Security of Police Vehicles
Advice
The Association of Chief Police Officers Trojan Vehicle Working group
has produced this advice and agree to it being circulated to, and used
by Police Forces in England, Wales, Northern Ireland and Scotland.
It is marked as PROTECT under the Government Protective Marking
Scheme and it is disclosable under the Freedom of Information Act
2000. It is fully anticipated that Forces can share this with any
organisation that uses liveried vehicles to inform their policies.
ACPO © 2012
2 PROTECT Security of Police Vehicles Advice (May 2012)
Document information
Protective marking
PROTECT
Author
ACC Sean White
Force/Organisation
ACPO TAM Prepare
ACPO Business Area
Terrorism & Allied Matters Business Area
Contact details
Sgt Daren Standen: 020 7084 8865
Review date
As required
Version
2.0
This advice has been produced by the ACPO TAM. Due to the
timescales involved the advice has not been through the formal
ACPO approval process and is therefore issued an interim
measure pending incorporation into the Authorised Professional
Practice (APP) programme. The purpose is to look at current
vulnerability of police vehicles whilst in service, under repair or at
point of disposal taking into consideration the possibility of their
theft and later use in a terrorist attack or serious and organised
crime. It will be updated according to legislative and policy
changes and re-published as required.
Any queries relating to this document should be directed to the
author detailed above
Association of Chief Police Officers of England, Wales & Northern Ireland
3 PROTECT Security of Police Vehicles Advice (May 2012)
Contents
Section
Page
1
Introduction
4-5
2
Recommendations
5-8
3
Conclusion
8
4
Points of Contact
8
Appendix A
ACPO Workbook
Association of Chief Police Officers of England, Wales & Northern Ireland
4 PROTECT Security of Police Vehicles Advice (May 2012)
1.
SECTION 1 – INTRODUCTION
1.1
The staff responsible for the implementation of this policy and briefing note should recognise that
some of the advice offered in this document draw upon existing good practice. The assistance
provided by a number of colleagues has been helpful in preparing this document and this fact should
be acknowledged by individual forces when reviewing local forces guidance. In addition, the authors
consider this to be a living document, so further suggested examples of good practice are welcome.
1.2
Primarily the aim of this document is to look at the current vulnerability of police vehicles whilst in
service, under repair or at point of disposal taking into consideration the possibility of their theft and
later use in a terrorist attack or serious and organised crime. Overall the police service must aim to
prevent, or at the very least, reduce the opportunities.
1.3
NB: It is important that Forces contact Op Fairway simultaneously to receiving the report of a stolen
liveried vehicle (including Police Vehicles) for them to fulfil their national obligations. Op Fairway will
manage their own investigation, which will run alongside the local Force investigation.
1.4
The major concern at present relates to the differing ways each police force deals with vehicle
security whilst vehicles are in service or under repair, especially for outsourced repairs, as well as
whilst in operational use. There are additional concerns regarding the security of other emergency
service vehicles whilst in operational use, as well as vehicles that are operated by other agencies
that are or resemble emergency service vehicles. These include, but are not limited to, vehicle
manufacturer’s demonstration vehicles, private ambulances, blood transfusion, second hand
emergency service vehicles used for entertainment or charities. There are also concerns around
vehicles being sold at auction, and the control and management of leased vehicles.
1.5
The change in emphasis on how the International Terrorist Threat might materialise in the UK,
including the opportunity to replicate some of the tactics different groups have used overseas needs
to be considered. This includes use of stolen Emergency Service Vehicles, used as VBIED’s (Vehicle
Borne Improvised Explosive Devices), as well as other uses of Emergency Service equipment for
example in Mumbai, Norway and the USA.
1.6
It is noted that all Emergency Service Organisations have current Security Policies and Procedures in
relation to their buildings throughout the UK, albeit there is still room for improvement. There is the
possible increased risk when a police vehicle is under repair, especially when outsourced to a private
sector contractor where its security could be compromised. A police vehicle with blue lights
illuminated with its sirens sounding approaching a cordon is generally permitted access to a
cordoned area. If that vehicle has been stolen while under repair and utilised as a VBIED the
consequences could be catastrophic.
1.7
This paper acknowledges that Chief Officers may have to implement local procedures to ensure they
remain in line with both, financial limitations, operational requirements or existing contracts. This
may result in recommendations that differ from those included in this paper.
1.8
Generally, the security of outsourced premises has not been an operational requirement of servicing
contracts. However this may grow during the current economic climate where senior management
may see certain financial, as well as operational advantages to outsource fleet maintenance and
repair. Sub-contracting by the main agent to smaller garages, which have not been inspected or
security checked, unfortunately is a regular occurrence.
1.9
Site security problems are evident even for forces which carry out their repairs in-house. There are
several repair depots which have no secure compound, are open, and can be accessed from
surrounding streets.
1.10
In many police areas, the practice is not to remove police equipment e.g. radios or portable
specialist police equipment prior to the vehicle going for repair to an outside agency. This clearly
heightens the risk of compromising the security of that vehicle and equipment.
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5 PROTECT Security of Police Vehicles Advice (May 2012)
1.11
Contracted staffs do not appear to be subject to any checks or vetting process in some police areas,
and are also not checked when collecting or delivering vehicles to and from police premises.
1.12
In many cases forces do not have any security policy or procedures for the repair and maintenance
of police vehicles both in-house and contracted out.
2.
SECTION 2 – RECOMMENDATIONS
2.1
ACPO LEAD
2.1.1
That each force area appoints an ACPO lead to take responsibility for this policy.
2.2
VEHICLE AND TRANSPORT SECURITY GROUP
2.2.1
Every force should consider forming a Vehicle and Transport Security Group.
2.2.2
The persons who sit on the group will differ from each force area, but the following personnel need
to be considered. It is also suggested that co-opted members from the other emergency services or
related organisations e.g. MOD, Ambulance and Fire Service etc are considered thus ensuring best
practice is shared and disseminated:
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ACC Rank Chair or nominated Senior Officer;
Force Fleet Manager;
Force Property Services Manager;
Force contracts Manager;
Force Crime Prevention Officer;
Force Counter Terrorist Security Advisor;
Force Health & Safety Advisor;
A representative from ACPO specialist operations.
2.2.3
The group should cover all aspects of the security procedures surrounding their vehicle fleet whilst
being used operationally, under repair, delivery and disposal, and formulate a detailed policy
procedure, which should complement the main servicing agreement and any Operational
Requirement.
2.2.4
It must be remembered that while there are vehicle security risks when vehicles are being serviced
or repaired in police in-house facilities, there is possibly a higher risk where vehicle maintenance
and repair is outsourced or sub contracted, or when vehicles are being utilised operationally.
2.2.5
It is important to note that the risk is perceived to be lower when the vehicle is in the control of
the in-house workshop facility than when it is being utilised operationally. Normally a police
vehicle only spends on average 10% of its time in workshops and 90% operationally; therefore
promulgation of good practice to frontline officers and police staff that may drive police vehicles is
paramount.
2.3
SECURITY POLICY
2.3.1
It is recommended that individual forces have a security policy and procedures set in place, in
respect of fleet vehicles being outsourced to private sector organisations for repair and maintenance,
and that contractors are made aware of their obligations with regard to the security of police
vehicles.
2.3.2
If an outsourced contractor is engaged, best practice would be that suitable security and personnel
checks should be carried out on all staff prior to the company taking up its assignment in line with
the individual forces security vetting procedures as well as national guidance.
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6 PROTECT Security of Police Vehicles Advice (May 2012)
2.3.3
The Security Policy Framework issued by the Cabinet Office is to be consulted regarding personnel
checking procedures. ISO/IEC 27002 should be adhered to regarding personnel checks. All
subsequent new members of staff joining the contract company should also be subject to the same
security vetting procedures prior to their employment.
2.3.4
Part of the operational requirement should state whether the outsourced company obtaining the
servicing contract should be allowed to sub contract. If the successful company is allowed to subcontract any work to other local companies/garages, the company staff and premises should be
security checked to the same level as the main contractor.
2.3.5
The security of both in-house and outsourced premises should be paramount to any operational
requirement. Unattended vehicles should always be stored in a secure compound or building, never
on the street, with keys kept in a safe area and preferably locked away.
2.3.6
Open-air compounds should have good perimeter fencing with secure access gates, fitted with good
quality locks or close shackled padlocks. Hinges on gates should not be ‘open-ended’ enabling them
to be ‘lifted’ off. Good lighting in the compound is essential, especially if CCTV is to be used.
Lighting levels should be equivalent or better to those advised for secure car parks.
Local
CPOs/CTSAs will be able to provide suitable security advice.
2.3.7
Consideration for CCTV coverage is an added advantage, especially if it can be remotely monitored
at local police control rooms. Usual force requirements regarding retention of archive material and
set procedures should be applied to the operational requirement.
2.3.8
Vehicle keys should be secured in a safe area within the sites buildings and never be left in the
vehicles. A higher level of key management security should be considered, for example computer
controlled key cabinets.
2.3.9
Enclosed premises housing vehicles overnight should ideally be equipped with a central station alarm
linked to a monitoring station with an immediate police response to any activation.
2.3.10 All outsourced garages/compounds should be ‘flagged’ on the force command and control systems
as a designated emergency vehicle repair depot. This will ‘alert’ operators to any calls in the locality,
which could affect the premises, any alarm activations, or suspicious persons on premises should
trigger an urgent response to such premises.
2.3.11 Collections and delivery to and from police premises should be carried out by Authorised or vetted
staff only, with appropriate identification on their person at all times. Vehicles collected in the street
should never be left unattended prior to collection.
2.3.12 All contracted staff should be issued photo identification passes. When on police premises, or when
driving/towing police vehicles, these passes should be worn prominently.
2.3.13 Prior to collection or delivery of police vehicles to outside contractors, all sensitive
materials/documents should be removed from the vehicle, also where reasonable and practicable to
do so Radios, MDTs (Mobile Data Terminals), ANPR, specialist equipment (collision investigation
kits/cones/signs/etc), and ideally any camera equipment should also be removed. Where it may
prove difficult to remove AIRWAVE or covert radio systems, MDTs etc, consideration should be made
to having them locked out or stunned.
2.3.14 NB. Future consideration should be given by Fleet Managers in conjunction with Forces
Communications Departments to evolving new “plug and play” technology, this would allow for the
easy removal of certain specialist technical equipment.
2.3.15 If possible the siren should be disabled, along with the emergency lights. The police roof lights
where feasible to do so should be covered and either ‘magnetic’ signs should cover door crests or a
sign permanently displayed within the vehicles side windows or other suitable clearly visible area
stating that the vehicle is ‘out of service’ and on road test.
Association of Chief Police Officers of England, Wales & Northern Ireland
7 PROTECT Security of Police Vehicles Advice (May 2012)
2.3.16 A priority consideration should be to fit all vehicles with AVLS trackers, preferably equipped with a
remote disabler facility, to also include a security alarm in a control room should the vehicle be taken
without consent. Each force will then be able to pinpoint where each vehicle is located, especially in
the event of one which is stolen. Similarly, consideration should be given to equipping high risk
vehicles such as ARVs with Run Lock security systems.
2.3.17 When a marked police vehicle comes to the end of its whole life cycle, prior to disposal, the Fleet
Manager/Police Force must as a minimum standard remove the word police, as well as blue lights,
sirens, radios and any other specialist equipment from the vehicle before it leaves police premises.
At this stage, a thorough search should also be carried out, to prevent exhibits, drugs, weapons (Inc
firearms), or any other property to be sent to auction or disposal. All remaining vehicle livery should
be removed ideally before the vehicle leaves the force for disposal, if not by the authorised NPIA
vehicle disposal company who have such services written into the framework agreement. A detailed
log sheet should be supplied to the force fleet manager signing off the vehicles service.
2.3.18 In relation to the disposal of armoured vehicles, either all armouring where reasonable and
practicable should be removed by the force Transport Department, or where it is not possible, the
vehicle should be crushed, this being witnessed by a member of the force Transport Department in
the company of a police officer, and a receipt kept for future records. In addition forces should prior
to disposal of any armoured vehicle contact the Metropolitan Police Service, as they may wish to
utilise any armoured vehicles going for disposal for Ordnance Testing etc, address below:

Physical Protection Group
Olwen House
No 8-20 Leman Street
London
SE1 0EH
Tel: 020 7230 0417
2.3.19 Where a force utilises a leasing or private sector company for the supply of its operational frontline
vehicle fleet, then it is imperative that a robust policy is set in place to ensure the proper
management and security of the asset. It is also imperative that all leased/private sector provided
vehicles are fully decommissioned and specialist equipment accounted for prior to those vehicles
going for disposal to auction. It would be the responsibility of the force Fleet Manager to ensure this
is carried out.
2.3.20 All specialist police equipment should be removed from vehicles going for disposal and stored in a
secure area, and if not recyclable should be destroyed. Any equipment removed from lease vehicles
by the leasing agent should either have proof that it has been destroyed or is returned to the
relevant Force.
2.3.21 Police Fleet Managers should ensure as part of their vehicle disposal arrangements that they notify
their PNC supervisor’s mailbox as to what vehicles are leaving police premises for auction/disposal,
as there is a national policy now set in place, this procedure is to help detect at the earliest
opportunity recently sold police vehicles which may be used for crime or terrorism. (See NPIA
attachment regarding this subject. Query to John Bradley to see if available as a link.)
2.4
INFORMATION SHARING
2.4.1
Police Fleet Managers / CTSAs should be encouraged to share good practice with their counterparts
in the Fire and Ambulance Services, MOD, HM Coastguard, Blood Transfusion services et al.
2.5
AUCTION HOUSES
2.5.1
An information sheet should be provided to the auctioneers/new owners regarding the penalties of
using a vehicle with emergency/police markings. The NPIA or whoever is the authorising body
responsible for delivering police vehicle disposal frameworks should ensure elements of this policy
are incorporated in the Tender documentation, in particular with regard to security of compounds,
lighting, vehicle de-commissioning et al.
Association of Chief Police Officers of England, Wales & Northern Ireland
8 PROTECT Security of Police Vehicles Advice (May 2012)
2.6
VEHICLE PROCUREMENT FRAMEWORKS
2.6.1
Where the NPIA or authorising body are producing documentation with regard to the letting of
frameworks for the supply of police vehicles, it is essential that this framework includes the following
key areas in relation vehicle security:
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The security of vehicles to be paramount in terms storage, tracking of the asset, control and
records relating to specialist police equipment;
The security of the police vehicle whilst being delivered to a force or forces, marked vehicles in
particular not to be left unattended during transit;
Any vehicle manufacturers demonstration vehicles should be strictly controlled, and accurate
records kept relating to vehicle make, model, registration number and classification e.g. Roads
Policing Unit, Beat Car etc
That the manufacturers should be made aware of the risks of leaving such vehicles vulnerable
to theft or attack;
That the vehicle manufacturers should be advised to consider the risk of allowing other
agencies e.g. specialist police equipment manufacturers etc to borrow vehicles in order to use
as a “Marketing” platform for their products;
That ideally a tracking system is fitted to such demonstration vehicles or at least as a minimum
standard an auditable location and monitoring system is set in place;
All demonstration vehicles should be decommissioned at the end of their life cycle and all
related police equipment should be either immediately re utilised or destroyed.
3.
SECTION 3 – CONCLUSIONS
3.1
The advice remain flexible, in that Chief Officers may invoke changes within the system to cater for
their force needs regarding any alteration in the national terrorist threat or in relation to threats from
serious and organised crime.
3.2
With ‘Alert States’ changing, sometimes on a weekly basis, the implementation of a good operational
requirement for vehicles under repair, or whilst on operational duty will enable Chief Officers to
personnel, any enhanced security checks required during raised alerts, whilst maintaining an
appropriate level of security, will allow business to continue as normal and improve resilience.
3.3
The contents of this paper are intended to ensure the continued safety, control and protection of
police vehicles whilst under repair, under operational use or in the control of other
contractors/organisations, in the light of potential changes in the terrorist threat and methodology.
4.
SECTION 4 – POINTS OF CONTACT
4.1
Points of Contact:
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ACC Sean White, Cleveland Constabulary, ACPO Lead Trojan Vehicles;
Staff Officer Sgt Daren Standen, Tel: 020 7084 8865, e-mail:
[email protected]
Dennis Ord, NAPFM Lead re Trojan Vehicles, Sussex Police Fleet Manager, Tel: 01273 404 024,
e-mail: [email protected]
C/Insp. Juliet McKane, ACPO TAM Prepare Delivery Unit, Tel: 020 7084 8830, e-mail:
[email protected]
Op Fairway, Tel: 020 7230 9665, e-mail: [email protected]
Association of Chief Police Officers of England, Wales & Northern Ireland