MATTHEW T. SOOY
Doctoral Candidate
University of Kentucky
Von Allmen School of Accountancy
Email: [email protected]
Phone: (404) 918-4770
July 2015
EDUCATION
Ph.D., Accounting, University of Kentucky
M.B.A., Finance & Decision Science, Emory University
B.B.A., Accounting, Georgia State University
2012 – 2016 (exp.)
2007 – 2009
2001 – 2005
RESEARCH
INTERESTS
Behavioral – Managerial / Financial
Hierarchies, Social Status & Power; Effects of Reporting Regulations on
Managerial Decisions; Employee Cooperation
PUBLISHED
RESEARCH
[ 1 ] ”The Effect of Rankings on Honesty in Budget Reporting” with Jason Brown,
Joe Fisher, and Geoff Sprinkle of Indiana University
Accounting, Organizations, and Society, May 2014
DISSERTATION
(Dissertation &
Working Paper
abstracts, Page 3)
WORKING
PAPERS
[ 2 ] ”Does Fault Matter? The Effects of Fault and Sanction Strength on Costly
Compliance”
Preliminary Data Collected, Full Data Collection Fall 2015
Committee: Sean Peffer (Chair), Bob Ramsay, Jason Brown (Indiana University),
Richard Smith
[ 3 ] ”Why Does Bonus Pay Increase With Seniority? Social Status and
Compensation Delay in Compensation Contracting” with Nigel J Barradale of
Copenhagen Business School, Jason Brown of Indiana University, and Sean Peffer
of University of Kentucky
Working Paper
o
Competitive Awards: IMA Summer Doctoral Research Scholarship, Luckett
Fellowship (UKY)
[ 4 ] ”Meritocracy or Aristocracy? The Role of Pedigree in the Market for
Accounting New Faculty Candidates” with Sid Bundy of Middle Tennessee
State University and Dan Stone of University of Kentucky
Working Paper
IN-PROGRESS
RESEARCH
[ 5 ] ”Price, Fundamental Value and Profit in a Laboratory Asset Market: Does
Marking-to-Market Matter?” with Nigel J Barradale of Copenhagen Business
School
Preliminary Data Collection Fall 2015
[ 6 ] ”The Effects of Status, Power, or Both on Individual Delay Discounting” with
Nigel J Barradale of Copenhagen Business School, and Charles Hoogland and
Sean Peffer of University of Kentucky
Preliminary Data Collected, Full Data Collection Fall 2015
o
Competitive Awards: Luckett Fellowship (UKY)
[ 7 ] ”Selling Out: Competing Economic Interests”
with Jason Peirce of Universidad Adolfo Ibanez
Preliminary Data Collection Fall 2015
1
MATTHEW T. SOOY
Doctoral Candidate
University of Kentucky
Von Allmen School of Accountancy
Email: [email protected]
Phone: (404) 918-4770
July 2015
OTHER
RESEARCH
[ 8 ] ”The IMA Educational Case Journal: A Guide to the First Five Years: 2008
through 2012” with Tim Miller of Xavier University, and Sean Peffer and Dan
Stone of University of Kentucky
IMA Educational Case Journal, 2014
ACADEMIC
EXPERIENCE &
TEACHING
Research / Teaching Assistant – University of Kentucky
2012 – 2015
Instructor - Intro to Management Accounting, Spring 2015 (3.4 / 4.0)
Research / Teaching Assistant – Indiana University
2009 – 2012
Instructor - Intermediate Management Accounting, Spring 2012 (6.1 / 7.0)
Instructor - Intro to Management Accounting, Summer 2012 (5.6 / 7.0)
Research / Teaching Assistant – Emory University
2008 – 2009
Teaching Assistant / Study Sessions, Financial Accounting (MBA)
SERVICE &
ACTIVITIES
Reviewer – AAA Annual Meeting (2014 - 2015), ABO Section Meeting (2013 - 2015),
MAS Section Meeting (2014)
Discussant – AAA Annual Meeting (2015)
Other – PhD Student Liaison to PhD Committee (2015 - 2016)
Member – Institute for Management Accountants (IMA), American Accounting
Association (AAA)
EXTERNAL
AWARDS
AAA / Deloitte / J. Michael Cook Doctoral Consortium Fellow (2015)
PROFESSIONAL
EMPLOYMENT
Associate, KPMG, 2005 – 2007
Dotcommer,
Interface Designer, Interland, 2000 – 2001
Interface Designer, Telephone.com, 2000
Designer, Earthlink, 1999 – 2000
Webmaster, Matrix Rehabilitation, 1997 – 1999
IMA Summer Doctoral Research Scholarship (2014) – for “Why Does Bonus Pay
Increase With Seniority? Social Status in Compensation Contracting”
REFERENCES
Dr. Sean Peffer (chair)
University of Kentucky
[email protected]
(859) 257 – 3149
Dr. Jason Brown
Indiana University
[email protected]
(812) 855 - 2381
Dr. Bob Ramsay
University of Kentucky, retired
[email protected]
(859) 227 - 9927
Dr. Dan Stone
University of Kentucky
[email protected]
(859) 257 - 3654
2
MATTHEW T. SOOY
Doctoral Candidate
July 2015
DISSERTATION
ABSTRACT
University of Kentucky
Von Allmen School of Accountancy
Email: [email protected]
Phone: (404) 918-4770
[ 2 ] ”Does Fault Matter? The Effects of Fault and Sanction Strength on Costly
Compliance”
In this study, I experimentally investigate the possibility that fault assignment in
sanctions may lead managers to perceive their compliance differently – as an
ethical, rather than economic choice, leading to higher frequencies and quality of
compliance. The SEC emphasizes ‘no-fault’ settlements in its enforcement, where
targets accept sanctions without admitting or denying fault. This policy is argued
to enable the agency to pursue greater numbers of violators. However, opponents
argue that no-fault sanctions may be less effective, reducing fines to a ‘cost of
business’. I predict that fault assignment, a social sanction, will lead managers to
comply with costly disclosure regulations at least as frequently as managers faced
with no-fault sanctions; and, the quality of compliance will be greater for managers
faced with assigned fault. This is predicted to be true even when comparing strong
no-fault sanctions to weak assigned-fault sanctions. These predictions are
consistent with fault preserving ethical decision frames even in the presence of
sanctions. They also suggest that the SEC’s arguments for emphasizing no-fault
settlements may be incomplete.
WORKING
PAPER
ABSTRACTS
[ 3 ] ”Why Does Bonus Pay Increase With Seniority? Social Status and
Compensation Delay in Compensation Contracting”
with Nigel J Barradale of Copenhagen Business School, Jason Brown of Indiana
University, and Sean Peffer of University of Kentucky
This study investigates the effects of social status on individual preferences for
delayed compensation. Prior research finds that senior employees receive a higher
proportion of their compensation in the form of bonuses, even after controlling for
job design factors. Given that bonus compensation is delayed relative to wages, we
investigate a novel factor that may contribute to the link between seniority and
bonus pay – junior employees may find bonuses to be less appealing because their
lower social status leads them to ascribe lower values to delayed rewards. We
predict and find that participants who experience low (high) social status
increasingly prefer compensation contracts with lower but more immediate
payment (higher but more delayed payment). Contract preferences are partially
mediated by shifts in individuals’ subjectively perceived time. We also find that
task performance does not differ by contract or by social status but that high status
is associated with higher forecasted performance, consistent with overconfidence.
Overall, our results suggest that compensation timing is an important element in
individuals’ utility functions that may explain why junior employees are not
frequently offered bonus compensation.
[ 4 ] ”Meritocracy or Aristocracy? The Role of Pedigree in the Market for
Accounting New Faculty Candidates”
with Sid Bundy of Middle Tennessee State University and Dan Stone of University
of Kentucky
What influences candidate research output and initial placements in the market for
U.S. new accountancy faculty? Analysis of data from the 2012 (n = 107) and 2013
(n = 128) Accounting PhD Rookie Recruiting and Research Camp suggests that
pedigree (i.e., graduating school rank) influences job placement rank for candidates
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MATTHEW T. SOOY
Doctoral Candidate
July 2015
University of Kentucky
Von Allmen School of Accountancy
Email: [email protected]
Phone: (404) 918-4770
with no “A” quality research output, but is unrelated to job placement rank for
candidates with “A” research output. In addition, graduates of private universities
place better than candidates from public universities, but have lower research
output. Supplemental analyses indicate that US candidates place higher than do
their international counterparts. Given that only about 20% of graduates have
research output, whereas all candidates have (either high or low) pedigree, we
speculate that graduating pedigree may proxy for long-term research output
potential. Although its limitations include excluding considerations of new faculty
ability related to teaching and administration, the presented evidence suggests that
the market for new accounting faculty evidences both aristocratic (pedigree-based)
and meritocratic (productivity-based) influences.
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