Nuanced rhetoric and the path to poverty: AGRA, small
Nuanced rhetoric and the path to poverty: AGRA, small-scale farmers, and seed and soil fertility in Tanzania February 2015 PO Box 29170, Melville 2109, South Africa www.acbio.org.za w w w. a c b i o. o r g . z a Contents ACRONYMS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY INTRODUCTION METHODOLOGY AND BACKGROUND TO SITES LAND AND AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION Background to land tenure in Tanzania Land tenure and access in the research sites AGRA on land Overview of agricultural production Farmer perceptions of agricultural challenges Agricultural production in the research sites THE GREEN REVOLUTION IN TANZANIA Overview The Southern Agricultural Growth Corridor of Tanzania (SAGCOT) Overview of AGRA in Tanzania SOIL FERTILITY, AGRO-ECOLOGY AND SYNTHETIC FERTILISER Agro-ecological practices in the research sites The introduction of synthetic fertilisers in Tanzania AGRA’s Soil Health Programme (SHP) in Tanzania Case study: Farm Input Promotions Africa Limited (FIPS) and village-based agricultural advisors (VBAAs) SEED Background to the commercial seed sector AGRA and seed in Tanzania Farmer seed use in research sites Seed quality, price and access Case study: Tanseed International Ltd, AGRA and the Green Revolution Key issues, recommendations and areas for further research MARKETS AGRA’s Market Access Programme (MAP) in Tanzania CONCLUSIONS REFERENCES APPENDIX 1: Farmer perceptions of agricultural challenges APPENDIX 2: Tanzania’s commitments under the G8 NAFSN APPENDIX 3: Selected data tables APPENDIX 4: AGRA grants in Tanzania, 2007–2012 APPENDIX 5: Seed varieties in use and farmer perceptions iv vii 1 3 7 7 8 10 11 12 13 16 16 18 19 21 21 22 24 27 31 31 39 40 42 43 46 49 50 53 56 59 60 61 66 71 The African Centre for Biosafety (ACB) is a non-profit organisation, based in Johannesburg, South Africa. It was established to protect Africa’s biodiversity, traditional knowledge, food production systems, culture and diversity, from the threats posed by genetic engineering in food and agriculture. It, has in addition to its work in the field of genetic engineering, also opposed biopiracy, agrofuels and the Green Revolution push in Africa, as it strongly supports social justice, equity and ecological sustainability. The ACB has a respected record of evidence-based work and can play a vital role in the agro-ecological movement by striving towards seed sovereignty, built upon the values of equal access to and use of resources. ©The African Centre for Biosafety March 2015 www.acbio.org.za PO Box 29170, Melville 2109 South Africa Tel: +27 (0)11 486 1156 Design and layout: Adam Rumball, Sharkbouys Designs, Johannesburg Photographs by Stephen Greenberg Acknowledgements Research team: Lina Andrew (MVIWATA) Fadhili Bahati (SAT) Stephen Greenberg (ACB) Gareth Jones (ACB) Janet Maro (SAT) Japhet Masigo (MVIWATA) Alex Wostry (SAT) We appreciate and acknowledge the assistance of Mariam Mayet, Haidee Swanby, Sabrina Masinjila and the team at ACB; also Paul Saidia, Abdullah Mkiga, Prof H. Majamba, Evaristo Longopa, Henry Dlamini and the Eastern and Southern African Small Scale Farmer’s Forum (ESAFF) for their inputs into the research process; staff at SAT and MVIWATA for logistical assistance; the Swiss Development Cooperation (SDC) for funding and support; and all those, including farmers, who shared their time and insights with us. Nuanced rhetoric and the path to poverty: AGRA, small-scale farmers, and seed and soil fertility in Tanzania iii Acronyms AATF ACB ACT ADP AFAP AGRA AGRF ANSAF ARI ARIPO ASA ASDP BRN ByT CA CAADP CEO CGIAR CIMMYT CNFA CSA DAP DFID DUS EACI ESAFF FAO FGD FIAAC FIPS FtF GAP GDP GPL GR ICRISAT ICT IFDC IITA IMF IP IPCC IPRs African Agricultural Technology Fund African Centre for Biosafety Agricultural Council of Tanzania Agro-dealer Development Programme African Fertiliser and Agribusiness Partnership Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa African Green Revolution Forum Agricultural Non-State Actors’ Forum Agricultural Research Institute African Regional Intellectual Property Organisation Agricultural Seed Agency Agricultural Sector Development Programme Big Results Now Bustani ya Tushikamane Conservation Agriculture Comprehensive African Agricultural Development Programme Chief Executive Officer Consultative Group for International Agricultural Research International Maize and Wheat Improvement Centre (formerly) Citizen’s Network for Foreign Affairs Climate Smart Agriculture Di-ammonium phosphate Department for International Development (UK) Distinct, uniform, stable Education for African Crop Improvement Eastern and Southern African Small Scale Farmer’s Forum Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations Focus Group Discussion Fund for the Improvement and Adoption of African Crops Farm Input Promotions Africa Limited Feed the Future Good Agricultural Practice Gross Domestic Product General Public Licence Green Revolution International Crops Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics Information and Communication Technology International Fertiliser Development Centre International Institute of Tropical Agriculture International Monetary Fund Intellectual Property Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change International Property Rights iv A F R I C A N C E N T R E F O R B I O S A F E T Y IRRI ISFM ISSD ISTA KK KSCL LDC MAFC MAP MCC MNCs MOA MoU MSEL MSV MVIWATA NAFSN NAIVS NAP NARS NASFAM NDUS NFRA NGO NMB NMRP NPK NPT OECD OPVs OT PASS PBRs PPP PVP PVS QDS R&D RUDI SACCOS SADC SAGCOT SAT SCODP SDC SEPA SHP International Rice Research Institute Integrated Soil Fertility Management Integrated Seed Sector Development International Seed Trade Association Kilimo cha Kiangazi Kilombero Sugar Company Limited Least Developed Country Ministry of Agriculture, Food Security and Cooperatives Market Access Programme Millennium Challenge Corporation Multinational Corporations Mtibwa Outgrowers’ Association Memorandum of Understanding Mtibwa Sugar Estate Limited Maize Streak Virus Mtandao wa Vikundi vya Wakulima Tanzania G8 New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition National Agricultural Input Voucher Scheme National Agricultural Policy National Agricultural Research Systems National Smallholder Farmers Association of Malawi New, distinct, uniform, stable National Food Reserve Agency Non-government Organisation National Microfinance Bank National Maize Research Programme Nitrogen, Phosphorus, Potassium National Performance Trial Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development Open-pollinated Varieties Opportunity Tanzania Programme for Africa’s Seed Systems Plant Breeders’ Rights Public-private Partnership Plant Variety Protection Participatory Variety Selection Quality Declared Seed Research and Development Rural Urban Development Initiatives Savings and Credit Cooperative Societies Southern African Development Community Southern Agricultural Growth Corridor of Tanzania Sustainable Agriculture Tanzania Sustainable Community Orientated Development Programme Swiss Development Cooperation Seed Production for Africa Soil Health Programme Nuanced rhetoric and the path to poverty: AGRA, small-scale farmers, and seed and soil fertility in Tanzania v SSF SSTP SUA TAFSIP TANPES TAP TAPP TASP TIC TLP TMV1 TOSCA TOSCI TPRI TSIL TWLB UPL UPOV USAID VBAAs WEF WFP Small-scale Farmer Scaling Seeds and Technologies Partnership Sokoine University of Agriculture Tanzanian Agriculture and Food Security Investment Plan Tanzania Private Extension Services Tanzania Agricultural Partnership Tanzanian Agricultural Productivity Partnership Tanzania Agro-dealer Strengthening Programme Tanzania Investment Centre Tropical Legumes Programme Tanzania Maize Variety 1 Tanzania Official Seed Certification Agency Tanzania Official Seed Certification Institute Tropical Pest Research Institute Tanzania Sugar Industries Limited Tanzanian Warehouse Licensing Board United Phosphorus Limited International Union for the Protection of Plant Varieties United States Agency for International Development Village-based agricultural advisors World Economic Forum World Food Programme vi A F R I C A N C E N T R E F O R B I O S A F E T Y Executive Summary This research report arises from a three-year research programme, which the African Centre for Biosafety (ACB) is conducting, to investigate the impacts of Green Revolution (GR) technologies in Africa on small-scale farmers (SSFs). The focus is on seed and soil fertility, and we aim to track the work of the Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA) in particular. The research has two objectives: first, to understand better the impacts of GR interventions on the livelihoods of SSF households and on the ecology; secondly, to build a regional, multi-disciplinary research network with a critical orientation, which will cooperate with activist networks, organisations and movements in support of food sovereignty and democratic producer-owned and controlled systems. The GR can be seen as a puzzle made up of interlocking pieces that form a complex picture. Pieces of the puzzle include policies, laws and institutions, infrastructure, input supply, production and value chain financing, production practices and markets. Significant donor and planning coordination are evident in the strategies being deployed to realise the GR in Africa, with central roles being played by the Comprehensive African Agricultural Development Programme (CAADP), the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), AGRA and the G8’s New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition (NAFSN). The vision of the completed puzzle is coherent and the logic is clear: a production system in which farmers large and small have access to the latest technologies, financed through the profitable production and sale of commodities that meet the requirements of global, regional and domestic markets. But the model is based on an ahistorical, linear view of development that assumes Africa will follow the path of development of Western societies. In this model, agricultural modernisation is the precursor to industrialisation and hence prosperity. But Africa occupies a subordinate position in an already existing global structure of accumulation. At best, many farmers who will inevitably be displaced by forces of competition and concentration will find poorly paid and insecure wage work in mines or factories. At worst, they will be left destitute, their historical connection to the land severed by commodification and commercialisation— without any alternative livelihoods to replace what they have lost. Some local producers and businesses certainly stand to benefit from the GR, but the costs will be borne by other, less visible, people. While the GR is presented in terms of ‘sustainable intensification’ of agriculture, there is nothing sustainable about it in the long term. The end result will be not only social dislocation and marginalisation, but also long-term ecological damage to soil, water and biodiversity. The negative impacts of this harm will not arise all at once and impoverished farmers, desperate for some improvement in their conditions, may be convinced by the short-term gains that appear to be on offer. New technologies are not automatically and necessarily negative. But in order for farmers to have meaningful choices they must receive a range of information that highlights both the pros and cons of different technologies. Few resources from the public and private sectors are being dedicated to supporting agro-ecological methods of production as options available to farmers, options which may be more suitable for their context than expensive inputs with questionable output markets and which will enable them not only to recover their expenditure, but also to realise improvements, together with those around them. Although AGRA speaks of integrated approaches, in practice it orients the bulk of its resources towards the commercial, private side of the equation. Likewise, CAADP gives rhetorical support to ecologically and socially sustainable production. But in practice agricultural programmes and budgets support only the GR. This report on the GR in Tanzania indicates a well-coordinated effort by selected states, philanthropic institutions like AGRA, multilateral institutions, donors and multinational corporations (MNCs) to construct a GR that aims to produce a layer of commercial surplus producers. This effort fails to consider the impacts on those who are Nuanced rhetoric and the path to poverty: AGRA, small-scale farmers, and seed and soil fertility in Tanzania vii not able to integrate into this system but who currently rely on agriculture for their survival. It is still early days for the GR in Tanzania. But it is necessary to raise a red flag of warning: that the inevitable negative social and ecological after-effects of these interventions have yet to be felt, but they will come. The African Centre for Biosafety (ACB) formed a partnership with Mtandao wa Vikundi vya Wakulima Tanzania (MVIWATA) and Sustainable Agriculture Tanzania (SAT) to conduct research in Tanzania. The research is framed by a survey of 60 farmers in Mvomero and Morogoro districts in Morogoro Region. Survey respondents comprised women (61%) and onethird youth, while female-headed households constituted just over one-fifth of the sample. Respondents relied on a mix of agricultural production, seasonal or temporary wage labour (mostly in the agricultural sector), and small businesses for their livelihoods. The sites cover two agro-ecological zones, one in the mountains (grouped into the Northern Highlands) and one in undulating hills with relatively fertile soil (in the Southern Highlands). The latter forms part of the ecological spine of the Southern Agricultural Growth Corridor of Tanzania (SACGOT), a key GR initiative. Irrigated rice is an important crop in Mvomero and is the target for GR interventions in the area. Focus group discussions (FGDs) with farmers on seed, soil fertility and markets, and with village-based agricultural advisers (VBAAs) complemented the survey. Key informant interviews were conducted in Tanzania with farmer and other civil society organisations, government officials, technical staff at universities and institutes, seed companies, donors, multilateral organisations and others. The report is divided into five main content sections: land and agricultural production, GR interventions in Tanzania, soil fertility, seed and markets. AGRA’s interventions are specifically considered in each section. The report concludes with reflections and ideas for the way forward. viii A F R I C A N C E N T R E F O R B I O S A F E T Y Land and agricultural production Land in Tanzania was historically communal and under the authority of the state, with most land farmed by SSFs on 3 hectares (ha) or less each, and with relative equality in land holdings. Although laws and policies provide for equality between men and women regarding land access, allocation and ownership, in practice women are discriminated against. As part of structural adjustment, from the mid-1980s land laws changed to open the door to long-term leases and even outright ownership for commercial production. Efforts are currently under way to survey and demarcate land, including village land, to facilitate commodification and privatisation. Demarcation and certification of land are key commitments by the Tanzanian government as part of NAFSN. The explicit goal is the “responsible and transparent allocation of land to investors in SAGCOT”. In the research sites, the average size of land owned was slightly less than 2 ha per responding household. Four households were landless (they had rented land in the past season) and the maximum land owned was 8 ha, signifying some, but not extreme, differentiation. Land access was becoming an issue in Mvomero, with available land very far from homesteads and land holdings mostly fragmented into dispersed plots. More than half the respondents in Mvomero had rented land in the past season, mostly to complement their own land holdings. Rents ranged from US$12–61/acre/season. Insecure tenure was cited as a reason for limiting investments in soil health. There are clearly tensions between pastoralists and crop growers, with reports of violence and even killings as a result of tensions over land. Though efforts are being made by MVIWATA and others to mediate in disputes, respondents indicated the problem was getting worse over time. The concentration of land holdings will exacerbate these tensions. AGRA recognises the generally small land holdings in Africa and therefore orients its support towards SSFs. Nevertheless, it explicitly supports the concentration of land holdings to allow for economies of scale in production. AGRA makes no reference to those who will lose their land when ownership is concentrated; it also acknowledges the value of customary land tenure systems while pointing out their limitations. However, it explicitly favours private ownership and formal titling for commercial production. Agriculture remains the mainstay of the Tanzanian economy, even though services (including tourism) make the largest contribution to GDP at 48% in 2012. Agriculture’s share of gross domestic product (GDP) is declining and stood at 28% in 2011, although it absorbs 75% of the economically active population, most of whom are SSFs. Only 2.5% of the total land area is currently equipped for irrigation, although it is estimated that ten times this amount has potential for irrigation. There are seven different agro-ecological zones with two dominant rainfall patterns (two rainy seasons in the north and east, and one in the south). Maize, rice, cassava, bananas and sweet potatoes are primary food crops, and major exports include coffee, cotton, cashew, tobacco and sisal. These are all plantation crops. The adoption of GR inputs and technologies in Tanzania is currently low, with an estimated 17% of farming households using certified seed (mainly maize) and an average 5.5 kg/ ha of synthetic fertilisers being used between 2002 and 2009. Synthetic fertiliser use has expanded relatively rapidly since 2009 with the introduction of the National Agricultural Input Voucher Scheme (NAIVS), which subsidises the cost of certified (including hybrid) seed and synthetic fertiliser. Farmers in our survey identified the lack of markets (68%) and crop damage caused by animals (58%) as their major agricultural challenges; high fertiliser prices (51%), access to land (47%) and seed prices (44%) were also notable. In our research sites, vegetables, maize, pigeon pea and paddy (rice) were the most commonly produced crops in Mvomero, while in Morogoro maize (especially local varieties), vegetables and beans were the most widespread crops. Local (or at least uncertified) maize varieties were more prevalent than hybrid or improved open pollinated varieties (OPVs), with only 8–12% of respondents harvesting the latter two, compared with 70% for local maize. More than half (57%) of respondents were growing SAT demo gardens, Morogoro. some kind of fruit tree, with banana, citrus and mango the most common. This indicates a diversity of production that can form a solid basis for a sustainable agriculture and nutrition strategy, if adequately supported. One of the villages in Mvomero is located on a large sugar estate (Mtibwa) but very few farmers were engaged in sugar production, citing low prices as a reason. When considering the absolute volumes produced (rather than per acre yields, because we do not have information on the exact amount of land under different crops), it is clear that those using hybrid maize and improved OPVs are producing higher yields than those using local varieties. Hybrid maize users achieved a two-thirds higher yield than those using local maize. The gap is even wider for those using improved OPVs; the five farmers using improved OPV produced on average 2 tons more than farmers using local maize. This is 210% higher. This finding should be qualified: first, the percentage of people using improved seed is very low so the result is open to distortion; secondly, we do not have an accurate picture of the amount of land planted using the various seed types. Also, farmers who can afford improved seed and the associated synthetic fertilisers are likely to be those with access to more land. There are various reasons why farmers may choose to use local rather than improved varieties, including access and price, and several of these are discussed in some detail in Appendix 5 of the main report. Nuanced rhetoric and the path to poverty: AGRA, small-scale farmers, and seed and soil fertility in Tanzania ix It is clear that, while yields are important to farmers, they are not the only consideration when selecting varieties. Rice yields averaged just under 2 tons, and rice is sold mainly into local markets. Cow pea, bean and pigeon pea are not produced at commercial scale, with yields from 60 to 175 kg for those who harvested these crops in the past season. Green Revolution interventions in Tanzania After independence in the 1960s the state asserted control over agriculture, which was the backbone of the Tanzanian economy. However, structural adjustment driven by the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF), from the mid-1980s and especially after 1992, led to deregulation, trade liberalisation and privatisation of state assets. The main effect felt by agriculture was the arrival of multinational input companies. Since 2009 a series of initiatives were launched to boost the GR and encourage private investment in agriculture. These include Kilimo Kwanza (Agriculture First), which was launched in 2009 as a framework for public private partnerships (PPPs), and investment in the commercialisation of agriculture, including through the expansion of GR technologies; the launch of SAGCOT in 2010; the Grow Africa Forum in 2011; the launch of the Tanzanian Agriculture and Food Security Investment Plan (TAFSIP), Tanzania’s national investment plan under CAADP in 2011; the launch of NAFSN in Tanzania and elsewhere in 2012, Big Results Now (BRN) in 2013, and the operationalisation of the SAGCOT Catalytic Fund in 2014. These initiatives are all linked to one another and are aligned with the embedding of CAADP at the national level. They are based on creating conditions for private sector investment and the commercialisation and modernisation of agriculture in Tanzania. Green Revolution organogram CAADP Grow Africa NAFSN World Bank and other government and multilateral donors USAID SSTP Feed the Future TAPP Nafaka Tanzanian government Markets SAGCOT ARIs Breadbasket strategy PASS CGIAR institutions x AFRICAN CENTRE FOR BIOSAFETY SHP AGRA USAID has played a constant role in Tanzanian agriculture, focusing on large-scale agricultural projects and export production. Currently USAID is working through the Feed the Future (FtF) initiative, launched in 2010 and described as the public sector contribution of the US to the NAFSN and Grow Africa partnerships. Two major projects under FtF are currently underway in Morogoro: the Nafaka food grain value chain project, which works with rice and maize; and the Tanzanian Agricultural Productivity Partnership (TAPP), which focuses on horticulture. Nafaka partners and subcontractors include Farm Input Promotions (FIPS) Africa, MVIWATA, the International Fertiliser Development Centre (IFDC) and SAGCOT. It is apparent from these initiatives over the past five years that there is a high degree of coordination between the Tanzanian government and donors, including especially G8 governments, and domestic and multinational private interests, including Diageo, Monsanto, SABMiller, Syngenta, Unilever, United Phosphorus (UPL)/Advanta and Yara. There is a concerted effort focusing on the commercialisation of agriculture and the ‘crowding in’ of investment in some key geographical areas, of which SAGCOT is a current priority. SAGCOT is “an international PPP aiming to catalyse large volumes of private investment to increase productivity and develop commercial agriculture in the southern corridor”, according to the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). The corridor covers about one third of the land area of Tanzania and is structured around the infrastructural spine connecting the port at Dar es Salaam with Mbeya and the border with Zambia. The concept of agricultural corridors fits firmly into the GR model of agriculture, structured along transport routes to reach markets. SAGCOT, as well as the Beira Agricultural Growth Corridor in neighbouring Mozambique, are being managed by the UK consultancy, Prorustica, along with its agricultural and infrastructure development arms, AgDevCo and InfraCo. SAGCOT’s investment blueprint envisions putting 350,000 ha under production, the creation of 420,000 jobs and potential Terraced plot, Uluguru Mountains, Morogoro farming revenues of US$1.2 billion by 2030. The government of Tanzania is expected to provide up to US$650 million in funding over the project’s first 20 years. It is not clear where these resources will come from, and it should be noted this is only the investment plan—it does not reflect the real possibility of the Tanzanian government being able to raise these resources without cannibalising other public sector expenditure. As part of NAFSN, Monsanto has committed to strengthening agro-dealer networks and distributing highyielding maize varieties in SAGCOT, including making 3–5 new maize varieties available, royalty-free, to seed companies. Yara is in the process of constructing a US$20 million fertiliser terminal at Dar es Salaam’s harbour, as well as providing other support in the corridor. AGRA has identified Tanzania as one of four priority countries earmarked for its breadbasket strategy, with the Southern Highlands and Kilombero region as its focus area, linked to SAGCOT. According to AGRA the strategy focuses on “increasing yields and expanding cultivated land in fertile areas already endowed with a minimum of essential infrastructure”, with over 90% of AGRA’s initial investments in Tanzania in the SAGCOT breadbasket area. In 2010–2011 the Ministry of Agriculture, Food Security and Cooperatives (MAFC) was granted US$640,000 to develop the breadbasket concept and to create ‘investment grade’ proposals. Nuanced rhetoric and the path to poverty: AGRA, small-scale farmers, and seed and soil fertility in Tanzania xi Total AGRA grants to Tanzania from 2007 to 2012 amounted to US$54.6m, with 60.2% being allocated to the Soil Health Programme (SHP). This is somewhat skewed by US$25m in grants for the establishment of the African Fertiliser and Agribusiness Partnership (AFAP), based in Tanzania but with an operational area in Ghana, Mozambique and Tanzania. The Programme for Africa’s Seed Systems (PASS) received 22.8% of total grants. About 17% of total grants went to markets, policy and the development of AGRA’s breadbasket strategy in Tanzania. In 2014 a new series of three-year projects worth US$4.3m was announced, but no details were given and none appeared on the AGRA website at the time of writing. While 78% of farmers owned poultry, the number of hens owned was an average of only 16 each. Less than a quarter of households owned goats and fewer than 10% owned sheep or cattle. A third of the farmers surveyed sourced animal manure from neighbours or other farmers, including from Masai pastoralists in the surrounding areas, usually free of charge, with farmers having to cover transport costs only. While tensions between pastoralists and farmers are evident in places, sharing of resources indicates another, cooperative, aspect to the relationship between villagers and the Masai, suggesting that the association is not just a one-way, conflictual relationship. Soil fertility, agro-ecology and synthetic fertiliser Traditional farming practices such as ‘slash and burn’ (in which land is clear cut and any remaining vegetation is burned, producing nutrient-rich ashes, removing weed seed and making soil friable) and fallowing (in which land is ploughed but left uncultivated for a season or two), are unable to keep up with increasing populations and are becoming less common but without being replaced by more appropriate techniques. Farmers who participated in our research sites were engaged in a number of agro-ecological practices, with potential for expansion of these and other techniques. The most common practices being conducted were seed saving (80%), leaving crop residues on the land (77%), intercropping and planting food trees (both 72%) and applying animal manure (62%). Farmers expressed interest in learning more about Conservation Agriculture (CA) which they mentioned by name without being prompted. When offered a menu of courses by Sustainable Agriculture Tanzania (SAT), farmers overwhelmingly chose a course on No Tillage Agriculture, with 90% of participating farmers selecting it as their first choice. CA is rooted in three inter-related practices: no till or minimum till; cover cropping/permanent ground cover; and intercropping, especially of maize and legumes. While these practices may be accompanied by the increased use of herbicides, this is not a necessary component of CA. Farmer interest in CA suggests an interest in agro-ecological methods of enhancing soil fertility. Herbicides are also expensive and not readily available. Monsanto’s Roundup is one among a number of herbicides being used in the fields. Limited livestock ownership mitigates against higher use of animal manure, and small farm sizes pose a challenge for integrated or mixed farming systems at the individual farm level. xii A F R I C A N C E N T R E F O R B I O S A F E T Y Concepts such as sustainable land and water management, used by CAADP, and Integrated Soil Fertility Management (ISFM), used by AGRA, have emerged in response to declining soil fertility across the continent. These concepts recognise the importance of agro-ecological soil conservation and nutrient enhancing practices, but argue that on their own these techniques are insufficient to replace nutrients exported from farmers’ fields following harvest, and that they must be used in conjunction with the increased use of synthetic fertilisers. Very low fertiliser use in Africa, compared with other parts of the world, is identified as the major reason why African yields are stagnating and even declining, in comparison to growth in yields elsewhere. AGRA maintains that the three primary challenges facing farmers in adopting integrated soil management practices are: i) a lack of physical and economic access to inputs (synthetic fertilisers and improved seeds); ii) low levels of inputs and crop management skills; and iii) poor market linkages that make it difficult for farmers to justify the additional expense of synthetic fertiliser purchases. AGRA’s SHP is designed to respond to these challenges. Currently use of synthetic fertilisers in Tanzania is low, estimated at 12% of farmers, with an average of about 10% of farmers in Morogoro using synthetic fertiliser. Average use nationally from 2002 to 2009 was 5.5 kg/ ha, far below the Abuja Declaration target of 50 kg/ha, with some indication of a rise in 2009 and 2010, following the implementation of NAIVS. This voucher scheme provides subsidies to farmers for a package of fertilisers and improved seed supplied through agrodealers, who then redeem the vouchers at the National Microfinance Bank (NMB), which in turn receives grants from MAFC, World Bank, AGRA and other donors. NAIVS accounted for about 57% of fertiliser consumption in 2010. At present the major emphasis is on increasing fertiliser use through a combination of ramping up domestic production where possible, and of increasing imports and distribution through agro-dealer networks. AGRA plays an important role in supporting these efforts. Despite an apparent balance between synthetic fertiliser use and agro-ecological techniques for soil health in ISFM, as a concept, in practice AGRA emphasises the synthetic fertiliser side of the equation. Around 55% of the value of grants in the SHP was used to increase access to synthetic fertiliser, with the greater part being used to support AFAP. AFAP, with an initial focus on AGRA’s breadbasket countries of Ghana, Mozambique and Tanzania, aims to double fertiliser consumption in these three countries. It intends increasing the number of fertiliser users by 15%, by extending credit guarantees and grants to actors in the fertiliser value chain. The US-based nongovernment organisation (NGO) called CNFA (formerly the Citizen’s Network for Foreign Affairs but now known as just CNFA) was granted US$1.5 million to develop an input distribution system. This is in addition to a grant of US$4.3 million received by CNFA to set up agro-dealer networks nationally under PASS, the seed programme. By contrast, grants to support maize-legume integration came to just Rice paddies, Dihombo irrigation scheme, Mvomero 4% of the total grant value in Tanzania. These projects also include provision of synthetic fertiliser as part of the intervention, in line with ISFM. In Mvomero farmers in the survey were participating in two projects with direct links to GR initiatives to increase the use of fertiliser. One is a new agricultural credit scheme being run in three rice irrigation schemes by Opportunity Tanzania (OT) together with Nafaka; the other is a project in which selected lead farmers run demonstration plots organised by FIPS and Nafaka. FIPS had previously received a grant under AGRA’s seed programme in Tanzania for the dissemination of improved crop varieties and ISFM. Morogoro and Mvomero were among the sites selected for participation in an AGRA-sponsored US$424,000 project, led by Sokoine University of Agriculture (SUA), to scale up Minjingu phosphate utilisation in Tanzania. Minjingu is a local company that mines and processes phosphate rock found in Tanzania. The project found that yields increased dramatically in some areas, while in others the response to the fertiliser was minimal. This indicates that locally specific conditions must be considered when applying fertiliser. Research areas are also targeted for other AGRA interventions, especially building agro-dealer networks to distribute GR inputs to farmers. As a result of these interventions the use of synthetic fertiliser in the study areas Nuanced rhetoric and the path to poverty: AGRA, small-scale farmers, and seed and soil fertility in Tanzania xiii was relatively high compared with national averages—37% of respondents had used some kind of synthetic fertiliser in 2014. Those applying urea to their fields were using 60.7 kg on average; again, this is much higher than national averages. There is a noticeable difference in fertiliser use between the two research sites in Morogoro and Mvomero, with only one farmer in the Morogoro site using synthetic fertiliser. This is not surprising, given that the Morogoro farmers work with SAT on organic agriculture. Since farmers in the Morogoro sites are performing at least as well as those in Mvomero, this suggests that more resources and attention might fruitfully be deployed towards supporting and expanding these ecologically sound farming practices. The average spent on synthetic fertilisers ranged from US$20–118, with an average US$37 spent on urea, the most commonly applied fertiliser. Around half the respondents cited high fertiliser prices as a serious problem, though it would be premature to conclude that high prices are the cause of low adoption. In our Malawi study, 89 out of 90 farmers surveyed said high fertiliser price was a serious problem, yet 81% also reported applying urea in the previous season, and 68% reported using NPK (nitrogen, phosphorus, potassium). Most fertiliser was purchased from agro-dealers. We looked at FIPS and its role in supporting VBAAs as a case study of an AGRA-supported intervention in Mvomero. FIPS is a Kenyan not-for-profit organisation that provides small quantities of fertiliser and seed with which farmers can experiment and select for further use if they choose. FIPS received a US$1.9 million grant from AGRA to work in Tanzania and Mozambique over the period 2012 to 2015. Partners include the UK’s Department for International Development (DFID), USAID, Norad, Monsanto, Yara, Dow, Pioneer and CNFA. FIPS is also a local subcontractor of FtF’s Nafaka programme, in its fourth year, and is the implementing agent for the Small Input Package Demonstration component of the Tanzania Agricultural Partnership (TAP). The other two TAP components are the AGRAsponsored CNFA agro-dealer programme, and the input finance pilot implemented by the NMB. Small quantities of improved seed xiv A F R I C A N C E N T R E F O R B I O S A F E T Y and synthetic fertiliser are provided free to demonstration plots. In Mvomero FIPS trained farmers as VBAAs to provide outreach and extension to farmer networks and to disseminate seed, fertiliser and sometimes pesticides. The VBAAs organise demonstration plots in their respective villages. The land is owned by the VBAAs as farmers and the produce is owned by the VBAA. Essentially the aim is to show farmers the results and encourage them to purchase inputs if they see something they like. It does build a market for the fertiliser companies, but it also offers farmers a choice of technologies. Nevertheless, it is not clear what kind of environmental monitoring takes place. Some farmers said that initial soil tests were done to tailor the type of fertiliser, but others indicated that no soil tests were done. In irrigated schemes, negative environmental impacts from synthetic fertiliser use may be felt downstream and there is no evidence this is being monitored. Since the better-off farmers tend to occupy the upstream plots, this could have longer-term implications for less well-off farmers downstream. The overall goal of the FIPS programme is to create a class of full-time, profitable agrodealers, complementing other GR initiatives under way in the area. According to the VBAAs, farmers have responded favourably to the technologies and practices on show. However, some practices, such as new planting and spacing techniques, have been taken up more rapidly than others. Fertiliser and pesticide adoption is currently being held in check by high prices; hence the linkages between FIPS’ demonstration plots and the micro-finance being offered by OT, with MVIWATA and Nafaka acting as intermediaries. Farmers we spoke to reacted positively to these GR interventions. While a number of farmers indicated they did not need to use synthetic fertilisers because the soils are fertile, others—especially farmers who are oriented towards producing surpluses for markets—do want increased access to synthetic fertilisers. Participating farmers indicated that while they were able to apply some of the techniques, they lack resources to apply others, in particular fertiliser and pesticides. This is why the GR emphasises reducing the price of synthetic fertiliser especially—which primarily means improving supply chain efficiencies—and boosting demand through input subsidies. We can acknowledge a participatory element in these interventions. Nowhere did we get the sense that farmers were being compelled to adopt the technologies on offer. At the same time, however, it is not clear that the longer-term impacts of the increased use of GR inputs, on biodiversity, soil life, water systems and social equality, are well understood, since they are longer-term and it is quite possible to overlook the links between the technologies and their socio-ecological consequences. These aspects of the GR must be monitored closely, together with farmers, so that the connection between growing landlessness, the necessity of precarious labour, ecological damage and the adoption of these technologies is made apparent. This requires ongoing longitudinal studies, especially since the introduction of these inputs is still at an early stage. Proponents of agro-ecology face a number of challenging questions, especially regarding access to sufficient animal manure and crop residues for effective nutrient replenishment. Agro-ecological approaches to soil health are knowledge intensive and it will be necessary to work with research institutes and other experts, to develop contextually appropriate means of improving soils over time, together with farmers and their organisations. Seed This section starts with an overview of Tanzania’s seed sector structure and its legal and policy framework, including the role of seed research and development (R&D) and in particular the changing roles of the public and private sectors. It then looks at AGRA’s seed interventions in Tanzania and in the research area, including the links between AGRA and other GR seed interventions in the research area, particularly USAID/FtF/Nafaka. We then turn to a consideration of the seed being used by farmers in the survey, including quality, price and access. We include a case study of Tanseed International, a domestic commercial seed company privatised from the state monopoly company that operated before liberalisation, and an AGRA grantee and partner. Tanzania did not have a commercial seed sector until the 1970s when USAID provided support to establish a project for commercial seed production. This included research into new varieties, the establishment of seed farms, the formation of the Tanzania National Seed Company (Tanseed) as a state-owned enterprise, and the launch of the Tanzania Official Seed Certification Agency (TOSCA). Up to the 1990s a number of improved OPV and hybrid maize and rice varieties were released. Deregulation and the liberalisation of seed production and distribution in Tanzania consisted of policy and legislative change, especially in plant variety protection (PVP). This created a role for private sector involvement, the privatisation of state-owned enterprises and the establishment of new quasigovernment agencies, facilitating private sector entry, public sector input subsidies to support the development of a commercial seed market, and a role for SSFs through the Quality Declared Seed (QDS) system. Following liberalisation and structural adjustment in the early 1990s, seed MNCs entered the market, targeting profitable seed (mainly maize hybrid and some rice), based mostly on imported seed and germplasm. Pioneer Hi-Bred, Monsanto and Syngenta are currently the largest of these MNCs. Tanseed was privatised in 2002 as part of structural adjustment that led to a collapse of the seed sector for most crops. The private sector focus on maize hybrids is a typical story in Africa, where MNCs concentrate their resources and attention on a few crops with high potential for profit. Smaller markets for indigenous and locally adapted seed typically are not served. According to MAFC, certified maize seed availability has almost reached government targets, but other crops are far behind (e.g. rice at 8% and beans at 3% of target). Most commercial seed is imported. The Agricultural Seed Agency (ASA) was established as a semi-autonomous entity under MAFC in 2006, to produce and sell high quality basic seed to private companies to Nuanced rhetoric and the path to poverty: AGRA, small-scale farmers, and seed and soil fertility in Tanzania xv multiply and sell on to farmers. ASA assumed the responsibilities previously performed by the Ministry’s Seed Unit. ASA’s main objectives are to support the development of a commercial seed sector in Tanzania, and to facilitate investment in seed beyond hybrid maize, with a mandate to work through PPPs. This includes providing seed for bulking up and leasing land and facilities for certified seed production. ASA may also produce seed on contract for private companies. After 2012 the government started a programme to license basic or foundation seed to private seed companies to produce basic and certified seed. This was in an effort to commercialise varieties developed by the research institutes. Eighty per cent of government-released varieties were made available to private sector seed companies but the associated conditions and requirements were stringent and, according to NAFSN, to date very few companies have taken up the offer. The law is also now opening up for private companies to produce basic seed from their own foundation seed, and the main interest is in maize, sunflower and legumes. Private companies may brand the seed they have multiplied and sell it for a profit. The essence of this arrangement is that the private sector provides bulking up capacity that is in short supply, and their brand offers a quality guarantee. In theory, if they do not produce good quality seed, farmers as consumers will reject their brand and acquire seed elsewhere. However, this depends crucially on the ready availability of alternative seed varieties. This may become a problem after many years of R&D having focused on only a few uniform varieties, thereby limiting farmers’ choice and forcing them to use available seed even if it is not of good quality. This argument is usually used against farmers’ own seed varieties, but can apply equally to poor quality certified seed. A big difference is that poor quality farmer varieties are usually restricted to local areas, whereas poor quality certified seed may be distributed nationally, thereby threatening agro-biodiversity. Like ASA, liberalisation has also forced research stations to orient their work towards partnerships with the private sector. Although xvi A F R I C A N C E N T R E F O R B I O S A F E T Y they do receive core funds from the public sector, researchers and institutes must supplement these funds with private sector funding to make ends meet. Public sector breeders conduct research on behalf of donors, whether public or private, and funds cover all or part of the costs of travel, logistics, irrigation and fertiliser. NAIVS was established in 2009 to boost the market in certified seed through public sector subsidisation. The scheme constituted between 37% and 44% of the annual MAFC budget between 2009 and 2012. The main target crops are hybrid and improved OPV maize and rice. NAIVS was suspended in 2014 following widespread corruption and was replaced with soft loans through financial institutions and cooperatives. The certification process involves a number of steps including on-station research, multilocation trials, participatory variety selection (PVS) and national performance trials to test for ‘distinct, uniform and stable’ (DUS) compliance. If successful, the variety can then be registered and officially released. There is value in rigorous quality controls, especially when farmers are actively involved in shaping the processes, but there are fundamental problems with the DUS criteria in particular. Distinctions between varieties are more important to those who want to benefit from ownership than to farmers. But the requirement makes it more difficult for farmers to gain recognition through the official system for varieties they manage. The emphasis on commercialisation of public sector varieties places small-scale, resource-poor farmers at a disadvantage when seeking access to public sector germplasm; they will find it more difficult to commercialise if they must go through the full certification process first. In the context of a distinct orientation towards the private sector, the QDS system is something of an outlier. It actually facilitates farmer involvement in the seed sector without necessarily forcing farmers into direct competition with MNCs. QDS allows local production and sales of seed with the focus on non-commercial crops and relatively light regulation. We encountered different opinions on QDS. In FGDs, farmers indicated they did not know of anyone producing seed through the QDS system. Farmers are recycling seed, sometimes for local sale, and being involved in certified seed production was not top of their agenda. However, farmers did express interest in learning more about seed production and said they were sure they could produce quality seed themselves if they could acquire the technical knowledge. Proponents of QDS seek to extend the boundaries of distribution beyond a single ward and favour greater public investment in the system, including building farmer capacity to produce quality seed of their favoured varieties and extending the area under QDS production. Private seed companies do not favour QDS, arguing rather for investment in the commercial sector. Part of their concern is that QDS promotes unfair competition in the seed market by relaxing standards for some. Following structural adjustment, the Plant Protection Act (1997), the Plant Breeders’ Rights Act (2003) and the Seed Act (2003) were passed to ‘modernise’ the seed system. Emphasis is placed on the involvement of private companies in bulking up and commercialising public varieties. Harmonisation of PVP laws aims to provide secure rights for private investment including and especially through the protection of private ownership over seed in the form of intellectual property (IP) protection, based on the provisions of the Union for the Protection of Plant Varieties (UPOV) 1991. UPOV 1991 has reduced farmers’ rights to save and exchange seed in favour of private breeders’ rights. Tanzania’s 2003 laws were already compliant with UPOV 1991 in many respects, and this is reinforced in recent proposals. Tanzania is in the process of joining UPOV and already has in place the Plant Breeders’ Rights Act 2012, which is UPOV 1991 compliant for mainland Tanzania. Zanzibar has adopted the Plant Breeders’ Rights Bill which is awaiting Parliamentary assent. Tanzania is in the process of finalising the Instrument of Ratification. Once Tanzania ratifies the UPOV 1991 convention it will be the only Least Developed Country (LDC) in the world to have done so. Tanzania has also signed the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Seed Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) which allows registration of a plant variety released SAT training centre, Morogoro by any two SADC member states without further testing. Theoretically, the main purpose of PVP laws are to protect private owners from others who might seek to benefit from their sunk investment in R&D. But approval of blanket PVP laws based on UPOV 1991 potentially opens the way for the criminalisation of the distribution of recycled genetic materials circulating in farming systems, by restricting farmers’ use of protected varieties. Amendments to the Seed Act in 2014 also place restrictions on the sale or exchange of non-certified materials. These currently are the lifeblood of Tanzania’s farming systems, as shown in the survey results below. It is necessary to develop alternatives that start with protecting and expanding contextual diversity, participatory R&D and shared ownership. QDS is a good starting point and should be supported and expanded with farmer involvement. The current situation (but liable to rapid change, given the laws and policies on the table) is that the Tanzanian government owns and controls the national germplasm supply. Final variety ownership is determined by an initial agreement between government and the private companies. Research stations do not negotiate this aspect directly with companies, but follow the instructions of national government via MAFC. This can result in a process of germplasm ownership transfer from the public to the private sector. ACB’s position is that all products that derive from a shared resource pool should be replaced in that resource pool, for further use by anyone who Nuanced rhetoric and the path to poverty: AGRA, small-scale farmers, and seed and soil fertility in Tanzania xvii chooses, on condition that they agree to these terms (i.e. a General Public Licence, already well-established in the computer sphere through the open source movement). programme, held one-fifth of the total value of seed grants. These were mostly similar-sized grants (US$150—230k) to a number of private seed companies, including Tanseed. AGRA’s seed programme in Tanzania favours the extension of certified seed through private sector production and distribution. AGRA spent US$12.4 million on 33 grants on seed to 19 recipients in Tanzania from 2007–2012. The Agro-dealer Development Programme (ADP) was the major seed sub-programme sponsored by AGRA in this period; it comprised 45% of the value of grants in the seed programme. ADP grants were provided to establish a national agro-dealer network (CNFA), provide a credit facility (NMB), and develop an official agro-dealer strategy (MAFC). The Tanzania Agro-dealer Strengthening Programme (TASP), managed by CNFA, operated in 13 districts including Mvomero and Morogoro, between 2007 and 2010. According to AGRA, 71% of agro-dealers were involved in the supply and distribution of agro-inputs, and all certified agro-dealers participated in the NAIVS. In our research sites we found a sporadic presence of agro-dealers—they were not a major presence. Nevertheless, the VBAAs play a similar role to agro-dealers as a kind of private extension network, by providing farmers with information and by connecting farmers and commercial input suppliers. AGRA has some clear links to other GR initiatives on seed in Tanzania, in particular the G8 NAFSN. An area of direct partnership is the Scaling Seeds and Technologies Partnership (SSTP), part of NAFSN in a number of countries (including Mozambique and Malawi) with funding from USAID channelled via AGRA. The SSTP in Tanzania targets improved varieties of beans, cassava, Irish potatoes, maize, pigeon pea, sorghum, and soybeans in 21 SAGCOT districts, including Mvomero and Morogoro, and 7 districts in northern Tanzania. A call for proposals was issued in mid-2014 which listsed the following requirements: the production and marketing of breeder, foundation and certified/ QDS seed; the scaling up of blended fertilisers for any of the identified crops; rhizobium inoculation (beans and soybeans); links to commercial suppliers are favoured; scaling up of commercial input and output marketing systems involving agro-dealers; and the integration of information and communication technology (ICT) platforms into value chains. It also called for the establishment of a seed business incubation centre to provide technical support and business development services to seed entrepreneurs in foundation seed production, seed quality control, and seed processing and packaging, on a cost recovery basis. We aim to track these activities under the SSTP. The Fund for the Improvement and Adoption of African Crops (FIAAC), which focuses on R&D and the commercialisation of new seed varieties, is the second biggest seed subprogramme with 32% of the total value of seed grants up to 2012. Half the value of FIAAC grants went to MAFC and covered a range of crops, including maize (hybrid and improved OPV), beans, cassava, sweet potato, soybean and rice. Mostly the geographical areas of operation are not specified in the grant summaries, but two MAFC grants, on beans and hybrid maize, were specifically located in the Southern Highlands. In the first five years of operation, four maize hybrid varieties, five paddy improved varieties and twelve improved varieties of roots and tuber crops were released through FIAAC activities in Tanzania. Seed Production for Africa (SEPA), AGRA’s private seed enterprise development xviii A F R I C A N C E N T R E F O R B I O S A F E T Y Interventions aimed at expanding access to improved OPV and hybrid seed varieties are still in their infancy in the study areas. Our small survey found that over 80% of local maize, legume and rice seed in use was non-certified, and 43–75% of improved OPV and hybrid maize in use was non-certified. Eighty per cent of respondents indicated they recycled at least some seed from one year to the next. The official advice is to recycle improved OPV rice for at least four seasons. Farmers usually mix varieties so by the fourth season it is a different variety and the recommendation is to buy fresh seed. There is no compulsion for farmers to acquire new certified seed, but it is recommended as a good agricultural practice (GAP). In this context, the distinction between a certified seed and an uncertified seed is blurred, especially where recycling is part of good practice. A similar situation applies to maize, especially the improved OPVs. These OPVs are closely related to local varieties because they are mostly a mixture of local varieties with external germplasm from institutes within the Consultative Group for International Agricultural Research (CGIAR). Therefore they already contain within them germplasm adapted for local conditions, and this produces plasticity, the ability to adapt to the ecological context. It would be a travesty if this beneficial process was disrupted by demands for private ownership of germplasm, preventing farmers from allowing beneficial traits to diffuse into the environment. This is not on the agenda at present (with regard to varieties based on public sector germplasm), but PVP and IP laws pose that threat in future. Once a seed enters circulation it should be considered part of the farmers’ asset base to nurture and grow, with support from public sector institutions and expertise to maintain and improve on that variety, for local use and even commercially, if acceptable standards are met. Improved OPVs deserve closer attention, because they are a potential key point of intersection between commercial and farmer-managed seed systems, along the lines of farmer-based Integrated Seed Sector Development (ISSD). ACB is critical of the ISSD in that it offers platitudes to farmermanaged seed systems but its practical work is oriented towards building the commercial sector—by taking advantage of the positive features of farmer-managed systems (e.g. diversity, local germplasm, organisational capacity). Nevertheless, if we turn the ISSD concept around and look at the issue from the perspective of the farmer-managed seed system, we can see the possibilities of connecting the two systems to the benefit of farmers—e.g. public sector germplasm and R&D, and seed enterprises (which can be profitable without being profit maximising). About a third of respondents in the survey indicated poor quality of seed as a serious concern; the other respondents were divided Rice, Mvomero between not serious and moderately serious. Seed price was slightly more of an issue and 44% of respondents indicated it as a serious issue. When looking at specific seed types, respondents were generally satisfied with the quality of the seed they were using (Table 13). The seed for hybrid maize was rated ‘good’ by 86% of respondents; while beans and local maize were mostly highly rated—beans by 82% and local maize by 76% of respondents. According to farmers in a seed FGD, access to seed is a big problem. The wrong varieties are given, and there is low germination, or the seed does germinate but doesn’t produce anything. The farmers felt the problem lay with the agro-dealers. Seed prices ranged from US$0.78/ kg for improved OPV maize to US$0.07/kg for local maize. This forms a baseline to track seed prices in these localities. Hybrid maize and beans showed the largest average expenditure. A case study of Tanseed sheds light on AGRA’s holistic support to private seed companies and also indicates an important role for AGRA in cementing different GR interventions by other actors, including USAID and NAFSN. It highlights the coordinated character of these interventions and provides a good example of the emphasis on commercial seed enterprises. Tanseed produces five maize varieties based on three technologies (drought resistance; strigaway—a maize seed that is resistant to the weed Striga; and quality protein). They are also testing other products, including work on hybrid rice with the African Agricultural Technology Fund (AATF) based in Nairobi and funded by the Gates Foundation. Tanseed has Nuanced rhetoric and the path to poverty: AGRA, small-scale farmers, and seed and soil fertility in Tanzania xix five commercial rice varieties and aims to start work on vegetable seed in the future. According to Isako Mushauri, Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of Tanseed, low productivity is the result of a lack of GAP skills, the low adoption of improved genetics, low farmer education, and poor market prices. He says hybrid seed is not suitable for all conditions since the genetic potential of the seed will be wasted unless conditions are right, and farmers will end up paying for something they cannot fully use. Tanseed is active in seed promotion and dissemination and works with Yara to sell products in a package of seed and soil health extension, seed and fertiliser, through Tanzania Private Extension Services (TANPES). Tanseed hosts field days and has mobile demonstration plots where they involve farmers and buyers, so that farmers can better understand demand and buyers can better understand the available varieties. Tanseed has sub-stations and are geographically located for regional expansion. Tanseed’s maize varieties are proprietary, based on an exclusivity agreement with the International Maize and Wheat Improvement Center (CIMMYT). Its rice varieties are public but branded by Tanseed. The company buys the foundation seed and produces certified seed, contracting SSFs to produce. In 2012 Tanseed trained about 300 farmers although only 56 farmers qualified. The company also has an MoU with SUA to commercialise rice and bean varieties on an exclusive basis. Tanseed received one direct AGRA grant worth US$167,000 for the period 2007–2009, for improved maize, pigeon pea and sesame. However, Mushauri says AGRA still provides grants directly to Tanseed, to increase production and facilitate processing, storage, promotion and dissemination, in order to make seed available. AGRA’s support goes well beyond the grants. According to Mushauri, “AGRA provides unique support across seed production, processing, storage, marketing, financing. It is an excellent concept and AGRA shares world class consultants who provide consulting and training support for different needs at different stages.” Beyond AGRA, Tanseed is linked into a number of other GR initiatives. The company has a xx A F R I C A N C E N T R E F O R B I O S A F E T Y NAFSN commitment to produce nutritionrich maize seed, as well as beans and soya as low cost sources of protein, currently using conventional breeding. It is also working with Yara, USAID and others on various projects and programmes. The Tanseed case highlights the centrality of private seed enterprises within GR interventions regarding seed. These companies are being supported to play an integrated role that comprises production, contracting of SSFs, dissemination, extension and training and advocacy. AGRA’s role in Tanzania’s seed systems should be seen within the context of a longer-term process of liberalisation and deregulation that took place in the early 1990s, which opened the door for private sector involvement in seed production and distribution. Based on its investment profile, AGRA has prioritised distribution, followed by work on developing new seed varieties, mainly with public sector institutions. AGRA has a clear position on combining improved seed varieties with synthetic fertiliser in a package of interventions that raise a number of issues for the food sovereignty movement. In particular they impel us to clarify our positions on public and private sector R&D, germplasm improvement, and the role of farmers in seed production and distribution. On the issue of improved seed ACB is not in favour of hybrids, primarily because they reduce farmers’ ability to recycle seed if they choose, and hybrids are generally heavily reliant on synthetic fertiliser and irrigation. Consequently it is the relatively wealthier farmers who favour hybrids and this increases inequality over time. If improvements are based on OPVs, seed can be recycled for a number of years without major loss of traits. Open pollination can increase biodiversity and the germplasm is more adaptable to the ecological context than hybrid seed. While it is true that even improved OPVs may perform closer to their potential with the increased use of synthetic fertiliser, they are generally less sensitive to a lack of concentrated nutrients than hybrids. Open access to germplasm is essential for the democratic control of production. Offering the underlying germplasm pool on an open source basis could operate along the lines of the General Public Licence (GPL) pioneered by the open source computer software movement. This would allow open access to germplasm on condition that modifications become freely available to others on the same terms. Open source germplasm does not mean that companies are prevented from selling the seeds they have developed. ‘First mover advantage’ means a company can still profit from innovations even if others know what they have done. “It takes time and money to reverse engineer a product” and “when the innovator begins production with a very large capacity, the size of the residual competitive rent left for even the first imitator becomes very small, so small that, in general, it will not be profitable to imitate.” (Both quotes are from Boldrin and Levine, 2008, and are referenced in the main report). Farmers who access the seed will be free to recycle it if they wish, but we know that commercial farmers will not recycle seed unless the quality is maintained. They are more likely to purchase fresh seed anew every year to ensure quality, so commercial seed producers will retain profitable markets even if there is some leakage, especially to small, resource-poor farmers. In the long run this leakage could also produce new markets for companies if the seed produces well and farmers decide they want to buy fresh seed. generally on a combination of local and external genetic resources. Local resources, which root improvements in an ecological context and which enable external germplasm to be adapted to local conditions, were developed over many years, primarily by farmers themselves. There was no certified seed sector in Tanzania before the 1970s and farmers generated and managed all varieties. If local germplasm is used in improvements, what rights should farmers have over the product? In line with an open source approach, farmers would contribute their varieties to the common pool for use by all. This obviously means that private companies could use local germplasm freely, but if this use was based on GPL it would not result in the privatisation of farmer varieties, since the source materials for any product would be made available on the same terms. The GPL approach would rule out PPPs based on privately-owned germplasm, unless the private owner would be willing to share the product freely. The logic of PVP law is to secure the private rights of owners of germplasm. ACB has an in principle opposition to the private ownership of germplasm—we consider all germplasm to be the product of a combination of natural resources that are part of the common benefits available to humanity. In addition, human innovation and ingenuity should be considered a pool of common knowledge that is far older than corporate and other private owners. To the extent that the public sector manages and maintains germplasm in the public interest, it might be considered the legal ‘owner’ of the germplasm, but only to the extent that it secures these resources for the common good. Further research may focus on QDS in practice and the tracking of ISSD and SSTP projects in Tanzania. We will also engage with our partners and farmers to identify possible areas of cooperation to support farmer involvement in seed production and distribution, especially of locally valuable farmer varieties. We are also interested in exploring the differential impact on farmers of private seed company expansion into local areas over time. This brings us to the question of farmer varieties. Improved varieties are based QDS occupies an important niche in the Tanzanian seed system. Comments made by people we interviewed suggest it is coming under pressure from private enterprises—it is seen as a potential threat and a diversion of public resources away from supporting the private sector. ACB believes QDS provides a basis for public-farmer partnerships and we will look for ways of interacting with these processes to strengthen and support them. Markets Markets are not a focus of this research but farmers indicated it as one of their main concerns. Market access is a central aspect of GR interventions since farmers will be able to afford costly inputs, especially fertiliser and irrigation, only if they can increase their incomes from production sales to pay for the inputs and be in a better position after paying these costs. Farmers are under pressure to Nuanced rhetoric and the path to poverty: AGRA, small-scale farmers, and seed and soil fertility in Tanzania xxi markets and US$0.13/kg offered by middlemen. However, there are some challenges and farmers are distrustful of the scheme. Farmers have to transport their produce to Dodoma and this is a bureaucratic and time-consuming procedure. Unexpected costs were deducted and larger business people received payment while smaller farmers were not yet paid. Vendors tried to insert themselves into the process, buying directly from farmers for lower prices and then selling to the NFRA. The NFRA had initially committed to purchase 7,000 tons from SSFs but ended up purchasing only 2,000 tons. Street vendors, Dar es Salaam. produce and sell surpluses in the context of low producer prices, weak storage systems, and the challenges of product quality, standardisation and physical distance to markets. Production generally is split between sales (often distress sales to raise some cash) and household use. Most sales are to local, informal markets. In the research sites, improved OPV maize and rice were the two crops with the highest volumes traded. Some survey participants were selling vegetables, with tomatoes being very popular, but large seasonal surpluses were evident throughout the survey areas, resulting in low prices. Some of the survey participants were involved in a new AGRA funded initiative in Mvomero, for collective marketing of maize to the National Food Reserve Agency (NFRA) in Dodoma. MVIWATA is contracted to facilitate farmer participation. The project involves a number of aggregation points managed by Savings and Credit Cooperative Societies (SACCOS) funded by Nafaka. The initiative offers farmers a higher price for maize than local markets, at US$0.30/kg after costs compared with US$0.15/kg realised in local xxii A F R I C A N C E N T R E F O R B I O S A F E T Y Although the market linkages programme with NFRA has many positive aspects— working with farmer associations, public sector procurement, offering higher prices for products—over time it inevitably will become a conduit for larger commercial producers at the expense of smaller producers, who are unable to afford the necessary inputs, or who do not have the knowledge or capacity to produce on a large scale. Conclusions The GR thrust in Tanzania is essentially about identifying points of blockage as well as areas of potential opportunity for the private sector. AGRA is playing an important role in these processes. GR interventions in the research sites are uneven. There is evidence of the uptake of improved seed by farmers, especially rice and to a lesser extent legumes. In the study sites farmers still mostly use local maize varieties. The use of synthetic fertiliser is significantly higher than the national average, both in terms of average per hectare applications and numbers of farmers using these technologies. This is evidence of the impact of GR interventions, including the expansion of agro-dealer networks, and programmes such as Nafaka that are introducing these inputs into farming systems. Key issues with regard to seed relate to the use of DUS criteria in the formal certification process and the impacts on farmer seed production and distribution; the role of QDS in the seed system; the adoption of UPOV91 compliant PVP laws and the potential impact on SSFs in the longer-term; and the channelling of public sector resources to advance processes of private and corporate gain. With regard to DUS and seed certification we argue that while these criteria may be conducive to secure the interests of private ownership, they are not appropriate for the expansion of SSF involvement in seed production beyond a commercial scale. We propose that quality criteria be developed between farmers as producers and farmers as users of seed, in cooperation with public sector institutions. In this regard we believe QDS has an important role to play in introducing farmers to seed production in a systematic way, which includes production of their own varieties for local use as well as for expanded distribution within the agro-ecological zones for which the seed is adapted. In a similar way to the DUS criteria, a blanket approach to PVP laws that prevents farmers from freely adapting and using whatever seed they have at their disposal threatens the long term sustainability and diversity of the seed system. In principle we are opposed to the private ownership of genetic resources as these are the product of social and collective endeavour that goes well beyond corporations and private individuals. Private companies should have a right to sell products with their own quality guarantee attached if they wish, but this should not prevent others from using the genetic resources in ways they choose. The GR emphasis on competitive private enterprise, economies of scale and the standardisation of cultures, consumption patterns and agricultural outputs, runs counter to the flourishing of diversity that is crucial for the survival of humans and the nurturing of our ecological habitat. A complex set of responses is required in the face of the GR thrust. First, the technological and methodological aspects of the GR must be broken down to see what benefits may accrue to farmers if aspects of these are managed on the basis of democratic control and decision-making, cooperation, collectivity and accountability. Technological advances, even in the current setup, may have value, but we must also have the foresight to consider possible implications in the decades ahead, especially if these technologies are placed under the control of MNCs accountable only to their financial backers. Secondly, lobbying in opposition to these interventions is required where they pose an immediate and direct threat to the construction of a society based on the principles of democratic control and decisionmaking, cooperation and collectivity. A current example is the effort to privatise the gene pool and criminalise the fundamental right— and indeed the fundamental necessity—for farmers to save, share and exchange genetic materials, as they choose. Thirdly, it is necessary to develop practical alternatives in the present to move us towards a future based on these principles. This includes lobbying and working with governments and donors to create a space for the material advancement of agro-ecological practices, and the materialisation of the principles of democratic control and decision-making, cooperation, inclusiveness and collectivity in our practices as we move towards our envisioned future. Key recommendations and way forward The following recommendations are for civil society organisations and the food sovereignty movement, in conjunction with government and public sector R&D institutions: • Develop methodologies and support longitudinal studies that closely monitor the long-term social and environmental impacts of GR interventions, including land access, soil and water health and biodiversity; • Develop multidisciplinary partnerships and methodologies to support these processes, cutting across social, organisational and technical fields; • Support farmers and public sector extension officers with training in agro-ecological techniques, working together with farmers and their organisations, public sector institutions, universities, and training organisations and institutions; • Support cooperative processes of curriculum development for technical training on agroecology; Nuanced rhetoric and the path to poverty: AGRA, small-scale farmers, and seed and soil fertility in Tanzania xxiii • • SAT demo plots, Morogoro. • Support the construction of open, inclusive and democratic farmer-based extension networks linked to research and training; • Investigate further the practical operation of QDS to identify the opportunities and limits of the system in supporting knowledge for the consolidation and expansion of farmer-managed seed systems and the incorporation of farmer varieties, including building farmer capacity by using participatory methods to produce quality seed of their favoured varieties and extending the area under farmer-managed production and distribution; • Work on alternatives to proprietary plant variety ownership, starting from protecting and expanding contextual diversity, participatory R&D and shared ownership; • Lobby for the application of General Public Licencing as the basis of variety improvement, where all products deriving xxiv A F R I C A N C E N T R E F O R B I O S A F E T Y • • • • from a shared germplasm source pool are replaced in that resource pool for further use by anyone who chooses, with open access for responsible use, on condition that the users agree to these terms; Monitor and analyse the implementation of SSTP and ISSD interventions, and engage with participating farmers if the opportunity arises; Lobby for the removal of proprietary ownership on all seed once it enters circulation so it becomes part of the farmers’ asset base to nurture and grow, with support from public sector institutions and expertise to maintain and improve genetic resources, for local use and commercially, if acceptable standards are met; Pay close attention to improved OPVs under public ownership as a potential key point of intersection between commercial and farmer-managed seed systems from an R&D point of view, with a focus on expanding farmer-managed diversity, local germplasm and organisational and technical capacity; For the food sovereignty movement, clarify positions on improved OPVs, QDS and its orientation towards genuine farmermanaged seed systems, public and private sector R&D, germplasm improvement, and the role of farmers in seed production and distribution; Exclude any PPPs based on privately owned germplasm—unless the private owner is willing to share the product freely; and Develop seed quality criteria as an alternative to DUS, with farmers as producers and users of seed, in cooperation with their organisations and other public and education institutions, building on the lessons learned from QDS to date. Introduction This research report arises from a three year research programme which the African Centre for Biosafety (ACB) is conducting to investigate the impacts of Green Revolution (GR) technologies in Africa on small-scale farmers (SSFs). The focus is on seed and soil fertility, and we aim to track the work of the Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA) in particular. We started the research in Malawi early in 2014, working in partnership with the National Smallholder Farmers Association of Malawi (NASFAM), Kusamala Institute of Agriculture and Ecology, and Dr Blessings Chinsinga from the University of Malawi, with technical support from Chitedze Research Station. The Tanzanian research is part of the same process and in 2015 the research will expand to include Mozambique, Zambia, Zimbabwe and South Africa. The first objective of the research is to understand better the impacts of Green Revolution interventions on the livelihoods of SSF households and on the ecology. The Green Revolution is presented as a win-win situation with farmers, private companies, governments, consumers and even the environment benefiting. However, we are extremely sceptical of these claims and are interested in interrogating them in more detail. We conducted desktop research on AGRA in 2012 but wanted to look at the practice behind the claims. The picture turns out to be quite complex, with some possible opportunities but also threats and dangers in the processes unfolding on the ground. The second objective of the research is to build a regional, multi-disciplinary research network with a critical orientation, cooperating with activist networks, organisations and movements in support of food sovereignty and democratic producer-owned-and-controlled systems. We aim to cooperate with farmers and their organisations, education and training institutions (including universities, non-government organisations (NGOs) and public sector institutions), activist movements and any other institutions and organisations including the public sector and multilateral institutions, with whom we share common interests, to see where points of possible intersection lie and to plot a shared path for the future. We aim to share the results with network partners on a regional level and to consider methodological issues and ways of more effectively connecting research and activism in agriculture and food in Africa. The GR can be seen as a puzzle, made up of interlocking pieces that form a complex picture. Pieces of the puzzle include policies, laws and institutions, infrastructure, input supply, production and value chain financing, production practices and markets, not to mention the political, cultural and social dynamics that can sink the best laid plans. Significant donor and planning coordination are evident in the strategies being deployed to realise the GR in Africa, with central roles being played by the Comprehensive African Agricultural Development Programme (CAADP), the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), AGRA and the G8’s New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition (NAFSN). The vision of the completed puzzle is coherent and the logic is clear: a production system in which farmers large and small have access to the latest technologies, financed through the profitable production of commodities that meet the requirements of global, regional and domestic markets. Infrastructure development benefits the population as a whole and is built on the basis of agreements between public and private sectors that allow each segment to play to its strengths (accountability and resources for the former; business acumen, technical expertise and economic efficiency for the latter). But the model has fatal flaws. The GR is based fundamentally on the idea of a linear model of development. In this theory of change, agricultural modernisation lays the groundwork for industrialisation, urbanisation, the growth of a middle class, higher consumption, a more rapid flow and circulation of capital, and plenty for all. But this is an ahistorical view of development. Africa is already integrated into the world economy and the flows of capital. Agricultural modernisation in the US, Europe and Asia have opened the way for new arenas of economic expansion based on industrial manufacture, Nuanced rhetoric and the path to poverty: AGRA, small-scale farmers, and seed and soil fertility in Tanzania 1 and thence to computerisation and the information economy. These activities have allowed the agricultural population to be absorbed into other areas of specialised work. But today Africa faces modernisation—with the inevitable displacement of the agricultural population without any outlets to absorb the surplus labour thus created. Populations historically reliant on land-based livelihoods will be displaced with nowhere to turn to realise alternative livelihoods. Industry and the knowledge economy are dominated by the advanced capitalist economies. Large scale commercial agriculture, mining and energy production, and even manufacturing in niche markets offer erstwhile farmers and their families little more than low wages and insecure labour at best, and destitution at worst. Owners of the machinery of industry have always had greater power than workers, but this has become ever starker in the era of neo-liberalism, in which financiers and gamblers of other peoples’ money make billions, while workers and their families eke out a living on starvation wages. The global trade regime is skewed towards reinforcing the power of large surplus producing incumbents. Trade liberalisation forces weaker countries to open their economies to a flood of cheap goods, making it impossible to compete in any meaningful way. Farmers already experience this in the low prices they get for their products, competing as they do against large-scale producers, domestically and even globally. The prices of maize and rice are set on world markets distorted by large subsidies to corporate producers; they are not based on the real cost of production in Tanzania. The same applies to the production of manufactured commodities. Patent rights lock control of the knowledge and information required to become part of the knowledge economy in the hands of a small global elite. Innovations are snapped up and brought under private control. The GR, premised on agricultural modernisation, commercialisation and increasing economies of scale, is indeed revolutionary in its disruptive impacts on longstanding ways of producing and organising economic life. It explicitly endorses the idea that not everyone can be an agricultural producer and this job is better left to fewer, larger actors. Some of these will arise from 2 AFRICAN CENTRE FOR BIOSAFETY the ranks of the existing farming population to join the multinational giants in benefiting. Yet the GR offers nothing to the much wider population that will be displaced and made landless in these processes of social and economic change. In exchange for severing their ties to the land and social networks, the GR can offer no more than insecure, poorly paid wage labour on the large estates and mines owned by others. This ‘accumulation by dispossession’ (Harvey, 2003) follows in the wake of the GR as night follows day. Proponents of the GR will point to the growth and expansion of successful commercial producers as a result of their interventions. Yet the destructive turbulence that follows is ignored. We are tasked with making visible these after-effects and with working actively with farmers and other constituencies, not only to counter these effects with whatever energies we have, but also to identify alternative paths of economic development that result in a more secure and prosperous future for all, not only for a narrow band of beneficiaries whose benefits come at the cost of the collective. This report covers the results of research conducted in Tanzania in 2014. It starts with an overview of the methodology we used and a background to the research sites in Morogoro Region, then discusses land and agricultural production both in Tanzania as a whole and in the research sites in particular. It then considers GR interventions in Tanzania with a focus on the Southern Agricultural Growth Corridor of Tanzania (SAGCOT) and AGRA. It then looks in more detail at soil fertility, seed and markets in the research sites, with an emphasis on interventions by AGRA. The report concludes with some reflections, recommendations and considerations for further research. Methodology and Background to Sites ACB formed a partnership with Mtandao wa Vikundi vya Wakulima Tanzania (MVIWATA) and Sustainable Agriculture Tanzania (SAT) to conduct the research in Tanzania. MVIWATA is a small-scale farmer organisation founded in 1993 through a project of the Sokoine University of Agriculture (SUA) in Morogoro. It consists of an estimated 70,000 farmer members organised into networks in 12 regions in Tanzania. It seeks to represent SSFs with lobbying and advocacy and to facilitate knowledge and information sharing among farmers. MVIWATA has programmes on markets, finance, and planning and production, and works with a range of actors including a current Market Linkages programme with USAID and AGRA. MVIWATA is a member of the Eastern and Southern African Small Scale Farmers’ Forum (ESAFF) and the Agricultural Non-State Actors Forum (ANSAF) in Tanzania. SAT is a local organisation which was registered in June 2011. The idea of having an organisation which deals with sustainable agriculture was born during the successful work of Bustani ya Tushikamane (ByT), a grassroots project based in Morogoro. ByT enabled positive experiences by involving farmers in the planning stage of working together on challenging agricultural issues. SAT’s foundation was thus established on the needs of farmers. SAT collaborates with other stakeholders such as universities, companies and governmental extension officers, who are involved in activities performed by SAT. This holistic approach has established an Innovation Platform comprising dissemination, research, application and networking as its main pillars. This platform is the starting point from which to evolve and implement systems by building on existing knowledge. SAT applies an abiding principle of dealing with famers face to face and acknowledging their experiences. All research team members from Tanzania are graduates of SUA in Morogoro and enjoy good relations with the university, government agricultural research institutes and with units within the Consultative Group for International Agricultural Research (CGIAR). These are situated within agricultural research institutes (ARIs). The International Maize and Wheat Improvement Centre (CIMMYT), International Rice Research Institute (IRRI), International Crops Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics (ICRISAT), International Institute of Tropical Agriculture (IITA) and others are active in this part of Tanzania. The research offers a glimpse of some of the dynamics we encountered in the different study sites. In order to establish a firm quantitative baseline, the research is based on a survey of 60 farmers in 12 villages1 in the two districts of Mvomero and Morogoro (Figure 1). ACB and MVIWATA conducted the survey in Mvomero with 30 farmers, and SAT did the same in Morogoro, also with 30 farmers. The survey is derived from a similar study we conducted in Malawi earlier in 2014, which in turn was drawn from a longer survey in Kusamala, together with some additional information from previous NASFAM surveys. Following discussion with our partners in Tanzania we made minor adaptations following which the survey fitted the context very well. We added a missing question on livestock, since this is important both in relation to soil fertility and to the vision of integrated, mixed farming that lies at the heart of agro-ecology. We stratified the sample by gender and age, aiming for a minimum of 50% women and 50% youth (35 and under), if possible. The final breakdown of participants comprised 61% women and 39% men, and one-third (33%) of respondents were youth. Both districts had a similar sample by gender, and respondents in Morogoro were slightly younger overall than in Mvomero. Although we targeted youth for involvement, youth are less involved in agriculture and are not always interested in attending meetings. In Morogoro youth are mostly employed as motorcycle messengers, and are engaged in petty businesses in the 1. Mgambazi, Ruvuma and Tulo in Morogoro District; and Kunke, Dihombo, Mkindo, Komtonga, Mbogo, Kigugu, Makuyu, Msufini and Kidudwe in Mvomero District. Nuanced rhetoric and the path to poverty: AGRA, small-scale farmers, and seed and soil fertility in Tanzania 3 Figure 1: Map of Tanzania showing Morogoro Region, and the location of Morogoro and Mvomero districts in the region Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mvomero_District; http://actmorogoro.com/Map_Pull_Out.html Table 1: Agro-ecological zones Sites Zone Soils and topography Rainfall (mm/yr) Growing season Morogoro Uluguru Mountains grouped in Northern Highlands (Granite Mountains) (VI) Granite steep mountainside to high plateaux; soils are deep, arable and moderately fertile on upper slopes, shallow and stony on steep slopes Bimodal and very reliable 1,000– 2,000 mm October– December Northern Morogoro Region grouped in Southern and Eastern Highlands (V) Undulating plains to dissected hills and mountains. Moderately fertile clay soils Unimodal, reliable, local rain shadows,2 800–1,400 mm December– April Mvomero March–June Source: Maghema, et al., 2014:1080 informal sector. Most of them have left the villages to seek jobs in the towns. The mean age of respondents was 40.4 years. Female-headed households constituted just over one-fifth (21.7%) of the sample, and the mean age of household heads was 45.3 years. The average number of people per household was 5.17. Respondents relied on a mix of agricultural production, seasonal or temporary wage labour (mostly in the agricultural sector), and small businesses for their livelihoods. The sites cover two agro-ecological zones, one in the mountains (grouped into the Northern Highlands) and one in undulating hills with relatively fertile soil (in the Southern Highlands) (Table 1). The Southern Highlands 2. A region having little rainfall because it is sheltered from prevailing rain-bearing winds by a range of hills (Google). 4 AFRICAN CENTRE FOR BIOSAFETY form part of the ecological spine of SAGCOT, a key GR initiative. Ruvuma, Tulo and Mgambazi in Morogoro are on the slopes of the Uluguru Mountains. During the dry season they experience temperate weather conditions and it is difficult to cultivate annual crops at this time. However, during the rainy season water flows from the mountain and farmers can irrigate and therefore plant vegetables. Vegetable planting in the villages started in the 1980s. Irrigation is accomplished independently by the farmers who have to invest in getting water to their plots as there is no government irrigation scheme. Normally water runs through trenches and then is tapped into pipes which enter the farmers’ plots. Irrigation is also important on the floodplains and in the foothills in the Mvomero sites. Mvomero has both government irrigation schemes for SSFs (e.g. Mkindo), and private schemes set up by farmers on their own with little state or other support (e.g. Dihombo). The rice association started schemes in the area in the 1980s. The Mkindo Training Centre was established in 1993 with Indonesian sponsorship. The formal schemes require payment for communal irrigation. A common complaint from farmers at the Dihombo irrigation scheme (and from other farmers who participated in the survey) is the basic state of infrastructure—the mud lined irrigation channels frequently leak or collapse. Farmers are generally cooperative regarding the allocation of water usage within the scheme but there appears to be no overall organisational structure for its general upkeep. Basic infrastructural improvements, such as are needed by the Dihombo irrigation scheme, would likely have positive impacts on productivity without necessitating the wholesale indebtedness of the farmers who use it. Some respondents in the survey came from these schemes as well as from a village (Kidudwe) on the Mtibwa Sugar Estate, a large privatised enterprise with a lot of land. Tanzania has four commercial sugar producers, two of which are mentioned here: Kilombero Sugar Company (KSCL) (also in Morogoro Region) and Mtibwa Sugar Estate Irrigation canals, Dihombo irrigation scheme, Mvomero Limited (MSEL) (in the Mvomero Region). MSEL is a property of Tanzania Sugar Industries Limited (TSIL) which is owned and funded by a consortium of Tanzanian business people from Turiani, who also own Kagera Sugar. MSEL occupies an area of more than 6,000 ha and produces sugar cane for sugar, bio-energy, animal feeds, fertilisers and ethanol. It also contracts SSFs for sugar production. Morogoro town is the regional centre, with many smaller settlements dotted throughout the countryside. There is some infrastructure in the town although water and electricity are under strain. Main roads are of fairly good quality while side roads are poorer, but there is some investment, (mainly Chinese companies) in tarring the road to Mvomero settlement. Morogoro town has experienced recent rapid growth, with many new buildings under construction intended as offices and shops. The Nuanced rhetoric and the path to poverty: AGRA, small-scale farmers, and seed and soil fertility in Tanzania 5 town hosts the main agricultural university (SUA) and many local and international organisations have their field offices there due to its closeness to Dar es Salaam and the Iringa and Dodoma regions. It is also well situated in the growth corridor connecting Mbeya and Zambia’s border with Dar es Salaam and its port facilities. There is physical evidence of recent investments in upgrading and expanding Dar’s port facility which is a gateway to the whole region. The survey is a snapshot and the complexity of life cannot be reduced to 21 questions. But the answers give us some indication of what people are doing. The objective is to conduct action research, which means the findings form the basis for making decisions, together with partners,3 about what to do next. We complemented the survey with focus group discussions (FGDs) with 6—8 farmers in a group, discussing seed, soil fertility and markets; and with village-based agricultural advisers (VBAAs). The focus groups were gender balanced, with two women-only groups. VBAAs are part of a farmer-based extension network receiving support from AGRA, Nafaka and others. They were established in an AGRAsponsored micro-dosing project managed by Farm Input Promotions Africa (FIPS) and continue to play an extension role today. They are currently involved in a number of Nafaka projects (USAID/Feed the Future, Opportunity Tanzania) and AGRA-sponsored projects (Market Linkages programme), of which more below. We conducted key informant interviews at the national, Morogoro regional and local levels with farmers and their associations; farmer support organisations; ESAFF; ANSAF; seed companies (Agricultural Seed Agency (ASA) and Tanseed); financing organisations (Opportunity Tanzania); the Ministry of Agriculture; various university staff, especially at SUA; government agricultural research institutes (ARIs) at Ilonga and Dakawa; training centres (Mkindo); and USAID and others. 3. This research has already produced an activity in the form of farmer training in agro-ecology. Twenty MVIWATA farmers from Mvomero were given a menu of courses offered by SAT and they selected a five-day course titled Zero Tillage Farming. The course covered topics in conservation agriculture, soil and water conservation practices, intercropping, agroforestry, crop rotation, cover crops, contour farming, organic soil fertility management (composting, manuring, nutrients, liquid organic fertilisers) and pest and disease management. We will explore further the possibilities for facilitating access to training for farmers as well as following up with farmers to see whether there was any uptake of the methodologies and hear the farmers’ opinion of the methodologies so far, considering the value of training in this form, and looking at constraints and opportunities for practical expansion if desired. The content of training should be tailored through our partnerships, not only at national but also at regional level. This has arisen from the research process, and we are interested to pursue it as part of the action research process. 6 AFRICAN CENTRE FOR BIOSAFETY Land and Agricultural Production Background to land tenure in Tanzania Tanzania’s land area is 88.6 million ha, of which up to 80% is covered by forests, woodlands, open grasslands and bush vegetation (USAID 2011). Around 15% of the total land is considered suitable for agriculture. Land in Tanzania was historically divided into two different tenure systems: land held by non-African settlers, governed by a formal set of laws; and land held by Africans, governed by customary law. After independence, all land was considered public land and chieftainships were abolished. Enforced ‘villagisation’ (ujamaa) placed elected village councils in charge of village land allocation and management. The tenure changes gave women more secure tenure although there were ongoing problems with governance and the system limited investment in production. Tanzania has a large pastoralist population and there are sporadic but ongoing tensions between itinerant pastoralists and settled villagers for land access. Land law reform in the 1980s and 1990s opened the door to foreign and commercial interests by providing for broad land acquisition rights which, among other things, threatened tenure security for women. This was a hallmark of land policy under the leadership of Julius Nyerere (USAID, 2011:7). The Land Act and the Village Land Act categorised all land in Tanzania as being ‘general land’, ‘village land’ or ‘reserved land’. Village land is land within the demarcated areas for each of the 11,000–12,000 villages in Tanzania. The Village Land Act recognises the rights of land held by villages collectively, while individual or joint customary rights to occupancy are perpetual and inheritable. Land can be mortgaged with a certificate of approval from the village council. Occupancy rights on village land may be leased to others with the approval of the village council. Land may be transferred to outsiders with permission of the village council and the village assembly, and the state is granted some power to transfer village land to general land ‘if it serves the public interest’. Village assemblies can only reject or approve such classifications if the land area in question is below 250 ha. Generally, because of the limitations on transferability of customary land, this land is considered unsuitable for use as collateral for lending (USAID, 2011:10). Although women’s rights to land are theoretically equal to those of men, the practical situation appears to be biased against women, with women in Tanzania holding an estimated 20% only of registered land, with an even lower figure likely on customary lands (USAID, 2011:10–11). Reserve land includes national and marine parks, forest reserves, etc., and falls under the authority of relevant state institutions such as Tanzania National Parks or the roads agency. Rights to occupancy can be granted on 99 year leases under fixed terms, subject to an annual rent. Holders of registered granted rights of occupancy may lease the land to others. Short term leases of less than one year do not need to be registered (USAID, 2011:9). There is a conflict between the Land Act and the Village Land Act. Unlike the latter, the Land Act definition of general land includes ‘unoccupied or unused village land’, giving ample scope for the appropriation of village land (Rosengren, 2013). Foreign investment can be made only on ‘general land’, and between 2004 and 2009 an estimated 50,000 ha of agricultural land was transferred to large commercial investors, mainly for commercial forestry (teak) and rice and livestock production (USAID, 2011:6). These rights are secured through central or local government. Sometimes land is expropriated from villages without adequate consultation or the participation of villagers and village councils; at other times investors bypass government and deal directly with village councils (USAID, 2011:13). The 1997 Tanzania Investment Act opened the way for non-citizens to own land in Tanzania. Various indices indicate private investor dissatisfaction with the security of property rights in Tanzania, but at the same time show a high level of equality in the distribution of land holdings among the population (USAID, 2011:8). Recent efforts to survey land should be understood as the first step in the commodification and alienation of land (Craib, 2004). Nuanced rhetoric and the path to poverty: AGRA, small-scale farmers, and seed and soil fertility in Tanzania 7 Land tenure and access in the research sites There is no production without land, the two are interlinked. In our survey we divided land into own land, rented and borrowed land, and kilimo cha kiangazi (KK) land. In some cases the latter is rented or borrowed, so these categories should be adjusted. There is individual ownership of plots of land which is subject to local rules, and there is a land market where land is traded as a commodity for money. An average of 4.34 acres (slightly less than 2 ha4) of land is owned by respondent households, with a range from 0 to 20 acres (8 ha) as the largest (Table 2). The average amount of land owned is slightly larger in Mvomero than in Morogoro, but respondents cultivated more of their own land in Morogoro than in Mvomero. Four households (6.7%), all in Mvomero, did not own any land at all. Some respondents indicated that land is available but far away, sometimes up to 50 km away, and that it is difficult to get to distant land. The average distance to cultivated own land in Mvomero (almost 8 km from the homestead) is much higher than in Morogoro (2.5 km away, on average). Sometimes land far away is rented to others. Other respondents indicated that land access is limited because of the increasing population, or because they were not originally from the area. One respondent said their own land is a very small garden plot (20 m x 15 m). A female respondent indicated that there is gender equality in land allocation. Other respondents reported having idle land mainly because they could not afford to cultivate it (paying for labour was mentioned specifically by one woman respondent). Significantly more men (57%) than women (41%) thought land access was a serious challenge (Appendix 1). There was no rented or borrowed land among respondents in Morogoro villages. In Morogoro most of the land is inherited by families and has been passed on for generations and generations. In Mvomero more than half of respondents (53%) cultivated on rented land while only 3 cultivated on borrowed land. The average size of rented land cultivated (2.41 acres) was almost as much as own land cultivated. Land is fragmented into a number of plots, with a number of respondents indicating two or more separate plots. Rentals quoted by respondents ranged from Sh20,000–Sh100,000 per acre per season [US$12.20–US$60.98],5 depending on the local land market and the Table 2: Average size of land owned and cultivated in the past season Area Average land owned (acres) (N=60) Average land cultivated in past season (acres) (N=60) Own land (all) Rented land (those who cultivated rented land) Borrowed land (those who cultivated borrowed land) KK land (all) KK land (those who cultivated KK land) Total average land cultivated (all) Mvomero 5.40 2.66 2.41 1.67 0.63 1.17 4.46 Morogoro 3.28 3.19 0 0 0.70 1.17 4.03 Total 4.34 3.00 2.41 1.67 0.66 1.17 4.24 Range 0–20 0–12 0.5–6.00 1–3 0–6 0.25–6 0.75–12 4. Based on 2.5 acres = 1 hectare (rounding up from 2.471:1). 5. At a US$:Sh rate of 1:1,640 at the time of the research. 8 AFRICAN CENTRE FOR BIOSAFETY demand for land. For those cultivating KK land in the past season, the average size was just over half an acre (Table 9). KK land was also rented in the same price range as other rented land. Respondents from Kidudwe on Mtibwa Sugar Estate reported having access to KK land on the estate with free access and no rent. According to Edgar Eidfons (interview, 19/09/2014), one of the farmer respondents at Kidudwe, the land is available to anyone in the area to farm and you don’t have to be working there. He says MSEL has a huge amount of land and people can farm on unused land. Other respondents reported having previously produced sugar for the Estate but abandoning it because of overdependence on a single buyer. Another farmer indicated that he bought 20 acres of land to plant sugar cane but no longer grows it. It seems that land access, rather than the quality of land (or water) is currently of more concern to farmers: 47% said access to land was a serious problem, while only 13% said the same for soil fertility and 15% for soil erosion (compared with 45% and 58% respectively saying they were not serious problems). This could be for a number of reasons, from the general quality of soil and rainfall patterns in the area to the historical use of land. A number of farmers said they had no need to use fertiliser because they had been farming their land for a few seasons only, and were still achieving good yields without fertiliser. However, with the increasing demand for land over time, cultivation on new land is likely to become continuous. Timely and low cost soil fertility interventions (such as crop rotation, applying ground cover and organic matter to the soil) could maintain the soil before it degenerates into a situation where the seasonal demands of agriculture require the application of large quantities of synthetic fertilisers, pesticides and other inputs (a case of treating the symptoms rather than the cause). A number of farmers had moved to the area in recent years to start farming and general conversations with people in and around Morogoro paint a picture of significant internal migration in Tanzania. Some FGD participants were hiring extra land for the current season Mtimbwa Sugar Estate Mvomero to grow food for their own consumption. This required approaching a farmer in their own village and negotiating for access (from a very weak position). Farmers know if the land they are being offered is productive (tall grass, or the productivity of adjacent land being tell-tale signs to look for) but they have no bargaining power over the land they get. One of the FGD participants using rented land was also using synthetic fertiliser, but the group was unanimous that it would not use any other soil improving techniques on rented land, as the benefits would accrue to the land owner over the long term, rather than the renter over the short term. This is a problem inherent in insecure tenure and has a negative impact on sustainable natural resource management and socio-ecologically sound improvement. There was no evidence of land grabs in our research sites, although the presence of the Mtibwa sugar estate indicates that land was expropriated for commercial use in the past. In the context of fairly evenly distributed land holdings of 1–3 ha among many households, the presence of a 6,000+ ha estate necessarily means that many households were displaced to make way for the estate. This is an area for potential follow up in future research. Tensions between pastoralists and crop growers are evident, with reports of violence and even killings as a result of conflicts over land. Reports of animal damage to crops (excluding insect pests) included rats, birds and Nuanced rhetoric and the path to poverty: AGRA, small-scale farmers, and seed and soil fertility in Tanzania 9 monkeys, but by far the most reported was damage from cattle owned by pastoralists. Though efforts are being made by MVIWATA and others to mediate in disputes, respondents indicated the problem was getting worse over time. Demographic factors, such as population growth and internal migration, contribute to the problem, and regional and international interest in Tanzania as a potential agricultural breadbasket implies that even more land will be converted to permanent cropland in the future. This may exacerbate tensions between SSFs and pastoralists, especially when considering that the large estates (sugar, for example) will have the means to exclude pastoralists from the land they operate on, even more than poor SSFs. AGRA on land AGRA (2013) recognises that limited access to natural resources is a key constraint to expanding agricultural production (2013:28). It argues that a significant amount of land in Africa is uncultivated and needs to be brought into productive use (2013:32). AGRA surveyed a number of Eastern and Southern African countries and found that average land holdings were less than three hectares in most countries (2013:32). Consequently, AGRA orients its support towards small-scale agriculture, but to a commercial layer that will have larger than average land sizes. This excludes a large number of producers who make a major contribution to food security on the continent. Looking at Southern and Eastern Africa as a whole, AGRA has noted an expansion of the area under production in the past two decades and also reports a decline in average farm sizes over the past decade or so (AGRA, 2013:32). This finding, however, is not given further consideration. AGRA anticipates that higher investments in land will “induce land holdings to adjust” (AGRA, 2013:37), meaning a greater concentration among commercial producers. Unlike the World Bank’s disastrous attempts in the past to impose a private property model onto Africa’s complex and diverse systems of land holding, allocation and management, AGRA recognises the value of customary land tenure systems while also pointing to their downsides. Nevertheless, AGRA indicates that for commercial production, private ownership 10 A F R I C A N C E N T R E F O R B I O S A F E T Y of land is the best model. It launches an attack on state-owned land and argues that the lack of a formal certificate or title is one of the reasons for the lack of access to credit (AGRA, 2013:35). It links regularisation (formal titling) to increasing productivity (2013:36), and places emphasis on the productivity of land with investment in input and output markets. The logic here is that farmers will invest more, land values will rise, and “land holdings will be induced to adjust” (2013:37); i.e. there will be a concentration of land among those who can use the land to generate marketable surpluses. When discussing financing, AGRA proposes that private ownership should allow farmers “to pledge their land as collateral for borrowing” (2013:77). Thus AGRA suggests it is fine to have collective or communal land holding models, but when it comes to commercial agriculture individual title and ownership is a better option, as land can be commoditised and used as collateral. The Tanzanian government, as part of its NAFSN work, has committed itself to demarcation of village land to pave the way for this legalised expropriation. It aims to demarcate all village land in the ‘SAGCOT region’, plus it anticipated that 20% of the villages in SAGCOT would complete land use plans and be issued a certificate of occupancy, by June 2014, with another 20% by June 2016 (Appendix 2). According to NAFSN, the goal is the responsible and transparent allocation of land to investors in the SAGCOT region (NAFSN, n.d.). As mentioned earlier, demarcation is the first step towards the commodification and expropriation of land (Craib, 2004). A ‘certificate of occupancy’ will be allowed to float on the market, to be acquired based on no criteria set by existing land holders themselves. While this sounds like something that might be a progressive means to expropriate the large corporate farms in South Africa and elsewhere for land and enterprise redistribution, to aim this at small-scale, resource-poor farmers effectively facilitates them to lose their land, which will entrench the concentration and ownership of economic assets in the hands of a relative elite and create greater impoverishment for those who have lost their land. As indicated above, there is some initial evidence of landlessness in the research sites, accompanied by growing casual labour when farming households are turned into landless worker households, as the processes of land concentration expand. AGRA says that most food for urban areas comes from a few large farms and therefore, in an urbanising context, “a policy of land equality under severe population pressure may not provide much food security to urban populations” (2013:37). On this basis it proposes the coexistence of small and ‘larger commercial’ farms (2013:37). Again, there is a sense that AGRA is carving out its target audience, its niche, among better-off farmers who will produce as commercial entities for formal markets. Nevertheless, AGRA acknowledges that no single land policy or strategy can address tenure security across the continent, and that these must be context specific. AGRA states that secure access is the precursor to clear, secure and negotiable property rights (2013:36). Despite the nuanced rhetoric, it is apparent that AGRA has a defined view on the necessity of both the private ownership of land and of land consolidation into larger units, as the long-term basis for a successful GR strategy. This is very clear from its insertion into SAGCOT where the explicit plan is to alienate tens of thousands of hectares of land for exclusive large-scale commercial use. We will monitor any changes in land access patterns over the course of the research, including threats of large-scale land grabs, if any, together with the less conspicuous and slower process of the gradual concentration of land holdings among fewer people, as farmers separate into those who aim for commercial production with expanded land holdings, and those who end up selling some or all of their labour for money on the farms of others or elsewhere. Overview of agricultural production Agriculture remains a significant economic activity in Tanzania, although value added in agriculture as a share of GDP dropped from 32% in 2002 to 28% in 2011 (services, including Improved pigeon pea demo plots, Ilonga ARI tourism, stood at 48% of GDP in 2012—OECD, 2013). Agriculture value added grew at an average real annual rate of 4.2% during these years,6 and in 2012 agriculture employed 75% of the economically active population. Despite the presence of large agricultural estates and increasing interest in their expansion, 80% of people involved in agriculture are SSFs (Mbunda, 2013). Agricultural land comprises roughly 42% of total land in Tanzania, of which about 36% is arable and permanent crop land.7 Land under irrigation is currently around 326,000 ha (2.5% of arable and permanent crop land) although official data show that 29.4 million ha are suitable for irrigation (Mbunda, 2013). Approximately 85% of arable land is used by smallholders cultivating between 0.2 and 2 ha and traditional agro-pastoralists who keep an average of 50 head of cattle. Tanzania and South Africa have the largest cattle herds in southern Africa and between them account for 57% of the region’s total cattle population (Louw & Kapuya, 2012:5–6). By far the majority of cattle in Tanzania are indigenous varieties (Sarwatt & Mollel, 2000). Livestock production (mainly cattle, but also sheep, goats and pigs) has grown slowly in Tanzania between 2002 and 2011.8 Tanzania has seven different agro-ecological zones with two dominant rainfall patterns. In northern and eastern Tanzania the long 6. World Bank, African Development Indicators, http://databank.worldbank.org/data—accessed 16/01/15. 7. World Bank, op cit. 8. World Bank, op cit. Nuanced rhetoric and the path to poverty: AGRA, small-scale farmers, and seed and soil fertility in Tanzania 11 rainy season (masika) lasts from March to May, followed by a short rainy season (vuli) from October to December. During the long rains planting starts in February/March, to be harvested in July/August. During the short rainy season planting takes place around November, to be harvested in January/February. Southern Tanzania has a unimodal rainfall regime, from December to April. Planting takes place in November to be harvested from June to July (Lui et al., 2013). Soil properties vary across the country, with volcanic soils of high agronomic potential found around Arusha and Kilimanjaro in the north, and the south west highlands, which form the bulk of the Southern Agricultural Growth Corridor of Tanzania (SAGCOT). Maize and rice are the principal grain crops in Tanzania. Maize accounts for 31% of total food production and SSFs produce 85% of the crop (AGRA, 2010). About 43% of arable and permanent crop land is under cereals (25% maize and 8.4% rice).9 Between 2005/06 and 2009/10 the area under maize in Tanzania increased from 2.5 to 3 million ha, while average maize yields increased from 1.3 tons to 1.6 tons per ha over the same period (ESAFF, 2013). This is in an era of a shift to hybrid maize seed. Rice is the nation’s second staple after maize and constitutes 17% of cereal consumption. Tanzania ranks second (after Madagascar) for rice production in Eastern and Southern Africa, with all regions growing the crop. Small-scale farmers (0.5–2.4 ha) account for 94% of national rice output (AGRA, 2010). More than half of Tanzania’s farmers grow legumes: 10% of the area under pulses and 5% of the area under oil crops are planted with improved seed. Beans are the major grain legume in Tanzania, mostly intercropped with maize or permanent crops such as banana or coffee. Groundnuts are cultivated mainly in areas that receive long rains, in intercropped systems with maize. From the 1960s to the 1980s farmers were encouraged to produce soya for export, although production declined following the collapse of the parastatal buying organisations during the process of 9. World Bank, op cit. 10. World Bank, op cit. 12 A F R I C A N C E N T R E F O R B I O S A F E T Y structural adjustment. In 2003/04 the Ministry of Agriculture revived the production of soya and this was followed by the launch of the Tanzanian soybean development strategy 2010–2020. Cassava, banana and sweet potato are other important food crops. Major exports are coffee, cotton, cashew nuts, tobacco and sisal. Adoption of GR inputs and technologies in Tanzania is currently low. A national panel survey from 2010/11 found that, overall, 17% of households were using certified seed. However, this hides large discrepancies between crops— up to 27% of the maize area is planted with certified seed, compared with just 1% of the rice area (World Bank, 2012). Fertiliser consumption averaged 5.5 kg/ha between 2002 and 2009, with growth in 2009 to 8.7 kg/ha. The value of pesticide imports grew rapidly from 2008, from an average US$17.7 million in the period 2002–2007 to an average US$41.6 million in the period 2008–2011.10 These sharp increases in inputs are attributable to the launch of the National Agricultural Input Voucher Scheme (NAIVS) in 2008, which provides government subsidies for inputs (Hepelwa, et al., 2013). NAIVS was suspended in 2014 following widespread corruption and soft loans through financial institutions and the voucher system has been replaced with cooperatives (Domasa, 2014). Farmer perceptions of agricultural challenges There are numerous challenges facing Tanzania’s agricultural sector, ranging from climatic factors to issues around marketing and insufficient state support. Despite robust GDP growth in recent years and discoveries of large reserves of natural gas, poverty in Tanzania remains pervasive, particularly among the country’s SSFs who account for roughly 70% of people living in ‘income and food poverty’. The vulnerability that poverty brings is further exacerbated by reliance on rain-fed agriculture and the anticipated detrimental effects of climate change. Access to and ownership of land is another challenge faced by SSFs and, in the context of changes to land laws and increasing overtures to large-scale investors, there is potential for the situation to deteriorate even further. Marketing is another significant trial for SSFs in Tanzania; markets are unpredictable and prices plummet in years with good harvests, a situation that merchants are known to exploit. Lack of post-harvest storage and infrastructure, weak bargaining positions and general levels of poverty all give farmers little option but to seek quick sales after the harvest, usually in full knowledge that they are not receiving good prices. For our survey farmers were asked to assess the extent to which certain factors were a challenge to their agricultural practices. The two main major challenges identified were lack of markets (68%) and crop damage caused by animals (58%), with high fertiliser prices (51%), access to land (47%) and seed prices (44%) also notable (Appendix 2). None of the men in the survey thought labour access was a serious problem, compared with 19% of women who did. AGRA’s responses to seed, soil fertility and markets are covered in greater detail in relevant sections of this report. AGRA has no specific programme on climate change, although its 2014 Status of African Agriculture Report is dedicated to the subject. The report, which draws heavily on the work of the United Nation’s Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), paints a picture of rising temperatures, changes in rainfall patterns, more extreme weather events and increasing pressure from plant pests and diseases (AGRA, 2014). Survey participants indicated that some of these issues had already been experienced. The main thrust of AGRA’s response to climate change is based on climate smart agriculture (CSA), a concept proposed by the UN Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) at The Hague conference in 2009 on Agriculture, Food Security and Climate Change. The FAO currently defines the three pillars of CSA as sustainably increasing agricultural productivity and incomes; adapting and building resilience to climate change; and reducing and/or removing greenhouse gas emissions, where possible. AGRA’s approach to CSA is broad; simultaneously it calls for mixed crop and livestock farming, the mulching and promotion of indigenous crops while also proposing increased access to financial products (credit and insurance), the efficient use of synthetic fertiliser and welcoming the potential for carbon sequestration (AGRA, 2014a). Few would disagree with the importance of increasing on-farm biodiversity or making use of organic matter for soil health (including from animal sources). However, the use of agro-chemicals under CSA is implicit in Integrated Soil Fertility Management (ISFM) and Conservation Agriculture (CA), for which “herbicides are a necessary input” (AGRA, 2014:92a). Calls for the increased financialisation of agriculture under CSA will accelerate processes of rural differentiation. Insurance products could provide vital safety nets for rural communities, but they could also encourage production shifts and create divisions between those who can access insurance and those who cannot. Agricultural production in the research sites In our research sites vegetables, maize, pigeon pea and paddy (rice) were the most commonly produced crops in Mvomero, while in Morogoro maize (especially local varieties), vegetables and beans were the most widespread crops (Table 3). Table 3: Percentage producing main crops on any land by district Mvomero % yes Morogoro % yes Any maize 86.7 100 Any veg 96.7 93.3 Local maize 50 96.7 Beans 10 86.7 Pigeon pea 73.3 16.7 Rice 66.7 6.7 More than half (57%) of respondents were growing some kind of fruit tree, with banana, citrus and mango the most common (Table 4). Nuanced rhetoric and the path to poverty: AGRA, small-scale farmers, and seed and soil fertility in Tanzania 13 Table 4: Fruit trees of any land Tree type N % Guava 8 13.3 Mango 16 26.7 Banana 18 30 Avocado 9 15 Citrus 18 30 Papaya 11 18.3 Coconut 10 16.7 Any fruit tree 34 56.7 Maize was the most widely produced crop in main fields (93% of respondents produced maize in their main fields), especially local maize (73%), followed by any vegetables (78%) of which pumpkin, tomato and cabbage were the most popular, then beans (48%), pigeon pea (40%) and rice (38%) (Appendix 3, Table 3A). Production is dispersed among many crops, indicating a lot of production diversity between the respondents who are mostly producing a few different crops each. Rice and pumpkin are more important in the main fields in Mvomero, and maize and tomatoes are more important in the main fields in Morogoro. In both places there is significant vegetable production of some kind. Kilimo cha kiangazi (KK) land is a small irrigated plot for dry season production, operating under customary rules of allocation that are similar to those for main fields. It is similar to dimba/dambo land in Malawi. Not everyone has access to KK land, and one third of respondents in our survey had not planted on KK land in the past season. Thirty-nine per cent of women-headed households overall did not plant on KK, compared to 32% of maleheaded households, so there is some gender difference but not of major significance. We do not know whether this difference is a product of gendered lack of access to KK land, difficulties in putting land into production, or other causes. In Mvomero, more than half (53%) of respondents did not plant on KK. This may be because farmers use the same piece of land as their main field and as their KK land. Only 13% 14 A F R I C A N C E N T R E F O R B I O S A F E T Y of respondents in Morogoro had not planted on KK land in the past season. This indicates a clear distinction between main fields and KK land and also widespread access (Table 5). Mainly vegetables are produced on KK land, with smaller quantities of beans and rice being cultivated (Annex 1, Table B). Table 5: No planting on kilimo cha kiangazi or around home in past season by district No planting on kilimo cha kiangazi % No planting around home % Mvomero 53.3 3.3 Morogoro 13.3 63.3 Total 33.3 33.3 Two-thirds of respondents had planted around their homestead in the past season, with a big difference between sites—97% in Mvomero but only 37% in Morogoro. In Morogoro planting around the home is not undertaken by many farmers because water is not accessible and most of the farmers keep small livestock at home, which spoil the crops. Sixty-three to sixty-five per cent of those planting around their homesteads cultivated vegetable or fruit crops. Lemon grass, sweet potato leaves, mango and papaya were the most popular, but were all less than one-third of the crops planted, which reinforces a sense of the wide diversity of production (Annex 1, Table C). Sugar cane is a major crop in the Mvomero district, which is home to a number of large estates, such as Mtibwa Sugar Estate. MSEL (the company operating the estate) has its own large-scale production operations but also contracts SSFs who are members of a registered NGO, Mtibwa Outgrowers’ Association (MOA). Contracts are underpinned by the Sugar Industry Act of 2001 and incorporate contractual agreements on issues such as transportation, prices, credit, and organisation of the harvesting, payment and transport. MSEL extension officers offer training sessions and visit villages to offer specific agronomic advice to individual farmers on credit. Contracted farmers may hire tractors and may receive farm inputs, such as fertilisers and crop pesticides, on loan (production financing). Farmers weed, harvest and transport the crops to the factory. Farmers plant sugar cane once every four or five years and harvest once a year in this period. Some of the bigger farmers have left the MOA but continue to sell sugar cane to the factory. Sugar cane with high levels of sucrose achieves higher prices and world market prices are influential. A number of farmers related problems they had experienced as sugar outgrowers, such as the high costs (and risks) of production, for low incomes. Only 4 households in our sample had produced sugar cane in the past season (Appendix 3, Table 3A). Our survey looked at yields for the primary crops being produced (grains and legumes). Vegetables and fruit are the other main areas of production but they are difficult to quantify accurately. Horticultural crops are produced in different units and households harvest at will, rather than in one go, so it is impossible to assess accurately the amounts being produced. For commercial producers it makes sense to quantify and measure output, but it may not be necessary to monitor each vegetable picked when it is for household use. Once you enter the market, then quantification is essential because profitability (and general resourceuse efficiency) cannot be measured without quantification. There are definitely commercial markets in maize and rice (see the section on markets), heavily supported by Nafaka, AGRA and others. Nafaka also has a programme focusing on fresh produce in the area. Nafaka, through the Tanzania Agricultural Productivity Partnership (TAPP), is also working on building production and markets for horticulture in Mvomero. Table 6: Average yields of key crops (only those who harvested these crops) Crop # harvesting Average yield of those harvesting (kg) Hybrid maize 7 1,641.7 Improved OPV maize 5 3,075.2 Local maize 42 991.4 Rice 22 1,972 Beans 25 106.3 Pigeon pea 17 62 Cow pea 16 175.1 There is significant difference in maize yields depending on source materials (Table 6). The majority of respondents are using local maize and 70% of the sample reported harvesting local maize. Among those using hybrids and improved OPVs, 8–12% of respondents reported harvesting and that yield gains are significant. An average of 991 tons of local maize was harvested but our data does not indicate the per acre yield. Although we could crosstabulate with land cultivated, we do not know what area of cultivated land is under maize, so we cannot make accurate statements. It would be useful to delve deeper but that must develop organically over time and in partnership with farmers. Considering only the overall yields for now, it is clear from an absolute point of view that those using hybrid maize and improved OPVs are producing higher yields. Because this is not a per acre yield, it suggests a few larger producers using these seed types and hence a commercial layer of small-scale maize farmers. Hybrid maize users achieved a two-thirds higher yield (65.6%) than those using local maize. The gap is even wider for those using improved OPVs: the 5 farmers using improved OPV produced over 2 tons on average more than farmers using local maize—this is 210% higher. We have taken a closer look at the seeds in use and improved OPVs in Appendix 5. Rice yields averaged 1,972 kg (just under 2 tons) and rice is sold mainly into local markets, with potential new markets through Nafaka- and AGRA-sponsored channels (see the section on markets below). Cow pea, bean and pigeon pea yields are very low, at between 60–175 kg for those who harvested. It may have to do with how the crops are perceived and their historical use in these places, e.g. pigeon pea was historically used to demarcate borders. Pigeon pea is widely planted in the Mvomero sites. AGRA has sponsored pigeon pea development but results are mixed (see the case study on Tanseed). Details of the seed issues related to these yields are found in the seed section below. Nuanced rhetoric and the path to poverty: AGRA, small-scale farmers, and seed and soil fertility in Tanzania 15 The Green Revolution in Tanzania Overview Tanzania was colonised by the Germans and British and won independence in 1961 and the United Republic of Tanzania and Zanzibar was formed in 1964. After 1967 the state asserted control over the economy, including the agricultural sector which formed the backbone of the financial system. In the 1980s Tanzania was forced into structural adjustment under the name of the Economic Recovery Program, leading to privatisation, deregulation and liberalisation of the economy, especially after 1992 when multiparty liberal democracy was introduced. This was followed by the Economic and Social Action Program in 1998 which reinforced and entrenched these processes (OECD, 2013). During this period multinational input companies (seed and fertiliser) entered Tanzania. The state withdrew from various economic roles, leading to a collapse of some services and sectors but growth in others. The activities of Multinational Corporations (MNCs) were bolstered in the 2000s as investment in African agriculture rose up the global agenda, and this was reinforced with the introduction of the national input subsidy scheme in 2008. A series of policy initiatives and partnerships were developed over the past five years, starting with Kilimo Kwanza (Agriculture First) which was launched in 2009. Kilimo Kwanza is a framework for public private partnerships and investment in the commercialisation of agriculture through: the expansion of Green Revolution technologies; the launch of SAGCOT in 2010; the Grow Africa Forum in 2011; the launch of the Tanzanian Agriculture and Food Security Investment Plan (TAFSIP), Tanzania’s national investment plan under CAADP, in 2011; the launch of the G8’s NAFSN in Tanzania and Figure 2: Green Revolution organogram CAADP Grow Africa NAFSN World Bank and other government and multilateral donors USAID SSTP Feed the Future TAPP Nafaka Tanzanian government Markets SAGCOT ARIs Breadbasket strategy PASS CGIAR institutions 16 A F R I C A N C E N T R E F O R B I O S A F E T Y SHP AGRA elsewhere in 2012; Big Results Now (BRN) in 2013; and the operationalisation of the SAGCOT Catalytic Fund in 2014. These initiatives are all linked to one another and are aligned with the embedding of CAADP at a national level. They are based on creating the conditions for private sector investment and the commercialisation and modernisation of agriculture in Tanzania. Kilimo Kwanza is a Tanzanian government policy initiative with the objective of “fostering a Green Revolution and transforming agriculture into a modern sector” (OECD, 2013:29). It forms the framework for further initiatives. SAGCOT arose as a priority investment area in the Southern Highlands and is dealt with in more detail below, since our research sites are located in the corridor. Grow Africa essentially seeks to integrate African government interventions with global GR interventions, with CAADP as the overarching structure. As such it has laid the groundwork for global PPPs through the G8’s NAFSN.11 TAFSIP is an expanded version of Tanzania’s previous Agricultural Sector Development Programme (ASDP) (ASDP, 2006–13), incorporating issues of climate change, nutrition and a greater role for the private sector. The development of Phase 2 of the ASDP is considered to be critical for the implementation of TAFSIP as well as binding government to NAFSN commitments. Tanzania is one of 10 countries10 that have entered into partnerships under NAFSN. The initiative was launched in Tanzania in 2012 as a partnership between the government, the G8 countries and 19 private organisations. A country level lead group consists of the government, USAID, the UK’s Department for International Development (DFID), the SAGCOT Centre, the Agricultural Council of Tanzania (ACT) (the private sector agricultural association) and the Agriculture Non-State Actors’ Forum (ANSAF) representing civil society (NAFSN, 2014). USAID has played a constant role in the background in Tanzanian agriculture, focusing on large-scale agricultural projects and export production. USAID helped to establish Sokoine University of Agriculture (originally known as Morogoro Agricultural College) and played an important role in enforcing structural adjustment in the 1980s.13 Currently USAID is working through the Feed the Future Initiative (FtF) launched in May 2010 by the US government as the umbrella programme for the US Global Hunger and Food Security Initiative, itself a product of the June 2009 L’Aquila Summit in Italy (Ho and Hanrahan, 2011). The FtF Initiative is described as the United States’ public sector contribution to the NAFSN and Grow Africa partnerships. FtF has a presence in 12 African countries including Tanzania.14 USAID leads FtF but the initiative also draws on the resources of numerous other public bodies in the US, including the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, State and Treasury, the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) and the US Geological Survey. Two major projects under FtF are currently underway in Morogoro: the Nafaka food grain value chain project, working on rice and maize; and TAPP which focuses on horticulture. Nafaka is a five year, US$30 million project scheduled for completion in 2016. Morogoro and Zanzibar are the two areas where Nafaka focuses on irrigated rice production. By developing smallholder irrigation schemes in these areas, FtF aims to increase the overall irrigated area in Tanzania by 15%, from 306,000 ha to 353,000 ha (FtF, 2011). As of September 2014 more than 80,000 farmers were applying ‘new technologies’ in rice and maize production. FtF’s activities in Tanzania are carried out by its main implementing partner, ACDI/VOCA,15 a nonprofit development organisation based in Washington, D.C, and nine other subcontracting partners, both local and international. Farm Input Promotions (FIPS) Africa and MVIWATA 11. https://www.growafrica.com 12. Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, Ghana, Malawi, Mozambique, Nigeria, Senegal and Tanzania. 13. http://www.usaid.gov/tanzania/history—accessed 16/01/15. 14. Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Liberia, Mali, Malawi, Mozambique, Rwanda, Senegal, Uganda, Zambia. 15. http://www.acdivoca.org/ Nuanced rhetoric and the path to poverty: AGRA, small-scale farmers, and seed and soil fertility in Tanzania 17 are among Nafaka’s local subcontractors. International subcontractors include the International Fertiliser Development Centre (IFDC), Kimetrica and Catholic Relief Services.16 Other local Nafaka partners include the SAGCOT Centre, Kilombero rice planters and SUA. The BRN initiative was launched in 2013 with agriculture as one of six national key result areas. Three value chains are prioritised: maize, rice and sugar, focusing on the promotion of 25 commercial farming deals; enhancing 78 smallholder rice irrigation and marketing schemes using private service providers; and developing 275 collective warehousebased marketing schemes in rice and maize. Horticulture, oilseeds, potatoes and tea have been earmarked for future work. The initiative is also fast-tracking the land acquisition process, with 80,000 ha having been entrusted to the Tanzania Investment Centre (TIC) as of June 2014 for fielding expressions of interest from investors for land grants (NAFSN, 2014:5). It is apparent from these initiatives over the past five years that there is a high level of coordination between the Tanzanian government, donors (especially including the G8 governments), and domestic and multinational private interests.17 There is a concerted effort focusing on the commercialisation of agriculture and the ‘crowding in’ of investment in some key geographical areas, among which SAGCOT is a current priority. Nevertheless, the role of the farmer in each differs in so far as TAFSIP focuses on enhancing smallholder production, while Kilimo Kwanza and BRN emphasise economies of scale in production, with Tanzania’s farmers largely relegated to the role of contracted outgrowers. These inherent tensions have been attributed in part to wider political considerations, with the ruling party caught between trying to secure the rural vote through ‘farmer-friendly’ policies and securing the continuing loyalty of local elites, who stand to gain from the proposed large-scale investments under Kilimo Kwanza and BRN. This is further exacerbated by the policy ‘homes’: the TAFSIP coordination team is located in the Ministry of Agriculture, Food Security and Cooperatives (MAFC), while Kilimo Kwanza is housed within the Prime Minister’s Office and BRN falls under State House. It has been observed that due to these issues, TAFSIP has played second fiddle in Tanzania’s agricultural policy processes to both Kilimo Kwanza and BRN (Cooksey, 2013). Government spending on agriculture stands at around 6.8% of the total budget, which is below the CAADP target of 10% (NAFSN, 2014:6). Approximately 25% of NAFSN funds committed had been disbursed by the end of 2013 (NAFSN, 2014:13– 15). The Southern Agricultural Growth Corridor of Tanzania (SAGCOT) SAGCOT is “an international public-private partnership (PPP) aiming to catalyse large volumes of private investment to increase productivity and develop commercial agriculture in the southern corridor” (OECD, 2013:29). The corridor covers about one-third of the land area of Tanzania and is structured along the infrastructural spine connecting the port at Dar es Salaam with Mbeya and the border with Zambia at Tunduma (Figure 2). The concept of agricultural corridors fits firmly into the GR model of agriculture, structured along transport routes to reach markets. The concept was first proposed at the UN General Assembly in 2008 by Norwegian fertiliser multinational Yara, before being subsequently presented (again by Yara) at the World Economic Forum (WEF) in 2009 and 2010. Under the agricultural corridor approach, initiatives and investments are to be carried out in areas perceived to have high agronomic potential and an existing infrastructure ‘backbone’. SAGCOT and the Beira Agricultural Growth Corridor in neighbouring Mozambique are being managed by UK consultancy Prorustica, together with its commercial agricultural and infrastructure development arms, AgDevCo and InfraCo. 16. http://www.acdivoca.org/site/ID/tanzania-staples-value-chain-Nafaka 17. Including Diageo, Monsanto, SABMiller, Syngenta, Unilever, United Phosphorus (UPL)/Advanta and Yara. 18 A F R I C A N C E N T R E F O R B I O S A F E T Y Figure 3: The Southern Agricultural Growth Corridor of Tanzania Source: http://www.sagcot.com/who-we-are/what-is-sagcot/ - accessed 15/01/15 The SAGCOT investment blueprint was presented at the WEF in 2011 by then Tanzanian president Jakaya Kikwete. Comparing the SAGCOT area (which covers approximately one-third of Tanzania’s land area) with the Brazilian cerrado (which has seen huge increases in mono-cropped maize and soya production) and noting Tanzania’s proximity to lucrative Asian markets, the investment blueprint envisions putting 350,000 ha under production, the creation of 420,000 jobs and potential farming revenues of US$1.2 billion by 2030. The government of Tanzania is expected to provide up to US$650 million in funding for the project’s first 20 years. This, together with a multi-donor US$50 million catalytic fund and proposed changes to tax, investment and intellectual property laws, are expected to stimulate US$2.1 billion in private investment over the same period (SAGCOT, 2011). As of May 2014, SAGCOT’s partners included AGCO (a seller of tractors and other agricultural machinery), Bayer CropScience, Monsanto, Nestle, Olam (a large multinational grain trader), SABMiller, Unilever and Yara (SAGCOT, 2014). As part of NAFSN, Monsanto has committed to strengthening agro-dealer networks and distributing high-yielding maize varieties in SAGCOT, including making 3–5 new maize varieties available, royalty-free, to seed companies (NAFSN, 2014:19). Yara, which has been involved in SAGCOT since its inception, is in the process of constructing a US$20 million fertiliser terminal at Dar es Salaam’s harbour as well as providing other support in the corridor (Paul and Steinbrecher, 2013). In the Morogoro region SAGCOT has been collaborating with the Kilombero Sugar (KSCL) and Mtibwa Sugar Estates. SAGCOT seeks to coordinate investments both for large-scale production, as in the case of sugar estates, as well as the integration of SSFs into commercial value chains. During our research we encountered mainly the latter since we partnered with MVIWATA, the SSF association. Overview of AGRA in Tanzania AGRA has identified Tanzania as one of four priority countries for its breadbasket strategy, with the Southern Highlands and Kilombero region as AGRA’s focus area, linked to SAGCOT (AGRA, 2012). The strategy focuses on “increasing yields and expanding cultivated land in fertile areas already endowed with a minimum of essential infrastructure” (AGRA, 2010:5). Over 90% of AGRA’s initial investments in Tanzania are in the SAGCOT breadbasket area (AGRA, 2010:15). AGRA is part of a coordinated ‘pincer’ movement (Figure 3) along what the World Bank (2009) refers to as the Guinea Savannah agro-ecological zone, a fertile swathe stretching from southern Mozambique to Mali. Tanzania a key part of this plan, including Dar es Salaam as a port of entry into the interior via SAGCOT. In 2010–2011 the Ministry Nuanced rhetoric and the path to poverty: AGRA, small-scale farmers, and seed and soil fertility in Tanzania 19 of Agriculture was granted US$640,000 to develop the breadbasket concept and to create ‘investment grade’ proposals (Appendix 4, Table 4C). Figure 4: AGRA countries of operation and the occupation of the Guinea Savannah and the development of AGRA’s breadbasket strategy in Tanzania. In 2014 a new series of three year projects worth US$4.3m was announced but no details were given and none appeared on the AGRA website at the time of writing.18 More details are given on AGRA’s role in seed and soil health in the sections below. Source: AGRA, 2012 Total AGRA grants to Tanzania from 2007 to 2012 amounted to US$54.6m, with the Soil Health Programme (SHP) allocated 60.2% of this amount (Appendix 4). This is somewhat skewed by US$25m in grants for the establishment of the African Fertiliser and Agribusiness Partnership (AFAP), based in Tanzania but with an operational area in Ghana, Mozambique and Tanzania (see ACB, 2014a). We cannot entirely exclude this grant from our analysis of AGRA’s activities in Tanzania because a significant portion of these resources were allocated to Tanzanian activities. The Programme for Africa’s Seed Systems (PASS) received 22.8% of total grants, and 42% of grants if we exclude AFAP. About 17% of total grants went to markets, policy 18. http://agra-alliance.org/media-centre/news/us-4-million-in-new-grants-to-strengthen-tanzanias-agriculture-/ 20 A F R I C A N C E N T R E F O R B I O S A F E T Y Soil Fertility, AgroEcology and Synthetic Fertiliser Agro-ecological practices in the research sites Participating farmers in our research sites were asked what agricultural practices they had carried out during the last season. The results (Table 7) suggest that farmers are engaged in a number of agro-ecological type practices, with potential for expansion of these and other techniques. The most common practices carried out were seed saving (80%), leaving crop residues (77%), intercropping and planting food trees (both 72%) and applying animal manure (62%). Maize, beans and pumpkin were the main crops intercropped (Appendix 3, Table 3A). Sixty-five per cent of respondents were growing maize intercropped with legumes and the most commonly intercropped legumes were pigeon pea (30%), beans (27%) and cow pea (25%). Some practices appear universal regardless of the gender of household head. Major practices for both men- and women-headed households included seed saving, leaving crop residues on the land, intercropping, fruit trees and perennial cultivation. Significantly more male- than female-headed households practiced mulching, permanent beds, leaving crop residues and intercropping, while more female-headed households engaged with small scale irrigation and crop rotation. However, the sample consisted of 22% female-headed households only, so the results should not be overanalysed. This is something we can monitor in the future. A large number of respondents (62%) applied animal manure to their fields in the past season, with an average application of 394.5 kg. According to Moses Temi, principal at the Mkindo training centre, “For rice, farmers are likely to get more productivity by using manure and increasing organic content.” The average cost of acquiring animal manure by those farmers who used it was Sh1,647 [US$1.00] which is significantly lower than the average cost of synthetic fertiliser—see below). Table 7: Percentage of farmers implementing agricultural practices in the last season Practice % yes % Female HH % male HH Making and using compost 38.3 38.5 38.3 Nitrogen-fixing trees 26.7 30.8 25.5 Animal manures 61.7 61.5 61.7 Mulching 50 38.5 53.2 Permanent beds 36.7 23.1 40.4 No burning (leaving crop residues) 76.7 61.5 80.6 Small scale irrigation 53.3 61.5 51.1 Seed saving 80 76.9 80.9 Crop rotation 43.3 53.8 40.4 Intercropping in main field 71.7 64.3 72.3 Cultivation during all seasons 65 61.5 66 No till or minimum tillage 30 30.8 29.8 Planting food trees 71.7 69.2 72.3 Contour planting 40 46.2 38.3 Rainwater catchment 31.7 23.1 34 Nuanced rhetoric and the path to poverty: AGRA, small-scale farmers, and seed and soil fertility in Tanzania 21 Table 8: Livestock ownership Livestock type % who own, in Mvomero % who own, in Morogoro % who own total % female HH who own Poultry 90 66.7 78.3 61.5 83 16.4 2–60 Dairy goats 10 23.3 16.7 0 21.3 2.6 1–4 Meat goats 13.3 36.7 25 15.4 27.6 5.4 2–13 Pigs 13.3 — 6.7 0 8.5 4.5 3–6 Cattle 10 — 5 7.7 4.2 3.3 1–5 - 6.7 3.3 7.7 2.1 3.5 3–4 Rabbits Nevertheless, limited livestock ownership mitigates against the increased use of animal manure, and small farm sizes pose a challenge for integrated or mixed farming systems at the individual farm level. A third of the farmers surveyed sourced animal manure from neighbours or other farmers, including from Masai pastoralists in the surrounding areas, usually free of charge, with farmers having to cover transport costs only. This indicates another, cooperative, aspect to the relationship between villagers and the Masai, suggesting it is not only a confrontational relationship. A majority of respondents (78%) reported owning poultry (mostly chickens with some ducks) and an average of approximately 16 birds were owned by those who reported ownership (Table 8). Some farmers raised poultry as part of a group. One such group (26 members) said they owned 150 chickens while another group (5 farmers) owned 50 chickens. Goats were the next most commonly held farm animal, with 23% of respondents indicating ownership of dairy and meat goats. A small number of farmers reported owning cattle (5%) and pigs (7%), with mean ownership at 4.5 pigs and 3.3 head of cattle. Animal ownership is generally higher across the board for maleheaded households, with small but mixed variations in ownership between the sites in the two districts. Farmers expressed interest in learning more about Conservation Agriculture (CA) which they mentioned by name without being prompted. One farmer indicated already having 22 A F R I C A N C E N T R E F O R B I O S A F E T Y % male HH who own Mean # owned by those who own Range received training on CA from Simlesa. When offered a menu of courses by SAT, farmers overwhelmingly chose a course on No Tillage Agriculture, with 18 of 20 farmers selecting it as their first choice. CA is rooted in three inter-related practices: no till or minimum till; cover cropping/permanent ground cover; and intercropping, especially of maize and legumes. While these practices may be accompanied by the increased use of herbicides, this is not a necessary component of CA. It should be noted that SAT’s course offers an agro-ecological approach that does not include the use of herbicides. Farmer interest in CA suggests an interest in agro-ecological methods of enhancing soil fertility. ACB will identify ways of interacting with farmers and organisations to facilitate expansion of knowledge about these and related agro-ecological practices. The introduction of synthetic fertilisers in Tanzania Much of Africa has soils of low inherent fertility (Montpellier, 2014:5). Traditional farming practices such as ‘slash and burn’ (which allows bush to regrow after a few seasons of cultivation, followed by burning of the bush to produce nutrient-rich ashes, to remove weed seed and to produce a friable soil) and fallowing, are unable to keep up with increasing populations and are becoming less common without being replaced by more appropriate techniques (AGRA, 2007:5). These practices may exacerbate low nutrient content in soil. Add to these the long-term lack of attention to and investment in soils and the result is soil degradation that makes it more difficult for farmers to generate sufficient food for themselves and others. Concepts such as sustainable land and water management (used by CAADP, 2009) and ISFM have emerged in response to declining soil fertility across the continent. These concepts recognise the importance of agroecological soil conservation and nutrient enhancing practices including no till, cover cropping and permanent ground cover, agroforestry, increasing organic matter of the soil, intercropping with legumes for nitrogen fixation, and the use of animal manures for long term soil health. At the same time, their proponents suggest that on their own these techniques are insufficient to replace nutrients exported from farmers’ fields following harvest, and that these techniques must be used in conjunction with the increased use of synthetic fertilisers (e.g. AGRA, 2007). Very low fertiliser use in Africa compared with other parts of the world is identified as the major reason why African yields are stagnating and even declining, compared with growth in yields elsewhere. Approaches by AGRA and others seek to integrate soil health with water management (mostly through irrigation) and with the use of improved seed varieties. AGRA (2007:3) says that about half of yield improvements from the GR come from seed and the other half come from improved soils. Farmers face numerous challenges in adopting these integrated approaches. For AGRA (2007) the three primary challenges are: the lack of physical and economic access to inputs (synthetic fertilisers and improved seeds); low levels of inputs and crop management skills; and poor market linkages that make it difficult for farmers to justify the additional expense of synthetic fertiliser purchases. AGRA’s SHP is designed to respond to these challenges (see below for more detail on the SHP in Tanzania). Farmers also mentioned difficulties concerning the lack of political and financial support, lack of technical knowledge on soil science, lack of information and data, and insecure land rights (Montpellier, 2014). Rice drying, Mvomero The use of synthetic fertilisers in Tanzania is low, estimated at 12% of farmers (6% for maize and 1% for rice) (IFDC, 2012:17), with an average of about 10% of farmers using synthetic fertiliser in Morogoro (IFDC, 2012:19). The average use nationally, from 2002 to 2009, was 5.5 kg/ha,19 which is far below the Abuja Declaration target of 50 kg/ha. There is some indication of a rise in 2009 and 2010, following the implementation of NAIVS, a scheme that provided subsidies to farmers for a package of fertilisers and improved seed, supplied through agro-dealers who then redeemed the vouchers at the National Microfinance Bank (NMB), which in turn received grants from the MAFC, World Bank, AGRA and other donors. As mentioned earlier, NAIVS was suspended in 2014 following widespread corruption, and was replaced with a straightforward loan system through financial institutions and cooperatives. Under NAIVS, vulnerable farmers were selected by the head of the local village council and given a voucher entitling them to a 50% discount for one 50 kg bag of urea or NPK fertiliser (one 50 kg bag costs approximately Sh70,000 [US$42.68]). NAIVS accounted for about 57% of fertiliser consumption in 2010 (IFDC, 2012:30). Urea (high nitrogen content) and diammonium phosphate (DAP) accounted for about half of all fertiliser use in Tanzania in 2010, with NPK responsible for another 21% (IFDC, 2012:18). Over 75% of Tanzania’s fertiliser consumption takes place in four provinces in 19. World Bank, African Development Indicators, http://databank.worldbank.org/data—accessed 16/01/15. Nuanced rhetoric and the path to poverty: AGRA, small-scale farmers, and seed and soil fertility in Tanzania 23 the southern highlands—Iringa, Mbeya, Rukwa and Ruvuma—and the adjacent provinces of Morogoro and Tabora (IFDC, 2012). In the fertiliser trade Yara and Export Trading Group (ETG) are currently the two dominant players, accounting for approximately 61% of imports and exports between June 2012 and December 2013 (ACB, 2014b). Tanzania has large deposits of high grade rock phosphate east of Lake Manara, which is mined and processed by a local private company, Minjungu Mines and Fertiliser Ltd, for domestic and regional markets (AGRA and IIRR, 2014:53). However, the majority of fertiliser is imported, mainly from the Middle East and Commonwealth of Independent States, with smaller amounts from North Africa and China (IFDC, 2012:29). An estimated 311,000 tons of additional fertilisers are required to meet TAFSIP targets for priority crops (IFDC, 2012:31). The major emphasis at present is on increasing fertiliser use through a combination of ramping up domestic production where possible (see Mtulya, 2015), and increasing imports and distribution through agro-dealer networks. AGRA plays an important role in supporting these efforts, as indicated below. As part of its NAFSN commitments, the Tanzanian government has agreed to review the time required to register imported agrochemicals and benchmark against international ‘best practices’. MAFC has initiated a process of reviewing legislation and has hired a consultant to work on a draft bill, but there are no tangible results to date (NAFSN, 2014:11). AGRA’s Soil Health Programme (SHP) in Tanzania Despite a seeming balance between synthetic fertiliser use and agro-ecological techniques for soil health in ISFM as a concept, in practice AGRA emphasises the synthetic fertiliser side of the equation. Around 55% of the value of grants in the SHP went to increasing access to synthetic fertiliser (Appendix 4, Table 4A). AFAP received US$25 million in grants, or 48% of total grants received in Tanzania. AFAP is initially focusing on AGRA’s breadbasket 20.Interview, 24/10/14. 24 A F R I C A N C E N T R E F O R B I O S A F E T Y countries of Ghana, Mozambique and Tanzania (with additional work in Cote d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, Malawi, Nigeria and South Africa). It aims to double fertiliser consumption in these three countries and increase the number of fertiliser users by 15%, by extending credit guarantees and grants to actors in the fertiliser value chain (ACB, 2014a). In Tanzania AFAP has signed agribusiness partnership contracts with the Minjingu Fertiliser Company and International Raw Materials, a US based marketer and distributor of fertilisers with offices in Australia, Canada, Madagascar, Mauritius and Singapore. Finance is to be supplied via Stanbic Bank, part of South Africa’s Standard Bank Group, and the NMB, 35% of which is owned by the Dutch financial corporation Rabobank (ACB, 2014a). The US-based NGO named CNFA (formerly the Citizen’s Network for Foreign Affairs but now just CNFA) was granted US$1.5 million to develop an input distribution system. This is in addition to a grant of US$4.3 million that CNFA received to set up agro-dealer networks nationally under PASS, the seed programme. MAFC received a grant of US$967,000 to increase access to improved seed, fertiliser and markets in the southern highlands. By contrast, grants to support maize-legume integration came to just 4% of the total grant value in Tanzania, and these projects also include provision of synthetic fertiliser as part of the intervention in line with ISFM. Another 4% went to capacity building on ISFM. According to Messrs Makenge and Rupindo at the Ilonga ARI,20 AGRA is training more than 3,000 farmers, using demonstration plots and trials, to micro-dose phosphorus fertiliser in pigeon pea. They buy the fertiliser from agrodealers and have tested DAP, urea, minjingu grande and minjingu mazao. It started as a three-year project in 2009 but was renewed. It is being conducted in Arusha, Manyara and Kilimanjaro in the northern zone; and in Gairo and Kilosa in the eastern zone. AGRA sponsors a programme to reach other farmers, targeting farmers who have 3—10 acres of land under cultivation. Table 9: Fertiliser use in the research sites in the past year Type of fertiliser (# of users) % yes (N=60) Mvomero % yes (N=30) Morogoro % yes (N=30) Mean kg applied by respondents using fertiliser Mean amount paid by those using (Sh) Mean paid US$ Urea (10) 15 26.7 3.3 60.7 60,611 36.96 NPK (1) 1.7 3.3 — 50 — — DAP (6) 10 16.7 3.3 35 33,500 20.43 Minjingu Mazao (2) 3.3 6.7 — 75 105,000 64.02 YaraMila (3) 5 10 — 175 194,000 118.29 Compost (20) 35 6.7 63.3 334 — — 56.7 36.7 76.7 394.5 1,674 1.02 Green Manure (2) 5 — 10 2 — — Liquid organic fertiliser (2) 21.7 13.3 30 104.9 (litres) 5,538 3.38 Other 6.7 13.3 — — — — Animal manure (33) In Mvomero there are currently two projects with which farmers in the survey are involved. These have direct links to GR initiatives, to increase the use of fertiliser. One of these is a new agricultural credit scheme being run in three rice irrigation schemes by Opportunity Tanzania (OT); the other is a project in which selected lead farmers run demonstration plots organised by Farm Input Promotion Services (FIPS) and Nafaka. FIPS had previously received a grant under the AGRA seed programme, PASS, in Tanzania for the dissemination of improved crop varieties and ISFM (Appendix 4, Table 4B). Morogoro and Mvomero were among the sites selected for participation in an AGRAsponsored US$424,000 project led by SUA (Appendix 4, Table 4A), to scale up Minjingu Figure 5: Sources of fertiliser Nuanced rhetoric and the path to poverty: AGRA, small-scale farmers, and seed and soil fertility in Tanzania 25 Pesticide use in the research area In addition to the introduction of synthetic fertiliser, many farmers said they were given training or exposure to pesticides,21 including 2,4-D and Roundup. Pesticides have been largely absent from the GR discourse in Africa and were not intended as a focus of research by ACB. However, experiences on the ground indicated it would be remiss to completely overlook the pesticide issue. A list of some of the pesticides encountered, with some of the known health and environmental risks, is given below in Table 10. Table 10: Pesticides in use and known effects Brand Company 2,4-D Active ingredient Effects 2,4-D Classified as ‘possibly carcinogenic’ by the World Health Organisation; linked with non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma, a cancer of the white blood cells; suspected endocrine disruptor (disrupts hormone activity); completely banned in Norway, Sweden and Denmark; heavily restricted in several provinces in Canada. Actellic Syngenta Pirimiphos-Methyl Cholinesterase inhibitor: Exposure to cholinesterase-inhibiting pesticides has been linked to impaired neurological development in the fetus and in infants, chronic fatigue syndrome, and Parkinson’s disease; listed as a Bad Actor by the Pesticide Action Network (PAN); highly toxic to bees Karate Syngenta Lambdacyhalothrin Suspected endocrine disruptor; ‘highly toxic when inhaled’; highly toxic for bees; suspected of influencing the hormone system Roundup Monsanto Glyphosate Disruption of hormonal systems and beneficial gut bacteria; damage to DNA; developmental and reproductive toxicity; birth defects Solito Syngenta Pretilachlor & Pyribenzoxim Source: ACB, 2012; Government of Tanzania; Pesticide Action Network phosphate utilisation in Tanzania. The project also involved Minjingu Phosphate Company, MAFC and the African Soil Health Consortium, and targeted 100 extension workers, 10,000 smallholder farmers and agro-dealers (AGRA and IIRR, 2014:53–58). The project found that yields increased dramatically in some areas, but that in others the response to the fertiliser was minimal. This indicates that locally specific conditions must be considered when applying fertiliser. The research areas are also targeted for other interventions, especially building agro-dealer networks to distribute GR inputs to farmers. As a result of these interventions, the use of synthetic fertiliser in the study areas was relatively high compared with national averages, with 37% of respondents using some kind of synthetic fertiliser in 2014 (Table 9). Urea was the most commonly used type, with 15% of respondents using it in the past season, followed by DAP (10%) and YaraMila (5%). Those applying urea to their fields were using 60.7kg 21. The term pesticides as used here refers to insecticides, herbicides and fungicides. 26 A F R I C A N C E N T R E F O R B I O S A F E T Y on average, again much higher than national averages. The average application of YaraMila, on the other hand, was 175 kg, but with only 3 users no firm conclusions can be drawn. Despite these high comparative figures, there is still a contrast with the results from earlier fieldwork carried out in Malawi, where, for example, urea topdressing was used by 81% of respondents, and the average amount applied by all users of synthetic fertilisers was 341.5kg. There is a noticeable difference in fertiliser between the two research sites in Morogoro and Mvomero. Only one farmer in the Morogoro site was using urea or DAP and there was no reported usage of NPK, Minjingu mazao or YaraMila. This is not surprising, given that the Morogoro farmers are involved with SAT’s work on organic agriculture. There is also a big difference in fertiliser use by crop. Individual farmers as well as those participating in FGDs said they did not need to use fertiliser as their soils were fertile enough without it. Rice is a different story and the standard application rate is 150 kg per acre (50 kg of either urea or DAP as basal and another 100 kg of urea for top dressing). The average spend on synthetic fertilisers ranged from Sh33,500 [US$20.43] for DAP to Sh194,000 [US$118.29] for YaraMila, with a Sh60,611 [US$36.96] average spend on urea, the most commonly applied fertiliser. Just over half (51%) of respondents cited high fertiliser prices as a serious problem, though it would be premature to conclude that high prices are the cause of low adoption. In Malawi, 89 out of 90 farmers surveyed said high fertiliser price was a serious problem, yet 81% also reported applying urea in the previous season, and another 68% reported using NPK. The majority of fertiliser used was purchased from agro-dealers; this accounted for all the NPK and Minjingu mazao, 67% for urea, 50% for DAP and 33% for YaraMila (Figure 4). Only 4 respondents (7%) in the survey had accessed fertilisers through NAIVS in the past season. In one case, a farmer explained how they had to re-sell the bag obtained using a voucher, as they could not afford to purchase a second bag for the full retail price. Another farmer shared urea and DAP with a neighbour who had received a voucher in the past season. As in Malawi, there was a feeling among those to Rice paddies, Dihombo irrigation scheme, Mvomero whom we spoke that the fertiliser subsidies were problematic: the targeted vouchers did not necessarily reach those most in need, and late deliveries were a commonly reported problem. Case study: Farm Input Promotions Africa Limited (FIPS) and village-based agricultural advisors (VBAAs) Farm Input Promotions Africa (FIPS) is a Kenyan not-for-profit organisation. It has its roots in an earlier NGO project initiated in 1990 called the Sustainable Community Orientated Development Programme (SCODP), which provided small quantities of fertiliser and seed with which farmers could experiment and select for further use if they chose. This is seen as a low-risk means of assessing new technologies (Blackie and Albright, 2005). FIPS was established out of SCODP in 2003, to expand this model to include other agricultural inputs (seed and herbicides) with funding from Rockefeller Foundation, DFID (as part of its Crop Protection Programme) and later USAID and AGRA (Partnership Africa, n.d.). FIPS Africa had received an earlier AGRA grant (2008–2010) to support its work in Kenya. FIPS received a US$1.9 million grant from AGRA to work in Tanzania and Mozambique over the period 2012 to 2015 (Appendix 4, Table 4A). Its partners include DFID, USAID, Norad, Monsanto, Yara, Dow, Pioneer and CNFA. FIPS is also a local subcontractor of the Nafaka programme, in Nuanced rhetoric and the path to poverty: AGRA, small-scale farmers, and seed and soil fertility in Tanzania 27 its fourth year. FIPS is the implementing agent for the Small Input Package Demonstration component of the Tanzania Agricultural Partnership (TAP) which arises in turn from the ASDP. The other two TAP components are the AGRA-sponsored CNFA agro-dealer programme, and the input finance pilot implemented by the NMB (MAFC and ACT, 2007). Private sector fertiliser companies include ARM from Kenya and Minjingu Mines and Fertiliser Ltd in Tanzania. Chapa Meli, a Yara subsidiary,22 is also involved in the partnership. Extension methodologies are based on farmer experimentation and the selection of technologies, through farmer field schools and demonstrations with farmers, and work with national, regional and district extension staff (Blackie and Albright, 2005). FIPS has operated in Mvomero to train farmers as village-based agricultural advisors (VBAAs), to provide outreach and extension to farmer networks and to disseminate improved seeds and fertiliser. The VBAAs organise demonstration plots in their respective villages. VBAAs are nominated by existing village farmer groups, which typically comprise 10–30 farmers and have their own constitution. MVIWATA and Nafaka play a key role in establishing village based groups which historically existed in small numbers but have mushroomed since the interventions by AGRA, FIPS, MVIWATA and Nafaka. Once a VBAA has been nominated he or she receives training from FIPS and Nafaka on a variety of agronomic practices (such as land preparation), the use of organic and synthetic fertilisers and using and selecting improved seeds. VBAAs then establish and maintain demonstration plots on land they own or have rented, and are given a variety of different improved seeds and fertilisers to test. In a FGD, VBAAs revealed that the fertilisers given by FIPS were from Yara (DAP, urea and YaraMila) and Minjingu mazao, a local product. Different types of fertiliser are provided to demonstration plots to allow for comparisons. Each demonstration plot has one type of fertiliser on show, but there are also control plots. Most of the seed is hybrid and FIPS buys from the research institutes (Dakawa, Katrin, Ilonga) and seed companies (ASA and Tanseed, as well as Pioneer Hi-Bred hybrid maize PHB 30D79, PHB 3253 via Bytrade Tanzania Ltd as part of FIPS packages in southern Tanzania) (Pioneer and FIPS, 2010). FIPS is looking for farms to produce Quality Declared Seed (QDS) in the coming season. Farmers rate the seed quality as good, although there are some challenges of weevil damage in maize seed (FGD, 21/10/14). As part of the programme VBAAs also receive training in the use of pesticides, which some VBAAs have started using as a result, including Monsanto’s Roundup, 2,4-D, Solito and Carat (See Box Pesticide use in the research area). The land is owned by the VBAAs as farmers and the produce is owned by the VBAA. Essentially the aim is to show farmers the results and encourage them to purchase inputs if they see something they like. So it builds a market for the fertiliser companies and while it offers farmers a choice of technologies, this choice itself is narrowed into the GR toolkit. It is not clear what kind of environmental monitoring takes place. Some farmers said initial soil tests done were conducted to tailor the type of fertiliser, but others indicated that no soil tests had been done. In irrigated schemes, negative environmental impacts may be felt downstream of fertiliser use and there is no evidence that this is being monitored. Since the better-off farmers tend to occupy the upstream plots, this may have longer-term implications for the less well-off farmers downstream. The overall goal of the FIPS programme is to create a class of full-time, profitable agro-dealers from the VBAAs with whom it works, which will also complement other GR initiatives already underway in the area. The aim is to make the venture financially sustainable after the exit of donors (Hall, et al., 2010). For example, one VBAA said he had already organised his farmers group to approach OT for a (Yara) fertiliser loan this season. OT had paid the VBAA an allowance for doing this. According to the VBAAs, adoption rates for the technologies and practices have been generally high, with between 25 and 22. http://www.yara.com/products_services/fertilisers/index.aspx 28 A F R I C A N C E N T R E F O R B I O S A F E T Y 30 farmers in Mkindo adopting the package. Some practices, such as new planting and spacing techniques, have been taken up more rapidly than others. Fertiliser and pesticide adoption is currently being held in check by high prices; hence the linkages between FIPS’ demonstration plots and the micro-finance being offered by OT, with MVIWATA and Nafaka acting as intermediaries. Farmers reported demonstration plots applying the equivalent of 100 kg per ha of synthetic fertiliser for rice and maize (Sh140,000 [US$85.37] at the going rate). No soil testing was done prior to setting up the demonstration plots. Farmers to whom we spoke reacted positively to these GR interventions. While a number of farmers indicated they did not need to use synthetic fertilisers because the soils are fertile, others—especially farmers who are oriented towards producing surpluses for markets—do want increased access to synthetic fertilisers. Farmers participating in the programme with Nafaka and OT, who provided production loans for a package including improved rice seed and synthetic fertilisers, were happy with the intervention. An important part of the approach is to combine input provision with market access. A key challenge for GR interventions remains the high cost of inputs, especially where farmers cannot find profitable markets for additional output. Participating farmers indicated that while they were able to apply some of the techniques, they lack resources to apply others, in particular fertiliser and pesticides. Farmers were advised to use 50 kg/ha of fertiliser but could not afford to do so (Farmer FGD, 21/10/14). This is why the GR emphasises reduction of the price of synthetic fertiliser especially—which primarily means improving supply chain efficiencies—and boosting demand through input subsidies. Fertiliser application rates in the demonstration plots being organised through FIPS are very high. Although farmers may be swayed into adopting synthetic fertiliser from what they see, will they realistically be able to apply these ideal doses? Further, we saw little evidence of alternative soil health methodologies being compared side-by-side with synthetic fertiliser, though some farmers we spoke to did express an interest in this. SAT demo plot, Morogoro Farmers received training on Good Agricultural Practice (GAP) which is interpreted to include timely land preparation, use of improved seed, correct spacing of plants, timely weeding and harvesting, regular field visits to check on the development of crops, post-harvest storage, the use of water berms and many others (VBAA FGD, 21/10/14). GAP from a GR perspective often incorporates use of synthetic fertilisers and pesticides while from an agro-ecological perspective these would not be included. There are also various opinions regarding tilling, with some arguing that GAP involves the use of tractors and hand hoes, with tilling to a depth of 15–16 cm while others argue for a no till or minimum till approach, to reduce disturbance of the soil structure. This really indicates that GAP can be interpreted in widely divergent ways. Accordingly, we must look for the specific content of what is being proposed, rather than just accepting that if someone mentions GAP this automatically means ecologically and socially sustainable methods of production. We can acknowledge a participatory element in these interventions. Nowhere did we get the sense that farmers were being compelled to adopt the technologies on offer. We can even say that some of the demonstration plots were quite impressive, with farmers owning the plots and the process and being very clear about what the purpose of the demonstration was. The demonstrations are not only about increasing GR inputs; for example, we also came across demonstrations that were testing variations in spacing for rice. However, even Nuanced rhetoric and the path to poverty: AGRA, small-scale farmers, and seed and soil fertility in Tanzania 29 these demonstrations of GAP incorporate the use of synthetic fertilisers as a matter of course. We did not see demonstrations comparing production using synthetic fertiliser with those using organic sources of fertility. It is not clear that the longer-term impacts of increased use of GR inputs on biodiversity, soil life, water systems and social equality are well understood, since they are longer-term and it is quite possible to overlook the links between new technologies and their socio-ecological consequences. These aspects of the GR must be monitored closely, together with farmers, so that the connection between growing landlessness, the necessity of precarious labour, ecological damage and the acceptance of 30 A F R I C A N C E N T R E F O R B I O S A F E T Y these technologies is apparent. This requires ongoing, longitudinal studies, especially since the introduction of these inputs is still at an early stage. Agro-ecological methods will need to take into account limited access to sufficient animal manure and crop residues for effective nutrient replenishment. Agro-ecological approaches to soil health are knowledge intensive and it will be necessary to work closely with research institutes and others to develop contextually appropriate means of improving soils over time, together with farmers and their organisations. Seed This section starts with an overview of the seed sector structure and the legal and policy framework in Tanzania, including the role of seed R&D and in particular the changing roles of the public and private sectors. It then looks at AGRA’s seed interventions in Tanzania and in the research area, including the links between AGRA and other GR seed interventions in the research area, particularly by USAID/FtF/ Nafaka. We then turn to a consideration of the seed being used by farmers in our survey, including main types, quality, price and access. Appendix 5 provides more detail on various seed varieties in common use together with their pros and cons. We include a case study of Tanseed International, a domestic commercial seed company privatised from the state monopoly company that operated before liberalisation, and an AGRA grantee and partner. The section ends with a reflection on key issues, policy recommendations and further areas for research. Background to the commercial seed sector Tanzania did not have a commercial seed sector until the 1970s when USAID provided support to establish a project for commercial seed production. This included research into new varieties, the establishment of seed farms, the formation of Tanzania National Seed Company (Tanseed) as a state-owned enterprise, and the launch of the Tanzania Official Seed Certification Agency (TOSCA) with three laboratories.23 Improved maize was introduced into Tanzania through the National Maize Research Programme (NMRP) in 1974, a partnership between the Tanzanian government and USAID. We can understand USAID’s role here as part of the US objectives during the ‘second food regime’—building national agricultural research systems (NARS) that replicate the US model (Friedmann, 1993), and linking them to the CGIAR institutional network. The Rockefeller Foundation established the CGIAR network and was also a co-founder of AGRA with the Gates Foundation. Therefore AGRA is an update of the older strategy and the formative involvement of USAID at the start, as well as its present involvement, highlights the philanthropic-business-state connections, in this case based in the US. There has been some Atlantic partnership support more recently, e.g. from DFID in the UK and from AGRA as an extension of US foreign policy. From 1976 the NMRP released a number of improved OPV varieties: Tuxpeno (released 1976); Kitimo, Kilima and Staha (1983); TMV1 and TMV2 (1987); the maize streak virus (MSV) resistant varieties, Kilima, UCA, Kito and Katumani (1994); as well as two hybrids for the highlands (H6302 and H614) in 1977–1978 and another two hybrids (CH-1 and CH-3) in 1992 (Kaliba, et al., 2000; Lyimo et al., 2014). TXD, the favoured improved rice variety, was developed through public sector R&D in the early 1980s using local and IRRI germplasm, although it was officially released only in 2010. Deregulation and liberalisation of seed production and distribution in Tanzania consisted of policy and legislative change, especially in plant variety protection (PVP). This opened the door to private sector involvement, the privatisation of state-owned enterprises and the establishment of new quasi-government agencies. These agencies facilitated private sector entry, public sector input subsidies to support the development of a commercial seed market, and a role for SSFs through the QDS system. These are considered in turn before we scrutinise AGRA’s interventions and the picture on the ground. As part of the processes of deregulation, the Tanzanian government launched the National Seed Industry Development Programme in 1989, with the aim of shifting from a statecontrolled to a private sector economy. Private seed companies were allowed to operate in the country, and the Plant Protection Act (1997), the Plant Breeders’ Rights Act (2003) and the 23. “Tanzania seed sector status”—http://q.datakultur.se/~svalofco/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/Tanzania-SeedSector-Status-Paper.pdf—accessed 5 December 2014. Nuanced rhetoric and the path to poverty: AGRA, small-scale farmers, and seed and soil fertility in Tanzania 31 Seed Act (2003) were passed to ‘modernise’ the seed system. TOSCA was transformed from an agency into an institute, becoming the Tanzania Official Seed Certification Institute (TOSCI), and was empowered to licence private laboratories and encourage international collaboration on plant breeding.24 Private sector involvement and privatisation Following liberalisation and structural adjustment, from 1993 multinational seed companies entered the market, targeting profitable seed (mainly maize hybrid and some rice), mostly based on imported seed and germplasm. Private companies released 17 hybrid maize varieties from then until 2000, notably Pannar 7, Cargill 4, Ciba-Geigy 2, Pioneer 2, DeKalb 1, and Kenya Seed 1 (Kaliba, et al., 2000:36–37; Lyimo et al., 2014:646–647). Pannar is now owned by Pioneer Hi-Bred (a subsidiary of Du Pont), Cargill Seed and DeKalb are now owned by Monsanto and CibaGeigy is now owned by Syngenta, indicating an extensive multinational presence and concentration in the hybrid maize seed market in Tanzania. Tanseed was privatised in 2002. According to Dr Mizambwa, the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of ASA (interview, 11/02/14), the enforced privatisation of Tanseed as part of structural adjustment led to a collapse of the seed sector for most crops. The private sector focus on maize hybrids is a typical story in Africa, where MNCs concentrate their resources and attention on a few crops with a high potential for profit. Given that the private sector becomes the primary source of investment as states undergo funding cuts and structural adjustment, R&D in the so-called ‘orphan’ crops (i.e. those crops considered not to have high potential for private profit) declines. Mizambwa says MNCs produce only for national markets where they can sell a uniform product. The result is that niche markets of indigenous and locally adapted seed are not served. However, in a clear example of the contradictions of the corporatisation of state entities, Dr Mizambwa says that ASA “needs a return on investment to invest, and therefore will target the more 24. “Tanzania seed sector status”, op cit. 32 A F R I C A N C E N T R E F O R B I O S A F E T Y profitable crops”. So, although its mandate is to expand investment beyond the most profitable crops, its structural position as a commercial enterprise forces it to pursue a path similar to that taken by other private entities. According to MAFC, certified maize seed availability in 2012/13 had almost reached the target. Other crops were far behind (e.g. rice 8% and beans 3% of target) (Saidia and Mkiga, 2014:4). Most commercial seed is imported. Since 2007 certified seed, as a share of total seed used, rose from less than 10% to over a quarter in 2013/14 (Saidia and Mkiga, 2014). From 2003 to 2010 the private sector accounted for 84% to 99% of certified seed of all varieties produced in Tanzania. This dropped to below 80% in 2010 (Saidia and Mkiga, 2014:7–8) although the reasons for this are not known. In 2013 there were 27 active seed companies operating in Tanzania to produce or import seeds, although altogether there were 65 registered seed companies (40 local, 25 foreign) (Saidia and Mkiga, 2014:6). Imports are mainly from the US, Uganda, Zambia, Malawi, Kenya, South Africa and the United Arab Emirates (USAID 2013:19). Most of the local companies are headquartered in Arusha, while Tanseed and ASA are based in Morogoro. Major multinational seed companies currently operating in Tanzania include Monsanto (US), Pannar (Pioneer Hi-Bred, US), Seed Co (Zimbabwe), East Africa Seed Co (Kenya), Kibo, Brac, Bytrade and Kisimbaguru Estates (Saidia and Mkiga, 2014:7). Seed Co was recently acquired by Groupe Limagraine with portions going to Monsanto (AFSA, 2014). The major maize seed producers are Pannar (28% of the certified seed market in 2010/11), SeedCo (26%), Suba Agro (a local company, 9%), Kibo Seed (7%), Highland Seed and Monsanto (6% each) (Saidia and Mkiga, 2014:8). After 2012 the government started a programme to license basic or foundation seed to private seed companies to produce basic and certified seed (Saidia and Mkiga, 2014). Licensing may be on an exclusive basis. According to NAFSN (2014:11) the system to authorise qualified private seed companies to produce basic (foundation) seed from publicly bred varieties is in place and has been operational since January 2013. Two private companies—Highland Seed Growers and Kipato Seed Company (the latter an AGRA grantee)—have been licensed to produce basic seeds for maize and sesame in 2013. However, it is unclear if the companies have made use of the licences. Eighty per cent of government-released varieties were made available to private sector seed companies but the associated conditions and requirements were stringent and, according to NAFSN, very few companies have taken up the offer to date. USAID (2013) indicates ongoing institutional weaknesses in seed certification and variety release procedures, in particular, and also in data management as obstacles to greater private sector involvement within Tanzania. Public sector facilitation of private sector entry – ASA, the ARIs and NAIVS The ASA was established as a semiautonomous entity under MAFC in 2006 to produce and sell high quality basic seed to private companies to multiply and sell on to farmers. ASA took over the responsibilities previously performed by the Ministry’s Seed Unit (ASA, 2014). ASA is the only government agency involved in commercial seed production. Its main objectives are to support the development of a commercial seed sector in Tanzania, and to facilitate investment in seed beyond hybrid maize, with a mandate to work in partnership with the private sector through PPPs. According to Mr Kunde, ASA’s Production Manager (interview 23/10/2014), ASA can enter into agreements with other companies to develop seed. He says the law now is that private companies can produce basic seed from foundation seed from research stations, on the basis of a written expression of interest—but they have not received any so far. According to USAID (2013) weak licensing regulations and competition from ASA remain obstacles to private sector involvement. Mr Kunde says the private sector will eventually take up the challenge because there is a large gap between supply and demand. ASA has set aside a budget to send private sector enterprises to network internationally (see a similar role played by AGRA with Tanseed—Box). In 2013/14 ASA worked with two local companies, Suba Monsanto WEMA experimental plot, Ilonga ARI. Agro and Meru Agro Tour and Consultancy (both AGRA grantees, Appendix 4, Table 4B), to produce certified maize seed on one of ASA’s farms (Saidia and Mkiga, 2014:9). The law is now opening up for private companies to produce basic seed from their own foundation seed. Most companies are looking at maize, sunflower and legumes. According to Mr Kunde, ASA is considering acquiring its own breeding capacity. They will have more power to shape the breeding agenda when they have their own internal system, but currently ASA buys from available released varieties. ASA has farms in Arusha, Kigoma, Msimba and Kilangali, seed farms in Morogoro, Dabaga farm in Iringa (now leased to the Clinton Foundation, an AGRA grant recipient in Malawi), Mwele farm in Tanga and two in Kilosa. The 4,000 ha Mbozi farm in Mbeya is earmarked for private sector use to produce seed, paying a small land rent to government. Vegetable seed is multiplied at Tengeru and Dabaga (Kunde interview 23/10/2014; Saidia and Mkiga, 2014). Research stations are strategically placed in agro-ecological zones, with personnel tasked to develop new seed varieties. ASA buys foundation seed from the research stations. They then produce basic seed and some certified seed for maize, paddy, sorghum, sunflower, pigeon pea, cow pea, beans, wheat and some vegetables (tomato, onion, eggplant). They sell the basic seed to companies to produce seed for farmers. ASA is open to SSF interaction, including contracting of certified seed production, on a commercial basis. Size is a limit to seed production on a small scale—the seeds must Nuanced rhetoric and the path to poverty: AGRA, small-scale farmers, and seed and soil fertility in Tanzania 33 be able to enter into diverse ecologies, because on a small scale seeds will cross-fertilise with neighbouring species in the specific socio-ecological context. This is a problem for commercial, certified seed production. Private companies may brand the seed they have multiplied and sell it for a profit. The essence of this arrangement is that the private sector provides bulking up capacity that is in short supply, and their brand offers a quality guarantee. In theory, if they do not produce good quality, farmers as consumers will reject their brand and acquire seed elsewhere. However, this depends crucially on the ready availability of alternative seed varieties. This may become a problem after many years of R&D focusing on a few uniform varieties only, thereby limiting farmers’ choice and forcing them to use available seed even if this is not of good quality. This argument is usually used against farmers own seed varieties, but can apply equally to poor quality certified seed. A big difference is that poor quality farmer varieties are usually restricted to local areas whereas poor quality certified seed may be distributed nationally, thereby threatening agricultural biodiversity. According to Andrew Kunde, the main challenges to a market in improved seed are the lack of awareness of the available seed and the costs of seed. Most SSFs rely on rainfed agriculture so investments in seed may be lost and farmers will not be willing to invest again. ASA currently supplies less than 20% of certified seed, and the rest is from the private sector (mostly imports). Mr Kunde identifies markets for produce as another key issue. Once a market is secured, farmers will adopt new seed varieties. ASA’s approach is to work throughout value chains, not just with farmers (see similarities with Tanseed in the case study). The focus is on paddy and sunflower. Rice millers want a standardised brand. ASA hosts farmer field days with farmers and millers, conducts field trials and the selection of varieties, and secures markets. In this way farmers benefit, says Mr Kunde, and so do seed producers and millers. ASA deals with officially released seed only, tested for disease resistance, adaptability, yield, etc. It must start from the breeding ground. ASA has no special agreement or partnership with Nafaka and 34 A F R I C A N C E N T R E F O R B I O S A F E T Y others, just a “normal business arrangement”. Liberalisation has also forced the research stations to orient their work towards partnerships with the private sector, like ASA. Although they do receive core funds from the public purse, researchers and institutes must supplement these funds with private sector funding to make ends meet. The private sector will sponsor only those activities that further their private interests. According to Mr Okhunda, Dakawa provides basic seed like ASA does, but is also contracted to produce seed for private companies (e.g. ASA and Tanseed, for TXD306). The same goes for other research stations such as Ilonga. Okhunda says “PPPs are good. We can do the research and share the costs.” Breeders do research on behalf of donors, whether public or private, and funds cover all or part of the costs of travel, logistics, irrigation and fertiliser. At Ilonga we saw an example of private funding in the form of a Monsanto water efficient maize trial under irrigation, where the infrastructure was sectioned off behind a fence. The infrastructure is not available for wider use by others at the research station. According to Okhunda, the major constraint on developing varieties is lack of funds. He says, “The contribution from the private sector on R&D is low, so far. They want cheap things. The private sector want to make money. They are not ready to take the risks. But I would like the private sector to get involved.” NAIVS was established in 2009 to boost the market in certified seed through public sector subsidisation. The scheme constituted between 37% and 44% of the annual MAFC budget between 2009 and 2012. The main target crops are hybrid and improved OPV maize and rice. In this system, the government distributes vouchers that subsidise about half the price of a package of improved seeds and fertilisers, which farmers obtain with the vouchers from private dealers. Households that cultivate approximately one hectare of maize and/or rice, and can afford the top-up payment for the input package, are eligible for participation. In essence this means better-off farmers are targeted, although female-headed households and those households that have not used improved seeds and fertilisers for target crops in the past five years are given first priority (Saidia and Mkiga, 2014). It is reasonable to view NAIVS as a subsidy for market creation for multinational seed and fertiliser companies. While some farmers do benefit, this is not evenly spread and these scarce public resources might be channelled more equitably, through R&D and farmer support focusing on practices carried out by a wider layer of producers, especially agro-ecological techniques that have additional long-term ecological benefits. We did not encounter widespread access to the NAIVS in our research sites, even though Morogoro and Mvomero are both target areas. An overview of the certification process Mr Okhunda at Dakawa Research Station uses rice as an example of the formal process of variety selection, approval and certification. It starts with on-station research, where the breeder selects the variety, for use only at the research station. This takes a few years of testing for standards. The second stage is multi-location trials for other conditions and agro-ecological systems, which take a minimum of two years. The breeder conducts these trials. Participatory variety selection (PVS) is part of the process and other stakeholders are involved. The objective is to test whether the variety performs as indicated. At this stage the seed is still under the breeder’s custody. It must be tested successfully in at least three of Tanzania’s seven agro-ecological zones or any other country which is in agreement or has harmonised its seeds policy and legislations with Tanzania. The third stage is the National Performance Trial (NPT) with independent testing by TOSCI for distinct, uniform, stable (DUS) compliance. This stage takes one year/ one season. If successful, the variety can then be registered and officially released. This covers breeders seed and foundation seed. The breeder maintains the germplasm. Breeders are not allowed to release unless the variety is officially recognised. There are normally two DUS tests which lengthen the variety release process, but recommendations on the review of the Seed Act is that there should be only one, to shorten the process. The Tropical Pest Research Institute (TPRI, Arusha) grants permits for imported varieties in collaboration with the Ministry of Agriculture on phytosanitary and import control issues. The TPRI goes to the research centres for evaluation. What can we make of the certification process and criteria? We can recognise the value of rigorous quality controls, especially when farmers are actively involved in shaping the processes, but there are fundamental problems with the DUS criteria in particular. The first thing is that the precise specification of points of difference in two seed varieties (distinct) is of interest mainly to those who want to benefit from ownership, and therefore have to specify a distinct product over which they have claim. That one variety is distinct from another may be less important to a farmer than that it performs as stated, and that it can adapt to the local ecological context. The requirement for uniformity actually runs counter to the importance of contextual diversity, which certainly is an underlying principle of food sovereignty and agro-ecological production. Small-scale farmers who recycle seed, including local varieties that have never been commercialised (but which may contain traits that are of interest to private companies), are impeded because their varieties are not recognised by the official system. Small-scale farmers will struggle to meet the prohibitive costs involved in the processes of developing or breeding a variety to meet formal DUS standards. The emphasis on commercialisation of public sector varieties places small-scale, resource-poor farmers at a disadvantage when seeking access to public sector germplasm, because they will find it more difficult to commercialise if they first must go through the full certification process. Farmers may not be interested in selling seed at a national level but will still have to go through multi-location trials as part of the certification process. This is where the QDS system comes in. Quality Declared Seed (QDS) Within the context of a strong orientation towards the private sector, the QDS system is something of an outlier, because it actually facilitates farmer involvement in the seed sector without necessarily forcing farmers into direct competition with MNCs. QDS was adopted in Tanzania based on FAO’s 2000 framework and is governed by the 2003 Seed Act, along with the rules, regulations and procedures of 2007 and the Guidelines for Control for Quality Declared Seed Production of 2007. It is a seed system which involves farmers Nuanced rhetoric and the path to poverty: AGRA, small-scale farmers, and seed and soil fertility in Tanzania 35 However, farmers did express interest in learning more about seed production and said they were sure they could produce seed themselves if they could get the technical knowledge. Farmers were not necessarily referring to commercial production of certified seed, although they did not explicitly exclude this option either. They said they come from groups of farmers and there is a demand for quality seed. Individual farmers commented that training is required on seed selection, preparation and control, as well as broader issues of basic agricultural practices including seed quality and seed health issues. Terraced plot, Uluguru Mountains, Morogoro in the production and supply of good quality seeds in their own areas under the supervision of trained and authorised inspectors at district level. QDS allows local production and sales of seed with the focus on non-commercial crops and relatively light regulation. A registered QDS producer normally purchases basic seed from ASA and produces certified seed grade one (C1), known as QDS1, which can be distributed to other smallholder farmers within the ward. The QDS1 can be recycled by the same registered farmer to produce certified seed grade two (C2), known as QDS2, after inspection and conformity to regulations by TOSCI. Inspections are limited to 10% of the total amount of seed to reduce costs, assuming that the QDS farmer has already conducted 90% inspection of the seeds, according to an official from the Ministry. QDS produces relatively small amounts of maize, paddy, beans and sorghum seed (e.g. 112 tons of maize seed compared with 19,000 tons of certified maize seed in 2011/12) (Saidia and Mkiga, 2014). Despite the low amounts, the QDS process engages farmers in the technicalities of seed production (thus building capacity), and makes available a wider pool of quality seed in local areas (thus improving access to better quality seed). We encountered different opinions on QDS. In FGDs farmers indicated they did not know of anyone producing seed through the QDS system. Farmers are recycling seed, sometimes for local sale, and being involved in certified seed production was not top of their agenda. 36 A F R I C A N C E N T R E F O R B I O S A F E T Y According to Makenge and Rupindo, Ilonga ARI works on QDS with SSFs who are authorised to sell locally. They say QDS is good, because it can reduce supply constraints/availability issues. QDS is mainly for maize, sorghum and rice, and there is not much pigeon pea or cow pea. Seed companies were less positive about QDS. According to Kunda at ASA, “QDS must not be the basis of the seed system. It is local production and distribution, but volumes are low. There is a challenge with certification because it is hard to certify when producers are so far apart and are producing low amounts. QDS is in the seed law, but it is not a system to depend on if you want to solve the availability and affordability of seed. It is a short term solution in a limited area and limited distribution. We should rather encourage the strengthening of the existing system.” Mr Mushauri, CEO of Tanseed agrees. He says, “Some extension officers are producing bulk seed and competing on the market. QDS is not allowed to be packaged, and it would be wasting resources to support packaging. Rather support the private sector”. We should note here that farmers could also be organised as private sector actors, as ESAFF suggests (below). Mushauri continues, “So QDS is not attracting farmers. The seed is not treated because that is too high tech, so it encourages the continuation of diseases. QDS is the lowest system of production, designed for a country starting independence. There have been lots of QDS projects here, but there are marketing problems. Marketing is a profession and farmers can’t be expected to do that.” ESAFF’s position is that government should promote QDS as a source of good quality improved seed varieties as an alternative to imports, as well as support for communitybased seed production. ESAFF’s emphasis is on recognising that SSFs can also form private entities to sell certified seed and should be supported to realise this goal. ESAFF identifies a limit to the QDS system, in that producers cannot sell the seed beyond ward level, and argues that the area of sale should be expanded to allow QDS producers to compete alongside other commercial enterprises (ESAFF, 2014:4). ACB agrees that farmers should not be discriminated against if they want to form private seed enterprises in their own right when it comes to seed sales. But we prefer to emphasise collective ownership based on shared technologies and cooperation between economic agents. ESAFF’s focus on the role of farmers in private enterprise perhaps unwittingly places emphasis on competition between individuals as the basis for economic activity. The formation of proprietary enterprises is the seedbed for corporate cherrypicking of the most successful commercial enterprises in future, as we can witness from MNC acquisitions of any sizeable seed company in Africa. Recommendations made by different stakeholders during review workshops of the Seed Act mentioned that the seed law needs to be reviewed to address issues within the QDS, including that limitations to the QDS system be extended beyond the ward level to agro-ecological zones, increased land area for the production of QDS seeds, capacity building and increased investment in the system. However, discussions with officials at the Ministry revealed their concern that the extension for sale of QDS seeds outside the ward level will result in competition with the certified seeds produced by the private seed companies, and the government still feels that certified seeds need to dominate the market and meet the demand for the smallholder farmers. Nevertheless the demand for seeds cannot be met only by the private sector, especially in areas where there are no certified seeds or seed dealers who sell the certified seeds. While the Ministry does recognise the need to further train and build capacity for QDS farmers, officials say that they lack the necessary financial and human resources to do this. None of the recommendations raised under QDS have been addressed in the draft bills so far, with no further mention of QDS in the amendments. Plant variety protection (PVP) The harmonisation of PVP laws, based on agreements through the African Regional Intellectual Property Organisation (ARIPO), aims to provide secure rights for private investment, including and especially through the protection of private ownership over seed in the form of intellectual property (IP) protection, based on the provisions of the Union for the Protection of Plant Varieties (UPOV) 1991. Tanzania’s 2003 laws were already compliant with UPOV 1991 in many respects, and this is reinforced in recent proposals. As ACB has pointed out elsewhere, earlier versions of UPOV where the rights of breeders were more evenly balanced with the rights of farmers, are no longer available for signing. The baseline is the 1991 version, with a decay in farmers’ rights in favour of private breeders’ rights (ACB, 2012a). Tanzania is in the process of joining UPOV and already has in place the Plant Breeders’ Rights Act 2012, which is UPOV 1991 compliant, for mainland Tanzania. Zanzibar has adopted the Plant Breeders’ Rights Bill, which is awaiting parliamentary assent. Tanzania is in the process of finalising the Instrument of Ratification. Once Tanzania ratifies the UPOV 91 convention it will be the only Least Developed Country (LDC) in the world to have done so. Tanzania has also signed the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Seed Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) which allows registration of a plant variety released by any two of the SADC Member states without further testing (NAFSN, 2014:10–11). The content of recent changes to breeders’ rights disregards the contribution of SSFs, marginalises their varieties through DUS requirements, inadequately protects genetic material held by farmers and has adverse impacts on their interests and livelihoods as it severely restricts farmers from engaging in their customary practices of freely sharing, exchanging and selling seed/propagating material (AFSA, 2013). Private ownership Nuanced rhetoric and the path to poverty: AGRA, small-scale farmers, and seed and soil fertility in Tanzania 37 of knowledge and material resources (for example, seed and genetic materials) means the flow of royalties out of Africa into the hands of MNCs. The 2013 National Agricultural Policy (NAP) identifies plant breeders’ rights (PBRs) as a priority area. It argues that in order to avert challenges facing plant breeding, including inadequate knowledge of the intellectual property rights (IPRs) and low participation of local and foreign enterprises in seed production and breeding, there are a number of things that must be undertaken to rectify the situation. These include the promotion of public awareness on PBRs and other IPRs, facilitating and protecting IPRs and research initiatives, and facilitating the participation of local and international companies in breeding and seed production (United Republic of Tanzania, 2013). The main purpose of PVP laws are theoretically to protect private owners from others who might seek to benefit from the investment they have sunk into R&D. Currently these are the lifeblood of Tanzania’s farming systems, as shown in the survey results below. A blanket PVP law, whose main purpose is to protect the investments of corporations against other corporations who might be able to take advantage of the products without incurring any development costs, may well destroy the ability of SSFs to save and exchange seed. Changes to the Seed Law potentially open the way for the criminalisation of the distribution of recycled genetic materials circulating in farming systems. The continued circulation of farmers’ own varieties could also be outlawed by prohibiting or constraining the sale or exchange of non-certified materials. Any seed “not registered in the national variety catalog” is considered by some as falling within the category of ‘fake’ seed requiring “the need for a stiffer system of penalties and fines sufficient to deter fraudulent individuals” (USAID 2013:5). Current proposals to amend the Seed Act criminalise any person who sells or intends to sell or distribute any seed that does not conform to prescribed standards, with the offending person liable to a fine and the destruction of the seed (URP 2014:41).25 We cannot support a regulatory and quality control system where small-scale, resourcepoor farmers are ‘collateral damage’ in global corporate wars for profit and supremacy. It is necessary to work out alternatives that start from protecting and expanding contextual diversity, participatory R&D and shared ownership. QDS is a good starting point and should be supported and expanded with farmer involvement. The current situation (which is liable to rapid change given the laws and policies on the table) is that the Tanzanian government owns and controls the national germplasm supply. According to Mr Okhunda at Dakawa, the research stations may not sell (rights to own) breeders’ seed. There are no exclusivity agreements for multiplication, i.e. anyone can approach the station for access to the germplasm for commercial use, subject to agreement. Final variety ownership is determined by an initial agreement between government and the private companies. The research stations do not negotiate this aspect directly with companies, but follow the instructions of national government via the MAFC. This can result in a process of germplasm ownership transfer from the public to the private sector. The Tanzanian government also is in the process of developing the Plant and Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture Bill, currently at the Cabinet’s Secretariat. According to a lawyer in the legal unit at the Ministry, the bill will protect farmers’ rights to benefit sharing when it comes to genetic resources, while plant breeders’ rights protect the rights of breeders. Benefit sharing is required where breeders use germplasm or genetic material developed by farmers over the years. Experience however, indicates limited implementation of laws. ACB’s position is that all products deriving from a shared resource pool should be replaced in that resource pool for further use by anyone 25. Thanks to Michael Farrelly of Tanzania Organic Agriculture Movement (TOAM) for bringing this to our attention. 38 A F R I C A N C E N T R E F O R B I O S A F E T Y who chooses, on condition that they agree to these terms (i.e. a General Public Licence, already well in operation in the computer sphere through the open source movement). AGRA and seed in Tanzania What role does AGRA play in this whole picture? It is clear that AGRA is in favour of the extension of certified seed through private sector production and distribution. AGRA spent US$12.4 million on 33 grants on seed to 19 recipients in Tanzania from 2007– 2012 (Appendix 4, Table 4B). The Agrodealer Development Programme (ADP) is the major seed sub-programme sponsored by AGRA in Tanzania over the period 2007–2012, comprising 45% of the value of grants in PASS. ADP grants were provided to establish a national agro-dealer network (CNFA), provide a credit facility (NMB) and develop an official agro-dealer strategy (MAFC). The Tanzania Agro-dealer Strengthening Programme (TASP), managed by CNFA, operated in 13 districts including Mvomero and Morogoro between 2007 and 2010. The agro-dealers are a conduit for the dissemination of improved seed and synthetic fertiliser, and the size of the grants directed to the sub-programme suggests that access and distribution is identified as a key issue. Our research sites found a sporadic presence of agro-dealers, but they were not a major presence. Nevertheless, the VBAAs (discussed in more detail in the section on soil fertility)—also sponsored by AGRA through the SHP—play a similar role to agro-dealers by providing farmers with information and by connecting farmers and commercial input suppliers. As indicated earlier, CNFA received an additional US$1.6m under SHP (2009–2011) for the expansion of the commercial input distribution system (Appendix 4, Table 4B). According to AGRA (2012a) the CNFA project trained and certified a total of 1,729 agro-dealers from 53 districts in business management and safety in use. Also it demonstrated activities by establishing 663 plots in 17 districts, involving 259 agro-dealers and reaching an estimated 23,068 farmers. Financial support was extended to 233 certified agro-dealers who received overdrafts worth US$2m from NMB under the AGRA credit facility. The programme included training, certification, financing, and sales adoption. AGRA says 71% of agro-dealers were involved in the supply and distribution of agro-inputs, and all certified agro-dealers participated in the NAIVS. Agro-dealers received 2.22m vouchers at approximately US$53m for 141,050 tons of fertiliser and 7,250 tons of seed, targeting an estimated 762,000 farmers. The Fund for the Improvement and Adoption of African Crops (FIAAC), which focuses on R&D and the commercialisation of new seed varieties, is the second biggest seed subprogramme and received 32% of the total value of seed grants up to 2012. Half the value of FIAAC grants went to MAFC and covered a range of crops, including maize (hybrid and improved OPV), beans, cassava, sweet potato, soybean and rice. The areas of operation generally are not specified in the grant summaries, but two MAFC grants, on beans and hybrid maize, were specifically located in the Southern Highlands. Ilonga scientists reported receiving AGRA grants for pigeon pea and cow pea since 2009, although this is not indicated in the PASS grants. It may be part of the SHP on maize-legume integration. The relatively large proportion of R&D grants going to MAFC and the ARIs suggests existing capacity in the public sector. As far as we can tell, unless there is a private sector partner, the improved germplasm remains in the public sector. In the first five years, four maize hybrid varieties, five paddy improved varieties and twelve improved varieties of roots and tuber crops were released through FIAAC activities in Tanzania (AGRA, 2012a). Seed Production for Africa (SEPA), the enterprise development programme, received one-fifth of the total value of seed grants. These were mostly similar sized grants (US$150–230k) to a number of private seed companies. Two of these, Itente and Tanseed, also received additional support from outside experts paid through AGRA grants (see Appendix 4, Table 4B). SEPA grants identified for activities in the Southern Highlands went to Kipato Seed (US$150k, for improved maize, rice and beans), Suba Agro-Trading and Engineering (US$187k, for improved maize, sorghum and sesame in Morogoro, Dodoma and Singida as part of breadbasket areas) and Agriseed Technologies (US$200k, for quality seed in Tabora, Singida Nuanced rhetoric and the path to poverty: AGRA, small-scale farmers, and seed and soil fertility in Tanzania 39 and Dodoma). Of the AGRA-sponsored seed enterprises, we encountered only Tanseed in our research sites (see case study on Tanseed). Education for African Crop Improvement (EACI) received just 3% of total seed grants, held by SUA for MSc training in plant breeding, to the value of US$402k. AGRA has some clear links to other GR initiatives on seed in Tanzania, in particular the G8 NAFSN. The government of Tanzania’s key commitments on seed under NAFSN are: • Taxes (cess, VAT) on seeds and seed packaging to be reduced or lifted. • To revise the Seed Act that aligns PBRs with the UPOV system. • To review and benchmark the time required to release new varieties of imported seeds from outside the region with international best practices. • To authorise qualified private sector companies to produce foundation seed under proper supervision and testing. • To acquire seed testing accreditations from the International Seed Trade Association (ISTA) and the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), to enable regional and international seed sales. These are very broad policy level interventions and AGRA plays a more detailed technical support role within this framework. An area of direct partnership is the Scaling Seeds and Technologies Partnership (SSTP) which is part of NAFSN and operates in a number of countries (including Mozambique and Malawi) with funding channelled via AGRA from USAID. The SSTP in Tanzania targets improved varieties of beans, cassava, Irish potatoes, maize, pigeon pea, sorghum, and soybeans in 21 SAGCOT districts, including Mvomero and Morogoro, and 7 districts in northern Tanzania (USAID, 2014). Five grant areas were identified in a call issued in May 2014, with projects to be completed by April 2017: • Production and marketing of breeder, foundation and certified/QDS seed— maximum individual grants of US$300k; • Scaling up of blended fertilisers for any of these crops and/or rhizobium inoculation (beans and soybeans), with links to commercial suppliers favoured and a 40 A F R I C A N C E N T R E F O R B I O S A F E T Y focus on awareness creation, training and demonstration—maximum grants of US$250k; • Scaling up of commercial input and output marketing systems involving agro-dealers seeking expansion, taking a business approach and defined links to public or private institutions favoured—maximum grants of US$500k; • Integration of information and communication technology (ICT) platforms into value chains—maximum grants of US$250k; and • Establishment of a seed business incubation centre providing technical support and business development services to seed entrepreneurs, and providing a range of services on a full cost recovery basis in foundation seed production, seed quality control, seed processing and packaging— maximum grants of US$500k with matching resources favoured. It is apparent from these that there is a focus on facilitating private sector involvement in breeder and foundation seed production. There is mention of QDS and it will be interesting to track any grantees receiving funds for QDS work. Farmer seed use in research sites Interventions aimed at expanding access to improved OPV and hybrid seed varieties are still in their infancy in the areas of study. An estimated three-quarters to 90% of seed in Tanzania as a whole is non-certified, farmermanaged seed, even for maize (Saidia and Mkiga, 2014). In our small survey we found that over 80% of local maize, legume and rice seed in use was non-certified, and 43–75% of improved OPV and hybrid maize in use was non-certified. Eighty per cent of respondents indicated they recycled at least some seed from one year to the next. Table 11, which shows these results, is limited to the crops many farmers were planting, mainly grains and legumes. While many farmers plant vegetables, there is wide diversity and the information is too scattered to be of use. Most respondents used recycled seed for legumes, but there were also quite significant local purchases of pigeon pea (40% of those using pigeon pea seed), and free seed for cow pea from NGOs, charities, and Table 11: Seed types used for main crops in the past season (%) Certified (% of all respondents) Non-certified (% of all respondents) 5 6.7 57.1 11.7 Improved OPV maize 6.7 5 42.9 11.7 Local maize 3.3 65 95.1 68.3 Rice 5 31.7 86.4 36.7 Beans 1.7 45 96.4 46.7 Pigeon pea 1.7 40 96 41.7 Cow pea 6.7 30 81.9 36.7 Hybrid maize neighbours (27% of those using cow pea seed) (Appendix 3, Table 3D). According to Mr Mvukeya Okhunda of Dakawa research station,26 official advice is to recycle rice for at least four seasons. Farmers usually mix varieties so by the fourth season it is a different variety and the recommendation is to buy fresh seed. There is no compulsion for farmers to acquire new certified seed, but it is recommended as a good agricultural practice (GAP). In this context, the sharp distinction between a certified seed and an uncertified seed is blurred, especially where recycling is part of good practice. A similar situation applies to maize, especially improved OPVs. These OPVs are closely related to local varieties, because they are mostly a mixture of external germplasm from the CGIAR institutes with local varieties. Therefore they already contain within them germplasm adapted for local conditions, and this produces plasticity, the ability to adapt to different ecological contexts. It would be a travesty if this beneficial process was disrupted by demands for private ownership of germplasm, preventing farmers from allowing beneficial traits to diffuse into the environment. This is not on the agenda at present (with regard to varieties based on public sector germplasm), but PVP and IP laws pose that threat in future. Once a seed enters into circulation it should be considered part of the farmers’ asset base to nurture and grow, Non-certified as % of those using this seed type Total (% of all respondents) with support from public sector institutions and expertise to maintain and improve on that variety, for local use and even commercially, if acceptable standards are met. Improved OPVs deserve closer attention because they are potentially a key point of intersection between commercial and farmer-managed seed systems, along the lines of farmer-based Integrated Seed Sector Development (ISSD) (Louwaars and de Boef, 2012). ACB has a critique of the ISSD in that it offers platitudes only to farmer-managed seed systems while its practical work is oriented towards building the commercial sector, by taking advantage of the positive features of farmer-managed systems (e.g. diversity, local germplasm, organisational capacity). The Gates Foundation’s recent embrace of ISSD projects through ISSD Africa27 is an indicator of this orientation towards the commercial sector. Nevertheless, if we turn the ISSD concept around and look at the question from the perspective of a farmer-managed seed system, we can see the possibilities of connecting the two systems to the benefit of farmers—e.g. public sector germplasm and R&D, and seed enterprises that can be profitable without being profit maximising. ESAFF (2014) has gone on record as saying that the environment should be made more conducive to private seed enterprises and oriented towards supporting individual or 26. Interview, Dakawa, 24/10/2014. 27. www.issdseed.org Nuanced rhetoric and the path to poverty: AGRA, small-scale farmers, and seed and soil fertility in Tanzania 41 collective farmer seed entrepreneurs. There is a role for a stringent certification process for good quality seed that can be developed and shared with farmers, and adapted by them to local conditions, without fear of penalty. This is where QDS could play a critical role, because it allows for local adaptation of standards for locally circulated products, with some formal verification and occasional injections of certified seed to maintain quality. The main question to be asked here is how are these standards measured? Appendix 5 shows the main seed varieties currently in use in the research sites, including TMV1, Staha and Situka for maize, TXD306 and various Supa varieties for rice, as well as legume and vegetable varieties in use. The Appendix provides some reflection from farmers on the pros and cons of the different varieties and indicates their reliance on local varieties and improved OPVs as the basis for seed in these sites. Seed quality, price and access Table 12: How serious are the following as a challenge to your farm? Challenge % serious % moderate % not serious High seed price 44.1 37.3 18.6 Poor quality seed 34.5 29.3 36.2 About one-third of respondents indicated that poor quality of seed is a serious concern, with the rest divided between not serious and moderately serious (Table 12). Seed price was slightly more of a concern and 44% of respondents indicated that it is a serious issue. This indicates an active commercial seed market where people are buying seed. When looking at specific seed types, respondents were generally satisfied with the quality of the seed they were using (Table 13). Hybrid maize, beans and local maize seed was highly rated by respondents—at 86%, 82% and 76% respectively. Surprisingly, given the yields from improved OPV maize (see production section above), most users of the seed ranked 42 A F R I C A N C E N T R E F O R B I O S A F E T Y it only ‘acceptable’. Rice and pigeon pea were balanced between good and acceptable. Table 13: Seed quality, percentage Good Acceptable Poor Hybrid maize 85.7 14.3 — Improved OPV maize 16.7 83.3 — Local maize 76.2 16.7 7.1 Rice 47.6 52.4 — Beans 82.1 14.3 3.6 Pigeon pea 54.2 45.8 — Cow pea 68.2 31.8 — Certified/non-certified combined; those who reported using this seed in the past season Farmers indicated that seed quality varies and one farmer said, “Local seed is better than purchased seed”. A number of people said seed sometimes does not germinate. Individual farmers mentioned specific cases of poor quality seed including from Seed Co, Pioneer, ASA and the research stations. Farmers in the survey generally were not using Tanseed products although there was mention of TAN250. One farmer complained about expired seed from agro-dealers: he took the seed back and the agro-dealer agreed to give him new seed. The farmer said the agrodealers always change the dates on the packs. Farmers felt that the mixing of seed on the farm by neighbours, during pollination, reduces quality because you can’t see which seed has produced which crops—the different seeds are not planted separately. However, where farms are close together it is a challenge to keep one variety firmly distinct from other varieties due to cross-pollination across farm borders. The issue of ‘fake seed’ came up a few times, in particular in the commercial sector. According to Mr Kunde at ASA: “Fake seed means there is no quality control. We need to strengthen TOSCI’s capacity. In the formal system, if you keep seed for more than 6 months, it must be retested. Agro-dealers are much more focused on income than quality. Their storage conditions are not reliable or dependable. We need reliable, trained agro-dealers with appropriate facilities and business discipline. Table 14: Average paid for seed Average paid in past season (Sh) Average paid in past season US$ 13,928.57 8.49 857.14 0.52 7,357.14 4.49 1,285.71 0.78 731.71 0.45 121.95 0.07 Rice 3,476.19 2.12 233.33 0.14 Beans 9,571.43 5.84 739.29 0.45 Pigeon pea 2,338.00 1.43 726.00 0.44 990.91 0.60 468.18 0.29 Hybrid maize Improved OPV maize Local maize Cow pea ASA has trained their own agro-dealers and others.” According to farmers in a seed FGD, access to seed is a big problem: the wrong varieties are provided, there is low germination, or the seed germinates but does not produce anything. They are buying from the agrodealers. The seeds may have expired—new packs are purchased by agro-dealers for seed and fertiliser and old products are then put into the new packs. Farmers felt that the problem lay with the agro-dealers, not the companies, although they were uncertain. Seed prices ranged from Sh1,286/kg [US$0.78] for improved OPV maize, to Sh121.95/kg [US$0.07] for local maize (Table 14). This forms a baseline to track seed prices in these localities. Hybrid maize and beans had the largest average expenditure although users of hybrid maize seed are few in number. This again reinforces the idea that there is a commercial layer of producers in the sample. The high price of hybrid maize seed was given as a reason for recycling seed and respondents also indicated that prices fluctuate, that vegetable seeds are pricier than maize seeds, and that it is hard it tell the difference in quality between seeds. Case study: Tanseed International Ltd, AGRA and the Green Revolution The Tanzania Seed Company was set up by the government in the early 1970s as part of its formal seed sector development and enjoyed a monopoly on seed production and distribution. As indicated, following structural adjustment in the early 1990s, including Average cost/ kg (Sh) Average cost/kg US$ the liberalisation of agricultural inputs, the seed sector was opened to the private sector. MNCs entered the maize seed market with hybrid varieties. The state-owned company performed poorly and collapsed (Lyimo, et al., 2014:652). It was privatised in 2002 and Tanseed International Ltd (Tanseed) emerged as a private entity in control of the assets and qualified staff. Tanseed CEO, Isako Mushauri, had been an employee and has an MSc in seed science and technology from Mercy University in New Zealand. Mushauri started Tanseed International as a private business, using publicly bred varieties with germplasm from CGIAR, farmers and the public sector. Mr Mushauri (interview, 22/10/2014) told us that Tanseed had approached CIMMYT to release five maize varieties, and was the first local private company to produce its own seed. Tanseed uses three distinct technologies (drought resistance, strigaway and quality protein) and has five maize varieties: TAN250, TAN254 and H600 (all drought-tolerant maize), TAN222 (a strigaway maize to control striga weed—over 600,000 ha in Tanzania are affected by striga) and H611 (a quality protein maize). Tanseed is testing hybrids, including ProVitamin A and emaleni (maize necrosis) resistance—Kenya has an emaleni screening facility that can be used. Artificial inoculation is being used but has not yet been commercialised. Tanseed is also testing other products, including work on hybrid rice with the African Agricultural Technology Fund (AATF) based in Nairobi, together with SUA and IRRI and funded by the Gates Foundation, and a PPP Nuanced rhetoric and the path to poverty: AGRA, small-scale farmers, and seed and soil fertility in Tanzania 43 with USAID to reduce seed rates (the amount sown) and to improve seed quality. Tanseed has five commercial rice varieties— TXD306, Supa, Nerica1, 4 and 7—which are based on public and farmer germplasm. According to Mushauri vegetable seed will be the next step. He says vegetable seed is high tech and complicated to produce and that is why farmers are complaining about quality. If it is not produced properly there will be diseases. Mushauri says some businesses practice ‘double-selling’: first they sell diseased seed and then they sell agrochemicals to combat the diseases. He argues, “This produces poisonous crops and is exploiting Africa. They are killing the industry because they want quick money.” Mushauri says there are problems of ‘fake’ seed, agrochemicals and fertiliser. “We advise farmers but then they use and the effect is low productivity. This is a result of the lack of GAP skills, low adoption of improved genetics, low farmer education, and poor market prices. We are also faced with climate change, and African governments don’t have the resources to invest in R&D. The question is how to optimise the genetic potential. Most production is rainfed. Fertiliser has to be applied for the seed to perform to potential but if there is no rain, it is ineffective. We need both OPVs and hybrids. There are different products for different markets. Some areas are low potential so there is no point sending high potential products. Some genetics can perform well if they are used with fertiliser, etc., but farmers can’t afford this package so we must give them suitable seed.” “There is expansion of the seed market”, continues Mushauri. “Farmers need information that is properly explained. Tanseed is using our experience with farmers. You must study the market first, not just send seed. Effective demand is not yet known. We are just producing blindly and many companies have high carry-over stocks. Quality declines. Last year Tanseed had 102 agro-dealers registered. They want Tanseed products. They are expensive but the quality is high and there are no questions from farmers. Quality must be the bottom line: genetic, physiological, sanitary and germination.” 44 A F R I C A N C E N T R E F O R B I O S A F E T Y Tanseed is also active in seed promotion and dissemination. According to Mushauri, hybrid genetics are not being optimised because of the lack of extension. Tanzania Private Extension Services (TANPES) with its team of eight production officers is addressing this issue and Mushauri says they know how to approach farmers. TANPES works with Yara to sell products in a package of seed and soil health extension, seed and fertiliser. Tanseed is given money from Morogoro local government to support this “private-private” partnership. According to Mushauri, “We are happy to release our innovations because we are using public funds.” Mushauri says extension in Africa is collapsing and without extension farmers will not continue buying seed. Tanseed had advertised phone numbers which farmers could use to receive extension advice but cancelled this service because demand was too high. Their activities include demonstrations and field days, with a mobile demonstration plot on top of a vehicle, with demonstration crops planted on different dates to target national agricultural shows at which all the stages of growth can be displayed at the same time. In 2014 Tanseed participated in 4 agricultural shows (Mbeya, Mwanza, Morogoro and Lindi). Like ASA, Tanseed hosts what it calls ‘field days plus’ at which millers also are involved and can eat the product then and there, to get a sense of it. Tanseed attends congresses and workshops, including in Burundi and Cameroon in 2014, and the company participates in the African Green Revolution Forum (AGRF) organised annually by AGRA. Tanseed has sub-stations in Kigoma/Mpanda, Iringa and Mbeya, situated for regional expansion. Kigoma shares a border with the DRC, Burundi and Rwanda, and in the south there are plans for expansion into Mozambique and Madagascar. Germplasm and seed ownership Tanseed’s maize varieties are now proprietary, based on an exclusivity agreement with CIMMYT, with whom it has been working since 2006. According to Mushauri, “The private sector needs permanent exclusivity in varieties.” Tanseed’s rice varieties are public but branded by Tanseed. Tanseed buys the foundation seed and produces certified seed, contracting SSFs to produce. This is Tanseed’s target market and the company invests in training and monitoring. Farmers get to know the company or product, and Tanseed assists them with agronomic aspects which they can also use on their own crops. In 2012 Tanseed trained about 300 farmers although only 56 qualified. There are issues of the history of the land, distance (isolation), etc. “We have created a demand we can’t even meet. Tanseed is a popular brand name, 30 years public and 12 years private,” says Mushauri. Tanseed has an MoU with SUA to commercialise rice and bean varieties on an exclusive basis and another on rice with IRRI, which is based on non-exclusive access to germplasm. Tanseed and IRRI collaborate on research. Says Mushauri, “Tanseed looks with private business eyes and there is plenty of time. We can indicate which products will be accepted by farmers even before they are registered. Most research stations just do what they want to do and just involve farmers using PVS, but this is not enough. Then the product fails. Business eyes are important. Farmers are interested in high yields, but business also considers consumer needs. Therefore we must not only involve farmers, but also other value chain actors.” AGRA, the G8 and the Green Revolution Tanseed received one direct AGRA grant worth US$167k on improved maize, pigeon pea and sesame, active in 2007–2009. Duncan Kirubi (Kenya) received US$30k in 2010 to support Tanseed on seed production and processing. This is all we could find in the AGRA database, up until 2012. But Mushauri says AGRA still sponsors Tanseed directly with grants to increase production, processing, storage, promotion and dissemination in order to make seed available. They have targeted maize and pigeon pea as a cheap source of protein. But AGRA’s support goes well beyond the grants. According to Mushauri, “AGRA provides unique support across seed production, processing, storage, marketing, financing. It is an excellent concept and AGRA shares world class consultants who provide consulting and training support for different needs at different stages. To stay with those guys for one day, you will solve most of your challenges. We are not paying for this. AGRA is serious about growing business in Africa, AGRA is great.” In addition, Tanseed staff have received training in technology and marketing skills training at the University of Nairobi, and were sponsored to attend continental gatherings, both through AGRA. Beyond AGRA, Tanseed is linked also into a number of other GR initiatives. The company has an NAFSN commitment to produce nutrition-rich maize seed (to increase protein and Vitamin A content to 80%, up from 45%), as well as bean and soya as low cost sources of protein, and is currently using conventional breeding. Tanseed’s five-year commitments as part of NAFSN are: • To produce 12,000 tons of certified maize and rice seed in 5 years (part of the Global Nutrition for Growth project); • To achieve a US$700k increase in sales of rice and maize foundation seed by breeders and researchers; • To ensure that US$12m of certified seed is procured from contract growers (but not necessarily SSFs); • To realise a US$1.5m profit for agro-dealers and seed stockists distributing and selling Tanseed certified seed to SSFs; and • To achieve a target of 600,000 ha of smallscale land under certified maize and rice seed (NAFSN, n.d.). Mushauri says Nafaka supported TXD306, the first Tanseed certified rice seed to have been produced by SSFs—56 of whom were involved. In 2013 Tanseed became the first private company to produce certified rice seed in Tanzania, with a target of 250 tons. Farmers produced about 95% of the target although the actual seed accepted was about 80%, with some rejection based on quality standards. This contract may be renewed in 2015. Most tasks are manual: harvesting, processing, handling and drying, and Tanseed has asked Nafaka to support a mobile mini combine harvester, threshers, cleaners and driers. Tanseed is also working with Yara to train Nuanced rhetoric and the path to poverty: AGRA, small-scale farmers, and seed and soil fertility in Tanzania 45 Tanseed staff to provide soil health extension along with seed extension. Tanseed will use Yara products in seed production and bundle these into a package for sale to farmers. In this way they share the costs of developing markets. Mushauri has justified his partnership with Yara: “Farmers are using DAP and urea but have no science. Urea is a single nutrient but a plant needs multi-nutrients, and Yara have developed these products.” Regarding the commercial seed market, Mushauri says: “The objective is to develop a bigger cake. Then it can become an issue of market strategy, but for now we are just trying to grow the market. Foreign companies are not helping farmers to increase production. They are selling seed registered in their countries but not suited to the ecology (here). They will increase the size of the cake if they do local trials, but they don’t. We welcome others to come and share the challenges. They are looking for short-term gains but not longterm benefit. For example they are using dent varieties of maize, which are prolific but are low density and soft and so are attacked by insects. Then farmers lose and they don’t buy again. In milling the coat of dent varieties must be removed, reducing the amount available for meal. The product must also be designed for high milling yield, and there are taste issues. A good producer should address farmer needs as well as processors, traders and consumers.” The Tanseed case highlights the centrality of private seed enterprises in GR interventions in seed. These companies are being supported to play an integrated role of production, contracting of SSFs, dissemination, extension and training and advocacy. The case sheds light on AGRA’s holistic support to private seed companies and also indicates an important role for AGRA in cementing together different GR interventions by other actors, including USAID and NAFSN. It highlights the coordinated character of these interventions and provides a good example of the emphasis on commercial seed enterprises. Tanseed’s regional aspirations also suggest that successful expansion is likely to result in an acquisition by one of the big multinationals in the not too distant future. 46 A F R I C A N C E N T R E F O R B I O S A F E T Y Key issues, recommendations and areas for further research AGRA’s role in Tanzania’s seed systems should be placed in the context of a longer-term process of liberalisation and deregulation in the early 1990s. This opened the door for private sector involvement in seed production and distribution. Based on its investment profile, AGRA has prioritised distribution, followed by work on developing new seed varieties, mainly with public sector institutions. AGRA has a clear position on combining improved seed varieties with synthetic fertiliser in a package of interventions. AGRA’s interventions raise a number of issues for the food sovereignty movement, in particular they impel us to clarify our positions on public and private sector R&D, germplasm improvement, and the role of farmers in seed production and distribution. The first question is whether improvements in genetic materials are required. There may be an argument that local germplasm and varieties are well suited to local ecological conditions and do not need to be supplemented with materials from outside Tanzania’s borders. However, external genetics are usually brought in to improve selected traits in local materials, including yield enhancement, pest and disease resistance, drought or salinity tolerance, etc. These genetic improvements may be beneficial and evidence of this is farmer adoption. The improvements do not necessarily have to be damaging to the ecology, especially when they are recycled for a number of years. ACB is not in favour of hybrids for a number of reasons including proprietary ownership, their production is radically separated from farmers, and because they reduce farmers’ ability to recycle seed if they choose. Also, hybrids are generally heavily reliant on synthetic fertiliser and irrigation. This means that hybrids favour relatively wealthier farmers, and thus increase inequality over time. If improvements are based on OPVs, seed can be recycled for a number of years without major loss of (original) traits. Open pollination can increase biodiversity and the germplasm remains more adaptable to the ecological context than hybrid seed. While it is true that even improved OPVs may perform closer to their potential with the increased use of synthetic fertiliser, they are generally less sensitive to a lack of concentrated nutrients than hybrids. The second key issue is access to germplasm. If the underlying germplasm pool were classified as ‘open source’ access to it could operate on the lines of the General Public Licence (GPL) pioneered by the open source computer software movement. The GPL “allows modifications and distribution only when the source code to these modifications is made available under the same licence” (Boldrin and Levine, 2008:20). For germplasm, this means that if a breeder wants to make changes, they can do so only with free germplasm if their alterations are available to others under GPL. But open source germplasm does not mean that companies are not allowed to sell the seeds they have developed, or that they will not be able to do so. ‘First mover advantage’ means a company can still profit from innovations even if others know what they have done. First, “it takes time and money to reverse engineer a product” and “when the innovator begins production with a very large capacity, the size of the residual competitive rent left for even the first imitator becomes very small, so small that, in general, it will not be profitable to imitate” (both quotes from Boldrin and Levine, 2008:139). Farmers who access the seed will be free to recycle it if they wish. But we know that commercial farmers are not going to recycle seed unless the quality is maintained—they are more likely to purchase fresh seed anew every year to ensure quality. So commercial seed producers will retain profitable markets even if there is some leakage, especially to small, resource-poor farmers. In the long run, this leakage could also produce new markets for companies if the seed produces well and farmers decide they want to buy fresh seed. The GPL approach would rule out PPPs based on privately owned germplasm unless the private owner would be willing to share the product freely. The logic of PVP laws is to secure the private rights of the owners of germplasm. ACB has an in principle opposition to the private ownership of germplasm: we consider all germplasm to be the product of a combination of natural resources that are part of the common resources available to humanity, as well as the human innovation and ingenuity that should be considered part of the pool of common knowledge that is far older than corporate and other private owners. To the extent that the public sector manages and maintains germplasm in the public interest, it might be considered the legal ‘owner’ of the germplasm, but only to the extent that it secures these resources for the common good. This brings us to the question of farmer varieties. Improved varieties are based generally on a combination of local genetic resources and external genetics. The local resources, which root improvements in an ecological context and thus enable external germplasm to be adapted to local conditions, were developed over many years primarily by farmers themselves. There was no certified seed sector in Tanzania before the 1970s so farmers generated and managed all varieties. If local germplasm is used in improvements, what rights should farmers have over the product? In line with an open source approach, farmers would contribute their varieties to the common pool for use by all. This obviously means private companies could come in and use local germplasm freely. But if this use was based on GPL it would not result in the privatisation of farmer varieties, since the source materials for any product would be made available on the same terms. QDS is an important niche in the Tanzanian seed system. Comments made by people we interviewed suggest it is coming under pressure from private enterprises that see it as a potential threat and a diversion of public resources away from supporting the private sector. ACB believes that QDS provides a basis for public-farmer partnerships and we will look for ways of interacting with these processes to strengthen and support them. However, there may be weaknesses in the way QDS is implemented in practice, as well as some possible conceptual weaknesses. For example, QDS is treated as a way of integrating farmers into the formal certification system, and it might serve better as a mechanism to enable farmers to identify, select and improve varieties, together with public sector R&D based on quality criteria they define collectively, and which are appropriate for their differing contexts. In this regard, farmermanaged certification systems based on a trust Nuanced rhetoric and the path to poverty: AGRA, small-scale farmers, and seed and soil fertility in Tanzania 47 relationship between producers and users of seed may be more useful than a standardised certification system at national level. More work can be done to explore the possibilities of developing such context-specific, trust-based certifications systems rooted in farmer practice. Further research may focus on QDS in practice, working with farmer associations and public sector R&D institutions to develop context- 48 A F R I C A N C E N T R E F O R B I O S A F E T Y specific farmer-managed certification systems, and tracking of ISSD and SSTP projects in Tanzania. We will also engage with our partners and farmers to identify possible areas of cooperation that support farmer involvement in seed production and distribution, especially of locally valuable farmer varieties. We will also be interested to track the differential impact on farmers of private seed company expansion into local areas over time. Markets Market access is a central aspect of GR interventions, since farmers will be able to afford costly inputs (especially fertiliser and irrigation) only if they can increase their incomes from production sales to pay for the inputs—and still be in a better position after paying these costs. A key reason for GR interventions in the first place is to increase productivity and overall production, but farmers must have outlets for their produce. There is a big infrastructure element to this— roads and communications, as well as adequate water supplies and sources of energy—that enables farmers and processors to produce goods that meet buyers’ requirements. Market access is therefore an integral component of the GR orientation. Farmers are under pressure to produce and sell surpluses in a context of low producer prices, weak storage systems and challenges of product quality, standardisation and the physical distance to markets. Market access proved to be the biggest single challenge identified by farmers in the survey (nearly 68%). This is consistent both with the experience from field work carried out in Malawi and general literature on agriculture in Tanzania. In the research sites improved OPV maize and rice were the two crops with the highest volume traded (Table 15). Most improved OPV maize produced was being sold, but we must remember this was a small number of producers. However, this does provide evidence that the users of improved OPVs in these sites are larger commercial producers with higher yields and a larger proportion for sale. This is consistent with a growing body of scholarship which recognises heterogeneity and differentiation among SSFs, with Wiggins (2009) suggesting that the “bulk of marketed output from small farms comes from those that are towards the upper part of the range” and that “most of the increased production, and hence increased earnings will accrue to only a minority of small farms”, and that “it is likely that it will be a minority of small farms that see the bulk of added production and sales”. Sugar cane is an important crop in the Morogoro region and is grown individually by SSFs as part of outgrower schemes. But a number of the people surveyed have stopped growing sugar cane as production costs are high but prices low. Sugar cane production is highly prominent in the agendas of SAGCOT, NAFSN and the BRN. Though the sample from the present study is too small to draw any firm conclusions, this is something that will need further monitoring. Some survey participants were selling vegetables and while tomatoes were very popular large seasonal surpluses were in evidence throughout the areas of the survey, resulting in low prices. Sesame was also touted as a potentially lucrative crop, as one tin can fetch Sh25,000–Sh30,000 [US$15.24–US$18.29] on the local market (equal to one bag of maize). But the plant is highly susceptible to pests and diseases and this raises issues of post-harvest storage. Table 15: Production for sale Crop # harvesting Average sales of those harvesting (kg) Average sales as % of harvest Hybrid maize 7 867.1 52.8 Improved OPV maize 5 2,905.6 94.5 Local maize 40 488.9 49.3 Rice 21 1,358.6 68.9 Beans 25 59.6 56.1 Pigeon pea 17 42.9 69.2 Cow pea 16 88.0 45.7 Nuanced rhetoric and the path to poverty: AGRA, small-scale farmers, and seed and soil fertility in Tanzania 49 A FGD was organised to probe further the issue of markets and explored both general marketing challenges and potential opportunities, as well as a specific focus on a newly established scheme under AGRA’s Market Access Programme (MAP). Poor output prices were the main grievance and the major reason why many farmers had joined MVIWATA in the first place. There are few opportunities for marketing beyond local vendors, who were universally derided for the poor prices they offered. Prices are generally better in the initiative to sell to the National Food Reserve Agency (NFRA) (see below) but this comes with its own challenges and is restricted to a narrow range of crops. FGD interactions revealed the clear desire to engage in more processing and other value adding activities. For example some farmers were paying to have surplus rice processed at a local mill to sell on but, as with other value-adding activities, the lack of capital hampers further expansion. Another potential marketing opportunity is in cooking oil, which 83% of survey respondents said they had purchased within the previous 24 hours. Some activities around processing oilseeds (pumpkin and sunflower) were reported to be taking place, predominantly for home consumption, with some oil being sold locally. There was a desire among some to expand production, but the cost of equipment and lack of information on potential markets is holding farmers back in this regard. Table 16: Average key crops retained for HH use Crop # harvesting Average retained for HH consumption of those harvesting Hybrid maize 7 774.6 OPV maize 5 1,393.6 Local maize 41 526.4 Rice 21 645.4 Beans 25 46.7 Pigeon pea 17 19.1 Cow pea 15 25.7 50 A F R I C A N C E N T R E F O R B I O S A F E T Y Despite most improved OPV maize being sold, this category still produces higher volumes for household use than either hybrid or local maize, at almost 1.4 tons on average per household. Local maize is half a ton and hybrid maize is just over three-quarters of a ton (Table 16). Nearly 650 kg of rice is kept on average for household use. Just less than 1 kg of beans per week is retained for household use. For cow peas and pigeon peas, the average amount retained for household use for those who produced is just 1.5–2 kg/month. This presents a picture of food being produced mainly for household consumption, with surpluses in maize and rice being sold, but at low product prices that make it difficult for farmers to embrace expensive technologies. AGRA’s Market Access Programme (MAP) in Tanzania MAP was established in 2008 to complement the work on seed systems, soil health and policy. AGRA cites a number of reasons for marketing problems in sub-Saharan Africa, including narrow markets (e.g. few buyers), low farm-gate prices, high end-user prices (long value chains inflate prices to the detriment of consumers, without benefiting producers), weak farmers’ organisations, lack of market information, and lack of affordable finance. To overcome these AGRA argues for more organisation and coordination among SSFs, the reduction of systemic barriers (e.g. improvements in infrastructure, market information, etc.) and strengthening staple food value chains (AGRA, 2014a). The major AGRA grant recipients under AGRA’s MAP in Tanzania, to date, have been Standard Bank of South Africa, TechnoServe (a USbased development NGO) and Rural Urban Development Initiatives (RUDI), a Tanzanian NGO (Appendix 4, Table 4C). The grant to RUDI is to assist savings and cooperative societies in central Tanzania to register legally as trading entities, to sell maize to the World Food Programme (WFP) and other traders. Other investments (up to the end of 2013) have resulted in the establishment of 36 warehouses, 28 of which had been certified by the Tanzanian Warehouse Licensing Board (TWLB). AGRA has also engaged with the TWLB to increase its inspection and certification capacity (AGRA, 2014a). Some of the survey participants were involved in a new AGRA-funded initiative in Mvomero for collective marketing of maize to the NFRA in Dodoma. AGRA provided funding to MVIWATA to organise farmer participation. The plan is to expand this initiative to include rice production if it proves successful. Aggregation points are managed by Savings and Credit Cooperative Societies (SACCOS) and funded by Nafaka. At harvest time farmers shell and bag their maize before taking it to a central collection point, usually by hiring a bicycle, motorbike or lorry, at a cost ranging from Sh2,500–Sh6,000 [US$1.52–US$3.66] per bag. A further levy of Sh1,000 [US$0.61] is also paid on each bag before it leaves the farmer’s district. At the collection point the farmer must pay Sh1,000 per bag to have the maize cleaned (e.g. removal of stones and other debris) which is achieved by manual labour. A further Sh3,000 [US$1.83] is charged per bag for the centre’s overheads and the cost of pesticides (acteric), which are applied to the maize in storage. From the local collection point a committee representing a farming group organises transportation to the NFRA in Dodoma and covers the costs; these varied from a quote of Sh370 per ton per km to a flat rate of Sh60,000 [US$36.59] per trip. A group representative accompanies the maize and stays in Dodoma until completion of the transaction. The farmer group is responsible also for covering the costs, said to average Sh25,000 [US$15.24] per day, of their representative’s stay in Dodoma. It is not uncommon for the procedure to take up to four days once the maize has arrived at the NFRA. The NFRA in Dodoma charges farmers Sh20 [US$0.01] per bag in taxes and unloading charges. Initial impressions among those participating in the NFRA scheme were tentatively positive, as the price they received after deductions of Sh490/kg [US$0.30] is substantially more than the local market price of Sh250/kg [US$0.15] or the Sh218/kg [US$0.13] given by middlemen. However there are some challenges and farmers are cautious about the scheme. Farmers must transport their produce to Dodoma and it is a bureaucratic and time- consuming process. Unexpected costs for transport, levies and taxes were deducted, and farmers were not clear about why they had to pay these (FGD 23/10/14). Larger business people received payment while smaller farmers were not yet paid. The NFRA initially committed to purchase 7,000 tons from SSFs but ended up purchasing only 2,000 tons (discussion with MVIWATA staff, 20/10/14). Vendors tried to insert themselves into the process, buying directly from farmers for lower prices and then selling to the NFRA. Although the farmers we spoke to resisted this, other farmers gave in to the pressure for immediate cash. As farmers Agrodealer, Morogoro put it, they entered the programme to escape the middlemen in the village but ended up competing with them at the NFRA, as well. It is clear that markets are important for farmers—they have explicitly stated as much. However, we must also understand markets as the other side of the coin of increased input supply. There are many beneficiaries of such GR interventions: input suppliers get guaranteed markets; service providers make a comfortable living; banks and financial institutions receive interest on loans; buyers receive better quality products more suited to their requirements— whether standardisation or volume or quality—governments remain in power on the basis of spending public resources to subsidise inputs. An entire economy is built around the Green Revolution and it is little wonder that there is widespread support for it. But we have yet to understand what benefits farmers derive from these billions of dollars being spent. Product prices remain extremely low and farmers shell out a higher proportion of their income on input costs. Farmers who are capable of producing at a larger scale to meet market requirements can benefit—but this is often at the cost of other farmers who are forced off the land into wage labour as land is consolidated and an increasing scale of production is required. Markets for a few standardised products displace diverse production, but it may be too late to return to the days of local production for food security. All farmers, whether they are market-oriented or not, are caught up in Nuanced rhetoric and the path to poverty: AGRA, small-scale farmers, and seed and soil fertility in Tanzania 51 global relations of production which insistently enforce a business logic of profitability and scale. GR market programmes are explicitly designed to produce a differentiation into large, successful farmers and a mass of wage workers. Commercial agriculture relies on wage labour and, in predominantly peasant societies, those labourers will come from the base of erstwhile producers. Although the market linkages programme with NFRA has many positive aspects—working with farmer 52 A F R I C A N C E N T R E F O R B I O S A F E T Y associations, public sector procurement, offering higher prices for products—over time it inevitably will become a conduit for larger commercial producers, at the expense of smaller producers who are unable to afford the necessary inputs, or who do not have the knowledge or capacity to produce at scale. And while these processes of differentiation are occurring, multinationals are entrenching their power over agro-food systems. Conclusions Since the early 1990s the Tanzanian government has embarked on a structural adjustment programme including deregulation and liberalisation of the agricultural sector. Although the government continues to play a role in the agricultural sector, it has opened the way for private sector—including MNC— involvement. In some areas the private sector has responded vigorously, for example, in the production of hybrid maize seed. But generally the response is lukewarm because the institutional, legal and economic environment is not conducive to adequate returns on private investment and profitable markets are not big enough to warrant investment. The GR thrust in Tanzania is essentially about identifying points of blockage as well as areas of potential opportunity for the private sector. The government has reoriented its overall framework to encourage private sector investment, diverting public resources to supporting this through PPPs, and providing subsidies for input and output markets, for example through NAIVS and the NFRA. Laws and policies are under review and are being redrafted to favour private sector investment. Government is working with the private sector in priority geographical areas such as SAGCOT to ‘crowd in’ investment. Nevertheless, government employees do have a concept of social and ecological sustainability and this remains the basic starting point for their work. Generally it appears that farmers, researchers, scientists and others involved in agricultural and farmer support consider the judicious use of GR inputs as compatible with improving livelihoods and with ecologically sustainable agricultural practices. AGRA is playing an important role in these processes. Its broad categories of seed, soil health, policy financing and market support are framed in the context of ‘breadbasket’ areas aligned with other GR initiatives such as SAGCOT. AGRA’s main focus on seed in Tanzania is the development of private sector distribution networks and the development of new varieties, mostly with the public sector. However, support for public sector seed work is not an end in itself but is one step towards the private commercialisation of seed. Evidence of this is found on AGRA’s positions on seed law harmonisation and PBRs. Regarding soil fertility its focus is on the expansion of synthetic fertiliser use, with a small amount of resources going to legume integration for nitrogen fixation (but also including a component of synthetic fertiliser use in line with ISFM). This includes a very large grant to AFAP to develop systems for the importation and wider use of synthetic fertilisers. GR interventions in the research sites are uneven. In Mvomero, MVIWATA is working directly with AGRA, USAID and others, on private sector distribution of improved seed and synthetic fertiliser and on developing output markets. Given that 2014 was the first year of the market linkages programme, it is too early to assess the impact, although farmers are encouraged by the possibility of higher net prices for their outputs. There is evidence of the uptake of improved seed by farmers, especially rice and to a lesser extent legumes. In these sites, farmers still use mostly local maize varieties. The use of synthetic fertiliser is significantly higher than the national average, both in terms of average per hectare applications and numbers of farmers using these technologies. This is evidence of the impact of GR interventions, including the expansion of agro-dealer networks and programmes such as Nafaka, that are introducing these inputs into farming systems. Key issues with regard to seed relate to the use of DUS criteria in the formal certification process and the impacts on farmer seed production and distribution; the role of QDS in the seed system; the adoption of UPOV91 compliant PVP laws and their potential impact on SSFs in the longer-term; and the channelling of public sector resources to aid private and corporate gain. With regard to DUS and seed certification we argue that while these criteria may be appropriate to secure the interests of private ownership, they are not appropriate for the expansion of SSF involvement in seed production beyond a commercial scale. We propose that quality criteria be developed between farmers as producers and farmers as users of seed, in cooperation with public sector Nuanced rhetoric and the path to poverty: AGRA, small-scale farmers, and seed and soil fertility in Tanzania 53 private enterprises, believing that the future of humanity depends on cooperation rather than competition as the basis of economic activity. Everything that has been produced by humans is the result of social cooperation but the fruits of that collective labour have been appropriated by private interests. This is not a sustainable model, as the growing gap in ownership and command over resources and the attendant inequalities reveal. Uluguru Mountain plots, Morogro institutions. In this regard we believe QDS has an important role to play in bringing farmers into seed production in a systematic way; this includes production of their own varieties for local use as well as for expanded distribution within the agro-ecological zones for which the seed is adapted. In a similar way to the ‘new, distinct, uniform, stable’ (NDUS) criteria, a blanket approach to PVP laws that prevents farmers from freely adapting and using whatever seed they have at their disposal threatens the long term sustainability and diversity of the seed system. In principle we are opposed to the private ownership of genetic resources as these are the product of social and collective endeavour that goes well beyond corporations and private individuals. Private companies should have a right to sell products with their own quality guarantee attached if they wish, but this should not prevent others from using the genetic resources in ways they choose. Here we are also concerned that public resources are being channelled into extending private control over germplasm and into subsidising and guaranteeing markets for private, corporate gain. We do recognise a potential role for private enterprises as long as public resources are not sequestered to support these sectional interests. We are in favour of cooperative, collective farmer enterprises based on shared technologies and knowledge rather than 54 A F R I C A N C E N T R E F O R B I O S A F E T Y The GR emphasis on competitive private enterprise, economies of scale and the standardisation of cultures, consumption patterns and agricultural outputs, runs counter to the flourishing of diversity that is crucial for the survival of humans and the nurturing of our ecological habitat. A complex set of responses is required in the face of the GR thrust. First, the technological and methodological aspects of the GR must be unpacked to see what benefits may accrue to farmers if these are managed on the basis of democratic control and decision-making, cooperation, collectivity and accountability. Technological advances may be of great value, but we must also have the foresight to consider the possible implications in the decades ahead, especially if these technologies are placed under the control of multinational corporations accountable only to their financial backers. Secondly, active lobbying against these interventions is required where they pose an immediate and direct threat to the construction of a society based on the principles of democratic control and decisionmaking, cooperation and collectivity. A current example is efforts to privatise the gene pool and criminalise the fundamental right—and indeed the fundamental necessity—for farmers to save, share and exchange genetic materials as they choose. Thirdly, it is necessary to develop practical alternatives in the present to move us towards a future based on these principles. This includes lobbying and working with governments and donors to create a space for the material advancement of agro-ecological practices, and the materialisation of the principles of democratic control and decision-making, cooperation, inclusiveness and collectivity, in the ways in which we strive for an alternative future. Key recommendations and way forward The following recommendations are for civil society organisations and the food sovereignty movement, in conjunction with government and public sector R&D institutions: • Develop methodologies and support longitudinal studies that closely monitor the long-term social and environmental impacts of GR interventions, including land access, soil and water health and biodiversity; • Develop multidisciplinary partnerships and methodologies to support these processes, cutting across social, organisational and technical fields; • Support farmers and public sector extension officers with training in agro-ecological techniques, working together with farmers and their organisations, public sector institutions, universities, and training organisations and institutions; • Support cooperative processes of curriculum development for technical training on agroecology; • Support the construction of open, inclusive and democratic farmer-based extension networks linked to research and training; • Investigate the practical operation of QDS further, to identify the opportunities and limits of the system in supporting knowledge for the consolidation and expansion of farmer-managed seed systems and the incorporation of farmer varieties, including building farmer capacity using participatory methods to produce quality seed of their favoured varieties and extending the area under farmer-managed production and distribution; • Work on alternatives to proprietary plant variety ownership, starting from protecting and expanding contextual diversity, participatory R&D and shared ownership; • Lobby for the application of General Public Licencing as the basis of variety improvement, where all products deriving from a shared germplasm source pool are replaced in that resource pool for further use by anyone who chooses, with open access for responsible use on condition that the users agree to these terms; • Monitor and analyse the implementation of SSTP and ISSD interventions, and engage with participating farmers if the opportunity arises; • Lobby for the removal of proprietary ownership on all seed once it enters into circulation so that it becomes part of the farmers’ asset base, to nurture and grow, with support from public sector institutions and expertise to maintain and improve genetic resources, for local use and commercially if acceptable standards are met; • Pay close attention to improved OPVs under public ownership as a potential key point of intersection between commercial and farmer-managed seed systems from an R&D point of view, with a focus on developing farmer-managed diversity, local germplasm and organisational and technical capacity; • For the food sovereignty movement, clarify positions on improved OPVs, QDS and its orientation towards genuine farmermanaged seed systems, public and private sector R&D, germplasm improvement, and the role of farmers in seed production and distribution; • Exclude any PPPs based on privately-owned germplasm unless the private owner is willing to share the product freely; and • Develop seed quality criteria as an alternative to DUS with farmers as producers and users of seed, in cooperation with their organisations and other public and education institutions, building on the lessons learned from QDS to date. 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Investment blueprint. http://www.sagcot.com/uploads/media/Invest-Blueprint-SAGCOT_High_res.pdf SAGCOT 2014. SAGCOT list of partners. http://www.sagcot.com/newsdetails/article//southern-agricultural-growth-corridorof-tanzania-list-of-partners-as-of-may-2014/—accessed 04/07/2014. Saidia, P. and Mkiga, A. 2014. An overview of seed systems in Tanzania. Unpublished background paper prepared for ACB. Sarwatt, S. and Mollel, E. 2000. Tanzania country pasture/forage resource profile http://www.fao.org/ag/AGP/AGPC/doc/ counprof/tanzania/tanz.htm—accessed 17/11/14. URP (United Republic of Tanzania) 2013. National agriculture policy. Dar es Salaam, Ministry of Agriculture, Food Security and Cooperatives. URP 2014. Special Bill Supplement No. 2. The Written Laws (Miscellaneous Amendments) Act. Part XXXII Amendment of the Seeds Act (Cap.308). Dodoma, Government Printer. Nuanced rhetoric and the path to poverty: AGRA, small-scale farmers, and seed and soil fertility in Tanzania 57 USAID (United States Agency for International Development) 2011. Property rights and resource governance: Tanzania country profile. Washington DC, USAID. USAID 2013. SeedCLIR Tanzania pilot report. Washington DC, USAID. USAID 2014. Request for concept notes: SSTP / AGRA-TANZANIA. Washington DC, USAID. Wiggins, S. 2009. Can the smallholder model deliver poverty reduction and food security for a rapidly growing population in Africa? Presentation at FAO expert meeting on How to feed the World in 2050, Rome, 25–26 June. World Bank 2009. Awakening Africa’s sleeping giant: Prospects for commercial agriculture in the Guinea Savannah zone and beyond. Agriculture and Rural Development Unit, World Bank Africa Regional Office. World Bank. 2012. Agri-business indicators: Tanzania. Washington, D.C., World Bank. 58 A F R I C A N C E N T R E F O R B I O S A F E T Y APPENDIX 1: Farmer perceptions of agricultural challenges Table 1A: How serious are the following as a challenge to your farm? Challenge % serious % moderate % not serious % women serious % men serious Drought 41.7 28.3 30 45.9 34.8 Flood 29.8 17.5 52.6 32.4 25 Change in rainfall patterns 33.9 18.6 47.5 27.8 43.5 Soil infertility 13.3 41.7 45 16.2 8.7 Soil erosion 15 26.7 58.3 13.5 17.4 High fertiliser price 51 15.7 33.3 58.6 40.9 Late fertiliser delivery 37.8 6.7 55.6 44 30 Poor quality fertiliser 24.4 13.3 62.2 24 25 High seed price 44.1 37.3 18.6 36.1 56.5 Poor quality seed 34.5 29.3 36.2 Lack of markets 67.8 22 10.2 63.9 73.9 Pests and diseases 32.2 49.2 18.6 32.4 31.8 Animal damage 58.3 20 21.7 59.5 56.5 Land access 46.6 19 34.5 40.5 57.1 Availability of labour 11.9 23.7 64.4 18.9 0 Technical knowledge/ extension 25 20 55 27 21 Water quality 8.3 21.7 70 10.8 4.3 Nuanced rhetoric and the path to poverty: AGRA, small-scale farmers, and seed and soil fertility in Tanzania 59 APPENDIX 2: Tanzania’s commitments under the G8 NAFSN Table 2A: Tanzania’s NAFSN commitments Objective Framework policy actions Timeline Increased stability and transparency in trade policy, reduced tariff and non-tariff barriers 1. Implement policy alternatives to export ban identified in the comprehensive food security study to strengthen response to food emergencies while minimising disruptions in the market. July 2014 Improved incentives for the private sector by reducing taxes and increasing the transparency and consistency of the agricultural tax and incentive system. 2. Pre-profit tax at the farm-gate on crops reduced or lifted. July 2013 3. VAT on spare parts for farm machinery and equipment reduced or lifted July 2013 4. Secure certificate of land rights (granted or customary) for small holders and investors: All village land in Kilombero demarcated. All village land in SAGCOT region demarcated; and 20% of villages in SAGCOT complete their land use plans and are issued certificates of occupancy. August 2012 June 2014 June 2014 and additional 20% by June 2016 5. Instrument developed that clarifies the roles of land implementing agencies (TIC, RUBADA, Ministry of Lands and Local Government) in order responsibly and transparently to allocate land for investors in the SAGCOT region. December 2012 6. Taxes (cess, VAT) on seeds and seed packaging reduced or lifted. July 2013 7. Revised Seed Act that aligns the rights of plant breeders with the International Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants (UPOV) system. November 2012 8. Time required to release new varieties of imported seeds from outside the region to be reviewed and benchmarked with international best practices. December 2013 9. Qualified private sector companies authorised to produce foundation seed under proper supervision and testing. December 2013 10. ISTA and OECD seed testing accreditations achieved to enable regional and international seed sales. December 2013 11. Time required to register imported agrochemicals from outside the region to be reviewed and benchmarked with international best practices. December 2013 12. Update and align the National Food & Nutrition Policy with the National Nutrition Strategy. June 2013 Develop and implement domestic and regional seed and other inputs. Policies that encourage greater private sector participation in the production, marketing and trade in seeds and other inputs. 60 A F R I C A N C E N T R E F O R B I O S A F E T Y APPENDIX 3: Selected data tables Table 3A: In the past year did you grow any of the following in your main field? Crop Monocrop N % monocrop Intercrop N % intercrop Total N Total % Hybrid maize 2 3.3 6 10 8 13.3 Improved OPV maize 2 3.3 5 8.3 7 11.6 Local maize 14 23.3 30 50 44 73.3 Maize total* 17 28.3 39 65 56 93.3 Beans 13 21.7 16 26.7 29 48.3 Groundnut 2 3.3 - - 2 3.3 Pigeon pea 6 10 18 30 24 40 Cow pea 4 6.7 15 25 19 31.7 Sweet potato 3 5 - - 3 5 Irish potato 1 1.7 - - 1 1.7 Soya 1 1.7 - - 1 1.7 Cassava 7 11.7 5 8.3 12 20 Millet 2 3.3 - - 2 3.3 Rice 23 38.3 - - 23 38.3 47 78.3 Any type of veg Okra 3 5 1 1.7 4 6.7 Pumpkin 3 5 17 28.3 20 33.3 Swiss chard/spinach 4 6.7 - - 4 6.7 Amaranth 2 3.3 1 1.7 3 5 Chinese cabbage 7 11.7 - - 7 11.7 Cabbage 7 11.7 6 10 13 21.7 Tomato 13 21.7 4 6.7 17 28.3 Onion 6 10 - - 6 10 Carrot 6 10 4 6.7 10 16.7 Lemongrass - - 1 1.7 1 1.7 Sugar cane 3 5 1 1.7 4 6.7 Sweet pepper - - 1 1.7 1 1.7 Chilli pepper 1 1.7 - - 1 1.7 Sunflower 4 6.7 1 1.7 5 8.4 Sesame 2 3.3 1 1.7 3 5 Sweet potato leaves 1 1.7 - - 1 1.7 Nuanced rhetoric and the path to poverty: AGRA, small-scale farmers, and seed and soil fertility in Tanzania 61 Crop Monocrop N % monocrop Intercrop N % intercrop Any fruit Total N Total % 14 23.3 Guava 2 3.3 - - 2 3.3 Mango 5 8.3 1 1.7 6 10 Banana 6 10 1 1.7 7 11.7 Avocado 3 5 1 1.7 4 6.7 Citrus 2 3.3 2 3.3 4 6.6 Papaya 1 1.7 1 1.7 2 3.4 Coconut 2 3.3 1 1.7 3 5 Passion fruit 2 3.3 - - 2 3.3 *For maize total, some may have answered more than one so totals may not add up in the columns 62 A F R I C A N C E N T R E F O R B I O S A F E T Y Table 3B: In the past year did you plant the following on kilimo cha kiangazi land? All respondents Crop N yes Respondents who planted KK (N=40) % of all % yes Local maize 3 5 7.5 Maize total 3 5 7.5 Beans 7 11.3 17.5 Pigeon pea 3 5 7.5 Cow pea 1 1.7 2.5 Irish potato 3 5 7.5 Cassava 1 1.7 2.5 Rice 6 10 15 Any type of veg 30 50 75 Okra 3 5 7.5 Pumpkin 4 6.7 10 Swiss chard/spinach 9 15 22.5 Kale 1 1.7 2.5 Amaranth 4 6.7 10 Chinese cabbage 8 13.3 20 Cabbage 9 15 22.5 Tomato 12 20 30 Onion 10 16.7 25 Carrot 11 18.3 27.5 Sweet pepper 3 5 7.5 Chilli pepper 3 5 7.5 Salad leaves 4 6.7 10 Spices and herbs 1 1.7 2.5 Sweet potato leaves 4 6.7 10 Any fruit 2 3.3 5 Banana 2 3.3 5 Passion fruit 1 1.7 2.5 Berries 2 3.3 5 Nuanced rhetoric and the path to poverty: AGRA, small-scale farmers, and seed and soil fertility in Tanzania 63 Table 3C: In the past year did you plant the following around your home? All respondents Crop Respondents who planted around home (N=40) N yes % of all % yes Hybrid maize 1 1.7 2.5 Local maize 2 3.3 5 Maize total 2 3.3 5 Beans 1 1.7 2.5 Pigeon pea 2 3.3 5 Cow pea 4 6.7 10 Sweet potato 3 5 7.5 Cassava 2 3.3 5 Any type of veg 25 41.7 62.5 Okra 8 13.3 20 Pumpkin 6 10 15 Swiss chard/spinach 4 6.7 10 Amaranth 4 6.7 10 Chinese cabbage 7 11.7 17.5 Cabbage 2 3.3 5 Hibiscus/roselie 1 1.7 2.5 Lemon grass 11 18.3 27.5 Chilli pepper 4 6.7 10 Sweet potato leaves 11 18.3 27.5 Any fruit 26 43.3 65 Guava 6 10 15 Mango 11 18.3 27.5 Banana 10 16.7 25 Avocado 6 10 15 Citrus 14 23.3 35 Papaya 9 15 22.5 Coconut 7 11.7 17.5 Passion fruit 3 5 7.5 Sugar cane 3 5 7.5 64 A F R I C A N C E N T R E F O R B I O S A F E T Y Table 3D: Source of seed acquired in the last season, percentage (only those who acquired this type of seed) Hybrid maize Improved OPV maize Local maize Rice Beans Pigeon pea Cow pea 42.9 50 4.9 9.1 7.7 - 4.5 - 16.7 - 4.5 - - 9.1 57.1 35.2 95.1 68.2 61.5 36 50 gift/exchange within village - - - 9.1 - 16 18.2 gift/exchange from outside village - - - - - - - purchased from neighbour/other farmer - - - 9.1 23.1 20 9.1 purchased from general dealer/local market - - - - 3.8 20 - other - - - - 3.8 8 9.1 purchased seed dealer NGO/charity own saved seed *Some answered more than one, so totals may add up to more than 100% Nuanced rhetoric and the path to poverty: AGRA, small-scale farmers, and seed and soil fertility in Tanzania 65 APPENDIX 4: AGRA grants in Tanzania, 2007–2012 Table 4A: AGRA SHP grants, 2007–2012 Subprogramme Dates Fertiliser supply (FS) 2009–2011 FS Recipient Description 1,577 CNFA Develop existing input distribution system 2010–2013 397 MAFC Improving fertiliser quality FS 2010–2011 149 Jason Alan Scarpone Fertiliser market development FS 2012 2,741 AFAP Start-up grant to operationalise AFAP FS 2012–2015 22,259 AFAP AFAP (Ghana, Mozambique and Tanzania) Sub-total FS Amount (US$’000) 27,123 SH Extension (Ext.) 2010 – 2013 795 MAFC Integration of pigeon-pea into maize production systems in central and northern zones SH Ext. 2009–2012 (later extended to 2014) 424 SUA Increase use of locally available phosphate rock SH Ext. 2010–2012 406 MAFC Increased maize-legume productivity and striga weed control SH Ext. 2010–2013 895 MAFC Integration of legumes in maize-based cropping systems (Maruku Agricultural research and development institute) SH Ext. 2012–2015 967 MAFC Increased access to improved maize and bean seed, fertiliser and output markets in southern highlands Sub-total SH Ext. 3,487 SH Training 2010–2015 1,867 SUA Capacity building in soil and water management SH Research 2011–2014 389 Faida Market Link Co. Capacity building of extension staff in ISFM Total 32,866 66 A F R I C A N C E N T R E F O R B I O S A F E T Y Table 4B: AGRA PASS grants, 2007–2012 Subprogramme Dates Amount (US$’000) Recipient Description FIAAC 2007–10 185 MAFC, Selian ARI, Arusha hybrid maize FIAAC 2007–10 184 MAFC, Uyole ARI, Mbeya high yielding maize—disease resistance FIAAC 2007–10 185 MAFC, Naliendele ARI, Mtwara 2 farmer-preferred, high yielding, disease resistant bean varieties—conventional breeding FIAAC 2007–10 185 MAFC improvement of farmer-preferred cassava varieties and market development for surpluses FIAAC 2009–11 193 MAFC, Uyole ARI, Mbeya improved soybean FIAAC 2010–13 185 MAFC improved sweet potato—weevils, storage, beta-carotene FIAAC 2011–13 185 MAFC cassava improvement in humid and subhumid lowlands FIAAC 2011–14 165 MAFC disease resistant bean varieties in Southern Highlands FIAAC 2011–14 150 MAFC improved maize varieties in Northern zone FIAAC 2011–14 185 MAFC hybrid maize in Southern Highlands FIAAC 2011–14 195 MAFC salt tolerant rice 1997 sub-total MAFC FIAAC 2012–15 1977 Farm Input Promotions Africa Ltd (FIPS) (Kenya) dissemination of improved crop varieties and ISFM FIAAC 2009–10 18 KH Refrigeration (SA) investigation on cold storage Sokoine UA Training MScs in Plant Breeding for improved crops Sub-total FIAAC EACI Sub-total EACI 3992 2008–10 402 402 Nuanced rhetoric and the path to poverty: AGRA, small-scale farmers, and seed and soil fertility in Tanzania 67 Subprogramme Dates Amount (US$’000) Recipient Description SEPA 2007–10 158 MAFC Kizimbani ARI participatory multiplication and dissemination of cassava using diseasefree materials SEPA 2011–13 230 MAFC cassava and soil fertility management in Zanzibar SEPA 2007–09 169 Tanseed produce and disseminate improved maize, pigeon pea and sesame SEPA 2010 25 Duncan Kirubi (Kenya) support to Tanseed, especially on seed production and processing SEPA 2008–10 151 Krishna Seed Co Ltd multiplication and distribution of improved seed SEPA 2008–10 154 Zanobia Seeds Ltd improved varieties of orphan crops SEPA 2009–14 170 Itente Co Ltd improved seed for staple crops in Kagera region SEPA 2011 30 Temba Katambarare (Zim) support to Itente SEPA 2012 34 Temba Katambarare (Zim) support to Itente SEPA 2010–13 223 Meru Agro-Tours and Consultants production and dissemination of improved maize, sorghum and beans SEPA 2010–13 200 Agriseed Technologies Ltd quality seed in Tabora, Singida and Dodoma SEPA 2010–13 200 Aminata Quality Seeds and Consultancy Ltd improved maize, rice, sesame and sunflower in north western Tanzania SEPA 2010–13 197 IFFA Seed Co improved maize, pigeon pea, sunflower and tomato in Northern Region SEPA 2011–14 200 Northern Seed Co high yielding varieties of maize, sorghum, beans, pigeon peas, vegetables, cassava and sweet potatoes SEPA 2011–13 150 Kipato Seed Ltd improved maize, rice and beans in Southern Highlands SEPA 2012–13 187 Suba AgroTrading and Engineering Co Ltd improved maize, sorghum and sesame in Morogoro, Dodoma and Singida Sub-total SEPA 2478 68 A F R I C A N C E N T R E F O R B I O S A F E T Y Subprogramme Dates Amount (US$’000) Recipient Description ADP 2007–10 4,311 CNFA national agro-dealer networks for agricultural inputs ADP 2008–11 1,000 National Microfinance Bank Ltd credit facilities to agro-dealers ADP 2010 246 MAFC national agro-dealer strategy Sub-total ADP 5,557 Total PASS 12,429 Nuanced rhetoric and the path to poverty: AGRA, small-scale farmers, and seed and soil fertility in Tanzania 69 Table 4C: AGRA other grants, 2007–2012 SubProgramme Dates Amount (US$ ‘000) Recipient Description BBTE 2010–11 640 Ministry of Agriculture, Food Security and Cooperatives Define, test and refine the breadbasket approach, create investment grade proposals and transfer knowledge for rollout to other breadbasket areas in Tanzania Markets 2009–14 5,000 Standard Bank South Africa Limited Facilitate credit access in small-holder value chains in Tanzania, Uganda, Mozambique and Ghana Markets 2009–11 568 Rural Urban Development Initiatives (RUDI) Improving rice trading environment and providing rice marketing support services Markets 2010–11 261 RUDI Increase capacity of small-holder farmers to engage in WFP procurement programmes Markets 2010–13 1,354 TechnoServe Inc. Storage and warehouse receipt systems for small-holder maize and rice farmers Markets 2011–13 298 RUDI Building post-harvest handling for smallholder farmers Markets 2012–15 413 Center for Sustainable Development Initiatives Company Ltd Business support to small and medium size enterprises in the southern highlands Sub-total markets 7,894 Policy 2010 16 Tanzania Bureau of Standards To create an enabling policy, institutional and regulatory environment for a sustained uptake of Green Revolution technologies and improve farm productivity and incomes of smallholder farmers in Africa Policy 2011–15 492 Rural Livelihood Development Company To create an enabling policy, institutional and regulatory environment for staple food market development to improve farm productivity and incomes of smallholder farmers Policy 2012–16 222 Research on Poverty Alleviation To support enhanced crop productivity through the implementation of conducive agricultural policies in Tanzania Sub-total policy 730 Total other 9,264 70 A F R I C A N C E N T R E F O R B I O S A F E T Y APPENDIX 5: Seed varieties in use and farmer perceptions Here we provide an overview of maize, rice, vegetables, pigeon pea and cow pea seeds used as the main crops produced in the research sites. Maize seed The most popular maize varieties among the farmers we spoke to are TMV1 and Staha, while Situka—whose origins cannot be traced—is also popular. Tanzania Maize Variety (TMV1) is now widely found in the drier areas of Tabora, Dodoma and Iringa. TMV1 is very popular because it is sweet, so good for green maize, and also heavy, so good for business. It has a white, flinty grain and is resistant to white flint streak. It is specially used for roast, and matures between 75 to 90 days. Farmers rated the variety good and said they recycled it. Farmers described it as an old variety, drought and disease resistant, and sweet, but has a small seed so people do not prefer it. Farmers did not specifically mention TMV2. Situka improved OPV maize matures within a period of 75 days, whereas other varieties require at least 90 days. It is expected also to increase yield by 50 % compared to non-drought-tolerant varieties. It has a strong ability to grow in the semi-arid areas in the central part of Tanzania and in the highlands. Situka is rated as good quality by some, with one farmer saying “Situka is the best quality seed, better than the recycled hybrid”. Others felt it was dependent on the weather but that Situka produced under any conditions. Another described it as pest and disease resistant. Yet another farmer said the seed ranked poor after three seasons of recycling. The agro-dealer recommended its use to one farmer, and another got their seed from ASA. Farmers priced the seed at Sh2,000–Sh3,000/kg. Staha is another local variety. According to farmers it was originally a hybrid. Farmers recycle it for 3–4 seasons before the quality becomes poor and they must repurchase. According to farmers in the seed FGD, Staha takes 90 days to harvest and produces high yields, the maize is very white, and it has big seeds. Staha was originally bred for tolerance to MSV (Kaliba, et al., 2000:37), but farmers said it is not disease resistant, and they don’t buy much because agro-dealers are not providing the right seed. Other varieties mentioned include seed by domestic companies. The Kifaro hybrid by Suba Agro was seen in a Nafaka demonstration plot, and the respondent said they would try it next season. A drought tolerant TAN250 maize OPV (Tanseed) was mentioned for next season and farmers also mentioned other local maize varieties, including Emblidi, Mpingo and Katmbili. Others didn’t know the varieties they were using. Rice seed Supa is the basic variety for improvement and there are a number of varieties including Supa Mbeya and Supa Shinyanga. The improved variety TXD306 (see below) is also based on Supa germplasm. According to Moses Temi, principal at Mkindo Training Centre, there is an inverse relationship between productivity and aroma. Improved varieties have little aroma while quality is based on aroma. Saro (the other name for TXD) stands for semi-aromatic. “We want people to forget about aroma”, says Temi, only half joking, explaining that in the hungry season people are forced to eat Saro and increasing yields is important. According to farmers in the seed FGD, farmers use Supa. It is the oldest local variety. It has a good aroma and once it is processed it doesn’t break, it is dense, has a high yield (15x110 kg bags/acre of processed rice). It has good markets, mainly middlemen purchasing at the farm gate (‘home Nuanced rhetoric and the path to poverty: AGRA, small-scale farmers, and seed and soil fertility in Tanzania 71 market’) with a good price—Sh1,200/kg compared with Sh1,000/kg for other varieties. Farmers like to try new varieties but as a result have ended up losing the Supa varieties. Other say Supa varieties are not being grown widely because middlemen do not want to buy except for low prices. They ask for the other varieties. The only issue is of physical appearance. Supa Mbeya comes from the research station. It is improved seed and has higher yields than the original Supa. Supa Shinyanga was introduced in 2002–2005. It has higher productivity, a denser seed and higher yields. Both (although Shinyanga less than Mbeya) are easily attacked by diseases, are not drought resistant and need lots of fertiliser. One farmer using Supa Shinyanga said they would switch to TXD if they had irrigation. According to Mr Okhunda at Dakawa, “Supa is an aromatic variety. Farmers prefer it, so the improvement of Supa is viewed as important. TXD is not so aromatic but has a yield improvement. Consumers in town want Supa but the price is not very different, at Sh50,000/bag of TXD for a yield of 30–45 bags, compared with Sh55,000 of Supa for a yield of 15 bags. So it makes economic sense to use the higher yielding variety. There is a 15 cm height difference between Supa and Saro (TXD). Supa can also lodge (fall over) with high water levels. It still comes out if no weeding is done because it is tall, but we do not promote no weeding. Some cooking methods lose the aroma even if Supa is used. As researchers we don’t try to convince farmers, we just show them and they choose.” Mr Kunde at ASA says they produced 100 tons of certified Supa seed in 2014, “But,” says Kunde, “the challenge is that you cannot compare the yields with TXD.” Supa did appear in field trials but wasn’t selected. TXD is built on the Supa germplasm. The most popular variety is TXD306 (Saro 5), bred by the Dakawa Research Station. Mr Okhunda explained that Dakawa is a local office of the Ilonga ARI. TXD was developed from 1982 to 1985 at Dakawa and is a cross between a Korean variety and Supa. The aim is to improve yields. Supa has a good aroma but low responsiveness to fertiliser. There are many varieties based on Supa, including TXD varieties 306, 88 and 85, the latter two of which are available “but not preferred”. TXD306 was officially released 4 years ago (2010). Official release requires the generation of a management package and tests for pests and diseases. Says Okhunda, “TXD was being used before the official release; farmers took it from multi-location trials so it did diffuse into the environment.” Okhunda said that Dakawa conducts non-commercial training to maintain varieties so they can keep them longer. Dakawa produces to market and conducts research on rice, maize and vegetables. It has expertise in agronomy, soil fertility and pest management and conducts trials on all these crops with the private sector. Private companies contract on fertilisers and herbicides and there is some collaborative research. Farmers can and do purchase seed directly from the station. Moses Temi of Mkindo Training Centre says: “People have accepted the improved seed but many do not have irrigation. The benefit is that it can produce 2–3 times a year compared to 1 time for rainfed paddy. If local varieties are planted more than once a year, they turn to grass. Local varieties have no more than 20 tillers/hill and 6 grains/panicle compared to TXD Saro with 30–120 tillers/hill and 100–300 grains/panicle. The variations are based on real conditions … ASA wanted to do contract production of improved varieties with farmers, but farmers haven’t got the skills yet, especially in marketing. The focus is on reducing production costs for farmers. Under the old varieties, income was Sh500,000/ha, but are now Sh2.5m/ha income per season from TXD using GAP.” Temi continues: “It is hard to convince farmers to adopt something new. Improved varieties need irrigation. Farmers know the benefits of local varieties, e.g. drought resistance. The rule is that you should not mix local and certified varieties in irrigated areas, and the project is thus based on irrigation and certified seed. The seed used is based on government certified seed with breeder specification.” According to farmers in the seed FGD, in irrigated areas they plant improved seed and in other areas they plant local varieties. Some villages have only one season, so they can plant only one variety at a time. Farmers in the seed FGD considered TXD306 to be high yield (15–20 x 95–105kg bags/ 72 A F R I C A N C E N T R E F O R B I O S A F E T Y acre). The variety has more tillers and a shorter maturity—120 days compared with 6 months for local varieties. It is disease resistant but is still susceptible to pests. It does not necessarily die but will take more than 120 days to harvest. Some farmers indicated trying it in rain-fed areas and said it performed well. Farmers in the FGD who were not using Saro did not know it could survive in drought areas, but were warned by others that it must be a flat area so the water doesn’t flow out and is therefore not good in areas with slopes. According to farmers in the FGD, Saro 5 tastes better than Mbeya and Shinyanga but not the original Supa. Farmers do not have the voice with which to bargain so they accept the switch to Saro. Farmers generally ranked TXD306 as good and indicated they recycled it for 2–3 seasons, saying it had better markets than other varieties. Some farmers indicated receiving TXD306 from Nafaka demonstration plots or directly. Other local rice varieties in use that were mentioned are mbawa mbiri (two wings), with general agreement that yields are low but markets are better than for Supa, and Nondo which has intermediate advantages regarding taste and yield. According to Mr Okhunda at Dakawa, hybrids are a problem because they don’t maintain their vigour. They are now seeing many varieties from China. Vegetable seed is a very fragmented sector, with a wide selection of vegetables being produced but no reliable seed market. Most vegetable seed is imported. Dakawa does contract research on vegetable seed but has no breeder seed. Seed prices vary widely with purchase amounts ranging from Sh3,500/250g for Chinese cabbage seed to Sh27,000 for carrot seed. NGOs provide some vegetable seed free of charge. Seed quality is variable, as indicated above, with problems of seed not germinating or underperforming. There are also problems with agro-dealers, similar to those concerning maize, with false information being given to farmers. Some unidentified onion seed was from South Africa (likely Pannar, which is now owned by Pioneer Hi-Bred). Some farmers have recycled Chinese cabbage and salad leaf seed. There are seedlings for sale locally. According to one farmer the short stalk variety of pigeon pea gives a better yield while the long stalk gives a better taste, and she is using both varieties. Farmers received pigeon pea and cow pea from Ilonga Research Station in Kilosa, or purchased it from agro-dealers or the village office. One person reported buying pigeon pea as food and then planting it. During an interview on 24/10/2014 with Meshack Makenge and Osmond Rupindo, who are with the Ilonga ARI and who are responsible for plant breeding, and agricultural economics and farming systems, respectively, the production of improved pigeon pea and cow pea seed at Ilonga started in 1980. Local varieties were given names from local areas. There are three officially released varieties of pigeon pea from Ilonga. The first is Mali (worth), which has a long duration maturity (7–8 months) and is suited to the high and medium altitude areas in the northern and central areas of the country. Mali has a large seed and is white, which traders prefer. It is exported to India. Wholesalers collect the seed in a central area and export it from Dodoma central market. In the past season the price was Sh2,000/kg. There is a local market for pigeon pea but the price is low (Sh1,000/kg) so traders prefer exporting. Mali is bred for resistance to fusarium wilt because local varieties are not resistant. It is based on ICRISAT germplasm and was released in 2003. It is high yielding (8–10 bags/acre, 100kg bags) and can be irrigated, but does not need additional water since it is drought resistant. Farmers should recycle the seed for three years and then buy more—from ASA, agro-dealers or the research station. The second variety is Tumea, which has a medium duration maturity (6 months) and is best suited to medium and low altitudes. It has a yield of 6–8 bags/acre. The short time it spends in the field means it escapes fusarium. It is good for areas of low rainfall (semi-arid) and is exported to India. The most important consideration for exports is quality. Tumea has a smaller seed and originated from Kenya. Nuanced rhetoric and the path to poverty: AGRA, small-scale farmers, and seed and soil fertility in Tanzania 73 Komboa is a short duration (4 months) variety. Tumea and Mali can be intercropped with maize or sorghum, but not Komboa. It requires close planting and matures at the same time as maize so it challenges for nutrients. It is preferred in coastal areas. The variety is insensitive to photo period so flowers at any time. The other two flower from March–June (i.e. when the days are long). Komboa can be planted up to 3 times a year. If you remove the seed coat the seeds are yellow inside, the coats are of a different colour. It is used for dhal in India, mixed with rice, and is used locally to produce bonko (a dish that requires the seed coat to be retained and the seeds to be soaked, boiled and spiced) and to make biscuits. The price is lower than Mali, and it yields 6–8 bags/acre. Makenge and Rupindo explained that pigeon pea production and price has increased over the past 3 years, due to the high demand. The local market price rose from Sh600 to Sh1,000/kg without much of a seasonal price fluctuation. Ilonga have not organised market training for farmers and while NGOs provide support the farmers still lack information. Pigeon pea existed previously but not as a commercial crop and was used to demarcate fields. Commercial fields now use up to 20 or 30 acres. According to Isako Mushauri, CEO of Tanseed, there is demand for pigeon pea in the northern zone, “but to transport it there eats up profitability”. Tanseed received an AGRA grant to support pigeon pea commercialisation but according to Mushauri, “After AGRA’s support ended, Tanseed stopped producing pigeon pea. The market was still low and farmers recycle seed for most self-pollinating crops. There are lots of requirements like spraying practices, etc., which are difficult for farmers to get right. As a business, we decided the pigeon pea market was too small so we stopped.” According to Makenge and Rupindo, Ilonga has released 6 cow pea varieties: Fahari (90 day maturity, trailing, indeterminant); Tumahini (80–85 day maturity); Vuli 1 (erect type, matures 60–65 days); Vuli 2 (69–74 day maturity); and VuliAR1 and AR2 which are alectra28 resistant. Ilonga researchers want to combine the traits for alectra resistance, drought resistance and resistance to cow pea aphid. They can do this using conventional breeding after molecular marking and are in discussions to establish their own microbiology laboratory. Currently, they use facilities at SUA. Cow pea is a popular crop grown almost everywhere. Its leaves are eaten during the rainy season, then the leaf is blanched and dried for off-season use and stored in the house. But there is no systematic market and the main market is local. Ilonga are assisting farmers to reach other markets. There were local cow pea varieties and most improved germplasm is based on IITA germplasm crossed with local varieties. There is no payment for IITA germplasm and institutions collaborate in the Tropical Legumes Programme (TLP). In January 2015 Phase 3 of the programme will begin, continuing until 2018. Phase 2 also worked on pigeon pea. Legumes are a ‘low volume crop’ but Ilonga is starting a project with SSF in Iringa, Dodoma and Singida because legumes are used mostly in these areas. The TLP has a demonstration plot and a group of farmers who form part of the programme. There is a need to develop new varieties to deal with new climatic conditions, especially drought. Cow peas need phosphorus at an early stage for the strengthening of roots and then later for stabilising flowers. Nitrogen is not needed. Legumes are a protein and are expensive when compared with cereals. SSF are starting to grow pigeon pea and cow pea as their commercial crops and there are positive benefits in increased income, concluded Makenge and Rupindo. A number of farmers to whom we spoke, who planted cow pea, did not know what varieties they were planting. 74 A F R I C A N C E N T R E F O R B I O S A F E T Y Nuanced rhetoric and the path to poverty: AGRA, small-scale farmers, and seed and soil fertility in Tanzania February 2015 PO Box 29170, Melville 2109, South Africa www.acbio.org.za w w w. a c b i o. o r g . z a
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