Court File No. CV-14-10695-00CL ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE (COMMERCIAL LIST) IN THE MATTER OF THE COMPANIES'CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED AND IN THE MATTER OF A PROPOSED PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR ARRANGEMENT WITH RESPECT TO U.S. STEEL CANADA INC. NOTICE OF OBJECTION April 14, 2015 Paliare Roland Rosenberg Rothstein LLP 155 Wellington Street West, 35th Floor Toronto, ON M5V 3H1 Ken Rosenberg (LSUC #21102H) Email: [email protected] Lily Harmer(LSUC #31880T) Email: lily.harmerapaliareroland.com Gordon Capern (LSUC #32169H) Email: gordon.capernapaliareroland.com Tel: 416-646-4300/Fax: 416-646-4301 Lawyers for United Steel, Paper and Forestry, Rubber, Manufacturing, Energy, Allied Industrial and Service Workers International Union (USW) INCH HAMMOND Professional Corporation 500 — One King Street West Hamilton, ON L8P 4X8 Sharon L.C. White Email: [email protected] Tel: 905-525-4481 Fax: 905-525-0031 Lawyer for Local 1005 Local 8782 Attn: Bill Ferguson, President TO: THE SERVICE LIST NOTICE OF OBJECTION (USS Claims Approval Motion returnable on a date to be determined) A. OVERVIEW — SUMMARY OF OBJECTION 1. The United Steel, Paper and Forestry, Rubber, Manufacturing, Energy, Allied Industrial and Service Workers International Union ("USW") is an international trade union representing the interests of the active and former hourly workers at U.S. Steel Canada Inc.'s ("USSC") Hamilton Works ("HW"), and Lake Erie Works ("LEW"). The USW is working with Locals 1005 (HW) and 8782 (LEW) (collectively, the "Union"). 2. The Union is one of the most significant stakeholders in these proceedings. It represents workers, retirees, and beneficiaries of USSC's defined benefit pension plans sponsored by USSC (the "Pension Plans") (the "Beneficiaries"). Many of the Union's members will lose their jobs, pensions, and other postemployment benefits ("OPEBs") if United States Steel Corporation's ("USS") request that its non-contingent secured claim in the amount of USD$122,432,496.11 and its unsecured claims in the aggregate amounts of USD$127,805.815.36 and CAD$1,847,169,934.04 be accepted as proven claims pursuant to the Claims Process Order dated November 13, 2014 if granted. If allowed, USS's claims will improperly and inequitably displace the Union's and Beneficiaries' recovery on their legitimate claims. 3. The Union's Objection is based on a number of grounds: 1 (a) USS's secured claim is based on security interests effectively granted by USS to itself, at a time when there was no independent board of directors or advisors, for insufficient consideration, and in a manner which amounted to an improper preference and/or fraudulent conveyance; (b) a significant portion of USS's "debt" is really in the nature of equity and should be re-characterized as such. For instance: (i) much of the debt was incurred to acquire Stelco; (ii) USS completely controlled USSC; (iii) USS was the sole source of USSC's financing; (iv) USS provided commercially unreasonable interest and repayment terms; (v) USS had no reasonable expectation of repayment on the purported loans; and (vi) USSC was significantly undercapitalized throughout the years following its acquisition by USS; (c) USS has acted in a manner that is oppressive, unfairly prejudicial to, and unfairly disregards the interests of the Union's members in respect of all of USSC's obligations. USS has failed to: (i) comply with its obligations to the federal and provincial government to maintain and/or increase production levels; 2 (ii) make good faith efforts to run USSC as a viable business, managed in Canada; (iii) maintain the viability of the Pension Plans; and (iv) avoid incurring debts which would give USS repayment priority over USSC's other creditors or which would seriously dilute any recovery by them on their claims; (d) USS has engaged in business practices which breached legally binding undertakings it provided to the Canadian government, and which undermined USSC's ability to meet its obligations to the Beneficiaries. USS's conduct in this regard is in breach of fiduciary duties that it owed to the Beneficiaries by virtue of its role as administrator of the Pension Plans, including: (i) failing to meet its undertakings to the Canadian government with respect to production and employment levels; (ii) directing USSC's operations in a way which caused it to incur significant debts; (iii) diverting production from Canadian facilities to its American facilities; and (iv) locking out the Union's members in order to slow down Canadian production rather than for genuine labour relations purposes. 3 4. USS controlled USSC to further its own interests, to the detriment of USSC's business, its employees, pensioners, and other stakeholders. This conduct directly affects the validity of many or all of USS's claims. It would be inequitable to allow USS's claims in these circumstances, at the expense of USSC's other creditors, and in particular the Union and Beneficiaries. Its claims should be disallowed in their entirety, reduced, or subordinated to the claims of the Union and the Beneficiaries. 5. Given these fundamental issues with USS's claims and their significant impact on other stakeholders, it is crucial that these claims be tested through a robust process, on a full evidentiary record, prior to a determination of this Court as to their validity. B. PARTIES AND BACKGROUND TO THIS PROCEEDING 1. 6. USS USS is a publicly traded Delaware corporation. It is one of the largest integrated steel manufacturers in the world, with facilities throughout North America, Europe and South America. It operates integrated steel facilities, research and development facilities, tubular operations, and it also produces coke. 7 USS and a number of its related companies have filed 14 distinct claims against USSC (the "USS Claims") pursuant to an order of this court dated November 13, 2014 (the "General Claims Process Order)). The General Claims Process Order established a claims process for USSC to identify, determine, and resolve certain claims of its creditors. Paragraph 28 of that Order provides that the USS's claims 4 shall not be accepted or determined as Proven Claims without approval of this Court. 8. The Monitor is clear in its Seventh Report that it has merely checked the documentation and registration of the USS Claims. It has not reviewed "any other matters ....including without limitation the amount secured under the USS Security or the Priority thereof," nor has it considered "the potential application of equitable principles, doctrines or remedies that might be claimed to alter the rights created by written agreements." 2. 9. USSC USSC is a wholly owned subsidiary of USS. USSC and its subsidiaries operate and conduct most of their business from two large steel plants in Ontario: 10. (a) HW, located in Hamilton, Ontario, and (b) LEW, located in Nanticoke, Ontario. LEW also has a separate finishing facility. 3. 11. The Union USW is a trade union with approximately 750,000 members. USW's head office is in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. It is composed of 13 Districts, with three of those Districts in Canada. District 6 covers Ontario and Atlantic Canada and has more than 74,000 members and approximately 50,000 retirees. 12. Local 1005 is the bargaining agent representing workers at HW as well as the retirees and beneficiaries of USSC's HW defined benefit and defined contribution 5 pension plans. It currently represents approximately 8,250 active and retired members. 13. Local 8782 is the bargaining agent representing workers at LEW as well as the retirees and beneficiaries of USSC's LEW defined benefit and defined contribution pension plans. It currently represents approximately 785 active and retired members. 14. The USW appears on behalf of its members and retirees in all proceedings of significance under the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act ("CCAA") that affect its members, and in similar proceedings in the United States. In certain cases, some of the Locals also choose to be active participants. 15. The USW, with its then Locals, was a key stakeholder and an instrumental participant in the successful restructuring proceedings under the CCAA in 20042006 involving Stelco Inc. ("Stelco"), described below, which ultimately resulted in USS's acquisition of the I-IW and LEW facilities in 2007. At that time, the Union supported the steps which were taken by Stelco, the federal and provincial governments, and ultimately USS, to fulfill USS's representations that the Pension Plans were "safe" with USS. 4. 16. The Pension Plans USSC provides pension and retirement benefits pursuant to: 6 (a) registered non-contributory defined benefit pension plans, which include pension plans for Lake Erie Works employees (the "LEW Plans") and Hamilton Works employees (the "HW Plans"); (b) four group registered retirement savings plan arrangements; and (c) non-registered supplemental individual "retirement benefit contracts" and other supplemental non-registered retirement payments known as "retiring allowances". 17. USSC also provides OPEBs to former employees and their dependents, including drug and medical benefits. The total present value of future OPEB contingent liabilities is close to $790 million at August 31, 2014. 5. Stelco 18. Stelco, in events described below, became USSC. 19. Stelco was a publicly traded, Canadian-based steel producer, founded in 1910. Stelco produced a variety of steel products for customers in the automotive, steel service centre, appliance, energy, and construction industries within North America. It was one of Canada's largest steel producers and a competitor of USS. 20. On January 29, 2004, Stelco sought and obtained an order from the courts granting creditor protection under the CCAA. The CCAA restructuring process continued for two years, until March 31, 2006. 7 21. At the time, the USW represented in excess of 5,550 unionized employees working with Stelco and their affiliated companies as follows: 22. (a) Stelco Hamilton: approximately 3500 employees (Local 1005); (b) Stelco Lake Erie: approximately 1000 employees (Local 8782); (c) CHT Steel Company Inc.(now sold) 24 employees (Local 7024); (d) Norambar Inc.(now sold): approximately 350 employees (Local 6951); (e) AltaSteel Ltd.(now sold): approximately 280 employees (Local 5220); (f) Stelwire Ltd.(now sold): approximately 315 employees (Local 5328); and (g) Stelfil Ltee.(now sold): approximately 235 employees (Local 3258). The Union was actively engaged in the CCAA restructuring process. USW retained legal, financial, and actuarial advisors to assist itself and all of its affected Locals and their retirees. 23. On March 31, 2006, Stelco emerged from CCAA protection. Tricap Management Limited ("Tricap") acted as the USW financial advisor in the Stelco CCAA proceedings. Following an introduction by the USW, Tricap purchased the HW and LEW businesses. 6. 24. The Pension Plans in the Stelco restructuring At the time of the Stelco restructuring, Stelco's pension plans and OPEBs were underfunded in an aggregate amount in excess of $2.5 billion. The Union's 8 portion of the claim, together with other claims of the USW and its members, made the USW and its then locals the largest creditor of Stelco. 25. As part of the CCAA plan of arrangement under which Stelco emerged from bankruptcy protection on March 31, 2006, Stelco and the province of Ontario entered into a pension funding agreement (the "Pension Agreement"). The Pension Agreement was designed to transition Stelco from the provisions of the Pension Benefits Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.8 ("PBA"), which had exempted Stelco from the requirement to fund solvency deficiencies in the Pension Plans, to the general regulatory requirements of the PBA by January 1, 2016. Regulation 99/06 of the PBA (the "Stelco Regulation") came into effect in 2006, and will expire on December 31, 2015, following which the Pension Plans will be subject to the normal PBA funding regime. 26. The Stelco Regulation provides that USSC is required to contribute level monthly contributions to the Pension Plans. Currently, USSC contributes $70 million per year in the aggregate as required by the Stelco Regulation, in addition to the funding of any benefit improvements under each of the Pension Plans in accordance with the regular PBA funding regime. 27. The Pension Agreement was intended to ensure the financial security of the more than 12,500 retirees in the Stelco plans, as well as their spouses and dependents. 28. Pursuant to the Pension Agreement, Stelco made a special payment of $400 million on March 31, 2007. Stelco was permitted to fund the solvency deficit over 9 10 years, versus the usual requirement of 5 years. Payments of $65 million per year were to be made from 2006 — 2010, and $70 million per year from 2011 — 2015, with payments ceasing should the plan be fully funded prior to 2015. 29. The Ontario government also extended a $150 million loan to Stelco at a 1% interest rate. The Ontario government agreed that 75% of the $150 million loan would be forgiven if the Pension Plans were fully funded on a solvency basis by December 31, 2015. 7. 30. Steel-making facilities in the wake of Stelco's restructuring In 2007, HW was an integrated steel producer with a 445 hectare production facility in Hamilton. It produced approximately 2 million tons of semi-finished steel annually, and an extensive range of products, including world-class zinc coated steel on its "Z line". It had a coke plant, a blast furnace, a sinter plant, steelmaking furnaces, rolling mills, pickling machines, galvanizing lines, and cold finishing mills. 31. In 2007, LEW was an integrated steel producer located on a 640 hectare production complex in Nanticoke. It had been built in 1980 and USS described it at the time of its acquisition as the "newest and most cost-effective integrated steel facility in North America," producing 2.25 million tonnes of slabs and 3 million tonnes of high quality rolled coil. A significant upgrade of the LEW hot strip mill was substantially completed in 2006 that increased its steel-making capacity and expanded its hot strip mill. It had a blast furnace, a coke plant, steelmaking furnaces, a hot strip mill, and rolling and cold finishing mills. 10 32. HW and LEW were complementary facilities, and operations were coordinated between the two. LEW produced steel slabs and unfinished hot band steel, which could either be sold directly to customers or sent to HW for finishing. HW depended on LEW for steel slabs and unfinished hot band steel for its finishing, coating, and galvanizing operations. 33. HW and LEW were, and continue to be, major employers in their areas. Local 8782 and Local 1005 and their members are significant contributors to their local communities and economies. 8. USS acquisition of Stelco (a) 34. USS announces agreement to acquire Stelco On August 26, 2007, USS and Stelco announced that they had entered into an agreement pursuant to which USS, through a wholly owned subsidiary, 1344973 Alberta ULC ("134 Alberta"), acquired Stelco for approximately $1.1 billion. 35. On August 27, 2007, John Surma, CEO of USS, met with members of the Union at the Steelworkers Hall in Hamilton. Surma told the Union that USS had done its due diligence and had no problems with the Union's collective agreements, contracts, or pensions. (b) 36. USS's undertakings to the Government of Canada and representations regarding the Pension Plans USS's acquisition of Stelco was subject to the review and approval of the federal Minister of Industry under part IV of the Investment Canada Act ("ICA"). That 11 review and approval is intended to ensure that a proposed investment from a non-Canadian is likely to be of net benefit to Canada. 37. Under the ICA, applications must contain certain information, including a detailed description of the investor's "plans" for the Canadian business it proposes to acquire. 38. By letter dated October 10, 2007 (the "Undertaking Letter"), USS and 134 Alberta confirmed to the Minister that in consideration for allowing the acquisition of Stelco by USS, through its wholly owned subsidiary 134 Alberta, USS and 134 Alberta would perform the 31 undertakings which were set out in Schedule "B" to the Undertaking Letter (the "Undertakings"). 39. The Undertakings are legally binding commitments which can be enforced under s. 39(1)(e) of the ICA. Undertakings assure the Minister that the investor is legally committed to carrying out the investment in a way that is beneficial for Canada in light of the factors in the ICA and may relate to matters such as continued operations in Canada, participation of Canadians in the business, and employment in Canada. 40. The Union was involved in the consultations leading up to the Investment Canada application. 41. The Undertakings were significant to the Union, particularly those undertakings with respect to production and employment levels. Without those assurances, the 12 Union would not have been satisfied with, and would not have supported, USS's acquisition of Stelco. 42. USS and 134 Alberta undertook to increase annual steel production for a term of three years from the date of the completion of USS's investment (the "Term"): The Investor will increase the annual level of production at the facilities of the Canadian Business by at least 10% over the Term (excluding periods of interruption in production due to capital investment projects) relative to the average of the last three completed calendar years. (the "Production Undertaking"). 43. USS and 134 Alberta further undertook to maintain certain employment levels over the Term: Over the Term, the Investor will maintain an average aggregate employment level at the Canadian Business of not less than 3,105 employees on a full time equivalent basis if the bar mill continues to be operated or 2,790 employees on a full time equivalent basis if the bar mill is sold or closed. (the "Employment Undertaking"). 44. USS also gave certain undertakings with respect to the degree of Canadian control and management of the business in Canada (the "Canadian Control Undertakings"), including that: (a) The head office of USSC would remain in Canada; (b) Operational management in Canada would continue to be responsible for the day-to-day operations of the business, including: (i) Production; (ii) Staffing; 13 45. (iii) Safety and industrial hygiene; (iv) Facility planning & scheduling; (v) Human resources & employee relations; and (vi) Subsidiary & plant accounting and legal. Moreover, Gretchen Haggerty, USS's CFO, represented publicly that the Stelco pensions were "safe" with USS, in an article she wrote for the Hamilton Spectator, published on October 5, 2007 (the "Pension Representation"). She gave two reasons: (a) USS was unconditionally guaranteeing pension funding obligations at the corporate (i.e., USS as opposed to USSC) level. Thus, instead of having to rely solely upon Stelco's ability as a stand-alone enterprise to generate the cash necessary to meet pension funding obligations, Stelco's employees and pensioners could now look to the strength of the entire company to do so; and (b) USS was making an "extraordinary" payment of $32.5 million into the plans up front at closing, in addition to the pension payment schedule agreed upon by Ontario and Stelco. (c) 46. USSC is formed On October 31, 2007, USS announced that it had completed the Stelco acquisition. 14 47. On acquisition, Stelco changed its name to U.S. Steel Canada Inc. 48. Given USS's undertakings and representations, including that it would maintain employment, increase production levels, make capital investments in LEW and HW, and that the pensions would be "safe", as described above, the Union supported USS's acquisition of Stelco.' Without such representations, the Union would not have supported the acquisition. 49. As part of the Stelco acquisition, USSC became an indirect, wholly owned subsidiary of USS. (d) 50. The Beneficiaries'and the Union's reasonable expectations At the time of the Stelco acquisition, USS guaranteed Stelco's pension funding obligations with the province of Ontario, and agreed to make a voluntary contribution of $32.5 million to Stelco's Pension Plans at the closing of the investment (the "Pension Undertaking"). 51. The Beneficiaries and the Union had reasonable expectations, based on the Undertakings and USSC's fiduciary obligations pursuant to the Pension Plans, USS's other public commitments, and its public comments, that USS would cause USSC to: (a) comply with the Undertakings; (b) comply with the Pension Representation; While Local 1005 did not oppose the acquisition transaction as a whole, Local 1005 was concerned over amendments to the 2006 Plan of Arrangement that removed certain safeguards for pension funding. Local 1005 did not support the 2007 Plan of Arrangement. 15 (c) maintain and/or increase production levels at HW and LEW; (d) maintain and/or increase employment levels at HW and LEW; (e) make good faith efforts to run USSC as a viable business; (f) maintain the ongoing health and viability of the Pension Plans; and (g) not incur or place security on debts which would give USS repayment priority over or dilute repayment to USSC's other creditors. 52. The Union made significant efforts during the Stelco restructuring to ensure the future health of the Pension Plans. It expected that the Pension Plans would be protected based on Stelco's, and later USS's, assurances that the Pension Agreement would bring the plans to fully funded status by December 31, 2015, based on best estimate assumptions. C. USS FIDUCIARY DUTY TO PLAN MEMBERS 1. 53. USS's role as administrator of the Pension Plans USSC and USS are each administrators of the Pension Plans. As such, both entities owe fiduciary duties to the Beneficiaries. 54. USS has delegated administration and investment of certain of its pension and retirement plans to the United States Steel and Carnegie Pension Fund ("UCF") pursuant to a Board of Directors resolution and a Retirement Plan Administration Services Agreement between UCF and USS dated August 5, 2008. 16 55. UCF, a Pennsylvania corporation operating out of New York City, operates as an investment arm of USS. It is controlled by USS. 56. USS, through UCF and otherwise, administers pension, retirement, medical care, and other benefit plans for employees, both current and retired, of USS and USSC, including the Beneficiaries. 2. 57. USS owes the pension beneficiaries fiduciary duties by virtue of its administrator role USS and USSC, as joint pension plan administrators, owe the Beneficiaries statutory duties as set out in the PBA and other relevant legislation. 58. In addition to these statutory duties, USS, having assumed the role of administrator of the Pension Plans, owed the Beneficiaries fiduciary duties to: (a) act in the Beneficiaries' best interests; (b) avoid situations which created a risk that the USS and USSC could prefer their own financial interests over their duties to the Beneficiaries as administrator of the Pension Plans; (c) ensure that USSC, as plan sponsor, would be able to and did continue to ensure that pension payments were made when due; (d) advise the Beneficiaries should USSC become insolvent and no longer be able to meet its obligations as sponsor of the Pension Plans; (e) advise the Beneficiaries if any situation arose which put at risk the duties they owed to Beneficiaries, and resign as administrator; and 17 (f) avoid taking steps which would imperil the long-term viability of the Canadian business and, by extension, of the Pension Plans. D. USS HAS BREACHED ITS FIDUCIARY DUTIES 59. In breach of the duties it owed to the Beneficiaries, USS directed USSC in a way that has been ruinous to the USSC business and has undermined its ability to meet its funding obligations to the Pension Plans. USS, by virtue of its control of USSC, has prevented USSC from becoming a profitable business. 60. As described below, USS has diverted production away from USSC and towards its American plants, and instituted lockouts which resulted in the slowing down of production in Canadian plants, all in breach of the Undertakings, the Pension Representation, and its fiduciary duties to the Beneficiaries. 61. It is clear from these, and many other, decisions and activities, that USSC was not being run by its management and board, but at the direction of USS in Pittsburgh. These decisions and activities were directed by USS and were not in the best interests of USSC, the employees represented by the Union, or the Beneficiaries. 62. By effectively undermining USSC's business, USS has increased the amount of USSC's debt, diluting the Union's and Beneficiaries' claims against USSC. USS now attempts to recover the alleged debts owed by USSC in this proceeding, to the detriment of USSC's other creditors, including the Beneficiaries, and in further breach of the fiduciary duties it owes to the Beneficiaries. 18 1. 63. USS's control of Canadian operations from Pittsburgh Following USS's acquisition of Stelco, USS assumed control of USSC's enterprise. 64. In so doing, USS breached the Canadian Control Undertakings made to Industry Canada. 65. Though USSC's head office nominally remained in Canada, USSC effectively became a branch plant controlled by USS in Pittsburgh from that point forward. 66. USS controlled the members of USSC's Board of Directors. Between November, 2007 and December, 2013, a majority of USSC's Board of Directors was controlled by USS. 67. USS controls all senior management at USSC. All senior managers are located in Pittsburgh, not in Canada. Any managers located in Canada are required to obtain approval from USS prior to taking any material action or decision, and sometimes even minor actions and decisions. 68. USS controls USSC's human resources, including: (a) payroll; (b) hiring employees; (c) firing employees; (d) discipline; 19 69. (e) promotion; and (f) health and safety. All human resources policies, including health and safety policies, came out of Pittsburgh, regardless of whether they were appropriate in the Canadian context and under Ontario law. 70. When Locals 1005 and 8782 were engaged in collective bargaining with USSC, senior executives and managers from USS represented USSC. 71. Other key functions of the company are performed by USS in Pittsburgh, including control over: (a) (b) Customers, including: (i) sales teams; (ii) recruitment; (iii) retention; Products, including: (i) order books; (ii) purchasing; (iii) where particular work was done; (iv) order of manufacture; 20 72. (v) final destination; (vi) pricing; (c) Capital projects (new projects and repairs); and (d) Day to day matters, including: (i) approval for reimbursement of even small amounts; and (ii) IT support. USS has had virtually complete control over USSC's operations and was and is able to run it entirely for the benefit of USS, without regard to other stakeholders' interests or to the fiduciary duties it owed and continues to owe the Beneficiaries. At all relevant times, USS has been USSC's alter ego. 2. 73. 2008: USS begins to decrease production in Canada At the time USS acquired control of USSC, HW's and LEW's operations were integrated. LEW was originally built to be a facility which would complement production at HW and which in turn would be complemented by operations at HW. 74. In November and December 2007, at the time USS took control, USS's Canadian operations produced 490,000 tons of steel. 75. Beginning in 2008, USS caused USSC to begin to decrease production and redirected work to its U.S.-based plants. 21 76. In November 2008, USS shut down the blast furnace at HW and cut almost 700 of its 1,700 hourly workers. 77. USS failed to meet its obligations under the Production Undertaking for 2008. In 2008, USSC produced approximately 3.9 million tons of steel, which was roughly equal to the previous benchmark level of 3.95 million. Under the Production Undertaking, USS had agreed to increase annual production to 10% above the benchmark level. 3. 78. 2009: Work is shifted to U.S. plants / "Buy American" On March 3, 2009, USS announced it was putting 1,500 USSC employees out of work by idling: 79. (a) the finishing and coking operations at HW; and (b) the steelmaking and finishing operations at LEW. USS provided no justification for idling the LEW. USS had described the LEW facility as the "most modern integrated steel plant in North America" in its press release at the time of the Stelco acquisition. 80. As a consequence of idling production, USS failed to comply with the Employment Undertaking. 81. With production idled at HW and LEW, USS began shifting production to its American plants, and sending products to the United States for manufacturing. It began transferring USSC-produced coke from HW to its American facilities for conversion into steel products. Although USS claimed that the shutdowns were 22 temporary, it gave no indication as to when or if the plants would resume production. 82. During the period the HW and the LEW were closed, USS served its Canadian customers with steel from its American plants, virtually all of which could have been produced by USSC. 83. At that time, USS continued to produce steel at the Mon Valley Works near Pittsburgh, the Gary Works in Gary, Indiana, and the Fairfield Works near Birmingham, Alabama. It sold that steel to customers in, among other places, Canada. 84. USS announced that it was "restarting" HW in July 2009 and recalled about 850 Local 1005 members. Despite this announcement, steelmaking and finishing operations remained idled, and only the coke facility continued to operate. Employees who would normally be producing steel were not producing steel: they were told to clean, pick weeds, paint, and engage in other activities unrelated to the production and refinement of steel. USS recalled the Local 1005 workers for the sole purpose of avoiding its obligations under the Employment Standards Act regarding severance pay. 85. USS's decision to shift production from its Canadian plants to its American plants from 2009 forward was influenced by the company's desire to take advantage of "Buy American" provisions in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act ("ARRA"), which was signed into law in the United States in February 2009. 23 86. Section 1605 of the ARRA provided that for any ARRA-funded project requiring the construction, alteration, maintenance, or repair of a public building or public work, 100% of the iron, steel, and manufactured goods used in the project had to be produced in the United States. 87. Through the conduct described in this Objection, USS undermined the complementary and profitable operations at LEW and HW, contrary to the best interests of USSC and its Canadian stakeholders. USS undermined the integrated nature of USSC's operations, resulting in a loss of the business advantages USSC enjoyed, and loss of the related profits. Its conduct distorted and diminished the value and profitability of USSC. 88. USS knew, or should have known, that preferring the interests of its United States operations over its Canadian operations would result in continued breaches of the Undertakings, would have a devastating financial impact on USSC and on the Pension Plan and the Beneficiaries, and would frustrate the expectations of the Union and the Beneficiaries. 4. 89. 2009 LEW Lockout Local 8782 had never been locked out or shut down until USS locked out unit members in August, 2009. 90. Local 8782's contract with USS expired on July 31, 2009. Bargaining between Local 8782 and USS had begun in May 2009. USS had assured the Union and Local 8782 that it was not seeking "deep cuts". 24 91. Then, 30 hours prior to the lockout deadline, and contrary to its representations, USS demanded extensive, deep, across the board concessions. The concessions sought by USS were unnecessary and out of proportion to the economic circumstances facing the company. USS's proposed reductions were at direct odds with an intention to remain in the Canadian steel industry in the long term, and reflected a lack of interest in complying with the Undertakings and its fiduciary duties, or in acting in a manner consistent with the Union's and Beneficiaries' reasonable expectations. 92. On August 3, 2009, USS locked out the 150 workers who remained at LEW throughout the layoffs, in addition to the approximately 850 members of Local 8782 who were already laid off when USS locked its gates. 93. USS locked out its workers in order to slow down production at Canadian plants and divert production to its American plants, rather than for genuine labour relations reasons. 94. Indeed, USS restarted slab production at HW in August 2009, at the same time as USS locked out unit members at LEW. 95. With the lockout of LEW bargaining unit members, the slabs that HW produced at HW were either sold as slabs or sent to various USS plants in the United States for finishing. Further, HW did not receive coils from the LEW hot strip mill for processing. Whatever coils HW processed during this period were from other USS plants. Very rarely did the finishing end of the HW operation run at capacity or even close to capacity. 25 96. It was evident that USS had no intention of operating HW at full capacity. Indeed, since 2009, it has never operated HW at full capacity. 97. USS's lockout of Local 8782 lasted for 8 months, until April 2010. 5. 98. 2010 Hamilton Works lockout The HW collective agreement expired on July 31, 2010. On October 1, 2010, while contract negotiations were underway, USS announced that it was shutting down all steel making operations at HW. 99. On November 2, 2010, USS dictated its terms to renew the collective agreement with Local 1005. It insisted that Local 1005 agree to end indexing for its 9,000 pensioners and beneficiaries and close the pension plan to new hires in favour of a defined contribution scheme. USS refused to negotiate unless those conditions were met. Local 1005 refused to hold a vote on these unacceptable demands, and on November 8, 2010, USS locked out 900 workers at HW. The USS lockout of Local 1005 lasted for 11 months. The workers were not allowed back in the facility until October 2011. 100. During this 11 month lockout at HW, LEW could not run at full capacity as hot band coil produced at LEW could not be finished at HW. 101. After the lockout ended at HW in October of 2011, the blast furnace at HW was not put back into service. 26 6. 2011-2013: Further shifts in production to American plants 102. On March 24, 2011, USS started shipping thousands of tons of metallurgical coke from HW for use in its US plants. At the time, there were about 200,000 tons of coke at HW which had been produced by Stelco. Although the coke would normally have been used for steelmaking at LEW, USS had shut down steelmaking at HW and shifted production of steel to its plants in the United States. Coke production is the most environmentally challenging aspect of blast furnace steelmaking. 103. USS's actions resulted in Hamilton bearing the burden of the coke production activities, while at the same time, USS took the coke to the United States where the value added through steelmaking took place. 104. USS also continued to service Canadian customers with steel products from its American factories. 105. Since the return to work of Local 1005 members in October 2011, the HW has produced coke and has operated the cold mill which includes finishing operations on its #3 galvanize line and the Z-line. Only the coke ovens and Z-line have occasionally been operated at full capacity on a 21-turn schedule (24 hours a day, seven days a week). Most of the coils that HW now finishes come from the LEW. 7. 106. 2013 LEW lockout On April 28, 2013, USS locked out nearly 1,000 workers at LEW. It imposed the lockout — the second at LEW in three years — after members of Local 8782 27 rejected its demands for a wage freeze, the elimination of cost of living increases, cuts to vacation, drug and other benefits, and the gutting of work rules so as to permit USS to redeploy skilled workers to other jobs at lower wages. 107. Prior to the lockout, USS demanded that Local 8782 members train managers and other non-union employees on the operation of LEW. The lockout lasted until September 1, 2013. The lockout ended when Local 8782 voted in favour of a 5year collective agreement in which they would receive, among other things, virtually no pay increases, a loss of vacation bonuses, reduction in vacation entitlement, a loss of out of country medical coverage, and a weakened cost of living formula. 8. 2013: Shut down of productions at HW 108. On October 29, 2013, USS announced that it would permanently cease steel production at HW. This meant that 2 million tons of steel-making capacity were eliminated at a time when as many as 8 million tons were being imported to Canada annually. HW still retained its coke making operations, a cold mill, the galvanized line, and the Z line which finishes steel for uses such as body panels on cars. 109. Employees at LEW continued to make steel and finish it in the hot strip mill and pickling line. However, the hot strip mill at LEW has not run at full capacity since USS closed steel production at HW. That closure created a 1 million ton shortage in slab at LEW. 28 110. As a result of the shifting of steel production to the United States, USS lost a number of customers because there was no guarantee their orders would be filled with Lake Erie steel. 9. 111. Impact on the Union and the Beneficiaries USSC's solvency and financial performance directly impact the Pension Plans and the Beneficiaries. USSC is sponsor of the Pension Plans, and as such, is responsible for making contributions to the Pension Plans. USSC's ability to make required pension and OPEB payments is directly affected by its solvency and financial performance. 112. USS, by virtue of its control of USSC, has directed USSC's operations in a way which has caused it to significantly underperform, requiring it to incur significant debts, and diluted the Beneficiaries' and the Union's recoveries in this proceeding. 113. USS's conduct has completely undermined its own and USSC's obligations to the Union's members and Beneficiaries in respect of pensions and OPEBs, among other things. E. THE UNSECURED CLAIM IS MISCHARACTERIZED AS DEBT 114. The purported loans from USS to USSC underpinning both the Secured Claim and the Unsecured Claims were characterized as intercompany "debt" but are, in whole or in part, really in the nature of equity. 29 115. $1,847,169,934.04 of the Unsecured Claim arises pursuant to a term loan agreement made between U.S. Steel Canada Limited Partnership, a subsidiary of USS (and currently the direct 100% owner of USSC), and 134 Alberta, October 29, 2007 (the "Term Loan"). 116. Immediately prior to applying for CCAA protection, USS deconsolidated the USSC balances from its consolidated balance sheet. Prior to the deconsolidation date, USS's loans, associated interest, and net trade accounts receivable from USSC were considered intercompany transactions and were eliminated in consolidation, but are only now being treated as third party transactions and have been recognized in the financial statements based upon the recoverability of their carrying amounts and whether or not the amounts are secured or unsecured. 117. The USS's characterization of the Term Loan as debt should carry little weight. This was in large part the cost of USS's acquisition of Stelco. 118. The court should have regard to the pertinent features of the various "loan" transactions, which bear the hallmarks of equity contributions. In particular: (a) there was a complete identity of interest between the recipient of the funds and the provider of the funds. USS, as the sole owner and shareholder of USSC, exercised complete control over USSC and its board of directors at all material times; 30 (b) USS was the sole source of financing for USSC, and no reasonable armslength lender would have provided loan funds on similar terms in the circumstances; (c) the repayment terms of some or all of the loans was unrealistically lengthy, and commercially unreasonable; (d) the interest provisions of some or all of the loans, including provisions calling for payment of interest years after the interest was incurred, were commercially unreasonable; (e) USS waived significant amounts of interest otherwise due and payable by USSC; (f) only a portion of the Term Loan funds provided in connection with USS's acquisition of Stelco was used to refinance existing indebtedness of Stelco; (g) there was no internal source of funding available to repay the Revolving Loan; instead, repayments were funded by equity contributions into USSC by USS, with USS essentially swapping indebtedness for equity contributions as needed for tax planning purposes; (h) all advances made by USS were unsecured until 2013; 31 (i) USS continued to fund USSC throughout a period when USSC was incurring substantial operating losses such that USS could not have had any reasonable expectation of repayment on the purported loans; (j) USSC was significantly undercapitalized throughout the years following its acquisition by USS. 119. Under the circumstances, including as described in this Objection, it would be equitable for the purported loan transactions to be re-characterized in whole or in part as equity contributions from USS to USSC, or otherwise subordinated in whole or in part to the claims of the Beneficiaries and the Union. F. THE SECURITY ON THE SECURED CLAIM SHOULD BE DISALLOWED 120. USS's security on the Secured Claim is improper and should be disallowed. 121. USS was the sole shareholder of USSC, and exercised complete control over it at the time when the security interests were granted to USS. USSC did not have an independent Board of Directors or independent legal or financial advisors at the time of the Security Agreement (January 2013), the First Amended Security Agreement (October 2013), or the Second Amended Security Agreement (November 2013). 122. USS failed to provide adequate or any consideration, to USSC in exchange for the grant of the security interests. 123. At the time that the security interests were granted, USS was well aware of USSC's precarious financial position. 32 124. The security interests were granted to USS with the intention of preferring USS's interests and defeating or hindering the interests of other creditors of USSC, including the Beneficiaries. G. USS HAS ACTED IN A MANNER OPPRESSIVE TO THE BENEFICIARIES 125. The Beneficiaries are creditors of USSC. 126. USS has caused USSC to act in a manner that is oppressive, unfairly prejudicial to, and which disregards the interests of the Beneficiaries and the Union. It has: (a) failed to comply with the Undertakings; (b) failed to comply with the Pension Representation; (c) diverted production from HW and LEW to its American plants; (d) locked out workers at HW and LEW on three occasions; (e) laid off workers at HW and LEW; and (f) caused USSC to incur significant debt, including debts which improperly gave USS repayment priority. 127. USS's conduct is unfair and has had prejudicial consequences for the Beneficiaries and the Union. It has destroyed USSC's financial viability, and thus its ability to meet its obligations to its creditors. 128. In these circumstances, it would be wholly inequitable for USS to be treated as a creditor at the direct expense of the Beneficiaries and the Union. 33 129. The Union relies on the provisions of the PBA and CBCA, and such other statutes as counsel may advise. H. OTHER ISSUES 1. Labour Relations Board proceedings 130. As described above, USS assumed comprehensive control over virtually all aspects of the activities of USSC. The relationships among USSC, USS, and the Union are governed by the Ontario Labour Relations Act. The Union is party to collective agreements with USSC. 131. However, it is clear that USS has assumed control over USSC's business, and by extension, the terms and conditions of employment of all the Union's members, and including USSC's collective agreements. The Labour Relations Act does not permit employers to avoid their legal responsibilities and obligations, and frustrate the terms of collective agreements by shifting control to an associated employer, purportedly beyond the reach of the collective ag reement. 132. Sections 1(4) and 69 of the Labour Relations Act are explicitly designed to target the types of economic manoeuvering engaged in by USS in this matter. Consequently, the Union intends to bring a motion to lift the stay against USSC, and commence a related employer/sale of business application before the Ontario Labour Relations Board ("OLRB") under sections 1(4) and 69 of the Labour Relations Act. 34 133. There is little doubt that the arrangement USS has entered into, and specifically its assumption of the responsibilities and obligations of USSC in regard to the Union, is captured by the provisions of the Labour Relations Act. Moreover, it is exactly the type of arrangement that is prohibited by the Labour Relations Act, where whether by design or effect, it undermines the collective agreement rights of the affected Union and its members. 134. The outcome of the anticipated proceedings before the OLRB can reasonably be expected to impact the Union's pursuit of the objections raised herein, as well as USS' willingness to bid on the assets of USSC. 2. PBA deemed trust issues 135. The deemed trust provisions of the PBA and section 30(7) of the Personal Property Security Act, R.S.O. 1990, c.P.10 further affect USS's claims. 136. These provisions entitle the Union's members to first priority recovery for all amounts owing to the Pension Plans ahead of the claims of all other creditors, including secured creditors, over "an account or inventory and its proceeds" of USSC. 137. The PBA deemed trust is valid in a CCAA proceeding (subject only to paramountcy) and applies to pension plans that are ongoing and to those that are wound up. 35 138. These provisions can reasonably be expected to impact the Union's pursuit of the objections raised herein, as well as USS' involvement in making any bid on the assets of USSC. ALL OF WHICH IS RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED THIS 14TH DAY OF APRIL, 2015 Ken Rosenberg Paliare Roland Rosenberg Rothstein LLP Lawyers for the USW Sharon White Inch Hammond Professional Corporation Lawyers for Local 1005 Local 8782 By their agent Paliare Roland Rothstein LLP Rosenberg 36 Court File No. CV-14-10695-00CL IN THE MATTER OF THE COMPANIES'CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED AND IN THE MATTER OF A PROPOSED PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR ARRANGEMENT WITH RESPECT TO U.S. STEEL CANADA INC. ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE (COMMERCIAL LIST) NOTICE OF OBJECTION PALIARE ROLAND ROSENBERG ROTHSTEIN LLP 155 Wellington Street West, 35th Floor Toronto, ON M5V 3H1 Ken Rosenberg (LSUC #21102H) Email: [email protected] Lily Harmer(LSUC #31880T) Email: [email protected] Gordon Capern (LSUC #32169H) Email: [email protected] Tel: 416-646-4300/Fax: 416-646-4301 Lawyers for United Steel, Paper and Forestry, Rubber, Manufacturing, Energy, Allied Industrial and Service Workers International Union(USW) INCH HAMMOND Professional Corporation 500 — One King Street West Hamilton, ON L8P 4X8 Sharon L.C. White Email: [email protected] Tel: 905-525-4481 Fax: 905-525-0031 Lawyer for Local 1005 Local 8782 Attn: Bill Ferguson, President
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