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i s s u e No. 1, 2015
Owen Abbott
THE SELF AND MORALITY IN MEAD:
THE PROBLEMS WITH THE ‘I’ AND THE ‘ME’
Owen Abbott (Penryn, Cornwall)
Abstract
This article aims to interrogate George Herbert Mead’s account of the Self. While
recognising that Mead’s work provides an invaluable contribution to theories of the self,
it is argued here that a number of the theoretical underpinnings employed by Mead
hold back his theories. It is maintained that this restricts Mead’s conceptualisation of the
“I” and the “me”. Furthermore, his theoretical basis led to a number of shortcomings in
his attempts to unify his theories of the self with his theories of ethics.
1. Introduction
The conceptual clarity produced by George Herbert Mead means that his body of
work should be considered as foundational for studying the self. More than this, his
efforts to describe a link between ethics and self surely means that any study into
the relationship between morality and self-identity would be at a loss if it failed to
give substantial regard to his ideas. As such, this essay will begin by outlining the
contribution that Mead made to understanding the self. This will be followed by a
critical investigation into some of Mead’s most fundamental concepts and their
consequences for his theories of ethics.
The polemic offered here will be based on four key points. Firstly, Mead
behaviourist approach led him to conceptualise meaning as only arising in the
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exchange of gestures between an individual and the other1. Secondly, Mead
explicitly emphasised that he gives precedence to structure over agency in
explaining individual social action2. It will be argued that this point fails to accurately
account for the self in general. But as well as this, it also affects many of Mead’s
specific conceptualisations. This leads us to the third point of criticism. Due to
Mead’s emphasis on structure, the concepts of the ‘I’ and the ‘me’ leave little room
for agency. While Mead occasionally highlighted individual differences in choice3, it
becomes clear that these instances were little more than token efforts. As will be
explained, this seems to be because the behaviourist and structure-driven nature of
Mead’s thought led him to ignore the relevance of individual identity construction in
the processes of the self. The self is conceptualised in terms of the ‘I’, which is
reactive in behaviourist terms, and the ‘me’, which is made up of the generalised
attitudes of others within an individual’s society. While it is not doubted that both
these elements are of great significance to the self, it is maintained that they do not
leave room for an individual to act in terms of who they see themselves to be – that
is, Mead’s concepts cannot facilitate the importance of identity to understanding the
relationship between the individual and society. This feeds into the fourth aspect of
the polemic. Again, as a result of his theoretical foundations, Mead’s ethical theories
frequently offer a short-sighted extension of Kantian rationality, while also failing to
accurately describe how ethical principles in a society become significant to
individual morality.
Mead does make many important contributions to understanding the self and
ethics. But, to remedy his inability to precisely describe the relationship between the
two, it is necessary to add a conceptualisation of moral identity construction through
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Gould 2009.
Mead 1967/1934.
3
Mead 1925.
1
2
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the process of structuration. Of course, an essay of this length will be not be long
enough to undertake this task in full. However, the final section of this paper will
offer a brief indication of how such a theory may be assembled.
2. An Outline of Mead’s Theories of the Self
To provide a linear account of Mead’s theories, it makes sense to begin where he
begins in Mind, Self, and Society. His most basic premise is this: the self develops in
relation to the social. That is, “...selves are essentially social products, products or
phenomena of the social side of human experience”4. Of course, Mead emphasised
that this is underlined by physiological mechanisms. However, the self is not
reducible to the physiological functioning of the organism. The self is not there at
birth, but instead develops through the individual’s relation to social experience.
This claim is fairly uncontroversial, but it is Mead’s analysis of how this process
occurs which makes his work stand out. For Mead, the self is characterised by
reflexivity, meaning that the self is a self when it is capable of being both a subject
and an object for itself5. Becoming an object for oneself inherently requires social
interaction. This is because it is necessary for the individual to absorb the attitudes
of others about herself before she can reflect on her self as an object6. Mead
explicitly states that it is only through the “verbal gesture” that this process can
occur, because it is language which allows us to refer to ourselves in terms of the
attitudes of others7. The full development of the self occurs through two stages.
Firstly, the individual must take on other individuals’ attitudes towards himself.
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Mead 1967/1934, p. 1.
Ibid.
6
Mead 1925.
7
Mead 1967/1934, p. 39.
4
5
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Secondly, he must take on the generalised attitudes towards social issues of the
social group of which he is part. The first stage is integral to being able to relate to
oneself as an object. The second aspect is an essential facet of a fully developed
self, because, for Mead, a fully developed self exists in relation to other selves within
their milieu.
The self is therefore able to take on the attitudes of the “generalised other”
towards social behaviour8. Mead uses the example of property ownership to
illustrate this point. As a self in contemporary Western society, we typically absorb
the general attitude that property can be owned and, consequently, should not be
stolen. The attitude of the generalised other can thus extend into the notion that
stealing other peoples’ property is generally wrong. Part of having a fully developed
self is being able to reflect on such generalised attitudes when reflecting upon one’s
conduct. This occurs through the concepts that Mead refers to as the “I” and the
“me”9.
The “I” is the aspect of the human being which acts in response to the other,
whereas the “me” is constituted by the organised set of attitudes of the others that
have been taken on in the development of the self. The individual reacts towards
the attitudes of others through the “I”10. The “I” is pre-reflexive, meaning that it
provides the immediate response towards others. This means that the individual can
often act in a way which the “me” may call into question11. The “me” reflects on the
actions of the “I” in relation the attitudes of others. In this sense, the “I” remains
elusive, because we can never fully understand why we act in certain ways. We can
only reflect upon such actions, by which point it has become absorbed into the
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Mead 1967/1934, p. 161.
Mead 1967/1934, pp. 174-175.
10
Mead 1967/1934; Mead 1925; Gould 2009; Hjortkjær/Willert 2013.
11
Hjortkjær/Willert 2013.
8
9
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reflexive memory of interpreting behaviour that constitutes the “me”12. What we
have in Mead’s theory is a triadic conversation in which the “me” engages with the
“I” in relation to the attitudes of others. And it is through this mechanism “...that the
whole social process is thus brought back into the experience of the individuals
involved in it; it is by such means, which enable the individual to take the attitude of
the other towards himself, that the individual is able consciously to adjust himself to
that process...”13.
3. Problems with Mead’s Theory, Part 1 – Behaviourism
The process of the development of the self, just described, is not yet complete. This
is because we have not yet touched on the significance which Mead attributed to
behaviourism. He argued that if we are to understand how we become a self by
taking on the attitudes of others, we need to understand how such attitudes are
absorbed by the individual. Mead emphasised the role played by gestures and
meanings in this process. Taking on the attitudes of others requires the individual to
understand the meaning that the other’s gestures carry14. This point seems to be
perfectly reasonable until we look deeper into how Mead describes meaning. He
argues that:
Meaning arises and lies within the field of the relation between the gesture
of a given human organism and the subsequent behaviour of this organism
as indicated to another human organism by that gesture15.
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Mead 1967/1934.
Mead 1967/1934, p. 134.
14
Mead 1967/1934.
15
Mead 1967/1934, pp. 75-76.
12
13
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So for Mead, meaning emerges in the threefold relationship of the gesture to
another, the other’s response to that gesture, and the subsequent social act. Thus,
taking on the attitude of the other requires that we engage with the other in a
conversation of gestures, through which the meaning of their attitude arises. If, as
Mead suggests, it is through gestures that meaning arises, then it is through these
gestures that the attitudes of the other are taken on by the individual. This entails
the process of the “I” acting and responding, followed by the “me” reflecting upon
this response of the “I” in relation to the other’s gestures, as described above.
Here then, is how Mead explained the development of the self in behaviourist
terms. But his theory begs the question: does meaning really emerge through the
exchange of gestures? Gould16 answers that this is far from being the case, because
meanings, held within a culture, have to precede the individual in such a way that
they mediate the individual’s practice, rather than emerging out of that practice.
Gould offers the example of hand shaking. We generally know that if a new
acquaintance extends their hand in a particular situation, then we respond by
shaking the hand. For Mead, it is in the gesture and the response that meaning
arises. But, Gould suggests, what if the person extending their hand used it as a
ploy to distract or coerce the recipient in order to rob them? Here, it becomes
obvious that meaning preceded the exchange of gestures, because the robber was
aware of the meaning attached to a person to extending their hand, which enabled
the robber to exploit this situation.
It is perhaps an overstatement to suggest that Mead thought that meaning arose
entirely through the exchange of gestures, without any sort of meaning preceding
the particular situation. However, Mead’s emphasis on behaviourism does lead his
work to read as though meaning only arises through specific interaction. It seems
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16
Gould 2009.
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much more likely that, as fully developed adults, we learnt what certain things mean
for us, and we carry these meanings into certain situations. The social interaction
with an other then allows us to reflexively engage with the meanings in relation to
our self. Take this example. A young individual is sympathetic to left-wing causes,
although she is yet to actively participate. She enters into a conversation with a new
acquaintance, who bemoans and vilifies those on the left who do not actively
engage with more radical Marxism. These were general comments, which were not
aimed directly at our first individual – the second knew nothing of the first’s lack of
participation. Nonetheless, the first individual takes on the attitudes of the other and
reflexively engages with her self and her position in left wing politics. As Mead’s
theory reads, this would occur through an exchange of gestures, in which the
meaning of the second’s attitudes arose. Yet, it would not be possible for the
reflexivity of the first to occur as it did unless she had some prior conception of leftright politics, activism, and Marxism. The meanings of such things could not have
entirely emerged from a series of throw-away comments by a newly acquainted
other. As Daanen and Sammut17 point out, Mead’s theory lacks a coherent account
of how certain meanings can exist between people without exchanging gestures in
every situation.
Indeed, many authors, for example Burger and Luckman18, Gadamer19,
Giddens20, have all highlighted how some theoretical understanding of the world is
necessary to coherent social interaction. Without these theoretical underpinnings,
we would be completely unintelligible to ourselves and to others. We can only take
on the attitudes of others in the process of becoming a self insofar as these attitudes
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Daanen/Sammut 2012.
Burger/Luckmann 1966.
19
Gadamer 1975.
20
Giddens 1979.
17
18
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are generally intelligible to us. And for these attitudes to be intelligible to us as
individuals, they must carry some sort of meaning which is generally held within our
society21. To be sure, Mead makes this point himself when he argues that we take on
generalised notions of right and wrong from our society22. If this is the case, then we
have to assume that such attitudes have a meaning which is carried into the specific
exchange of gestures, rather than emerging from them. The overall point is this: if
meaning did not precede a specific interaction, then we would not be able to
interpret the attitude of the other which Mead claims is so integral to the
development of the self.
4. Problems with Mead’s Theory, Part 2 – Explaining the Parts
in Terms of the Whole
Mead makes himself perfectly clear as to which side of the structure-agency debate
he falls on. According to him “...an individual can be understood only in terms of the
behaviour of the whole social group of which he is a member...”23. He stresses that it
is necessary to explain individual conduct through the conduct of the society of
which he is part. “For social psychology, the whole (society) is prior to the part (the
individual), not the part to the whole; and the part is explained in terms of the
whole, not the whole in terms of the parts”24. Mead leaves us in no doubts about his
position. However, it must be asked whether his position is a sound.
Of course, the structure-agency debate has endured long after Mead, and there
is still huge variation between different social scientists regarding the best position
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Burger/Luckmann 1966.
Mead 1925.
23
Mead 1967/1934, p. 6.
24
Mead 1967/1934, p. 7.
21
22
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to take in the debate. As this essay predominantly focuses on how Mead’s
theoretical foundations affected his conceptualisations, I will not offer an extensive
investigation into the vast body propositions and rebuttals which make up the
structure-agency literature today. Instead, I will briefly address the general problem
that Mead causes for himself by attempting to describe the self from the position
that the part should be explained in terms of the whole. From here, I will move on to
its specific consequences for his work in the following sections.
Taking the position that the part can only be explained in terms of the whole
seems to be an odd way of approaching the self. By making such a claim, Mead is
inherently arguing that the role played by individual agency is minimal compared to
the role played by social structure. In the case of the self, this means that if we are to
explain an individual self, then we need to explain the society and its structures of
which he is part. Now this point is perfectly reasonable – part of understanding an
individual’s self must of course be a consideration of the social system in which that
self is formed. However, Mead pushes us beyond this. The sentence “...the part is
explained in terms of the whole, not the whole in terms of the parts”25 suggests that
to explain each individual self (part) we need only explain the whole.
This implies that agency is of little relevance to the self, which hardly seems to
be the case. By Mead’s definition, the self is reflexive, in the sense that it can be an
object for oneself once we have taken on the attitudes of others towards ourselves.
It is via this point that Mead describes the part (the self) as being explained by the
whole. But it seems unlikely that we could understand the self as being reflexive
without at least some sort of agency. Even if we take Mead’s point that we need to
become an object for ourselves by taking on the attitudes of others, surely engaging
with oneself reflexively requires agency. Reflexivity is not passive. We engage with
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
25
Ibid.
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ourselves in relation to others, and in relation to whom we see ourselves as being,
and what we want to achieve26. As Mead highlights himself, we modulate our actions
according to this reflexivity, we reflect on previous actions through it, and we think
about how we could act differently in the future because of it. This being the case, it
becomes clear that agency is necessary to reflexivity, because reflexivity both entails
and yields conscious action on the part of the individual, even if this action is
mediated by the social structures of which he is part (as a structuration approach
would maintain27).
In short, it seems unlikely that the whole can fully describe the part when relating
to the individualised reflexive experience of the self. While our reflexivity inevitably
draws upon our social experience, the nature of reflexivity also allows for
individualised reflection on who we are and who we want to be, which do not have
to occur entirely in relation to the social whole – if this was the case, it is hard to
imagine a world of individual differences. Mead28 loosely makes this point himself
when he says that each individual comprises multitudes of differences, which arise
out of differences in experience and preference. That Mead highlights this, if only in
passing, should have indicated that the self cannot be entirely explained in terms of
the whole. However, as with his behaviourism, Mead seems to have concreted his
feet in the theoretical foundations of “the whole explains the part”, which leads to a
certain incommensurable vein running throughout his work.
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Hjortkjær/Willert 2013.
Giddens 1984.
28
Mead 1925.
26
27
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5. Problems with Mead’s Theory, Part 3 – The Concepts of the ‘I’ and the
‘Me’
This previous point becomes particularly clear in Mead’s conceptualisation of the ‘I’
and the ‘me’. Because his structure-led theoretical foundations, Mead leaves little
room for agency in his conceptualisations. Agency can be understood as simply
having the ability to act and the ability to have acted differently to how one did29.
The ability to have acted differently to how one actually did is significant to a
definition of agency because it implies a certain facility for the agent to actively
engage with her actions. If there was no such facility, then we would only be able to
understand action as entirely determined by structure or unconsciously led by the
physiological organism.
However, it seems that Mead’s theory of the ‘I’ and the ‘me’ function precisely
along such an understanding of action. As has been described above, the ‘I’ is the
pre-reflexive response of the individual organism to the other30. As such, the ‘I’ is
often described as acting in ways which are unpredictable to the individual’s self31.
The ‘I’ acts and the ‘me’, which is constituted by the generalised attitudes of others,
responds to that action reflexively.
It is here that the general inadequacies of Mead’s behaviourism and his
argument that ‘the whole explains the part’ combine and translate into his specific
theoretical applications. According to his theory, we act through the ‘I’ with little
engagement on the part of the agent. We simply act in behaviourist terms, and then
the ‘me’ reflects upon this action in relation to the attitudes of the social whole. But
general day-to-day experience tells us that this is not an accurate account of how we
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Giddens 1979.
Mead 1967/1934.
31
Mead 1967/1934; Gould 2009; Hjortkjær/Willert 2013.
29
30
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act in the world. As Gould32 points out, it seems likely that we can think of occasions
where we have contemplated the likely scenarios of a situation, and decided how to
act before we enter into the situation. Such a circumstance exemplifies how the
engagement with the ‘me’ can pre-empt the response of the ‘I’. This point leads us
on to what I think is the most significant shortcoming of Mead’s theory: it ignores
the role played by self-narrative and identity.
I do not disagree with Mead the ‘I’ and the ‘me’ are integral facets of the self,
and much action does occur in the terms Mead described. However, his theory
overlooks the significance of who the individual sees herself as being, and who she
wants to be. This individual self-narrative is the essential aspect of self-identity33. This
being the case, our self-narrative has a hugely significant role to play in both the
processes of the self and future action. It guides how we reflexively engage with
ourselves, and in turn informs how we aim to conduct ourselves in the future. Of
course, in line with Mead’s argument, we may reflect upon ourselves and our actions
in light of the unpredictable action of the ‘I’, perhaps looking back on our actions
with shame as we realise through the ‘me’ that we did not act in a way which
represents who we see ourselves as being. But equally, as Gould points out, future
actions can be considered beforehand, particularly in relation to one’s self-narrative.
To give an example, I, as a pacifist, have considered my views on the use of
violence in relation to my self-narrative, and I have come to the conclusion that the
use of violence is not becoming of who I want to be – the identity that I want to
maintain is that of a pacifist. As such, I have decided not to use violence under any
circumstances. Of course, a time may come where the ‘I’ acts unpredictably and I
break my vow, in which case I am likely to respond shamefully through the ‘me’.
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32
33
Gould 2009.
MacIntyre 1985.
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However, this does necessarily change the fact that I have applied my agency in
reflexively considering what kind of person I would like to be, and I have made a
moral choice in relation to that view of myself, and this view to who I would like to
continue to be has affected my behaviour and my subsequent choices as an agent in
such a way that I have not used violence since this aspect of my self-narrative began
to emerge. This relationship is something that Mead’s ‘I’ and ‘me’ does not seem to
be able to facilitate. This is because his behaviourist and structure-led theoretical
foundations negates the possibility of his concepts from considering how agents can
construct a self-narrative around who they see themselves as being, and allow their
action to be affected according to this self-narrative, rather than simply responding
in behaviourist terms and reflecting on this response in relation the social whole.
6. Problems with Mead’s Theory, Part 4 – Mead’s Theory of Ethics
In order to get to grips with the shortcomings of Mead’s ethical theory, let us begin
with a quote from ‘The Philosophical Basis of Ethics’:
Within the field of ethics... the moral individual and his world cannot
consistently be presented as lying inside another moral field. The growth
of moral consciousness must be coterminous within that of the moral
situation.34
The point that Mead is making here is important – the individual moral
consciousness emerges in relation to the moral structures of the social settings in
which he exists and develops. Yet, he criticises the notion that each individual’s
moral consciousness is entirely determined by her society, and hints at individual
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
34
Mead 1908.
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differences which allow for individual variations in moral ideals35. In this sense, Mead
fits in with pragmatist approaches to ethics. However, Mead fails to accurately
account for how the individual moral consciousness relates to the society in which it
develops. This is due, again, to the inadequacies of his theoretical underpinnings.
This becomes obvious in his references to Kant. Mead’s theory of the ‘I’ and the
‘me’ led him to conceptualise moral consciousness as emerging in relation to the
views of the generalised other, which leaves no room for agentive reflexivity of one’s
self-narrative. So when Mead refers to Kant, he argues that: “The universality of
judgement, upon which Kant places so much stress, is a universality that arises from
the fact that we take the attitude of the entire community, of all rational beings.”36
There is something archaic about this sentence. In what society would we consider
an entire community to be formed of rational beings? And why would it be assumed
that all individuals would accept a particular rational attitude? Would some people
not be suspicious of universal and rational moral attitudes?
Yet, Mead continues to make a number of Kantian assertions about the nature of
morality which surely emerge out of his misguided assumption that only the ‘me’
and the ‘I’ are of relevance to the self. He claims that the categorical imperative
stands because we invariably judge our actions through the claim that anyone in our
situation would have acted as we did in that particular situation37. This example
challenges his point. Imagine an individual who morally disagrees with the practices
of supermarkets, and thus occasionally steals from them in a minute act of protest.
We cannot say that this individual would say that every person in the same position
would act the same, because that person would probably be aware that most
people do not steal from supermarkets, even if they do think that they are immoral
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Mead 1925.
Mead 1967/1934, p. 379.
37
Mead 1967/1934.
35
36
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institutions. Instead, the individual is acting in relation to her self-narrative view of
who she is as a moral person, and what she sees as acceptable moral action in
relation to her self-narrative. She is not acting according to the generalised view of
the other, quite the contrary.
Similarly, Mead claims that, in moral terms, “It is a practical impossibility” to act
in one way and to expect others to act in another way towards you38. For example,
an individual cannot treat another dishonestly and expect honesty in return. But this
does not necessarily seem to be how morality has to work. A person may have been
treated dishonestly, but decided that it is not right to respond with further
dishonesty, according to their moral identity. Or perhaps a student of Emmanuel
Levinas has constructed a self-narrative around the notion that morality is at its most
pure when it is asymmetric39. It thus cannot be assumed that members of a society
tacitly absorb a tit-for-tat rationality approach to moral judgements. Rather, we have
to assume a more complex relation of self-identity, which draws upon ethical
structures within one’s society, but which is not delimited by these structures.
We can see from these examples that Mead’s typology of the ‘I’ and the ‘me’ led
him to make the kind of deterministic claims that the quote used at the top of this
section would suggest he is against. His theoretical framework led him to be unable
to accurately explain how there can be general ethical structures in a society, while
also being distinct variations in individual morality. What he ends up with is a
rationalist explanation of why ethics can often be seen to be fairly uniform, without
any concrete interpretation of how individual agency is embroiled in the processes
of moral consciousness.
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38
39
Mead 1967/1934, p. 381.
Levinas 1989.
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7. Concluding Remarks – Can Mead’s Theories Still be Useful to
Contemporary Ethical Theory?
I am in no doubt that much of the theoretical framework established by Mead can
be used to inform contemporary theories of ethics and morality. In particular,
Mead’s conceptualisations of the ‘I’ and the ‘me’ are integral to understanding the
self. However, while it seems that Mead wanted to extend his theories of the self
into explaining ethics within a society, the shortcomings of the conceptualisations of
the ‘I’ and the ‘me’ mean that he was not successful on this front. His mission of
explaining the relationship between the individual self and society is a
commendable one, which likely holds the key to understanding how ethics and
morality function and are reproduced within a society. But if this task is to be
completed, then an understanding of self-identity needs to be added. But this
cannot be any tired interpretation of identity. Only a theory of self-identity which
gives accurate credence to the role played by structure and agency in the process of
constructing one’s identity can be used to account for the relationship between the
ethical structures of a society and the individual’s moral identity.
I suggest, in incredibly brief terms here, that it is necessary for the theory of
structuration40 to be applied to the construction of identity if we are to understand
how a moral identity is formed. If we take identity to refer to the process of
constructing one’s self-narrative41, then it is clear that identity requires the individual
agent to draw upon the structures of their society in this process. If this was not the
case, then the self-narrative that one is constructing would be utterly unintelligible to
others, which, as Mead’s work highlights, would be contrary to the formation of the
self. But this is not to say the individuals are passive in their identity construction,
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40
41
Giddens 1979; Giddens 1984.
Bauman 2008.
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particularly in contemporary Western society. The process of identity construction is
rich with agency because the individual selectively engages with the particular
structures which she feels are relevant to the identity that she wishes to construct.
And, to drive home the importance of structuration, as she draws upon these
particular structures, she is also reproducing their relevance to constructing the
specific kind of identity that she is forming.
It is surely through this same process that a moral identity is formed. The ethical
structures of a society are drawn upon by the agent and utilised in the construction
of one’s self-narrative of what is right and what is wrong. This process is neatly
demonstrated in the opening interviews of the classic work Habits of the Heart42. As
has been indicated throughout this paper, agency has a lot more relevance to the
reflexive nature of the self than Mead’s theory allows for. By adding the notion of a
self-identity formed through the process of structuration, we can begin to
understand how the ethical structures of a society are taken on and interpreted by
individuals through their reflexive engagement with who they see themselves as
being as moral people, that is, in relation to the continuous construction of their
moral identity.
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42
Bellah et al. 1996.
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