SC was made by
R u t h e r f o r d (1970), e.g.
He'll m a r r y you, unless I'm mistaken.
In v i e w of this g e n e r a l i t y it is parsimonious to regard
Austin's two ifs as two d i f f e r e n t uses arising out of the
c o n t e x t of the speech act, r a t h e r than as t w o d i f f e r e n t
meanings of if.
R e j e c t i n g Austin's ifs as possible contenders for an i f '
having a non standard meaning does not, however, show
that there are no non standard meanings.
In fact the O.E.D suggests 9 d i f f e r e n t uses of if:
1. conditional;
2. s e m i - f a c t u a l ;
3. counter factual;
4. a pregnant sense, e.g.
If they are poor, they are at any r a t e happy;
5. an archaic use with that;
6. an e l l i p t i c use, e.g. i f at all;
7. the protasis alone, e.g. [f [ had only known;
8. in phrases, e.g. as if;
9. introducing a noun clause, e.g. ask if.
(Note that this list does NOT include Austin's two uses of
if!)
Counterfactuals
C o u n t e r f a c t u a l if, which is a problem for logicians, is
s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d from our point of view. An i n f e r e n c e
r e l a t i o n from the protasis proposition to that in the
apodosis is being asserted, while it is known that the
protasis proposition is false (Bree, 1982).
It is usual (16 o f the 18 c o u n t e r f a c t u a l sentences in
our sample) for the apodosis proposition to be false (or a
question), which is indicated by using the a u x l l a r y would:
(26)
If Elaine's uncle had stuck to this desire for
aloneness, he probably would still be alive,
(60)
"Laura, what would you say i f I smoked a pipe?"
H o w e v e r the apodosis proposition may be true (1/18):
(76)
(...) i f it had never printed a word o f l i t e r a t u r e
its c o n t r i b u t i o n to the p o l i t i c o - s o c i o l o g i c a l area
would s t i l l be historic.
The protasis alone is used to indicate that i m p o r t a n t
(desirable) consequences would flow from the t r u t h o f the
protasis:
(85)
" I f it wasn't for these dear children."
To check whether or not there were f u r t h e r possible
uses we have taken a 10% sample of i f sentences from
the Brown U n i v e r s i t y corpus of A m e r i c a n printed texts,
a v a i l a b l e on magnetic tape (Kucera & Francis, 1967). [n
our judgement in 61% of the 218 sentences in the sample,
i f was used in a standard c o n d i t i o n a l way. In 8% the i f
was preceded by some m o d i f i e r , e.g. as if. This l e f t 69
(31%) non standard uses of i f as possible contenders for
d i f f e r e n t meanings of if.
219
Table 1. Su~nary of the uses of if in the sample.
Category and sub-category
STANDARD
A
Counterfactual
Factual
BI
Conditional speech act
Performative conditional
B2
Noun clause
Doubtful presupposition
Restrictive (if not)
Concessive
OTHER
Protasis only
Idicmatic
Total non standard
Modified if
N
p
q
Relation
?
?
I-(~>q)
18
6
~
+
+ [+
D-> ]-q
6
I
?
?
+
?
p->]-q
listener knows p is + { perf(p->q)
10
17
5
2
?
?
?
?
na
+
÷
+
x[-p
x]-p
oon(x) ]p
p is a question
p is presupposed by x
to replace x in q?
p connotated by x in q
2
2
?
na
na
if p is sufficient
÷
true
false
unknown truth
not applicable
exclusive or
inference
assertion speech act
132
Total sample
[-(re>q)
Comments
for ~phasis
ZP
69
17
218
Legend:
N
Number of sentences
p
protasis proposition
q
apcdosis proposition
q'
q w/o performative verb
x
part of q
pert performative
con connotation of
?
na
I
->
[-
(174)
The c o u n t e r f a c t u a l c o n s t r u c t i o n is not unique to if; it
occurs w i t h o t h e r SCs in which the t r u t h status o f the
subordinate clause proposition is n o r m a l l y open, e.g.:
She w o u l d n ' t have m a r r i e d him unless she had loved
him.
She would have m a r r i e d him provided he had asked
her.
In both c a s e s the main proposition is false; the
s u b o r d i n a t e proposition is true for unless and false for
provided. Thus the c o u n t e r f a c t u a l use should NOT be
based on a d i f f e r e n t meaning of if, but r a t h e r in the use
of the s u b j u n c t i v e mode.
If we thus spent our v e r y first day in (...) our
last day to us at least, was e q u a l l y impressive
(...)
But n e i t h e r sense would be a p p r o p r i a t e in
(185) If Wilhelm Reich is the Moses who has led them
out of the Egypt of sexual slavery, Dylan
Thomas is the poet who o f f e r s them the
Dionysian d i a l e c t i c of j u s t i f i c a t i o n for t h e i r
indulgence in liquor, (...)
A more s a t i s f a c t o r y e x p l a n a t i o n is t h a t it is the speech
act t h a t is c o n d i t i o n a l upon the protasis proposition. The
w r i t e r is emphasising the speech act by p r e f a c i n g it (the
protasis must always occur b e f o r e the apodosis in these
factuals) w i t h a proposition t h a t he knows the r e a d e r w i l l
know to be true. The i n f e r e n c e is from the protasis
proposition to the speech act c o n t a i n i n g the apodosis, as
in:
(178) (...) w h e t h e r there is such fitness or not, we w i l l
assume t h a t there is, and i f we do, we express
(...)
It is used w i t h e f f e c t in emphasising an i m p e r a t i v e :
(211) (...) so if you w a n t to avoid nicked fingers, keep
your hands well out of the way.
Factuais
The p r o t a s i s p r o p o s i t i o n may be true r a t h e r than
false; this is the O.E.D. p r e g n a n t s e n s e of if. In such
c a s e s the apodosis proposition is also true. M o r e o v e r
t h e r e is no DIRECT r e l a t i o n from the p r o t a s i s p r o p o s i t i o n
to the apodosis proposition, so it is s t r a n g e t h a t if is
being used at all. One possible e x p l a n a t i o n is t h a t it is a
slip for the more a p p r o p r i a t e SC although, as in:
(113) [f Robinson was a liar and a s l a n d e r e r , he was
also a very canny g e n t l e m a n (...)
S o m e t i m e s it is used w h e r e c o r d i n a t i o n would be m o r e
suitable:
When a w r i t e r wishes to d r a w a t t e n t i o n to a speech
act, he can do so by making it c o n d i t i o n a l on a
proposition t h a t both he and the reader know to be true.
While this c o n s t u c t i o n does not occur w i t h o t h e r SCs, it is
220
the mind of the speaker;
doubt if, when the a g e n t b e l i e v e s
q u e s t i o n in the mind of the s p e a k e r
This c o n s t r u c t i o n is not found with
whether;, nor is t h e r e any q u e s t i o n
under any of the o t h e r uses of
m e a n i n g o f if.
c l e a r l y a d i f f e r e n t PRAGMATIC use of if, which does not
require a d i f f e r e n t m e a n i n g of if.
Conditional s p e e c h a c t s
We turn now to non s t a n d a r d uses in which the
protasis proposition is indeed in doubt, but the i n f e r e n c e
r e l a t i o n is non standard. We showed t h a t A u s t i n ' s if of
doubt or h e s i t a t i o n can be c o n s i d e r e d as a c o n d i t i o n a l
s p e e c h a c t r a t h e r than as a s p e e c h a c t in which t h e r e is a
conditional. Conditional s p e e c h a c t s are m a d e when t h e
w r i t e r does not know w h e t h e r or not a s p e e c h a c t is
a p p r o p r i a t e in the c i r c u m s t a n c e s , but he b e l i e v e s t h a t the
r e a d e r does know. Most (4/6) of our e x a m p l e s are of this
form:
(189) If you would feel happier with full collision
insurance, t h e r e is a small additional c h a r g e (...)
(209) "You may c o m e back to Strasbourg, now, if you
wish."
The o t h e r use in the s a m p l e (2/6) is when the w r i t e r
wishes to pose a question but only under the a p p r o p r i a t e
circumstances:
(190) If you use c o m p a n y t r a n s p o r t a t i o n to m e e t
trains or haul visitors, would taxis be c h e a p e r ?
t h a t the a n s w e r to a
is probably n e g a t i v e .
o t h e r SCs, e x c e p t for
of it being s u b s u m e d
if. So it is an a p a r t
Doubtful presuppositions
A frequent non standard use is to cast doubt on a
presupposition of the main clause. Just as w i t h the use of
i f to i n t r o d u c e a noun clause, the protasis proposition is
in doubt - more, it is being put i n t o doubt - and t h e r e is
no i n f e r e n c e relationship from the protasis to the
apodosis proposition. The presuppositions that were
denied in this way in the sample were:
-existence, presupposed by a noun (4/17):
(77)
But it also made him conspicuous to the enemy,
i f it w a s the enemy (...)
-an event, presupposed by the use o f a verb (3/17):
(159) Perfect, c o m p l e t e entities, if they move at all,
do not move towards what t h e y lack.
- n u m b e r and place, presupposed by c e r t a i n adjectives or
adverbs, which are put i n t o doubt using i f any(where)
(5117):
As has a l r e a d y been pointed out, the s p e e c h a c t can
fall within the s c o p e of o t h e r SCs. Thus it is not
parsimonious to p o s t u l a t e a s e p e r a t e m e a n i n g of if for
c o n d i t i o n a l s p e e c h acts.
(10)
Few areas, if any, (...)
(16)
For here, if anywhere, (...)
-and possibility or necessity, presupposed by i m p e r a t i v e s
and promises or threats (2/17):
( I I 0 ) Begin the e x a m i n a t i o n of a site w i t h a g o o d map
and a e r i a l photos, i f possible.
(I00) The posse then asked that he send out the
women and children as the building would be
fired (...) i f necessary to take him dead or alive.
There is also the i n t e r e s t i n g case in which a c o m p l e x
e n t i t y which is doubtful enters into a proposition. This is
done by placing the c o m p l e x e n t i t y into the protasis,
t o g e t h e r w i t h ever, and r e f e r r i n g to it in the apodosis
(3117):
(149) [f there was e v e r a thought in her mind that
(...), it was now dispelled.
It might be thought that this is a special case of a
c o n d i t i o n a l speech act. H o w e v e r it differs from the l a t t e r
in that the protasis proposition is not thought by the
w r i t e r to be decidable by the reader. R a t h e r it is in the
nature o f a hedge against a possible, but not highly
probable, state presupposed by the apodosis. Thus we
have classified it as having no i n f e r e n c e r e l a t i o n from the
protasis to the apodosis.
Performative conditionals
The scope o f the s p e e c h a c t normally includes the
i n f e r e n c e relation. We have just seen how the s p e e c h a c t
may instead o c c u r within this relation. With p e r f o r m a t i v e
verbs in the apodosis we see a shift the o t h e r way; the
s p e e c h act i n d i c a t e d by a verb in the apodosis is NOT
within the s c o p e of the i n f e r e n c e relation, d e s p i t e the
f a c t t h a t the verb o c c u r s in the apodosis. This is the c a s e
with A u s t i n ' s s t i p u l a t i v e if, e.g.:
(28)
(...) he vowed v e n g e n c e on Viola Lake if e v e r
the c h a n c e c a m e his way.
We have seen that this use also occurs with o t h e r SCs, so
the use of if within the scope of a p e r f o r m a t i v e does NOT
require a s e p e r a t e meaning of if.
Doubtful noun clauses
We have just looked at two uses of if in which the
protasis proposition is indeed in doubt, but in which the
i n f e r e n c e r e l a t i o n is non standard. We turn now to uses in
which the i n f e r e n c e r e l a t i o n is absent. The first of t h e s e
is the use of if to i n t r o d u c e a clause to f u n c t i o n as the
o b j e c t of a m e n t a l act:
(144) I asked an old guy (...) if the boat was Moore's.
A range of verbs involving questions take
this
construction:
wonder if, when the a g e n t has the question in his mind;
s e e if, when the a g e n t t r i e s d i r e c t l y to a n s w e r his
question;
ask if, when the agent puts his question to a third party;
know if, when the agent has the a n s w e r to a q u e s t i o n in
H o w e v e r there is some relationship between the
protasis and the apodosis, best c h a r a c t e r i s e d as an
a l t e r n a t i v e relationship. The apodosis proposition is
doubtful because one aspect, x, w i t h i n it may not be
applicable. Thus where x occurs in the apodosis
proposition there must be (x v not-p), e.g. I0 could be:
number of areas (small v not-one).
This proposal is r e l a t e d to m a t e r i a l i m p l i c a t i o n in
standard symbolic logic: p x is e q u i v a l e n t to n o t - p v x.
Restrictives
In c o n t r a s t to an i f phrase i n d i c a t i n g that a word may
go too far because a presupposition may not hold, an i f
221
not phrase is used to i n d i c a t e t h a t the word being used, a
noun or an adverb, may not go far enough:
(102) And social r e l a t i o n s arising out of business ties
impose c o u r t e s y , if not s y m p a t h y , t o w a r d (...)
(105) (...} the i n e v i t a b l e t i m e crisis e x p e r i e n c e d by
most (if not all) adolescents in our society (...)
Can this use of i f not be d e r i v e d from another use of if,
t o g e t h e r w i t h not, or is it a d i f f e r e n t use in its own right?
There are three possibilities for the d e r i v a t i o n : t h a t the
i f not phrase is d e r i v e d from an i f not clause, t h a t the
r e s t r i c t i v e use is found w i t h o t h e r SCs w i t h not, and t h a t
the r e s t r i c t i v e use can be d e r i v e d from another use of i f
in a phrase.
i d e n t i c a l . For a s e n t e n c e o f the form q
r e l a t i o n s h i p is (x v p), w h e r e o n c e again x
the apodosis. For e x a m p l e the r e l e v a n t
could be f o r m a l i s e d as
n u m b e r o f a d o l e s c e n t s (large v all).
C o m p a r e this with the f o r m a l i s a t i o n for
any':
number of areas (small v not-one).
if not p, the
is an e n t i t y in
phrase in 105
' f e w a r e a s if
While the e q u i v a l e n c e to the if o f doubtful
p r e s u p p o s i t i o n holds at this level, r e s t r i c t i v e if has a
d i f f e r e n t function. In t h e f o r m e r the p r o t a s i s i n t r o d u c e s a
doubt about the l e g i t i m a c y of s o m e t h i n g p r e s u p p o s e d in
the main clause; the l a t t e r p r o p o s e s a possible
r e p l a c e m e n t for s o m e t h i n g in the main clause.
C o n s i d e r the first possibility, i.e. t h a t the r e s t r i c t i v e
use of an if not phrase is simply an a b b r e v i a t e d form for
an e n t i r e clause, e.g. 102 would be d e r i v e d from:
(102') And if social r e l a t i o n s arising out of business
ties do not impose s y m p a t h y , t h e y i m p o s e
c o u r t e s y t o w a r d (...)
But if this is the c a s e t h e n 102' should be e i t h e r a
s t a n d a r d c o n d i t i o n a l use of if or one of the non s t a n d a r d
uses. It is c e r t a i n l y not a s t a n d a r d use as the apodosis, at
least of the original, is a s s e r t e d s i m p l i c i t e r . However,
n e i t h e r is it a f a c t u a l use as t h e p r o t a s i s is not a s s e r t e d ,
but left open. This s u g g e s t s t h a t it might be a c o n d i t i o n a l
s p e e c h act; but 102 t lacks an i m p o r t a n t f e a t u r e o f
c o n d i t i o n a l s p e e c h acts, n a m e l y t h a t the s p e a k e r e x p e c t s
the l i s t e n e r to know w h e t h e r the p r o t a s i s p r o p o s i t i o n is
true or not. So, while the r e s t r i c t i v e use of if not to
i n t r o d u c e a phrase can be d e r i v e d from an if not clause,
this does not help m a t t e r s as this use would in i t s e l f be
d i f f e r e n t from any o t h e r .
We c o n c l u d e t h a t the r e s t r i c t i v e use of if not is
d e r i v a b l e from the s a m e logical s t r u c t u r e as the use o f if
to doubt a p r e s u p p o s i t i o n and so does NOT i n t r o d u c e a
new m e a n i n g o f if.
Concessives
A n o t h e r use of if in which the apodosis p r o p o s i t i o n is
t r u e and in which t h e r e is no i n f e r e n c e relation, is a
c o n c e s s i v e use. It o c c u r s only with an a d j e c t i v e in the
protasis:
(5)
(...) now t h a t you have finally grown up, if a
l i t t l e l a t e (...)
(121) (...) a well known e s t a b l i s h m e n t for the s p e e d y
if t e m p o r a r y r e h a b i l i t a t i o n of drunkards (...)
This use c a n n o t be r e d u c e d to the s t a n d a r d c o n d i t i o n a l
m e a n i n g o f i f by c l a i m i n g t h a t the p h r a s e in the p r o t a s i s
has been r e d u c e d from s o m e c o m p l e t e clause. If we try to
do so, as in:
(5')
You have finally grown up, if you have grown up
a l i t t l e late.
the result is not a s t a n d a r d c o n d i t i o n a l but r a t h e r a
f a c t u a l , but one which c o n t a i n s new i n f o r m a t i o n in the
protasis; no such f a c t u a l s o c c u r r e d in our sample. So the
c o n c e s s i v e use of if p h r a s e s c a n n o t be d e r i v e d from a
underlying if c l a u s e use.
The s e c o n d possibility is t h a t the r e s t r i c t i v e use of if
not occurs with o t h e r SCs. T h e r e is only one o t h e r SC
t h a t has this s y n t a c t i c c o n s t r u c t i o n , n a m e l y although.
H o w e v e r s e m a n t i c a l l y t h e r e is a d i f f e r e n c e from this
c o n c e s s i v e use of although, e.g.
Most although not all a d o l e s c e n t s in our s o c i e t y (...)
is d e f i n i t e l y a r e s t r i c t i o n to ' n o t all a d o l e s c e n t s ' r a t h e r
than a possible r e s t r i c t i o n to 'all a d o l e s c e n t s ' . So t h e r e is
NO similar use for the o t h e r SCs t h a t is s e m a n t i c a l l y
e q u i v a l e n t to this r e s t r i c t i v e use of if not.
As we have a l r e a d y seen, it is possible that a non
standard use of i f has a c o u n t e r p a r t w i t h o t h e r SCs. The
only o t h e r SC t h a t p e r m i t s a s i m i l a r c o n s t r u c t i o n is
We turn now to the last possibility, o t h e r if phrases.
T h e r e are two: the c o n c e s s i v e use (see below) and the
doubting of a p r e s u p p o s i t i o n . T o s h o w t h a t the r e s t r i c t i v e
use c a n n o t be d e r i v e d from the c o n c e s s i v e use c o n s i d e r
this ambiguous e x a m p l e :
The e s t a b l i s h m e n t o f f e r e d a longlasting, if not
p e r m a n e n t , cure.
This can have a r e s t r i c t i v e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , i.e. t h a t the
cure is c e r t a i n l y longlasting and may well be p e r m a n e n t .
But it can also have a c o n c e s s i v e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n as can be
seen when 'not p e r m a n e n t ' is r e p l a c e d by ' t e m p o r a r y t :
The e s t a b l i s h m e n t o f f e r e d
a
longlasting,
if
t e m p o r a r y , cure.
So the r e s t r i c t i v e use c a n n o t be d e r i v e d from c o m b i n i n g
not with the c o n c e s s i v e use of if ( o t h e r w i s e t h e r e would
be no ambiguity).
although:
You have f i n a l l y grown up, although a l i t t l e late.
which is almost a paraphrase o f 5. But it is u n l i k e l y t h a t
this concessive use of i f is a ' m i s t a k e ' for although;
c e r t a i n authors use concessive i f phrases consistently,
e.g. Schoenberger (1969). A possible d i f f e r e n c e b e t w e e n
the t w o is t h a t the a d j e c t i v e f o l l o w i n g although is
d e f i n i t e l y applicable, c.f.
A speedy although t e m p o r a r y r e h a b i l i t a t i o n .
A speedy i f t e m p o r a r y r e h a b i l i t a t i o n .
This suggests that t h e r e is a r e l a t i o n between the
concessive use and the use to indicate a d o u b t f u l
presupposition. Here what is put into doubt is not the
presupposition but a l i k e l y c o n n o t a t i o n o f a word, e.g.
r e h a b i l i t a t i o n s are n o r m a l l y permanent. H o w e v e r the
logical r e l a t i o n is NOT the same, e.g. it is not the case
that 'speedy if t e m p o r a r y
rehabilitation'
can
be
formalised by:
t i m e for r e h a b i l i t a t i o n (short)
R a t h e r the r e s t r i c t i v e use is s e m a n t i c a l l y e q u i v a l e n t
to the use of doubting a presupposition. The r e l a t i o n s h i p
in the l a t t e r c a s e we have c l a s s i f i e d as (x v not-p), w h e r e
x is an e n t i t y in the apodosis. The r e s t r i c t i v e use is
222
duration
of
rehabilitation
(permanent
v
nottemporary);
r a t h e r it is
duration of rehabilitation (permanent v temporary).
So the c o n c e s s i v e use of if c a n n o t be r e d u c e d to the use
to doubt a presupposition. We have also shown t h a t it
c a n n o t be d e r i v e d from a s t a n d a r d or f a c t u a l if clause;
nor do o t h e r SCs exhibit the s a m e p h e n o m e n o n . So t h e
c o n c e s s i v e use of if must be c o n s i d e r e d as being based on
a d i f f e r e n t m e a n i n g of if.
Within the BI c a t e g o r y , with non s t a n d a r d i n f e r e n c e ,
we find a s y m m e t r i c a l s i t u a t i o n . For the c o n d i t i o n a l
s p e e c h act, the s p e e c h a c t is m o v e d IN to within the
s c o p e of the protasis; for t h e p e r f o r m a t i v e use the main
verb in the apodosis is moved OUT beyond t h e s c o p e of
t h e protasis. Thus we do not e x p e c t to find f u r t h e r subc a t e g o r i e s within Bl.
Within the B2 c a t e g o r y , in which the i n f e r e n c e
r e l a t i o n is absent, we found 5 s u b - c a t e g o r i e s within the
s a m p l e . In the s u b - c a t e g o r y in which if i n t r o d u c e s a noun
c l a u s e t h e r e is no apodosis; if is being used just to
i n t r o d u c e a proposition with unknown t r u t h value. T h e r e
is a n o t h e r s u b - c a t e g o r y with no apodosis, when t h e
p r o t a s i s is s u f f i c i e n t for the s p e a k e r to stop.
Protasis only
One of the uses of if that, w i t h i n our sample, occurs
only w i t h i n r e p o r t e d speech, is when the speaker puts
f o r w a r d a possibility which in i t s e l f is s u f f i c i e n t to cause
a r e a c t i o n in the listener:
(187) "If you want to see" ... " N e v e r mind", she said
sternly.
(200) "But i f you say you managed it - - - " The stanger
was hooked.
it is the pragmatics of the c o n t e x t that leads to the
protasis being s u f f i c i e n t to cause the speaker to stop or
the listener to interrupt, so no new meaning of i f is
required.
The r e m a i n i n g 3 sub-categories w i t h i n B2 are all
r e l a t e d in several ways: the protasis may be a phrase (in
t w o cases, restricitJve and concessive use, it MUST be a
phrase); w h i l e the protasis is in doubt the apodosis
proposition is true, w i t h a m i n o r exception; this e x c e p t i o n
is being put f o r w a r d in the protasis as possibly although
not necessarily the case. In the r e s t r i c t i v e use (if not) the
w r i t e r suggests the p o s s i b i l i t y o f a f u r t h e r r e s t r i c t i o n to
one of the features of the apodosis; in the use to doubt a
presupposition, the apodosis, on the contra~'y, goes too far
in one of its presuppostions; in the concessive use it is not
something as strong as a presupposition that goes too far
but just a l i k e l y c o n n o t a t i o n of a phrase w i t h i n the
apodosis. While there is some p a t t e r n to this B2 c a t e g o r y ,
we b e l i e v e that it is essentially open; i n n o v a t i v e uses of
i f w i l l be found here r a t h e r than in the o t h e r t w o
categories.
Summary
The non standard examples of i f sentences have been
divided into 9 sub-categories w i t h i n the three categories
that we proposed above. Is there any post hot: r a t i o n a l e
that can be given for these categories? A r e t h e y
necessary or c o m p l e t e ?
CONCLUSION
Within c a t e g o r y A, in which the p r o t a s i s proposition
DOES have a t r u t h value, t h e r e are two s u b c a t e g o r i e s ,
c o u n t e r f a c t u a l s and factuals, which c o r r e s p o n d to the
protasis proposition being false and t r u e r e s p e c t i v e l y .
H o w e v e r this is not the only d i f f e r e n c e b e t w e e n the two:
c o u n t e r f a c t u a l s have a s t a n d a r d i n f e r e n c e r e l a t i o n from
the protasis to the apodosis proposition, while f a c t u a l s do
not. For the f a c t u a l s it is the s p e e c h act t h a t is
conditional upon the protasis proposition.
We have found 9 d i f f e r e n t non standard uses of if, as
summarised in Table I. H o w e v e r this does not require
there to be 9 d i f f e r e n t meanings for if. Three meanings
are s u f f i c i e n t .
Four of the d i f f e r e n t uses are e x p l a i n a b l e by
p r a g m a t i c considerations, a point we made when
c r i t i c i s i n g Austin's claim. His two ifs are the two uses in
c a t e g o r y BI; the d i f f e r e n c e s arise from differences in the
scopes of the speech act and the c o n d i t i o n a l and are
c o m m o n to o t h e r SCs. The f a c t u a l use occurs when both
the w r i t e r and reader know t h a t the protasis proposition
is true and is used for emphasis. L a s t l y the protasis may
occur w i t h o u t an apodosJs when the speaker is
i n t e r r u p t e d . A l l four uses are based on the standard
c o n d i t i o n a l meaning of if; the non standard uses arises
from p r a g m a t i c considerations.
Why is it that we do not find two o t h e r subc a t e g o r i e s : false p r o t a s i s with conditional s p e e c h act and
true protasis with s t a n d a r d i n f e r e n c e ? T h e r e is no
p r a g m a t i c s i t u a t i o n in which the f o r m e r might occur; if
both the w r i t e r and the r e a d e r know t h a t the p r o t a s i s
proposition is false, then the s p e e c h act would n e v e r be
a c c e p t e d at all. For the l a t t e r t h e r e is a n o t h e r SC which
fulfills the function, namely n o n - t e m p o r a l since.
The c o u n t e r f a c t u a l use arises from an i n t e r a c t i o n
w i t h the subjunctive mode in the apodosis. This is
c o m m o n to o t h e r SCs and so does not require an apart
meaning o f if.
N e i t h e r do we find the condition falling within the
scope of a p e r f o r m a t i v e verb in c a t e g o r y A. It c a n n o t
o c c u r with c o u n t e r f a c t u a l s as the p e r f o r m a t i v e would
have to be c o u n t e r e d in which c a s e it would no longer be
p e r f o r m e d , e.g.
I would have p r o m i s e d to m a r r y him if he had asked
The use of i f to introduce a noun clause DOES require
an apart meaning o f i f as no i n f e r e n c e r e l a t i o n is present.
This suggests that the f e a t u r e of i f to introduce a
proposition of unknown t r u t h value is p r e d o m i n a n t o v e r
the inference relationship feature. The factual use of i f is
the only use in which the f o r m e r f e a t u r e is absent; then Jt
is a s t y l i s t i c consideration that leads to the use of if, i.e.
me.
is simply no promise at all but a s t a n d a r d c o u n t e r f a c t u a l .
N e i t h e r have we been able to c o n s t r u c t a factual within a
p e r f o r m a t i v e . So t h e r e are no s u b - c a t e g o r i e s missing
from A.
223
We r e f r a i n from s u g g e s t i n g a fourth m e a n i n g of if. We
would e x p e c t t h a t t r a n s l a t i o n s into o t h e r languages would
not be to the conditional, e.g. with D u t c h if in such
e x p r e s s i o n s is t r a n s l a t e d using zij her, literally b e it.
to add emphasis.
The three r e m a i n i n g uses are possible candidates for a
third meaning of if, as none display an i n f e r e n c e
relationship. These uses cannot be accounted for by some
p r a g m a t i c v a r i a t i o n of the standard c o n d i t i o n a l , such as a
shift in the scope of the speech act, nor are s i m i l a r uses
found w i t h o t h e r SCs in general. In t w o of these uses,
r e s t r i c t i v e and concessive, the protasis must be a phrase;
but these phrases cannot be d e r i v e d f r o m a corresponding
standard c o n d i t i o n a l clause.
In conclusion, we p r o p o s e t h a t if has t h r e e d i f f e r e n t
meanings, all o f which have one f e a t u r e in c o m m o n : t h e
t r u t h s t a t u s of the p r o t a s i s is in doubt. They are, in o r d e r
of f r e q u e n c y of o c c u r e n c e in our sample:
1. i n f e r e n t i a l ( p ~ q ) : as used in s t a n d a r d , c o u n t e r f a c t u a l
and f a c t u a l c o n d i t i o n a l s , t o g e t h e r with the c o n d i t i o n a l
s p e e c h act, t h e p e r f o r m a t i v e c o n d i t i o n a l and the use
of t h e p r o t a s i s w i t h o u t an apodosis (in this last c a s e
the i n f e r e n c e is l e f t open);
2. m a t e r i a l i m p l i c a t i o n {q v not-p): as used in a few
s t a n d a r d c o n d i t i o n a l s , for doubting a p r e s u p p o s i t i o n
and in the r e s t r i c t i v e use;
3. doubting:, as used in noun clauses, in which only t h e
t r u t h of t h e a s s o c i a t e d p r o p o s i t i o n is put into doubt.
We e x p e c t t h a t o t h e r languages will use d i f f e r e n t words
for t h e s e t h r e e meanings. This is t h e c a s e in Dutch, for
e x a m p l e , w h e r e the uses d e p e n d i n g on an i n f e r e n t i a l
m e a n i n g a r e i n d i c a t e d by als or the m o r e formal indien,
the m a t e r i a l i m p l i c a t i o n by zo and doubting by o f (which
is also used to t r a n s l a t e w h e t h e r ) . T h e r e is only one
e x c e p t i o n to this, the f a c t u a l use in Dutch is not
i n d i c a t e d by als but by a c h a n g e in word order.
Two uses, doubtful p r e s u p p o s t i o n and r e s t r i c t i v e , have
a s e m a n t i c f e a t u r e in c o m m o n , n a m e l y t h a t t h e r e is s o m e
f e a t u r e of the apodosis, x, which may need to be
modified. We propose t h a t if h e r e has a m e a n i n g
e q u i v a l e n t to m a t e r i a l implication, i.e. x v not-p, which is
e q u i v a l e n t to p D x. This is the t r a d i t i o n a l logicians
s u g g e s t i o n for the s t a n d a r d m e a n i n g of if.
We do not a c c e p t t h a t in the s t a n d a r d c o n d i t i o n a l use
the m e a n i n g of if is e q u i v a l e n t to m a t e r i a l implication;
such an e q u i v a l e n c e runs into d i f f i c u l t i e s . For i n s t a n c e it
r e q u i r e s the e q u i v a l e n c e of:
If I hit you, it'll hurt.
Either I d o n ' t hit you or you'll be hurt.
and such unacceptable reasoning as:
God doesn't exist, so i f God exists we are free to do
what we want.
Several a t t e m p t s to save the e q u i v a l e n c e have been
made. For instance Grice (1967) did so by requiring t h a t
speakers adhere to c e r t a i n c o n v e r s a t i o n a l i m p l i c a t u r e s ,
such as saying as much as t h e y know, thus ruling out the
use of a c o n d i t i o n a l i f sentences w i t h a false protasis.
Formal semanticists propose some slight m o d i f i c a t i o n s .
For instance Stalnaker (1975) c l a i m e d t h a t in any c o n t e x t
in which a sentence of the form n o t - p or q is acceptable,
a sentence of the form i f p then q is also acceptable.
Elsewhere (Bree, 1981) we have taken issue w i t h these
and o t h e r a t t e m p t s to d e m o n s t r a t e e q u i v a l e n c e of i f w i t h
material implication.
Any c o m p u t e r p r o g r a m which p u r p o r t s to u n d e r s t a n d
t h e English language will need to be able to distinguish
b e t w e e n t h e s e t h r e e d i f f e r e n t meanings. The last,
doubting, is e a s y to d e t e c t as if is then used to i n t r o d u c e
a noun c l a u s e as o p p o s e d to a sub clause. H o w e v e r
distinguishing b e t w e e n the i n f e r e n t i a l and m a t e r i a l
i m p l i c a t i o n is not s o l v a b l e on s y n t a c t i c grounds. One
s u g g e s t i o n is to a s s u m e t h a t if has an i n f e r e n t i a l
meaning; if no i n f e r e n c e r e l a t i o n can be found, then it
must be e q u i v a l e n t to m a t e r i a l i m p l i c a t i o n . This sholJl~
be e a s y to d e c i d e when if is being used to put a
p r e s u p p o s i t i o n into doubt or in its r e s t r i c t i v e use; m o r e
d i f f i c u l t would be to d e t e c t m a t e r i a l i m p l i c a t i o n in
s t a n d a r d uses of if.
H o w e v e r in the use of if to doubt a p r e s u p p o s i t i o n or
to make a r e s t r i c t i o n , the m e a n i n g of if can be
c o n s i d e r e d to be e q u i v a l e n t to m a t e r i a l i m p l i c a t i o n . It
also occurs i n f r e q u e n t l y (3%) with s t a n d a r d conditionals:
(62)
(...) if 1 d o n ' t put my two c e n t s in, s o m e o n e else
will.
in which t h e r e is no i n f e r e n t i a l r e l a t i o n . This m e a n i n g
d i f f e r s from our s t a n d a r d m e a n i n g in t h a t the t r u t h of the
apodosis proposition is s u f f i c i e n t to c o n f i r m the s e n t e n c e ,
e.g. knowing t h a t ' s o m e o n e e l s e will' is s u f f i c i e n t to
c o n f i r m 62. Similarly for two o t h e r uses: with the
doubtful p r e s u p p o s i t i o n use of if, knowing t h a t the
apodosis is true is s u f f i c i e n t to c o n f i r m the s e n t e n c e , as
the presupposition is no longer in doubt; with the
r e s t r i c i t v e use, the apodosis is the minimal a s s e r t i o n t h a t
is being made so its t r u t h is s u f f i c i e n t for the t r u t h of the
s e n t e n c e . So the x v not-p, or m a t e r i a l implication,
meaning of if a c c o u n t s for t h e s e two uses of if.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The r e s e a r c h r e p o r t e d h e r e was c a r r i e d out as p a r t of
t h e p r o j e c t "The S e m a n t i c s of s u b o r d i n a t i n g c o n j u n c t i o n s :
an i n f o r m a t i o n p r o c e s s i n g approach", s u p p o r t e d by the
N e d e r l a n d s e S t i c h t i n g voor P s y c h o n o m i e , with funds
m a d e available from the ZWO. P r o j e c t Nr. 15-30-10.
Don S h e r m a n of S t a n f o r d U n i v e r s i t y C o m p u t i n g
C e n t e r kindly provided us with the d a t a for this study.
REFERENCES
Austin, J.L., lfs and cans, in J . O . U r m s o n &
G . j . W a r n o c k , eds., P h i l o s o p h i c a l p a p e r s o f J . L A u s t i n .
London; O x f o r d U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1961.
The last non standard use of if, the concessive, is an
anomaly. There is no question of inference, but neither is
there any a f f i n i t y w i t h m a t e r i a l i m p l i c a t i o n , e.g.
speedy if t e m p o r a r y ~ speedy or not t e m p o r a r y .
[t is possible t h a t this use is a c o n t r a c t i o n from even if.
Bree, D.S., The i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of i m p l i c a t i o n , in
A . E l i t h o r n 8= D . J o n e s , eds., A r t i f i c i a l and human thinking.
A m s t e r d a m ; Elsevier, 1973, 273-282.
224
Bree, D.S., Can
IF be formally represented?
Proceedings of the 3rd. annual conference of the
Cognitive Science Society. Berkely, 1981, 173-176.
Bree, D.S., Counterfactuals and causality. Journal of
Semantics, 1982, 1, 147-185.
Grice, H.P., William James Lectures, Harvard
University, 1967. Published in part as "Logic and
conversation", in P.Cole & J.L.Morgan, eds., Syntax and
semantics, vol. 3. New York; Seminar Press, 1975, 41-58.
Harper, W.L., Stalnaker, R. & Pearce, G., Ifs.
Dordrecht; Reidel, 1981.
Kucera, H. & Francis, W.N., Computational analysis
of present-day American English. Providence; Brown
University Press, 1967.
Rutherford, W.E., Some observations concerning
subordinate clauses in English. Language, 1910, 46, 97115.
Schoenberger, W.S., Decision of destiny. Athens, Ohio;
Ohio University Press, 1969.
Stalnaker, R.C., indicative conditionals. Phiiosophica,
1975, 5, 269-286.
Wason, P.C. & Johnson-Laird, P.N., Psychology of
reasoning. London; Batsford, 1972.
225