International Journal of Law and Management Lobbying: a critical dimension of business strategy Clifford D. Scott Article information: Downloaded by Universitas Muhammadiyah Malang At 01:07 27 March 2015 (PT) To cite this document: Clifford D. Scott , (2015),"Lobbying: a critical dimension of business strategy", International Journal of Law and Management, Vol. 57 Iss 1 pp. 17 - 27 Permanent link to this document: http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/IJLMA-04-2013-0013 Downloaded on: 27 March 2015, At: 01:07 (PT) References: this document contains references to 29 other documents. 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Scott Department of Business Administration, University of Arkansas, Fort Smith, Arkansas, USA 17 Downloaded by Universitas Muhammadiyah Malang At 01:07 27 March 2015 (PT) Abstract Purpose – This paper aims to prepare executives to pilot a US lobbying effort within the bounds of the US Federal law. Lobbying law may be thought of as the “regulation of regulation”, as it defines the ground rules for those wishing to have a direct impact upon all other regulatory systems. The article outlines what the US lobbying law requires, what it forbids and, perhaps most important, what the law does NOT regulate. Design/methodology/approach – The paper takes the full spectrum of US laws and regulations relevant to lobbying – including the Internal Revenue Service Code (tax code), the Federal Election Campaign Act, the Ethics in Government Act, the internal rules of both the House and Senate, the US Criminal Code and the Honest Leadership and Open Government Act – and organizes them into a single 2 ⫻ 2 matrix, explaining what all parties must do as well as what they must not do. Via this approach, the rules that govern the “marketplace” for lobbying in the USA are explained. The competition to shape US government policy transpires within this marketplace. Findings – Few activities the executive may engage in carry the potential payback of a well-executed lobbying campaign: empirical estimates range to returns on investment in the thousands of per cent. But the uninitiated may easily step over the line and invite both legal and public relations (PR) nightmares. Practical implications – Effective lobbying can afford a corporation or industry a lasting competitive advantage. Every well-rounded business strategy should include such a component, and every well-rounded executive should be capable of performing in this arena. A solid grounding in the legal matrix forming the boundaries of this activity is a prerequisite for effective performance. Originality/value – The paper organizes and outlines lobbying law in a fashion digestible by executives without legal training. It is of value to anyone wishing to engage in lobbying activities targeted at the US Government. Keywords Strategy, Lobbying, US federal government Paper type Conceptual paper Introduction Can a single word be worth billions of US dollars? Yes, it can. Buried deep in the recent 1,500-page overhaul of US banking regulations was the statement that when a bank processed a charge-card transaction for a retailer, a bank may charge only the “incremental cost of transactions”. That “incremental” cost is miniscule. Once the charge-card system is up and running, the cost of an additional transaction is almost non-existent. Soon the banking lobby had the single word “incremental” removed, allowing banks to charge for the “costs of transactions”. Every aspect of designing, building and operating the entire charge-card system is within the scope of the “cost of transactions”. The net effect was that rather than charging only the trivial cost of Many thanks to Prof Terrence Gabel for his assistance on an earlier version of this paper. International Journal of Law and Management Vol. 57 No. 1, 2015 pp. 17-27 © Emerald Group Publishing Limited 1754-243X DOI 10.1108/IJLMA-04-2013-0013 IJLMA 57,1 Downloaded by Universitas Muhammadiyah Malang At 01:07 27 March 2015 (PT) 18 processing an electronic payment, banks could set fees so as to amortize the total costs of their entire retail charge-card operations. Rather than the banks bearing the costs of the operations, the costs would be borne by the retailers. With the deletion of one single word, billions of dollars changed hands (Sidel and Fitzpatrick, 2010). Lobbying the US Federal Government is a very, very big business. Many authorities long ago recognized the centrality of lobbying to any successful business strategy. This point was emphasized more than a quarter-century ago by Philip Kotler, the Dean of US academic marketing. Writing in the Harvard Business Review, Kotler explained that the business strategist “needs political skill and a political strategy”, and must flex “sophisticated lobbying […] skills” (Kotler, 1986, p. 120). Reginald Jones, former CEO of General Electric, flatly stated that: I can do more for General Electric by spending time in Washington and assisting in the development of responsible tax policy than I can by staying home and pricing refrigerators (Birnbaum, 1993, p. 197). Yet as recently as 2007, fewer than half of global firms polled by McKinsey & Co. even engaged in lobbying (McKinsey & Co., 2007). This is shocking in view of the return on investment (ROI) numbers reported for those firms wise enough to invest in lobbying activities. For example, one study shows a return of between 1,100 and 3,600 per cent on lobbying expenditures (De Figueiredo and Silverman, 2006). A second study shows an average ROI of a stunning 22,000 per cent (Alexander et al., 2009). Any executive seeking to take advantage of the opportunities afforded by lobbying the US Federal Government would be well-advised to know the basic rules of the road. This article provides an executive briefing on the topic of the US lobbying law, outlining both what is required and, perhaps more important, what the law does NOT proscribe. Lobbying law may be thought of as the “regulation of regulation”, as it defines the ground rules for those wishing to have a direct impact upon all other regulatory schemes. To create a meaningful context for this discussion, we will first define what we mean by “lobbying”, and specifically mention what lobbying is not. This will be followed by a brief discussion of the history of lobbying in the USA, which is necessary for a comprehension of how the US lobbying law is structured and why lobbyist’s activities are so relatively unfettered. Definition of “lobbying” Lobbying may be defined as “the act of directly expressing your views to elected officials in order to influence the action of that person or persons with the goal of affecting the law” (Libby, 2012, p. 14). The key point to be made here is that lobbying is distinct from making a contribution to a campaign or a candidate. While donations may provide access, true influence comes from established relationships – as it does in any other setting. A lobbyist develops influence with lawmakers by providing something useful; in this case, information and analysis. Lobbyists are information brokers. Lobbying’s legal framework Lobbying activities helped in the formation of the USA, prior even to the nation’s inception. For example, William Hull lobbied for better wages on behalf of the Continental Army (Nipper, 2007, p. 342). James Madison, the father of the US Constitution, anticipated the actions and influence of lobbyists in Federalist No. 10, Downloaded by Universitas Muhammadiyah Malang At 01:07 27 March 2015 (PT) published prior to the Constitution’s ratification (Madison, 1787). The first lobby formed expressly to influence legislation for a business interest was the Philadelphia Society for the Promotion of National Industry, formed by Alexander Hamilton, the first Secretary of the US Treasury (Johnson, 2006, p. 11). The history of lobbying regulation, however, is quite compact: the first act to regulate lobbyists was not signed into law until 146 years after the USA’s formation. These earliest laws, triggered by national scandals, targeted only public utilities and shipping corporations rather than lobbyists in general. As one might anticipate, this piecemeal approach proved ineffectual. (Zorack, 1990). The first legislation to address the full breath of the lobbying industry did not pass until 1946. Taking an approach parallel to current legislation, the Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act required registration and a certain level of disclosure. The sweep of this Act was so constricted by the courts that registration became largely a voluntary act (Bassett, 2008, Part III A). The next major overhaul of lobbying law had to wait almost a half-century. The Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995 closed many of the loopholes in the legal definition of “lobbyist”. Specifically, an attorney conducting lobbying activities for a client could no longer avoid registration by simply characterizing the work as straight legal representation. This act also broadened the level of disclosure required, calling for documentation of client identities, issues lobbied upon and level of payments (Lawson, 1996, p. 1177). The most recent revision is the Honest Leadership and Open Government Act of 2007. This update represents the current state of lobbying law at the federal level. While there have been only a very few bills to address lobbying directly and in a comprehensive fashion, many other statutes, regulations and rules interact with and augment these major bills, including the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) code, the Federal Election Campaign Act, the Foreign Agents Registration Act, the Ethics in Government Act, the internal rules of both the House and Senate and the US Criminal Code (Bauer and Gordon, 2008, p. 371). Lobbying law, thus, Table I, exists within a largely immutable context of Constitutional rights and basic US history. This yields a state of affairs where, for many observers, there exists a sharp contrast between what one feel the limits on lobbying should be and what the limits can be. Protections for, and a reverence for, the act of lobbying weave through the very DNA of the USA. Thomas Jefferson’s Declaration of Independence specifically calls out limits on lobbying activities as a catalyst for the American Revolution. He states: “In every stage of these oppressions we have petitioned for redress in the most humble terms: our repeated petitions have been answered only by repeated injury” (The Declaration of Independence, 1776). The First Amendment to the US Constitution echoes Jefferson’s exact terms, protecting the right “to petition the government for a redress of grievances” (USA Senate, 2011a, 2011b). Of course, appealing directly to one’s duly elected representatives and stating one’s case for a change in the law is what we today call “lobbying”. In the USA, any law or regulation that impinges upon a Constitutional freedom must pass the judicial test of “strict scrutiny”, the most exacting level of scrutiny used by the Supreme Court (Korematsu v. USA, 1944, 323 US 214). Specifically, it must both serve a “compelling state interest” and be “narrowly tailored” (Johnson v. California, 2005, 543 US 499). To give the reader a context for understating what the Court means by a Lobbying 19 IJLMA 57,1 Supply of access/influence (Senate and/or House members) Requirements Downloaded by Universitas Muhammadiyah Malang At 01:07 27 March 2015 (PT) 20 Prohibitions Table I. The supply of and demand for lobbying access and influence Demand for access/influence (lobbyists and lobbying firms) Register with Secretary of Senate and Clerk of House Disclose quarterly, for each client: Identity information Houses/agencies contacted Bill numbers lobbied upon Issue areas lobbied upon Estimates of income and expenses Disclose semi-annually: Statement of familiarity with and adherence to House/Senate gift rules Identities of all political committees controlled by lobbyist Contributions to campaigns, Presidential libraries, inaugurations Payments for events connected to government officials Finance lobbying activities with posttax dollars: Limitations on charity’s/private Foundation’s ability to lobby or risk losing favorable tax status Constitution prohibits the Federal Default rule: Lobbyist may not give Government from imposing most limitations gifts to government officials (over 20 on lobbying activity based upon “free exceptions each for House and Senate) speech” and the right to “petition the government” “Revolving door”: “Cooling off” periods Contingency-fee arrangement not prohibit former House or Senate or staff normally enforced by courts members from having direct lobbying contact with former colleagues for two years Liable only for statements made with “actual malice” “Switching sides”: Executive branch Limits on ability to lobby IF in receipt officials face certain permanent limits, if of federal contracts or loans they had personal involvement with the issue May not solicit gifts Default rule: Members of Congress may not receive gifts from private sources (over 20 exceptions each for House and Senate) “compelling” state interest, the first such interest to ever pass Constitutional muster was protecting the lives of US citizens during World War II (Korematsu v. USA, 1944, 323 US 214). Clearly, the Court’s intent is to see that very few interests rise to the level of “compelling”. Downloaded by Universitas Muhammadiyah Malang At 01:07 27 March 2015 (PT) Even if the Court agrees that the state’s interest in trimming a Constitutional freedom rises to the level of “compelling”, the solution offered must be “narrowly tailored” to be approved by the Court. “Narrowly tailored” implies that the law takes the smallest bite possible out of Constitutional freedoms while serving the compelling state interest. For example, even a rule that might make citizens less likely to make public statements, while still not prohibiting any speech whatsoever, may be struck down for the “chilling effect” it has on the exercise of the Constitutional freedom of free speech (New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 US 254, p. 300). Even such a “chilling effect” is a bite too large to pass Constitutional muster. The right to lobby is doubly protected, as any limit on lobbying may also be seen as an infringement of the right to free speech. The US Supreme Court has repeatedly reinforced the centrality of freedom for political speech, in particular. Justice Brennan summed it up by noting our “profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be robust, uninhibited and wide-open” (New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 US 254, p. 270). This famous decision demonstrates just how serious the Court is about allowing “wide-open” debate: it concludes that even speech that is less than factual will often be protected, provided that the speech concerns a public issue. This zealous protection of free political speech, combined with the high bar presented by strict scrutiny, makes it appear most unlikely that we will see any laws placing significant limits on the right to lobby – the right to speak freely to government officials – in the foreseeable future. While the right to lobby appears well-protected, and the content of lobbying discourse must be kept wide open, Congress has created parameters to make the practice of lobbying more transparent and less prone to ethical questions. Those legal parameters defining the limits of public policy marketplace activities may be organized into a two-by-two matrix (Table I). The horizontal axes represents the supply of and demand for access to policy makers and the concomitant potential to impact policy, regulation and statutes. Elected officials and their staffs, of course, control the supply side of the matrix. On the demand side, we see lobbyists providing information, analysis and deep insight into constituency perspectives to earn access to the process. The vertical axis differentiates what various players are legally required to do from what they are legally precluded from doing. These dimensions, supply/demand and requirements/prohibitions yield the 2 ⫻ 2 matrix seen in Table I. Each quadrant will now be discussed in turn. The “marketplace” for lobbying activity Lobbying practice in the USA is regulated by intertwined aspects of numerous federal laws and regulations, e.g. the IRS code, the Federal Election Campaign Act, the Ethics in Government Act, the internal rules of both the House and Senate and the US Criminal Code – that was significantly amended in 2007 with passage of the Honest Leadership and Open Government Act (Bauer and Gordon, 2008; Hrebenar and Morgan, 2009). Collectively, this policy both protects the rights of citizens to engage in lobbying activity and structures and controls the nature of lobbying as practiced in the highly competitive marketplace for public policy. Each function of lobbying policy is addressed below. Lobbying 21 IJLMA 57,1 Downloaded by Universitas Muhammadiyah Malang At 01:07 27 March 2015 (PT) 22 Regulatory control of lobbying practice The legal limits of what lobbyists – and policy makers – can and cannot do are both summarized in Table I and discussed in further detail below. The “supply” of access/ influence is controlled by policy makers and their staffs. On the “demand” side, lobbyists provide targeted entities with analysis, information and insight aimed, ultimately, at influencing policy. Requirements on the supply side (i.e. of policy makers) As suggested by the empty upper-left quadrant of Table I, Members of the Congress have placed the weight of “requirements” upon lobbyists. While it is entirely possible that a diligent combing of all laws pertaining to lobbying could reveal some actions required of legislators, the author found none worthy of inclusion in this overview. Prohibitions on the supply side (i.e. of policy makers) These prohibitions place limits on whom the corporate strategist may hire to carry out specific lobbying activities. To temper potential problems arising when legislators or staff members leave office and become lobbyists, the law imposes “cooling off” periods during which “revolving door” lobbyists are precluded from engaging in lobbying activities. As a general rule, members of the House, and their senior staffers, are barred from lobbying for a period of one year after leaving government employ. Senators and their senior staffers are subject to a two-year moratorium (USA Code 2009, 18 USAC. § 207(e)). Similar rules apply to hiring members of the executive branch, who are precluded from engaging in lobbying for one year after leaving their positions. Very high-level officials, such as the Vice President or a Cabinet-level appointment, are barred for two years (USA Code 2009, 18 USAC. § 207(a)). Members of the executive branch are further limited by the “switching sides” restrictions. These provisions preclude former executive branch employees from lobbying any department of the executive branch concerning any matter in which the employee was personally involved. Unlike any other of the revolving door laws, this is a permanent restriction (USA Code 2009, 18 USAC. § 207(a)(2)). What is NOT regulated In all quadrants, what is most interesting is what is not required or not prohibited. For example, while a corporation would be ill-advised to hire an executive branch official to lobby other members of the executive branch, it would not be a violation for that same official to lobby Senate members (USA Code 2009, 18 USAC. § 207(c) and (d); Maskell, 2007, p. 13). For former House staffers, the restriction applies only to the particular House Member employing that staffer; not to any other Member or Senator (USA Code 2009, 18 USAC. § 207(e)). Further, during “cooling off” periods, “revolving door” lobbyists may: • provide information and advice to, and otherwise “coach”, their new co-workers, who may be directly targeting the revolving door lobbyist’s former colleagues (Horwitz, 2008); and • target constituents of policy makers by organizing grass-roots campaigns (Lynch, 2010). Downloaded by Universitas Muhammadiyah Malang At 01:07 27 March 2015 (PT) Requirements on the demand side (i.e. of lobbyists) Provisions dictating what lobbyists can and cannot do should be of interest not only to the professional lobbyist but also to the corporate strategist. Corporate executives can easily fit the legal definition of a “professional lobbyist” and must, accordingly, comport with federal law. The two key legal requirements of professional lobbyists involve disclosure of their activities and IRS regulations concerning how these activities are financed. Requirements in each area are discussed below. Lobbyist disclosure. While the heart and soul of lobbying law concerns lobbyist disclosure, it should be noted that compliance is only necessary if one fits the definition of a “lobbyist”. Regulations are crafted to apply only to professional (in-house or agent) lobbyists; definitional leeway exists to exclude individual citizens acting out of their own concerns, particularly when participating only at the state or local level. The law defines one as a “lobbyist” once either an expenditure threshold – of above $10,000 for a single client – or a contact/time threshold – of more than 20 per cent of one’s time being devoted to lobbying activities for a single client – is passed (Maskell, 2007, p. 4; USA Code 2009, 2 USAC. § 1,603(a)). All parties fitting the definition of a lobbyist must register with the Secretary of the Senate and the Clerk of the House. Most of what must be disclosed on the registration is simply identity information for the entities involved. The lobbying firm, or corporate entity, must also reveal if any of the individuals acting as lobbyists have worked in the executive or legislative branches of the Federal Government (USA Code 2009, 2 USAC. § 1,603 (b)). Following registration, lobbyists must file quarterly reports and more detailed semi-annual reports. The quarterly reports focus on individual clients. In fact, a lobbyist must file a separate quarterly report for each client served, including identity information for that client and the client’s financial partners. For each client, the firm must provide an enumeration of specific bill numbers lobbied upon and issue areas addressed, an accounting of federal institutions contacted and a good-faith estimate of revenues and expenses (USA Code 2009, 2 USAC. §§ 1,604 (a) and (b)). An in-house lobbyist, having only his or her employer as a client, would file a single report. Corporations hiring a lobbying firm would be well-advised to see that these reports are up-to-date, as well as complete and accurate in divulging relevant information. The semi-annual reports focus on ethical concerns (rather than clients and contacts). It is not enough that the lobbyists state that they have adhered to the law themselves; they must certify that they have not caused policy makers to deviate from House and Senate ethics rules (most notably those prohibiting the giving gifts to Members) (USA Code 2009, 2 USAC. § 1,604 (d)). What is NOT regulated Of equal interest are things that lobbyists are not required to disclose. While a lobbyist must reveal that they did “lobby Congress”, there is no requirement to name specific persons contacted. The law requires no disclosure of either contact hours or itemization of expenditures reflecting relative effort devoted to targeted individuals. The lobbyist is under no obligation to state the specific sections of a bill addressed (despite the fact that bills may run more than 1,000 pages in length and contain sections on unrelated matters). Also not mandated is disclosure of having submitted draft legislation; either directly to House or Senate members or indirectly through Members, to the House or Lobbying 23 IJLMA 57,1 Downloaded by Universitas Muhammadiyah Malang At 01:07 27 March 2015 (PT) 24 Senate Office of Legislative Counsel (OLC) [due to the application of the traditional attorney– client relationship to OLC work (Zorack, 1990, p. 947)]. Finally, there is no requirement to indicate if the lobbyist’s efforts succeeded; just as there is no general requirement for lobbyist disclosure of being able to influence targeted policy maker behavior. Payment for lobbying activities. Lobbying expenses are not tax-deductible (Internal Revenue Code 2006, § 162(e)). As a measure to level the playing field between tax-paying and tax-privileged entities, private foundations and charitable organizations are largely precluded from engaging in lobbying activities (Internal Revenue Code 2006, § 162(e); § 170(c)(2)(D)). Prohibitions on the demand side (i.e. of lobbyists) The three main prohibitions on lobbyist activity involve relationships with clients or policy makers, the making of false statements and financial limits on lobbying activities by certain groups. Each matter is addressed below. Relationships. With regard to their interactions with policy makers, lobbying entities have traditionally been limited in their ability to give gifts; not by statute law but by the House and Senate Ethics Rules. Registered lobbyists must provide certification of their familiarity with these rules (USA Code 2009, 2 USAC. § 1,604(d)(1)(G); Maskell, 2007, p. 15). Within House Rules, the default rule that lobbying entities may not give gifts to policy makers is stated in a single sentence; the Rules then continue with 18 pages of exceptions to this rule (USA House of Representatives, 2011, Rule XXV, 5(a)(1)(A)). A parallel situation exists in the Senates Rules (United States Senate 2011, Rules of the Senate). For lobbyists, a key exception to these rules concerns gifts of travel, which are acceptable, regardless of sponsor, if for a one-day event. A night’s stay, or, in some cases, two night’s stay, is acceptable within these rules (USA House of Representatives 2011, 25 cl. 5 (b)(1)(C); USA Senate, 2011a, 2011b, 35, 2(a)(2)). No lobbyist, in-house or agent, may accompany a legislator traveling to or from such an event, but lobbyists may attend the event itself (USA House of Representatives 2011, Rule 25 cl. 5 (c)(1)(A); USA Senate, 2011a, 2011b, Rule 35 2(a)(1)). With respect to client relationships, lobbyists are not to be paid on a contingency-fee basis (with compensation tied to attainment of a specified legislative outcome). Although no federal statute bans the practice, the courts have a long-standing tradition of non-enforcement of such contracts (Marshall v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co. 1853, 57 US 314, pp. 335-436). Simply stated, a contract to gain a federally mandated advantage for one party, presumably at the expense of another party, is viewed as contrary to public policy (Hazelton v. Sheckells, 1906, 202 US 71, p. 79). Making false statements. Like any other entity, lobbyists are precluded from making false statements; doing so can constitute slander, deceptive trade practice or even fraud. However, the law operates differently in regulating political speech, which is afforded the most Constitutional protection and, therefore, the greatest latitude. Our legal system recognizes that the occasional “erroneous statement is inevitable in free debate” (New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 1964, 376 US 254, pp. 271-79) and, further, that the “theory of our Constitution is that every citizen may speak his mind […] on matters of public concern […]” (New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 1964, 376 US 254, p. 298). Accordingly, all Americans engaging in politically oriented speech – lobbying entities included – are Downloaded by Universitas Muhammadiyah Malang At 01:07 27 March 2015 (PT) accorded first-amendment protection, unless they act with “actual malice” [defined as knowing that the statement is false, or demonstrating a “reckless disregard” for the truth (New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 1964, 376 US 254, pp. 279-80)]. Financial limits. The final category of demand side/lobbyist preclusions effectively limits corporations from using federal money to subsidize their lobbying efforts. For example, entities receiving contracts or loans from the Federal Government may not spend these monies on lobbying the Federal Government in an attempt to renew these loans/contracts or to obtain new loans/contracts (USA Code 2009, 31 USAC. § 1,352(a)). Charities enjoying tax exempt status can lose that status by engaging in lobbying activities (Maskell, 2007, p. 12). A final example is of the shell-game variety inspiring cynicism of government regulation. Parallel to the discussion in the above paragraph, a “social welfare” organization formed under § 501(c)(4) of the Internal Revenue Code is precluded from engaging in lobbying activities if it receives any federal funding. However, there is nothing in the law stopping this very same organization from forming a separate § 501(c)(4) – an entity receiving no federal funding – and engaging in an unlimited amount of lobbying via this new entity (Maskell, 2007, p. 12). Conclusions Lobbying the US Federal Government is quite complex – but holds the promise of massive payoffs. An executive would be foolhardy to embark on a lobbying campaign without a solid understanding of the basic regulations of lobbying activity. Yet the far more foolish move would be to leave the influence game to one’s competitors. Influencing the regulatory schemes impacting one’s industry is a pillar of any sound business strategy. References Alexander, R., Mazza, S. and Scholz, S. (2009), “Measuring rates of return on lobbying expenditures: empirical case study of tax breaks for multinational corporations”, The Journal of Law and Politics, Vol. 25 No. 401, pp. 401-453. Bassett, E. (2008), “Reform through exposure”, Emory Law Journal, Vol. 57, pp. 1049-1086. Bauer, R.F. and Gordon, R.H. (2008), “Ethics rules and standards in a time of reform”, in Baran, J.W., Kenneth, A.G, and Chip, N. (Eds), Corporate Political Activities, Practicing Law Institute, New York, NY, pp. 365-388. 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(1986), “Megamarketing”, Harvard Business Review, Vol. 64 No. 2, pp. 117-124. Lawson (1996), “Shining the ‘Spotlight of pitiless publicity’ on foreign lobbyists? Evaluating the impact of the lobbying disclosure act of 1995 on the foreign registration act”, Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, Vol. 29 No. 5, pp. 1151-1184. Libby, P. (2012), “Lobbying and advocacy: what does it mean and why should you do it?”, in Pat L. and Associates (Eds), The Lobbying Strategy Handbook, Sage Publication, Los Angeles. Lynch, S.N. (2010), “Ex-SEC aide to represent trader group’”, Wall Street Journal, June 16, available at: http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704198004575311102941517556.html (accessed 20 March 2013). McKinsey & Co. (2007), “How companies spend their money: a mckinsey global survey”, available at: http://mkqpreview1.qdweb.net/PDFDownload.aspx?ar⫽2019 (accessed 18 March 2013). Madison, J. 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United States Code (2009), available at: www.gpoaccess.gov/uscode/ (accessed 1 October 2009). United States House of Representatives (2011), “Rules of the house of representatives”, available at: www.rules.house.gov/singlepages.aspx?NewsID⫽160&rsbd⫽165 (accessed 20 March 2013). United States Senate (2011), “Rules of the senate”, available at: www.rules.senate.gov/public/ index.cfm?p⫽RulesOfSenateHome (accessed 20 March 2013). United States Senate (2011), “Constitution of the United States: amendment I”, available at: www.senate.gov/civics/constitution_item/constitution.htm#amdt_1_(1791) (accessed 23 February 2011). Zorack, J.L. (1990), The Lobbying Handbook: A Comprehensive Lobbying Guide, Professional Lobbying and Consulting Center, Washington, DC. About the author Professor Clifford D. Scott received his J.D. from the University of Colorado, Boulder, and his Doctorate in Business from Louisiana State University. He held Professorships in both the Virginia and California state university systems, publishing 20 peer-reviewed articles in outlets such as the Journal of Consumer Research, the Journal of Retailing and the Journal of Marketing and Public Policy. He spent 10 years in the fields of bio-tech and high-tech, specializing in product launches for the $1.5-billion Silicon Valley firm, Exodus Communications, and directing the Center for Customer and Competitive Intelligence for Beckman Instruments (now Beckman Coulter; Fortune rank: 735). Dr Scott’s research interests focus upon legal aspects of the marketing function. Most recently, he has published on the Internet’s impact on trademark law. He has been an Associate Professor at UA Fort Smith since 2007. Clifford D. Scott can be contacted at: [email protected] Lobbying Downloaded by Universitas Muhammadiyah Malang At 01:07 27 March 2015 (PT) 27 For instructions on how to order reprints of this article, please visit our website: www.emeraldgrouppublishing.com/licensing/reprints.htm Or contact us for further details: [email protected]
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