1. No category

THE STATE OF TERRORISM IN BANGLADESH
2010 – 2011
Bangladesh Enterprise Institute (BEI)
September 2011, Dhaka, Bangladesh
1
2
Foreword
Bangladesh had witnessed sporadic acts of terrorism in the first half of the last decade. A
number of serious attacks were mounted, particularly in 2004 and 2005. The most
significant of these was the 21st August 2004 grenade attack on an Awami League public
meeting, which specifically targeted the Awami League leadership, including Sheikh
Hasina, the then Leader of the Opposition and currently the Prime Minister of
Bangladesh. On 17th August 2005, around 500 ‘home-made’ bombs were exploded, in 63
out of 64 districts, and the issue of terrorism in Bangladesh gained worldwide attention.
The violent nature of these incidents has convinced stakeholders in the government, civil
society and general public that if Bangladesh becomes susceptible to terrorist activities,
there will be severe consequences for the stability, security and economic development of
the country. With this backdrop in mind, the Bangladesh Enterprise Institute (BEI) has
undertaken a three-year project (2010-2012), with the objective of conducting research on
the state of terrorism in Bangladesh. The project covers the writing of three annual
reports and developing a national counter terrorism strategy, aimed at creating a more
effective counter terrorism regime in the country.
The first annual report, “The State of Terrorism in Bangladesh 2009-2010”, published
with some relevant conclusions and recommendations, has been disseminated to the
relevant government stakeholders involved in countering terrorism in Bangladesh
The second annual report, “The State of Terrorism in Bangladesh, 2010-2011”, is the
outcome of qualitative and quantitative analysis of the information and data collected by
way of desk research, perception survey and key informant interviews.
The study indicates that, compared to the previous year, crime-related activities have
declined. Although people are aware of the activities of militant organizations, they are
usually unwilling to talk about the active presence of these groups. Militant groups were
found to have networks within the country as well as around the world. Networking was
found to be strong, particularly in terms of following common or similar ideologies,
receiving training on high-tech equipment and funding. The findings also indicate that
Islamist terrorist groups in Bangladesh have changed the pattern of their activities and
organizational identity in order to ensure their survival and sustainability. Some militant
groups have reportedly united with Hizbut Tahrir, where activists have access to a
modern education system and share a strong network with international terrorist groups.
HUJI, Hizbut Tawhid and other militant groups have been found to be regrouping and
following alternative strategies, due to concerted counter-terrorism operations undertaken
by the current government.
The results of the study also indicates that poverty unemployment, governance problems,
decline in the quality of education and lack of political consensus are perceived as
contributing factors for the people, especially the youth, to join either Islamist militant
groups or support their activities and ideology. This report provides valuable information
regarding terrorist activities in 2010-2011, as well as background information of the
various terrorist groups in Bangladesh. We hope this information will contribute to the
preparation of an effective national strategy to combat terrorism in Bangladesh.
3
The commitment of the team of dedicated researchers of the Foreign Policy and Security
Section of BEI in preparing the report deserves to be commended. We would also like to
express our deep gratitude to the Royal Danish Embassy for its generous financial
support for our project and for making this publication possible. We would also like to
extend our sincere appreciation to all those who provided us with valuable inputs and
suggestions for improving our understanding of the problem of terrorism, and in the
writing of this report.
Farooq Sobhan
President
Bangladesh Enterprise Institute
4
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Foreword
List of Tables
List of Figures
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
9-11
1. INTRODUCTION
12-14
Background
About the Project
Objectives of the Project
Objectives of the Report
Structure of the Report
2. METHODOLOGY
15-17
Data Collection Methods
Sample Selection Procedure
Data Processing and Analysis
3. SALIENT FEATURES OF THE SURVEY
3.1 Demographic Profile of the Survey Respondents
Age, Gender and Residence
Education and Working Status
3.2 General Perception on Security
3.3 Terrorism and Bangladesh
Public Definition of Terrorism
Public Reluctance to Share Information
Common Activities of Militants
Objectives of Militant Activities
Militant Networks
Present Trends: Signs of Regrouping by Militants
Sources of Finance for Militant Groups
Involvement of Women in Militancy
Target Population of Militancy Recruitment
Motivational Techniques used in Militancy Recruitment
Consequences of Militancy/Terrorism
Reasons for Getting Involved in Terrorism
5
18-36
Sources of Information on Militants
Respondent’s Views on Combating Terrorism
Awareness of Anti-Militancy Programs
Steps towards Combating Terrorism
4. GOVERNMENT RESPONSES IN COUNTERING TERRORISM
37-58
Updated Profiles of Terrorist Organizations
Regional and International Cooperation
Role of the Concerned Groups of Society
Social Integration of Former Militants
Need for Counter Terrorism (CT) Policy
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS
59-60
APPENDIX TABLES
61-69
6
LIST OF TABLES
Table 1.1: Proportion of respondents who provided opinions on crimes that occurred in
their localities.
Table 1.2: Percentage distribution of respondents by their opinions regarding the
current situation based on the prevalence of injustice/crime/extremism/illegal
acts as compared to the previous year.
Table1.3: Percentage distribution of respondents’ opinions on the most frequent
injustice/crime/extremism/illegal acts which occur in their localities.
Table 1.4: Measurement of respondents’ fears of facing injustice due to
crime/suppression/ torture (%).
Table 1.5: Types of injustice/crime/torture faced by people (%).
Table 1.6: Peoples’ perception about Militancy/Terrorism (%).
Table 1.7: Name of Militant groups found to be active by the respondents (%)
Table 1.8: Common activities of terrorist organizations found by the respondents (%).
Table 1.9: Strategies followed by terrorists in their dawat (%).
Table 1.10: Sources of finance for militant activists/groups (%)
Table 1.11: Major causes of women’s active participation in militancy (%)
Table 1.12: Categories of people involved with militant groups (%)
Table 1.13: Motivation techniques followed by militant activists (% of respondents)
Table 1.14: Terrorists’ usual movement and their increased level of activities (% of
respondents)
Table 1.15: Scopes of terrorists/militants threatening national security and democracy (%
of respondents)
Table 1.16: Reasons for involvement with terrorism (% of respondents)
Table 1.17: Major sources of information about militant groups and their activities (% of
the respondents)
Table 1.18: Measures to tackle terrorism (% of respondents)
Table 1.19: Respondents’ awareness of anti-terrorism activities (%)
Table 1.20: Level of success of law enforcement agencies (Police, RAB) in the
prevention of terrorism (%)
Table 1.21: Suggestions for mitigating insecurity and violence caused by extremist
groups (%)
Table 1.22: Suggestions about integration of Ex-Militants within mainstream society (%)
7
LISTOF FIGURES
Figure 2.1: Percentage distribution of respondents by their opinions regarding the
current situation based on prevalence of injustice/crime/extremism/ illegal
acts as compared to the previous year.
Figure 2.2: Name of Militant groups found to be active by the respondents (%)
Figure 2.3: Sources of finance for militant activists/groups (%)
Figure 2.4: Recognized women participation in militancy (%)
Figure 2.5: Reasons for involvement with terrorism (%)
Figure 2.6: Level of success of law enforcement agencies (Police, RAB) in the
prevention of terrorism (%)
8
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The inception of the new millennium was marked by a series of sporadic and often
deadly terrorist attacks in Bangladesh. In addition to the mainstream political groups,
some extremist religious organizations have come into existence under political
patronage. These organizations follow the same doctrine as that of the Taliban. The
violent intentions of these groups were made apparent by several fatal terrorist attacks.
The 2001 bombing of the Ramna Botomul during Bengali New Year Festivities which
killed 10 people and left scores injured was a major terror attack by HUJI. The following
year JMB exploded bombs in several cinema halls in Mymensingh, killing 15 people and
injuring many. Again in 2004, an attempt was made to murder the eminent writer and
academic of Dhaka University, Humayun Azad, and the British High Commissioner,
Anwar Chowdhury. There was also a deadly attack at a public rally of (the then
opposition party) Awami League, which killed 24 people and injured 200. HUJI was
accused of carrying out all these deadly attacks. In August 2005, JMB conducted
synchronized explosions in 63 of the 64 districts of the country. These incidents
galvanized immediate public attention and international concern for the need to counter
these terrorist groups. With the extensive support of the current government, law
enforcement agencies conducted effective counter-terrorism operations which reduced
the level of activities of terror groups. However, it has been stated in several research
reports that these groups still exist in the country by assuming different identities and
following diverse strategies to continue their actions. Against this backdrop, DANIDA
has extended their support to the Bangladesh Enterprise Institute to undertake a three year
project on assessing the state of terrorism in Bangladesh. The main objective of this
project is to develop a National Counter Terrorism Policy (NCTP) in close partnership
with the Government of Bangladesh. Under the Phase–I project activities, a report
entitled ‘The State of Terrorism in Bangladesh 2009-2010’ was published, which
contained relevant conclusions and recommendations and was disseminated to
government stakeholders involved in countering terrorism in Bangladesh
Under the Phase-II activities of the DANIDA project, a survey has been conducted with a
view to assessing and monitoring the characteristics, patterns and trends in radicalization,
militancy and terrorism and thereby generating a pool of useful and reliable information.
With a sample size of 3,200 comprising different segments of literate people between the
ages of 18 and 65 years, the survey was undertaken in June 2011 throughout the country.
In addition, prominent citizens, religious leaders (the Imams), law enforcement agency
personnel and gate-keepers of the community were included as Key Informant
Interviewees. Information from newspapers was also included in this survey.
The study indicates that, compared to the previous year, crime related activities have
reduced. Also, in comparison with last year, a slight decline has been observed by a
significant proportion of (about 40 percent) respondents. Some people (20 percent) still
believed that the situation was the same as the year before. While identifying the types of
illegal activities, respondents mentioned the following: robbery, highjacking, theft (80
9
percent), politically motivated violence (69.1 percent), crimes based on small arms (36.3
percent), and extortion (49.2 percent). Eve teasing was found to be common and an issue
of great community concern. There are more issues which are causing insecurity among
community people, such as drug addiction (74 percent), torture by police (17 percent),
women and child trafficking (15.2 percent) and murder (28 percent). Over 13 percent of
the respondents believed that these crimes had high impact on their lives. It is important
to note that quite a low proportion, only 6 percent of the respondents, recognized about
crimes related to any religion and 2 percent cited about the use of explosive devices.
Findings indicate that the relationship between general people and law enforcement
agency personnel, especially the police, is not amicable. In regard to approaching the
police, general people expressed their fear of being involved in legal matters, as it
requires considerable amount of money and other associated consequences. As a result,
the majority of criminal cases are resolved among themselves.
Regarding militant groups, although the respondents are aware of their activities, very
negligible proportion of people is willing to talk about the active presence of these
groups: JMB (10 percent), JMJB (4 percent), Allahr Dal (4.2 percent), HUJI (2 percent),
Hizbut Tawhid (0.4 percent) and Hizbut Tahrir (0.8 percent). The major objective and
goal of these militant groups are: to threaten people initially and then takeover the
country and establish an Islamic regime in the long-run. Some of the respondents believe
that this is a strategy to destroy democracy and establish a rigid Islamic system of
governance in the country. Militant groups were found to have networks within the
country as well as around the world. Networking was found to be strong particularly in
terms of following common or similar ideologies, receiving training on the use of hightech equipment and funding. Funding is provided through NGOs in the name of
community development or during religious festivals. Different wealthy Islamic countries
are mentioned as sources of funding by over 51 percent of the respondents. About 53
percent of the people surveyed believe that the flow of funding is maintained by activists
in different developed countries. Funding activities of local militant groups are mentioned
as looting, murdering, high jacking, extortion or other illegal criminal activities. It has
been reported in newspapers that many Rohingyas living in some Middle Eastern
countries are involved in providing funds to militant groups. Ukhiya in Cox’s Bazar, at
the Bangladesh-Myanmar border, had been reportedly used for training by many
notorious militant activists. In order to save themselves, these militant groups (previously
notorious for heinous activities) have reportedly united with Hizbut Tahrir where
activists have access to the modern education system and have strong networks with
international terrorist groups. HUJI, Hizbut Tawhid and other militant groups have been
found to be regrouping and following alternative strategies due to strong drive taken by
the current government.
The reasons behind supporting militant groups have been mentioned by the respondents
as poverty, illiteracy, lack of proper practice of democracy and misinterpretation of
Islam. The question therefore posed to the respondents was how to fight terrorism in
Bangladesh? Generating mass awareness through broadcasting programs in the media
and other campaign programs could be one way of combating terrorism and this is
supported by 92 percent of the survey respondents. Strengthening legislation and justice
10
system has been mentioned by 79.3 percent of the respondents. Appropriate attention
should also be given to the cases that have remained unsettled for several years. There
are about 50 international terrorists and militants who have been captured in Bangladesh;
however, due to lack of adequate evidence against them, legal complications, lack of
funds and other difficulties these cases have remained pending. About 92 percent of those
surveyed have suggested that Imams have a responsibility to inform people about the
peaceful nature of Islam. Appropriate amendment of the madrassa education system,
impeding/checking corruption in different government circles, empowerment of people
and banning student politics have been mentioned by 75 percent, 59 percent, 54 percent
and 30 percent of the survey respondents respectively. In addition, families, societies,
Ulema, public representatives and the youth have responsibility to rescue the nation from
this process of creeping anarchy.
Finally, we can conclude by saying that in order to combat terrorism in Bangladesh, the
accomplishment of the following tasks is essential. These are: implementation of a
national counter terrorism strategy and policy; establishing strong co-operation with the
international community on a global counter terrorism strategy and policy; maintaining
continuous efforts for overall sustainable socio-economic development of the country to
offset the negative impact of poverty, illiteracy, unemployment, misinterpretation of
Islam, improper practice of democracy and so on. It was also mentioned that creating a
sense of patriotism, and campaign and awareness related programs against militancy is
also essential. Employment generation at different levels also should take place,
respondents stated.
11
12
1. INTRODUCTION
Background
When we look back on the history of terrorism, there are several different linkages to this
issue. In South Asia, terrorism has had a profound impact on inter-state relations.
Accusations of cross-border terrorism and state terrorism continue to constrain moves
towards a constructive engagement. It has also been reported by a segment of the Indian
media that some South Asian countries have spawned, encouraged, aided and abetted
terrorism in neighboring countries making border areas the familiar scene for terrorists
including providing sanctuary, training and financial support.1 Therefore, to understand
the trajectory of terrorism in Bangladesh, its history, roots and potential impact on society
must be explored. Bangladesh’s history, geographic location, weak infrastructure, socioeconomic and demographic factors and Islamic roots have facilitated the spread of
extremist agendas.2 Political inaction and tacit approval of certain vested quarters
encouraged terrorists to consolidate resources and strike when least expected.
One of the first terrorist attacks for which HUJI gained nationwide notoriety was the
2001 attack on the Ramna Botomul during Bengali New Year Festivities which killed ten
people and left scores injured.3 The following year, JMB carried out near-simultaneous
explosions in cinema halls in Mymensingh which killed 15 people and caused grievous
injuries. In 2004, heinous attacks were carried out allegedly by HUJI members on
eminent writer Humayun Azad and British High Commissioner Anwar Choudhury. One
of the the deadliest attacks was in August 2004, at the then opposition Awami League’s
meeting, which killed 24 and injured 200. It was widely perceived that the target of the
attack was the party leader Sheikh Hasina.4 JMB and JMJB grew unnoticed between
1998-2005 until they violently announced their existence in August 2005 with a countrywide bombing campaign of 500 coordinated bomb explosions in 63 districts of
Bangladesh5. Although the number of casualties was small, this was the largest terrorist
bombing campaign in the country and demonstrated the coordination and tactical
capabilities as well as the wide reach of extremists. In November 2005, nine people,
including two lawyers and a police constable, were killed and 78 persons injured in two
suicide bomb attacks by JMB on the Chittagong and Gazipur court premises. In the same
1
2
3
4
5
Rahman, R. “Bangladesh’s Fight against Terror: Lessons learnt and future perspectives”. Osmany,
M.R; Kabir, M. H edt. “Global War on Terror: Bangladesh Perspective”. APPL, Dhaka: 2007. P. 18
Hussain, M. S. Terrorism in South Asia: Ramifications in the Internal and External Security of States: A
Bangladesh Perspective
‘Ramna Batamul Blast Case’ in The Daily Star viewed on the 01/06/11
http://www.thedailystar.net/newDesign/news-details.php?nid=134379
Karlekar H. ‘The Terrorism that stalks Bangladesh’ in Global Asia Spring 2008, Vol 3, No 1, p42-48
Viewed on the 01/06/11 http://globalasia.org/new/l.php?c=e121
Hussain, M. S. Terrorism in South Asia: Ramifications in the Internal and External Security of States: A
Bangladesh Perspective. Osmany, M.R; Kabir, M. H edt. “Global War on Terror: Bangladesh
Perspective”. APPL, Dhaka: 2007. P.122
13
month, a JMB suicide bomber killed two senior assistant judges and wounded three
people in the district headquarters of Jhalakathi.6 Later, only due to intense pressure from
donor countries, the then government banned HUJI, JMB and JMJB in 2005.
Prompted by the pressure of public perception as well as international concern, the
extremist elements faced their first pressure under the Caretaker Government (CTG) of
Fakhruddin Ahmed. By early 2007, six prominent leaders of JMB and JMJB had been
arrested, tried and executed. The Awami League-led Grand Alliance government, upon
assuming office in January 2009, continued the momentum started by the CTG and
adopted a proactive approach to curbing terrorism. The adoption of the Anti-Terrorism
Act and the Money Laundering Prevention Act in 2009 and the formation of ‘The
National Committee on Militancy Resistance and Prevention’ and ‘The National
Committee for Intelligence Coordination’ have built a strong multi- faceted resistance to
extremism and portrayed Bangladesh’s concerted efforts against terrorism to national and
international observers.7
It is imperative that a comprehensive national strategy be adopted that would act as a
holistic intra-governmental blueprint for countering terrorism with the plenary
endorsement of civil, community and military constituents.
About the Project
The project, ‘Towards Developing a Better Counter Terrorism Regime in Bangladesh’
aims to address the following challenges:

Overcome the existing absence of a comprehensive national CT policy by initiating
action to work with the government and other relevant stakeholders in developing a
government-owned and consensus-based National Counter Terrorism Policy which
would provide the framework and policies to enable the government to address the
problems of radicalization, militancy and terrorism in a comprehensive manner;

Lack of detailed action plans on priority areas of counter-terrorism, preventing
strategies from taking practical shape;

Lack of systematic information, monitoring and assessment on terrorism trends in
Bangladesh. This information is vital for policy-makers and to raise awareness of
various stakeholders.
Objectives of the Project
Long-Term Objective:
The long-term objective of the project is to strengthen the counter terrorism regime
through advocacy for a government-owned and implemented National Counter Terrorism
Policy.
6
7
Bangladesh Enterprise Institute, ‘Countering Terrorism in Bangladesh: A Strategy Paper’ July 2007
revised in March 2011.
Ibid, p. 2
14
Immediate Objectives:
The immediate objectives of the project are as follows:




To reach a broad national consensus and raise consciousness of all stakeholders,
particularly the government, on the need for a comprehensive national level
government-owned policy addressing radicalization, militancy and terrorism;
To assess and monitor the characteristics, patterns and trends of radicalization,
militancy and terrorism, thereby generating a pool of useful and reliable information
for policymakers and other stakeholders to sensitize them about the need for a
National Counter-Terrorism Policy;
To develop intellectual dialogue and discourse against terrorism amongst civil
society members and youth, making them vigilant against radicalization/militancy
and giving them an ownership of the counter terrorism agenda;
To provide technical assistance in developing a comprehensive government-owned
policy on the basis of the BEI Strategy Paper on Counter Terrorism and other
documents
Objectives of the Report
The objectives of the Report are to assess and monitor the scenario as 2nd phase
observation between the period of 2010 and 2011 focusing on the characteristics, patterns
and trends in radicalization, militancy and terrorism, thereby generating a pool of useful
and reliable information for the policy makers, development partners, and other relevant
stakeholders to sensitize them in order to further develop and provide inputs to
countering terrorism in the country.
Structure of the Report
The report has been structured into four parts that include the Introduction, Methodology,
Major Findings of the Survey and Concluding Remarks. Ancillary tables are presented in
the appendix.
15
2. METHODOLOGY
In accomplishing the aforementioned objectives, the research adopted both quantitative
and qualitative methods. Qualitative method included desk research and Key Informant
Interviews (KIIs) with three categories of respondents (Religious Leaders/Imams,
Influential People of the Community, Law Enforcement Agency Personnel), in order to
gather detailed information related to community insecurity, violence and militancy. In
addition, a newspaper survey was done to collect more supportive and case specific
information on these issues. A field survey for data collection was conducted in the
month of July 2011.
2.1 Data Collection Methods
Quantitative
Quantitative data was collected following a semi-structured questionnaire in face to face
interviews with adult male and female respondents. Survey participants were selected
from those who have at least primary level of education.
Qualitative
Qualitative data collection was conducted through the following methods:
 Desk Research
 Key Informant Interview (KII)
 Newspaper Survey
Sample Selection Procedure
The target age group for the quantitative portion of the survey was between 18 and 65
years. Throughout the country with similar segment of male and female, respondents
were selected on random basis.
Distribution of Sample Size and Location
The study locations were selected from all seven administrative divisions of the country,
with two upazilas from each of the selected districts. These locations were identified as
most insecurity-prone places in terms of Islamist radicalization, extremism and religious
militancy. Having this in mind, a total of 32000 sample size was selected from 64
thanas/upazilas (Sub-districts) of 32 districts of the seven divisions. Equal distribution
was maintained in each thana/upazila having 100 in each.
16
The following table depicts detailed distribution of sample for the survey:
Table 1: Distribution of survey locations
Division
Rangpur
Rajshahi
Khulna
Barisal
Dhaka
Sylhet
Chittagong
District
(Urban)
Lalmonirhat
Thakurgaon
Nilphamari
Kurigram
Rangpur
Gaibandha
Jaipurhat
Naogaon
Chapainawabganj
Rajshahi
Natore
Sirajganj
Pabna
Kushtia
Jhenaidah
Chuadanga
Jessore
Satkhira
Khulna
Barisal
Barguna
Bhola
Dhaka
Gazipur
Jamalpur
Mymensingh
Upazila/Thana (Rural)
Patgram, Durgapur
Ranisonkhail, Baliadangi
Dimla, Domar
Ulipur, Bhurungamari
Pirgachha, Badarganj
Sadullahpur, Phulchhari
Khetlal, Akkelpur
Atrai,Raninagar
Shibganj, Bholahat
Bagmara, Godagari
Singra, Gurudaspur
Ullapara, Shahzadpur
Santhia, Chatmohor
Mirpur, Bheramara
Shailokupa, Moheshpur
Alamdanga, Damurhuda
Jhikorgachha, Sharsha
Kaliganj, Shyamnagar
Dakope, Paikgachha
Gournadi, Agailjhara
Pathorghata, Amtoli
Char Fashion, Borhanuddin
Dakshinkhan, Demra
Kapasia, Tongi
Sharishabari
Fulbaria, Muktagachha
Sherpur
Sylhet
Habiganj
Noakhali
Chittagong
Cox’s Bazar
Nokla, Nalitabari
Jaintapur, Jokiganj
Baniachar, Nabiganj
Begumganj, Chatkhil
Hathazari, Raujan
Naikhangchhari, Ukhia
KIIs
As many as 96 KIIs were taken with 3 different respondents namely, Religious Leaders
(Imams), Teachers, Public Representatives (Chairman/Member) and Officials from Law
Enforcement and Intelligence Agencies (Police, RAB, NSI, DGFI).
Desk Research
A review of different newspaper reports, articles, editorials, books and documents was
done, reflecting the overall situation of the different communities in Bangladesh and
17
exploring the associated problems that have been hindering the development of these
people.
Media Survey
As source of media reports, BEI has chosen twelve daily newspapers. These newspapers
are nationally and internationally well known and acceptable to the public as impartial
news reports/sources on Community Security, Radicalization, Terrorism, Drugs and
Arms Trafficking in the country. The newspapers are: The Daily Star, Prothom Alo, New
Age, Shamokal, The Independent, Sangbad, Daily Naya Diganta, Jugantor, Inqilab,
Ittefaq, New Nation and The Daily Janakantha from July 2010 to June 2011.
Data Processing and Analysis
The data, acquired from the survey using three different techniques, was processed and
analyzed independently and then triangulated.
Under the newspaper survey, articles or any kind of news on community security,
radicalization, terrorism, drugs and arms trafficking and the use of explosive devices
were collected from the 12 selected newspapers between July 2010 to June 2011.
For quantitative data processing, SPSS (Version 17.0) was used for data analysis. Data
processing involved the following stages:






Data entry and entry verification
Cleaning and processing of data
Coding and code transfer
Development of analysis plan
Analysis of programme development
Programme running and report generation
18
3. SALIENT FEATURES OF THE SURVEY
Under this section, major findings of the surveys are presented in different broad and subheadings which were derived from three separate methods that include quantitative
household survey, Key Informant Interviews (KII) from three distinguished groups of
personalities spread in different sections of the communities, information through desk
research and the newspaper survey.
3.1 Demographic Profile of the Survey Respondents
Age, Gender and Residence
This section presents the socio-economic characteristics of the survey respondents in
terms of age, sex, education, religion and occupation. Table 2 shows the distribution of
male and female respondents throughout the survey areas under seven divisions of the
country.
The distribution of respondents by division of residence shows that a majority of the
respondents live in Rajshahi (22 percent), nearly one-fifth (19 percent) live in Rangpur
and another one-fifth (19 percent) lives in Khulna. Over 9 percent live in Barisal and 16
percent of the respondents reside in Dhaka division. The number of respondents living in
Chittagong was found to be similar to that in Barisal (over 9 percent). Sylhet division
showed the lowest proportion (6.2 percent) of respondents in the survey. Nearly nine in
every ten were Muslims, while the rest were mostly Hindus.
Table 2: Background Characteristics of the Respondents
Percentage distribution of male and female respondents by age, religion, gender,
education and occupation
Background
Characteristics
Age
18 – 30 Yrs
31 - 45 Yrs
46 - 59 Yrs
60+ Yrs
Division
Rangpur
Rajshahi
Khulna
Barisal
Dhaka
Sylhet
Chittagong
Religion
Male
Female
Total
62.4
64.6
74.3
78.6
37.6
35.4
25.7
21.4
68.0
24.3
6.3
1.3
51.5
61.6
59.3
50.7
60.0
63.5
68.3
48.5
38.4
40.7
49.3
40.0
36.5
31.7
18.7
21.8
18.7
9.3
15.6
6.2
9.3
19
Background
Characteristics
Islam
Hindu
Others
Education
Primary
Secondary
Higher Secondary
Graduate
Post-Graduate
Occupation
Employed
Student
Politician
Businessman
Unemployed
Other
N
Male
Female
Total
59.6
52.6
61.8
40.4
47.4
57.3
87.5
9.4
1.2
51.8
61.4
56.0
56.7
68.2
48.2
38.6
44.0
43.3
31.8
4.2
27.0
34.5
23.2
10.3
61.4
55.0
68.9
96.7
54.4
9.7
1,880
38.6
45.0
31.1
3.3
45.6
90.3
1,320
22.2
45.4
1.4
17.0
2.8
10.9
3,200
Education and Working Status
About 35 percent of the respondents interviewed completed Higher Secondary level
schooling. The second highest respondents (27 percent) completed their education up to
secondary level. A good number of respondents interviewed completed their level of
education up to graduation. There were also post-graduate level respondents, at over 10
percent. The lowest (4.2 percent) responses were taken from the respondents who had
primary level of education. No significant differences were found in education levels
between male and female respondents.
A variation was observed in the occupation list of the participants. It seems that the
majority responses were taken from the students (45.4 percent). The second majority
responses (22.2 percent) were found to be employed. About 17 percent of the respondents
had small or medium categories of businesses; among them almost 97 percent were male.
Although it is very low and insignificant (1.4 percent), there were people who hold
politics as occupation.
3.2 General Perception on Security
From a security perspective, in order to get a clear view of the situation of the country,
respondents were asked about the frequency of crime/injustice/extremism/illegal acts or
incidents compared to the previous year. About 40 percent of the respondents opined that
such acts had declined, compared to last year. Similarly, from in-depth interviews taken
of particular professionals, it was revealed that terrorist activities had decreased
comparatively in their respective localities, although the reasons behind this changed
situation were not given by them. Over 15 percent of the respondents said that there was
little increase in terrorism. More than 20 percent of the respondents believed the situation
was the same as before (Appendix Table: 1.1).
20
Figure 2.1:
Percentage distribution of respondents by their opinion regarding the
situation based on prevalence of injustice/crime/extremism/ illegal acts
compare to the previous year.
50
40
39.5
Too high
Li ttle increase
30
Huge decline
25.0
20
20.2
Smal l decli ne
Very little
10
15.3
11.2
7.4
6.5
14.5
10.9
7.9
6.3
4.7
4.0
0
Mal e
9.3
7.4
4.9
2.7
2.5
Female
Same as before
Total
Types of illegal activities were gleaned from the survey participants. According to their
opinion, crimes related to personal property such as robbery, highjacking and theft (80
percent), politically motivated violence (69.1 percent), crimes based on small arms (36.3
percent), and extortion (49.2 percent) were found to be common in the participants’
respective areas of residence. Another often reported crime is eve teasing. A significant
proportion (63 percent) of the respondents had complained about this cause of insecurity.
Drug addiction is another crime that causes high level of insecurity among community
people as more than 74 percent of the respondents mentioned about it. Among others,
police torture (17 percent), trafficking in women and children (15.2 percent), and murder
(28 percent) were mentioned by the survey participants. About 65 percent of the
respondents believed that all this had some influence on their lives. Although a
significant number of responses were noted to have experienced the influence of crime in
their lives, the vast majority (83.2 percent) of them denied experiencing any injustice or
crime during the past one year (Figure: 2.1).
Although respondents mentioned a series of crimes the community people had dealt with,
a majority (65 percent) of them believed that this had little influence in their lives. Over
13 percent of the respondents felt that it had high influence in their lives. During the past
one year, how much the community people had come across any injustice/crime or
suppression was measured. About 17 percent of the respondents said that they had
experienced such crimes. Among them, 10 percent were male and 7 percent female
(Table 1.5).
The majority of the respondents mentioned crimes related to personal property such as
theft, robbery, looting, hijacking, etc to be a common type of violence in the community,
33.4 percent claimed that violence was mostly politically motivated, while 21 percent
thought about eve teasing to be another cause of rising violence in the community. About
11.3 percent of those surveyed agreed that drug addiction was a reason for community
violence. Conflict due to religious reasons was cited by 6 percent of the respondents, and
violence using explosive materials was stated by only 2 percent of those surveyed as
another reason for community violence. Participants (64 percent) also said that they
would report to the police if they were confronted by these types of violent acts again
(Table: 1.5).
21
Respondents were also asked about why they did not report to the police for the violent
incidents faced in the past. In response to this question, a number of reasons were given.
The survey results are presented according to the proportion of their response. Over 25
percent of the respondents gave family and personal reason, while 18.4 percent
mentioned fear of vengeance or worsening of situation. Some respondents (17 percent)
mentioned that they had resolved the problems through mutual understanding. Fear of
harassment by the police was another reason as stated by 15 percent of the survey
participants, while 14 percent mentioned about not having such kind of experience so far.
However, 50 percent of the respondents said that they were a little worried, while 17
percent felt very worried for the members of their families who might be victims of any
crime, torture or injustice. According to the KII respondents, money was another factor
for not approaching the police. “There is law but no implementation. Moreover, the
police charges Tk. 1,500 to Tk. 10,000 for filing a case” was the opinion expressed by
many KII respondents of Jhenaidah and Pabna.
Table 1.5: Types of injustice/crime/torture faced by the people (%).
Indicators
Politically motivated violence
Ethnic conflict
Religious / conflict motivated by religious reasons
Torture using explosive devices/materials
Extortion
Crime related to personal property (theft, robbery, looting,
highjacking)
Eve teasing
Rape
Murder
Drug addiction/drinking
Women and children trafficking
Police exploitation / torture
RAB exploitation/torture
In favour of reporting to the police in case of facing any
illegal activities
Male
23.4
2.8
2.3
1.3
10.7
26.8
Female
10.0
1.0
2.2
0.7
4.2
14.8
Total
33.4
3.8
4.5
2.0
14.9
41.6
5.7
3.1
4.0
7.3
1.8
5.4
1.2
36.0
14.9
2.8
1.2
4.0
0.4
2.5
0.9
27.5
20.6
5.9
5.1
11.3
2.2
7.9
2.0
63.5
3.3 Terrorism and Bangladesh
Public Definition of Terrorism
The public’s understanding of terrorism was assessed through a survey of a number of
people. The survey participants were asked ‘have you ever heard of the word
terrorism/militancy?’ Table 1.6 (Appendix) indicates that most of the respondents, except
2 out of 10 people, had not heard about the terms. Some views on militancy are recorded
22
here from the respondents’ idea about this issue. As many as 89 percent of the
respondents perceived terrorism or militancy as ‘using Islam as a reason to cause
instability in the society, and causing fear through anti-social and anti-state acts such as,
bombing, vandalism, looting, murder, use of arms, etc.’ More than 81 percent of the
participants understand the term/issue of terrorism/militancy as ‘using Islam to steer
people in the wrong direction or giving people wrong concepts’. Some people (21.1
percent) took this issue as a fight against non-Islamic state. According to a report
published in a journal, the power seeking leaders, who want to use religion as a tool, are
the facilitators of extremism in Bangladesh. Beside these, religious and political
ideological contradictions, rigid religious beliefs, socio-economic factors like poverty,
unequal job opportunities, hunger, backwardness and unemployment also significantly
contribute to the rise of extremism in Bangladesh. 8
Public Reluctance to share Information
In this survey, attempts have Figure 2.2: Name of Militant groups found to be active by
been made to explore the nexus the respondents (%)
between religion and militancy.
10
9.6
As such, questions were asked
about active terrorist groups
8
who motivate people using
6 5.5
Jihadi9
ideas
in
the
Male
4.2
4.1
participants’
respective
Female
3.8
4
Total
localities. Compared to the
2.7
2.6
2.4
2.0
2
1.7 1.8
1.6
response rate on other issues,
1.3
1.3
1.2
0.8
0.8
0.4
a very low proportion of
0
JMB
JMJB
HUJI
Allahr
Hizbut
Hibut
participants
spoke
about
Dall
Tawhid Tahrir
extremist groups. The active
presence
of
JMB
was
mentioned by only 10 percent of the respondents. Regarding other militant groups,
responses were lower than 10 percent. The other groups were JMJB (4 percent), Allahr
Dal (4.2 percent), HUJI (2 percent), Hizbut Tawhid (.4 percent) and Hizbut Tahrir (0.8
percent). From the findings and field observation, it was obvious that people were
somehow not willing to provide information about the militant groups (Figure 2.2).
8
9
Islam, M. A. Mapping Terrorism Threats in Bangladesh, BIISS Journal. Vol, 29, No.2, April 2008. P. 161
The meaning of jihadi is ‘something of or relating to a jihad’. Jihad is an Arabic for what can be
variously translated as "struggle" or "effort," or "to strive," "to exert," "to fight," depending on the
context. In the West, the word is generally understood to mean "holy war," and the terms are given,
inaccurately, exclusively militant or violent connotations.
Including "jihad" as one of the five pillars of Islam is another common Western misunderstanding.
Jihad is not among the five pillars of Islam (the profession of faith, prayer five times a day, fasting
during Ramadan, alms for the poor, and performance of the holy Hajj, or pilgrimage to Mecca, at least
once in each financially solvent Muslim's lifetime).
23
Common Activities of Militants
Although respondents were somewhat reluctant to provide information about the
presence of terrorist groups in their localities, survey participants were responsive in
expressing their views on the activities of the militants. Few activities are mentioned here
as stated by the participants: invite people through Jihadi concepts (46.3 percents),
extortion (26 percent), motivating in Jihadi sentiments (23.1 percent), threaten (22
percent), torture in various ways (19 percent), disseminate motivational messages for
fundamentalism (17 percent), teach about how to hate other religions and countries (16
percent), murder (14 percent), provide Jihadi training (12.4 percent), provide training on
how to use arms (7 percent). (Table: 1.8)
Table 1.8: Common activities of the terrorist activists found by the respondents (%)
Common activities of the terrorist
activists
Giving dawat (special invitation) through
jihadi concepts
Murder
Extortion
Causing fear/terror
Torturing in various ways
Increasing/ Disseminating
fundamentalism/radicalization
Increasing/disseminating militancy
Giving jihadi training
Motivating in jihadi sentiments
Training in arms use
Teaching to hate other country/religion
Male
Female
Total
30.4
15.8
46.3
8.6
14
11.1
11.5
10.4
5.1
11.7
10.6
7.5
6.2
13.7
25.7
21.7
18.9
16.6
5.6
8.4
15.3
4
9.8
1.6
4
7.8
2.7
5.6
7.3
12.4
23.1
6.7
15.5
Arranging invitations to motivate people to join militant groups is a common strategy of
these groups, which is commonly known as “Dawati Strategy”. Among their many
activities under this strategy, some have been revealed in this survey. Dissemination of
messages through distribution of Jihadi books, leaflets and CDs are known to the
majority of survey participants; 74 percent of the respondents mentioned about this. The
other activities included use of mosques to motivate general people (13 percent) and door
to door visit (12.4 percent). Targeting madrasa students and motivating them (39.4
percent) has been claimed by different sources as well (Table: 1.9)
Table 1.9: Strategies followed by the terror activists in their dawat (%).
Indicators
Jihadi Books, Leaflets, CD, etc.
Door to door visit
Visit madrasas
In Mosques
Male
45.8
7.1
25.4
7.3
24
Female
27.7
5.3
14
5.3
Total
73.6
12.4
39.4
12.6
KII respondents from all seven divisions have mentioned that militant outfits involve
themselves in activities such as spreading misinterpretation of Islam, distribution of
invitations and manifestos, creating fear among citizens by bombing and killing.
Respondents have also said that militants hide in mosques and follow the guerrilla style
of warfare.
Objectives of Militant Activities
The study also aimed to understand the objectives of militant activities. KII respondents
in different regions sketched a few aims of the militants such as: “Their short term
objective is to threaten people and long term plan is to capture political power of the
country”; “They have only one objective which is to disturb the people and government”;
and, “Demolish democracy and establish Saudi system of governance”. These views were
mentioned by respondents in Barguna, Jhenaidah, Lalmonirhat, Baniyarchar, Cox’s
Bazar, Khulna, Noakhali, and Joypurhaat.
A report published in a journal states that JMB tries to instill fear in people and force
society to accept a corrupt version of Islamic ideology. They attempt this not realizing
that this ideology is deeply flawed and fails to fit in a nation that adopts a unique blend of
religio-cultural values to govern their day-to-day life. 10 Another research report has
shown that a global Islamist organization, Hizb-ut-Tahrir (HuT, Party of Liberation) aims
to impose Shariah (Islamic Law) across the world. With this aim in mind, the
organization has built strong global networks11.
Militant Networks
All three categories of KII respondents have acknowledged that there is a nexus between
militant groups residing in Bangladesh and based abroad in terms of economic,
technological and organizational connections. A religious leader from Barguna stated,
‘Terrorist organizations in Bangladesh receive funds from international terrorist
groups’. In addition to receipt of funding, terrorist groups in Bangladesh also maintain
connections for learning and adopting training techniques and the same ideology, as
stated by respondents in Thakurgaon and Rangpur. Terrorist groups are quite proficient in
using modern technology, such as the internet, mobile phones, some special signals and
other types of very strong networking systems. This information was provided by all KII
respondents from law enforcement agencies.
In this survey, attempts have been made to figure out the number of militants operating in
Bangladesh and those arrested. From the statements given by some KII respondents, it
has been estimated that approximately 4,000 to 5,000 militant activists are operating in
this country and about 200 activists have so far been arrested by law enforcement
agencies. However, respondents have not provided information about foreign militants
who are suspected to have connection with home-grown terrorist groups.
10
11
M. Sakhawat Hussain, “Terrorism in South Asia: Ramifications in the Internal and External Security of
States: A Bangladesh Perspective” in Mufleh R. Osmany, and Mohammad Humayun Kabir (ads.),
Global War on Terror: Bangladesh Perspective”. APPL, Dhaka: 2007. P.122
http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/sair/index.htm#assessment1 (Accessed on 26/10/2011)
25
According to newspaper reports, five Bangladeshi people were arrested on suspicion of
conducting terrorist attacks near the Sellafield nuclear site in UK. It was also reported by
the BBC that all the arrestees were suspected of taking pictures of the nuclear site hours
after the killing of Osama Bin Laden.12 In another case, a Bangladeshi citizen named
Maulana Mohammad Imran, staying in Habiganj, was found working as a local cocoordinator for the Pakistan-based militant outfit Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT). LeT’s
Bangladesh co-coordinator Khurram, alias Mohammad Salem, was mentioned as the cocoordinator of India and Bangladesh LeT chapters. 13
Some leading newspapers have reported that militants are still receiving funds from
several foreign NGOS to carry out their activities. It has also been alleged that militants
have linkages with an islamist political party in Bangladesh.14 Some Islamist extremist
groups are alleged to have collaboration with the underground leftist groups.
Present Trend: Signs of Re-grouping by Militants
According to newspaper reports, militants are resorting to alternative strategies to ensure
their existence under effective counter-terrorism operations taken by the current
government.
In order to retain their existence, the Islamist militants are trying to unite under a
common platform keeping Hizbut Tahrir in the forefront, as its members are educated in
the modern education system. According to intelligence sources, international terrorist
groups are also keeping an eye on Hizbut Tahrir.15 Evidence shows that JMB and Hizbut
Tahrir are trying to form joint collaborations. They are also trying to establish liaisons
with other terrorist and political groups at home and abroad. It has also been revealed in a
media report that those who had been arrested during a hartal were HUJI and JMB
militants who were being reorganized slowly under the banners of various Islamist
groups. 16
Sources of Financing for Militant Groups
International terrorist groups were the top source of funding, according to the majority
(65.4 percent) of the people surveyed. Another major source of fund collection for these
groups was the subscription from dedicated activists residing in different developed
countries. About 53 percent of the selected participants for this survey mentioned about
this source of funding. Over 51 percent people were of the view that different wealthy
Muslim countries nurtured these militant groups’ activities by providing funds to some
NGOs. Local people also unintentionally finance these groups by giving donations in the
name of Islam. This was realized by 21.3 percent of the respondents. Money collection
12
13
14
15
16
The Independent: 5 May 2011
Janakantha, Protham Alo, The Daily Star, of 5 October 2010.
The Daily Janakantha: 9 April 2011
The Daily Janakantha: 9 April 2011
The Daily Janakantha: 7 April, 2011
26
by force from local people, such as extortion, murder, looting, highjacking or creating
fear was mentioned by 24 percent of the survey participants. (Figure: 2.3)
Figure 2.3: Source of financing to the militant activists/groups (%)
80.0
65.4
60.0
40.0
20.0
52.9
51.1
41.8
33.1
19.8
32.6
18.5
24.0
23.6
14.6
9.4
21.3
12.3
9.0
0.0
Male
Female
Total
From their Donation International Forcibly
Religious
activists from Muslim Terrorist collect money donation
living in countries for
groups
from local from local
different
NGOs
people
people
wealthy
countries in
the name of
Islam
“Expatriates in Saudi Arabia and England, foreign madrasas, Muslim countries such as
Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Pakistan and non- Muslim countries such as
China, various Islamic NGOs and INGOs” were sources of funding as mentioned by KII
respondents from Pabna, Daulatpur of Kushtia, Dhaka, Rajshahi, Sirajganj, Jamalpur,
Sherpur and Sylhet.
A senior official in law enforcement disclosed a HUJI leader’s confession during
interrogation that HUJI had received financial aid from around 3,000-4,000 associates
working in different Middle Eastern countries. 17 The HUJI leader also stated that an
organization named “Rashid Trust” in Pakistan had been providing HUJI with financial
aid. 18 According to another newspaper, Islamist extremists receive huge financial
resources from different local and international NGOs, banks, insurance companies,
private clinics, real estate companies and other business organizations.19
Involvement of Women in Militancy
Regarding women activists in militant groups, 32 percent of the survey respondents were
aware of it. When asked about the reasons for women joining extremist groups, a few
factors were mentioned by the respondents. Over 48 percent noted that women activists
were mostly the family members of the militants. Financial problems in the family were
another reason given by 32.1 percent of the surveyed people (Figure: 2.4). Being family
17
18
19
The Daily Star: 28 April 2011; The Daily Janakantha: 30 April 2011
The Daily Janakantha: 29 April 2011
The Independent: 19 June 2011
27
Figure 2.4: Recognized women participation in militancy (%)
Recognized women participation in
militancy
40
31.7
30
20
18.3
13.4
10
0
Male
Female
Total
members of the militant group activists, some women were compelled to act as militants
as stated by 30 percent of the respondents. It is easy to force women than men to join
these groups, 23 percent respondents stated. Extremist male members forcibly brought
the women into their groups, over 17 percent of the respondents claimed. Some women
joined these groups with an intention that they would be able to empower themselves and
could also prove their worth in the society; 8.4 percent of the respondents stated this
factor. Over 8 percent of the respondents believed that women who wanted to change the
society by establishing an Islamic state would join militant groups. (Table. 1.11)
Table 1.11: Major causes of women’s active participation in militancy (%)
Indicators
Male
Female
Recognized women participation in militancy
18.3
13.4
Reasons for being involved with militant groups by the women
Being relatives or family members of the
29.6
18.6
militant activists
Being forced by their family to join the
18
11.5
militant groups
It is much easier to force women to join the
13.5
9.3
groups than the men
Extremist male members force the females to
9.8
7.5
join the groups
Joins the groups for receiving financial
18.2
13.9
benefit
To bring change in the society through
5.5
2.9
establishing Islamic state
Because they do not get equal political, economic
2.4
3.1
and social rights in the present state system
To gain equal
2.8
1.8
acceptability/acknowledgement/ freedom of
expression as men
To increase women empowerment or to
5.4
3
increase their status in the eyes of their elders
28
Total
31.7
48.2
29.5
22.8
17.2
32.1
8.3
5.5
4.6
8.4
Target Population for Militancy Recruitment
One of the fundamental activities of any militant organization relates to recruitment. The
underprivileged groups of people are the main target group to get involved in terrorist
activities. As gleaned from the survey, the intended people are: poor uneducated males
(46.2 percent); madrasa students (44 percent); educated and unemployed youth (41.3
percent); those people who are truly sympathetic to the extremists’ principles (35
percent); poor and uneducated people (32.4 percent); youths who want change in the
society (25.1 percent); those people who did not get legal justice from cases including
murder, rape, kidnapping, robbery, highjacking, loot, etc. (24.2 percent); criminals and
those who got involved in criminal activities (18 percent); and educated unemployed
young females (14 percent). (Appendix Table 1.12)
Motivational Techniques Used in Militancy Recruitment
The survey results revealed that there were various strategies followed by extremists for
motivating people to join them. The most popular way of influencing people was to
motivate them in the name of Islam; 61 percent of respondents agreed about this
technique, among which 35.2 percent were supported by male and 26 percent female. As
they target the underprivileged people, especially those who were unable to meet their
basic human needs, extremists offer money to them and then involve them in their
activities; more than 33 percent of the respondents said about this method.
Approximately one third of the respondents mentioned leaflet distribution for
encouraging people with their ideology. Organizing meetings and discussions to
encourage people to accept the militant group’s ideology was stated by 22.4 percent of
respondents. Extremists also engage them in community welfare activities such as
providing food, jobs and giving financial support for organizing marriage ceremonies, as
observed by 23 percent of survey participants. Extremists not only allure people with
their social welfare activities, they also seduce people by promising to provide smart cell
phones, computers and other luxury items, as stated by 25 percent of the respondents.
Some respondents also said that extremists’ used intimidation (8 percent) and showed
their continuous endeavor in undertaking welfare activities to demonstrate that they were
more active than the government in this area (9 percent).
Table 1.13: Motivation techniques followed by the militant activists (% of respondents)
Indicators
Influence and motivate in the name of Islam
Encourage people distributing leaflets
Encourage people to join their meetings/discussions
Helping people through charity works such as, providing
food, employment, giving money for wedding, etc.
Giving financial support
Alluring people by offering better life, mobile phone,
computer, etc.
Criticizing the government and the political system
Constantly trying to prove that they more devoted to
people’s welfare
Terrorizing people or forcing them
29
Male
35.2
16.7
12.8
14.0
Female
25.5
12
9.6
8.7
Total
60.7
28.7
22.4
22.7
18.9
14.0
14.3
11.0
33.2
25.0
12.7
4.2
8.3
3.5
21.0
7.7
10.7
5.5
16.2
Consequences of Militancy/Terrorism
Respondents were asked about how terrorist activities could affect one’s life, the society
and the country as a whole. A highly significant proportion of respondents mentioned
about different security threats. These are mentioned below in chronological order by the
proportion of findings (Appendix Table 1.14):




Threat to national security was mentioned by 95 percent of the respondents
89.4 percent believed that terrorism was a threat to life and property of the people
85 percent of the respondents thought terrorism damage national image of the country
74 percent of the respondents mentioned that it was a threat to the process of
democracy
The most viable issue, ‘the economy of the country’, terrorism brings threat to this
(75 percent)


Social security, social cohesion and social stability could be paralyzed as mentioned
by 88 percent, 71 percent and 81.3 percent of the respondents respectively

Eight out of ten people believed that incidents related to anti-social and anti-state
activities such as, bombing explosion, looting, vandalism, destruction of lives and
property damage, attacking the state structure, etc. were a menace to national security
and democracy of the country

Terrorism causes enmity among different ethnic and linguistic groups as believed by
32 and 55.4 percent of the respondents respectively.

More than one-fourth of the respondents believe that it involves innocent members of
the public in the anti-state and anti-government activities.
Similar to the above mentioned findings, another report has viewed terrorism as a threat
to a wide range of national security goals. This threat perception is concurrent with
terrorists’ methods of operation, saliency of enemy and counter terrorism efforts. So it is
important to understand threat, threat sources, and determinants of terrorism. Although
threat differs from place to place and time to time, the perception of threat includes
analysis of the indicators and vulnerabilities.20
Table 1.14: Terrorists’ usual movement and their increased level of activities (% of respondents)
Indicators
Male
Female
Can easily define/identify the terrorists
6.4
4.5
Terrorist activities have increased a lot
4.9
6
A little increase
7.9
7.4
Same as before
18.1
16.3
Terrorism is a threat to national life
56.2
38.4
Threatened areas of our life due to terrorism
Threat to national security
55.3
39.8
Threat to life and property of people
51.9
37.5
20
Total
10.9
10.9
15.2
34.3
94.6
95.1
89.4
Islam, M. Aynul, “Mapping Terrorism Threats in Bangladesh,” BIISS Journal. Vol, 29, No.2, April
2008. P.156
30
Indicators
Threat to national image
Threat to democracy
Threat to the economy of the country
Threat to social security
Threat to social cohesion
Threat to social stability
Male
52.4
44.9
45.8
50.4
42.5
49.8
Female
32.3
28.5
28.9
37.7
28.3
31.5
Total
84.7
73.5
74.7
88
70.8
81.3
Table 1.15: Scope of creating threat at the level of national security and democracy (% of
respondents)
Indicators
Terrorism can threaten national security and
democracy through anti-social and anti-state
activities (such as, bombing, looting,
destruction, loss of life and property,
attacking state structure, etc.)
Terrorism hampers state sovereignty, security,
social and economic prosperity, degrades the
national image at international level and
undermines human rights.
Causes enmity among different ethnic and
linguistic groups
Destroys the image of Islam as a religion
Involves general and innocent people in antistate and anti-government activities
Male
47.2
Female
32.1
Total
79.3
41.4
23.3
64.7
20.5
11
31.5
32.3
16.1
23.1
11.9
55.4
28
Reasons for Getting Involved in Terrorism
‘Why some people in Bangladesh get involved in terrorism?’ It is natural for this question
to grow in the minds of the people of Bangladesh as they have faced challenges due to
terrorists’ deadly attacks several times. Through this survey, the reasons for peoples’
involvement
with
terrorist Figure 2.5: Reasons to be involved in terrorism (%)
activities have been explored.
Poverty has been mentioned as
80
one of the prime causes for
73.4
getting involved in terrorism by
62.8
60
three fourths of the people in the
survey. According to them,
48.2
Male
42.1
41.7
40.3 38.5
people join militant groups
40
Female
31.2
because they cannot meet their
29.0
27.5
Total
25.4
24.3
23.9
basic
needs.
Wrong
20.7
19.9
20
17.8
16.9
14.9
interpretation of Islam to Muslim
12.1 11.5
8.3
devotees is another reason, as
0
mentioned by 63 percent of the
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
people surveyed. Four out of ten
people believe it is a political
matter in which Islam is being manipulated. Illiteracy is another important reason stated
by 42 percent of the survey people. Lack of democracy in the country was stated by 20
31
percent of the respondents and 29 percent believe terrorism in Bangladesh is influenced
by regional and international militancy. (Figure: 2.5).
Similar to the responses derived from the quantitative survey, KII participants also
mentioned about poverty, illiteracy, lack of democracy and misinterpretation of religion.
“Militants want to capture state power”, “This is a conspiracy of external sources”, “This
is to create chaos in the society” were mentioned by public representatives of
Mymensingh, Lalmonirhat, Sylhet and Rangpur. Some respondents viewed that some
people engaged in terrorist activities do not even realize the consequences of their
activities.
According to an article published in a journal, there are linkages between terrorism and
Islam. The analysis shows that Deobandi Islam denounces the worship of saints, music
and dancing, and refuses any idea of progress and envisions a return to a puritanical view
of Islam. Such a misguided view of Islam is able to spread due to five specific reasons:
bad state of Islamic scholarship in the Muslim world; the misperceptions of what
“secularism” means; the strong influence of Saudi Arabia and Wahhabi Islamic
ideologies due to the rise of petrodollars; the post-national diaspora in the Middle East,
those involved being attracted to a puritan version of Islam; and the weaponization of
society.21
Sources of Information on Militants
Most people surveyed mentioned television as the major source of information regarding
the militants and their activities (92 percent). Newspapers came as the second available
source for this kind of information (approximately 75 percent). Hearing from other
people as a source has been mentioned by 33.2 percent of the respondents. Only 27.2
percent people mentioned radio as a source of information. Some respondents mentioned
the internet, their own experiences and talking to witnesses as sources of information,
which are 13 percent, 6 percent and 2.2 percent respectively.
Table 1.17: Major sources of information about the militant groups and their activities (% of
the respondents)
Indicators
TV
Radio
Newspaper
Internet
Heard from other people
Own experience
Have witnessed
21
Male
53.8
16.6
45.7
7.4
17.8
3.3
1.4
Female
38.2
10.5
27.8
5.1
15.5
2.3
.8
Total
92
27.2
73.5
12.5
33.2
5.7
2.2
Shuman, A. Counter-Terrorism in Bangladesh: The Imperative for Community-Based Approach. BIISS
Journal, Vol. 28, No.3, July 2007, p. 238
32
Respondents’ Views on Combating Terrorism
While initiating to take opinion from the target audience on how to counter terrorism, it
was essential to know their awareness on this issue. Over 68 percent of them were aware
of this. Among them, 41 percent were male and 28 percent were female respondents.
Table 1.18: Measures to tackle terrorism (% of respondents)
Indicators
Male
Peoples’ awareness on terrorism
40.6
Few measures to tackle terrorism
By giving proper interpretation of Islam through the
53.7
Imams
By amendment of Madrasa education
44.8
Strengthening legislation and the judiciary
45
Banning of student politics
15.8
Stopping corruption in different government circles
33.9
Empowerment of people
31.2
Increasing public awareness through the mass media
54.4
and public awareness programmes
Don’t know/ Can’t say
44.4
Female
27.5
Total
68.1
38.1
91.8
30.2
34.3
14.2
25.4
22.5
37.7
74.9
79.3
30.0
59.3
53.7
92.1
52.8
97.2
In response to the question on how terrorism could be prevented, there are as many as 7
different ideas/thoughts stated by the respondents. Slightly over 92 percent suggested for
generating mass awareness, broadcasting programmes through the media and
implementation of other campaigns as one way of preventing terrorism in the society.
Eight out of ten people (79.3 percent) suggested strengthening legislation and the justice
system of the country. In order to promote the true meaning and image of Islam, Imams
(Muslim religious leaders) could take the responsibility of explaining religion properly
(suggested by majority participants - 92 percent). Three fourths of people surveyed (75
percent) think that appropriate reforms of Madrasa education could be one of the
measures against terrorism. Slightly over 59 percent and 54 percent of the respondents
recommended stopping corruption in different government circles and empowerment of
people respectively. Only 30 percent of people mentioned of the banning of student
politics as a mean of preventing terrorism in Bangladesh.
The most common recommendation from all KII respondents of seven divisions is
seeking assistance from general people, as terrorists reside within the community. It is
often difficult to deal with them unless community people cooperate in providing
information to law enforcement agencies.
“Terrorists live among general people. So, they can help by providing information
secretly. We can ensure security in this case”- is the gist of the statements from all seven
divisions.
Respondents have been asked about how to improve the situation related to the present legal
framework or any other weaknesses in countering terrorism. Some respondents were
unwilling to opine as they were not aware of this issue. However, a majority of those who
were aware of it appreciated the actions taken by the current government and according to
them, it made the situation comfortable for the citizens. Some of the respondents, mostly
people’s representatives, recommended death penalty for acts of terrorism.
33
Awareness of Anti Militancy Programmes
According to 30 percent of the respondents, there are some anti-terrorism measure in
their respective areas. Four out of ten people (40 percent) have stated that they were
aware of some public awareness campaigns undertaken by the government and other
sources.
Table 1.19: Respondent’s awareness on anti-terrorism activities (%)
Indicators
Male
Female
Area wise anti-terrorism activities
19.5
10.4
Public awareness programmes undertaken by the
26.2
13.8
government or by the general public
Among those who observed the awareness programmes
The law enforcement agencies have been more
60.6
31.8
strengthened
Forming a secured society by organizing people through
47.4
23.5
various awareness programs
Expressing dislike for extremist groups and bringing them
29
17.1
under the legal framework
Modernization of Madrasa education
26.1
16.6
Providing employment opportunities
18.4
13.1
Establishing various recreational organizations such as
12.3
6.8
clubs, groups, etc.
Employing community police
26.7
15.3
Establishing equal rights for both men and women through
10.6
8.2
reformation of shalish
Improving the law or judicial system
37.7
16
Nothing has been done
21.7
8.5
Anti militancy sermons in mosques
20.8
9.5
Total
29.8
40
92.3
70.9
46.1
42.7
31.6
19.1
42
18.8
53.7
30.3
30.4
Those who mentioned these measures were asked to describe those. Ten different
measures had been identified by the people surveyed such as the initiative taken to
strengthen the law enforcement agencies (92.3 percent) and encourage local people to
organize different awareness programmes aiming to have a peaceful society (71 percent).
More than half (54 percent) of the surveyed people had talked about improvement in the
judicial system and 46 percent had appreciated the initiatives taken to prosecute the
extremist groups under the legal framework. Initiatives taken for madrasa reform had
been appreciated by 43 percent of the survey participants. As unemployment has been
cited as a reason for joining terrorist groups, many people (32 percent) suggested for
measures to create employment opportunities. As many as 19 percent of respondents
mentioned about setting up various recreational facilities, such as clubs, groups, societies,
etc and reforming ‘Shalish’ to establish equal rights for both genders. About 30.4 percent
respondents have acknowledged the importance of messages passed through the sermons
in mosques. However, 30.3 percent of the people surveyed reported that there were not
many social awareness campaigns against terrorism (Table. 1.19).
34
In the survey, people were asked about
the role of law enforcement agencies
in combating terrorism. Certain
positive changes have been recognized
by 43.2 percent of the respondents,
while 17 percent believe that the
programmes/ initiatives taken by law
enforcement agencies have been quite
successful.
Figure 2.6: Level of success of the law enforcement
agencies (Police, RAB) in prevention of terrorism (%)
50
43.2
40
30
20
Male
24.8
18.4
16.8
Female
Total
9.9
Respondents of the survey also
10
6.9
mentioned that terrorist cases were
0.8 0.6 1.4
0
handled under the Criminal Procedure
Alittle
Quitesuccessful
Completely
Act while some others mentioned the
successful
Anti Terrorism Act 2009 and the
Small Arms Act. “This Act helped in
arresting and punishing terrorists” was the view of people of five survey areas. Indeed,
those who were aware of these Acts appreciated this initiative. According to the KII
respondents, due to successful implementation of these laws, the number of terrorists has
decreased.
Newspapers reported about programmes arranged by a civil society organization named
Shamprodaikota-Jangibad Birodhi Mancho based in Chittagong. Some observers are of
the view that communalism and militancy were crucial challenges facing the country.
Others were of the view that the country would suffer a lot if the government and people
of the country compromised on the matter and did not stop the activities of the militants
and communalists immediately.22 Mobilization of community people in countering
ideological radicalism has also been emphasized in the International Conference on
Community Engagement (ICCE), held in September 2011. In this conference, community
engagement has been focused on three-dimensional approaches. First, engagement
programmes to reach out to the Muslim community in order to empower them with
knowledge that will immunize them from extremists’ ideologies. The second approach
targets the non-violent extremists who are exposed to violence and the violent ones who
exist but remain unknown. The third approach would engage non-Muslims in community
programmes to ensure that they do not have a wrong understanding and perception of
Islam.23
Steps towards Combating Terrorism
Almost all the respondents (98 percent) supported the integrated collective approach
between local/general people and the intelligence/law enforcement agencies as an
effective force to counter terrorism. Similarly, 97 percent of the respondents felt it
necessary to have a comprehensive national strategy to prevent terrorism in Bangladesh.
22
23
The Independent: 19 June 2011
CTTA: Counter Terrorist Trends and Analysis, International Centre for Political Violence and
Terrorism Research – S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies; Volume 3, Special Issue 1,
October 2011.
35
Table 1.21: Suggestions for the solution of the insecurity and violence caused by the extremist
groups (%)
Indicators
The law enforcement agencies must come forward
The capacity of the law enforcement agencies should
be enhanced so that they can handle any violent
situation more easily.
Perpetrators of violence must be brought under legal
framework
Modernization of educational system and making it
more suitable for employment
Amendment of Madrasa education
Increase employment opportunities
Making young generation aware of their duties and
responsibilities
Civil society must come forward and work with
security and judicial agencies
Move people away from violent paths through
introducing art and cultural programmes
Stopping student politics
Establishing Islamic governance system through
sharia/laws
Stopping religion based politics
Arresting and punishing those involved with
extremist groups
Don’t know
Male
48.7
33.3
Female
32.2
21.1
Total
80.8
54.3
22.1
16.5
38.6
18.2
12.6
30.8
26.3
27.2
22.1
18.3
20
15.7
44.6
47.3
37.8
20.8
14.8
35.6
11.4
6.6
18
12.5
11.7
9.4
6
21.9
17.7
21
20.9
15.9
15.2
36.9
36.1
1.3
1.5
2.8
Opinions have been taken from the respondents on several issues to create a safeguard in
Bangladesh against terrorism. According to them, the roles of law enforcement agencies
have been given high priority in tackling this issue (81 percent respondents). As such,
they have suggested for enhancing the capacity of law enforcement agencies so that they
can handle any kind of violent situation (54.3 percent). Almost half (47.3 percent) of the
respondents have advocated for the creation of job opportunities that would prevent
people from joining extremist groups. A little less then half (45 percent) of the people
surveyed have opined about madrasa reform. Madrasa reform has been a priority task of
the government. About 39 percent of the respondents stated that perpetrators of violence
must be prosecuted under the legal framework, while 36 percent stated that an integrated
approach by the civil society and security and judicial agencies was essential. Banning
religion-based politics and student politics was favoured by 37 and 22 percent of the
respondents respectively. Many respondents (36.1 percent) wanted not only the
perpetrators of terrorist violence prosecuted but also those linked with extremists to be
arrested and punished. The role of the youth is crucial in mitigating extremism. They
should be aware of their responsibilities to society and also accountable for their actions,
as claimed by 38 percent of the surveyed people. Moving people away from a violent
path by encouraging them to be involved in art and cultural programmes was suggested
by some people (18 percent). About 18 percent of the respondents agreed about
establishing Islamic governance through Islamic laws in the country.
36
Beside mainstream survey respondents, in-depth responses have been collected through
open-ended discussion with a few groups of professionals known to have high levels of
understanding on the issues of terrorism and security. They suggested certain initiatives
that could be taken to fight against terrorism. These are the following:
“Preaching the correct meaning of Islam; more mass awareness programmes;
modernizing both mainstream and madrasa education system; practicing democracy
properly in order to minimize social inequalities; transparent and proper judiciary;
economic reform; creating employment opportunities for the youth; more effective law
and justice system; corruption and foreign cultural aggression should be effectively
fought; strengthening investigation mechanism; organization like CID needs to be more
active; modernizing law enforcement agencies”, etc.
37
4. GOVERNMENT RESPONSE IN COUNTERING TERRORISM
The government of Bangladesh has taken several steps to fight terrorism. These include a
terrorist monitoring cell, the proper interpretation of Islam, education and finance and
social development related programmes that encourage people to fight poverty. All these
initiatives have been taken to accelerate the government’s goal of uprooting terrorism
from the country.
However, according to a leading newspaper report, the activities of the terrorist
monitoring cell have somewhat slowed down. This monitoring cell was formed to ensure
the uninterrupted process of the war crimes trial. The issue of allocating about Tk. 10
crore to contain militant activities has not yet been resolved. The surveillance on the
enlisted Qawmi madrasas, militant groups and political groups also waned.24
The government has taken a long-term plan to deter the funding of terrorism and
militancy. Accordingly, a decision has been taken to amend the money-laundering act.
Bangladesh has applied for membership of the EGMONT group, an international network
of Financial Intelligence Units (FIU) with 117 member countries. Besides, steps have
been taken to improve the financial intelligence unit of the Bangladesh Bank. Software
and hardware equipment is being used for computerized analysis of data and information.
To improve the skills of the employees working in the FIU, they are being sent for
training inside and outside the country. The Bangladesh Bank has also issued notices to
all banks in the country to implement the regulations of the Money Laundering
Prevention Act 2009 and the Anti Terrorism Act 2009.25
There are about 50 international terrorists and militants who have been captured in
Bangladesh at different times since 2009. However, they cannot be charge-sheeted due to
lack of adequate evidence against them. Request was made to Interpol to help in
investigating their backgrounds. But there was no proper response from Interpol in this
regard. Bangladeshi agencies were also unable to carry out a proper investigation due to
legal complications and lack of adequate funds. As a result, these cases have remained
unresolved for some time now.26
Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina reiterated the importance of the initiatives in poverty
alleviation for eradicating terrorist and militant activities from Bangladesh and the region.
She said that poverty had the potential for continued terrorism and militancy. She
remarked that poverty and peace could not live together. The Prime Minister also stated
that it was important to establish democracy and human rights.27
24
25
26
27
The Daily Janakantha: 3 April, 2011
Jugantor: 9 May 2011
Sangbad: 10 May 2011
The Daily Star: 5 June 2011; Daily Naya Diganta: 5 June 2011; Jugantor: 5 June 2011; Prothom Alo: 3
June 2011
38
Rigorous programmes have been introduced in schools and mosques to deliver speeches
against militancy and drug abuse before assemblies and in Khutbas (sermons before
Friday prayers). A committee has been formed to report on the progress/monitoring of
these initiatives, as stated by the Education Minister.28
In order to provide functional evidences of terrorist acts and counter terrorism initiatives
taken by the Bangladesh government, the following table has been developed based on
newspaper reports during the period of July 2010 to June 2011:
Date of Events/
Source
3rd Aug, Prothom
Alo, 2010
4th Aug, Prothom
Alo, 2010
7th August,
Janakantha, 2010
New Age, 9 Aug
2010
10th Aug, Prothom
Alo, 2010
28
Recoveries/Terror
Incidents/Acts
Arrested members during July 2010
– June 2010/Other Legal Measures
JMB member named Kalim Uddin
alias Kalim was arrested in Bagmara
3 suspected members of Hizb-ut
Tawhid were arrested in Nilphamari
A task force comprised of all
intelligence agencies of the country,
interrogated Bhagne Shahid, the
organizational chief of JMB. Under
interrogation, he stated that a suicide
squad of 50 members had been
making plans for terror attacks in
different parts of the country to stop
the war crimes trial. They have
targeted seven sensitive places and
important persons. He further
informed that a former M.P. of
Jamaat, Syed Abdullah Mohammad
Taher, is functioning as the
coordinator of JMB, HuJi, Hizbut
Tahrir and Jamaat Shibir.
A Gopalganj court granted the
Criminal Investigation Department
seven days to interrogate Harkatul
Jihad-al-Islami chief Mufti Abdul
Hannan in a case related to the
explosion at the Baniarchang Catholic
Church. The case details stated that
ten young Christians were killed and
over fifty others were injured in a
bomb attack at the Church in
Maksudpur upazila on June 3, 2001
when the weekly prayers were
underway
There was a report that 3 members of
JMB, including wife of JMB’s leader
Siddikul Islam alias Bangla bhai, were
The Independent: 8 may 2011; Prothom Alo: 9 May 2011
39
Outfit
JMB
Hizb-ut
Tawhid
JMB
Harkatul
Jihad-alIslami
JMB
Date of Events/
Source
Prothom Alo, 11
Aug 2010; Jugantor,
10 Aug 2010; The
Independent, 10
Aug 2010; The
Daily Star, 11 Aug
2010
12th Aug, Prothom
Alo, 2010
12th Aug, New Age;
13th Aug, Samakal,
2010
13th Aug, Prothom
Alo; 14th AugNaya
Diganta, Samakal,
The Independent,
2010
14th Aug, Jugantor;
15th Aug, The Daily
Star, 2010
16th Aug, Prothom
Alo; 17th Aug,
Samakal, 2010
19th Aug, Prothom
Alo, Jugantor; 20th
Aug, Naya Diganta,
Janakantha, 2010
21st Aug, Prothom
Alo, 2010
21st Aug, The
Independent, 2010
22nd Aug, Samakal,
2010
Jugantor, 24 Aug,
2010
31st Aug, Prothom
Alo; 1st September,
Ittefaq, The Daily
Star, 2010
Recoveries/Terror
Incidents/Acts
Arrested members during July 2010
Outfit
– June 2010/Other Legal Measures
sentenced to twenty years of
imprisonment under the ‘Explosive
Materials Act
Five JMB militants were sentenced to JMB
life imprisonment in Bogra by the
CMM court in relation to the 17th
August 2005 bomb blasts
3 activists of Hiz-but Tahrir were Hiz-but
arrested in Chittagong
Tahrir
Top JMB leader Yanus Ali was JMB
arrested from Atrai
2 student members of Hiz-but Tahrir Hiz-but
were arrested from Chittagong Tahrir
University of Engineering and
Technology
2 members of Hiz-but Tahrir were Hiz-but
arrested from Sylhet.
Tahrir
2 members of Allahr Dal were Allahr
arrested from Gaibandha, Sadullahpur Dal
Regional Commander of JMB, JMB
Hemayet Hossain Himu was arrested
from Atrai, Naogaon
A JMB militant was arrested in
Mymensingh
An absconding member of JMB was
arrested in Sholakia
A member from HIz-but Tahrir was
arrested from Brahmanbaria
Police arrested the Jamayat-e Islami
Amir, Mawlana Matiur Rahman
Nijami, and sent him to prison on a
case filed under the anti-terrorism
law. He was arrested on the basis of
evidence
gathered
from
the
confessions of JMB leader Mawlana
Saidur Rahman
9 suspected youths including district
commander, Saiful Islam of Allahr
Dal were arrested in Shariatpur
40
JMB
JMB
Hiz-but
Tahrir
JMB
Allahr
Dal
Date of Events/
Source
Prothom Alo, 31
Aug 2010; New
Nation, 1 Sept 2010;
The Daily star, 1
Sept 2010
Recoveries/Terror
Incidents/Acts
The Independent, 3
Sept 2010
Jugantor, 4 Sept
2010; The
Independent, 6 Sept
2010
6th Sept, The
Independent, 2010
14th September,
Samakal, The
Independent,
Janakantha; 15th
September, New
Age, The Daily Star,
2010
18th Sept, Ittefaq;
19th Sept, Samakal,
New Age, 2010
22nd Sept, Samakal,
The Independent,
2010
23rd Sept, The
Independent, 2010
Police found a
sophisticated 7.6
mm pistol, 2
magazines and 1
round of bullets
from a JMB
member, Mr.
Moktar Hossain,
arrested from
Daulatdia ferry
terminal
Arrested members during July 2010
Outfit
– June 2010/Other Legal Measures
A Nilphamari Court, in two separate JMB
cases, sentenced nine militants of
Jama’atul Mujahedin Bangladesh
(JMB) for twenty years rigorous
imprisonment under Arms and
Explosive Act
Dhaka CMM Court formed charges Hiz-but
against four persons, including Hiz- Tahrir
but Tahrir chief coordinator Professor
Mohiuddin Ahmed, in a case filed
under Anti-Terrorism Act
JMB
Mr. Ali Ahmed (28), a former
member of Islami Chhatra Shibir,
student outfit of Jamaat-e-Islami, now
an active member of Hiz-but Tahrir,
revealed in interrogation that many
activists of Hiz-but Tahrir (HT) had
gone underground following the
banning of the organization. Police
also found several copies of the draft
constitution of HT in his possession
which pleaded for setting up an
Islamic state in Bangladesh
6 members of Hizbul Mahdi were
arrested
in
Barkal
Upazilla,
Rangamati, Chittagong Hill Districts
Hiz-but
Tahrir
Hizbul
Mahdi
A member of Allahr Dal was arrested Allahr
in Jaipurhat
Dal
An activist of JMB was arrested in JMB
Rupganj, Narayanganj
There was a report that CID arrested HUJI
HUJI leader Mufti Mainuddin alias
41
Date of Events/
Source
24th Sept, Prothom
Alo; 25th Sept, The
Independent,
Janakantha, 2010
26th Sept, Prothom
Alo; 27th Sept,
Samakal, Jugantor,
The Independent,
New Age, The
Daily Star, 2010
27th Sept, Jugantor,
New Age; 28th Sept,
Prothom Alo, Naya
Diganta, Samakal,
The Independent,
2010
28th Sept, Jugantor,
2010
Prothom Alo, 29th
Recoveries/Terror
Incidents/Acts
Arrested members during July 2010
Outfit
– June 2010/Other Legal Measures
Abu Jandal and took him on remand
for 5 days. In interrogation, he
repeatedly revealed the name of
Abdus Salam Pintu who was the
mastermind behind the grenade attack
on Awami League’s (AL) rally on
Bangabandhu Avenue in Dhaka on
August 21, 2004. Pintu was a deputy
minister of the four-party alliance
government at that time.
2 members of Hiz-but Tahrir were Hiz-but
arrested from Gazipur, Dhaka
Tahrir
7 activists including 4 women of Hiz- Hiz-but
but Tawhid were arrested in Rajshahi
Tawhid
4 suspected members of Hiz-but
Tahrir were arrested from Dhaka city
It was reported that
Hiz-but Tahrir,
after being banned
by the Government
of Bangladesh,
started functioning
under the banner
of Hiz-but Tauhid
using the
organizational
infrastructure of
that militant outfit.
It was also
reported that they
were recently
recruiting female
members in their
propaganda
activities to
encourage general
people to join their
group.
Hiz-but
Tahrir
Hiz-but
Tahrir
The local operational commander of JMB
42
Date of Events/
Source
Sept 2010
Recoveries/Terror
Incidents/Acts
Prothom Alo, 30
Sept 2010; Samakal,
30 Sept 2010; The
Independent, 30
Sept 2010
1st Oct, Samakal,
2010
2nd Oct, The
Independent, The
Daily Star, 2010
2nd Oct, Samakal;
20th Sept, Samakal,
22nd Sept, Jugantor,
2010
Samakal, 3 Oct
2010; The
Indeendent, 2 Oct
2010; New Age, 3
Oct 2010; New
Arrested members during July 2010
Outfit
– June 2010/Other Legal Measures
JMB, Mr Mezbaul Haque alias
Hockey Bipul, and his father were
incarcerated from Bagmara in
Rajshahi.
Mr. Jahid Hosain alias Babu was
arrested in connection with carrying
out bomb attacks at Barisal on 17th
August 2005. In addition to this case,
twelve other cases were filed against
him due to various allegations relating
to terrorism. He, therefore, was also
sentenced
to
90
years
of
imprisonment.
Mawlana Sohel Mahfuz, one of the JMB
founding Shura members of JMB was,
appointed as the new Amir of JMB
after Mawlana Saidur Rahman had
been arrested. He had been hiding out
in India for a long time before he took
his position as the Amir. Intelligence
sources said that, staying in Sylhet, he
had been trying to operate JMB’s
strategies. He already marked Dhaka
as their base and appointed a branch
Amir for Dhaka.
2 activists of Hiz-but Tawhid were Hiz-but
arrested in Rajshahi
Tawhid
The second in command of Mufti
Hannan and Huji leader, Mufti
Mainuddin
alias
Abu
Jandal,
confessed in interrogation by CID,
that Ivy Rahman was killed by the
grenade thrown by him. He stated that
he collected these grenades from
Mawlana Tazuddin who is the
younger brother of Abdus Salam
Pintu. He also said that he led a 12
member team on that day for the
attacks. He further confessed that an
influential faction of the then coalition
government and several prominent
intelligent officers facilitated this
horrific attack behind the scene.
Three members of
JMB, including the
Divisional Chief of
Dhaka, Mr.
Shariful Islam
JMB
43
Date of Events/
Source
Nation, 3 Oct 2010;
The Daily Star, 3
Oct 2010; Prothom
Alo, 4 Oct 2010
Recoveries/Terror
Incidents/Acts
Likhan alais Rana,
were arrested
along with a huge
quantity of
explosives from
Savar on the
outskirts of the
capital. The other
two arrestees were
Ehsar (fulltime)
member Mr.
Sahinul Islam alias
Belal, and Gayebi
Ehsar (part-time)
member Mr.
Shahinur Rahman
Babul. The Rapid
Action Battalion
also seized eight
petrol bombs, a
huge quantity of
explosive
substances,
including boric
power, a revolver,
batteries, wires and
books on jihad
from their
possession. The
Battalion officials
claimed that the
terrorists were
planning attacks at
various places
including Dhaka
with the purpose of
reviving the group
by publicizing
their activities and
existence. Upon
primary
interrogation, it
was revealed that
Shariful Islam was
the warrant second
in command of
JMB and a
convicted criminal
of the 17 August
Arrested members during July 2010
– June 2010/Other Legal Measures
44
Outfit
Date of Events/
Source
Recoveries/Terror
Incidents/Acts
2005 bomb blasts.
A Dhaka Court
approved eight
days remand in
two separate cases
under AntiTerrorism Act and
Arms and
Explosive
Substances Act
1908.
4th Oct, Prothom
Alo; 5th Oct
Samakal,
Independent, 2010
5th Oct, Prothom
Alo; 6th Oct, Naya
Diganta, Samakal,
New Age, 2010
Naya Diganta, 6 Oct
2010
5th Oct, Prothom
Alo; 6th Oct, Naya
Diganta, Samakal,
New Age, 2010
Samakal, 6 Nov
Four figuitives of
2010; Janakantha, 6 JMB’s Gayebe Ehsar
Nov 2010
members were
arrested from a
residential hotel at
Tongi by the
members of law
enforcement agencies
and recovered nine
bombs, two daggers
and thirteen jihadi
books from their
possession.
Arrested members during July 2010
– June 2010/Other Legal Measures
Outfit
3 Pakistanis were arrested as Lashkarsuspected members of Lashkar-i- i- Taiba
Taiba in Dhaka
An activist of Lashkar-i- Taiba was Lashkararrested in Dhaka
i- Taiba
Government has decided to provide
training for Sixty Four (32 males and
32 females) members of Ansar and
VDP on countering terrorism through
the Islamic Foundation. The training
would be provided in light of two
objectives. After having trained, it is
expected that they would help in
training other members of their forces.
Later, they will also build awareness
among the general people with an aim
to obtain information on militant
activities from the grassroots level.
A Pakistani member of Hizbul Hizbul
Mujahidin was arrested in Dhaka
Mujahidin
JMB
45
Date of Events/
Source
Prothom Alo, 7 Oct
2010
Recoveries/Terror
Incidents/Acts
9th Oct, Prothom
Alo; 10th Oct,
Samakal,
Janakantha, 2010
14th Oct, The
Independent; 6th
Nov, Samakal, 2010
Prothom Alo, 14
Oct 2010
Arrested members during July 2010
– June 2010/Other Legal Measures
Eight members of Hiz-but Tauhid,
arrested in Rajshahi, were taken on
remand for 3 days.
RAB officials arrested two Lashkar-iTaiba members from Abdullahpur,
Tongi, and Dhaka. The arrestees were
- Wajed Khan alias Zafar alias
Salman, a Pakistani citizen and bomb
specialist of LeT, and Mr. Abu Bakar
Siddik. RAB officials said that they
arrested these terrorists upon getting
information from another Lashkar
member, Maulana Imran, arrested
earlier.
Outfit
Hiz-but
Tauhid
Lashkari-Taiba
It was reported that
the Hiz-but Tauhid
had been carrying
out campaigning
programmes in
southern regions of
the country
including
Jhalakathi,
Pirojpur and
several other areas.
They selected
remote areas for
their campaigning
programmes,
including door to
door campaigns at
the grass roots
levels to motivate
the local people to
join their cause of
establishing
Islamic law in
Bangladesh. The
activists of Hizbut
Tauhid are offering
many opportunities
to poor villagers as
well as using
religious notions
and quotations for
attracting them in
their parties.
Two Members of Huji, Abdul Malek HUJI
alias Golam Mohammad and Shafi
46
Date of Events/
Source
Samakal, 17 Oct
2010
Recoveries/Terror
Incidents/Acts
Arrested members during July 2010
– June 2010/Other Legal Measures
alias Samiullah alias Moshtak were
sent to prison after completing two
days remand. RAB filed a case against
them under Article 11 of Antiterrorism Act-2009
It was reported that
five militants,
using fake
identities, were
taking driving
lessons from the
Bangladesh
Technical School
under UCEP
(Under Privileged
Children
Educational
Programme) at
Mirpur in Dhaka.
After six months
of training, they
suddenly stopped
attending classes.
When the school
authority tried to
reach their contacts
to find out the
reason of their
absence, it was
eventually found
that they had given
false identities.
Later, Detective
Branch of Dhaka
Metropolitan
Police found that
they were, indeed,
dangerous
terrorists who built
a terrorist base at a
house in North
Bishil of Shah Ali
thana in Dhaka
where they
gathereda huge
number of jihadi
books, a SMG, live
grenades, shells for
making grenades, a
47
Outfit
Date of Events/
Source
Prothom Alo, 14
Dec 2010; Prothom
Alo, 16 Dec 2010
The Daily Star, 14
Dec 2010
Recoveries/Terror
Incidents/Acts
loaded pistol, gun
powder, formula
for making bombs
and huge amounts
of explosives
RAB officials
captured twelve
HUJI members
from Hathajari and
Rangamati and
recovered a lot of
books on training
and ideology of the
militants, maps for
carrying out
terrorist attacks,
cocktails, bomb
making materials
and electronic
circuits. In this
connection, RAB
officials also
arrested the
Chairman of a
faction of Islami
Oikyjote, Mufti
Mohammad
Izaharul Islam
Choudhury, from
Chittagong on
allegations of
having connections
with HUJI
Arrested members during July 2010
– June 2010/Other Legal Measures
Outfit
HUJI
The Rapid Action Battalion raided a HUJI
hilltop training camp of Harkat-ulJihad-al-Islami (Huji) in Chittagong
and held five leaders of the banned
militant outfit with some training
materials and explosives. The
detained Huji operatives admitted to
RAB that they had been running
training camps in the hilly areas for
the last few months. With the help of
around 100 locals who gathered there
hearing the gunshots, the Rab
members held four Huji men, while
around 20 others managed to flee the
scene, said a RAB officer who led the
operation.
Intelligence
sources
48
Date of Events/
Source
22nd Oct, Prothom
Alo, 23rd Oct, New
Age, The Daily Star,
Independent,
Janakantha; 26th
Oct, Samakal, 2010
23rd Oct, Prothom
Alo, Independent,
2010
28th December,
Prothom Alo, 2010
4th Nov, Samakal,
2010
13th Nov, New Age,
Janakantha, 2010
16th Nov, Prothom
Alo; 20th Nov,
Samakal, 2010
22nd Nov, New Age,
2010
24th Nov, The Daily
Star, 2010
2nd Dec, Ittefaq,
2010
3rd Dec, Prothom
Alo, New Age, 2010
Recoveries/Terror
Incidents/Acts
Arrested members during July 2010
Outfit
– June 2010/Other Legal Measures
confirmed that Huji set up training
camps in the remote hilly forest areas
in the early 1990s and ran those till
the crackdown after the August 17
blasts in 2005.
3 members of Hiz-but Tawhid including Hiz-but
its district Amir were arrested in Tawhid
Chapainawabganj, Rajshahi
3 suspected members of Hiz-but
Tahrir were arrested in Sylhet
Hiz-but
Tahrir
JMB’s Ehsar member Shamim
Hosain, who was arrested from
Hathajari,
Chittagong,
by the
members of the law enforcement
agencies, confessed to the police that
some militants, including him, rented
a house at Hathajari for conducting
organizational activities of JMB. They
stayed at this house pretending to be
rickshaw pullers, masons and day
laborers. He also confessed that he
was one of the bomb specialists of
JMB and a case was filed against him
in 2008 under Anti-terrorism Act. He
had been a fugitive since then
2 members of Hiz-but Tawhid was
arrested in Uzirpur, Barisil
3 JMB members were arrested in
Satkhira
4 Hiz-but Tahrir activists were caught
in Chittagong
JMB
16 suspected JMB activists were
arrested in Gopalganj
1 Gayree Ehsar member and JMB
Leader, Abul Kashem were arrested in
Kurigram, Rangpur
9 members, including 2 women
activists and the district chairman
were arrested in Natore. They are the
members of Kalema Jamayet militant
group
JMB activist Maulana Obaidur Rahman
Ibne Abdullah, brother of Sheikh Abdur
R ahman, was arrested in Gopalganj
JMB
49
Hiz-but
Tawhid
JMB
Hiz-but
Tahrir
JMB
Kalema
Jamayet
JMB
Date of Events/
Source
5th Dec, Prothom
Alo; 6th Dec, New
Age, 2010
23rd Dec, Protham
Alo, Ittefaq, 2010
25th Dec, Prothom
Alo, 2010
Prothom Alo, 26
Dec 2010
1st Jan, New Age,
2011
3rd Jan, New Age,
2011
6th Jan, Ittefaq, 2011
6th Jan, Ittefaq, 2011
4th Jan, The Daily
Star, 2011
20th Jan, The Daily
Star, 2011
Recoveries/Terror
Incidents/Acts
There was a report
that Hiz-butTahrir,
a banned militant
outfit, had started
operating under
different names at
various
educational
institutions in
Bangladesh.
Earlier, this
organization used
to operate only in
the Madrasas and
orphanages across
the country but has
now expanded its
operational areas
particularly in
private universities
and English
medium schools.
Police found many
Jihadi books and
four bombs from
the house where
the JMB militant
was arrested
Leaflets, CD,
Books on Jihad
5 computers, 3
laptops, Jihadi
books, Training
guides and BDT.
65,000.
Leaflets, CDs,
Books on Jihad
Leaflets, CD,
Books on Jihad
7 books, 6 CDs, 70
leaflets
Huge quantity of
publications and
posters of Hizb-ut
Tahrir and 2
computers.
Arrested members during July 2010
– June 2010/Other Legal Measures
Outfit
Hiz-but
Tahrir
6 members of Hiz-but Tahrir were
arrested in Dhaka
4 female activists of Hiz-but Tawhid
were arrested in Barisal
Police captured a member of JMB
named Mr. Shamim Hasan from
Hathajari, Chittagong, when he tried
to flee after throwing a bomb at the
policemen. At least six other JMB
members fled from the scene.
Police arrested 3 terrorists in
Chittagong.
In Kalabagan, Dhaka, RAB arrested 4
JMB activists.
Hiz-but
Tahrir
Hiz-but
Tawhid
JMB
RAB-5 CT Cell Unit, Railway Colony
Camp Members arrested 6 terrorists in
Rajshahi.
RAB arrested 11 activists from
Chuadanga
Police arrested 4 activists from
Atwary, Thakurgaon
Police arrested 9 activists from
Dakkhinkhan, Hazaribagh, Ashkona,
Uttara of Dhaka.
Hiz-but
Tawhid
50
Hiz-but
Tawhid
JMB
Hiz-but
Tawhid
Hiz-but
Tawhid
Hiz-but
Tahrir
Date of Events/
Source
23rd Jan, The Daily
Star, 2011
Recoveries/Terror
Incidents/Acts
7 books on Jihad,
2CDs and leaflets
26th Jan, The Daily
Star, 2011.
Jihadi Books, CDs,
posters, leaflets,
calendars,
microphones,
loudspeakers
20 books, 19 CDs
26th Jan, New Age,
2011
1st Feb, The Daily
Star, 2011
Leaflets, books on
Jihad, CDs and
Calendars
4th Feb, The Daily
Star, 2011
9th Feb, New Age,
2011
11th Feb, Jugantar,
2011
12th Feb, The Daily
Star, 2011
18th Feb, New Age,
2011
18th Feb, The
Independent, 2011
22nd 23rd of Feb,
The Independent,
2011
25th of Feb, The
Independent, 2011
1st of March, New
Age, 2011
1st of March, The
Independent, 2011
4th March, The
Daily Star, 2011
5th March, The
Daily Star, 2011
11th March, The
Bomb making
materials and
bombs
Explosives, books
on Jihad
Jihadi books,
papers, CDs,
leaflets, and fake
BD currencies
worth 25,000 taka
Religious books,
CDs, leaflets
Jihadi books, CDs,
posters, leaflets,
calendar,
microphone,
loudspeaker
Books, CDs, 4000
leaflets
Arrested members during July 2010
– June 2010/Other Legal Measures
With the help of local people police
arrested 3 male activists from
Bhagnagarkandi in Singra of Natore.
With the help of local people police
arrested 11 men and 6 women
activists from Uzirpur, Barisal
RAB arrested 4 activists
Charghat, Rajshahi
Police arrested 2 activists
Chandpur
Outfit
Hiz-but
Tawhid
Hiz-but
Tawhid
from Hiz-but
Tahrir
from Hiz-but
Tawhid
A JMB activist was arrested on charge JMB
of abduction and extortion in
Bagmara, Rajshahi.
Police arrested 3 women activists JMB
from Mirbagh, Dhaka
RAB arrested 25 activists
Shirajganj
RAB arrested 2 activists
Alokdia, Sirajganj
from JMB
from JMB
Police arrested 2 activists from
Jhikargachha, Benapole.
RAB arrested 4 activists from Uzirpur
and Gournadi upazila, of Barisal
Hiz-but
Tawhid
Hiz-but
Tawhid
Police arrested 8 activists from
Shiddeshwari,
Dhaka
14 activists were arrested by the
Police from Jamalpur
Police arrested the JMB leader from
Naldanga, Natore, who was fugitive
and was a close ally of Bangla Bhai
Police arrested a terrorist from
Adabar, Dhaka.
8 member of a terrorist group was
arrested in Joypurhat and Dinajpur
2 activists were arrested by the RAB
in Elephant Road, Dhaka.
RAB-12 arrested a JMB activist from
Hiz-but
Tahrir
51
Hiz-but
Tawhid
JMB
Hizb-ut
Tahrir
Hiz-but
Tawhid
Hiz-but
Tahrir
JMB
Date of Events/
Source
Daily Star, 2011
11th March, The
Daily Star, 2011
30th March, The
Daily Star, 2011
30th March, The
Daily Star, 2011
2nd April,
Independent,
Janakantha,
Samakal, 1st April,
Prothom Alo, 2011
2nd April, The Daily
Star, 1st April,
Prothom Alo and
The New Age, 2011
5th April, The Daily
Samakal
16th April, The
Daily Star, 2011
Recoveries/Terror
Incidents/Acts
China made
7.62mm pistol, 15
gram ganja, 4
small packet of
heroin and 14
bottles of
phensidyle
A huge amount of
explosives, a
number of Jihadi
and militant books
Jihadi books,
Leaflets and CDs
According to the
local people,
arrestees used to
conduct Islami
dawat in different
places.
The activists were
pasting posters on
walls protesting the
government's move
to ban fatwa
(religious edict),
and demanding
cancellation of the
proposed Education
Policy and National
Women
Development
Policy, local people
said.
Arrested members during July 2010
– June 2010/Other Legal Measures
Bahadurpur, Bheramara of Kushtia.
DB police arrested 6 activists in
Kotalipara, Gopalgonj
Outfit
Police and BGB arrested 2 activists JMB
and discovered a training camp as
Safe Haven in Thanchi, Bandarban.
Police arrested an activist from Sadar
Upazila, Pabna.
RAB arrested 8 male and 2 female
activists from Baje Kajla, Rajshahi
city while holding their organizational
meeting. The arrestees are Mozaffar
Hossain Lala, Mizanur Rahman
Mithu, Razon Ali, Sharif Hossain,
Moniruzzaman
Milon,
Manik
Hossain, Nabizul Islam, Ashraf Ali,
Moriam Khatun, and Mina Begum.
RAB officials stated that all the
arrestees confessed their involvement
with the outfit and denied that their
outfit was banned.
Chittagong
Metropolitan
Police
(CMP) arrested 3 student activists
from Sholokbahar, Chittagong
JMB
Hiz-but
Tawhid
Hiz-but
Tahrir
Police arrested 4 suspect JMB JMB
members from Betagi, Barguna
Police arrested 5 activists from Nazrul
Avenue in Kandirpar, Comilla. They
were held on charge of anti-state
activities.
52
Jagrata
Muslim
Towhidi
Janata
(JMTJ)
Date of Events/
Source
26th April, The
Daily Star, The
Naya Diganta, 2011
28th April, The Daily
Star, The
Independent, 2011;
27th April, The Daily
Samakal, The Daily
Naya Diganta, 2011
19th May, The Daily
Star, 2011
24th May, The Daily
Star; 23rd May
Prothom Alo and
Jugantor, 2011
27th May, The
Independent,
Sangbad, Jugantor,
2011
Recoveries/Terror
Incidents/Acts
According to
RAB, the arrestees
rented a house near
Pachgona
Government
Primary School in
Ati Bazar area a
month ago by
disguising
themselves as
garment workers.
The law enforcers
also recovered
some CDs, a
bomb-making
manual and
organizational
books of the outfit.
Arrested members during July 2010
Outfit
– June 2010/Other Legal Measures
RAB arrested 2 activists including HUJI
acting chief Abdul Hannan Sabbir
from Pachgona Government Primary
High School in Ati Bazar area,
Keraniganj
RAB arrested the HUJI Chief Sheikh HUJI
Farid Ahmed alias Farid alias Rashid
from Tongi railway station area in
Gazipur.
A cache of fire
arms, explosives
and bomb making
materials, shutter
guns, a 9mm pistol
loaded with one
bullet, a revolver
and a pipe gun,
two live bombs,
half kg of
gunpowder, two
magazines,
cartridge making
equipment,
batteries of mobile
phones and eight
books on Jihad.
4 books on Jihad
RAB arrested a suspected operative HUJI
Abdul Alim from East Khajurapara in
Jhenaidah. Alim was taken to the Rab6 headquarters for interrogation.
The RAB members
also recovered 16
hand bombs, 24
cocktails, 41
RAB arrested Maulana Mohammad HUJI
Abdus Samad, Secretary of Sylhet
unit and Ashraful Islam, Secretary of
Iswardi Upazila Unit in Pabna from
RAB arrested suspected operative Md.
Obaidullah from Sadar Upazila in
Pabna
53
Date of Events/
Source
6th June, The New
Age and Prothom
Alo, 2011; 7th June,
The Daily Star and
The Independent,
2011
9th June, The Daily
Samakal, sangbad,
Jugantar, 2011
16th June, The Daily
Star, 2011
30th June, The daily
Star and The
Independent, 2011
3rd June, Prothom
Alo and 4th June,
The Independent,
2011
24th June, Prothom
Alo; 25th June, The
Independent and
The Daily Samakal,
2011
20th April, The
Daily Janakantha,
2011
16th June, Prothom
Alo and Jugantor,
2011
Recoveries/Terror
Incidents/Acts
grenade bodies and
other chemicals,
including nitric
acid, used in
making bombs.
28 Anti state
posters, 160
leaflets, 13
magazines and
Jihadi books
Jihadi books, 2
diaries
Arrested members during July 2010
– June 2010/Other Legal Measures
Nabi Nagar, Savar, Dhaka
Outfit
RAB arrested 27 activists from Hiz-but
Barakaw village of Kaliganj Upazila Tahrir
of Gazipur. On primary investigation,
they
confessed
about
their
involvement with the organization and
the intention to establish Khilafat by
abolishing the present ruling system.
Legal action against them was
underway as per the Anti-terrorist
Act-2009 for supporting and taking
membership
of
the
banned
organization, posing threat to the
sovereignty and security of the state.
4 young women were arrested by the
police from Eden College, Dhaka
Under the police operation 4 terrorist Banglad
leaders and activists were arrested esh
from Dhaka
Khelafat
Majlish
(BKM)
RAB arrested 2 activists from Hiz-but
Goalpahar area under Kotwali police Tahrir
station, Chittagong
Police arrested 2 activists from Hiz-but
Elephant Road, Dhaka.
Tahrir
Police arrested 3 activists from Shahi Hiz-but
Eidgah area in Sylhet city
Tahrir
520 rounds of
Bullets, Bomb
making devices,
Jihadi books
Jihadi books and
leaflets
BGB arrested 2 activists from
Manaipara at Thanchi Upazilla of
Bandarban
Police arrested 8 activists including 2
women and 2 children from Teknaf
and Shatkania, Chittagong
54
Regional and International Cooperation
In order to uproot terrorism, Bangladesh has not only become active within the country
itself but has also taken up initiatives with some neighbouring countries. Different survey
findings have clearly reflected that there have been strong international networks among
the militants, which enable them to act boldly and often visibly.
According to a leading newspaper report published in June 2011, the Bangladesh
government recommended that a counter-terrorism institute be set up in Bangladesh to
bolster anti-terrorism campaigns in its southern and south-eastern regions. Under the
South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), an agreement was signed
on "Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters"; however, a task force by the South
Asian countries is yet to be formed. Another "Agreement on Cooperation in Combating
International Terrorism, Organized Crime and Illicit Drugs Trafficking" was signed
under the BIMSTEC29. This is a regional organization comprising of some South and
South-East Asian countries. Under this agreement, there was a plan to set up a counterterrorism institute.30
SAARC has recently taken more initiatives to enhance regional efforts in the face of
increasing terrorism in the region. It has also been mentioned in newspapers that a
regional follow-up meeting has been scheduled to be held in Thimpu, Bhutan in the
following months among the concerned SAARC members with a view to increasing
cooperation in combating terrorism.31 The terrorism issue was taken into consideration
under SAARC over two decades ago. In the 1986 Bangalore Summit, all the heads of the
states unequivocally condemned all acts, methods and practices of terrorism as criminal
and deplored their impact on life and property, socio-economic development, political
stability, regional and international peace and cooperation, and recognized the importance
of the principles laid down in UN Resolution 2625 (XXV), which among others required
that each state should refrain from organizing, instigating, assisting or participating in
acts of civil strife or terrorist acts in another state or acquiescing in organized activities
within its territory directed towards the commission of such acts32. Moreover, an
additional protocol was mandated in the 11th SAARC Summit held in 2002 to strengthen
the SAARC Regional Convention on Suppression of Terrorism, 1987 particularly by
criminalizing the provision, collection or acquisition of funds for the purpose of
committing terrorist acts and taking further measures to prevent and suppress financing of
such acts.
Role of Concerned Groups of the Society
Beside general views of the respondents on combating terrorism, their discrete views on
different segments of the community people have been assessed in this survey.
29
30
31
32
BIMSTEC: Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation
The Independent: 17 June 2011
The Independent: 21 June 2011
SAARC Conventions, 1985-2007”. Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, New Delhi. p.45
55
Role of Families
Families have been identified to have a distinctive role in preventing their household
members from being associated with militant groups and other anti-social elements. Since
the activists were mostly found to be involved in religious extremism, respondents urged
upon the families to provide proper knowledge on this issue. Besides, it has also been
accentuated that every individual belongs to a family and, more or less, everyone has
weakness for their family members.
“Each terrorist is a member of a family. So, the role of the family is immense. The family
can play a major role in making their children aware of the dangers of going astray”religious leaders of Jamalpur, Dhaka, Jessore, Khulna, Lalmonirhat, Sylhet, and
Chapainawabganj held such a view.
“Families can protect their members by keeping them away from criminal activities like
highjacking, taking drugs, etc. Also, families are responsible for providing knowledge
about Islam so that children cannot be misled and also about the consequences of
terrorism”- respondents from Law Enforcement Agencies of Gournadi, Nilfamari,
Jhenaidah, Kurigram, Dhaka, Rajshahi, and Noakhali expressed this view.
Role of the Society
A number of issues have been raised by the respondents that could be addressed by
society for providing safeguards against the proliferation of terrorism. The proposed ideas
were: creating social values among people; involve the youth in awareness programmes;
preaching Islam in a proper manner; exchanging information explicitly regarding terrorist
activities; assisting law enforcement agencies through providing information about
terrorist activities. Forming an anti-militant committee was also recommended by some
respondents.
“A society in a particular area can play such a role so that no terrorist can enter into that
area to affect the people”- mentioned by the Imams of Natore, and Santhia of Pabna.
“An anti-militant committee should be formed with the consensus of the local people and
the information should be given to the police in case of any militant activities occurring
in that location”- Imam, Joypurhat.
“If the people are familiar with their particular area, no terrorist can be produced
there”- Law Enforcement Agency personnel of Barguna, Nilphamari, Jhenaidah,
Kurigram, Gournadi, Kushtia, and Pabna.
Role of madrasas
Since madrasas have often been linked with terrorists, strong recommendations have been
made for reforming the education system of madrasas. As per the respondents’
suggestions, madrasas can play an important role in countering terrorism by modernizing
their education system, providing proper education on Islam to the pupils, preventing
militancy training, and having an effective monitoring system.
“Make the students aware of misinterpretation of Islam”- opinions of Law Enforcement
Agency Personnel, in Nilphamari, Jhenaidah, Kurigram, Sylhet, and Khulna.
56
“Madrasa teachers are required to play an important role in giving proper guidelines on
Islamic knowledge” – said religious leaders of Demra, Dhaka; Jhenaidah.
Role of the Ulema
The Ulema consists of persons who are known to have expert knowledge of Islam.
Respondents stated that these intellectual personalities had a big role to prevent Islam
from being misinterpreted. The Ulema should take initiatives to remove any stigma
attached to Islam, such as it being perceived as a religion that accepts violence. The
following suggestions were made by respondents:




Discuss the evils of extremism in madrassas, mosques and with locals;
Hold regular monthly discussions with people in the community;
Deliver speeches condemning extremism;
Deliver lectures explaining the proper meaning of Islam.
Role of the People’s Representatives
Public representatives have a multi-purpose role to play, as identified by the KII
respondents of the survey. According to the respondents’ views, this group of people in
the society not only has the power of influencing the community people but is also in a
position to lobby at the policy implementation level. Some statements of the survey
respondents are given below:
“Public representatives can influence local people by gathering and mobilizing them for
anti- militant activities”- Religious Leader, Cox’s Bazaar.
“As the people’s representatives have close connection with the ministers, they can exert
strong influence on any decision to secure the society”-Public Representative, Jhenaidah.
“Representatives can take part in different activities with the general public to create
awareness in the society”- Public Representatives of Barguna, Naogaon, Mymensingh,
Sylhet, Habiganj, Gaibandha, Baniarchar, Noakhali, Khulna, Chapainawabganj, and
Chuadanga.
“Door to door visit for creating awareness is needed”- LEA Personnel of Rajshahi,
Nabiganj of Dhaka.
Role of the Youth
The youth, as the new generation of the society, can take immense steps in terms of
upholding the society as crime free and progressive, as mentioned by the KII
respondents. Respondents also viewed that the youth were the most inspiring segment of
the society who could effectively take part in the awareness programmes against
terrorism and other anti-social activities. Some statements of the survey respondents are
given below:
“If the new generation, the youth and the students are actively involved in antiterrorism
activities, it is easier to eradicate terrorism or crime from the society”- Public
Representatives of Barguna, Jhenaidah, Khulna, and Chapainawabganj.
57
“Role of the youth is desirable in any kind of activities in the society. If they step ahead in
this case, a terrorism free country could be visualized”- LEA Personnel of Barguna, and
Khulna.
Social Integration of Former Militant Activists
The survey respondents have not only opined to take action against extremists, they have
also provided some suggestions for those militants who have abandoned their violent
ideologies in their desire to be re-integrated into mainstream society.
According to the majority of respondents (81 percent), a strategy should be devised to
rehabilitate and integrate exmilitants
involving
the Figure 2.7: Suggestions about integration of the Exparticipation of civil society, Militants with mainstream society (%)
security and the justice system.
Eight out of ten people (80
100
percent) suggested for training of
such militants in vocational or
81.0
80.0
78.3
80
75.0
modern education. The third
71.7
majority of the respondents (78.3
62.0
60
Male
percent) favoured
providing
49.0
47.6
46.4
46.0
Female
42.6
profitable
employment
40
36.7
Total
32.4
31.9
32.0
opportunities. Three-fourths of
29.0
29.1
25.3
the respondents (75 percent)
20
supported the notion that local
people needed to be made aware
0
A
B
C
D
E
F
of the ex-militants’ rehabilitation.
Elderly citizens in the society
should have an important role in
the assimilation of ex-extremists in the society as suggested by 62 percent of the people.
About 23 percent of the people stated that the youths be the mentors in the integration
process.
[N.B: For Figure 2.7: A - Implementing a proper rehabilitation and unification strategy
through the civil society, security and judiciary system, B - Making the local people
aware of their rehabilitation, C - Providing profitable employment opportunities, D Helping them by using the youths as their mentors, E - Using the elders to help them to
get involved in the society, F - Educating them in vocational/modern education]
Need for Counter Terrorism (CT) Policy
In order to reinforce the country’s situation against militant activities, almost all the KII
respondents have opined for developing a comprehensive and coordinated strategy and
policy paper. As cited by a respondent,” There is a need for a comprehensive and
coordinating strategy and policy paper which can modify the law and help the resistance
of criminal activities. The new law would be introduced based on this paper”. Among the
other general respondents irrespective of their age, occupation, race and religion, 97
percent have supported the need for a national counter terrorism policy and strategy
58
paper. In terms of gender, 58 percent male and 39.4 percent female respondents agreed
that there was a need for such a policy. Some respondents of KII categories have viewed
that this paper would help to combat the terrorists and improve the strength of the law
enforcement agencies which would ultimately contribute to the improvement of the
society/community. It would also help in developing a working relationship between the
government and general public. Essential inclusion of stakeholders from the grassroots
level within the strategy paper has also been cited by the survey respondents.
In addition to the development of CT strategy and policy paper, religious leaders (Imams)
have recommended for a law that would prevent the misinterpretation of the teachings of
the Holy Quran and Sunnah.
59
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS
This survey presented the second phase of the project “Towards Developing a Better
Counter Terrorism Regime in Bangladesh” for the period 2010 – 2011. Since the
occurrence of a series of deadly terrorist attacks in the country, there have been several
measures taken at various levels of government to successfully combat terrorism. This
survey has however revealed that there are still some insecurities and risk factors
associated with the issue of extremism in the country.
According to survey findings, insecurity related to extremism has decreased compared to
the previous years. However, within certain communities, insecurities still exist in other
forms. A significant proportion (63 percent) of the respondents highlighted the issue of
eve teasing. Other issues mentioned included the narcotics use (over 74 percent), robbery,
hijacking and theft (80 percent), extortion (49.2 percent), politically motivated violence
(69.1 percent), and trafficking in women and children (15.2 percent). These findings
indicate that community development-related programs have immense influence on the
anti-violence efforts. The perpetrators of terrorism take advantage of the unstable
situation in communities and the country to easily recruit people into their groups. Other
survey findings have also reflected this conclusion. Respondents discussed the key
recruitment targets of militant groups, such as poor uneducated males (46.2 percent),
madrasa students (44 percent), educated unemployed youth (41.3 percent), people who
are truly sympathetic to extremists’ principles (35 percent), poor and uneducated people,
youth who want change in the society (25.1 percent), people who did not get legal justice
for their unfair sufferings due to criminal activities (24.2 percent) and the uneducated and
unemployed young females (14 percent). The government and the non- government
sector need to undertake appropriate measures in dealing with these factors in order to
successfully combat and defeat extremist militancy and terrorism in Bangladesh.
The present government’s commendable initiatives to uproot terrorism from Bangladesh
have been reflected in many cases. The government has achieved a great deal of success
in combating terrorism. However, it is believed that further steps are required nationally
and internationally to eradicate the menace of terrorism in Bangladesh. Therefore, action
is required against the strong network of militants who obtain funding from the Middle
East and several developed countries. The use of modern technology to carry out their
activities and maintaining networks have also been revealed here. It is understood that
banned militant groups are regrouping under a new leadership and with a newly adopted
strategy, which would curtail the government’s strong drive to apprehend them and
disrupt their networks.
About 50 international terrorists have been arrested and confined due to suspicion of their
dubious activities. However, these cases have remained pending for several years due to
complications at different levels including inadequate evidence, lack of funding in
carrying out investigations and other legal complications. There is therefore an immediate
requirement in taking urgent action to solve such cases to ensure proper justice.
60
The government of Bangladesh has been taking a series of initiatives to implement the
provisions of the Money Laundering Prevention Act 2009 and the Anti Terrorism Act
2009. Regional and international co-operation has also been established with a number of
countries to bolster anti-terrorism efforts in the country. Although no task force has been
set up yet, an agreement has been signed on "Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal
Matters" under SAARC (South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation). Under
BIMSTEC (Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic
Cooperation), an organization of some South and South-East Asian countries, another
agreement has been signed, namely as "Agreement on Cooperation in Combating
International Terrorism, Organized Crime and Illicit Drugs Trafficking". Under this
agreement a counter terrorism institute has also been planned to be set up in Bangladesh.
The government, civil society, madrasas and other educational institutions, religious
clerics and scholars of Islam, youth and members of the general public have an important
role to play in order to successfully defeat the scourge of extremism and terrorism in
Bangladesh. The role of the media was also widely mentioned as the most reliable and
accessible source of information. The government of Bangladesh may be said to have
used the Presenting Extremism Together (PET) approach, where the government works
with local communities and various other stakeholders in combating terrorism.33 Of
course, the Government needs to do a lot more on this.
Furthermore, through proper implementation of a national counter terrorism strategy and
policy, greater socio-economic development in the country may be achieved leading to a
vibrant, secular and just society where extremism and terrorism is rejected by all
members of society.
33
The Daily Janakantha: 3 April, 2011
61
APPENDIX TABLES
Table 1.1: Proportion of respondents provided opinion on crimes that occurred in their localities.
Types of Crimes
Male
Female
Politically Motivated
Yes
42.1
27
No
17.1
14
Tortured induced by ethnic conflicts
Yes
7.4
4
No
52
37.1
Religious Suppression
Yes
5
3
No
54.1
38.4
Crime/Torture/Extremism based on small arms
Yes
20.8
15.4
No
37.7
26
Crime/suppression emanating from self improvised explosives
Yes
6.8
4.6
No
51.9
36.7
Kidnapping and ransom
Yes
10.2
7.3
No
48.8
33.6
Extortion
Yes
28.9
20.3
No
29.9
20.9
Crime related to personal property (theft, robbery. High jacking)
Yes
46.2
33.8
No
12.4
7.7
Eve Teasing
Yes
33.3
29.6
No
24.6
12.5
Rape
Yes
14.3
9.6
No
44.7
31.4
Trafficking of Women and Children
Yes
7.6
7.6
No
51.2
33.6
Police Torture
Yes
10.6
6.1
No
48.4
35
62
Total
69.1
31
11.2
89
7.5
92.5
36.3
63.7
11.4
88.6
17.5
82.5
49.2
50.8
79.9
20.1
62.9
37.1
23.9
76.1
15.2
84.8
16.7
83.3
Table 1.2: Percentage distribution of respondents by their opinion regarding the situation
based on prevalence of injustice/crime/extremism/illegal acts as compared to the
previous year.
Indicators
Too high
Little increase
Huge decline
Small decline
Very little
Same as before
Male
4
7.9
6.3
25
4.7
10.9
Female
2.5
7.4
4.9
14.5
2.7
9.3
Total
6.5
15.3
11.2
39.5
7.4
20.2
Table 1.3: Proportion distribution of respondents’ opinion on the most frequent injustice /
crime/extremism/illegal that acts occur in their localities.
Indicators
Politically motivated
Tortures induced by ethnic conflicts
Religious suppression
Crime/torture/extremism based on small arms
Crime/suppression emanating from self improvised
explosives
Kidnapping and ransom
Extortion
Crime related to personal property (theft, robbery,
high jacking)
Eve teasing
Rape
Murder
Drug addiction/drinking
Trafficking in women and children
Police torture
RAB torture
Male
42.1
7.4
4.9
20.8
6.8
Female
27
3.8
2.7
15.4
4.6
Total
69.1
11.2
7.5
36.3
11.4
10.2
28.9
46.2
7.3
20.3
33.8
17.5
49.2
79.9
33.3
14.3
16.9
42.1
7.6
10.6
4
29.6
9.6
10.8
32.2
7.6
6.1
2.8
62.9
23.9
27.7
74.3
15.2
16.7
6.7
Table 1.4: Measurement of respondents’ fear of facing injustice due to crime / suppression /
torture in life (%).
Indicators
Not influenced at all
Influenced little
Highly influence
Don’t know/ Can’t tell
Male
7.9
39.6
7
4.3
63
Female
4.8
25.3
6.2
4.9
Total
12.7
64.9
13.2
9.2
Table 1.5: Types of injustice/crime/torture faced by the people (%).
Indicators
Politically motivated violence
Ethnic conflict
Religious / conflict motivated by
religious reasons
Torture using explosive
devices/materials
Extortion
Crime related to personal property
(theft, robbery, looting, high jacking)
Eve teasing
Rape
Murder
Drug addiction/drinking
Women and children trafficking
Police exploitation / torture
RAB exploitation/torture
In favor of reporting to the police in
case of facing any illegal activities
Male
23.4
2.8
2.3
Female
10
1
2.2
Total
33.4
3.8
4.5
1.3
.7
2
10.7
26.8
4.2
14.8
14.9
41.6
5.7
3.1
4
7.3
1.8
5.4
1.2
36
14.9
2.8
1.2
4
.4
2.5
.9
27.5
20.6
5.9
5.1
11.3
2.2
7.9
2
63.5
Table 1.6: Peoples’ perception about Militancy/Terrorism (%)
Perception of Militancy/Terrorism
Heard about Terrorism/ Militancy
Using Islam as a reason to cause
instability in the society, and causing fear
through anti-social and anti-state acts
(such as, bombing, excited behavior,
looting, murder, using arms, etc.)
Using Islam to steer people in the wrong
direction/giving people wrong concepts
Fighting against non-Islamic state
Male
57.6
52.9
Female
40.2
36.1
Total
97.8
89
49.2
32.1
81.3
11.1
10
21.1
Table 1.7: Name of Militant groups found to be active by the respondents (%)
Indicators
JMB
JMJB
HUJI
Allahr Dall
Hizbut Tawhid
Hibut Tahrir
Male
5.5
2.4
1.2
2.7
1.3
1.8
64
Female
4.1
1.3
.8
1.6
.4
.8
Total
9.6
3.8
2
4.2
1.7
2.6
Table 1.8: Common activities of the terrorists observed by the respondents (%).
Common activities of the terrorist activists
Giving dawat (special invitation) through
jihadi concepts
Murder
Extortion
Causing fear/terror
Torturing in various ways
Increasing/ Disseminating of
fundamentalism/radicalization
Increasing/disseminating of militancy
Giving jihadi training
Motivating in jihadi sentiments
Training in arms use
Teaching to hate other country/religion
Male
30.4
Female
15.8
Total
46.3
8.6
14
11.1
11.5
10.4
5.1
11.7
10.6
7.5
6.2
13.7
25.7
21.7
18.9
16.6
5.6
8.4
15.3
4
9.8
1.6
4
7.8
2.7
5.6
7.3
12.4
23.1
6.7
15.5
Table 1.9: Strategies followed by the terror activists in their dawat (%).
Indicators
Jihadi Books, Leaflets, CD, etc.
Door to door visit
Visit madrasas
In Mosques
Male
45.8
7.1
25.4
7.3
Female
27.7
5.3
14
5.3
Total
73.6
12.4
39.4
12.6
Table 1.10: Source of financing of the militant activists/groups (%)
Major Funding Sources
From their activists living in different wealthy countries in
the name of Islam
Donation from Muslim countries for NGOs
International Terrorist groups
Forcibly collect money from local people
Religious donation from local people
Male
33.1
Female
19.8
Total
52.9
32.6
41.8
14.6
12.3
18.5
23.6
9.4
9
51.1
65.4
24
21.3
Table 1.11: Major causes of women’s active participation in militancy (%)
Indicators
Male
Female
Recognized women participation in militancy
18.3
13.4
Reasons for being involved with militant groups by the women
Being relative or family members of the militant
29.6
18.6
activists
Being forced by their family to join the militant
18
11.5
groups
It is much easier to force the women to join the
13.5
9.3
groups than the men
Extremist male members force the females to
9.8
7.5
join the groups
Join the groups for receiving financial benefit
18.2
13.9
65
Total
31.7
48.2
29.5
22.8
17.2
32.1
Male
Female
Total
5.5
2.4
2.9
3.1
8.3
5.5
2.8
1.8
4.6
5.4
3
8.4
Male
26.2
9.1
19.1
22.4
7.8
5.3
3.5
14.3
Female
20
7.2
13.3
18.9
5.7
3.4
2.6
9.9
Total
46.2
16.3
32.4
41.3
13.5
8.7
6.1
24.2
14.1
11
25.1
25.4
19.4
18
15.2
43.5
34.6
10.7
7.3
18
Indicators
To bring change in the society through
establishing Islamic state
Because they do not get equal political,
economic and social rights in the present state
system
To gain acceptability/equal acknowledgement/
freedom of expression in regard to men
To increase women empowerment or to increase
their status in the eyes of their elders
Table 1.12: Categories of people involved with militant groups (%)
Indicators
Poor illiterate males
Poor illiterate females
Any poor and uneducated people
Educated but unemployed young men
Educated but unemployed young women
Educated males from wealthy families
Educated females from wealthy families
Those who did not meet justice from cases
like murder, rape, kidnapping, robbery,
high jacking, looting, etc.
Youth groups who are in favor of changing
the society
madrassa students (boys and girls)
Those who truly believe in the extremist’s
principles
Criminals and their followers had
involvement in criminal activities
Table 1.13: Motivation techniques followed by the militant activists (% of respondents)
Indicators
Influence and motivate in the name of Islam
Encourage people distributing leaflets
Encourage people to join their
meetings/discussions
Helping people through charity works
such as, providing food, employment,
giving money for wedding, etc.
Giving financial support
Alluring people by offering better life,
mobile phone, computer, etc.
66
Male
35.2
16.7
12.8
Female
25.5
12
9.6
Total
60.7
28.7
22.4
14
8.7
22.7
18.9
14
14.3
11
33.2
25
Criticizing the government and the
political system
Constantly trying to prove that they more
devoted to people’s welfare
Terrorizing people or enforcing them
12.7
8.3
21
4.2
3.5
7.7
10.7
5.5
16.2
Table 1.14: Terrorists’ usual movement and their increased level of activities (% of respondents)
Indicators
Male
Female
Can easily be defined/identified the terror
6.4
4.5
activists
Terrorist activities have increased a lot
4.9
6
A little increase
7.9
7.4
Same as before
18.1
16.3
Terrorism is threat for national life
56.2
38.4
Threatened areas of our life due to terrorism
Threat to national security
55.3
39.8
Threat to life and property of people
51.9
37.5
Threat to national image
52.4
32.3
Threat to democracy
44.9
28.5
Threat to the economy of the country
45.8
28.9
Threat to social security
50.4
37.7
Threat to social cohesion
42.5
28.3
Threat to social stability
49.8
31.5
Total
10.9
10.9
15.2
34.3
94.6
95.1
89.4
84.7
73.5
74.7
88
70.8
81.3
Table 1.15: Scope of posing threat at the level of national security and democracy (% of
respondents)
Indicators
Terrorism can threaten national security
and democracy through anti-social and
anti-state activities (such as, bombing,
looting, destruction, loss of life and
property, attacking state structure etc.)
Male
47.2
Female
32.1
Total
79.3
Terrorism hampers state sovereignty,
security, social and economic prosperity,
degrades the national image at
international level and in terms of human
rights.
Causes enmity among different ethnic and
linguistic groups
Destroys the image of Islam as a religion
Involves general and innocent people in
anti-state and anti-government activities
41.4
23.3
64.7
20.5
11
31.5
32.3
16.1
23.1
11.9
55.4
28
67
Table 1.16: Reasons to be involved in terrorism (% of respondents)
Indicators
Poverty
Using Islam to gain political ends
Wrong interpretation of Islam
Influence of regional and international
terrorism
Lack of democracy
Lack of education
Unemployment
Male
42.1
25.4
38.5
16.9
Female
31.2
14.9
24.3
12.1
Total
73.4
40.3
62.8
29
11.5
23.9
27.5
8.3
17.8
20.7
19.9
41.7
48.2
Table 1.17: Major sources of information about the militant groups and their activities (%
of the respondents)
Indicators
Male
53.8
16.6
45.7
7.4
17.8
3.3
1.4
TV
Radio
Newspaper
Internet
Heard from other people
Own experience
Have witnessed
Female
38.2
10.5
27.8
5.1
15.5
2.3
.8
Total
92
27.2
73.5
12.5
33.2
5.7
2.2
Table 1.18: Measures to tackle terrorism (% of respondents)
Indicators
Male
Female
Peoples’ awareness on terrorism
40.6
27.5
Few measures to tackle terrorism
By giving proper explanation of Islam
53.7
38.1
through the Imams
By amendment of madrassa education
44.8
30.2
Strengthening of the legislation and the
45
34.3
judiciary
Banning of student politics
15.8
14.2
Stopping corruption in different
33.9
25.4
government circles
Empowerment of people
31.2
22.5
Increasing public awareness. Such as
54.4
37.7
through various mass media and public
awareness programs
Don’t know/ Can’t say
44.4
52.8
68
Total
68.1
91.8
74.9
79.3
30
59.3
53.7
92.1
97.2
Table 1.19: Respondents awareness on anti-terrorism activities (%)
Indicators
Male
Area wise anti terrorism activities
19.5
Public awareness program undertaken by
26.2
the government or by the general public
Among those who observed the awareness programs
The law enforcement agencies have been
60.6
more strengthened
Forming a secured society by organizing
47.4
people through various awareness
programs
Expressing dislike for extremist groups
29
and bringing them under legal framework
Modernization of madrassa education
26.1
Providing employment opportunities
18.4
Establishing
various
recreational
12.3
organizations such as clubs, groups etc.
Employing community police
26.7
Establishing equal rights for both men and
10.6
women through reformation of shalish
Improving the law or judicial system
37.7
Nothing has been done
21.7
Anti militancy sermon in mosques
20.8
Female
10.4
13.8
Total
29.8
40
31.8
92.3
23.5
70.9
17.1
46.1
16.6
13.1
6.8
42.7
31.6
19.1
15.3
8.2
42
18.8
16
8.5
9.5
53.7
30.3
30.4
Table 1.20: Level of success of the law enforcement agencies (Police, RAB) in prevention of
terrorism (%)
Success level of LEAs in preventing
terrorism
A little
Quite successful
Completely successful
Male
Female
Total
24.8
9.9
.8
18.4
6.9
.6
43.2
16.8
1.4
Respondents opinion in favor of LEAs
effectiveness in relation to sharing
information between the local/general
people and the intelligence/ law
enforcement agencies for prevention of
terrorism
57.7
40.1
97.8
69
Table 1.21: Suggestions for the solution of the insecurity and violence caused by the extremist
groups (%)
Indicators
The law enforcement agencies must come
forward
The capacity of the law enforcement
agencies should be enhanced so that they
can handle any violent situation
Perpetrators of violence must be brought
under legal framework
Modernization of educational system and
making it more suitable for employment
Amendment of madrassa education
Increase employment opportunities
Making young generation aware of their
duties and responsibilities
Civil society must come forward and work
with security and judicial agencies
Move people away from violent paths
through introducing art and cultural
programs
Stopping student politics
Establishing Islamic governance system
through Islamic Sharia law
Stopping religion based politics
Arresting and punishing those involved
with extremist groups
Don’t know
Male
48.7
Female
32.2
Total
80.8
33.3
21.1
54.3
22.1
16.5
38.6
18.2
12.6
30.8
26.3
27.2
22.1
18.3
20
15.7
44.6
47.3
37.8
20.8
14.8
35.6
11.4
6.6
18
12.5
11.7
9.4
6
21.9
17.7
21
20.9
15.9
15.2
36.9
36.1
1.3
1.5
2.8
Table 1.22: Suggestions about integration of the Ex-Militants into mainstream society (%)
Indicators
Implementing a proper rehabilitation and
unification strategy through the civil
society, security and judiciary system
Making the local people aware of their
rehabilitation
Providing profitable employment
opportunities
Helping them by using the youths as their
mentor
Using the elders to help them get involved
in society
Educating them in vocational/modern
education
70
Male
49
Female
31.9
Total
81
46
29
75
46.4
32
78.3
42.6
29.1
71.7
36.7
25.3
62
47.6
32.4
80