MATTHEW T. SOOY Doctoral Candidate University of Kentucky Von Allmen School of Accountancy Email: [email protected] Phone: (404) 918-4770 July 2015 EDUCATION Ph.D., Accounting, University of Kentucky M.B.A., Finance & Decision Science, Emory University B.B.A., Accounting, Georgia State University 2012 – 2016 (exp.) 2007 – 2009 2001 – 2005 RESEARCH INTERESTS Behavioral – Managerial / Financial Hierarchies, Social Status & Power; Effects of Reporting Regulations on Managerial Decisions; Employee Cooperation PUBLISHED RESEARCH [ 1 ] ”The Effect of Rankings on Honesty in Budget Reporting” with Jason Brown, Joe Fisher, and Geoff Sprinkle of Indiana University Accounting, Organizations, and Society, May 2014 DISSERTATION (Dissertation & Working Paper abstracts, Page 3) WORKING PAPERS [ 2 ] ”Does Fault Matter? The Effects of Fault and Sanction Strength on Costly Compliance” Preliminary Data Collected, Full Data Collection Fall 2015 Committee: Sean Peffer (Chair), Bob Ramsay, Jason Brown (Indiana University), Richard Smith [ 3 ] ”Why Does Bonus Pay Increase With Seniority? Social Status and Compensation Delay in Compensation Contracting” with Nigel J Barradale of Copenhagen Business School, Jason Brown of Indiana University, and Sean Peffer of University of Kentucky Working Paper o Competitive Awards: IMA Summer Doctoral Research Scholarship, Luckett Fellowship (UKY) [ 4 ] ”Meritocracy or Aristocracy? The Role of Pedigree in the Market for Accounting New Faculty Candidates” with Sid Bundy of Middle Tennessee State University and Dan Stone of University of Kentucky Working Paper IN-PROGRESS RESEARCH [ 5 ] ”Price, Fundamental Value and Profit in a Laboratory Asset Market: Does Marking-to-Market Matter?” with Nigel J Barradale of Copenhagen Business School Preliminary Data Collection Fall 2015 [ 6 ] ”The Effects of Status, Power, or Both on Individual Delay Discounting” with Nigel J Barradale of Copenhagen Business School, and Charles Hoogland and Sean Peffer of University of Kentucky Preliminary Data Collected, Full Data Collection Fall 2015 o Competitive Awards: Luckett Fellowship (UKY) [ 7 ] ”Selling Out: Competing Economic Interests” with Jason Peirce of Universidad Adolfo Ibanez Preliminary Data Collection Fall 2015 1 MATTHEW T. SOOY Doctoral Candidate University of Kentucky Von Allmen School of Accountancy Email: [email protected] Phone: (404) 918-4770 July 2015 OTHER RESEARCH [ 8 ] ”The IMA Educational Case Journal: A Guide to the First Five Years: 2008 through 2012” with Tim Miller of Xavier University, and Sean Peffer and Dan Stone of University of Kentucky IMA Educational Case Journal, 2014 ACADEMIC EXPERIENCE & TEACHING Research / Teaching Assistant – University of Kentucky 2012 – 2015 Instructor - Intro to Management Accounting, Spring 2015 (3.4 / 4.0) Research / Teaching Assistant – Indiana University 2009 – 2012 Instructor - Intermediate Management Accounting, Spring 2012 (6.1 / 7.0) Instructor - Intro to Management Accounting, Summer 2012 (5.6 / 7.0) Research / Teaching Assistant – Emory University 2008 – 2009 Teaching Assistant / Study Sessions, Financial Accounting (MBA) SERVICE & ACTIVITIES Reviewer – AAA Annual Meeting (2014 - 2015), ABO Section Meeting (2013 - 2015), MAS Section Meeting (2014) Discussant – AAA Annual Meeting (2015) Other – PhD Student Liaison to PhD Committee (2015 - 2016) Member – Institute for Management Accountants (IMA), American Accounting Association (AAA) EXTERNAL AWARDS AAA / Deloitte / J. Michael Cook Doctoral Consortium Fellow (2015) PROFESSIONAL EMPLOYMENT Associate, KPMG, 2005 – 2007 Dotcommer, Interface Designer, Interland, 2000 – 2001 Interface Designer, Telephone.com, 2000 Designer, Earthlink, 1999 – 2000 Webmaster, Matrix Rehabilitation, 1997 – 1999 IMA Summer Doctoral Research Scholarship (2014) – for “Why Does Bonus Pay Increase With Seniority? Social Status in Compensation Contracting” REFERENCES Dr. Sean Peffer (chair) University of Kentucky [email protected] (859) 257 – 3149 Dr. Jason Brown Indiana University [email protected] (812) 855 - 2381 Dr. Bob Ramsay University of Kentucky, retired [email protected] (859) 227 - 9927 Dr. Dan Stone University of Kentucky [email protected] (859) 257 - 3654 2 MATTHEW T. SOOY Doctoral Candidate July 2015 DISSERTATION ABSTRACT University of Kentucky Von Allmen School of Accountancy Email: [email protected] Phone: (404) 918-4770 [ 2 ] ”Does Fault Matter? The Effects of Fault and Sanction Strength on Costly Compliance” In this study, I experimentally investigate the possibility that fault assignment in sanctions may lead managers to perceive their compliance differently – as an ethical, rather than economic choice, leading to higher frequencies and quality of compliance. The SEC emphasizes ‘no-fault’ settlements in its enforcement, where targets accept sanctions without admitting or denying fault. This policy is argued to enable the agency to pursue greater numbers of violators. However, opponents argue that no-fault sanctions may be less effective, reducing fines to a ‘cost of business’. I predict that fault assignment, a social sanction, will lead managers to comply with costly disclosure regulations at least as frequently as managers faced with no-fault sanctions; and, the quality of compliance will be greater for managers faced with assigned fault. This is predicted to be true even when comparing strong no-fault sanctions to weak assigned-fault sanctions. These predictions are consistent with fault preserving ethical decision frames even in the presence of sanctions. They also suggest that the SEC’s arguments for emphasizing no-fault settlements may be incomplete. WORKING PAPER ABSTRACTS [ 3 ] ”Why Does Bonus Pay Increase With Seniority? Social Status and Compensation Delay in Compensation Contracting” with Nigel J Barradale of Copenhagen Business School, Jason Brown of Indiana University, and Sean Peffer of University of Kentucky This study investigates the effects of social status on individual preferences for delayed compensation. Prior research finds that senior employees receive a higher proportion of their compensation in the form of bonuses, even after controlling for job design factors. Given that bonus compensation is delayed relative to wages, we investigate a novel factor that may contribute to the link between seniority and bonus pay – junior employees may find bonuses to be less appealing because their lower social status leads them to ascribe lower values to delayed rewards. We predict and find that participants who experience low (high) social status increasingly prefer compensation contracts with lower but more immediate payment (higher but more delayed payment). Contract preferences are partially mediated by shifts in individuals’ subjectively perceived time. We also find that task performance does not differ by contract or by social status but that high status is associated with higher forecasted performance, consistent with overconfidence. Overall, our results suggest that compensation timing is an important element in individuals’ utility functions that may explain why junior employees are not frequently offered bonus compensation. [ 4 ] ”Meritocracy or Aristocracy? The Role of Pedigree in the Market for Accounting New Faculty Candidates” with Sid Bundy of Middle Tennessee State University and Dan Stone of University of Kentucky What influences candidate research output and initial placements in the market for U.S. new accountancy faculty? Analysis of data from the 2012 (n = 107) and 2013 (n = 128) Accounting PhD Rookie Recruiting and Research Camp suggests that pedigree (i.e., graduating school rank) influences job placement rank for candidates 3 MATTHEW T. SOOY Doctoral Candidate July 2015 University of Kentucky Von Allmen School of Accountancy Email: [email protected] Phone: (404) 918-4770 with no “A” quality research output, but is unrelated to job placement rank for candidates with “A” research output. In addition, graduates of private universities place better than candidates from public universities, but have lower research output. Supplemental analyses indicate that US candidates place higher than do their international counterparts. Given that only about 20% of graduates have research output, whereas all candidates have (either high or low) pedigree, we speculate that graduating pedigree may proxy for long-term research output potential. Although its limitations include excluding considerations of new faculty ability related to teaching and administration, the presented evidence suggests that the market for new accounting faculty evidences both aristocratic (pedigree-based) and meritocratic (productivity-based) influences. 4
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