VICS XX
ALL PARTY CONCLAVE OF KURDISH NATIONALISTS
Dear Delegates,
It is our great pleasure to welcome you to the 20th iteration of the Virginia International
Crisis Simulation! I hope you are all as excited as we are to participate in the All Party
Conclave of Kurdish Nationalists 2017.
Your Chair, Pranav Jain, is a second-year student at the University planning to pursue a
major in Commerce or Public Policy. During his downtime, he enjoys playing table tennis,
reading, and attending the various talks held on Grounds. Having spent the majority of his
life in the Middle East, and having endured the Egyptian Revolution, events in that region
have always held his attention. Thus, naturally, he eagerly looks forward to this committee.
Your Crisis Director, Neil Desai, is a fourth-year majoring in Sanskrit and Foreign Affairs.
During his downtime, he enjoys playing board-games, reading, and, like Pranav, attending
interesting lectures around Grounds. He developed a deep interest in the Middle East after
traveling to Morocco and learning Arabic. He looks forward to making his last VICS the
best one yet.
Reports on the Middle East are rarely able to convey the region's incredible diversity, both
ethnic and religious. The region is not only the birthplace of three of the world's largest
religions, but has also retained an array of smaller, stateless religious minorities and ethnic
identities, foremost amongst which are the Kurds. However, because of the recent Syrian
Civil War and the emergence of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, a long-overdue
spotlight has been shined on the plight of minorities in the Middle East. These events have
played right into the hands of the Kurdish movement, which has already established an
autonomous state in Northern Iraq, and everyday moves closer to its goal of an
independent Kurdish nation. At the same time, the suffering of the Kurds in Syria, and the
anger of Turkish Kurds due to their government's reluctance to fight ISIS, has caused
Kurds, both civilians and resistance fighters from other areas, to flee in droves to Iraqi
Kurdistan.
This committee begins on 15 April 2017, on the day that the Declaration of Independence
of Kurdistan is proclaimed. Trends already visible in our time have culminated in a
significantly changed political environment in 2017, and delegates will have to put all of
their political acumen to the test as they attempt to set about creating a new nation that
can function economically, gain international recognition, and avoid infighting. They must
strive to create a nation for the Kurds, created by the Kurds, and controlled by the Kurds.
We look forward to meeting all of you and working together as the Conclave attempts to
create a sovereign country for the world’s largest stateless nation. If you have any
questions, feel free to contact either us or the VICS Director General, Gary DePalo, at
[email protected].
Sincerely,
Pranav Jain
Chair
[email protected]
Neil Desai
Crisis Director
[email protected]
Committee Overview
All delegates will be participants in a secret All-Party Conclave of Kurdish
Nationalists, being held in the city of Erbil in Iraqi Kurdistan. This meeting is being
organized by the Kurdistan Regional Government to allow the different Kurdish
nationalist groups to coordinate their activities and to covertly participate in the
creation of an independent Kurdistan. The Conclave shall begin with a Declaration of
Independence by the President, Masoud Barzani. Delegates will represent either a
minister of a branch of the Kurdistan Regional Government or the leader of one of
the various Kurdish nationalist groups in Iraq, Turkey, Syria, and Iran.
Members of the Iraqi Kurdistan Regional Government shall include the Ministers
of Finance, Interior, Peshmerga Affairs, Natural Resources, and so on. There will be
two newly created positions: the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Director of the
newly established Kurdish Intelligence Service. The Conclave will also include
members of the various regional Kurdish parties. There are two parties from each of
the non-Iraqi Kurdish regions, and there will be two representatives from each party,
who will also be in charge of their own military forces in the region. The Declaration
of Independence establishes both Iraqi and Syrian Kurdistan as part of the new,
independent Kurdish nation, however for the time being the two regions will retain
separate representatives. The Syrian Kurdish representatives shall thus have access
to some additional resources, like tax revenue, but shall also have additional
obligations, such as rehabilitating the countless refugees. Iranian Kurdistan and
Turkish Kurdistan are not initially being claimed as part of the newly independent
country, and so the representatives of those regions shall only have resources
befitting a guerilla movement.
Kurdish History
General History
The desire of the Kurdish people for their own sovereign nation dates back to at
least World War I. In the chaotic environment of that era, the first band of Kurdish
nationalists organized themselves and attempted to carve their own nation out of
what is now Turkey. Their struggle seemed quite feasible towards the end of the
Great War, when the Ottoman Empire was about to be defeated.1 The Kurds were
specifically mentioned in American President Woodrow Wilson’s famous Fourteen
Points speech, with President Wilson calling for the autonomous development of
formerly Ottoman minorities in the post World War World.2 To reflect this, the
Treaty of Sevres, which was drafted to oversee territorial changes after the War,
included the establishment of a Kurdish nation for Turkish Kurds in the modern day
Turkish-Iraqi border region.3 It would have its own set of referendums to establish
the desired type of government, and to create its own internal political structure.
This suggestion failed to take into account the Kurdish populations outside the area,
such as in the nations of Persia, Armenia, and the area administered by the British
and the French as a result of the Sykes-Picot Agreement, but is still notable for
endorsing in principle the idea of an independent Kurdistan. Ultimately, however,
the Treaty of Sevres failed to come about due to the Turkish War of Independence
and the subsequent establishment of the Republic of Turkey. At the same time, a
separate attempt by Kurdish tribes to rebel from the British and create their own
Kurdish nation in modern-day Iraq failed in June 1919. There was a subsequent
attempt by the British in the early 1920s to establish a Kurdish state in modern day
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1 Van Bruinessen, Martin. "‘Kurds, States and Tribes’." JABAR, Faleh A. &
DAWOD, Hosham (orgs). 2003. Tribes And Power – Nationalism And
Ethnicity in the Middle East. London: Campos - Revista De Antropologia
Social, 2005. 165-183. Print.
2 Wilson, Thomas Woodrow, and Arthur Stanley Link. The Papers of
Woodrow Wilson. Vol. 45. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton UP, 1984. 536. Print.
3 "Treaty of Sevres." Foreign and Commenwealth Office. Government of the
United Kingdom. Web. 3 Feb. 2015.
Iraq, to counter Turkish influence, but the British failed to make this come about.4
The failure of these uprisings and attempts at nationalism led to an emigration of
Kurds from modern day Turkey and Iraq, resulting in a stronger Kurdish presence in
Syria.5
Attempts at Kurdish nationalism in Iraq
During the Second World War, a power vacuum in northern Iraq allowed the
Kurds, led by Mustafa Barzani, to effectively create a Kurdish state in northern Iraq.
However, Iraq was able to regain control over the region with the help of the British
in 1945, leading to Mustafa’s exile.6 He was invited back to Iraq in 1958 only after
Abdul Qasim successfully gained control of Iraq via a military coup.7 Qasim
promised regional autonomy if Barzani would support Qasim’s policies. To do so,
Barzani created the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) in 1960, and supported
Qasim.8 However, Qasim’s reluctance to follow through on his promises led to the
KDP to demand more autonomy, which Qasim prevented by inciting a war between
the Barzani clan and various other Kurdish clans, in which Barzani triumphed9.
Attempts by Qasim to regain control by invading northern Iraq failed, and could
have contributed to the Ba’athist military coup that toppled his regime. After a series
of skirmishes, a ceasefire came into effect by 1969, thanks to Soviet pressure on the
Baath government to reach a peace agreement. Iraqi Kurdistan’s autonomous status
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4 Stansfield, Gareth R. V. The Kurds and Iraq. London: Routledge, 2008.
Print.
5 Stansfield, Gareth R. V. The Kurds and Iraq. London: Routledge, 2008.
Print.
6 "18. Iraq/Kurds (1932-present)." Political Science. University of Central
Arkansas. Web. 3 Feb. 2015.
7 "18. Iraq/Kurds (1932-present)." Political Science. University of Central
Arkansas. Web. 3 Feb. 2015.
8 DeFronzo, James. "The Iraq Revolution and the Baathist Regime." The Iraq
War: Origins and Consequences. 1st ed. Vol. 1. Bolder, CO: Westview, 2010.
56-78. Print.
9 DeFronzo, James. "The Iraq Revolution and the Baathist Regime." The Iraq
War: Origins and Consequences. 1st ed. Vol. 1. Bolder, CO: Westview, 2010.
56-78. Print.
was established by 1974, however the single party system prevented actual
representation. An attempt by the Shah of Iran and Israeli intelligence to distract
Baghdad with another Kurdish insurrection failed when Iraq and Iran reached an
agreement, and Iran cut aid to the Kurds. This resulted in Barzani fleeing to Iran,
and led to clashes between Iraq and the Kurds from 1977-1979, resulting in the
destruction of at least 600 Kurdish villages10.
Kurdish sympathy for Iran during the Iraq-Iran War (1980-88) led to the Iraqi
government implementing a policy of Arabization of Kurdistan and launching a
military campaign into northern Iraq that used American-supplied chemical
weapons against the Kurdish civilian population. Widely considered an act of
genocide, the Al Anfal Campaign targeted the Kurdish, Yazidid, Assyrian, Jewish and
Shabak minorities in northern Iraq.11 It led to the deaths of at least 150,000 civilians
from 1986-1989. This event as followed by the 1994-1997 Kurdish Civil War between
Barzani’s KDP and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) which had its origins in
Iran due to a power struggle over between the leaders of the respective parties.
By 2011, the issue of Kurdish nationalism had once again risen to the forefront
Iraq. The inability of the Iraqi and Kurdish governments to agree on issues of power
sharing, oil revenue sharing, and territorial extents raised tensions. These were
visible in April 2012, when the Kurdish President issued an ultimatum, stating that if
Kurdish demands weren’t met then Iraqi Kurdistan would secede from the nation.12
Iraq’s attempt to get the Peshmerga, the Kurdistan army, under the control of
Baghdad resulted in limited clashes, and was not followed up on. The rise of ISIS and
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10 DeFronzo, James. "The Iraq Revolution and the Baathist Regime." The Iraq
War: Origins and Consequences. 1st ed. Vol. 1. Bolder, CO: Westview, 2010.
56-78. Print.
11 "The Crimes of Saddam Hussein." PBS. PBS. Web. 3 Feb. 2015.
12 Cooper, Helene, and Michael Gordon. "Iraqi Kurds Expand Autonomy as
ISIS Reorders the Landscape." The New York Times. The New York Times, 29
Aug. 2014. Web. 3 Feb. 2015.
the fight against it may have united the two sides in their efforts, but also allowed the
Kurds to seize a majority of the disputed region and integrate it into Kurdistan,
including the oil rich areas of Kirkuk (Peshmerga).
Attempts at Kurdish nationalism in Turkey
After failing to secure their own nation, the Kurds were incorporated into the newly
founded Republic of Turkey. This led to a series of rebellions in the 1920s and 1930s,
which were forcefully put down by the Turkish government and the region declared a
closed military area from which foreigners were banned between 1925 and 1965.13
The use of Kurdish language was outlawed, the words Kurds and Kurdistan were
erased from dictionaries and history books, and the Kurds were only referred to
as Mountain Turks.14 This evolved into a conflict during the early 1980s due to the
influence of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) in the area and its strong opposition
of the 1980 military coup in Turkey. This led to the ongoing Turkey-PKK conflict,
which officially began on 15 August 1984, with the PKK declaring a Kurdish
uprising.15 The Persian Gulf War led to geopolitical changes which prompted a
ceasefire, as the Turkish President, Turgut Özal, agreed to negotiations. Being halfKurdish and half-Turkish, he worked on a peace plan till his death in April 1993.16
He was known to have created a pro-Kurdish reform package that he would have
announced later in 1993, but his death prevented this from happening. An additional
ambush in May by Kurdish factions ended the peace process, although it is claimed
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13 Chaliand, Ge. A People without a Country: The Kurds and Kurdistan. New
York: Olive Branch, 1993. Print.
14 Chaliand, Ge. A People without a Country: The Kurds and Kurdistan. New
York: Olive Branch, 1993. Print.
15 "Timeline: PKK Conflict with Turkey." Al Jazeera. 21 Mar. 2013. Web. 3
Feb. 2015.
16 "Timeline: PKK Conflict with Turkey." Al Jazeera. 21 Mar. 2013. Web. 3
Feb. 2015.
by some that Özal’s death and this ambush were carried out by the Turkish military
to stop the peace process.17
The new Turkish leadership adopted a full-scale military campaign against the
Kurds in 1993, and the military implemented a change in its strategies due to the
new government’s hardline stance against this insurgency. The capture of the PKK
leader Abdullah Öcalan in 1998 led to a unilateral ceasefire being declared by the
PKK in 1999, marking the end of one stage of this conflict.18 The PKK then withdrew
into northern Iraq and tried to pursue diplomatic efforts to establish Kurdish
autonomy in Turkey. Failing to do so, the PKK resumed hostilities in Turkey in 2004.
The PKK shifted from being a rebel group that engaged the government forces en
masse into a guerilla group that started using mines, ambushes, and small squads
instead. After a brief ceasefire in 2012 due to progress in Kurdish representation in
the Turkish Assembly, the conflict started once again in 2014, mainly due to the
Turkish government’s reluctance to help the Kurds fight ISIS in Syria. This new
phase of the conflict is no longer militant, instead consisting of various
demonstrations and protests in eastern Turkey, since the militant elements are
involved in the fight against ISIS and had withdrawn to northern Iraq.
Attempts at Kurdish nationalism in Iran
An unsuccessful attempt to establish a Kurdish state in Iran occurred in 1946, with
the declaration of the Republic of Mahabad.19 Originally supported by the Soviet
Union, the small nation managed to fend off Iranian influence while the Soviets
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17 "Bianet: 8th President's Death Remains Conspiracy-Like." Bianet. 14 Dec.
2012. Web. 3 Feb. 2015.
18 Marcus, Aliza. Blood and Belief the PKK and the Kurdish Fight for
Independence. New York: New York UP, 2007. Print.
19 Roosevelt Jr., Archie. "The Kurdish Republic of Mahabad." The Middle East
Journal 1.3 (1947): 247-69. Print.
supported it. However, the withdrawal of the Soviets from the small republic in the
end of 1946 led to the Iranian government re-establishing itself in the region.20
A large-scale rebellion occurred in Iran in 1979, barely two months after the
Iranian Revolution. Led by the Kurdish Democratic Party in Iraq (KDP-I), this
rebellion came about as a result of an inability of the KDP-I and other Kurdish
groups to align themselves with the new Iranian regime.21 The uprising began when
the KDP-I published an eight-point plan, and soon after it took over state
institutions in Paveh, Mahabad, Saqqez and Divan Darreh. These initial gains
occurred at the expense of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard, prompting Khomeini to
approach the regular Iranian army which outlined a policy for suppressing the
rebellion.22 After a huge counter offensive and intense aerial bombardment, the
Iranian military was able to retake these regions by the winter of 1980, resulting in
approximately 7,000 casualties. The KDP-I survived the loss, however, and resumed
the uprising in 1989. While not as large-scale as the one in 1979, this iteration of the
uprising managed to claim at least 300 soldiers, and brought a severe crackdown on
the KDP-I that imprisoned most of its top leaders.23 It resulted in the KDP-I
declaring a ceasefire in 1996 and renouncing warfare in favor of becoming a regular
political party.
With the KDP-I marginalized, the dominant militant Kurdish organization in Iran
today is the Party of Free Life of Kurdistan (PJAK), founded in 2007, which has since
conducted a series of skirmishes against Iranian forces. Alleged American-PJAK and
Turkish-Iranian cooperation has been a major talking point around the conflict
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20 Roosevelt Jr., Archie. "The Kurdish Republic of Mahabad." The Middle East
Journal 1.3 (1947): 247-69. Print.
21 "Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization." UNPO: Iranian
Kurdistan. Web. 3 Feb. 2015.
22 "Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization." UNPO: Iranian
Kurdistan. Web. 3 Feb. 2015.
23 "22. Iran/Kurds (1943-present)." Political Science. University of Central
Arkansas. Web. 3 Feb. 2015.
among its various participants. The PJAK temporarily withdrew from Iran in 2011,
but later redeployed along the Iraqi-Iranian border region and continues to prepare
for future conflicts.
Attempts at Kurdish nationalism in Syria
Syria lacked any organized militant or diplomatic movements for an independent
Kurdish nation until very recently.24 Syria saw a sharp increase in its Kurdish
population after the First World War, due to its porous borders and the failure of
nationalist attempts in Iraq and Turkey. The Syrian government had some minor
history of anti-Kurdish policies, and revoked the citizenship of various Kurds during
the 1960s and 1970s.25 Small-scale protests and demonstrations spontaneously
erupted from time to time, but were efficiently dispersed by the Syrian forces.
However, the quest for a Syrian Kurdistan truly arose and became organized as a
result of the Syrian Civil War. The creation of a Kurdish Supreme Committee in Syria
by the Kurdish National Council presented a united front that was established in
early 2012 by the Kurds of Northern and North-Eastern Syria. The ease with which
the Kurdish National Council has managed to unofficially administer these Kurdish
regions during 2012 was upset by the large-scale offensive carried out by ISIS and
other radical Islamist groups that fragmented Syrian opposition. This fragmentation
culminated in various other Kurdish groups, such as the PKK and Iraqi Kurdistan,
lending support to their Syrian brothers and hence establishing some sort of Kurdish
government in this region as a result. Furthermore, the status of Kurds in Syria is
now deeply connected to Iraqi Kurdistan and the PKK, which shall result in the
formal integration of it into Iraqi Kurdistan.
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24 "The Plight of the Syrian Kurds." The Plight of the Syrian Kurds. The
Institute of Politics at Harvard University. Web. 3 Feb. 2015.
25 "The Plight of the Syrian Kurds." The Plight of the Syrian Kurds. The
Institute of Politics at Harvard University. Web. 3 Feb. 2015.
Timeline of events from 1 January 2015 to 15 November 2017
•
February 22nd 2015: The Kurdish Supreme Committee agrees to allow the PKK and
KDP to be non-voting observers on the KSC.
•
March 31st 2015: After having failed to take over the crucial Syrian-Turkish border
city of Kobane, ISIS declares the start of a new campaign to target Syrian minorities
in North Eastern Syria.
•
May 17th 2015: This attempted onslaught by ISIS resulted in heavy Kurdish losses
and the loss of Manajir and Tell Beydar, while Iraqi Kurdistan managed to fully
liberate the Iraqi states of Nineveh and Kirkuk.
•
May 24th, 2015: PJAK announces its intentions to temporarily suspend operations
against Iran in order to aid their fellow Kurds in Syria. The Iranian government goes
on record to applaud this action and stresses the need for peace in Iran.
•
June 6th, 2015: Due to the advance of ISIS against the Kurds, Iraqi Kurdistan
unanimously passes a bill that makes the Peshmerga: the nationalized Armed Forces
of Iraqi Kurdistan. All Iraqi Kurdish party’s militias are officially put under the
control of the President of Iraqi Kurdistan.
•
June 19th, 2015: The Revolutionary Party of Kurdistan and the Kurdistan Democratic
Party/North, two minor Kurdish political parties in Turkey, issued a joint statement
announcing their merger to create the Union of Turkish Kurds (UTK) under Serok
Barzani.
•
July 31st, 2015: A July offensive carried out by the PKK and Iraqi Kurdistan led to the
liberation of the Syrian province of Harakh, but also resulted in the Syrian Kurds
being forced to leave Kobane. This withdrawal was facilitated by the UTK.
•
December 22nd, 2015: Unknown militants attacked the Presidential Palace in
Damascus, maintaining their offensive for 46 straight hours. The Palace was reduced
to ruins, however Bashar al-Assad and his family escaped with minor injuries. No
group ever claimed credit for the attack, which served to demonstrate Assad's
increasingly precarious grip on the country, and the identity of the attackers remains
unknown.
•
January 14th, 2016: An ISIS attack was carried out in the Israeli city of Safed,
resulting in the deaths of 23 Israeli citizens and 2 Syrian refugees. As a result, Israel
declared its intention to commence airstrikes against ISIS targets in Central and
Northern Syria.
•
February 7th, 2016: Iraq and Iraqi Kurdistan jointly declared victory against ISIS in
Iraq, as simultaneous Iraqi and Kurdistani offensives, combined with Iranian and
American airstrikes, managed to exterminate the remaining ISIS presence in Tikrit.
•
March 17th, 2016: Iraq announced the construction of a new oil pipeline between
Kirkuk and Ceyhan to double the current pipeline’s capacity by March 17th, 2017. In
response, the PKK sent a letter to the PUK and the KDP, communicating their
displeasure that Iraqi Kurdistan would profit by giving resources to the prime
opponent of the PKK, Turkey.
•
May 2nd, 2016: Clashes broke out on the Turkish-Syrian border as the PKK and
Turkish border guards exchanged fire during an ISIS offensive against PKK forces in
the Syrian city of Tall Abyad. The UTK proclaimed its support for the PKK's fight,
and launched its own attacks against Turkish border guards in the region.
•
July 3rd, 2016: Iraqi Kurdistan stopped sending oil to the Iraqi oil pipelines to
support the Kurdish President's demand to retain a larger share of oil revenues. After
tense negotiations, a new agreement is reached that allows Iraqi Kurdistan to retain
23% of the sales revenue.
•
July 22nd, 2016: Police in Iraqi Kurdistan arrested members of the UTK on charges
of "conspiring to commit terrorist acts". However, the alleged UTK fighters managed
to escape within hours and are suspected of subsequently carrying out an attack
against a Turkish military camp near the city of Sirnak. The Turkish government has
called for Turkish access to the investigation into the original arrest.
•
November 15th, 2016: During a Turkish airstrike against PKK training camps in Syria
and Iraq, the PKK managed to shoot down and capture a Turkish F-16.
•
December 7th, 2016: During another round of airstrikes against PKK training camps,
a Turkish F-4 is mistakenly shot down by an Israeli F-35 which was conducting its
own airstrikes against ISIS training camps in the same area. The incident results in a
drastic cooling of Turkey-Israel relations.
•
December 31st, 2016: PKK forces carried out a raid against a Turkish prison on the
island of Imrali, and manage to break Abdullah Ocalan out of prison, along with
other PKK leaders that were being held there. On the same day, reports emerged that
PJAK forces had entered Syria for the first time, and are currently said to be helping
transport weapons to UTK and PKK forces, while also joining the KSC offensive in
Central Syria.
•
26th January, 2017: Iranian Kurds marched in peaceful demonstrations for increased
co-operation between Iran and Iraqi Kurdistan, while also calling for increased
Kurdish autonomy. In response, Iran proposed peaceful migration of Iranian Kurds
to Iraqi Kurdistan, while inviting the KDPI to work with Iran to represent the Kurds.
•
February 21st, 2017: The Free Syrian Army (FSA), having surrounded Damascus,
launched a final, all-out offensive to seize control of the city. A large contingent of
forces commanded by the Kurdish Supreme Council joins the offensive. Two weeks
of intense pitched battle and urban siege warfare follow, with large swathes of the
Syrian civil and military leadership being killed in the fighting, until finally a joint
FSA-KSC battalion takes control of the army HQ and puts an end to the fighting.
Bashar Al Assad himself, however, is believed to have escaped along with his family.
Their whereabouts remain unknown. Regardless, the Free Syrian Army declared
victory in the Syrian Civil War, allowing the Syrian National Council (SNC) to
assume control of the Syrian bureaucracy and government.
•
March 3rd, 2017: As a result of the fragmentation of the Syrian military, the SNC
makes massive gains overnight, while the KSC manages to take over large segments
of Central and Eastern Syria, with the SNC laying claim to the Central Syrian areas
that the KSC now controls. Meanwhile, ISIS still holds onto the Southern regions of
Syria, and makes gains near the Israeli-Syrian border region.
•
March 12th, 2017: A renewed conflict in Turkey occurs due to the PKK using areas of
Northern Syria as staging bases to launch attacks in Turkey to appeal for a Kurdish
state in Turkey.
•
March 14th, 2017: As a result of these various territorial gains and such radical
changes in the geopolitics of the region, the various Kurdish representatives agree to
have a secret conclave in the Iraqi city of Erbil to declare the creation of a new
Kurdish state, and to discuss ways to expand such a state to unite Kurds from Syria,
Iraq, Turkey and Iran into one united nation.
Analysis
The Syrian Issue
The Syrian Civil War, combined with the emergence of the Islamic State, has
radically redefined the balance of power in this historic region. Before these events,
the nation of Syria had complete control over its territory, and the Iraqi government
was able to administer its territory to some degree of efficiency. Additionally, Turkey
did not take any direct actions with regards to these nations, and was less involved in
regional affairs. However, pressing events have created a power vacuum in Syria,
which has divided it into three major factions and dozens of smaller ones. The
elimination of the Syrian authoritarian regime and its military leadership makes it
likely that the SNC will be recognized as the official representative of the Syrian
people. There was an agreement between the KSC and the SNC that ensured that the
Al-Hasakah and Deir ez Zor regions of Syria would be recognized by the SNC as
being under the control of the Kurdish people. However, the KSC has also been able
to rapidly expand its influence to take over the Aleppo and Ar-Raqqah regions in the
aftermath of the SNC and KSC attack on the Presidential Palace. Hence, formulating
a policy on this territorial issue in Syria will be a point of contention in this
upcoming Conclave, as it will determine relations with the new SNC government and
can have an impact on whether operations against ISIS will continue to commence in
the Homs region, the only territory in their control. Other factors to be considered in
this policy formulation process include the fact that Turkey has been carrying out
airstrikes against the PKK in these northern regions of Syria, and that giving up
these regions could potentially cause the PKK to be isolated from other Kurdish
groups. Resolving this territorial dispute on the Eastern front of this new Kurdish
nation will therefore have an impact on international relations, and will be
something that shall affect internal politics, especially since the KSC is a part of this
new nation. Additionally, the rapid advance by the KSC in the face of the shattered
Syrian military led to KSC forces being spread thinly across a vast area. This event
has proven to be sufficient enough to deal with the small fragments of Syrian Army
units that are attempting to claim their own territory, but could be fatal if a conflict is
carried out against the SNC. Such a conflict would force the KSC to vacate a large
part of the central region, and maintaining control over major cities like Aleppo in
the North will be a challenge. However, control over these parts ensures access to a
large part of Syria’s energy reserves, which due to the existing undamaged
infrastructure, can allow the KSC to finance itself if it can find a buyer for these vast
reserves and the approximately 330,000 barrels of oil that can be produced per day
The Iraqi Issue
After the war against ISIS ended in Iraq, Iraqi Kurdistan found itself holding
influence over approximately 38% of the Iraqi population, while also controlling the
border between Iraq and its neighbors of Syria and Turkey. The combination of
Kurdish success in the fight against ISIS, troubles in consolidating power in the
Baghdad government, and increased global attention on the region have prevented
the Iraqi leadership from being able to force the government of Iraqi Kurdistan to
withdraw their forces from other parts of the country. This has allowed Iraqi
Kurdistan to ensure that it essentially runs these regions. The regional inhabitants
themselves also seem satisfied with the current state of affairs, as the ability for local
governors to function had already been destroyed by the ISIS onslaught, and they
haven’t built up such capabilities again. However, the declaration of this new state
may cause the Baghdad leadership to deploy forces against the new Kurdistani state.
The Peshmerga lack the ability to defeat the Iraqi Army in an ordinary battle, but will
be able to stall any such advance after giving up the territory that was gained during
the campaign against ISIS.
A major element in this dispute will be the export of oil. As of the year 2017, Iraqi
Kurdistan receives 23% of the sales revenue that comes from Iraqi oil exports that
originated from Iraqi Kurdistan. Additionally, the newly expanded pipeline between
Turkey and Iraq acts as a point of contention between the involved Kurdish parties.
The PKK vehemently opposes such an action, as it believes that the money gained is
not being assigned to fight the enemies of the Kurdish movement, and that the sold
commodity actually fuels them. Furthermore, it acts as a point of international
debate, because if the Baghdad government controls some of these various pipelines,
other nations may perceive the pipelines as unstable. The oil business further
accounts for almost all of the foreign exchanges that the Baghdad government
receives, which shall impact the Baghdad government’s ability to regulate the Iraqi
Dinar, which will be serving as the transitional currency for Kurdistan until stability
is ensured. Controlling the majority of Iraq’s oil exports can also make Kurdistan
seem legitimate internationally, as a large number of nations rely upon Iraqi oil to
power their economies, and may recognize Kurdistan to ensure such a constant
supply.
Neighborly Relations
Special attention must be paid to the nations of Turkey and Iran, and to whatever
happens in the fragmented former state of Syria. The rise of a Syrian state created by
the SNC or ISIS could mark a renewed War on this front in addition to the expected
conflict with Iraq, and will force the new state to focus only on external threats.
Another possible external threat is with regards to Turkey. The Turkish government
has conducted sporadic airstrikes at PKK-KSC facilities in Northern Syria, and had
conducted strikes into Iraqi Kurdistan before the Syrian disturbances in the region.
Turkey also has the largest Kurdish population in these four nations, and hence,
integrating these individuals into the new nation, or at least ensuring that it can lead
them, is a high priority. However, Turkey’s membership in the NATO alliance will
make any full-scale attack by the Peshmerga against the Turkish-Kurdistani border a
suicidal act. The ongoing conflict between the PKK and Turkey, however, means that
not taking any action will be equal to abandoning our own people. Hence, the
committee must come up with ideas to encourage the Kurdish people in Turkey to
carry out actions that support Kurdish nationalism, and the Conclave must attempt
to coordinate such activities to stoke public opinion in such a way that an integration
of them into Kurdistan is appreciable, while the PKK carries out its own battle
simultaneously.
Iran presents a special situation. While Iran has taken harsh measures against the
Kurdish members immediately after its Revolution, it has also adopted a softer
stance as of late. Iran’s encouragement for peaceful migration into Iraqi Kurdistan
shows their aim to prevent another such ethnic conflict, and the incentive for the
KDPI to submit such ideas to the Iranian government puts the KDPI in a brilliant
position. The KDPI hence has the ability to act as a friendly channel through which
the new Kurdistani nation can communicate with Iran so that Kurdistan’s
integration can be carried out peacefully, while the PJAK forces may act as the
driving force to carry out actions that both the parties deem necessary to shape
public opinion in Iran. Hence, Iran may turn out to be an ally in this Act of
Independence, as they have helped us in the past to combat ISIS forces in Iraq.
International Support
Lastly, the Conclave must look for outside support. The possibility of hostile
enemies on our Southern, Western, and Northern flanks means that we must find
outside supporters who can help lend us credibility, and who can exercise influence
to grant us favorable terms in negotiations. In the immediate region, Israel may be a
possible regional friend, as it has inadvertently helped us with its own independent
aerial campaign against ISIS, and since its relations with Turkey have also
deteriorated as a result of the mistaken shooting. Additionally, the information that
Turkey may have sponsored ISIS can also make Israel a natural friend in a shadow
conflict against Turkey. However, this may prevent us from developing friendly ties
with Iran, and vice versa.
Getting support from players on a broader stage is also important. While the
nations that spearheaded a campaign against ISIS seemed sympathetic to our cause
and have allowed us to create a well equipped and well trained Peshmerga force,
their own relations with Iraq may cause them to at best be neutral in a fight against
Iraq. In such a situation, nations like Russia may be useful, although they may
harbor bad feelings towards us due to the KSC’s destruction of the Assad regime.
Nations like China, India, or Brazil, which are powered by Iraqi oil exports have a
stake in this conflict as well, and hence could be willing to be involved in this new
regional issue.
Questions to Consider
1. What stance should the new state of Kurdistan have regarding the extent of its
territorial claims? What, if any, territorial concessions should it consider, and for
what reasons?
2. What should Kurdistani policy be about the remainder of the state of ISIS, and
should it consider renewed aggression against ISIS to gain international favor?
3. What regional partners should Kurdistan consider to ensure Kurdistan’s stability
and independence?
4. What global partners should Kurdistan consider to ensure its stability and
independence?
5. How should Kurdistan balance the natural resources it controls over a large area of
land against the possibility of a smaller but more efficient nation?
6. How can Kurdistan integrate Kurds from Turkey and Iran without formally starting
a conflict on these two fronts?
7. Under what circumstances can the nation of Kurdistan welcome various Kurdish
groups like the PJAK, PKK, UTK, PYD, KNC and KDPI?
List of Parties (Guide to all the acronyms):
1) KDP: Ruling party of Iraqi Kurdistan
2) PUK: Coalition ally of KDP
3) KNC: Former KDP affiliate in Syria
4) KDPI: Historically important Kurdish party in Iran
5) UTK: Formed from merger of parties that compete with the PKK in Turkey;
6) PKK: Historically the most influential Kurdish force in Turkey. Currently engaged in
a conflict with Turkey
7) Gorran: Former PKK affiliate in Iraqi Kurdistan; also known as Movement for
Change
8) PYD: Former PKK affiliate in Syria
9) PJAK: Former PKK affiliate in Iran
10) FSA: Free Syrian Army, originally the military wing of the SNC and now the de facto
Armed Forces of the Republic of Syria
11) SNC: Syrian National Council, internationally recognized as the legitimate
government of Syria since they defeated Bashar al-Assad in the Syrian Civil War
Recommended Research Tools
As this is a futuristic committee, the background guide shall be the primary source of
information and preparation. Below is a list of resources to provide a better idea
about the Kurdish issue. Kindly keep the events of the timeline in mind while
consulting these resources.
1. http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/
2. http://www.vox.com/a/maps-explain-crisis-iraq
3. http://www.gov.krd/?l=12
4. http://www.infoplease.com/spot/kurds3.html
5. http://www.aljazeera.com/news/europe/2013/03/2013320652845642.html
6. http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/mar/chronology.asp?groupId=63007
7. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-28147263
8. http://www.thewashingtonreview.org/articles/turkey-syria-and-the-kurds.html
Useful Maps
The Current Situation in Syria
Yellow is KSC, Green is SNC, and Black is ISIS.
Oil in Syria
As you can see, the Kurds are in control of most of Syria's oil.
Map of Ethnicities in Syria
The KSC control far more territory than is actually inhabited by ethnic Kurds.
Governorates of Iraq
The Kurdish Regional Government (independent Kurdistan) controls Nineveh,
Dohuk, Arbil, Kirkuk, and Al-Sulaimaniyah governorates. Kurdish forces also have
some degree of control over the border between Syria and Iraq in the Al-Anbar
province, as well as with the Iranian border in Diyala. Kirkuk in particular is
disputed with Iraq.
Dossier
Masoud Barzani – President, KDP
President Barzani controls the KDP party apparatus. He needs to sign off on major
decisions. The Chair of the Conclave will represent President Barzani.
Kosrat Rasul Ali – VP, PUK
Vice President Ali controls the PUK party apparatus. He needs to sign off on major
decisions. The Vice Chair of the Conclave will represent Vice President Ali.
Abdul Karim Sultan Sinjari – Minister of the Interior, KDP
Interior Minister Abdul Sinjari was actively involved in ensuring that Iranian
Kurdish migrants could be easily processed and settled down into Iraqi Kurdistan.
The Syrian Crisis was something that pushed the Ministry of the Interior to its
breaking point, as these refuges consumed a lot of resources and their immigration
led to an obvious increase in unemployment and other social measurements. As a
result of these experiences, he views getting control over parts of Kurdistan’s
neighboring nations as crucial to ensuring stability in the new nation. The
integration of such parts will require his expertise on how to smoothen the
integration process, and how to incentivize individuals to move to newer parts of the
nation. Refugee crises will also need his help to make sure that violent elements do
not manage to infiltrate the nation. He will control national police and paramilitary
forces, and will be in charge of the police forces of the nation, as well as the refugee
camps and border checkpoints that process immigrants.
Bayiz Saeed Mohammad Talabani – Minister of Finance, PUK
The Finance Minister is in charge of preparing the budget and allocating it, and is
also in charge of assigning discretionary funds in cases of emergency. The Finance
Minister is also in charge of issuing debt, preparing possible economic sanctions,
creating economic policies regarding issues like business licenses, and monitoring
trade and the nation’s foreign exchange reserves. Due to the currently oil-centric
status of the economy of Kurdistan, the Finance Minister is currently relying upon
high oil prices and high oil exports to form the majority of the budget. However, a
recent attempt at trade liberalization, which was started in 2015, has managed to
diversify the economy to some extent and has hence allowed the Finance Minister to
rely upon oil revenue to form around 55% of the budget, as opposed to 85% in 2015.
This has been allowed due to an expansion in local heavy industries to produce
machinery that has been consumed locally or been used in the recent conflicts. The
Finance Minister hence will not look upon increasing the reliance on oil in order to
ensure his own influence in the nation, and to eliminate the ancient regional reliance
on oil.
Nechervan Barzani – Party WHIP of the KDP
The Party WHIP for the KDP serves as the Vice-Commander of the KDP, and is in
charge of the KDP in case of the KDP President being absent. Due to this, the WHIP
shall function as the de facto head of the KDP. This means that he must approve any
news releases that are created by other KDP members if they are to be published on
behalf of the KDP, and is in control of the grass-roots workers and party members.
This can however be forced by the Head of the KDP.
During the recent Syrian and ISIS conflicts, Mr. Nechervan had been a vehement
supporter of Kurdish expansion into the power vacuum that was created in the wake
of ISIS and the instability in Syria. He further supported the temporary co-operation
the Syrian National Council to depose the Assads, but was opposed to the idea of
rapidly expanding the area that was claimed by Syrian Kurdish forces.
Qubud Talabani – Party WHIP of the PUK
The Party WHIP for the PUK serves as the Vice-Commander of the PUK, and is in
charge of the PUK in case of the PUK President being absent. Due to this, the WHIP
shall function as the de facto head of the PUK. This means that he must approve any
news releases that are created by other PUK members if they are to be published on
behalf of the PUK, and is in control of the grass-root workers and party members.
This can however be forced by the Head of the PUK.
Minister Ahmad had been in support of rapid territorial expansion into Syria and in
Iraq as well. However, the PUK opposed co-operation with the Syrian National
Council to depose Assad, due to fears about a possible Kurdish state being limited by
the territorial agreements that the SNC and the KSC had agreed upon to divide a
post-war Syrian state. This led to the PUK instead campaigning actively for Syrian
Kurds to expand as far as they could once the Assads were deposed, as they view this
extra occupied territory as something that the Syrian Kurds deserve for their extreme
sacrifices. Additionally, the mineral riches of this region are something they wish to
exploit in order to secure the Kurdish economy, while the area itself shall function as
a buffer zone in their opinion.
Mustafa Qadir Mustafa Aziz – Head of the Peshmerga, Gorran
The Head of the Peshmerga will face a challenge in coordinating military activities
with his fellow Armed Force representatives. The fact that the various Kurdish
parties have unanimously agreed to nationalize their Armed Forces into a Kurdish
Peshmerga shall be of extreme help. He will need to inform the Conclave about
possible ways to handle threats and to achieve Conclave goals for a unified Kurdistan
with the help of a military. He shall also be responsible for talking about whether or
not a proposed military action is feasible or not. The Peshmerga head was heavily
involved in the conflict in Syria and against ISIS, and as a result coordinated with the
Foreign Affairs Ministry to come up with ideas to benefit Kurdistan. Being a military
man, he shall be supportive of expansionist ideas that will enhance his position’s
prestige, and will be hard to convince to retreat. He shall be in charge of giving
marching orders to his troops, and can suggest options for enlistment if in
agreement with the Interior Minister and the President. He cannot declare war or
conduct hostile acts against a peaceful fellow nation.
Ashti Hawrami – Minister of Natural Resources, KDP
The Minister for Natural Resources plays a historically important role in the new
nation’s economy. Being the prime source of information about nations that rely on
his nation’s oil exports can help him to contribute to a search for international allies.
However, his domestic power has been challenged by the Finance Minister’s efforts
at economic diversification, which have reduced the direct impact oil has on the
economy of Kurdistan. The Minister would hence aim to safeguard his natural
energy resources and will support actions that guarantee this. The Minister has the
ability to control the supply of oil from the Kurdish oilfields, which shall become
nationalized once independence is declared, and is needed to validate any
negotiations regarding this oil supply. His actions must be conveyed to the President
and the Conclave, and the President can demand that such actions be revoked.
Jonson Siyawash – Minister of Transport & Communication, KDP
The Minister of Transport and Communication must have a cordial and close
relationship with the Minister of the Interior. The Minister must look after internal
public infrastructure and ensure public satisfaction regarding the quality of this
infrastructure. At the same time, the Minister must be involved in the planning and
discussion of military operations and options to evaluate whether the infrastructure
could handle such plans. During the War against ISIS and the Syrian Conflict,
Minister Siyawash was highly involved in attempts at transporting troops to the front
line and handling the flow of refugees. Additionally, the Minister was a driving force
behind attempts by the Minister of natural Resources to double the pipeline flow
between Kurdistan and Turkey. The Minister views the integration of non Iraqi parts
into Kurdistan as beneficial to his position due to his Ministry being able to gain
control over more infrastructure. He has the power to use discretionary funds to
manage the infrastructure of the nation, to control the state media services, and to
close or open infrastructural networks.
Mahmoud Haji Salih – Minister Martyrs and Anfal Affairs, PUK
The Minister of Martyrs is in charge of creating propaganda that can be used by the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs to further the cause of Kurdistan. The Minister is in
charge of providing information about any atrocities or aggressive actions committed
against the Kurds outside and inside Kurdistan.
The Minister must also be in charge of cultivating a Kurdish identity in Kurdistan
and outside as well. The Minister must come up with ways to publicize the plight of
the Kurds and the wrongful acts committed against them, in order to gain
international sympathy and recognition, pressure neighboring Kurds into supporting
this movement, and force their own governments to engage in talks. The Minister
must work closely with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to achieve international
recognition, and shall act as a public relations individual for the Conclave’s
members. He may take actions like issuing public statements, cooperating with the
Communication Minister to spread propaganda and inviting journalists to show the
Kurdish situation to the world.
Darbaz Kosrat Rasul – Minister of Housing & Reconstruction, PUK
The Ministry of Housing and Reconstruction has been severely impacted by the War
against ISIS and the Syrian conflict. These conflicts had led to a need for greater
housing due to the influx of refugees, and for the internally displaced. Furthermore,
reconstruction activities were carried out in the regions that had been liberated from
ISIS, as most of these places had been the sites of intense battles that reduced entire
cities to rubble. The Minister has control over vast discretionary funds to rapidly
reconstruct housing units if an emergency occurs, and is also in charge of the various
refugee camps that still exist in the nation. The Minister must personally weigh the
benefits of having influence over internal workings by controlling these refugee
camps and making his Ministry carry out reconstruction in non Iraqi Kurdish areas.
At the same time, he must be able to ensure that his Ministry is capable of carrying
out his orders, for a failure to live up to his promises will undermine his position.
Rekawat Hama Rashid – Minister of Health, PUK
The Health Ministry has had some degree of success in Iraqi Kurdistan since 2015.
The Minister has been able to efficiently crack down against communicable diseases
in the Iraqi Kurdish population, and supported a campaign that called for the
immunization of refugees in Kurdistan. This has helped to prevent any disease
outbreaks from occurring in these camps, and has hence been hailed by the
international community. However, the Health Minister faces a challenge in the non
Iraqi Kurdish regions that Kurdistan now finds itself owning in Syria. The War had
thoroughly ravaged this region, and the constant state of warfare made proper
healthcare impossible in this region, leading to a large variety of diseases and
parasites resurging in Syria. Hence, an integration of Syrian areas into Kurdistan will
mean that the Ministry will have to implement radically new and stringent measures
to try and bring healthcare back to this region. The Minister will also need to
consider any combat operations that occur, since the Ministry will be called upon to
handle the casualties in any such events.
Kamal Muslim – Minister of Religious Affairs and Minorities, Gorran
The Minister of Religious Affairs used to have a minor role in the Kurdistani
Regional Government before the various crises that the region has faced. The
Minister’s roles were limited to maintaining places of religious importance and
handling any instances where the religious sentiments of the community were hurt.
This limited the Minister to use discretionary funds to maintain these sites and to
suggest lenient working hours during religious festivities.
However, the crises in the region have boosted the importance of the Minister of
Religious Affairs. The sudden influx of refugees from various nations has increased
the population, but has also led to a more even composition of Sunni and Shia Kurds
in Kurdistan. Additionally, minorities like the Yazidis have also immigrated or come
under the control of Kurdistan. Additionally, the increase in the territory of
Kurdistan has meant that the nation shall now be holding sites of varying degrees of
religious importance for various religions, and reconstructing them is a task that was
well accomplished by the Ministry of Religious Affairs. The Minister must hence
investigate ways to smooth over any actions that may offend the inhabitants of
Kurdistan religiously. Additionally, the Minister must also keep in mind the feelings
of minorities in Kurdistan, and ensure that they are not offended, in order to
maintain internal security.
Falah Mustafa Bakir – Minister of Foreign Affairs, KDP
As the Head of Foreign Affairs, Minister Bakir will be crucial in coming up with ideas
for the new nation to proclaim itself and gain recognition in the world of diplomacy.
Minister Bakir will need to look at the decisions the Conclave takes with an exclusive
eye on whether or not the decision will make Kurdistan a welcomed member of the
global community or a diplomatic pariah.
During the crises faced by the situation in Syria and Iraq, Minister Bakir was
essential in coordinating cross border activities, and colluded with the head of the
Peshmerga to help plan the offensive against Assad and convince the KSC to
collaborate with the SNC.
The Minister of Foreign Affairs will have to be consulted for policies that will have a
definite impact on foreign relations. He also has the power to establish and close
embassies, with the approval of the President, and can independently use the
embassy staff for whatever function.
Yardil Kani Rami – Director of the Kurdish Intelligence Service (KIS),
KDP
Yardil Rami has had a meteoric rise to fame over the course of the fight against ISIS
and the overlapping Syrian conflict. Starting out as a cadet in the fight against ISIS,
he managed to work his way up to the post of a general officer, and commanded the
Peshmerga offensive against Tikrit. His successes and ability to understand
international relations and foreign affairs caused him to be appointed as a liaison
general between the Peshmerga and the Foreign Affairs Ministry of Kurdistan.
Due to this position, he was able to convince the Peshmerga and the Foreign Affairs
Office to formally declare the creation of a Kurdish Intelligence Service, which would
aim to safeguard the Kurdish people of the Middle Eastern region. This agency was
set up with the help of information clandestinely acquired from the PKK and UTK, as
well as with aid provided by PJAK and Mossad contacts.
Abdullah Öcalan – Leader of PKK
The PKK has been highly involved with the recent events in the region. The PKK has
been a major combatant for the Syrian Kurds in Northern Syria, and had initially
been the driving force for defending isolated Kurdish parts of Syria that were
separated from the Iraqi border region. However, the ISIS onslaught in the region
forced the PKK to use UTK help to withdraw from isolated pockets of Syria.
However, PKK forces continued fighting in Eastern Syria, and the lost regions were
regained by a KDP and KSC offensive.
However, the rapid escalation of the fighting with Turkey in Syria and Turkey has
forced the PKK to be at high state of alert, while also forcing the PKK to compete
with the UTK for influence. The PKK aims to expand Kurdistan to Turkey as well, so
that the PKK can exert greater influence for Turkish Kurds. The PKK aims to make
itself an independently recognizable group once again, and wishes to reduce the
growing shadow of the UTK.
Feysel Yousuf – Leader of KNC (KDP-Syria)
The KNC forms one of the two voting blocs of the KSC. It originally started as a
Syrian branch of the KDP, but has now assumed its own identity in Syria and has
peacefully separated from the KDP. The KNC has exerted its influence in the Central
parts of Syria, which it occupied immediately after the fall of Assad. The KNC was
one of the participants in this attack against Assad, and chose to exert influence over
the suddenly unstable Central Syrian regions instead of the Eastern areas that were
under its control. The recent airstrikes by Turkey against PKK elements in Syria have
been a cause of concern, and have reversed opinion in the KNC, with regards to
support from Turkish Kurdish groups. Such airstrikes have forced the KNC to evict
the PKK from their own bases, in order to avoid any casualties from such future
attacks.
The KNC hence views controlling the Central regions of Syria as a crucial part of its
identity, and has convinced Iraqi Kurdistan to claim parts of Syria as well once
Kurdistan is declared as an independent nation. It further views its ownership of
unexploited resources and vast habitable areas as something that can allow it to
handle the influx of Kurds into the new nation.
Salih Muslim – Leader of PYD (PKK-Syria)
The PYD used to be the PKK’s front in Syria. However, even the PYD chose to evolve
independently from its parent organization due to a disagreement on where each
faction should have influence. The PYD believes that the PKK should be in charge
solely of activities in Turkey, due to the highly has attracted Turkish attacks against
Syrian Kurdish installments that have harbored the PKK. The recent airstrikes
against PKK bases in Syria has caused the PYD to instead ally themselves with the
UTK, which it perceives as being a deterrent to any PKK actions against PYD forces.
The PYD further views the UTK as being a faction whose presence allows them to
show their willingness to cooperate with other Kurdish groups in support of a grand
Kurdish nation. However, the PYD believes that the Syrian extent of such a
Kurdistan should only have the Eastern and mineral rich parts of Kurdistan. Such an
opinion stems from the PYD’s aim to emerge as the solitary Kurdish representative
of Syria in a new Kurdistan.
Mustafa Hijri – Leader of KDPI
KDPI used to be extremely close to KDP in Iraq. However, the recent changes in
leadership and ties with Iran that were brought about by the KDPI leadership have
convinced the party to adopt a new independent stance from the KDP and function
as its own group. The KDPI has been essential in improving the ties between the
Kurds of Iran and the Iranian government. Calls by the KDPI for diplomatic talks
between the two sides to discuss peaceful immigration of Iranian Kurds into Iraqi
Kurdistan was well received by Iran, and has helped the KDPI to make itself seen as
the legitimate representative of the Iranian Kurds. However, the relatively unknown
status of their armed forces makes the KDPI appear to be a representative that may
not be able to back up its claims in Iran. The KDPI must hence function as an idea
tank to unite the Iranian Kurds into Kurdistan via peaceful means, and views the
transfer of territory from Iran to Kurdistan something of low priority.
Abdul Rahman Haji Ahmadi – Leader of PJAK (PKK-Iran)
PJAK used to be an offshoot of the PKK in Iran, but has since then attempted to
create its own identity, as a result of what it perceived to be the irrelevance of the
PKK’s presence in Iran. PJAK views itself as a group that has the capacity to carry
out operations in Iran, in order to make the Kurdish question more relevant in the
nation of Iran. PJAK forces have attempted on numerous occasions to engage
Iranian forces in skirmishes, but have suspended such activities since 2015. The
organization then utilized this accepted break to transfer weapons into Syria in order
to aid the fighting over there against the former Syrian Army and Islamist factions.
In a symbolic move, PJAK even donated weapons to PKK and UTK forces in Syria,
showcasing that it no longer relied on the PKK and had become a self-sufficient
organization. PJAK forces were reluctant to advance further into Syria with the fall of
Assad, and were even against such an attack, due to the impact it could have on
Iranian–Kurdish ties. PJAK forces instead currently guard the border of ISIS
occupied regions, and are present on the Iraqi-Iranian borders and within Iran itself.
Serok Barzani – Leader of UTK
The UTK was formed by the merger of the Revolutionary Party of Kurdistan and the
KDP’s Northern affiliate. This new organization pursues a policy of peaceful
integration of the Kurdish parts of Turkey into a new Kurdish nation, and believes
that a declaration of hostilities against Turkey is the quickest way for a Kurdish state
to be destroyed. It has hence not carried out direct operations against the Turkish
military, with the exception of a single attack carried out by more conservative
members of the organization. An internal purge of such elements after this incident
actually attracted members from other Kurdish nationalists in Turkey to join this
group, and has made them grow to a scale that rivals that of the PKK. It is known to
have been grateful for the support it received from the PJAK, and has volunteered to
help allow the creation of a new Kurdish state that encompasses Kurdish controlled
areas of the region. The lack of strikes against it by Turkey, due to the obscurity of
their bases, has helped to position the UTK to be a major regional Kurdish player in
the Northern regions of Syria.
Murat Karayilan – PKK Armed Forces Representative
The PKK’s Armed Forces are among the most battle hardened Kurdish forces in the
region. Their decades long conflict in three various nations has helped to prepare
them to fight in a variety of terrains and against various oppositions. This makes the
PKK’s Armed Forces a formidable fighting force.
However, the recent airstrikes from Turkish airplanes have impaired the mobility of
the PKK, and prevents them from bringing their full force against Turkish Armed
Forces. The Armed Forces Representative is in charge of coming up with operations
for whatever his Party’s representative aims to achieve militarily, for diplomatic or
strategic purposes.
Kodyar Safar – UTK Armed Forces Representative
The UTK has become a well stocked newly created fighting force in the Kurdish
regions. While it lacks as much experience as its contemporaries, its acceptable
performance in Syria, ability to disguise its bases and forces, and newly equipped
status, help to make it an efficient penetrating force. The UTK is a prime target of
Turkish forces, but its ability to tease these forces has helped to make it a source of
inspiration for the Kurds of Turkey, and has attracted a large amount of fresh
recruits. The Armed Forces Representative is in charge of coming up with operations
for whatever his Party’s representative aims to achieve militarily, for diplomatic or
strategic purposes.
Waleed Kurdi – KNC Armed Forces Representative
The KNC has become the most experienced fighting force in the Kurdish region.
Their combination of experience gained while fighting in Syria and its neighboring
countries, combined with the direct onslaught it faced from Syrian governmental,
jihadist, and conventional fighters, has helped to make it a versatile and elite fighting
force. The KNC also holds the distinction of being the only Kurdish force that has
fought, and endured, in the face of chemical weapons and improvised weaponry.
However, such pride has also made them immensely territorial, and will make them
reluctant to give up the areas they have occupied. The Armed Forces Representative
is in charge of coming up with operations for whatever his Party’s representative
aims to achieve militarily, for diplomatic or strategic purposes.
Sipan Hemo – PYD Armed Forces Representative
The PYD has been more of a Kurdish centric fighting group, and hence avoided the
incredible government onslaughts that the KNC had to endure. However, this lack of
experience was made up by their increased contact against ISIS, and by the Kurdish
centric fighting tradition that the PYD prizes itself upon. Further, the PYD is one of
the largest fighting groups in the region, which helps to make up for their lack of
quality. Additionally, the fact that their area of operations are limited to a Kurdish
region lends them with massive local support and allows them to use the region’s
natural features to their advantage. The Armed Forces Representative is in charge of
coming up with operations for whatever his Party’s representative aims to achieve
militarily, for diplomatic or strategic purposes.
Nouri Sharafkandi – KDPI Armed Forces Representative
The KDPI has the least experienced armed forces among the Kurdish militias.
However, it makes up for this by its ability to connect with the Kurdish people of Iran
and spread its ideas efficiently, ensuring a great turnout in demonstrations and
protests. The KDPI views this as being its prime method operation, and instead of
full on conflicts, has Armed Forces that work in small groups and rely on stealth and
secrecy to carry out deniable actions in their area of operations. The Armed Forces
Representative is in charge of coming up with operations for whatever his Party’s
representative aims to achieve militarily, for diplomatic or strategic purposes.
Zanar Agri – PJAK Armed Forces Representative
The PJAK forces have not been actively involved in any conflict yet, and have played
more of a reinforcing role in the Syrian War. However, their performance in such
brief clashes have shown their expertise, and their ability to change the tide just by
their mere presence and involvement. This can be attributed to their new weapons
and advanced tactics, along with the high level of training that they have focused on
since their ceasefire with Iran from 2011. The Armed Forces Representative is in
charge of coming up with operations for whatever his Party’s representative aims to
achieve militarily, for diplomatic or strategic purposes.
Dilsad Talabani – Foreign Intelligence Officer on Russia
Dilsad Talabani was born in the city of Mosul, and spent most of his childhood there.
He was displaced by the Baathist regime’s crackdown against the Kurds during the
Iraq-Iran War, and as a result fled to Russia, where he had family. He hence grew up
in the newly created Russian state, and was there for the country’s transition from
the Soviet Union to the Russian Federation. He worked for the Iraqi embassy in
Russia and returned to Iraq during the mid 2000s. He joined the Peshmerga in
2010, and became a military intelligence officer during the fight against ISIS. He
hence has access to backchannels with Russia as a result of these experiences, and is
hence relied upon as the communication channel between the Foreign Minister and
Russia. He may make proposals to other ministers, but lacks the authority to take
any actions with regards to foreign relations unilaterally.
Golnaz Barzani – Foreign Intelligence Officer on Iran
Golnaz Barzani was born in the city of Erbil, and lived there for her entire life. She
has made frequent trips to Iran via the porous Iranian-Iraqi border near Kurdistan,
and hence has contacts in Iran. She was involved in the Peshmerga during the War
against ISIS, and coordinated with Iranian airstrikes near the area of Erbil, as a
result of her mastery of Farsi. This experience ensures that she has had diplomatic
meetings with the nation of Iran, and has provided her with a treasure trove of
experience with regards to the second largest Middle Eastern nation. She is hence
relied upon as the communication channel between the Foreign Minister and Iran.
She may make proposals to other ministers, but lacks the authority to take any
actions with regards to foreign relations unilaterally.
Gona Talabani – Foreign Intelligence Officer on the GCC
Gona Talabani was born in the city of Erbil, and lived there for her entire life. She is
a Sunni and has travelled throughout the Arabian Peninsula. She was involved with
the Peshmerga during the War against ISIS, and coordinated with Allied airstrikes
near the area of Erbil, as a result of her assignment to being a reconnaissance
member of the Armed Forces. This experience ensures that she has had diplomatic
meetings with the nations of Saudi Arabia and UAE. She is hence relied upon as the
communication channel between the Foreign Minister and the GCC. She may make
proposals to other ministers, but lacks the authority to take any actions with regards
to foreign relations unilaterally.
Mehmet Atilla – Foreign Intelligence Officer on Turkey
Mehmet Atilla was born in the city of Kirkuk, and lived there for his entire life. He
has made frequent trips to Turkey in his youth, as he admired the PKK and their
attempts at creating a Kurdish nation. He was involved with the Peshmerga during
the War against ISIS, and was assigned to a posting in Syria as the War against ISIS
went into this new nation. As he was able to speak Turkish, he was given the
responsibility of working with PKK and later UTK forces. He has also experienced
the ferocity of the Turkish airstrikes first-hand, and has contacts throughout the
PKK, UTK, and also in Southern parts of Turkey. He is also relied upon as the
communication channel between the Foreign Minister and Turkey. He may make
proposals to other ministers, but lacks the authority to take any actions with regards
to foreign relations unilaterally.
Faivish Kurdi – Foreign Intelligence Officer on Israel and the United
States
Faivish Kurdi was born in Dallas in the United States, and lived there for his
childhood years. He studied at the University of Washington and got a degree in
foreign affairs, with emphasis on the Middle East. However, after the death of his
parents as a result of the September 11 attacks, he decided to enlist in the American
Army and was involved in the invasion of Iraq. He surprisingly chose to become an
Iraqi citizen after rediscovering his Kurdish heritage during his stationing there, and
became a resident in Iraqi Kurdistan. He was on the frontlines of the War against
ISIS and was highly valued due to his previous American military experience, which
made him a point of contact between American and Kurdish forces during the Siege
of Kobane. His mix of military experience and foreign affairs awareness has made
him a respected member of the Kurdish intelligence committee, and has hence been
chosen as a specialist on American and Israeli affairs. He may make proposals to
other ministers, but lacks the authority to take any actions with regards to foreign
relations unilaterally.
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