1. law, govt and politics
2. government

CENTRAL POLICY UNIT
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE HONG KONG
SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
SOCIAL ATTITUDES OF THE YOUTH
POPULATION IN HONG KONG:
A FOLLOW-UP STUDY
THE CHINESE UNIVERSITY OF HONG KONG
MARCH 2015
Social Attitudes of the Youth Population in
Hong Kong : A Follow-up Study
《香港年青人的社會態度 — 跟進研究》
Final Report
Submitted by
Public Policy Research Centre
Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies
The Chinese University of Hong Kong
March 2015
Table of Contents
Preface
i
Executive Summary
1
摘 要
15
I. Background of the Study
1
II. Methodology
2
III. Telephone Survey on Social Attitudes of the Youth Population in
Kong: May to June 2014
Hong
4
3.1 Demographic Characteristics
4
3.2 Civic Engagement and Political Information Seeking
5
3.3 Voting Behaviour in the Legislative Council in 2012
8
3.4 Life Satisfaction
9
3.5 Identity and Political Trust
12
3.6 Attitudes Towards Education and Employment in the Mainland
13
3.7 To What Extent Youth Perceive Opportunities
15
3.8 Attitudes Towards "Occupy Central" and Civil Referendum
17
3.9 Conflicts between the Government and Civil Society
20
3.10 Defending for Autonomous Hong Kong Administration
22
IV. Correlates of Dissent Youth in Hong Kong
25
4.1 Social Attitudes of Dissent
25
4.2 Aggregate Measure of Dissenting Attitudes
27
4.3 Demographic Profile of the Strong Dissidents
32
4.4 Other Correlates of Dissenting Attitudes
34
4.5 Political Trust, Identity and Dissenting Attitudes
36
4.6 Materialism, Postmaterialism and Social Attitudes
38
4.7 Predictors of Dissenting Social Attitudes
45
V. Conclusion
51
References
58
Appendix 1
1
List of Tables
Table 3.1 Demographic Characteristics
5
Table 3.2 How often participating in Demonstrations or Rallies since 1997?
6
Table 3.3 Awareness of Demonstrations or Rallies to be Organized
6
Table 3.4 Channels for Learning About Demonstrations or Rallies to be Organized
(multiple responses allowed)
7
Table 3.5 How Users of Electronic Communications Learn about Demonstration or
Rallies to be Organized (multiple responses allowed)
8
Table 3.6 Voted in LegCo Election in 2012? (Eligible voters only)
9
Table 3.7 Which Political Camp They Cast Their Vote for in the LegCo Election in
2012 (only those having voted)
9
Table 3.8 Satisfaction with Political development in HK
10
Table 3.9 Satisfaction with Environmental conservation in HK
10
Table 3.10 Satisfaction with Economic development in HK
11
Table 3.11 Overall Life Satisfaction
11
Table 3.12 Identity and Political Trust
13
Table 3.13 Attitudes towards Pursuing Further Studies in the Mainland
14
Table 3.14 Attitudes towards Taking Up Employment in the Mainland
14
Table 3.15 Perception of Opportunities Available to Same Age Cohort for Personal
Development in Hong Kong
15
Table 3.16 Comparing with the present, will opportunities for personal development
in Hong Kong become better or worse in future?
16
Table 3.17 Generally speaking, are you satisfied with the opportunities for your own
development in Hong Kong?
17
Table 3.18 Support "Occupy Central" for Genuine Universal Suffrage in 2017 Chief
Executive Election
18
Table 3.19 Popular Nomination of Chief Executive Candidates in 2017 is
Indispensable
19
Table 3.20 Would Vote in "6.22 Civil Referendum" Organized by "Occupy Central" in
June 2014?
19
Table 3.21 Conflicts between Government and Civil Groups over Land Development
Issues
20
Table 3.22 Political Party Most Supported
21
Table 3.23 Democratic Progress since 1997
22
Table 3.24 Hong Kong Interests Prevail when Conflict between China and Hong
Kong
23
Table 3.25 One-way Permit Scheme for Mainland Residents to Hong Kong Approved
by Hong Kong Government
24
Table 3.26 Quota for Individual Visit Scheme for Mainland Residents must be
Limited
24
Table 4.1 Percentage of Respondents with Dissenting Attitudes: A Summary
29
Table 4.2 Aggregate Dissent Score & Dissent Intensity
29
Table 4.3 Demographic Characteristics and Dissenting Attitudes
32
Table 4.4 Demographic Characteristics of Youth Population who Show Strong
Dissent
32
Table 4.5 Correlations between Development Opportunities and Dissenting Attitudes
35
Table 4.6 Correlations between Quality of Life and Dissenting Attitudes
36
Table 4.7 Political Trust and Dissenting Attitudes
37
Table 4.8 Identity and Dissenting Attitudes
38
Table 4.9 Mean Scores of Postmaterialist and Materialist Value Orientations
43
Table 4.10 Postmaterialist Value Orientation & Social Attitudes
44
Table 4.11 Relative Strength of Predictors on Aggregate Dissent Score
48
Table 4.12 Relative Strength of Predictors on Aggregate Dissent Score in 2014
49
Preface
Background and Objective of the Study
This study was commissioned by the Central Policy Unit (CPU) of the
Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region in May
2014. It is a follow-up to a 2010 research also commissioned by CPU.
The objective of the study is to follow-up on the key findings of the 2010
survey, focusing on six general questions:
(1) Does the younger generation have unique socio-political orientations
vis-à-vis the older cohort? Are there any distinctive diversity in
values and orientation within this generation?
(2) How does the younger generation perceive their own position and
opportunities in the socio-economic system, and in particular the
chances of improving their social and economic conditions?
(3) More specifically, does the younger generation exhibit a distinctive
kind of post-materialist and "localistic" values?
(4) What are the socio-demographic and biographical factors that could
account for diversities in socio-political orientations among the
younger generation?
Methodology
This study uses a quantitative approach to gather information on the
i
young population of Hong Kong, including the social attitudes, beliefs,
values, orientations and behaviors. A telephone survey was conducted
from 14 May to 24 June 2014.
The main age cohort under study
includes those born in the years between 1975 and 1999, that is, those
aged 15 to 39 as of the year 2014. In which the 30-39 cohort are
included as a reference group to compare with the younger population.
Research Team
Members in the research team of the Public Policy Research Centre,
Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies, the Chinese University of
Hong Kong include:

Stephen Wing-Kai Chiu, Professor, Department of Sociology; and
Co-Director, Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies
Leung Yee-kong, Research Associate, Public Policy Research Centre,
Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies
ii
Executive Summary
1. Background of the Study
This is a follow-up project to a 2010 research commissioned by the
Central Policy Unit.
The idea is to gauge to what extent social and
political attitudes of young people in Hong Kong have changed over the
past several years and the reasons behind.
We have witnessed an
apparent escalation of social and political participation outside of
institutionalized channels over the past years.
The findings of this
project should provide us with insights to examine a number of prevalent
explanations of the rise in youth activism.
2. Methodology
A telephone survey was conducted from 14 May to 24 June 2014 by the
Telephone Laboratory of the Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies
at The Chinese University of Hong Kong.
The main age cohort under
study includes those born in the years between 1975 and 1999, that is,
those aged 15 to 39 as of the year 2014.
In which the 30-39 cohort are
included as a reference group to compare with the younger population.
A total of 2,000 respondents who completed the survey were drawn from
the target population.
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3. Telephone Survey on Social Attitudes of the Youth Population
in Hong Kong 2014
3.1 Demographic Characteristics
Of the total of 2,000 respondents who completed the survey, 1,076
(53.8%) are female and 924 (46.2%) male.
By generational distribution, 362 (18.1%) are aged 15-17, 276 (13.8%)
aged 18-19 (in combination, 638 or 31.9% aged 15-19), 780 (39.0%)
aged 20-29, and 582 (29.1%) aged 30-39.
By educational attainment, 7.7% are junior secondary or below, 39.0%
senior secondary, and 53.3% tertiary education or above.
A majority of the respondents (77.1%) were born in Hong Kong.
Of
those not born in Hong Kong, 8.3% have lived here less than 7 years,
40.4% between 7 and 15 years, and the remaining 51.3% 15 years or
more.
Only 12.2% of respondents have experience of living, education,
or working overseas.
The median household monthly income category is $30,000-$49,999.
Classified by economic activity status, 47.0% are economically active,
42.8% students, and 10.1% economically inactive.
3.2 Civic Engagement and Political Information Seeking
Anti-establishment sentiment is reflected in actions of our respondents.
Half of respondents (50.2%) have not joined any demonstration or rally
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since 1997, and a mere 3.2% report having joined frequently. A visible
group of youth population (46.6%) has experience in civic actions either
occasionally or frequently.
The Internet (74.3%) outplays conventional mass media to become the
major channel to receive information on civic actions to be organized.
TV comes not close enough (60.2%) and printed newspapers are farther
apart (48.3%).
3.3 Voting Behaviour in the Legislative Council in 2012
A majority of respondents reported voting for candidates from the
Pan-democrats camp, and about 26% of them did not remember to whom
they cast their vote.
3.4 Life Satisfaction
The majority of all age groups have indicated dissatisfaction with two
conditions: political development and environmental conservation. And
the economical development is rated average by half of respondents in all
age groups.
The differences among age groups are statistically
significant in three issues, but the trends are the same among age groups.
Respondents are generally positive towards overall quality of life.
The
15-19 age group is relatively more satisfied with overall life than the
other two cohorts.
The differences among cohorts are statistically
significant, but the magnitude is not large.
All respondents are on
average slightly satisfied with their personal life.
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3.5 Identity and Political Trust
An overwhelming majority of the two younger cohorts (15-19, and 20-29)
identify themselves as Hong Kongers, both over 80%, in contrast to 10%
being Chinese.
The older 30-39 cohort has about 63% of Hong Kong
identification, and about 21% being Chinese.
More respondents have trust in the Hong Kong SAR Government (42.6%)
than in the Central Government (25.2%).
The middle cohort (20-29)
has the least trust in both governments (34.6% Hong Kong, 18.8%
Central).
The youngest (15-19) has the most trust in Hong Kong
government (48.2%), and the oldest (30-39) the most trust in Central
government (36.1%).
3.6 Attitudes Towards Education and Employment in the Mainland
Respondents generally welcome opportunities to study or work in the
Mainland.
More than 40% of respondents find it acceptable to pursue
further study in the Mainland.
The percentage is similar across cohorts.
About 50% of respondents would be willing to work in the Mainland,
and the percentage is about the same across cohorts.
Our respondents
are rejecting Chinese identity only at an ideological level.
When it
comes to personal life and development, however, the youth population
finds it acceptable to have connections with the Mainland, e.g. through
further studies and employment opportunities.
3.7 To What Extent Youth Perceive Opportunities
About 50% of all respondents perceive moderate amount of opportunities
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available.
Slightly more than 30% perceive limited or no opportunity
available for their personal development.
Respondents of aged 20-29
are the least positive to the opportunities available to them.
Referring to their perception of opportunities for personal development in
future, nearly 40% of respondents expect their future would be the same
as now.
The youngest are the least pessimistic about their future than
others, 14.1% expecting a better tomorrow, or 46.9% worse than now.
The middle cohort (aged 20-29) is the least positive, with half of them
(51.2%) expecting a worse tomorrow.
About a quarter of all respondents are dissatisfied with the opportunities
available for their own development in Hong Kong.
Satisfied
respondents (24.3%) are about the same as those dissatisfied (23.5%).
Comparatively speaking, the youngest (aged 15-19) is the least satisfied
generation (19.2%), and the oldest (30-39) the most satisfied (29.9%).
3.8 Attitudes Towards "Occupy Central" and Civil Referendum
The younger two cohorts (aged 15-19 and 20-29) have more than half
supporting the "Occupy Central" movement to fight for their ideal form
of universal suffrage in 2017 Chief Executive Election.
The oldest
cohort (30-39) is ambivalent with favourable (46.7%) and unfavourable
(46.4%) responses about the same.
The popular nomination receives overwhelming support from all age
cohorts.
The younger two cohorts have 80% or more, and the oldest
about 70% endorsement of popular nomination.
At most time of the
survey period, the Civil Referendum had not yet taken place.
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Respondents, however, were not very enthusiastic to vote in the Civil
Referendum.
Only one-third in each cohort would cast a vote.
3.9 Conflicts between the Government and Civil Society
The conflicts between the administration and civil groups on
environmental conservation and land development are commonly seen.
The most supportive to the government is from the oldest cohort with
19.5%.
The younger two cohorts have less than 10%.
Among named parties, the Democratic Party is the most identified with
(6.1%).
Although Scholarism has the lowest percentage to be named
among the pan-democratic camp, it is the third most popular in the 15-19
cohort.
For the pro-establishment camp, the most supportive is the
30-39 cohort with 10.5%, while less than 5% from the two younger
cohorts.
The youth population is not satisfied with the democratic progress in
Hong Kong since 1997. More than half find the progress too slow.
Interestingly, the youngest is the least (still 46.4%) feeling too slow the
democratic progress, and the aged 20-29 the most (62.6%).
3.10 Defending for Autonomous Hong Kong Administration
About 90% of respondents insist that the interests of Hong Kong must
prevail whenever conflicts between Hong Kong and China occur in Hong
Kong.
About 80% of respondents in favour of autonomous
administration of Hong Kong, as reflected by the approval of One-way
Permit Scheme and imposing quota for Individual Visit Scheme for the
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Mainland residents.
4. Correlates of Dissent Youth in Hong Kong
4.1 Social Attitudes of Dissent
To examine the perceptions and attitudes of socially discontented youth,
9 social attitudes grouped in 4 areas are measured.
4.1.1 Attitudes Towards "Occupy Central" and Civil Referendum
(1) support Occupy Central for genuine universal suffrage:
the younger two cohorts (aged 15-19 and 20-29) have more
than half supporting the ideal form of universal suffrage in 2017
Chief Executive Election;
(2) agree Popular Nomination for Chief Executive election in 2017:
all
age
cohorts
overwhelmingly
support
the
popular
nomination;
(3) whether or not would vote in 22 June 2014 civil referendum:
one-third of eligible respondents (i.e. age 18 or above) in each
cohort would cast a vote.
4.1.2 Conflicts between the Government and Civil Society
(4) conflicts between the HKSAR Government and concern groups
on land development issues:
the most supportive to the government is from the oldest cohort
with 19.5%, and the younger two cohorts have less than 10%.
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4.1.3 Political identification
(5) support pan-democratic political camp in Hong Kong:
Democratic Party is the mostly supported (6.1%); Scholarism
the lowest percentage named among the pan-democratic camp,
but the third most popular in the 15-19 cohort;
to the pro-establishment camp, the most supportive is the 30-39
cohort with 10.5%, while less than 5% from the two younger
cohorts;
(6) evaluation of democratic progress in Hong Kong since 1997:
the youth population is not satisfied with the democratic
progress in Hong Kong since 1997. More than half find the
progress too slow.
4.1.4 Defending for Autonomous Hong Kong Administration
(7) agree Hong Kong interests take priority when China & Hong
Kong in conflict:
near 90% of respondents insist that the interests of Hong Kong
must prevail;
(8) Hong Kong SAR Government must have approval right of
One-way Permit:
about 80% of respondents in each cohort are in favour of Hong
Kong having approval right;
(9) agree Hong Kong to restrict visitors via Individual Visit Scheme:
again about 80% of respondents in each cohort support
imposing quota for Individual Visit Scheme.
4.2 Aggregate Measure of Dissenting Attitudes
The "aggregate" level of dissent is measured by counting how many of
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the above 9 social attitudes expressed discontent by the youth population.
The measure of "aggregate dissent" has a range of values from 0 to 9, the
higher the score, the more discontented a respondent is.
Except the
popular nomination for Chief Executive election in 2017, the respondents
in the 20 to 29 age cohort are the most dissenting comparing to other two
cohorts.
Almost no respondent is completely contented (i.e., score 0), 67.2% of
thee respondents are a little or moderately dissenting (with scores from 1
to 6). About 32% of respondents are reported to be holding strong
dissenting attitudes (scores 7 to 9).
The "baseline" 30-39 cohort is the least discontented, with the lowest
mean score of dissent 5.0; about 3% of them do not show any discontent
(with zero dissent score.)
The youngest generation (age 15-19) is as much (or as less) discontented
as the oldest, with mean score of dissent 5.1. No one in the youngest
generation reports zero score.
The middle generation (20-29) has the
highest dissent score of 5.8.
A tiny proportion (0.6%) of the middle
generation reports zero dissent.
The 20-29 cohort has the largest proportion to show strong dissent.
About 40% of them possess dissent score from 7 to 9.
The youngest
and the oldest cohort have more or less the same proportion of strong
dissent, with 21.8% and 19.4% respectively.
There are some statistically significant differences in dissent scores by
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demographic
characteristics.
In
general,
the
more
dissenting
respondents are male, born in Hong Kong, tertiary educated, and in more
economically well-off household. Overseas living experience has no
statistically association with the aggregate dissent measure.
For those
statistically significant differences, the magnitude is mostly less than 1
(out of 9).
The most divided demographic subgroups are those tertiary
educated against those junior secondary or below, and the difference is
said to be as "large" as 1 social issue apart.
Demographically speaking,
the overall youth population is not hugely divided.
4.3 Demographic Profile of the Strong Dissidents
A notable minority of 31.6% of respondents are identified as having
strong dissent, with dissent scores between 7 and 9.
Who are the
strongly dissenting respondents?
The strong dissidents share similar demographic characteristics
regardless of their generation.
The profile analysis reveals that the
youth population holding strong dissenting attitudes share similar
demographic characteristics: tertiary educated (68.1%), born in Hong
Kong (82.6%), not at the bottom layer economically (median household
monthly income $30,000-49,999), but only a few having experience
living overseas (11.7%).
4.4 Other Correlates of Dissenting Attitudes
The 3 measures of self-perceived opportunities available for personal
development are found to be negatively correlated with the dissenting
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attitudes of respondents.
The more dissenting the respondents are, the
fewer the opportunities they perceive as available to them.
The
relationships (or predictive power) are statistically significant but very
weak.
In other words, respondents perceiving limited opportunities are
not visibly more dissenting than those perceiving better development
opportunities.
Our findings cannot conclude that perceptions of blocked
mobility reinforce dissenting attitudes.
The effects of life satisfaction and happiness on dissenting attitudes are
almost invisible, with statistically significant but very weak negative
correlations.
Respondents dissatisfied with their life or feeling unhappy
do not generate noticeably more dissenting attitudes than their more
satisfied or happy counterparts.
Health condition has not been found
statistically significant difference.
The findings do not support
anecdotal explanation that dissatisfaction with life leads to dissent.
4.5 Political Trust, Identity and Dissenting Attitudes
A wide split among political trusts and dissenting attitudes.
In 2014,
those who do not trust in Hong Kong Government express stronger
dissent (by 2 more social issues apart out of 9) than those who trust.
And the gap is about the same between those who trust in Central
Government and those who do not.
Those who trust in Central
Government have the least dissent, and the score is lower than those who
trust in Hong Kong Government.
Those who identify themselves as Hong Kongers have the strongest
dissent (score 5.8), and who consider themselves Chinese is the least
dissent (3.8).
The gap between the two identities is as large as 2 social
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issues apart.
4.6 Materialism, Postmaterialism and Social Attitudes
The influences of value orientations on social and political perceptions
are real and significant.
One prominent approach to explaining such
influences is the cultural shift from materialism to postmaterialism which
has triggered a series of research studies in western societies since the
1970s.
Previous local studies clearly reveal that Hong Kong people were
basically materialist while also possessing partial but not yet fully
developed postmaterialist values.
In 2014 survey, the youth population is equally postmaterialistic and
materialistic.
For individual items measuring postmaterialist or
materialist values, the highest evaluated is "maintaining order in Hong
Kong" (asked in Chinese: 維持治安) classified as materialist value.
The second highest is "protecting freedom of speech" (asked in Chinese:
保障言論自由) from postmaterialist value.
And the remaining items
score come from postmaterialist and materialist value orientation
alternatively in order of magnitude.
This peculiar order further
illustrates the coexistence of both value orientations among the youth.
Their inclination towards which value orientation is then not about what
they hold more, but probably when and on what basis they prefer one to
another.
Postmaterialist value orientation has significant effects on social attitudes
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of dissent in 2014.
The magnitude of the difference found in each
attitude is notable between the dissent and the conservative.
The
general pattern is that higher postmaterialist score results in more critical
perception of socio-political issues, i.e. expressing dissenting attitudes.
The
postmaterialist
value
orientation
significantly
differentiates
evaluation of socio-political issues.
4.7 Predictors of Dissenting Social Attitudes
To better gauge the combined effects of both demographic (structural) as
well as value orientations predictors on dissenting attitudes, multivariate
regression analysis is employed to test their relative effects on dissent
score.
In the multivariate model, the effects of almost all demographic variables
become statistically insignificant.
effect in predicting dissent.
Generational effect has no significant
The common belief that (young) age
accounts for dissenting attitudes is not supported in this vigorous
statistical analysis.
Postmaterialist value orientation has the relatively
strongest effect in predicting aggregate dissent score.
The regression model illustrates that personal attributes are not able to
account for dissenting social attitudes.
Value orientations are more
powerful predictors in this regard.
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5. Conclusion
The 2014 survey was taken from 14 May to 24 June 2014.
This means
that data collection was done during a period of "normal" social
atmosphere.
By "normal" we refer to usual social and political
atmosphere we have been experiencing in most of our lifetime, but not
incidentally mobilized scenarios. In this regard, respondents were not
motivated nor mobilized by many political conflicts seen on streets from
September 2014 onwards.
Their evaluation towards socio-political
issues was believed to be reflecting their "normal" perceptions, and
extreme political split was therefore not expected.
In terms of academic and practical values, the survey was able to be
conducted during the period of "normal" social conditions. In order to
track long term changes in social and political sentiments, research
during "normal" period is necessary.
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摘要
1. 研究背景
本研究是為跟進 2010 年一項關於年青人的社會態度調查而進行，當
時同樣由香港區政府中央政策組撥款資助。2014 年再次進行研究是
希望探討自 2010 年調查完成之後，四年來香港年青人對社會及政治
議題的態度有甚麼變化。事實上自 2010 年起，不少社會及政治動員
事件都是在既有政治制度外發生，當中有不少年青人參加。因此，本
跟進研究讓我們了解年青人在社會及政治參與方面更趨熱衷及激烈
的種種促成因素。
2. 研究方法
是次研究通過電話調查收集被訪者意見，調查日期是 2014 年 5 月 14
日至 6 月 24 日，由香港中文大學香港亞太研究所電話調查室負責。
訪問對象是 2014 年 15 至 39 歲的香港年青人，即是生於 1975 至 1999
年之間，當中 30 至 39 歲是本研究的基線，以對比 15 至 29 歲較年青
的一群。最終成功訪問 2,000 人。
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3. 2014 年 5 月至 6 月進行之電話調查分析結果
3.1 受訪者人口特徵
成功訪問了 2,000 名於 1975 至 1999 年間出生的香港市民，女性 1,076
名(53.8%)，男性 924 名 (46.2%)。
三個年齡組別的分佈是：362 名 (18.1%) 15 至 17 歲，276 名 (13.8%)
18 至 19 歲（15 至 19 歲合計 638 名，佔 31.9%）
，780 名 (39.0%) 20
至 29 歲，及 582 名 (29.1%) 30 至 39 歲。
教育程度方面，7.7% 初中或以下，39.0% 高中，53.3%大專或以上
程度。
大部份受訪者 (77.1%) 都是生於香港。並非在香港出生的人當中，
8.3% 港少於 7 年， 40.4% 居住了 7 至 15 年，51.3% 居住 15 年或
以上。只有 12.2% 受訪者有海外居住、求學或工作經驗。
受訪者家庭每月收入中位數是港幣 30,000 至 49,999 元。47.0% 受訪
者從事經濟活動， 42.8% 是學生，10.1% 沒有從事經濟活動。
3.2 公民參與和獲取政治訊息
約半數受訪者 (50.2%) 自 1997 年沒有參加過任何示威或遊行，而只
有 3.2%回答常常參加，其餘 46.6% 間中參加公民行動。
S-16
有 74.3%受訪者經互聯網獲取公民行動資訊，取代傳統大眾媒體成為
最主要途徑，有 60.2%通過電視得知，印刷報章則有 48.3%。
3.3 2012 年立法會選舉投票情況
大部份有投票的受訪者於 2012 年立法會選舉中，都投票支持泛民主
派候選人，而大約 26%有投票者忘記投票給那個候選人。
3.4 生活滿意度
不同年齡的受訪者都不滿意於香港的政治和環境保育情況，而各年齡
組分別都有近一半人對經濟情況只是感覺一般。不同年齡組別之間的
生活滿意度在統計學上有顯著分別，但是方向大致相同。
另一方面，受訪者普遍傾向滿意他們的生活質素，15 至 19 歲一群比
其他兩個年齡組更感滿意。不同年齡組別之間，雖然生活滿意度在統
計學上有顯著分別，實際上差異只是微不足道。
3.5 身份與政治認同
較年青的兩個年齡組別 (15 至 19 及 20 至 29 歲) 之中超過 80%受訪
者都選擇認同自己是
「香港人」
，只有 10%選擇認同自己是
「中國人」
。
30 至 39 歲則有 63% 認同自己是「香港人」
，21%則選擇「中國人」。
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政治認同方面，信任香港特區政府的受訪者比例 (42.6%) 高於信任
中央政府 (25.2%)，而世代之間亦見差異。中間年齡組 (20 至 29 歲)
對政府的信任最少 (34.6% 香港政府，18.8%中央政府)。最年輕的
(15 至 19 歲) 最多比例信任香港政府 (48.2%)，30 至 39 歲的年齡組
別最多人信任中央政府 (36.1%)。
3.6 到內地升學或就業
受訪者對回內地升學或就業持正面態度，約 40% 接受自己到國內升
學，約 50% 則接受到國內就業，而不同年齡組別之間的差異不大。
雖然年青人在意識及身份方面抗拒建立中國連繫，但關乎個人前途及
發展時，卻非一面抗拒與國內接觸。
3.7 年青人主觀評價發展機會
關於個人在香港得到的發展機會，約 50%受訪者認為機會一般，大
約 30%則認為很少機會甚至完全沒有。比較三個年齡組別，20 至 29
歲的人最不樂觀。
另一方面，近 40%的受訪者認為未來發展機會與現在比較是相近，
14.1%認為會轉好，46.9% 則認為未來發展會比現時更差。20 至 29
歲的受訪者最為悲觀，超過一半 (51.2%) 認為未來會比現時差。
第三，關於個人在香港得到的發展機會，感到滿意 (24.3%) 與不滿
(23.5%)的比例相近。其中最年青的一群（15 至 19 歲）的滿意比例
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(19.2%) 最低，最年長（30-39 歲）的最高 (29.9%)。
3.8 對「佔領中環」及「民間全民投票」的態度
較年輕的兩個年齡組（15 至 19 及 20 至 29 歲）都分別有超過一半人
支持「佔領中環」爭取以他們心中理想的制度於 2017 年普選行政長
官。最年長的一群（30 至 39 歲）則對是否支持「佔領中環」不相上
下，46.7%支持、46.4%不支持。
關於 2017 年以公民提名候選人方式普選行政長官，較年輕的兩個年
齡組都分別有超過 80%受訪者支持，較年長的一組則有 70%。本調
查大部份時間進行期間，有關「民間全民投票」普通行政長官方案還
未開始，受訪者當中只有約三份一人會參加「民間全民投票」。
3.9 香港政府與公民社會的衝突
近年環境保育及土地開發問題屢屢成為政府與民間團體衝突的源頭。
就此類議題，最年長的一群受訪者最支持政府，有 19.5%認同政府立
場，較年輕的兩個年齡組認同政府的分別少於 10%。
各個政黨或政治組織之中，最多受訪者支持的是民主黨 (6.1%)，學
民思潮在泛民主派當中最少人支持，但卻最受 15 至 19 歲的受訪者支
持。最年長的一個年齡組最多人（10.5%）支持建制派政黨或組識，
而較年輕的兩個年齡組分別不足 5%支持建制派。
受訪者普遍不滿香港自 1997 年回歸以來的民主發展步伐，超過一半
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人認為民主步伐太慢。不同年齡組別之間有點差異，最少人認為太慢
是 15 至 19 歲組別，但仍有 46.4%；20 至 29 歲則有最多人認為太慢
(62.6%)。
3.10 維護香港高度自治
約 90% 受訪者認同當中港利益在香港出現矛盾時，應該以香港利益
優先。,此外，為體驗香港高度自治，約 80% 分別認同香港政府有權
審批內地來港單程證，及限制內地自由行旅客來港數目。
4. 與青年人異議態度相關的各項因素
4.1 異議者的對社會議題的態度
以 9 項社會議題來量度青年人對整體社會狀況的不滿及異議程度。9
項議題歸納為以下 4 個範疇：
4.1.1 「佔領中環」及「民間全民投票」
(1) 支持以「佔領中環」方式來爭取理想普選行政長官模式：
較年輕的兩個年齡組 (15 至 19 及 20 至 29 歲) 分別有超過
一半人支持；
(2) 同意公民提名方式普選 2017 年行政長官：
不同年齡組別都有大多數人支持：
(3) 參加 2014 年 6 月 22 日「民間全民投票」；
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每個年齡組都有大約三份一合資格投票者，即年滿十八歲或
以上將會投票。
4.1.2 香港政府與公民社會的衝突
(4) 香港政府與民間保育團體就土地開發的衝突；
最年長的一群支持政府立場的比最高（19.5%）
，較年青的兩
個年齡組分別只有不足 10%支持。
4.1.3 政治認同
(5) 支持泛民主派：
最多受訪者支持的是民主黨 (6.1%)，學民思潮在泛民主派
當中最少人支持，但卻最受 15 至 19 歲的受訪者支持。最年
長的一個年齡組最多人（10.5%）支持建制派政黨或組識，
而較年輕的兩個年齡組分別不足 5%支持建制派；
(6) 不滿意自 1997 年回歸以來的民主發展步伐：
超過一半人認為民主步伐太慢。不同年齡組別之間有點差異，
最少人認為太慢是 15 至 19 歲組別，但仍有 46.4%；20 至
29 歲則有最多人認為太慢 (62.6%)。
4.1.4 維護香港高度自治
(7) 當中港利益在香港出現矛盾時，以香港利益優先：
約 90% 受訪者認同；
(8) 香港政府有權審批內地來港單程證¡：
約 80% 受訪者認同；
(9) 限制內地自由行旅客來港數目：
約 80% 受訪者認同。
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4.2 累積異議指標
累積異議指標是由上述 9 項議題所表達的異議次數總和，代表累積程
度有多少，數值是 0 至 9 分，分數愈高，異議程度愈高。9 項議題之
中，除了有關公民提名普選 2017 年行政長官一項，其餘 8 項都是 20
至 29 歲年齡組別最高異議程度。
受訪者得 0 分是十分罕見，即是或多或少總有一點異議。大部份受訪
者（67.2%）累積異議指標是介乎 1 至 6 分，可算是低至中度異議者。
大約 32% 是強烈異議者，得分介乎 7 至 9 分。
比較之下，30 至 39 歲是最少異議，平均指標分數是 5 分，亦僅見有
大約 3% 沒有任何異議情緒。
最年青的一群異議程度與最年長的一群幾乎相同，平均分是 5.1，但
當中沒有人是全無異議。20 至 29 歲的異議程度最高，平均分是 5.8，
只有個別 (0.6%) 是全無異議。
整體來說，異議程度愈高者的人口特徵是：男性、在香港出生、具專
上教育程度及家庭收入比較好。具海外居住或求學經驗則對異議程度
沒有影響。大部份人口特徵的異議程度差距其實少 1 分，只有專上教
育程度與初中或以下程度者的差距大約達到 1 分。由此可見，青年人
的不同人口特徵沒有導致異議程度大異。
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4.3 強烈異議者的人口特徵
強烈異議者的比例是顯著的 31.6%，累積異議指標分數是 7 至 9 分，
他們的特徵是甚麼呢？
這批強烈異議者，不論年齡組別，其人口特徵都相近：具專上教育程
度(68.1%)、在香港出生 (82.6%)、並非最草根一層（家庭月入中位數
是$30,000-49,999）
、只有少數人具備海外生活經驗 (11.7%)。
4.4 與異議態度相關的其他因素
三項有關個人發展機會的評價都與異議態度呈相反關係，即是異議程
度愈高，就認為自己發展機會愈少，這些關聯力度不強，但統計學上
還是顯著。換句話說，異議情緒其實不是由於自覺發展機會不好而展
現。調查結果不能證實部份輿論對年青人的普遍印象，就是認為年青
人由於缺乏向上流動機會而對社會產生並累積不滿。
此外，對生活滿意或感覺開心，與異議情緒的關聯程度非常弱小，雖
然統計學上是顯著的。受訪者對生活感到不滿或不開心，其異議情緒
都不會高於感到滿意或開心的人。對自己身體健康狀況的評價與異議
情緒無關。因此，個人對生活的面感覺，不會增強異議態度。
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4.5 政治信任、身份認同與異議態度
不同程度的異議態度於政治信任方面分歧很大。2014 年不信任香港
政府的人，其累積異議指標高於信任香港政府者 2 分（總分 9 分）
。
相近的差異亦見於信任與不信任中央政府的兩群受訪者之中。此外，
信任中央政府的人，累積異議指標最低，比較信任香港政府的人更
低。
4.6 物質主義、後物質主義與異議態度
價值觀對政治最向的影響是顯著的。自上世紀七十年代起，國外學界
便開始對文化價值觀的轉變進行連串研究，檢視由「物質主義」轉為
「後物質主義」的趨勢，如何影響到對社會、政治、經濟狀況的評價。
上世紀九十年代有研究報告指出香港的主流價值觀仍然是物質主義，
但是後物質主義價值開始浮現。
2014 年的調查結果發現，香港青年人口是物質主義與非物質主義並
重。觀察兩類主義的個別項目評分，最高評分一項是關於物質主義的
維持治安，次高評分是後物質主義的保障言論自由。其餘項目評分高
低皆由物質主義與非物質主義輪流排序。由此可見，青年人口的態度
取向並非二分及互相排斥，而是要視乎具體社會及政治狀況而表現那
一方面的傾向。
後物質主義對異議態度有顯著影響。2014 的受訪者，保守派的與異
議者，後物質主義的傾向有別，後物質主義傾向愈強，對社會政治議
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題批判得愈激烈。
4.7 預測異議態度
以上分析發現不同因素都與受訪者的「累積異議指標」高低有關，為
找出當中最具影響力的因素，需要進行多變項迴歸分析，包括：人口
特徵、後物質主義價值觀、身份認同及對政府的信任。
多變項迴歸分析結果顯示，後物質主義傾向的影響是最強烈。人口特
徵的影響在統計學上是不存在。因此，一般印象是愈年青的異議程度
愈高，其實沒有證據支持。人口特徵不能解釋異議程度高低，價值觀
取向才是關鍵。
5. 總結
2014 年的調查於 5 月 14 日至 6 月 24 日進行，即是調查期間是社會
處於一個相對正常的狀態。所謂正常，就是指社會的政治氣氛是我們
常見及生活在其中的狀態。在此期間收集的意見，就是未經刻意動員
面對不尋常政治衝突的局面。因此，調查結果就不是反映極端對立以
至社會撕裂的狀況。以學術研究來說，在正常社會狀態下進行調查，
其實更具學術價值，因為要進行長期追蹤調查，正常的社會狀態是最
常見及持久，最能反映受訪者長期對社會及政治議題的評價。
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I. Background of the Study
This project is a follow-up to a 2010 research commissioned by the
Central Policy Unit.
The idea is to gauge to what extent social and
political attitudes of young people in Hong Kong have changed over the
past several years and the reasons why. We have witnessed an apparent
escalation of social and political participation outside of institutionalized
channels over the past years.
This project should help us ascertain
whether the perception of rising youth activism and dissent towards
public authority is true among the youth population as a whole or a
"localized" phenomenon within small pockets of young people.
It
should also allow us to test a number of prevalent explanations of the rise
in youth activism.
The current project will follow-up on the key findings of the 2010 survey,
focusing on four general questions:
(1) Does the younger generation have unique socio-political orientations
vis-à-vis the older cohort? Are there any distinctive diversity in
values and orientation within this generation?
(2) How does the younger generation perceive their own position and
opportunities in the socio-economic system, and in particular the
chances of improving their social and economic conditions?
(3) More specifically, does the younger generation exhibit a distinctive
kind of post-materialist and "localistic" values?
(4) What are the socio-demographic and biographical factors that could
account for diversities in socio-political orientations among the
1
younger generation?
II. Methodology
This study uses a quantitative approach to gather the required information
on the young population of Hong Kong. The main age cohort under
study includes those born in the years between 1975 and 1999, that is,
those aged 15 to 39 as of the year 2014.
In which the 30-39 cohort are
included as a reference group to compare with the younger population.
A telephone survey was conducted from 14 May to 24 June 2014 by the
Telephone Laboratory of the Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies
at The Chinese University of Hong Kong.
The previous 2010 survey
was also administered by the same Telephone Laboratory.
A total of 2,000 respondents who completed the survey were drawn from
the target population.
The procedures to select this sample followed a
strict probability sampling method and also, as is common practice for
other telephone surveys: only landline household telephone numbers
were generated by computer and then calls were made by interviewers.
If a household contacted had more than one eligible respondent, a
random process was used to select only one respondent from that
household. If the chosen individual was not at home or not free to
answer, follow-up calls were made.
With random selection, we try to
reduce systematic sampling error as much as possible.
The response
rate for the telephone survey was 67.1%, which was calculated from all
telephone calls with known eligible respondent(s) present in the
households.
Telephone numbers without an eligible respondent (i.e. no
household member aged between 15 and 39) were not included in
2
calculating the response rate.
A major limitation of telephone surveys, however, is the shorter attention
span of respondents.
As a result, the number of questions we could
include in our survey was much fewer than the number that could be used
in a typical face-to-face survey.
According to the experience of the
Telephone Laboratory, the maximum number of questions that should be
asked on the telephone is 40 since respondents are likely to hang up once
this threshold is reached so that the interview would be incomplete.
The
questions we asked in the study cover basic demographics, social values,
political orientations, affiliation and participations, acquisition of political
information, life satisfaction, personal development, and postmaterialist
values orientation.
Although we wanted to ask many questions, we had
to limit ourselves to relatively few for each aspect of youth attitudes.
The final version of the questionnaire is found in Appendix 1.
Statistical findings from the survey are reported in the rest of this chapter.
The choice of telephone over household survey is due to balance of time,
cost and sample size.
Conducting household survey has already become
much less efficient than 10 years before, mainly due to tightened security
measures among private housing.
The difficulty to get into dwelling
adds disproportionally higher fieldwork cost.
And because our target
respondents are a subgroup of the general population in terms of age,
successful contact rate should be lower than all adult population, hence
further adding cost and time.
To efficiently survey 2000 respondents of
age between 15 to 39, telephone survey has the advantage of timely
completion of data collection, and therefore reasonable fieldwork cost.
3
III. Telephone Survey on Social Attitudes of the Youth Population in
Hong Kong: May to June 2014
3.1 Demographic Characteristics
Of the total of 2,000 respondents who completed the survey, 1,076
(53.8%) are female and 924 (46.2%) male.
By generational distribution,
362 (18.1%) are aged 15-17, 276 (13.8%) aged 18-19 (in combination,
638 or 31.9% aged 15-19), 780 (39.0%) aged 20-29, and 582 (29.1%)
aged 30-39.
By educational attainment, 7.7% are junior secondary or
below, 39.0% senior secondary, and 53.3% tertiary education or above.
A majority of the respondents (77.1%) were born in Hong Kong.
Of
those not born in Hong Kong, 8.3% have lived here less than 7 years,
40.4% between 7 and 15 years, and the remaining 51.3% 15 years or
more.
Only 12.2% of respondents have experience of living, education,
or working overseas.
The median household monthly income category
is $30,000-$49,999. Classified by economic activity status, 47.0% are
economically active, 42.8% students, and 10.1% economically inactive.
Table 3.1 presents the basic demographic characteristics for the sample as
a whole.
4
Table 3.1 Demographic Characteristics
Female
Male
53.8%
46.2%
Education
Junior secondary or below
Senior secondary
Tertiary education or above
7.7%
39.0%
53.3%
Born in Hong Kong
Not born in Hong Kong
77.1%
22.9%
Lived in HK < 7 years
Lived in HK 7-15 years
Lived in HK 15 years or more
8.3%
40.4%
51.3%
Overseas living experience
No overseas experience
12.2%
87.8%
Median monthly household
income group
$30,000 49,999
Economic Activity Status
Economically active
Students
Economically inactive
47.1%
42.8%
10.1%
3.2 Civic Engagement and Political Information Seeking
Anti-establishment sentiment is reflected in actions of our respondents.
Table 3.2 indicates that half of respondents (50.2%) have not joined any
demonstration or rally since 1997, and a mere 3.2% report having joined
frequently. A visible group of youth population (46.6%) has experience
in civic actions either occasionally or frequently.
5
Table 3.2 How often participating in Demonstrations or Rallies since 1997?
(自 1997 年回歸以來，你有冇參加過示威集會、遊行呢？)
All
%
Never
Seldom
Occasionally
Frequently
Don't know
Total
(N)
p < 0.001
50.2
23.7
22.9
3.2
0.1
100.1
(2000)
Table 3.3 shows that a substantial majority of respondents (88.8%) are
aware of demonstrations or rallies to be organized.
Table 3.3 Awareness of Demonstrations or Rallies to be Organized
(無論以往你有冇參加過示威集會遊行，你事前有冇留意有關消息呢？)
All
%
Aware
Unaware
Total
(N)
88.8
11.2
100.0
(1999)
How do respondents learn about the holding of demonstrations and rallies?
As shown in Table 3.4, the Internet (74.3%) outplays conventional mass
media to become the major channel to receive information on civic
actions to be organized.
TV comes not close enough (60.2%) and
printed newspapers are farther apart (48.3%).
6
Different forms of online
communication are further examined in Table 3.5.
Social network
media and online new media ("new" as opposed to "old" conventional
mass media) are usual electronic communication channels to obtain
necessary information. It is not surprised but more importantly the data
here confirm the anecdotal observations.
Table 3.4 Channels for Learning About Demonstrations or Rallies to be Organized
(multiple responses allowed)
(你主要係靠乜嘢方法得知示威集會遊行嘅消息呢？可選多項)
All
%
Internet (computer, mobile phone,
tablet)
TV
Printed newspapers
Informed verbally by others
Radio
Banners or handbills
School / Teachers
On street propaganda by political
parties
Magazines
Others
Don't know / forget
(N)
74.3
60.2
48.3
25.6
1.0
0.5
0.5
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
(1776)
7
Table 3.5 How Users of Electronic Communications Learn about Demonstration or
Rallies to be Organized (multiple responses allowed)
(你主要係靠以下邊個途徑知道示威集會遊行嘅消息呢？可選多項) [只問有用電
腦/手機/平板上網的受訪者]
All
%
Facebook posts / private messages
Facebook Page
Online new media
Instant messaging
Blogs
Mobile phone SMS
Email
Online forum
Others
Don't know / forget
(N)
54.7
51.5
43.7
24.0
8.8
7.8
5.6
2.3
2.9
2.0
(1319)
3.3 Voting Behaviour in the Legislative Council in 2012
About 32% of respondents were not aged 18 or above in 2012, and
therefore not eligible voters then.
As self-reported by the respondents,
1,046 were eligible voters in 2012 Legislative Council Election. Table
3.6 reports that 74.1% voted in 2012, and the figure is much higher than
the official turnout rate of 53.1%.
8
Table 3.6 Voted in LegCo Election in 2012? (Eligible voters only)
All
%
Voted
Not voted
74.9
25.1
Total
(N)
100.0
(1046)
A majority of respondents reported voting for candidates from the
Pan-democrats camp as shown in Table 3.7.
And about 26% of them
did not remember to whom they cast their vote.
Table 3.7 Which Political Camp They Cast Their Vote for in the LegCo Election in
2012 (only those having voted)
All
%
Pan-democrats
(泛民主派)
55.8
Pro-establishment
(建制派)
11.3
Independent /
Neutral (獨立 / 中
間 / 無黨派)
Empty vote
Forgot
Total
(N)
5.8
0.6
26.5
100.0
(724)
3.4 Life Satisfaction
The present survey has assessed satisfaction of respondents with selected
social conditions. Respondents were asked to evaluate three social
conditions relevant to this study, plus the usual overall measures of
9
quality of life.
Satisfaction was measured using a 5-point rating scale: 1
is very dissatisfied, 3 the mid-point, and 5 very satisfied.
Tables 3.8-3.10 show respondents' satisfaction with three social
conditions: political development, environmental conservation, and
economic development.
The results show that the majority of all age
groups have indicated dissatisfaction with two conditions: political
development and environmental conservation. And the economical
development is rated average by half of respondents in all age groups.
The differences among age groups are statistically significant in three
issues, but the trends are the same among age groups.
The differences
are in terms of magnitude only.
Table 3.8 Satisfaction with Political development in HK
Age
15-19
%
20-29
%
30-39
%
52.3
36.7
11.0
69.4
25.6
4.9
58.8
30.3
10.9
60.9
30.6
8.6
Total
100.0
100.0
(N)
(637)
(772)
p < 0.001; 5-point scale, 1=very dissatisfied, 5=very satisfied
100.0
(571)
100.1
(1980)
All
%
Very dissatisfied / dissatisfied
Average
Very satisfied / satisfied
All
%
Table 3.9 Satisfaction with Environmental conservation in HK
Age
15-19
%
20-29
%
30-39
%
54.2
30.2
15.6
59.7
28.4
11.9
47.5
32.3
20.2
54.4
30.1
15.5
Total
100.0
100.0
(N)
(635)
(775)
p < 0.001; 5-point scale, 1=very dissatisfied, 5=very satisfied
100.0
(575)
100.0
(1985)
Very dissatisfied / dissatisfied
Average
Very satisfied / satisfied
10
Table 3.10 Satisfaction with Economic development in HK
Age
Very dissatisfied / dissatisfied
Average
Very satisfied / satisfied
Total
(N)
p < 0.001
15-19
%
20-29
%
30-39
%
All
%
12.1
55.3
32.7
100.0
(637)
26.3
54.7
19.0
100.0
(777)
31.2
45.9
22.9
100.0
(577)
23.2
52.3
24.5
100.0
(1991)
5-point scale, 1=very dissatisfied, 5=very satisfied
Table 3.11 reports findings with respect to assessment of overall quality
of life, measured using the same 5-point scale as described above.
The
mean scores for the overall sample reflect the respondents' generally
positive evaluation towards personal conditions.
The 15-19 age group
is relatively more satisfied with overall life than the other two cohorts.
The differences among cohorts are statistically significant, but the
magnitude is not large.
All respondents are on average slightly satisfied
with their personal life.
Table 3.11 Overall Life Satisfaction
Age
Overall life satisfaction
(N)
p < 0.001
15-19
20-29
30-39
All
3.45
(638)
3.26
(778)
3.28
(580)
3.33
(1996)
Mean scores on 5-point scale:
1=very dissatisfied, 5=very satisfied => higher score, more satisfied
11
3.5 Identity and Political Trust
Respondents indicate they are relatively dissatisfied with broad social
conditions.
Then, would this in turn weaken their choice among
national and Hong Kong identity, and their political trust in the HKSAR
government and Central government?
Table 3.12 shows that an
overwhelming majority of the two younger cohorts (15-19, and 20-29)
identify themselves as Hong Kongers, both over 80%, in contrast to 10%
being Chinese.
The older 30-39 cohort has about 63% of Hong Kong
identification, and about 21% being Chinese.
Comparatively speaking, more respondents have trust in the Hong Kong
SAR Government (42.6%) than in the Central Government (25.2%).
The middle cohort (20-29) has the least trust in both governments (34.6%
Hong Kong, 18.8% Central).
The youngest (15-19) has the most trust in
Hong Kong government (48.2%), and the oldest (30-39) the most trust in
Central government (36.1%).
12
Table 3.12 Identity and Political Trust
Age
15-19
20-29
30-39
All
%
%
%
%
10.5
10.3
20.6
13.4
9.4
9.0
16.6
11.3
80.1
80.7
62.7
75.3
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
(638)
(768)
(577)
(1983)
Trust / Trust strongly
48.2
34.6
47.4
42.6
Do not trust / Do not trust
51.8
65.4
52.6
57.4
(A) Identity
(認為自己是香港人多些，還是中國人多些)
Chinese
Both or both not
Hong Kong
Total
(N)
(B) Trust in HK SAR Government
strongly
Total
100.0
(N)
(616)
(748)
(547)
(1911)
Trust / Trust strongly
23.6
18.8
36.1
25.2
Do not trust / Do not trust
76.4
81.2
63.9
74.8
Total
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
(N)
(625)
(739)
100.0
100.0
100.0
(C) Trust in Central Government
strongly
(537)
(1901)
p < 0.001
3.6 Attitudes Towards Education and Employment in the Mainland
Although respondents do not exhibit high level of national identity or
trust the Central Government, they generally welcome opportunities to
study or work in the Mainland.
Table 3.13 shows that more than 40% of
13
respondents find it acceptable to pursue further study in the Mainland.
The percentage is similar across cohorts.
Table 3.14 shows slightly
more positive evaluation towards working in the Mainland.
About 50%
of respondents would be willing to work in the Mainland, and the
percentage is about the same across cohorts.
To summarize, our
respondents are rejecting Chinese identity only at an ideological level.
When it comes to personal life and development, however, the youth
population finds it acceptable to have connections with the Mainland, e.g.
through further studies and employment opportunities.
Table 3.13 Attitudes towards Pursuing Further Studies in the Mainland
Age
Accept / Strongly accept
Reject / Strongly reject
Indifferent
Total
(N)
p > 0.05
15-19
20-29
30-39
All
%
%
%
%
44.7
53.5
1.9
43.2
53.0
3.9
46.9
47.1
6.0
44.8
51.4
3.9
100.1
(638)
100.1
(780)
100.0
(582)
100.1
(2000)
Table 3.14 Attitudes towards Taking Up Employment in the Mainland
Age
Accept / Strongly accept
Reject / Strongly reject
Indifferent
Total
(N)
p > 0.05
15-19
20-29
30-39
All
%
%
%
%
51.0
46.0
3.1
51.4
43.9
4.8
51.4
44.2
4.5
51.3
44.6
4.2
100.1
(638)
100.1
(780)
100.1
(582)
100.1
(2000)
14
3.7 To What Extent Youth Perceive Opportunities
Table 3.15 shows the response to the question about the perception of
opportunities available to their same age cohort for personal development.
About 50% of all respondents perceive moderate amount of opportunities
available.
Slightly more than 30% perceive limited or no opportunity
available for their personal development.
Comparatively speaking,
respondents of aged 20-29 are the least positive to the opportunities
available to them.
Table 3.15 Perception of Opportunities Available to Same Age Cohort for Personal
Development in Hong Kong
(你認為同你年齡相近嘅香港人，喺香港各方面發展嘅機會多唔多呢？)
Age
None / Limited
Moderate
Many
Total
(N)
p < 0.05
15-19
20-29
30-39
All
%
%
%
%
31.2
55.3
13.5
34.3
50.9
14.8
26.5
53.3
20.2
31.1
53.0
16.0
100.0
(637)
100.0
(776)
100.0
(574)
100.0
(1987)
A second question asked respondents about their perception of
opportunities for personal development in future. As shown in Table
3.16, nearly 40% of respondents expect their future would be the same as
now.
With respect to cohort differences, the youngest are the least
pessimistic about their future than others, 14.1% expecting a better
tomorrow, or 46.9% worse than now.
The middle cohort (aged 20-29) is
the least positive, with half of them (51.2%) expecting a worse tomorrow.
15
Table 3.16 Comparing with the present, will opportunities for personal development
in Hong Kong become better or worse in future?
(你認為同你年齡相近嘅香港人，
未來喺香港各方面發展嘅機會，同依家相比，係會好啲、差唔多，定係差啲？)
Age
Worse than now
About the same
Better than now
Total
(N)
p < 0.05
15-19
20-29
30-39
All
%
%
%
%
46.9
39.0
14.1
51.2
38.9
9.9
49.9
41.0
9.1
49.4
39.5
11.0
100.0
(638)
100.0
(771)
100.0
(559)
100.0
(1968)
A third question asked respondents how satisfied they are with
opportunities for their own development in Hong Kong.
assessment is shown in Table 3.17.
Their overall
Nearly a quarter of all respondents
are dissatisfied with the opportunities available for their own
development in Hong Kong. Satisfied respondents (24.3%) are about
the same as those dissatisfied (23.5%).
Comparatively speaking, the
youngest (aged 15-19) is the least satisfied generation (19.2%), and the
oldest (30-39) the most satisfied (29.9%).
16
Table 3.17 Generally speaking, are you satisfied with the opportunities for your own
development in Hong Kong?
(整體嚟講，你滿唔滿自己喺香港所得到嘅發展機會呢？)
Age
Dissatisfied / Very dissatisfied
Average
Satisfied / Very satisfied
Total
(N)
p < 0.001
15-19
20-29
30-39
All
%
%
%
%
25.5
55.2
19.2
24.6
51.0
24.3
19.7
50.4
29.9
23.5
52.2
24.3
100.0
(634)
100.0
(778)
100.0
(579)
100.0
(1991)
3.8 Attitudes Towards "Occupy Central" and Civil Referendum
Tables 3.18 to 3.20 reveal the attitudes of youth towards two
controversial issues in Hong Kong recently: the "Occupy Central"
movement and the Civil Referendum organized by the "Occupy Central"
to vote for a proposal to the 2017 Chief Executive nomination.
were 3 proposals and an option of "Abstention".
There
The common element
in the three proposals is popular nomination. It is this common element
that has provoked strong reaction from the establishment.
The younger two cohorts (aged 15-19 and 20-29) have more than half
supporting the "Occupy Central" movement to fight for their ideal form
of universal suffrage in 2017 Chief Executive Election.
The oldest
cohort (30-39) is ambivalent with favourable (46.7%) and unfavourable
(46.4%) responses about the same.
The popular nomination receives
overwhelming support from all age cohorts. The younger two cohorts
have 80% or more, and the oldest about 70% endorsement of popular
nomination.
At most time of the survey period, the Civil Referendum
17
had not yet taken place.
Respondents, however, were not very
enthusiastic to vote in the Civil Referendum.
Only one-third in each
cohort would cast a vote.
Table 3.18 Support "Occupy Central" for Genuine Universal Suffrage in 2017 Chief
Executive Election
(支持佔領中環爭取落實真正普選特首方案嗎？)
Age
15-19
20-29
30-39
All
%
%
%
%
42.6
34.4
46.4
40.5
53.6
59.7
46.7
53.9
3.8
5.9
6.9
5.5
Total
100.0
100.0
100.0
99.9
(N)
(638)
(776)
(580)
(1994)
Don't support / Strongly don't
support
(唔支持 / 非常唔支持)
Support / Strongly support
(支持 / 非常支持)
Don't know
(唔知道／好難講)
p < 0.001
18
Table 3.19 Popular Nomination of Chief Executive Candidates in 2017 is Indispensable
(認同公民提名是普選行政長官方案中必不可少嗎？)
Age
15-19
20-29
30-39
All
%
%
%
%
13.1
16.1
24.7
17.6
85.0
80.0
69.4
78.5
2.0
3.9
6.0
3.9
Total
100.1
100.0
100.1
100.0
(N)
(637)
(777)
(580)
(1994)
Disagree / Strongly disagree
(唔認同 / 非常唔認同)
Agree / Strongly agree
(認同 / 非常認同)
Don't know
(唔知道／好難講)
p < 0.001
Table 3.20 Would Vote in "6.22 Civil Referendum" Organized by "Occupy Central" in
June 2014? (For Age 18 or Above )
(佔領中環運動於 6 月 20 日起舉行民間全民投票，請問你會唔會參加呢？只限
18 歲或以上)
Age
18-19
20-29
30-39
All
%
%
%
%
Would not vote (唔會投票)
29.3
24.4
38.5
30.2
Not yet decided (未決定)
37.7
35.8
27.8
33.3
Would vote (會投票)
32.6
38.8
33.0
35.7
0.4
1.0
0.7
0.8
Total
100.0
100.0
100.1
100.0
(N)
(276)
(780)
(576)
(1632)
Don't know
(唔知道／好難講)
p < 0.001
19
3.9 Conflicts between the Government and Civil Society
The conflicts between the administration and civil groups on
environmental conservation and land development are commonly seen.
Table 3.21 reveals that the government has not received support from our
respondents.
The most supportive to the government is from the oldest
cohort with 19.5%.
The younger two cohorts have less than 10%.
Table 3.21 Conflicts between Government and Civil Groups over Land Development
Issues (政府與民間團體就土地開發問題有過多次爭論及衝突，你認同
政府定係民間團體嘅立場呢？)
Age
Support Government more
15-19
20-29
30-39
All
%
%
%
%
9.2
8.7
19.5
12.0
50.2
46.5
45.0
47.3
39.0
42.6
32.4
38.5
0.5
0.6
1.0
0.7
1.1
1.5
2.1
1.6
100.0
100.1
(582)
(2000)
(完全/大部分認同政府)
Half-half
(政府同民間團體一半一半)
Support Concern Groups more
(完全/大部分認同民間團體)
Support neither
(兩面都唔認同)
Don't know
(唔知道/冇意見)
Total
100.0
(N)
(638)
99.9
(780)
p < 0.001
Table 3.22 reflects the political identification of the youth.
20
For
responses of named parties, the Democratic Party is the most identified
with (6.1%).
Although Scholarism has the lowest percentage to be
named among the pan-democratic camp, it is the third most popular in
the 15-19 cohort. For the pro-establishment camp, the most supportive
is the 30-39 cohort with 10.5%, while less than 5% from the two younger
cohorts.
Table 3.22 Political Party Most Supported (最支持香港邊個政黨或政團呢？)
Age
15-19
20-29
30-39
All
%
%
%
%
8.0
5.5
4.9
6.1
6.4
5.7
3.7
5.4
Civic Party (公民黨)
3.3
6.8
5.7
5.4
League of Social Democrats
2.5
5.7
3.0
3.9
4.1
1.2
0.5
1.9
4.9
7.4
7.3
6.6
4.2
4.6
10.5
6.2
66.6
63.2
64.5
64.6
Total
100.0
100.1
100.1
100.1
(N)
(638)
(768)
Democratic Party
(民主黨)
People Power
(人民力量)
(社民連)
Scholarism
(學民思潮)
Pan-democrats
(其他民主派/泛民主派)
Pro-establishment
(建制派)
Independent / Neutral
(獨立 / 中間 / 無黨派)
(574)
(1980)
p < 0.001
It is not unexpected that, as shown in Table 3.23, the youth population is
21
not satisfied with the democratic progress in Hong Kong since 1997.
More than half find the progress too slow. Interestingly, the youngest is
the least (still 46.4%) feeling too slow the democratic progress, and the
aged 20-29 the most (62.6%).
Table 3.23 Democratic Progress since 1997
(自 1997 年回歸以來，你覺得香港民主發展步伐方面係太快、太慢，定係適中呢？)
Age
15-19
20-29
30-39
All
%
%
%
%
5.6
4.5
6.2
5.4
About right (適中)
46.2
31.3
35.9
37.4
Too slow (太慢)
46.4
62.6
51.9
54.3
1.7
1.7
6.0
3.0
Total
99.9
100.1
100.0
100.1
(N)
(638)
(780)
Too fast (太快)
Don't know
(唔知道/好難講)
(582)
(2000)
p < 0.001
3.10 Defending for Autonomous Hong Kong Administration
One of the most heated controversies in Hong Kong in recent years is
defending for the autonomy in the administration of Hong Kong.
The
voice is even louder when conflict between China and Hong Kong is
involved.
Tables 3.24 to 3.26 illustrate the relevant issues. Across all
cohorts, near 90% of respondents insist that the interests of Hong Kong
must prevail whenever conflicts between Hong Kong and China occur in
Hong Kong.
About 80% of respondents in each cohort are in favour of
autonomous administration of Hong Kong, as reflected by the approval
22
of One-way Permit Scheme and imposing quota for Individual Visit
Scheme for the Mainland residents.
Table 3.24 Hong Kong Interests Prevail when Conflict between China and Hong Kong
(中港利益矛盾在香港發生時，香港人權利優先)
Age
Disagree / Strongly disagree
15-19
20-29
30-39
All
%
%
%
%
12.2
6.4
12.4
10.0
86.2
91.8
84.7
88.0
1.6
1.8
2.9
2.1
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.1
(唔認同 / 非常唔認同)
Agree / Strongly agree
(認同 / 非常認同)
Don't know
(唔知道／好難講)
Total
(N)
(638)
p < 0.001
23
(780)
(582)
(2000)
Table 3.25 One-way Permit Scheme for Mainland Residents to Hong Kong Approved
by Hong Kong Government
(香港政府取回內地來港單程證審批權)
Age
Disagree / Strongly disagree
15-19
20-29
30-39
All
%
%
%
%
25.2
12.1
16.8
17.7
71.2
84.1
76.5
77.8
3.6
3.8
6.7
4.6
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.1
(唔認同 / 非常唔認同)
Agree / Strongly agree
(認同 / 非常認同)
Don't know
(唔知道／好難講)
Total
(N)
(638)
(780)
(582)
(2000)
p < 0.001
Table 3.26 Quota for Individual Visit Scheme for Mainland Residents must be Limited
(限制內地自由行旅客來港數目)
Age
15-19
20-29
30-39
All
%
%
%
%
14.7
13.2
19.4
15.5
84.3
85.0
78.2
82.8
0.9
1.8
2.4
1.7
Total
99.9
100.0
100.0
100.1
(N)
(638)
(779)
Disagree / Strongly disagree
(唔認同 / 非常唔認同)
Agree / Strongly agree
(認同 / 非常認同)
Don't know
(唔知道／好難講)
p < 0.001
24
(582)
(1999)
IV. Correlates of Dissent Youth in Hong Kong
4.1 Social Attitudes of Dissent
One of the research objectives of the present study is to examine the
perceptions and attitudes of socially discontented youth.
We have
measured the extent of their discontent by 9 social attitudes reflected in
their responses to the following questions grouped in 4 areas.
Detailed
statistics are reported in previous tables, and brief results are recapped as
follows:
4.1.1 Attitudes Towards "Occupy Central" and Civil Referendum
(1) whether or not they support Occupy Central for genuine
universal suffrage (Table 3.18);
(2) whether or not agree Popular Nomination for Chief Executive
election in 2017 (Table 3.19);
(3) whether or not would vote in 22 June 2014 civil referendum
(Table 3.20);
In this area, the younger two cohorts (aged 15-19 and 20-29) have more
than half supporting the "Occupy Central" movement to fight for their
ideal form of universal suffrage in 2017 Chief Executive Election.
The
popular nomination receives overwhelming support from all age cohorts.
At most time of the survey period, the Civil Referendum had not yet
taken place.
Eligible respondents (i.e. age 18 or above), however, were
not very enthusiastic to vote in the Civil Referendum.
Only one-third in
each cohort would cast a vote.
4.1.2 Conflicts between the Government and Civil Society
25
(4) which side they support in various incidents of conflicts between
the HKSAR Government and concern groups on land
development issues (Table 3.21);
On land development issues, the government has not received support
from our respondents.
The most supportive to the government is from
the oldest cohort with 19.5%.
The younger two cohorts have less than
10%.
4.1.3 Political identification
(5) which political party in Hong Kong they most support (Table
3.22);
(6) their evaluation of democratic progress in Hong Kong since
1997 (Table 3.23);
The Democratic Party is the most identified with (6.1%). Scholarism
has the lowest percentage to be named among the pan-democratic camp,
however, it is the third most popular in the 15-19 cohort.
For the
pro-establishment camp, the most supportive is the 30-39 cohort with
10.5%, while less than 5% from the two younger cohorts.
It is not unexpected that the youth population is not satisfied with the
democratic progress in Hong Kong since 1997.
More than half find the
progress too slow.
4.1.4 Defending for Autonomous Hong Kong Administration
(7) whether or not agree Hong Kong interests take priority when
China & Hong Kong in conflict (Table 3.24);
(8) whether or not Hong Kong SAR Government must have
26
approval right of One-way Permit (Table 3.25); and
(9) whether or not agree Hong Kong to restrict visitors via
Individual Visit Scheme (Table 3.26).
Across all cohorts, near 90% of respondents insist that the interests of
Hong Kong must prevail whenever conflicts between Hong Kong and
China occur in Hong Kong.
About 80% of respondents in each cohort
are in favour of autonomous administration of Hong Kong, as reflected
by the approval of One-way Permit Scheme and imposing quota for
Individual Visit Scheme for the Mainland residents.
4.2 Aggregate Measure of Dissenting Attitudes
The above 9 social attitudes of dissent and political affiliation indicate
how much discontent the youth population has towards the socio-political
environment. To further analyze their "aggregate" level of dissent and
identify the most discontented group, we have created an aggregate
measure by counting how many of the following positions the
respondents have expressed:
(a) supporting Occupy Central for genuine universal suffrage;
(b) supporting Popular Nomination for Chief Executive election in 2017;
(c) would vote in 22 June 2014 civil referendum (for age 18 or above);
(d) supporting environmental concern groups on land development
issues;
(e) having a democratic affiliation;
(f) finding democratic progress too slow since 1997;
(g) Hong Kong interests taking priority when China & Hong Kong in
conflict;
(h) Hong Kong SAR Government gaining approval right of One-way
27
Permit;
(i) restricting visitors to Hong Kong via Individual Visit Scheme.
Table 4.1 summaries the proportion of respondents showing dissenting
attitudes towards the 9 social issues.
Attention is drawn on the middle
age cohort. Except the popular nomination for Chief Executive election
in 2017, the respondents in the 20 to 29 age cohort are the most
dissenting comparing to other two cohorts.
The measure of "aggregate dissent" has a range of values from 0 to 9, 1
point given to each of the 9 issues as shown in Table 4.1.
the score, the more discontented a respondent is.
28
The higher
Table 4.1 Percentage of Respondents with Dissenting Attitudes: A Summary
Age
15-19
20-29
30-39
All
%
%
%
%
53.6
59.7
46.7
54.0
84.9
80.1
69.3
78.5
32.6
38.8
32.7
35.6
39.0
42.6
32.5
38.5
(5) Democratic camp affiliation
29.2
32.3
25.1
29.2
(6) Democratic progress too slow
46.4
62.6
51.9
54.3
86.2
91.8
84.7
87.9
71.2
84.1
76.5
77.8
84.3
85.0
78.2
82.8
(1) Support Occupy Central for
genuine universal suffrage
(2) Support popular nomination for
Chief Executive election in 2017
(3) Would vote in 22 June 2014
civil referendum (for age 18 or
above)
(4) Support environmental concern
groups on land development issues
since 1997
(7) Hong Kong interests taking
priority when China & Hong Kong
in conflict
(8) Hong Kong SAR Government
has approval right of One-way
Permit
(9) Demand restricting visitors to
Hong Kong via Individual Visit
Scheme
Table 4.2 Aggregate Dissent Score & Dissent Intensity
29
15-19
20-29
30-39
All
"Baseline"
Aggregate Dissent
% of
Score 0-9
respondents
%
%
%
(Dissent Intensity
0.0-1.0)
0 (0.0)
0.0
0.6
3.1
1.2
1 (0.1)
2.0
1.4
4.8
2.6
2 (0.2)
5.2
4.4
9.1
6.0
Little or
3 (0.3)
10.7
9.1
13.2
10.8
moderate
4 (0.4)
20.8
14.7
14.3
16.6
dissent
5 (0.6)
21.3
14.1
14.6
16.6
6 (0.7)
18.2
15.3
10.3
14.8
Strong
7 (0.8)
12.2
15.4
11.0
13.1
dissent
8 (0.9)
6.3
15.5
11.2
11.3
3.3
100.0
9.5
100.1
8.4
100.0
7.2
100.0
(78.2)
(59.0)
(77.5)
(67.2)
(21.8)
(40.4)
(19.4)
(31.6)
Mean (out of 9) ***
5.1
5.8
5.0
5.3
S.D.
1.8
2.1
2.4
2.1
No dissent
9 (1.0)
Total
(Score 1-6 subtotal)
(Score 7-9 subtotal)
*** p < 0.001
As shown in Table 4.2, respondents showing nothing dissent (i.e., score 0)
are rarely found, 67.2% of all respondents are a little or moderately
dissenting (with scores from 1 to 6).
Alternatively speaking, a major
majority of them possess little or moderate level of dissent intensity (0.0
being no dissent, 1.0 full dissent).
About 31.6% of respondents are
reported to be holding strong dissenting attitudes (scores 7 to 9, dissent
intensity 0.8 to 1.0). Regarding generational differences, the "baseline"
30-39 cohort is relatively the least discontented, with the lowest mean
score of dissent 5.0; about 3% of them do not show any discontent (with
30
zero dissent score.)
The youngest generation (age 15-19) is as much (or
as less) discontented as the oldest, with mean score of dissent 5.1.
However, no one in the youngest generation reports zero score.
The
middle generation (20-29) has the highest dissent score of 5.8.
But
interestingly, a tiny proportion (0.6%) of the middle generation reports
zero dissent.
On the other hand, the 20-29 cohort has the largest proportion to show
strong dissent.
About 40% of them possess dissent score from 7 to 9, or
dissent intensity 0.8 to 1.0.
The youngest and the oldest cohort have
more or less the same proportion of strong dissent, with 21.8% and
19.4% respectively.
Apart from generation differences in the mean score of aggregate dissent,
there are also some statistically significant differences in dissent scores
by demographic characteristics as summarized in Table 4.3. In general,
the more dissenting respondents are male, born in Hong Kong, tertiary
educated, and in more economically well-off household.
Overseas
living experience has no statistically association with the aggregate
dissent measure.
For those statistically significant differences, the
magnitude is mostly less than 1 (i.e., 1 social issue among 9 under
survey). This narrow difference (less than 1 social issue) has already
been found among generations (Table 4.2).
The most divided
demographic subgroups are those tertiary educated against those junior
secondary or below, and the difference is said to be as "large" as 1 social
issue apart.
Demographically speaking, the overall youth population is
not hugely divided.
31
Table 4.3 Demographic Characteristics and Dissenting Attitudes
Dissent Score
Sex ***
Female
Male
5.1
5.5
Born in Hong Kong ***
Not born in Hong Kong
5.5
4.8
Education ***
Junior secondary or below
Senior secondary
Tertiary education or above
4.4
4.9
5.7
Overseas living experience
No overseas experience
5.2
5.3
Monthly household income group *
Below $10,000
$10,000 - $29,999
$30,000 or above
*** p < 0.001, * p < 0.05
5.0
5.3
5.5
4.3 Demographic Profile of the Strong Dissidents
Those aggregate dissent scores between 7 and 9 are regarded as holding
strong dissenting attitudes.
As reported in Table 4.2, among all
respondents, a notable minority of 31.6% of respondents are identified as
having strong dissent.
Who are the strongly dissenting respondents?
Table 4.4 describes briefly their demographic profile.
Table 4.4 Demographic Characteristics of Youth Population who Show Strong Dissent
32
All
15-19
20-29
Strong
Demographic profiles of
strong dissidents
30-39
"Baseline"
Dissidents
(n=632)
(31.6% of 2000 respondents)
Generational distribution
15-19
20-29
30-39
22.0%
49.8%
28.2%
Female
Male
44.9%
55.1%
43.2%
56.8%
47.0%
53.0%
42.7%
57.3%
Education ***
Junior secondary or below
Senior secondary
Tertiary education or above
3.3%
28.5%
68.1%
7.2%
69.1%
23.7%
1.0%
9.2%
89.8%
4.5%
30.9%
64.6%
Overseas living experience ***
Yes
No
11.7%
88.3%
2.2%
97.8%
12.1%
87.9%
18.5%
81.5%
Born in Hong Kong?
Yes
No
82.6%
17.4%
82.7%
17.3%
80.9%
19.1%
85.4%
14.6%
$10,000 29,999
$30,000 49,999
$30,000 49,999
Median monthly household
income group ***
*** across age, p < 0.001
$30,000 49,999
Table 4.4 illustrates that strong dissidents share similar demographic
characteristics regardless of their generation.
The majority of the 632
strong dissidents are tertiary educated (68.1%) and were born in Hong
Kong (82.6%); only a few (11.7%) have experience living overseas, and
their median household monthly income is $30,000-49,999.
33
Generational differences are statistically significant only for three
demographic characteristics: educational attainment, overseas living
experience, and household monthly income.
Because of age limitation,
the youngest cohort (age 15-19) has naturally the least proportion to
attain tertiary education. The middle cohort (20-29) has nearly 90%
attained tertiary education.
More respondents of the oldest generation
(30-39) have overseas living experience (18.5%) than the other two
younger generations.
The youngest generation is the least well-off
(median household monthly income $10,000-29,999). The other two
generations are the same in terms of monthly income. However, it would
be premature to conclude that dissenting attitudes are associated with
higher education, overseas exposure, or being economically well-off.
The profile analysis reveals only that the youth population holding strong
dissenting attitudes share similar demographic characteristics: tertiary
educated, born in Hong Kong, not at the bottom layer economically, but
only a few having experience living overseas.
4.4 Other Correlates of Dissenting Attitudes
Generations and some demographic characteristics have effects on
dissenting attitudes. Such personal attributes alert us to a certain extent
who the dissenting youth would be.
attributes.
However, we cannot change these
Therefore, our next step is to investigate the effects of
perceptions and values on dissenting attitudes.
Table 4.5 reports the
correlation of dissenting attitudes with 3 measures of self-perceived
opportunities available for personal development.
The 3 measures are
found to be negatively correlated with the dissenting attitudes of
34
respondents.
Negative correlation means that the more dissenting the
respondents are, the fewer the opportunities they perceive as available to
them.
Although the correlations are statistically significant, the
relationships (or predictive power) are very weak.
In other words,
respondents perceiving limited opportunities are not visibly more
dissenting than those perceiving better development opportunities.
Since 2010, one of the mainstream and salient preoccupations has been
that blocked mobility shapes youth perceptions.
Our findings, however,
cannot conclude that perceptions of blocked mobility reinforce dissenting
attitudes.
Table 4.5 Correlations between Development Opportunities and Dissenting Attitudes
Correlation with
Self-perceived opportunities for personal development:
Dissent Score (r)
(1) Opportunities available to same age cohort for Personal
Development
(2) Comparing with now, will future opportunities for
personal development in Hong Kong become better or
worse?
(3) Overall speaking, are you satisfied with the
opportunities for your own development in Hong
Kong?
** p < 0.01
-0.188 **
-0.175 **
-0.167 **
Respondents' dissenting attitudes are thus not noticeably influenced by
their perceptions of limited development opportunities.
Could their
subjective quality of life in general have an effect on dissenting attitudes?
Table 4.6 presents the correlations of 3 general measures of subjective
quality of life with dissenting attitudes.
The effects of quality of life on
dissenting attitudes are almost invisible. Two measures of quality of life
have very weak but statistically significant negative correlation with
dissenting attitudes, namely life satisfaction and happiness.
35
The
correlations are further weaker than those found in perceptions of
development opportunities available.
Respondents dissatisfied with
their life or feeling unhappy do not generate noticeably more dissenting
attitudes than their more satisfied or happy counterparts.
Health
condition has not been found statistically significant difference.
The
findings do not support anecdotal explanation that dissatisfaction with
life leads to dissent.
Table 4.6 Correlations between Quality of Life and Dissenting Attitudes
Correlation with
Quality of Life
Dissent Score (r)
(1) Overall life satisfaction
(2) Satisfaction with health condition
(3) Overall happiness
** p < 0.01
-0.091 **
0.014
-0.151 **
* p < 0.05
4.5 Political Trust, Identity and Dissenting Attitudes
Table 3.12 (in section 3.5) has reported that in general, more respondents
have trust in the Hong Kong SAR Government (42.6%) than in the
Central Government (25.2%). The middle cohort (20-29) has the least
trust in both governments (34.6% Hong Kong, 18.8% Central). The
youngest (15-19) has the most trust in Hong Kong government (48.2%),
and the oldest (30-39) the most trust in Central government (36.1%).
Table 4.7 reports a wide split among political trusts and dissenting
attitudes.
Those who do not trust in Hong Kong Government express
stronger dissent (by 2 more social issues apart) than those who trust.
And the gap is about the same between those who trust in Central
36
Government (lowest dissent score 3.7) and those who do not. Those
who trust in Central Government have the least dissent, and the score is
lower than those who trust in Hong Kong Government (dissent score 4.2).
The result is partly due to the controversial issues under survey relate
more to Hong Kong internal affairs.
Table 4.7 Political Trust and Dissenting Attitudes
Dissent Score
Trust in Hong Kong Government ***
Yes
No
Trust in Central Government ***
Yes
No
*** p < 0.001
4.2
6.3
3.7
6.0
In 2014 survey, we have asked about the identity of respondents with a
new question: which identity do you consider yourself: Chinese, Hong
Kong, both, or both not.
Table 3.12 (in section 3.5) reports that an
overwhelming majority of the two younger cohorts (15-19, and 20-29)
identify themselves as Hong Kongers, both over 80%, in contrast to 10%
being Chinese.
The older 30-39 cohort has about 63% of Hong Kong
identification, and about 21% being Chinese.
Table 4.8 reports the effect of identity on dissenting attitudes.
result is in line with the one relating to political trust.
The
Those who
identify themselves as Hong Kongers have the strongest dissent (score
5.8), and who consider themselves Chinese is the least dissent (3.8).
The gap between the two identities is as large as 2 social issues apart.
37
Table 4.8 Identity and Dissenting Attitudes
Dissent Score
Identity ***
Chinese
3.8
Both or both not
4.3
Hong Kong
5.8
*** p < 0.001
4.6 Materialism, Postmaterialism and Social Attitudes
The analysis so far has suggested that the influences of value orientations
on social and political perceptions are real and significant.
This leads
into the issue of how values affect and explain variations in perceptions
of social, political, and economic conditions. One prominent approach
to tackling this issue is the thesis of a cultural shift from materialism to
postmaterialism which has triggered a series of research studies in
western societies since the 1970s. Inglehart is the major proponent of
the testing of this thesis through empirical research.
Since his
influential publication in 1977, and despite having his academic critics,
his writings and research on this topic continue to serve as one of the
most influential perspectives to describe and explain the effect of
postmodernization on changes in values and perceptions in highly
industrialized societies (Inglehart 1977, 1984, 1989, 1990, 1997, 2000).
The World Values Survey, an ongoing global comparative research
project conducted every five years, has incorporated Inglehart's
materialist-postmaterialist value sets since 1990 to assess values change
over time (http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org).
Research on the extent of a postmaterialist cultural shift in Hong Kong is
38
not prolific but there have been several attempts to test his thesis.
Ho
and Leung (1995, 1997) were the pioneers to apply Inglehart's thesis and
research strategy to explore the extent of the rise of postmaterialism in
Hong Kong in the 1990s. They adopted Inglehart's original composite
measurement of postmaterialism.
Twelve items on materialist and
postmaterialist values were divided into 3 sets, and each set contains 2
items of materialist values and 2 of postmaterialist.
In each set,
respondents were asked which value item would be the most important to
them, and then which would be the next most important.
answer format as forced-choice.
We regard this
After having indicated choices in 3
sets, the same 12 items would then be presented altogether again to the
respondents. In this 12-item set, respondents were asked to indicate
which one would be the most desirable, the next most desirable, and the
least desirable.
We will not discuss in detail here the mechanism to
construct a composite score from the answers.
Briefly, Ho and Leung
categorized respondents into three value types: (1) materialist (all
materialist items were indicated to be important); (2) mixed type (some
items related to both materialist and postmaterialist items were rated
important); and (3) postmaterialist (almost all postmaterialist items were
considered important and desirable.) In their two surveys done in 1993
and 1995, materialist values prevailed (75.0% in 1993, 79.3% in 1995).
The postmaterialists were a negligible minority in both years although
their percentage doubled in two years time (from 0.3% in 1993 to 0.6%
in 1995).
The mixed type accounted for 24.7% of their survey
respondents in 1993 and 20.0% in 1995. In the 1993 survey, they found
that value types (materialist vs. mixed type) could broadly explain the
political inclination of respondents (Ho and Leung, 1995:243).
Materialists tended to support conservative political parties, and the
mixed type to support the liberal political camp.
39
In multivariate
analysis, being a materialist was a more powerful predictor of support for
conservative political parties than other demographic characteristics and
social attitudes.
Only the positive effect of "trust in the Chinese
government" was a stronger predictor than a materialist value (ibid:245).
As of the mid-1990s, Hong Kong had thus not experienced any notable
cultural shift from materialism to postmaterialism.
As the researchers
noted, "freedom, democracy, and human rights appear[ed] to be less
important in [Hong Kong people's] daily lives …… materialism
remained a dominant value in Hong Kong"
(Ho and Leung,
1997:351-353).
After Ho and Leung's works, Hsiao and Wan (2004) investigated and
compared whether postmaterialism was spreading in Hong Kong and
Taiwan.
Like Ho and Leung, they adopted the same measurement and
strategy to assess materialist and postmaterialist values.
Although
Hsiao and Wan published later than Ho and Leung, the formers'
fieldwork was done in 1992 (Ho and Leung in 1993 and 1995).
Interestingly, in the Hsiao and Wan 1992-survey, it was found that 8.5%
of respondents in HK (and 10.9% in Taiwan) had postmaterialist values.
This percentage was obviously much higher than Ho and Leung's
findings in their 1993-survey (0.3%) and 1995 (0.6%).
We do not have
enough information to be in a position to make sense of the difference.
It may be due to differences in the scale construction mechanism
involved, which was often seen in Inglehart's work since the 1970s, and
which has "kindled numerous research, discussions and criticisms" (Ho
and Leung, 1995:230).
Nevertheless, Hsiao and Wan (2004:260)
reported that postmaterialist was in majority (65.3%) NOT agreed
"efficiency of governance is more important that democracy".
By
contrast, only 31.0% of the materialists disagreed and as many as 55.1%
40
agreed.
These local studies on postmaterialism followed Inglehart's original
methodology to measure materialism and postmaterialism.
The
measurement assumes that materialist and postmaterialist orientations are
mutually exclusive, so that respondents are given forced-choice 4-item
sets to indicate preferences.
However, empirical findings from the
above local studies clearly reveal that Hong Kong people were basically
materialist while also possessing partial but not yet fully developed
postmaterialist values. It should be noted that the questionnaires used in
these studies were all administered in the face-to-face interview format.
Such format enables forced-choice questions to be answered without
much difficulty.
However, in telephone surveys, respondents have to
memorize a verbal description of 4 items in each set (and 12 items
although in the final stage) and then make their choices.
This would
definitely incur incomplete responses. In view of these methodological
concerns and practical constraints, the ratings on each item in our
telephone survey do not follow the force-choice format.
We used
instead a four-point rating scale to tap respondents' evaluation of
importance
on
each
value
item
(very
important/important/not
important/very not important). Such deviation from the original rating
format is not our invention.
A Hong Kong-wide survey research done
in 2000 used such an instrument (Cheung and Leung, 2002, 2004).
The 2000-survey used a five-point scale for respondents to rate each
value item.
The ratings were converted to the following scores: 0 for
the lowest rating, 25 for the next lowest, 50 for the middle, 75 for the
next highest, and 100 for the highest (Cheung and Leung, 2004:351).
They used the same 6 materialist items and 6 postmaterialist items as
41
Inglehart, but new method to calculate two composite scores of
materialism and postmaterialism.
The scores were actually calculated
by taking the mean of the 6-item summation in each set, with resulting
scores ranging from 0 to 100. The mean score of the materialist value
orientation was 83.9 and that of the postmaterialist was 71.3.
Although
the rating and scoring mechanisms were different from those used in
previous studies, the pattern of findings from both streams of research
was similar in that that Hong Kong people were found to be more
materialistic than postmaterialistic.
Because of the limited length of the telephone survey, we have selected 8
value items (4 materialist and 4 postmaterialist) for respondents to rate.
The selection was based on their relevance to the research objective of
this project.
(very
The eight value items were rated on a four-point scale
important=100
/
important=75
/
unimportant=25
/very
unimportant=0) following the scheme devised by Cheung and Leung
(2002, 2004), except for omitting the middle response.
Table 4.9 shows the mean scores for individual items as well as the
composite scores for the two value orientations. The summary scores of
postmaterialist (82.5) and materialist value orientations (82.4) are about
the same.
This may imply that the youth population is equally
postmaterialistic and materialistic.
For individual item scores, the
highest one is "maintaining order in Hong Kong" (90.6) classified as
materialist value.
The second highest score is "protecting freedom of
speech" (88.2) from postmaterialist value.
And the remaining items
score come from postmaterialist and materialist value orientation
alternatively in order of magnitude.
This peculiar order further
illustrates the coexistence of both value orientations among the youth.
42
Their inclination towards which value orientation is then not about what
they hold more, but probably when and on what basis they prefer one to
another.
Table 4.9 Mean Scores of Postmaterialist and Materialist Value Orientations
Mean score
(0-100)
Postmaterialist value orientation
82.5
(a) protect freedom of speech (保障言論自由)
88.2
(b) move towards a friendlier, more humane society
84.7
(社會變得更有人情味與更人道)
(c) give people more say in important government decisions
78.5
(市民對重要政府決策有更大影響力)
(d) move towards a Hong Kong society where ideas count more
than money (社會變得著重思想創意多過著重金錢)
77.4
Materialist value orientation
82.4
(e) maintain order in Hong Kong (維持治安)
90.6
(f) maintain a stable economy in Hong Kong
80.7
(維持穩定經濟)
(g) fight rising prices (穩定物價)
83.8
(h) maintain a high rate of economic growth in Hong Kong
74.2
(社會發展要維持高度經濟增長)
Table 4.10 below reports the differences in postmaterialist value
orientation among generations as well as in the social attitudes of dissent.
The generational difference in postmaterialist value orientation is
statistically significant, with the oldest generation the lowest and the
middle generation the highest.
The magnitude of difference between
these two generations, however, is very small.
On the other hand, postmaterialist value orientation has significant effects
43
on social attitudes of dissent.
The magnitude of the difference found in
each attitude is notable between the dissent and the conservative.
The
general pattern is that higher postmaterialist score results in more critical
perception of socio-political issues, i.e. expressing dissenting attitudes.
The
postmaterialist
value
orientation
significantly
evaluation of socio-political issues.
Table 4.10 Postmaterialist Value Orientation & Social Attitudes
Postmaterialist Value
Orientation (0-100) ***
Overall
82.5
Generation
15-19
82.5
20-29
83.9
30-39
80.9
Social Attitudes
Would NOT vote in 22 June 2014 civil
referendum
Would vote in 22 June 2014 civil referendum
Conflicts in land development issues
Support Government
Support concern groups
79.3
88.3
69.2
87.2
Democratic progress since 1997
Too fast
Moderate
Too slow
76.5
78.2
86.1
NOT supporting Occupy Central
Supporting Occupy Central
78.0
Hong Kong interests NOT take priority when
China & Hong Kong in conflict
77.6
86.0
44
differentiates
Postmaterialist Value
Orientation (0-100) ***
Hong Kong interests take priority
85.1
NOT supporting Popular Nomination
Supporting Popular Nomination
74.4
Hong Kong does NOT has approval
right of One-way Permit
Hong Kong has approval right of
One-way Permit
78.4
84.5
83.6
NOT restricting visitors via Individual
Visit Scheme
Restricting visitors via Individual Visit Scheme
76.8
83.6
Political affiliation
League of Social Democrats (社民連)
Scholarism (學民思潮)
88.8
87.2
Civic Party (公民黨)
86.9
People Power (人民力量)
85.9
Democratic Party (民主黨)
84.4
Pan-democrats (其他民主派 / 泛民主派)
85.8
All democrats
86.2
71.4
81.8
Pro-establishment (建制派)
Independent/ Neutral (獨立 / 中間 / 無黨派)
*** All items p < 0.001
4.7 Predictors of Dissenting Social Attitudes
The dissenting social attitudes are associated with generational difference,
identity, trust in the Hong Kong Government and Central Government,
and postmaterialist value orientation (Tables 4.2, 4.7 4.8 and 4.10). The
main patterns are that younger generations, not inclined to hold a national
identity, not trusting the Hong Kong or Central Government, and having
45
a higher postmaterialist score will result in more critical view of social
and political conditions.
In addition, Table 4.3 reveals that four demographic characteristics (sex,
education, whether or not born in Hong Kong, and household income)
are found to have statistically significant associations with aggregate
dissenting attitudes.
In general, the more dissenting respondents are
likely to be male, born in Hong Kong, and senior secondary educated or
above, and with household income $10,000 or above.
To better gauge the combined effects of both demographic (structural) as
well as value orientations predictors on dissenting attitudes, we have
conducted multivariate regression analysis by using aggregate score on
dissenting attitudes as the outcome. Six demographic variables and four
value orientations are used as predictor variables.
Demographic
variables include: (1) generations, (2) sex, (3) educational attainment, (4)
overseas living experience, (5) household monthly income, and (6)
whether born in Hong Kong or not. Value orientations as predictors
include: (a) trust in the Hong Kong Government, (b) trust in the Central
Government, (c) Hong Kong and Chinese identity, and (d) postmaterialist
value orientation.
Table 4.1 presents the ultimate model of linear
regression analysis.
By using structural variables and values together to
predict aggregate dissent score, the effects of almost all demographic
variables become statistically insignificant.
Generational effect has no
significant effect in predicting dissent. This is not easily discovered
when bivariate analysis is employed.
On the other hand, the common
belief that (young) age accounts for dissenting attitudes is not supported
by more vigorous statistical analysis.
46
Not surprisingly, postmaterialist value orientation has the relatively
strongest effect in predicting aggregate dissent score.
The second
strongest predictor is trust in Hong Kong Government, and the direction
is not counter-intuitive: having trust is less dissenting.
The third
strongest predictor is tertiary education, leading to higher dissent score.
The fourth is trust in Central Government, and again, with trust then less
dissenting.
Hong Kong identity comes the fifth resulting in higher
dissent score.
The last statistically significant predictor is male, but the
effect is only minimal.
All remaining variables are not statistically
significant predictors of dissent attitudes.
The regression model
illustrates that personal attributes are not able to account for dissenting
social attitudes.
Value orientations are more powerful predictors in this
regard.
To illustrate further the dominant effect of postmaterialist value
orientations, another regression model is built by adding 4 more variables:
overall life satisfaction, and 3 questions on development opportunities
available to the respondents. Table 4.12 shows that the resulting model
R2 rises from 0.418 (Table 4.11) to 0.426.
Only the dummy variable
"opportunities for personal development in future better than now" has
significant effect on reducing dissent score (standardized beta -0.47).
Another dummy variable "opportunities for personal development in
future worse than now" is statistically insignificant (standardized beta
0.1).
Life satisfaction and other two variables on opportunities are also
statistically insignificant.
By adding 5 new variables (2 are dummy),
having overseas living experience changes to be statistically significant
negative predictor (standardized beta -0.044).
47
Table 4.11 Relative Strength of Predictors on Aggregate Dissent Score
Models / Predictors
Relative Predictive
Power on
Aggregate Dissent
(standardized
regression coefficient)
Absolute Effect on
Aggregate Dissent
(regression
coefficient) ##
Model R2 = 0.418
Postmaterialist value orientation
0.309 ***
0.047
Trust in Hong Kong Government
- 0.242 ***
-1.032
Trust in Central Government
- 0.159 ***
-0.756
Tertiary educated or above
0.164 ***
0.693
Senior secondary educated
0.056
0.244
0.111 ***
0.554
Education #
Identity #
Hong Kong identity
Chinese identity
-0.036
Sex – Male
0.072 ***
-0.224
0.302
Generation #
15-19
-0.033
-0.149
20-29
0.010
0.041
-0.035
-0.221
0.021
0.105
$30,000 or above
-0.031
-0.129
$10,000 - 29,999
-0.032
-0.137
Have overseas living experience
Born in Hong Kong
Household monthly income #
# Generations, education, household monthly income, and identity are each
represented by 2 dummy variables.
## Regression coefficient indicates the amount of change in aggregate dissent given a
one-unit change in the value of each predictor, given that all other predictors in the
model are held constant.
*** p < 0.001
48
Table 4.12 Relative Strength of Predictors on Aggregate Dissent Score in 2014:
(add Life satisfaction, and 3 questions on Opportunities available)
Relative Predictive
Absolute Effect on
Power on
Aggregate Dissent
Aggregate Dissent
(regression
(standardized
coefficient) ##
Models / Predictors
regression coefficient)
Model R2 = 0.426
Postmaterialist value orientation
0.308 ***
0.047
Trust in Hong Kong Government
- 0.237 ***
-1.008
Trust in Central Government
- 0.157 ***
-0.744
Tertiary educated or above
0.163 ***
0.689
Senior secondary educated
0.056
0.242
0.108 ***
0.540
Education #
Identity #
Hong Kong identity
Chinese identity
-0.036
Sex – Male
0.074 ***
-0.226
0.313
Generation #
15-19
-0.031
-0.138
20-29
0.008
0.033
-0.044 *
-0.281
0.019
0.097
$30,000 or above
-0.034
-0.142
$10,000 - 29,999
-0.043
-0.182
Life satisfaction
-0.004
-0.13
Personal development
-0.19
-0.54
0.20
0.52
Worse than now
0.10
0.44
Better than now
-0.47 *
-0.324
Have overseas living experience
Born in Hong Kong
Household monthly income #
opportunities for same age cohort
Satisfaction with opportunities for
own development in HK
Opportunities for personal
development in future #
49
# Generations, education, household monthly income, identity, and "opportunities for
personal development in future" are each represented by 2 dummy variables.
## Regression coefficient indicates the amount of change in aggregate dissent given a
one-unit change in the value of each predictor, given that all other predictors in the
model are held constant.
*** p < 0.001, p < 0.05
50
V. Conclusion
The period of conducting the telephone survey for this project is crucial
to make sense of the findings in this report.
The survey was taken from
14 May to 24 June 2014. This means that data collection was done
during a period of "normal" social atmosphere.
In this regard,
respondents were not motivated nor mobilized by many political conflicts
to be seen on streets from September 2014 onwards.
Their evaluation
towards socio-political issues was believed to be reflecting their "normal"
perceptions, and extreme political split was therefore not expected.
In the present study, the social attitudes of three generations are surveyed:
age 15 to 19, 20 to 29 and 30-39, while the oldest cohort is used as the
baseline for comparison with the other two younger generations. Our
findings suggest that the youngest and the oldest cohorts express about
the same extent of dissenting attitudes, and the middle cohort (20-29)
gives the most critical evaluation towards socio-political issues.
An
important question that follows from this finding is whether the middle
cohort, after engaging more and more in incidents of social and political
conflicts since 2010, has become the major driving force of social
movements in Hong Kong.
Or will their political activism recede as
they become mature later, thereby even younger generation (i.e. 15 to 19
in the present study) takes over their radical orientation? In other words,
could we attribute the generational differences to the adolescent
tendencies to rebel against authority or has an enduring transformation in
social values indeed occurred?
The present study cannot predict the
future by presenting concrete evidence.
To provide answers to these
puzzles, however, we may look back to the similar 2010 study. The
findings of 2010 research suggested that respondents aged 20 or below
51
expressed "radical" ideologies comparable to, if not greater than, those
espoused by the 21 to 29 cohort.
Since 2010, social observers have been keeping suggestion of three
perspectives to account for social and political discontent among youth,
namely, (1) that discontents are a result of generational differences, (2)
that such generational difference in attitudes could be traced to the lack
of opportunities for social advancements among the younger generations,
and (3) that they are in general less satisfied with their personal life.
In
the present study done in 2014, results have partially confirmed the
generation effect only through bivariate analysis.
However, when more
factors are included in more vigorous analysis, the impact of the
generations becomes minimal and also statistically insignificant.
We
have also tested the second and third perspectives involving blocked
upward mobility for youth, and youth dissatisfaction with their life
situation. However, our findings also do not support such views.
Multiple regression analysis is used as the more vigorous test of effects
on dissenting attitudes.
Demographic variables are combined with
value orientations as predictors in multiple regression analysis. The
explanatory power of the resulting model is only moderate.
Results
show that generational effect has no significant effect in predicting
dissenting attitudes.
Other demographic attributes are also ineffective in
explaining dissent, with the exception of tertiary education, which leads
to higher dissent score.
Instead, value orientations are more powerful to explain dissenting
attitudes of youth.
One important discussion on value orientations
refers to the thesis of postmaterialism.
52
It suggests that a shift in cultural
values is occurring that would favour democratization, environmentalism,
new forms of social movement, and advocacy of non-material based
social change.
When ideologies and values prevail in social conflicts
and actions, sheer demographic profiling of activists becomes ineffective
as explanatory variables.
In view of relevant theoretical discussions and our findings, "radical"
ideologies, if termed properly, should be examined and explained in
terms of values formation and cultural shift rather than by reference to
demographic variables.
Our findings highlight the biographical
influence in the outcome of dissenting attitudes.
The fact that the
middle generation holding the strongest dissenting attitudes poses a direct
challenge to the stereotype shared among social observers in recent years:
radicalism belongs to the youngest.
Our findings refute the unilinear
change in radical ideologies in terms of age.
Secondly, postmaterialism
is also not a defining feature of the youngest generation. Again, the
middle generation has the highest score on postmaterialistic value
orientations, but the other two generations have lower scores marginally.
Postmaterialism is not a monopoly of the youngest generation. Instead,
it becomes a shared ideology among the wider youth population.
Given the limitations of the telephone survey method, we can only
establish the correlational effects of various factors on dissenting social
attitudes.
The survey findings do not have answer to why some
respondents become dissidents.
There is evidence showing systemic
relationships exist between value orientations and dissenting social
attitudes among youth irrespective of their demographic background,
However, we do not know the causal processes.
We were unable to
gather information relating to the process of values formation and uptake
53
by individuals.
And also the time taking the survey was almost 3
months before the prolonged demonstrations beginning from September
2014.
Therefore, we did not have information on how such values
conducive to mobilizing collective social actions.
One of the major policy implications from our findings is that dissenting
social attitudes cannot be deduced from knowledge of demographic
background variables. Instead, we should focus on understanding the
process of how these young people have come to acquire critical values
and attitudes.
If policymakers and the society wish to know the
processes and mechanisms through which youth become critical or
dissident, more focused research is needed.
We need further research
for example on the processes of political learning through which various
social and political values are formed and internalized by a significant
portion of the population, then manifest in social and political attitudes,
leading finally to public actions.
The influences of the various agents of
socialization and learning -- for example, family, Internet and school -would have to be traced and clarified. In particular, we believe that the
school (for younger students) and new media (to channel contents mainly
via the Internet) are at the present time important agents of political
socialization and learning. However, we need a lot more work to do in
order to master a systematic understanding of their influences over the
younger generation.
From values uptake to forming perceptions, and then to be mobilized for
social actions, it goes without saying that the whole process is so
complicated.
Therefore, we should not readily subscribe to the
conventional wisdom that youngsters are driven to critically evaluate the
establishment only by dissatisfaction in their personal life or limited
54
opportunities.
We have repeatedly found that blocked social mobility
and dissatisfaction with aspects of their personal life have only a very
slight effect on their negative orientations towards socio-political issues.
In short, miserable youth do not necessarily become angry and
anti-establishment.
Beliefs in upholding certain values, for example, democracy and land
development, once internalized by young people, could then be triggered
by social conflicts and mobilizations to become negative sentiments
towards the establishment.
Moreover, we must recognize the fact that
many of the young people who are critical of the government are
prompted by "positive" beliefs about themselves, the society, and the
polity. It will not help to reconcile the mobilized youth by adopting a
priori assumption that they are motivated by "negative" sentiments.
Our interpretation is that about 30% of youth are strong dissidents who
reveal an anti-establishment sentiment towards almost every social or
political issue.
This sizeable minority cannot be regarded as just
minority by the policymakers.
These minority dissidents would often
be ignored by the policymakers because of their radical views expressed.
By responding only to the mainstream views in the policy making
process, relevant officials involved in policy debates should expect
oppositional voices.
The dissidents will not be silent and that public
actions characterized by confrontation and vigorous expression of
anti-establishment sentiments will probably occur. On the other hand,
accommodating radical views during policy making is not an easy task
either.
In recent years, the systemic anti-establishment sentiments have
developed into social protests and actions, which have created a political
hurdle to accommodating the dissidents in policy discourse in the
55
direction set out by the government.
The dissenting minority in our study can at most regarded as holding
radical ideology.
We do not have information to answer how their
radical ideology transforms to social action, especially relating to the
prolonged street demonstration in past few months.
The research design of present study is decidedly a partial investigation
of a very complex problem.
Given the constraints on the scale and
depth of the project and the resources at disposal, we are unable to
provide conclusive answers to individual change over the years.
We can
only describe the general trend happened over the past 4 years.
In
particular, we have studied only the socio-political attitudes of the
younger population in general rather than their political actions.
A
sizeable minority of the youth population harbour much discontent over
the government and major policy decisions. Among them, a much smaller
minority actually engaged in protest actions of various kinds and degrees
before the survey time.
Nevertheless, our study has yielded a
comprehensive picture of the value dispositions of the youth population
in general.
We have identified that among the youth population, some
would be more readily than others to take part in social protests and
political actions because of their value dispositions.
Such political
actions have visibly resulted in positive and negative feedback from the
society at large.
We cannot be too optimistic about the clash of values
leading to further split in ideologies among the general public, not only
the youth population.
In the foreseeable future, youth dissent may
extend to older generation as the youth persistently experiencing and
exposing to deep ideological split. When they grow older, we have no
evidence to ensure that they would be less dissenting than before.
56
The survey period did not capture the social and political upheaval in
2014, which to some observers are not exciting.
However, in terms of
academic and practical values, the survey was conducted during the
period of "normal" social conditions.
By "normal" we refer to usual
social and political atmosphere we have been experiencing in most of our
lifetime, but not incidentally mobilized scenarios.
In order to track long
term changes in social and political sentiments, research during "normal"
period is necessary.
57
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59
Appendix 1
Questionnaire of Telephone Survey
14 May – 24 June 2014
香港年青人口的社會態度調查
(2014 年 5 月)
SEX 受訪者性別：
1. 男
2. 女
AGE「請問你係屬於以下邊一個年齡組別呢？」
【讀出 1-5】
1. 15 -- 17 歲
2. 18 -- 19 歲
2. 20 -- 24 歲
3. 25 -- 29 歲
4. 30 -- 34 歲
5. 35 -- 39 歲
9. 拒答
Q1「請問你係屬於以下邊個出生年份呢？係 1995 至 1999 年、1985 至 1994 年，
定係
1975 至 1984 年呢？」
1. 1995 至 1999 年（即 1995 年或以後） 8. 唔知道
2. 1985 至 1994 年（即 1985 年或以後） 9. 拒答
3. 1975 至 1984 年（即 1975 年或以後）
「以下係一對社會發展唔同價值觀，對你講有幾重要呢？」
Q2「社會發展要『維持高度經濟增長』
，你覺得有幾重要呢？係非常唔重要，唔
重要，重要定係非常重要呢？」
【讀出 1-4】
1.
2.
3.
4.
非常唔重要
唔重要
重要
非常重要
8. 唔知道／冇意見
9. 拒答
Q3「『維持穩定經濟』
，對你講有幾重要呢？」
【讀出 1-4】
1.
2.
3.
4.
非常唔重要
唔重要
重要
非常重要
8. 唔知道／冇意見
9. 拒答
Q4「『維持治安』，對你講有幾重要呢？」
【讀出 1-4】
1.
2.
3.
4.
非常唔重要
唔重要
重要
非常重要
8. 唔知道／冇意見
9. 拒答
Q5「『穩定物價』，對你講有幾重要呢？」
【讀出 1-4】
1.
2.
3.
4.
非常唔重要
唔重要
重要
非常重要
8. 唔知道／冇意見
9. 拒答
Q6「『俾市民對重要政府決策有更大影響力』，對你講有幾重要呢？」
【讀出 1-4】
1.
2.
3.
4.
非常唔重要
唔重要
重要
非常重要
8. 唔知道／冇意見
9. 拒答
A2
Q7「『社會變得更有人情味與更人道』，對你講有幾重要呢？」
【讀出 1-4】
1.
2.
3.
4.
非常唔重要
唔重要
重要
非常重要
8. 唔知道／冇意見
9. 拒答
Q8「『保障言論自由』，對你講有幾重要呢？」
【讀出 1-4】
1.
2.
3.
4.
非常唔重要
唔重要
重要
非常重要
8. 唔知道／冇意見
9. 拒答
Q9「『社會變得著重思想創意多過著重金錢』，對你講有幾重要呢？」
【讀出 1-4】
1.
2.
3.
4.
非常唔重要
唔重要
重要
非常重要
8. 唔知道／冇意見
9. 拒答
Q10「近年來政府與民間團體就保育同土地開發等問題，曾經有過多次激烈爭論
及衝突，你認同政府定係民間團體嘅立場呢？」
【有需要時讀出：例如新界東北發展計劃及開發西貢郊野公園等】
【讀出 1-5】
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
完全認同政府
大部分認同政府
政府與民間團體一半一半
大部分認同民間團體
完全認同民間團體
7. 兩面都唔認同
8. 唔知道／冇意見
9. 拒答
A3
Q11 「就 2017 年行政長官的選舉辦法，有人建議用『佔領中環』行動爭取中央
及特區政府落實真正普選行政長官的方案。請問你係非常唔支持、唔支持、
支持，定係非常支持呢？」
1.
2.
3.
4.
非常唔支持
唔支持
支持
非常支持
8. 唔知道／好難講
9. 拒答
Q12 「有意見認為，
『公民提名』係普選行政長官方案中必不可少的部份。請問
你認唔認同以上嘅講法呢？係非常唔認同、唔認同、認同，定係非常認同？
1.
2.
3.
4.
非常唔認同
唔認同
認同
非常認同
8. 唔知道／好難講
9. 拒答
Q13 「佔領中環運動將於六月二十二舉行全民投票，讓市民選出一個 2017 年普
選行政長官方案，請問你到六月時會唔會參加全民投票呢？」
1. 唔會投票
8. 唔知道／好難講
2. 會投票
9. 拒答
3. 未決定
4. 反對佔中【不讀出】
5. 反對公民提名【不讀出】
6. 既反對佔中、又反對公民提名【不讀出】
Q14 「你認為內地同香港經濟愈來愈密切，要維護香港『一國兩制、高度自治』，
係會容易好多、容易啲、困難啲，定係困難好多呢？」
1.
2.
3.
4.
容易好多
容易啲
困難啲
困難好多
7. 冇影響（再追問都答這答案）
8. 唔知道／好難講
9. 拒答
A4
Q15「有意見認為，『當中港利益矛盾在香港發生時，解決方法應該係以香港人
權利優先』。請問你認唔認同以上嘅講法呢？係非常唔認同、唔認同、認
同，定係非常認同？」
1.
2.
3.
4.
非常唔認同
唔認同
認同
非常認同
8. 唔知道／好難講
9. 拒答
Q16「有意見認為，
『香港政府應該取回內地來港人士單程證嘅審批權』
。請問你
認唔認同以上嘅講法呢？係非常唔認同、唔認同、認同，定係非常認同？」
1.
2.
3.
4.
非常唔認同
唔認同
認同
非常認同
8. 唔知道／好難講
9. 拒答
Q17「有意見認為，
『香港政府應該限制內地自由行旅客來港嘅數目』
。請問你認
唔認同以上嘅講法呢？係非常唔認同、唔認同、認同，定係非常認同？」
1.
2.
3.
4.
非常唔認同
唔認同
認同
非常認同
8. 唔知道／好難講
9. 拒答
Q18「自 1997 年回歸以來，你覺得香港民主發展步伐方面係太快、太慢，定係
適呢？」
1. 太慢
2. 適中
3. 太快
8. 唔知道／好難講
9. 拒答
A5
Q19「自 1997 年回歸以來，你有冇參加過示威集會、遊行呢？」
【讀出 1-4】
1.
2.
3.
4.
一次都冇
好少
間中
經常
8. 唔知道／冇意見
9. 拒答
Q20「無論以往你有冇參加過示威集會遊行，你事前有冇留意有關消息呢？
1. 冇留意【跳問 Q23】
2. 有留意【續問 Q21】
9. 拒答【跳問 Q23】
【此題只問 Q20 答「有留意」的受訪者】
Q21「咁你主要係靠乜方法得知示威集會遊行嘅消息呢？」
【讀出 1-4，可選多項，依先後次序排列】
__1.
__2.
__3.
__4.
__5.
__8.
__9.
報紙【跳問 Q23】
電視【跳問 Q23】
其他人口頭通知【跳問 Q23】
電腦或手機 / 平板上網【續問 Q22】
其他 (註明)【跳問 Q23】
唔知道／冇意見【跳問 Q23】
拒答【跳問 Q23】
A6
【此題只問 Q21 答「電腦或手機 / 平板上網」的受訪者】
Q22「咁你又主要係靠以下邊個途徑知道示威集會遊行消息呢？」
【讀出 1-7，可選多項，依先後次序排列】
__01. Facebook 貼文或私人訊息
__02. Facebook 專頁
__03. 即時通訊軟件（包括手機應用程式如 Whatsapp 及 Line 等）
__04. 新興網上新聞媒體，例如主場新聞、熱血時報、輔仁文體、
852 郵報等（不包括印刷報紙的網上版）
__05.
__06.
__07.
__77.
__88.
__99.
blog
email
手機短訊
其他 (註明)
唔知道／冇意見
拒答
Q23「你滿唔滿意香港嘅經濟發展呢？」
【讀出 1-5】
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
非常唔滿意
唔滿意
一般
滿意
非常滿意
8. 唔知道／冇意見
9. 拒答
Q24「你滿唔滿意香港嘅政治發展呢？」
【讀出 1-5】
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
非常唔滿意
唔滿意
一般
滿意
非常滿意
8. 唔知道／冇意見
9. 拒答
A7
Q25「你滿唔滿意香港嘅環境保育情況呢？」
【讀出 1-5】
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
非常唔滿意
唔滿意
一般
滿意
非常滿意
8. 唔知道／冇意見
9. 拒答
Q26「整體嚟講，你覺得自己嘅生活質素係點呢？」
【讀出 1-5】
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
非常差
差
一般
好
非常好
8. 唔知道／冇意見
9. 拒答
Q27「整體嚟講，你滿唔滿意自己嘅健康呢？」
【讀出 1-5】
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
非常唔滿意
唔滿意
一般
滿意
非常滿意
8. 唔知道／冇意見
9. 拒答
Q28「整體嚟講，你覺得生活過得開唔開心呢？」
【讀出 1-5】
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
非常唔開心
唔開心
一般
開心
非常開心
8. 唔知道／冇意見
9. 拒答
A8
Q29「喺考慮到您身份時，您認為您自己係香港人多啲，定係中國人多啲呢？」
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
香港人
中國人
兩者都係
兩者都唔係
其他
8. 唔知道／冇意見
9. 拒答
Q30「整體嚟講，你信唔信任香港政府呢？」
【讀出 1-5】
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
非常唔信任
唔信任
一般
信任
非常信任
8. 唔知道／冇意見
9. 拒答
Q31「整體嚟講，你信唔信任中央政府呢？」
【讀出 1-5】
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
非常唔信任
唔信任
一般
信任
非常信任
8. 唔知道／冇意見
9. 拒答
Q32「你認為同你年齡相近嘅香港人，喺香港各方面發展嘅機會多唔多呢？」
【讀出 1-5】
1. 完全冇機會
2.
3.
4.
5.
好少機會
機會一般
幾多機會
非常多機會
8. 唔知道／冇意見
9. 拒答
A9
Q33「你認為同你年齡相近嘅香港人，未來喺香港各方面發展嘅機會，同依家相
比，係會好啲、差唔多，定係差啲？」
【讀出 1-3】
1. 比依家差
2. 差唔多
3. 比依家好
8. 唔知道／冇意見
9. 拒答
Q34「整體嚟講，你滿唔滿自己喺香港所得到嘅發展機會呢？」
【讀出 1-5】
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
非常唔滿意
唔滿意
一般
滿意
非常滿意
8. 唔知道／冇意見
9. 拒答
Q35「請問你接唔接受自己到國內升學呢？」
【讀出 1-4】
1.
2.
3.
4.
非常唔接受
唔接受
接受
非常接受
7. 冇話接唔接受
8. 唔知道／冇意見
9. 拒答
Q36「請問你接唔接受自己到國內就業呢？」
【讀出 1-4】
1.
2.
3.
4.
非常唔接受
唔接受
接受
非常接受
7. 冇話接唔接受
8. 唔知道／冇意見
9. 拒答
A10
ELECTOR「請問你現在係唔係登記選民呢？」
1. 唔係【跳問 Q37】
2. 係【續問 Q34】
8. 不唔自己是否選民【跳問 Q37】
9. 拒答【跳問 Q37】
【此題只問登記選民】
Q38「2012 年嘅立法會選舉，請問你有冇投票呢？」
【只問 20 歲或以上及 ELECTOR=2】
1. 冇【跳問 Q40】
2. 有【續問 Q39】
9. 拒答【跳問 Q40】
8. 不適用
【此題只問有去投票的選民】
Q39「咁你投票俾邊個政黨或政團呢？」
【不用讀出答案】
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
21.
22.
23.
民主黨
66. 投白票
公民黨
77. 其他 (註明)
人民力量
88. 唔記得
工黨
99. 拒絕回答
社民連
民協
街工
新民主同盟
職工盟
民建聯
工聯會
自由黨
新民黨
港九勞工聯會
泛民主派
一般保守或建制派
獨立人士、中間或無黨派
A11
Q40「你最支持香港邊個政黨或政團呢？」
【不用讀出答案】
民主黨
66. 投白票
公民黨
77. 其他 (註明)
人民力量
88. 唔記得
工黨
99. 拒絕回答
社民連
民協
街工
新民主同盟
職工盟
民建聯
工聯會
自由黨
新民黨
港九勞工聯會
泛民主派
一般保守或建制派
獨立人士、中間或無黨派
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
21.
22.
23.
「為咗方便分析不同背景人士嘅意見，想問你一啲簡單嘅個人資料。」
EDU「請問你嘅教育程度去到邊呢？」
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
冇受教育或不識字
9. 拒答
小學
初中（中一至中三）
高中（中四至中七／工業學院）
大專或大學（非學士／學士學位）
研究院或以上（碩士／博士）
OVERSEAS「唔計喺內地及澳門，請問你有冇喺香港以外生活、讀書或者工作
超過一年呢？」
1. 冇
2. 有
9. 拒絕回答
A12
MARITAL「請問你嘅婚姻狀況係已婚、未婚，定係其他呢？」
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
未婚
9. 拒答【跳問 CHILD】
已婚【續問 CHILD】
其他：同居【續問 CHILD】
其他：分居或離婚【續問 CHILD】
其他：配偶死亡【續問 CHILD】
BIRTH「請問你係喺邊道出世呢？係香港、中國大陸，定係其他地方呢？」
1. 香港【跳問 WORK】
9. 拒絕回答【跳問 WORK】
2. 中國大陸【續問 LIVE】
3. 澳門【續問 LIVE】
4. 其他地方【續問 LIVE】
【此題只問非香港出生的受訪者】
LIVE「你喺香港定居咗幾多年呢？」
【讀出 1-4】
1. 少於 7 年
2. 7 至少於 15 年
3. 15 至少於 25 年
4. 25 年或以上
8. 忘記
9. 拒絕回答
WORK「請問你而家有冇全職工作呢？」【冇：追問沒有工作原因】
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
有全職工作
9. 拒答
冇：失業／待業
冇：退休
冇：主理家務
冇：學生
冇：其他（患病／休息／只作兼職）
A13
HINCOME「請問你屋企嘅家庭每個月嘅總收入大約有幾多呢？」
【讀出 1-5】
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
一萬以下
一萬至三萬以下
三萬至五萬以下
五萬至十萬以下
十萬或以上
8. 不定／不知道
9. 拒絕回答
0. 沒有收入
**「問卷已經完成，多謝你接受我哋嘅訪問，拜拜！」**
A14