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A Canadian Member of Grant Thornton International Ltd 1.800.265.8381 www. mckellar.com Vol. 34, No. 42 lawyersweekly.ca MARCH 20 , 2015 B.C. appeal court refuses to halt dementia patient’s spoon feeding Court offers rule clarity in dismissal cases Cristin Schmitz OTTAWA ‘Principle of patient autonomy’ at issue, judges’ panel rules Curbs, Page 2 Piper, Page 10 TAX LAW LABOUR & EMPLOYMENT BUSINESS & CAREERS Defining de facto Last rights of employees ‘Earn it before your spend it’ You may not think you’re a director, but CRA does Options for employees in a bankruptcy Small firms need to watch where the money goes PAGE 11 PAGE 14 PAGE 20 Toronto’s Hugh Scher, co-counsel for the intervener Euthanasia Prevention Coalition and its B.C. affiliate in a case involving spoon feeding a dementia patient, says the B.C. Court of Appeal has set out a bright line for caregivers. Matthew Sherwood for The Lawyers weekly the issue of whether a medical intervention is appropriate at that stage of life,” said Penny Washington, of Vancouver’s Bull, Housser & Tupper. Washington, counsel for the Developed for both Canadian and International business and corporate communities. The result of a comprehensive, two-year review which engaged in a broad consultation process. Professional administration is available from ADR Institute of Canada. NEW ADRIC Arbitration Rules Now in effect! To view the Rules, go to: adrcanada.ca/rules/arbitration.cfm or contact us for a copy. Canada’s Gold Standard™ ADR Institute of Canada Inc. / Institut d’Arbitrage et de Médiation du Canada Inc. [email protected] • www.adrcanada.ca PUBLICATIONS MAIL AGREEMENT NO. 40065517 priate at the late stage of the disease. In Margaret Anne Bentley’s case, her family wanted her care facility in Abbotsford, B.C. The British Columbia Court of Appeal has affirmed that a care facility is required to continue to offer food and fluids to a woman in the final stage of Alzheimer’s disease, even though her family says this contradicts her previously expressed wishes. Counsel said the March 3 ruling, in Bentley (Litigation guardian of ) v. Maplewood Seniors Care Society [2015] B.C.J. No. 367, is the first in Canada to grapple with a novel issue that that can arise when dementia patients who can’t verbally communicate are also physically unable to feed themselves: Are caregivers obliged to offer such patients nourishment — by holding a spoon or a glass to the person’s lips — despite statements the patients may have made years earlier that they do not want to be fed or hydrated in such circumstances? U.S. jurisprudence on the point is scant and there was no reported case law in British Columbia or the rest of Canada, counsel said. “Mostly the cases are the other way — that is, they’re around To subscribe to The Lawyers Weekly, visit www.lawyersweekly.ca/subscribe respondent Fraser Health Authority in Bentley, said the cases are more often about families insisting on artificial tubefeeding despite the patient’s care team saying it is inappro- Employers generally must have “legitimate business reasons” for administratively suspending their non-unionized workers, and should be “forthright” with employees about those reasons, the Supreme Court has ruled. Justice Richard Wagner’s March 6 ruling, in Potter v. New Brunswick Legal Aid Services [2015] S.C.J. No. 10, is the top court’s first major decision in the law of constructive dismissal since the leading case of Farber v. Royal Trust Co. [1997] 1 S.C.R. 846. The ruling provides guidance on the two-branch Farber test for determining whether a constructive dismissal has occurred, an issue that tripped up the New Brunswick courts below. Justice Wagner gives specific guidance on how to do the twostep analysis, under the first branch of the Farber test, for determining (1) whether an administrative suspension constitutes a unilateral change that amounts to a breach of contract and if so, (2) whether the unauthorized administrative suspension can reasonably be perceived as having substantially changed the essential terms of the contract. Cristin Schmitz 2 • MARCH 20, 2015 THE LAWYERS WEEKLY News Contents News Court of Appeal will not stop dementia patient’s feeding 1 Supreme Court offers clarity in dismissal cases 1 Alberta impaired case explores ‘imminent peril’ 3 Evidence not admissible, appeal court rules 3 GPS tracking of mental health patients banned 4 ‘Sudden nature’ of change found ‘worrisome’ by court 5 Ontario provincial employees lose in clash over anonymity 23 Focus TAX LAW You might not think you’re a director, but the CRA might 11 Bad news for testamentary, spousal trusts 12 The difference between secrets and privacy 13 LABOUR & EMPLOYMENT An employee’s options in bankruptcy 14 With discrimination, you can lose even if you win 15 Business & Careers Keep it simple when starting your own firm 20 Does Canada need a corporate tax? 22 22 22 19 16 13 4 ANNOUNCEMENTS CAREERS CLASSIFIED ADS DIGEST LAWDITTIES NAMES IN THE NEWS Curbs: Scher sees potential limits on laws restricting vulnerable care Continued from page 1 to stop prompting the 83-yearold former nurse to eat or drink by putting a spoon or a glass to her lips. Bentley is in the final stage of a 16-year battle with Alzheimer’s. She has not spoken since 2010 and doesn’t seem to recognize anyone. She has limited movement. She sits slumped over most of every day with her eyes closed but, when prompted, she does eat and drink at times, and even seems to show a preference for certain foods, such as applesauce. According to the judgment, her caregivers’ approach is to prompt her with a spoon or glass and, if she keeps her mouth closed, to try again. If she refuses to open her mouth after a couple of tries, they stop. Her family believes she eats and drinks reflexively, that she is not consenting, and that the caregivers’ holding of a spoon or glass to her lips constitutes battery. However, the Court of Appeal upheld the B.C. Supreme Court’s 2014 decision, which relied on expert medical evidence, that Bentley is capable of consenting to eating and drinking. The trial judge concluded that Bentley does consent and communicates her consent by accepting nourishment when it is offered to her. The case deals only with “natural” feeding by spoon or glass, not with artificial feeding through tubes, which is considered a medical intervention. The Bentleys’ appeal focused on issues of consent and onus of proof. Left unappealed were other holdings and statements by the trial judge. This included his statement that providing oral nutrition and hydration, by prompting with a spoon or glass, Riches, McKenzie & heRbeRt llp PATENTS, TRADE MARKS, COPYRIGHT, LITIGATION BARRISTERS & SOLICITORS - PATENT & TRADE MARK AGENTS Paul Herbert, b.Sc., PHm., r.PH, ll.b., J.D., PH.D. Dan HitcHcock, b.eng. (elec. eng.), ll.b. Jeff PervanaS, b.a.Sc. (eng. Sci.), ll.b. micHael Yun, b.Sc. (biocHem), J.D. Steven cHeng, b.a.Sc. (elec. eng.), J.D. brant latHam, b.a.Sc. b.Sc. (cHem. eng.), ll.b. garY m. traviS, b.Sc. (geol.), ll.b. micHael aDamS, b.eng. (mecH. eng.), b.Sc., ll.b. tHomaS mcconnell, b.Sc. (biol.), J.D. TRADE MARK AGENT marta tanDori cHeng 2 BLOOR ST. EAST, SuITE 1800 TORONTO, ONTARIO M4W 3J5 ESTABLISHED 1887 TELEPHONE: (416) 961-5000 FAx: (416) 961-5081 E-MAIL: [email protected] is “personal” or “basic” care and, as such, is not amenable to advance directives under B.C.’s Health Care (Consent) and Care Facility (Admission) Act. This contrasts with “health care,” such as artificial tube-feeding, that is subject to advance directives under the act. The Court of Appeal dismissed the Bentley family’s request for a declaration that would bar Maplewood House from giving Bentley food and hydration. The panel described the family as “loving. “I recognize the terribly difficult situation in which Mrs. Bentley’s family find themselves and I appreciate the disappointment they must feel in being unable to comply with what they believe to have been her wishes and what they believe still to be her wishes,” Justice Mary Newbury wrote for Justices Edward Chiasson and P.D. Lowry. “It is a grave thing, however, to ask or instruct caregivers to stand by and watch a patient starve to death,” Justice Newbury said. “It should come as no surprise that a court of law will be assiduous in seeking to ascertain and give effect to the wishes of the patient in the ‘here and now,’ even in the face of prior directives, whether clear or not.” Justice Newbury said this approach is consistent with “the principle of patient autonomy” reflected in the applicable provincial statutes and in many court decisions, including the Supreme Court of Canada’s recent ruling that physicianassisted suicide is sometimes permissible but must be based on patients’ “clear consent.” In Bentley, the B.C. courts have set out a bright line for professional caregivers, in the view of Toronto’s Hugh Scher, co-counsel with Geoffrey Cowper of Vancouver’s Fasken Mar- I think the likely outcome is more people are going to choose the option of doctor-assisted suicide. They won’t want to end up in Margo Bentley’s situation, which is a tragic situation. It is certainly contrary to what she wanted for herself. Kieran Bridge Construction Law Group tineau for the intervener Euthanasia Prevention Coalition and its B.C. affiliate. The court has clearly indicated, “and this is supported by international policy around the world,” that natural feeding by spoon or glass is not typically considered “medical treatment” or “health care” — to which an advance directive applies — and as such is not something that people can preclude that way, Scher said. Scher said he believes the same result would likely obtain in Ontario and the rest of Canada, notwithstanding that legislation varies from province to province. The Bentleys’ counsel, Kieran Bridge of Vancouver’s Construction Law Group, said his clients have not yet decided whether to seek leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. Bentley has implications for tens of thousands of people with dementia, Bridge said. “I think the likely outcome is more people are going to choose the option of doctor-assisted suicide,” he predicted. “They won’t want to end up in Margo Bentley’s situation, which is a tragic situation. It is certainly contrary to what she wanted for herself.” Bridge said the decisions don’t mean that British Columbians can’t use advance directives to prohibit being naturally fed when they are in an advanced stage of dementia. Rather, in his view, the B.C. Supreme Court’s decision stands for the proposition “that if that is your wish, you must be very clear in saying, ‘If I get to certain physical stage, don’t feed me through any means. Don’t try to give me spoon-feeding. Don’t try to hydrate me.’” Bentley told her family she never wanted to live in the “vegetative” state she saw some of her patients endure. She also signed two “living will” documents in the 1990s, whose meaning the courts ultimately found to be contradictory and inconclusive with respect to her wishes about being given food and water if she suffered in future from extreme mental or physical disability. Scher said it’s not clear that the Constitution would permit federal and provincial governments to make laws expressly permitting nursing homes, hospitals, and other caregivers to withhold spoon-feeding from dementia patients who — although they now open their mouths to eat and drink — previously requested that they not be given nutrition in the late stage of the disease. “The notion that someone should be permitted to starve, or to dehydrate, somebody to death, I think, gives rise to serious concern about basic neglect, and about [the Charter’s ss. 7 and 15 guarantees of ] life, liberty and security of the person, and equality in terms of treatment, potentially,” Scher said. “There may well be constitutional limitations on the ability of Parliament or the legislature to effectively permit restrictions relative to this basic and essential element of life.” MARCH 20 , 2015 • THE LAWYERS WEEKLY 3 News Alberta impaired case explores ‘imminent peril’ Kim Arnott Can imminent peril be “mostly eliminated”? And how quickly after peril ends does the defence of necessity cease to exist? An Alberta farmer has been granted leave to appeal his conviction for impaired care and control of a motor vehicle to the Alberta Court of Appeal, based on the impact of those questions on the defence of necessity. William Millar, a farmer in a rural area about 100 kilometres south of Edmonton, was charged after police found him passed out over the steering wheel of his truck, with the engine running. His 2013 conviction in Provincial Court was upheld by summary conviction appeal to the Court of Queen’s Bench in 2014. At trial, Millar testified that he had worked in his fields all day, then returned home and had five or six beers before going to bed. In the middle of the night, he awoke to discover that his herd of Black Angus cattle were loose and wandering toward a nearby highway. Claiming the defence of necessity, Millar said he felt he had no choice but to use his truck to chase down the cows before they put the lives of motorists at risk. After locating some cows, herding them into a field and closing the gate, he returned to his truck and passed out. Pearse The trial judge found that Millar’s initial actions satisfied the elements of a necessity defence in that there was immediate peril to the public, he had no reasonable alternative to his actions, and his travel on a lowuse rural road for a short distance reflected a low degree of risk. “The judge found that what he was doing was necessary, that it met the necessity defence until he collapsed from exhaustion behind the wheel,” said Alan Pearse, an Alberta lawyer specializing in impaired offences who acted as counsel for Millar throughout the case. After Millar’s return to his truck, however, the trial judge questioned “whether the defence of necessity continues to apply to excuse Mr. Millar’s actions after the imminent peril had been wholly or mostly eliminated.” In granting leave to appeal the conviction, Court of Appeal Justice Ronald Berger noted that Millar had testified that he wasn’t certain if he had all of the cows, but believed he had most of them. “It follows, having accepted that the defence of necessity would exist up to intercepting the cows, it is arguable that to the extent that there remained cows that had not yet been intercepted ‘imminent peril to the public’ remained a live concern,” said Justice Berger. He granted leave to appeal on the questions of whether the trial judge erred in law by finding that imminent peril ended when it was “mostly eliminated,” and if he erred by misapplying the defence of necessity by finding that the component of imminent peril is spent immediately after it is extinguished. “The issue in Millar is that the (trial) judge doesn’t really make a clear finding whether the appellant is still facing the imminent peril at the time when he is arrested for care and control of the vehicle,” said Lisa Silver, a Calgary lawyer and sessional professor with the University of Calgary. “The error is that it can’t be mostly eliminated. It’s either there or it’s not there.” She said Justice Berger’s decision to grant leave is consistent with a prior Alberta Court of Appeal decision in R. v. Sekhon [2007] A.J. No. 864. In that case, the longevity of the defence of necessity was evaluated as it applied to a man acquitted of drunk driving after fleeing a wedding where he had been threatened. The appellate court ordered a new trial because the original decision didn’t clearly address whether the driver was still in danger when arrested by police, said Silver. While Millar may similarly earn the right to a new trial when his case is considered by the full panel, she said the courts have typically been quite consistent when evaluating the defence of necessity in impaired cases. “Once the peril is no longer imminent, then the necessity does not apply; the second part of necessity can no longer be made,” said Silver. “It’s the word imminent that’s important, not the word peril.” The last few years have seen the necessity defence used successfully in impaired driving cases in Saskatchewan, Ontario and Nova Scotia. In R. v. Maxay [2013] S.J. No. 594, a Saskatchewan woman was acquitted after she drove to escape her sister’s enraged boyfriend who had violently attacked her and was chasing her in his vehicle. A Nova Scotia man convinced the court that his decision to drive impaired was excused by the necessity of getting an injured friend to a hospital in R. v. Pleau [2013] N.S.J. No. 630, and the defence was also accepted in R. v. Valauskas [2012] O.J. No. 6233 after the accused drove a very short distance to get home after being assaulted. Silver said the defence is probably being raised in the context of impaired driving offences because they are very difficult to defend. “Thus, necessity, as a legal excuse, which is applicable after the elements of the offence have been proven, becomes one of the last types of defences available to the accused when facing such a charge,” she said. Evidence was not admissible, Ontario Court of Appeal rules Sherrin, Page 23 We see the lives behind our laws. With over 40 years of litigation experience, Oatley Vigmond knows personal injury law. We’ve argued hundreds of cases, secured record settlements and have helped shape Canadian law. Yet for all our success in the courtroom, we have never lost sight of the fact that people come first. We are dedicated to serving clients across Ontario. Contact us at 1.888.662.2481 or oatleyvigmond.com. Proud Member AN LAWYER M A 2013-14 INE AZ G The Court of Appeal for Ontario has ordered a new trial in a 2010 Ottawa aggravated assault case, concluding that the trial judge used inadmissible evidence to help convict the accused. “The evidence upon which [Superior Court Justice Paul Lalonde] relied as confirmation consisted of an amalgam of inadmissible opinion and of evidence of the complainant’s statements that was properly admissible for one purpose, but not for that purpose used by the trial judge,” Appeal Court Justice David Watt wrote in R. v. Mackenzie [2015] O.J. No. 575, his Feb. 9 decision backed by Justice Sarah Pepall and Justice Grant Huscroft. The fact the case could now drag on for more than five years does not reflect well on the province’s justice system, said Lee Stuesser, dean of the Bora Laskin Faculty of Law at Lakehead University. “If this is the state of the criminal justice system in Ontario, shame on us all,” he told The Lawyers Weekly. The November 2011 trial ended with the conviction of 50-year-old Ottawa resident Luke Mackenzie on charges of aggravated assault, unlawful confinement, and uttering death threats. The charges stemmed from an August 2010 attack on Brenda Ethier, 47, a friend of the accused who lived nearby and a single mother with two daughters, then aged 15 and 29. The six-day trial featured testimony from Mackenzie, Ethier, her two daughters, five police officers, and a doctor who tended to Ethier’s injuries, which included a broken nose, a fractured rib, and multiple bruises. Ethier testified that after receiving minor surgery to remove a cyst at Ottawa’s Montfort Hospital on Aug. 30, 2010, she went to visit Mackenzie at his apartment later that after- CANA D I John Schofield 4 • MARCH 20, 2015 THE LAWYERS WEEKLY News Awards ■ Stockwoods LLP civil litigation lawyer Paul Le Vay has been named the recipient of the 2015 Lincoln Alexander Award, part of the Law Society of Upper Canada’s annual awards that include eight recipients of this year’s Law Society Medal: Fasken Martineau partner Craig Carter, Adam Dodek (University of Ottawa), Susan Eng (CARP Advocacy), Faisal Joseph (Lerners LLP), John Laskin (Torys LLP), sole practitioner Steward Lavigueur (Eganville, Ont.), E. Patrick Shea (Gowlings LLP) and Chantal Tie (Ontario Human Rights Legal Support Centre). Others to be honoured May 27 in Toronto include Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada executive director Kimberly Murray (Laura Legge Award) and paralegal bencher pioneer W. Paul Dray (William J. Simpson Distinguished Paralegal Award). ■ Julie Paquette, a partner in the Ottawa office of Norton Rose Fulbright with a practice focusing on commercial real estate and franchising, won the Feb. 20-22 women’s Ultraman Florida race with a combined time of 29 hours 33 minutes for the 10-kilometre swim, 145-km and 275-km bike legs and the concluding double marathon run of 84.3 kilometres. Programs ■ Dentons Canada has launched an Internationally Trained Lawyer (ITL) articling program in Toronto, and announced it will continue its ITL articling program partnership with Imperial Oil Ltd. for a second year. The firm’s ITL program, accepting applications until March 20, is geared to new Canadians who are trained and practised lawyers in their home countries and working to become licensed to practise in Canada. Publisher Ann McDonagh Editor In Chief Rob Kelly Senior Editor Matthew Grace, LL.B. Focus Editor Richard Skinulis Tracking of mental health patients banned donalee Moulton Nova Scotia has become the first jurisdiction in the country to legally ban the use of global positioning systems to track patients on leave or absent without leave from a mental health forensic hospital. The decision to prohibit the use of GPS tracking bracelets on forensic mental health patients came in the wake of Andre Noel Denny’s April 2012 charge of second-degree murder in the death of well-known gay rights activist Raymond Taavel. At the time, Denny was absent without leave from the East Coast Forensic Hospital, Canada’s only combination hospital-correctional facility, where patients arrive exclusively from the judicial system or after being sent there for courtordered assessments. Public outrage following Taavel’s death led the Capital District Health Authority to conduct a review of its forensic hospital’s processes and identify best practices in the field. The 18 ensuing recommendations included the development of a protocol for a daily assessment of a patient’s mental state before proceeding with any leave. The review, however, did not endorse the use of GPS monitoring in the absence of further information. The government prepared three reports in response, including a literature scan on the topic and interviews with experts in the United Kingdom and Australia — where GPS monitoring has been mandated — by the Nova Scotia Health Research Foundation. The third report, prepared by the Health Law Institute at Dalhousie University, analyzed potential legal issues and whether a legislative requirement to electronically monitor forensic patients would withstand a court challenge. “We were very conscious of the need to focus on public safety and the need to rehabilitate Gibson individuals,” said Constance MacIntosh, one of the three researchers and director of the Health Law Institute. MacIntosh and her colleagues looked at the legal landscape in several areas including the Criminal Code, administrative law, statutory human rights law, and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The latter was a significant concern. “The evidence didn’t show we would withstand a Charter challenge, and there would likely be a challenge,” said Ken Scott, director of mental health services with the province’s Department of Health and Wellness. The courts in Canada demand “proportionality” when discretionary decisions engaging Charter values are in play. Legislative objectives must be balanced against these values. On this issue, there was an imbalance, noted Sheila Wildeman, one of the report researchers and an associate professor at Dalhousie’s Schulich School of Law. “The government needs to demonstrably justify intruding on people’s rights,” said Wildeman. “There was no support or only the most speculative support that electronic monitoring would enhance public safety.” The 124-page report examined the use of electronic monitoring under six sections of the Charter including s. 15, which guarantees equal protection under the law without discrimination, including mental disability. The researchers concluded that a law or policy requiring electronic monitoring (EM) for forensic mental health patients exercising community access would probably be deemed “discriminatory” by the courts. “The application of EM to some or all forensic mental health patients would likely be held to perpetuate prejudice and exacerbate the stigma this population already experiences. A blanket policy likely would be held to be based on stereotyped views,” they stated. Given the relative newness of HOW TO REACH US ADVERTISING Tel: (905) 479–2665 Fax: (905) 479–3758 Toll-free: 1–800–668–6481 Email: [email protected] The government needs to demonstrably justify intruding on people’s rights. There was no support or only the most speculative support that electronic monitoring would enhance public safety. Sheila Wildeman Schulich School of Law, Dalhousie University Correspondents Main Office Advertising Sales Jim Grice (905) 415–5807 Ritu Harjai (905) 415–5804 Valery Salo (905) 415–5881 Kim Arnott, Toronto Luigi Benetton, Toronto Thomas Claridge, Toronto Christopher Guly, Ottawa Geoff Kirbyson, Winnipeg Luis Millan, Montreal Donalee Moulton, Halifax 123 Commerce Valley Drive East Suite 700, Markham, ON L3T 7W8 Advertising Traffic Co-ordinator Jackie D’Souza (905) 415–5801 Ottawa Bureau Circulation Controller Scott Welsh (905) 479–2665, ext. 324 c/o Parliamentary Press Gallery Rm 350–N, Centre Block Parliament Hill, Ottawa, ON K1A 0A6 Tel: (613) 820–2794 Fax: (613) 995–5795 Ottawa Bureau Chief Cristin Schmitz Website Production Co-ordinator Pauline Poulin Member, Ontario Press Council Art / Production Designer Sara Hollander www.lawyersweekly.ca 2 Carlton Street, Suite 1706, Toronto, ON (416) 340–1981; Fax: (416) 340–8724 GST/HST/QST No.: R121051767 Print Subscription Rates 1 year (48 issues): $305, plus tax 2 years (96 issues): $520, plus tax 1 year U.S./international: $420 1 year student: $70, plus tax Individual copies: $12, plus tax Digital Subscription rates 1 year (48 issues): $275, plus tax 2 years (96 issues): $470, plus tax 1 year U.S./international: $375 1 year student: $60, plus tax GPS technology, evidence was lacking on the effectiveness of electronic monitoring for forensic mental health patients as a means of enhancing public safety. “There is virtually no evidence linking people being AWOL with public safety concerns. Knowing where someone is and protecting the public are two different things,” said Elaine Gibson, one of the report researchers and an associate professor at Dalhousie. Seven public safety incidents involving violence and forensic mental health patients have occurred in Nova Scotia the past decade, and all but one of them occurred when the person was absent without leave. In other jurisdictions, in particular Australia and Britain where tracking bracelets are legally required, the primary focus was on reducing leave violations and not on preventing members of the public from being harmed. “The studies are not parallel,” said Gibson. In addition to not enhancing public safety, the Health Law Institute’s report noted that ankle bracelets on patients had negative consequences including affecting the progress of therapy and restricting community integration. The stigma of being electronically monitored reinforces stereotypes surrounding mental health and further criminalizes an illness, the researchers found. Recent changes to the Criminal Code address public safety concerns, including patients designated by a court as “high-risk accused” being prohibited from exercising indirectly supervised and unescorted community access. The designation may be made in circumstances where a court is satisfied there “is a substantial likelihood the accused will use violence that could endanger the life or safety of another person.” “That makes it harder for highrisk offenders to gain access to the community,” said Scott. Postal Information: Please forward all postal returns to: Circulation Controller, The Lawyers Weekly, 123 Commerce Valley Drive East, Suite 700, Markham, ON L3T 7W8. Return postage guaranteed. ISSN 0830-0151. Publications Mail Sales Agreement Number: 40065517. 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MARCH 20 , 2015 • THE LAWYERS WEEKLY 5 News ‘Sudden nature’ of change by expert ‘worrisome’ Luis Millan The Quebec Court of Appeal has set aside a second degree murder conviction and ordered a new trial after finding that an expert witness offered a completely different conclusion during crossexamination at a jury trial compared to the written report and testimony she provided during the preliminary inquiry. In a clear message to expert witnesses, the appeal court held that the forensic scientist, a professional expert witness with 14 years of experience who is often called upon by the Crown to testify, should have at the very least disclosed her new conclusion to Crown counsel or to the police investigator who interviewed her before trial. “The sudden nature of her new testimony is worrisome,” said the three-judge Court of Appeal panel in Gakmakge v. R. [2015] Q.J. No. 1047. Jacinthe Prévost is one of a An expert has an obligation to tell the Crown if his testimony will change the nature of his report in order for the defence to be able to present a full and complete defence. Mia Manocchio Criminal lawyer handful of professionals in Quebec with an expertise in blood splatters, DNA, and crime-scene investigation, according to criminal lawyers. Khalid Gakmakge was convicted by a jury in the stabbing death of his estranged wife, Lucia Medeiros, in 2009, and was sentenced to life imprisonment with no chance of parole before serving 14 years. The circumstances leading to the death of his wife are relatively clear, said the appeal court. Gakmakge admitted killing his wife after stabbing her with a large kitchen knife, but claimed he did it in self-defence after she first assaulted him with the same knife as he lay in bed sleeping. The Crown asserted that after he murdered his wife, he inflicted stab wounds on himself in an attempt to commit suicide. The core issue at trial was which stabbing occurred first, and which of the two spouses was the last to be stabbed. During testimony at the preliminary inquiry and in her preparation to testify at trial with a police investigator shortly prior to trial, Prévost said she was unable to answer the question, who was the last to be stabbed. “The sequence cannot be given by simply looking at what’s on the blade,” testified Prévost at the preliminary inquiry. But at trial, Prévost had a change of heart after she had “prepared herself more” and considered “a strong hunch.” During cross- examination, she came to the conclusion that Gakmakge was stabbed last because the majority of the blood found on the knife came from him, a conclusion she never shared with either Crown counsel or the police investigators. “An expert has an obligation to tell the Crown if his testimony will change the nature of his report in order for the defence to be able to present a full and complete defence,” said Mia Manocchio, a Sherbrooke criminal lawyer. Gakmakge argued before the trial judge that if his counsel had known what the expert witness was going to say at trial about the sequence of events, he would have sought to obtain and introduce a contrary opinion. Gakmakge added that if he was not given that opportunity, he would be deprived of a full and complete defence. 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(416) 866-2400 Personal Injury, Insurance, Commercial, Employment, Estates, Sports, Sexual Abuse 130 Adelaide Street West, Suite 701 Walsh McLuskie Doyle Toronto, Ontario, M5H 2K4 Suite 2200, 181 University Ave., Fax: (416) 866-2403 Toronto, ON M5H 3M7 Email: [email protected] Richard D. McLean, Q.C. Fred Sampliner Web: www.yorkstreet.ca Appointments Marjorie Coe Tel: 416 363 2977 [email protected] Cell: 416 805 8555 617-7 King Street East Toronto, Ontario M3C 3C5 Toll Free: 1 844 547 2977 Fax: 416 703 4597 www.coeadrmanagement.com Are you a mediator, arbitrator or ADR expert? We can help You find the T: 416-598-2140 F: 416-598-5466 [email protected] COE ADR MANAGEMENT MEDIATOR AND ARBITRATOR Mediator vey Spiegel, Q.C. ony Baker CH HARTER RED ARB BITRATO OR & MEDIATO M OR Deborah Anschell LL.B., LL.M. 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The Supreme Court ruled 7-0 that lawyer David Potter was constructively dismissed as executive director of the New Brunswick Legal Aid Services Commission when the commission’s board indefinitely suspended him in 2010 with pay, but without telling him why, or that it was an administrative suspension. The board decided to suspend Potter when it concluded that negotiations it had initiated months earlier in the hopes of buying out his seven-year contract more than three years early were not going to pan out the way it wanted. At the same time as the board ordered the then-66-year-old lawyer not to come into the workplace “until further direction” and delegated his responsibilities to someone else, it advised the province’s Minister of Justice to revoke his appointment for cause (unbeknownst to Potter). Eight weeks later Potter sued for constructive dismissal, at which point the commission took the position that he had effectively resigned, and stopped his pay and benefits. Potter maintained he had not resigned. The New Brunswick courts held that his administrative suspension with pay did not amount to a constructive dismissal because the An administrative suspension must be explicitly authorized under the contract or be reasonable and justified if it is to fall short of amounting to constructive dismissal. Jennifer Fantini Borden Ladner Gervais commission had not done or said anything that would lead an objective observer, in Potter’s shoes and with the knowledge he had of the situation at the time, to conclude that his duties had been permanently removed. The trial judge declined to consider the letter to the Minister of Justice recommending Potter’s termination because Potter was not aware of it at the time he launched his suit. The Supreme Court reversed the lower courts, ordering the defendant to pay the damages assessed at trial — except without deducting from those damages the pension Potter began collecting after his pay was cut off. “In light of the indefinite duration of the suspension, of the fact that the Commission failed to act in good faith insofar as it withheld valid business reasons from Mr. Potter, and of the Commission’s concealed intention to have Mr. Potter terminated, I respectfully find that the trial judge erred in concluding that the suspension was authorized by the contract of employment,” Justice Wagner wrote. He went on to conclude that this breach of the contract “amounted to a substantial change to the essential terms of the contract that was imposed unilaterally by the employer.” Fantini told The Lawyers Weekly the decision “suggests that an administrative suspension cannot be found to be justified in the absence of a basic level of communication with the employee. It also draws upon modern developments in employment law in terms of the employer’s obligation to act in good faith in relation to contractual dealings, by being honest, reasonable, candid and forthright.” Potter’s Supreme Court counsel, Pete Mockler of Fredericton, N.B., agreed. “People are entitled to know, when they get up in the morning, whether or not their job is still there, and what their relationship with their employer truly is,” Mockler said. “This decision will send a signal to employers that they have got to be more forthright in dealing with their employees. And particularly if they’ve got a hidden agenda, they better bring it out, so it’s not hidden too much.” Ben Piper, of Ottawa’s Sack, Goldblatt, Mitchell, called Potter “a very pro-employee statement of constructive dismissal. It takes a pretty expansive view.” He added by e-mail, “the court set out a clear test, concluding that [The ruling is] a very pro-employee statement of constructive dismissal. It takes a pretty expansive view. Ben Piper Sack, Goldblatt, Mitchell in suspension cases, the employer will have the burden to justify the suspension, by showing (a) that the suspension was authorized; and (b) that a reasonable person would consider that the employer was acting in good faith to protect a legitimate business interest and that the employer’s act had a minimal impact on the employee. This is a relatively stringent test that favours clarity for employees.” Counsel for the commission could not be reached at press time. Justice Wagner said it was unnecessary to articulate “a rigid framework” for determining whether a particular administrative suspension is wrongful. The approach to be taken, and the factors to be considered, will depend on the nature and circumstances of the suspension. “The overriding question will be whether the suspension was reasonable and justified,” he wrote. Relevant factors include the duration of the suspension, whether it is with pay, and good faith on the employer’s part, including the demonstration of legitimate business reasons. “In my view, legitimate business reasons constitute a requirement for a finding that an administrative suspension based on an implied authority to suspend is not wrongful,” Justice Wagner wrote. “Other than in the context of a disciplinary suspension, an employer does not, as a matter of law, have an implied authority to suspend an employee without such reasons. Legitimate business reasons must always be shown, although the nature or the importance of those reasons will vary with the circumstances of the suspension.” He held this basic requirement was not met in Potter’s case. First, he was given no reasons for the suspension. “It seems to me that, in most circumstances, an administrative suspension cannot be found to be justified in the absence of a basic level of communication with the employee,” wrote Justice Wagner. Moreover, the board’s ostensible purpose of suspending Potter to facilitate a buyout of his contract was “undercut by the actions the board took to have Mr. Potter terminated.” Add to that the fact that he was replaced during his suspension, and that the suspension period was indefinite, Justice Wagner said he was left with no doubt that the suspension was not authorized by the employment contract. Set aside: Quebec Court of Appeal orders new murder trial Continued from page 5 and that “an expert witness cannot be bound by the exact same answers on a given subject time after time.” He also noted that the trial was well underway and that 14 witnesses had already been heard. In his appeal, Gakmakge argued that he should have been given sufficient time to hire an expert, at a minimum to assist him in crossexamining Prévost, and at best to prepare a contrary opinion. He also argued once again that he was denied a full and complete defence. The appeal court agreed. What was at stake here was much more than a mere issue of the jury assessing the credibility of Ms. Prévost’s previous testimony at the preliminary inquiry and comparing it to her different testimony at trial,” said the appeal court. “This is a significant change…As the appellant argues, it was fundamental for the defence to know what case it had to meet.” The appeal court also said that Gakmakge should have been given sufficient time to hire an expert, at a minimum to assist him in cross-examining the expert, and at best to prepare a contrary opinion. That option would have been available at a trial by judge alone, which can be adjourned for an extended period of time. But given the impossibility of adjourning the jury trial for the time that would have been required, the “appellant’s subsidiary conclusion” to have the trial judge order a mistrial should have been granted. The appeal court also castigated Prévost for changing her mind on another subject that “fitted nicely” with what she had told the jury about the sequence of events. During cross-examination at the preliminary inquiry, she testified that the source of the blood came from both the appellant and his wife. At trial, however, she testified that the only source of the stain was Medeiros, even though there was evidence of blood cells from Gakmakge. On top of that, Prévost discussed her new conclusions with a workplace colleague during a recess of the trial when she was in the midst of testifying. “That was extremely harmful to the defence, and the appeal court was right to order a new trial because the accused was deprived of a full and complete defence,” said Joëlle Roy, the former president of the Quebec Association of Defence Lawyers The ruling does not imply that an expert cannot change their opinion, said Véronique Robert, a Montreal criminal lawyer. An expert can make changes to their report but risks losing credibility. “The sciences are rarely exact,” said Robert. “An expert might learn new elements and bring about nuances to his conclusions, but if he changes his opinion he risks losing his credibility.” Ever since the notorious case of Guy Turcotte, the former cardiologist who in 2011 was found not criminally responsible for killing his two children by reason of mental illness, expert witnesses have been under intense scrutiny, noted Manocchio. “They are being watched and have to be very careful about what they say. This decision is a message to them.” MARCH 20 , 2015 • THE LAWYERS WEEKLY Focus TAX LAW MattZ90 / iStockphoto.com DEFINING DE FACTO You might not think you’re a director, but the CRA has other ideas Adrienne Woodyard L ouis XIV’s Finance Minister famously observed that “the art of taxation consists in so plucking the goose as to obtain the largest possible amount of feathers with the smallest possible amount of hissing.” The Canada Revenue Agency, which has stepped up its audit and collection efforts noticeably in recent years, doesn’t seem troubled by a bit of hissing. This is a worrying trend for distressed corporations, whose directors may be held personally liable for the corporation’s failure to remit various taxes, including GST/ HST and employee payroll deductions. While most sitting directors are aware of the potential liability, many don’t know that it may persist long after they resign. The majority of director tax assessments are challenged on the basis of either the due diligence defence or the “two-year” rule. The latter provides that former directors cannot be assessed more than two years after they have resigned. The application of the two-year rule arises frequently in situations where all of the directors have formally resigned and none has been replaced; in these situations the courts have often been asked to consider whether another person has acted as a “deemed” or de facto director. In Ontario, ss. 115(4) of the Business Corporations Act provides that in the absence of a director, any person who manages or supervises the management of the affairs of a corporation will be deemed a director. Despite certain exceptions (including for officers operating under the direction of a shareholder; for lawyers and accountants providing professional services; and for trustees, receivers and secured creditors), the CRA has often successfully relied on this rule to assess individuals who were never formally appointed as directors. The courts have also recognized that even after a resignation, an individual may continue to act as a de facto director by performing functions that are typically reserved for directors, such as giving instructions in the corporation’s name and making financial and administrative decisions on the corporation’s behalf. De facto directorship may also result where an individual holds herself out to third parties as a director. Of courser such occurrences are fairly common in small, owner-managed businesses, where there are seldom clear distinctions between the owner and the corporate entity. Bremner v. Canada [2009] F.C.J. No. 569 was such a case. In that instance, Bremner was both a de facto director and a deemed director under the OBCA after his wife resigned. When the business finally shut down, Bremner claimed he was no longer a director. The Minister issued an assessment against him exactly two years and one month later. The Tax Court of Canada observed that there is no fixed rule for determining when a de facto director ceases to be a director, but the person’s “course of conduct” in relation to the corporation must be examined. It found no evidence that Bremner had informed any third parties that he was no longer a director and that he continued to act on the corporation’s behalf in winding up the business; most damaging to his case was a letter he wrote to the CRA on the corporation’s behalf seven months after he claimed to have ceased to be a director. The Federal Court of Appeal upheld the Tax Court’s decision and confirmed that a de facto directorship must be held to endure “at least as long” as a person manages or supervises the management of the corporation’s affairs, “however minimal those actions may have been.” Liability, Page 12 11 12 • MARCH 20, 2015 THE LAWYERS WEEKLY Focus TAX LAW Bad news for testamentary, spousal trusts Major changes to the estate taxation rulebook are on the way MaryAnne Loney tarting next year, there will be S significant changes to the manner in which trusts created under a will are subject to income tax. As there are no grandfathering provisions, these changes will also affect current wills, trusts and estates. Two substantial changes to trust and estate taxation are: n The introduction of graduated rate estates (GREs); and n The shift of the tax burden for spousal/common-law partner trusts, joint spousal/common-law partner trusts, and alter-ego trusts (for this article, “spousal trusts”). Currently, any trust that arises as a consequence of death (testamentary trust) is taxed at graduated rates indefinitely. This has led to added potential tax savings with each testamentary trust, and has resulted in testamentary trusts being used extensively in estate planning. However, starting Jan. 1 next year, legislation introducing GREs comes into effect. A GRE is an estate that arises as a consequence of an individual’s death. Only qualified disability trusts, testamentary trusts where an elected beneficiary qualifies for the disability tax credit, and GREs will be taxed at graduated rates. All other trusts, including other testamentary trusts, will be taxed at the top marginal rate (currently 39 per cent in Alberta). Unlike testamentary trusts, there may only be one GRE per deceased, lasting for 36 months after the deceased’s death. adrian825 / iStockphoto.com Other benefits which are currently available to testamentary trusts, such as the ability to carry back losses and transfer donation receipts to a deceased’s previous tax years, will only be available to GREs. A GRE must designate itself as a GRE in order to take advantage of the benefits available. These changes will substantially limit the use of trusts in general, and testamentary trusts in particular, as a vehicle for reducing taxes. That is likely the government’s goal. However, the limitation of graduated rates to only GREs and qualified disability trusts means that some trusts which, from a tax equity perspective, legitimately should have access to graduated rates — for example, trusts left for dependent minor children by deceased parents — will also be taxed at the top rate. Parents drafting their wills will have to choose between These changes will substantially limit the use of trusts in general, and testamentary trusts in particular, as a vehicle for reducing taxes. That is likely the government’s goal. MaryAnne Loney McLennan Ross either keeping the income out of children’s hands or reducing the tax burden of their estate by paying the income to children taxed at lower marginal rates. Spousal trusts have a deemed disposition of their assets at the death of the surviving spouse. Currently, the trust bears the tax burden for the income of that deemed disposition. However, with the new legislation, starting this Jan. 1, in the year the surviving spouse dies, the deceased must include all the taxable income, including the income from the deemed disposition of the spousal trust, in the deceased’s final tax return. This occurs even if the deceased’s estate will never receive that income. As a result, while the trust may realize the income, the deceased’s estate will bear the tax burden associated with that income. This potential mismatch between the tax burden and the income will be especially problematic if the beneficiaries of the deceased’s estate and the remainder of the trust are not the same, as is often the case when the spousal trust was established for the spouse in a second marriage. It is far too easy to imagine two sets of beneficiaries, connected through the marriage of now deceased individuals, fighting over who is responsible for the potentially substantial tax burden of the spousal trust. The spousal trust will be jointly and severally liable for the additional tax payable by the deceased as a result of the inclusion of the spousal trust’s income. The government has also indicated that the Canada Revenue Agency will first look to the spousal trust for the owed taxes. However, the CRA may not be obligated to do so and this does not change the fact that the ultimate burden rests with the deceased. It also raises the possibility that, if the CRA does collect the taxes from the spousal trust, the spousal trust may have a civil claim against the deceased for those same taxes. The takeaway from these changes are: n Estate plans using testamentary trusts will not have the tax advantages they previously had, potentially leading to worse tax outcomes than those of a plan designed taking the new legislation into account. n For estate plans that include spousal trusts, it would be substantially preferable to avoid the potential tangle caused by this shift in the tax burden from the spousal trust to the deceased by drafting wills/trust deeds to take into account this new legislation. n Anyone with an estate plan which creates a testamentary or spousal trust should seriously consider having their estate plan reviewed. MaryAnne Loney is a lawyer with McLennan Ross in Edmonton. Her practice includes tax planning for estates and private corporations, and tax dispute resolution. Liability: Claims to be acting as a shareholder have been unsuccessful Continued from page 11 Directors may be surprised to know that the cessation of a corporation’s operations or the loss of its control (for example, in the course of a receivership) will not, in and of itself, terminate a directorship. Former directors have also been largely unsuccessful in maintaining that actions taken after their resignation were done in their capacity as shareholder/ manager and not as director. Even duties performed solely to comply with statutory obligations, such as hiring accountants to prepare financial statements and tax returns, may be construed as the acts of a de facto or deemed director. Most director liability cases arise in the wake of the collapse of a business, a heightened time of stress in which corporate record-keeping is less than scrupulous and events somewhat chaotic. Two recent cases demonstrate the anomalous results that can obtain in such circumstances. In Bekesinski v. Canada [2014] T.C.J. No. 162, a director claimed for the first time, after being assessed, that he had actually resigned four years before. The judge found that he had likely backdated his written resignation, but because this was not pleaded, the Crown was precluded from leading evidence to show that the document was not authentic, and the appeal was allowed. The case is under appeal. In Gariepy v. Canada [2014] T.C.J. No. 193, the directors were mere figureheads; their husbands managed and operated the company, which was formed after its predecessor col- lapsed, leaving significant unremitted taxes owing. The husbands instructed their lawyers to prepare letters of resignation for their wives after the expiry of the two-year director liability period for the predecessor. The draft resignations were unsigned, and, it appears, never even delivered to the wives, but the court nonetheless held that the resignations were legally effective, and allowed the appeal. However, the court criticized the CRA for neglecting to assess the husbands — one of whom was bankrupt — as de facto directors. The Crown has not appealed, and the CRA is now likely time-barred from assessing the husbands. As these cases show, when closely-held corporations are unable to meet their remittance obligations, the post-resignation conduct of former directors will be subject to close scrutiny by the CRA in the course of determining which geese to pluck, and when. Adrienne Woodyard is a tax litigator with Davis LLP in Toronto. MARCH 20 , 2015 • THE LAWYERS WEEKLY 13 Focus TAX LAW The difference between secrets and privacy Global crackdown on tax evasion shines light on offshore bank accounts If someone other than you knows about your secret accounts, you should have no current expectation that it will remain secret for long. Roy Berg y father used to say the M only true secret is the one “only you know, and that you keep to yourself.” His admonition was true then, true now, and prescient when applied to those who thought they could maintain secret financial accounts abroad. This year’s release of certain customers of HSBC who thought Swiss banking law would forever shield their identity should make this clear. Further, domestic whistleblower awards and coordinated international efforts demonstrate the worldwide resolve to combat the drain on public coffers brought about by tax evasion. The information was facilitated by the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists (ICIJ) and resulted from an employee’s leak of client information, account balances, and client correspondence stolen and then leaked to several governments and the ICIJ itself. According to the ICIJ’s website, the HSBC data includes: n 1,859 clients from Canada, 48 per cent of whom have a Canadian passport or nationality; n 3,176 bank accounts held with HSBC; and n US$3.9 billion in maximum account balances from 2006-2007. Before we break out the pitchforks and torches, however, it’s important to keep in mind that not all owners of offshore accounts are criminals. There may be perfectly justifiable reasons to maintain these accounts (residing in the jurisdiction, for example) and the accounts may be part of a legitimate and legal structure to minimize overall tax liability. In other words, the raw data itself does not tell the full story, and the ICIJ report acknowledges this. This is not the first substantial leak of similar information. In 2007, ‘09, ‘13, and last year there were similar leaks which were met with predictable private and public outcry. The first three of those leaks resulted in nearly 2,000 account holders being handed over to the Canada Revenue Agency. The 2014 leaks showed that numerous Canadian corporations, including Bombardier, had received secret, taxfavourable deals from Luxembourg, and at least one Canadian pension fund, Public Sector Investment Board, received a Roy Berg Moodys Gartner PixHouse / iStockphoto.com similar deal. True tax evaders have been exposed by these leaks, but so have public companies and public retirement plans. It’s not unusual for whistleblowers to receive compensation from tax authorities for delivering leaked information that results in the recovery of tax. In fact, the whistleblowers in 2007, 2009, 2013 and this year were reported to have received several million dollars from the affected countries. However, CBC reports that Canada did not contribute to the whistleblower awards for those years. In 2013, Canada enacted its own individual whistleblower statute, and the CRA has since published guidance on the administration of the new law. The U.S. has had an individual whistleblower statute for several years, and many recall the $104 million award paid to Bradley Birkenfeld for delivering information on tax evasion at Swiss bank UBS. The tax gap is typically defined as the difference between the amount of tax liability owed by taxpayers that is not paid on time. The U.S. estimates this figure to be $376 billion U.S. annually, based on an examination of data from 2006, the last year for which this information is available. Canada has declined to undertake its own calculation of the tax gap for various reasons, including the difficulty of the calculation itself and the utility of the resulting figure. Admittedly, even the U.S. estimate of its tax gap does not differentiate between legal tax avoidance, criminal tax evasion, and whether tax evasion is attributable to domestic or offshore structures. All developed countries have recognized that tax evasion and aggressive tax avoidance constitute a threat to their fiscal coffers. In an effort to close the tax gap, there have been numerous individual and co-operative efforts. The most recent examples include the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA), the OECD’s Common Reporting Standard (CRS), and the OECD’s Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS). Canada has shown its willingness to close the tax gap by participating in these efforts, as well as committing $30 million to finding tax evaders in the 2013 federal budget and introducing the electronic funds transfer initiative (EFTI). The new EFTI law, which came into effect Jan. 1, requires certain financial intermediaries, including banks, to report directly to the CRA any electronic fund transfers of $10,000 or more. There is a difference between private information and secret information. Privacy is the state of being unobserved and out of public view. Secrecy is the act of keeping things hidden. Admittedly, privacy spills into secrecy the more you contemplate the subject. However, at some point there is a difference: the Constitution protects privacy, but it does not protect secrecy. The dividing line between the two is best left to philosophers, academics, and numerous other experts — certainly not this author. However, I submit that bank secrecy falls mostly outside of the realm of privacy. If someone other than you knows about your secret accounts, you should have no current expectation that it will remain secret for long. From a tax perspective, if your “planning” has involved having your assets remain secret, it should be reconsidered. Roy Berg is director, U.S. tax law, and a barrister and solicitor at Moodys Gartner Tax Law. bombuscreative / iStockphoto.com Pocket call to boss ends in theft charges One of technology’s gifts to law enforcement is that not much is secret anymore. That was the case when two Key West, Fla., men were heard planning a robbery because one of them accidently “pocket-dialed” his boss, reports cbsnews.com. David Ricky Fanuelsen made the accidental call while he was talking to co-worker Dean Ellis Brown as they allegedly discussed stealing $8,000 (all figures U.S.) worth of saws from their employer, Concrete Solutions. The inadvertent speed-dial call, made to company owner Stacey Valenzuela, went to voicemail, thus leaving a perfectly incriminating description of the entire caper, including what was to be stolen and how the loot would be sold to a drug dealer. Valenzuela said he hadn’t realized the significance of the call until he went to the work site and noticed that three saws were missing. “Talk about bumbling idiots,” Valenzuela was quoted as saying. The two men each face a felony grand theft charge and are being held on a $10,000 bond. — STAFF 14 • MARCH 20, 2015 Focus THE LAWYERS WEEKLY LABOUR & EMPLOYMENT Last rights Target’s closure underlines employee options in a bankruptcy Alison McEwen B y now we have all heard about Target’s less than successful venture into the Canadian market. For some, the closing of Target stores in Canada, so soon after their trumpeted opening, also means the loss of their employment. Target has filed for creditor protection, and is planning on closing all 133 of its stores in Canada. It has announced the creation of a $70 million trust, allegedly to be used for severance for employees. Some employees will be receiving pay in lieu of notice, while others will be required to work part or all of the 16-week notice period. The question many employees have when faced with their employer’s bankruptcy is: what should they do if their employer has not set aside a trust to cover termination and severance pay? Or, in the case of Target employees, what if the trust turns out to be insufficient? It brings to light a larger question: what are the options for employees should their employer go under? Generally, when an employer goes bankrupt, employment contracts are considered to be terminated. However, this does not mean that the rights created by the employment relationship disappear. In fact, the Supreme Court of Canada found the opposite in Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd. (Re) [1998] S.C.J. No. 2. Bankruptcy does not extinguish the employer’s obligation to pay termination and severance pay under the applicable employment standards legislation. Therefore, claims for statutory severance and other similar employer debts flowing from the employment relationship give rise to unsecured claims. The first thing an employee must determine is whether the employer has filed for protection against bankruptcy, or if they have in fact filed for bankruptcy itself. Federal legislation, the Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act (CCAA), governs how a company deals with protection against bankruptcy, and how debts are paid out. If an employee is unionized, he or she should be in contact with the union, as the union will provide the necessary information. If the employee is not represented by a union, the employee should contact the employer directly to determine the status of the proceeding under the CCAA. Ask if a monitor has been appointed, and obtain the monitor’s contact information. ale The employee should also consider contacting the applicable Ministry of xsl / iS toc Labour, as the Ministry may be able to assist with the paperwork kph oto required by the monitor. Under the CCAA, the employer will often retain .co m control of its operations, and so the employee can continue to deal with the employer directly, as well as with the monitor. If the employer has gone bankrupt, the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (BIA), a different piece of federal legislation, dictates how monies owing are paid out to creditors. Under the BIA, an employee who is owed money becomes an unsecured creditor. Once again, if unionized, the employee should contact the union. If non-unionized, an employee should obtain the name of the trustee or receiver from the employer, and then contact them. The employee should also consider contacting the appropriate Ministry of Labour, which will help the employee determine what is owed and may assist with the paperwork. Employees may also want to check within their home jurisdiction to see if there are any other applicable statues (for example, in Severance, Page 15 MARCH 20 , 2015 • THE LAWYERS WEEKLY 15 Focus LABOUR & EMPLOYMENT With discrimination, you can lose even if you win Doug MacLeod Nicole Simes n employer is not explicitly A required to investigate a discrimination complaint under the Ontario Human Rights Code, and in 2013 the Ontario Divisional Court concluded there is no freestanding duty to investigate. However, adjudicators appointed under the code continue to state that employers who fail to adequately investigate complaints should pay employees damages, whether or not discrimination took place. Section 5 of the code provides that employees should not face harassment and discrimination on the basis of 16 protected grounds. As early as 2005, these protections in the code were interpreted by the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario to mean that employers in the province have an obligation to take a complaint of discrimination or harassment seriously, respond promptly, investigate and take action where appropriate (see B.L. v. Marineland of Canada Inc. [2005] O.H.R.T.D. No. 30). Since 2005, many tribunal decisions concluded that employers have a duty to investigate com- danielschweinert / iStockphoto.com plaints about discrimination. Failure to do so could result in liability, even if the behaviour was found not to be discriminatory. For example, in Nelson v. Lakehead University [2008] O.H.R.T.D. No. 39, a professor interviewed for a tenuretrack position. He did not obtain the position and complained to the Dean of the University that his age was a factor in that decision — contrary to the code. The Dean took minimal steps following the complaint. The tribunal determined that age was not a factor in the decision not to hire the professor. However, the tribunal held that the Dean did not take reasonable steps to investigate the complaint and the University was liable under sections 5 and 9 of the code. The duty to investigate and corresponding liability for failing to do so in all situations was rejected by the divisional court in Walton Enterprises (c.o.b. Midas Auto Ser- vices Experts) v. Lombardi [2013] O.J. No. 3306. In this case, an employee was terminated following a workplace fight. The employer did not investigate whether the fight was connected to workplace harassment. The court held that “liability for a discriminatory dismissal does not rest on a freestanding duty to investigate.” The Walton case has been followed by some tribunal adjudicators. In Scaduto v. Insurance Search Bureau [2014] O.H.R.T.D. No. 248, an employee complained following his termination that he had been harassed at work on the basis of sexual orientation and that the decision to terminate his employment was discriminatory. At the tribunal, he argued that the employer had failed to investigate these post-termination complaints. The tribunal determined that the harassment did not occur and that the termination was not discrimin- Severance: Employees are not secured creditors Continued from page 14 British Columbia, the Business Corporations Act may apply in some circumstances, though if there is a conflict the federal legislation will prevail). Another employee option is the federal Wage Earner Protection Program, which was developed to protect employees when employers are bankrupt or subject to receivership. In this program, employees are entitled to a payment up to $3,000 that is equal to four weeks of insurable Employment Insurance earnings, less amounts prescribed by regulations, to cover debts for unpaid wages, vacation pay, termination pay, and severance pay that the employee became entitled to in the last six months prior to bankruptcy or receivership. Initially, WEPP did not cover termination pay or severance pay. However, as of March 12, 2009, and retroactive to Jan. 27, 2009, it began to cover those entitlements. In addition, starting on Dec. 15, 2011, WEPP entitlement was expanded to cover employees who lose their jobs when the employer attempts to restructure under the CCAA, or when a Division I proposal under the BIA ends in bankruptcy or receivership. The trustee in bankruptcy or the courtappointed receiver should provide the employee with the necessary information, and the employee should file a proof of claim with the trustee as soon as possible, and then apply for the payment through Service Canada. Applications to WEPP must be submitted to Service Canada within 56 days of the date of bankruptcy or receivership. Further, an application for WEPP does not necessarily prevent an employee from filing a claim under the applicable employment standards legislation (for example, in Ontario, an employee can apply to WEPP, and also to the Ministry of Labour to enforce the Employment Standards Act, 2000. However, in Alberta, Employment Standards has no jurisdiction to act on behalf of an employee where an employer is in bankruptcy). Despite these protections, and the fact that the employee is entitled to termination and/or severance pay, it can prove difficult to collect the money. The claims of employees may receive preferential treatment over other non-secured creditors, but government and secured creditors still get to take their piece of the pie first. Depending on the employer’s financial situation, there may be few or no assets remaining to pay the outstanding severance obligations. Bankruptcies are never simple, and this can be particularly true for employees, who may not have all the facts. But employees should know that they do have rights when their employer goes bankrupt, and should consider which route will best protect those rights and is most likely to lead to a payout. Alison McEwen is a lawyer in the labour, employment and litigation groups at Nelligan O’Brien Payne, a full-service law firm in Ottawa. She can be reached at alison. [email protected]. atory. It then addressed the question of the duty to investigate. Following Walton, it held that “there is no contravention of the Code simply because there was a failure to investigate a complaint of discrimination where there is no finding of discrimination.” Other tribunal adjudicators, however, have ignored Walton and awarded damages for the failure to investigate a complaint of discrimination even where that discrimination did not exist. For example, in Sears v. Honda of Canada Mfg. [2014] O.H.R.T.D. No. 44, the tribunal held that “the Code imposes a duty on organizations to investigate a complaint of discrimination, and that a failure to investigate can attract liability, even if the Tribunal ultimately dismisses the underlying allegations of discrimination.” In view of the conflicting case law, employers need to know how to address discrimination complaints from the human resources and legal perspectives. Given the negative impact that discrimination can have on employee productivity, attendance, and morale, it makes sense for employers to investigate all discrimination complaints. Where there is smoke, there is sometimes fire, and fires are expensive to put out. If it is only smoke, then the cost to investigate can be minimal. In this regard, an investigation may involve nothing more than a brief conversation with the alleged discriminator. Currently, an employer has a legal obligation to maintain a discrimination-free workplace and a safe workplace under the code and the Occupational Health & Safety Act, respectively. The courts can revisit whether there is a derivative duty to investigate discrimination complaints (which the divisional court has rejected). Alternatively, if the Ontario government believes that this derivative right exists, it can amend the code accordingly. In the meantime, employers who do not investigate discrimination complaints do so at their peril. As mentioned above, some adjudicators under the code have ignored the Walton decision which means an employer may be ordered to pay damages under the code even if no discrimination is found to exist. Alternatively, if discrimination is found to have taken place, then the employer can be ordered to pay discrimination damages and damages for failing to investigate. Doug MacLeod and Nicole Simes of the MacLeod Law Firm represent employers and employees in all areas of employment law, including human rights complaints. We Practise At the CUTTING EDGE You are a corporate counsel, a lawyer who does not practice employment and labour law, or a member of a firm which has been conflicted out or does not have an office in Ontario. You have an important matter which requires representation you will be confident with. Kuretzky Vassos Henderson LLP is widely recognized as one of Canada’s leading employment and labour law boutiques. We practise at the cutting edge assisting a wide spectrum of clients ranging from major corporate employers through to individual plaintiffs. Our practice includes employment contracts, wrongful dismissal, collective bargaining, labour board applications, arbitrations, adjudications, employment standards, health & safety, human rights and ADR. To discuss what we can do for you or your client, call Kuretzky Vassos Henderson LLP at (416) 865-0504. KURETZKY VASSOS HENDERSON LLP Suite 1404, Yonge Richmond Centre, 151 Yonge Street, Toronto, Ontario, M5C 2W7 Telephone (416) 865-0504 Facsimile (416) 865-9567 www.kuretzkyvassos.com 16 • MARCH 20, 2015 THE LAWYERS WEEKLY Digest Aboriginal Law Communities and governance Duties of Crown - Fair dealing and reconciliation - Consultation and accommodation - Government funding and services - Government oversight Appeals and judicial review Appeal by the Crown from a judicial review decision issued in favour of the respondent First Nation. The issues under appeal related to the eligibility criteria for income assistance on First Nation reserves in Atlantic Canada. The respondents challenged a decision by the Minister of Aboriginal Affairs undertaken to ensure strict compliance with the provincial eligibility criteria in accordance with pre-existing obligations under agreements with the Treasury Board, particularly a 1990 Memorandum of Understanding (MOU). Previously, the respondents had utilized criteria reasonably comparable to the provincial criteria. The judge found that a change in policy from a reasonably comparable standard to one of strict adherence to provincial criteria would adversely affect First Nation applicants. Although the change in policy was consistent with a prior directive and the 1990 MOU, the judge found that the decision was unreasonable, as the Minister had failed to assess the impact of the decision on First Nation recipients of income assistance. The judge found that the respondents had not been accorded procedural fairness and that meaningful consultation had not occurred. The Crown appealed. HELD: Appeal allowed. The reviewing judge erred in concluding that respondents had to be consulted prior to the Minister deciding that the eligibility criteria for income assistance on First Nation reserves were to be identical to the applicable provincial criteria. The wording of the 1990 MOU was clear and unambiguous regarding the qualifying conditions Aboriginal Affairs was to apply for income assistance to First Nations. The use of reasonably comparable wording in national draft manuals was to ensure Aboriginals were treated the same way as non-Aboriginals in respect of the provision of income assistance, and gave no indication of departure from the direction given by the Treasury Board in the 1990 MOU. The manuals did not evidence a change of policy, and the Minister had no discretion with respect to the application of the prior directives and the MOU. No duty of consultation thus arose. To the extent that the Minister gave notice, time and training to the respondents to adapt their income assistance to the provincial eligibility criteria, the duty of procedural fairness was met. The judgment below was set aside and the respondents’ application for judicial review was dismissed. Elsipogtog First Nation v. Canada (Attorney General), [2015] F.C.J. No. 80, Federal Court of Appeal, Nadon, Trudel and Boivin JJ.A., January 23, 2015. Digest No. 3442-001 Administrative Law Judicial review and statutory appeal When available - Bars - Alternate remedy available Appeal by Prasad from an order striking his Notice of Application and dismissing it. The Employment Insurance Commission imposed an $8,000 administrative penalty on the appellant pursuant to s. 39(1) (a) of the Employment Insurance Act on the basis he made false and misleading representations by issuing fraudulent records of employment. Rather than pursuing his right to have the Commission reconsider the penalty, the appellant applied for a declaration that the decision was capricious, wrong in fact and law, was void for failure to provide adequate reasons, and resulted from officials engaging in an abuse of process and misfeasance in public office. The appellant also sought orders quashing the decision and prohibiting the Commission from collecting the penalty pending disposition of his application. The Commission moved to strike the application on the basis it was without merit and the appellant had failed to pursue remedies under the Act. The judge dismissed the appellant’s application. Prasad appealed. HELD: Appeal dismissed. Although it would have been preferable for the chambers judge to provide more fulsome reasons, the reasons given were sufficient to discern the basis for the decision. It was wellestablished that any statutory administrative process be exhausted prior to an applica- tion for judicial review. The appellant’s failure to follow the reconsideration and appeal procedures in the Act provided a complete justification for the judge’s decision. The appellant did not establish exceptional circumstances justifying early recourse to the courts. The record did not support the allegations of bias, misfeasance of public office, or abuse of process, which were allegations capable of being raised within the administrative process. No basis for appellate interference was established. Prasad v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Social Development), [2015] F.C.J. No. 81, Federal Court of Appeal, Ryer, Webb and Boivin JJ.A., January 27, 2015. Digest No. 3442-002 Alternative Dispute Resolution Binding arbitration Arbitrators and arbitration boards Jurisdiction - Practice and procedure Awards and remedial relief - Setting aside - Orders - Enforcement of orders Appeal by the Manitoba Teachers’ Society (MTS) from a ruling setting aside the ruling of a second arbitator and reinstating the decision of the first arbitrator charged with determining whether MTS was entitled to offset disability benefits payable to a member, Loewen, under its Disability Benefits Plan, against an award she received in a tort action for income loss. Loewen was a teacher who was injured in a 1992 motor vehicle accident. She received a monthly disability payment representing a percentage of her salary pursuant to the plan. In 1999, Loewen reached a global tort settlement for $425,000. MTS ceased paying disability payments to Loewen, taking the position it was entitled to either subrogation or an offset with respect to the settlement. The first arbitrator charged with determining whether MTS was entitled to stop making disability payments concluded that neither the common law doctrine of subrogation, nor the offset provisions in the plan were applicable. He found the offset provisions of the plan ambiguous and construed them against MTS, finding it had failed to discharge its onus to show the provisions applied. MTS continued to withhold disability payments from Loewen, therefore she applied, in 2009, for an order enforcing the first arbitrator’s award. The court would not enforce the award because it had not been finalized. The first arbitrator was no longer available, therefore a second arbitrator was appointed. The second arbitrator did not consider himself bound by the first arbitrator’s decision. He found the parties’ dispute had been wrongly decided and that there could be an offset. He quantified it at $135,000. Loewen successfully appealed from the second arbitrator’s decision, and the court reinstated the first arbitrator’s decision. HELD: Appeal dismissed. The second arbitrator’s decision was reviewable on the standard of reasonableness. It was unreasonable to find the first arbitrator’s decision was not a final one. The second arbitrator should have embarked on a consideration of the context of the first arbitrator’s decision, including the nature of the administrative scheme, the specific statutory and plan provisions at issue, the factual matrix in which the decision was made and the applicable legal principles. The parties clearly intended that the first arbitrator’s decision would be final on the issues he was asked to determine, specifically, whether the offset provisions or the doctrine of subrogation applied. The court’s refusal to enforce the first arbitrator’s award did not mean it was not a final decision on the issues it addressed. The court did not invite the parties to redo what the first arbitrator had already done. Loewen v. Manitoba Teachers’ Society, [2015] M.J. No. 21, Manitoba Court of Appeal, F.M. Steel, M.M. Monnin and C.J. Mainella JJ.A., January 30, 2015. Digest No. 3442-003 Civil Litigation Civil evidence Witnesses - Credibility - Opinion evidence - Expert evidence - Criteria for admissibility Appeal by the plaintiff from damages of $50,652 awarded to him for personal injuries suffered when he was struck by a motor vehicle driven by the respondent. The only issue at trial was the quantum of damages. The trial judge did not accept the appellant’s view of the gravity of the incident or the injuries he claimed and held that the appellant had failed to mitigate his damages. The appellant argued that the trial judge’s view of his evidence was heavily influenced by evidence in the form of consulting reports from two psychiatrists reporting to the appellant’s family physician that were improperly admitted as expert reports. The two contested documents were part of the clinical file of the family physician. The appellant also argued that the trial judge misapprehended aspects of his medical files and evidence concerning the appellant’s recollection of the accident, matters relevant to the assessment of his credibility. The appellant argued that the psychiatrists’ reports failed to set out the qualifications and educational experience of the doctors, the instructions provided to the doctors, and the nature of the opinions sought. Although the trial judge recognized that that the documents did not comply with the Rules, he held that there was sufficient compliance because the parties knew so well who the experts were. HELD: Appeal allowed. New trial ordered. The judge wrongly admitted the consulting reports as expert evidence. Neither of the impugned consulting reports contained a commitment to the standards of the Rules or evidenced the author’s awareness that the documents would be tendered as expert reports. It was plain that the two consulting reports were simply in response to the family physician’s referrals of the appellant in the course of treatment. As such, they did not meet the requirements of expert opinion in any respect. Referral by a family doctor to a physician with specialized knowledge did not equate to knowledge by the patient of the specific information required in the expert report. These documents were consequential in the judge’s reasoning. The trial judge overlooked and misapprehended evidence materially bearing on the credibility assessment as to the first reporting by the appellant of depression, vomiting and chest pain. In the area of these three symptoms and the appellant’s lack of independent recollection of the accident, the judge’s comments fatally undermined his finding of the appellant’s credibility and bore upon the reliability of the expert reports. It was not open to the judge, given the appellant’s evidence of the source of his version of the accident, to discount the appellant’s reports to doctors as MARCH 20 , 2015 • THE LAWYERS WEEKLY 17 Digest exaggeration because of his account of the accident unless the judge concluded the appellant was not so informed, a finding that the judge did not make and an issue he did not address. It was also not open to attribute to the appellant a “story” of the accident to which he professed no independent recollection. Healey v. Chung, [2015] B.C.J. No. 158, British Columbia Court of Appeal, M.E. Saunders, P.A. Kirkpatrick and D.M. Smith JJ.A., February 3, 2015. Digest No. 3442-004 Contracts Misrepresentation What constitutes - Negligent misrepresentation - Good faith Appeal by the defendant, the Province of British Columbia, from an order requiring it to pay damages to the plaintiff, Moulton Contracting. The plaintiff was a logging contractor who was unable to access its timber harvest areas due to a blockade erected by the respondents, the Fort Nelson First Nation, and members of the Behn family. After the plaintiff and the Province entered into the timber sale licences, Behn told a Province employee that he intended to stop the logging. The Province did not convey the threat to the plaintiff for two months, after logging had commenced. The blockade was erected shortly thereafter. The plaintiff was unable to complete its logging under the licences and litigation ensued. The trial judge found that the parties’ agreement did not guarantee the plaintiff access to the harvest areas, but nonetheless included an implied term that the Province was unaware of any dissatisfaction with its consultation with the First Nation. The Province was ordered to pay damages of $1.75 million to the plaintiff, representing the lost opportunity to enter into alternative logging contracts. Liability was based on a breach of the implied contractual term, and concurrent liability in negligent misrepresentation for breach of an implied continuing representation. The plaintiff ’s claims against the Behns and the First Nation were dismissed. The Province appealed. HELD: Appeal allowed. The law and evidence did not support the trial judge’s conclusion that it was an implied term of the timber sale licences that the Province was not aware of any First Nation expressing dissatisfaction with the consulta- tion undertaken by the Province, save as disclosed. Nor did the law or evidence support liability for negligent misrepresentation based on an implied continuing representation on the same terms, or upon a standalone legal duty of care in that respect. In addition, the exemption clause in the timber sale licences shielded the Province from liability in the circumstances. There was no ambiguity in the documents. The exemption clauses were inconsistent with contractual intent to imply a duty on the Province to inform the plaintiff of information relevant to its ability to exercise its rights under the licences. The trial judge’s order was set aside to the extent it affected the Province. The orders for costs payable by the Province were set aside, with the plaintiff rather than the Province required to pay the First Nation’s costs in accordance with the terms imposed by the trial judge. Moulton Contracting Ltd. v. British Columbia, [2015] B.C.J. No. 331, British Columbia Court of Appeal, R.E. Levine, E.C. Chiasson and S.D. Frankel JJ.A., February 26, 2015. Digest No. 3442-005 Criminal Law informations were not nullities and that the trial judge was obliged to allow the amendment of them by having them re-sworn. HELD: Appeal allowed. The informations falsely sworn by the informant were nullities and could thus not be amended. The trial judge found that the informant knowingly did not have reasonable and probable grounds to permit the informations to be validly sworn. Once this was demonstrated, the informations were no longer valid. There was no excuse for not having the informations validly sworn. It was just as serious as if the person administering the oath was not a justice of the peace. The intent of Parliament in mandating that to institute a criminal proceeding an informant must swear before a justice of the peace that he or she had personal knowledge or, at a minimum, reasonable grounds, that an offence had been committed, was not a mere technicality that could be cured by amending the information. The decision of the provincial court judge was reinstated. R. v. Awad, [2015] N.S.J. No. 34, Nova Scotia Court of Appeal, D.R. Beveridge, P. Bryson and J.E. Scanlan JJ.A., January 30, 2015. Digest No. 3442-006 Procedure Procedure Information or indictment Requirement for laying information Reasonable and probable grounds for belief - Validity Trial judge’s duties - Charge or directions - Defences - Evidence of witnesses Appeal by the accused from a decision of a summary conviction appeal court judge setting aside a decision of a provincial Court judge quashing the informations sworn against the appellants as being nullities. A police officer had routinely picked up informations prepared by other officers and had appeared before a Justice of the Peace swearing she had reasonable grounds to believe that the persons named had committed the charges enumerated in the various informations. The officer had, in fact, no knowledge whatsoever about the charges against the individuals named in the informations. The appellants were among the individuals named in such informations. The officer testified that she had followed this process hundreds of times from 2009 to June 2012. Although the informations appeared to be regular on their face, the trial judge found that the appellants had rebutted the presumption of regularity and concluded that the informations were nullities that should be quashed. On appeal by the Crown, the appeal court judge found that the Appeal by the accused, Campione, from convictions for two counts of first degree murder. The accused had a history of mental illness and delusional conduct. Her marital relationship was destructive. In 2006, the accused killed her two daughters, aged 19 months and three years, by drowning them in the family bathtub. She subsequently dressed the girls, surrounded them with stuffed animals and a doll, and wrapped rosary beads in their interlocking hands. The accused filmed a lengthy video in conjunction with her actions with vindictive comments directed toward her former husband. Thereafter, the accused unsuccessfully attempted suicide. At trial, the accused advanced a defence that she was not criminally responsible (NCR) for her conduct by reason of a mental disorder. The defence theory was that the accused’s psychotic delusions caused her to view the killings as an altruistic act to save the children from her estranged husband and his family. The Crown alleged the killings were acts of vengeance carried out in the midst of a bitter custody battle in which the accused risked losing the children due to her husband’s attempt to reveal the state of her mental health to the court. Expert evidence was adduced in support of each side’s position. The jury convicted the accused of first degree murder. The accused appealed on the basis the trial judge erred in instructing the jury. HELD: Appeal dismissed. The trial judge did not err in charging the jury on moral wrongfulness in the context of the accused’s NCR defence. A passage included from the recent Court of Appeal decision, Ross, did not cause confusion or mislead the jurors into believing the NCR test had an objective component. Instead, the Ross passage drew the jurors’ attention to the issue of capacity in a clear and succinct fashion, and summarized the standard against which the jury was to measure the accused’s conduct in the context of the defence. The jury was well aware that if they accepted the defence position that the killings were an altruistic act, driven by the accused’s psychotic delusions, they had to render a verdict of NCR. The opinion of the Crown expert did not mislead the jury with respect to the applicable law regarding the NCR defence. The trial judge clearly directed the jury that they were not to be influenced by others’ statements on the law. The trial judge did not unfairly single out the defence expert when cautioning the jury, as the whole of the charge would not leave the impression that the caution was solely confined to the evidence of the defence’s expert. R. v. Campione, [2015] O.J. No. 454, Ontario Court of Appeal, R.A. Blair, S.E. Pepall and P.D. Lauwers JJ.A., February 2, 2015. Digest No. 3442-007 plainant in the head using full force. The complainant suffered a broken jaw which required surgery and post-surgical treatment prior to a full recovery. The offender was convicted at trial. He had no prior record. The Crown sought a custodial sentence of 12 to 15 months. Defence counsel sought a 90-day intermittent sentence plus 12 to 15 months of probation with community service. The sentencing judge imposed a nine-month custodial sentence. The offender appealed on the basis the sentence was excessive and demonstrably unfit. He sought to admit fresh evidence of ill health based on heart issues caused by a motor vehicle accident. HELD: Appeal dismissed. The sentence judge erred in addressing the principle of restraint by linking it with the nature of the assault and by suggesting separation from society would assist the offender’s rehabilitation. Notwithstanding the mistaken references to the law of restraint and the rehabilitative value of incarceration, the sentencing judge imposed a sentence that was not clearly excessive or unreasonable in the circumstances. The fresh evidence would not affect the result, as the damage to the offender’s heart was mild to moderate and no indication was given as to how the sentence would unduly affect him. Sentence: Nine months’ imprisonment -- Criminal Code, s. 268. R. v. Keresztes, [2015] A.J. No. 109, Alberta Court of Appeal, R.L. Berger, P.A. Rowbotham and R.S. Brown JJ.A., February 3, 2015. Digest No. 3442-008 Education Law Schools Sentencing Criminal Code offences - Aggravated assault - Particular sanctions Imprisonment - Sentencing considerations - Rehabilitation - No previous record - Health - Procedure Appeals - Fresh evidence Appeal by the offender, Keresztes, from a sentence imposed for aggravated assault. A group of individuals left a nightclub at closing. The complainant mistook the offender for another individual he had interacted with earlier in the evening and struck him in the head from behind. The offender struck back in selfdefence. Following that initial blow, the offender and a group of men surrounded the complainant and assaulted him while he lay on the ground. Police approached the group and witnessed the offender kick the com- Pupils or students - Student rights Privacy - Searches - Constitutional issues - Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms Application by two high school students, Gillies and Gorski, for declaratory relief pursuant to the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Prior to the senior prom hosted by the applicants’ school, the principal announced that administration of a mandatory breathalyzer test would be a pre-condition of entry to the event. The principal deposed that the measure was a last resort to counteract a culture of alcohol consumption at the school’s dances and proms. The applicants were members of the student council executive. They met with the principal to voice their opposition to the policy. The principal maintained his position. 18 • MARCH 20, 2015 THE LAWYERS WEEKLY Digest The applicants applied for a declaration that the policy breached s. 8 of the Charter, and was contrary to School Board policies and procedures. The parties agreed that the application could not be adjudicated prior to the prom and that the event would occur without the mandatory testing. Instead, students were observed upon arrival and venue security conducted pat-down searches. No students were denied entry. The principal indicated that a mandatory breathalyzer would serve as a precondition to entry at future school dances and proms. At issue was whether the Charter applied to school authorities at off-site school events, and if so, whether a mandator y breathalyzer impermissibly breached students’ s. 8 Charter rights. prescribed by law, and was not rationally connected to the health, safety and discipline objectives of the principal and school authorities. The policy did not involve minimal impairment of students’ privacy interest and, in light of the social evidence regarding student drinking, was a disproportionate reaction by school personnel. Declaratory relief was granted accordingly. HELD: Application allowed. Although the matter was moot, the principal’s indication that the policy would be implemented in the future, and the importance of the issues raised, justified determination of the merits. The Charter applied to the Toronto District School Board and the actions of the principal. They derived their powers from statute, carried out a quintessentially government function, and acted in furtherance of specific government policies to which the Charter applied. An off-site prom was a school-sanctioned event at which the principal acted in his professional capacity. The implementation of the policy requiring a mandatory breathalyzer test as a condition to entry engaged s. 8 of the Charter. To the extent that voluntary consent to the test could be implied, it was not sufficiently informed to amount to a waiver of rights. Students enjoyed a reasonable expectation of privacy in their breath samples. Although such expectation was diminished in the context of a school prom, the absence of consent to the seizure justified protection of the privacy interest. The principal did not have reasonable grounds to believe a school rule was being violated to justify the use of a mandatory breathalyzer test in the manner proposed. The principal’s suspicion of pre-event drinking did not meet the requisite threshold under the Charter, or under School Board policy. Administration of a mandatory breathalyzer test at an off-site school event was a highly intrusive search disproportionate to the nature of the suspected violation of school rules. The proposed policy was unreasonable and breached s. 8 of the Charter. The breach could not be saved by s. 1 of the Charter, as the proposed policy was not Crown Gillies (Litigation guardian of) v. Toronto District School Board, [2015] O.J. No. 833, Ontario Superior Court of Justice, S.G. Himel J., February 23, 2015. Digest No. 3442-009 Government Law Contracts with Crown - Appeals and judicial review Application by the Crown for judicial review of a decision by the Canadian International Trade Tribunal allowing the complaint by the respondent, Tritech Group Ltd. Public Works issued a Request for Standing Offer (RFSO) for the supply of modular building units for the Department of Fisheries and Oceans. The terms of the RFSO required, among other things, fixed pricing for the building units throughout a standing offer duration period of one year, with two one-year options. The RFSO included a provision that allowed Public Works to extend the time for acceptance of offers. The respondent submitted a standing offer that specified the unit pricing, but also included a provision that materials pricing was valid for 90 days, after which it would be indexed to published aluminum indices. Public Works rejected the offer as non-compliant on the basis that the provision was an impermissible modification of the terms of the fixed pricing condition of the RFSO. The respondent filed a complaint with the Tribunal, alleging that the impugned provision applied to any acceptance period extension request rather than the fixed pricing condition. The Tribunal found that Public Works should not have rejected the respondent’s standing offer as non-compliant, as its interpretation of the impugned provision was unreasonable. The Crown sought judicial review. HELD: Application dismissed. The Tribunal’s decision was reviewable on a standard of reasonableness. The Tribunal’s decision was not based on imposition of a duty upon Public Works to clarify the impugned provision. Instead, the Tribunal’s decision was that Public Works was free to interpret bid language, but ran the risk of an incorrect or unreasonable interpretation in the absence of asking for clarification. The Tribunal’s interpretation of the impugned provision was not unreasonable. Its reasons provided a sufficiently transparent and intelligible justification for its interpretation. The Tribunal’s decision to uphold the respondent’s complaint was not unreasonable. Tritech Group Ltd. v. Canada (Public Works and Government Services), [2015] F.C.J. No. 114, Federal Court of Appeal, Dawson, Ryer and Webb JJ.A., February 4, 2015. Digest No. 3442-010 Immigration Law tionship existed between the respondents and their grandmother at the relevant times. The respondents maintained regular contact with their birth parents and continued to receive guidance and financial support. Similarly, the record before the officer allowed her to reasonably conclude that the respondents failed to demonstrate that the adoptions were not primarily for the purposes of obtaining Canadian citizenship. The officer duly considered the safety of both respondents in Jamaica. No evidence was ignored and no irrelevant factors were considered. The Federal Court decisions were set aside and the applications for judicial review were pronounced dismissed. Davis v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2015] F.C.J. No. 115, Federal Court of Appeal, Dawson, Stratas and Near JJ.A., February 6, 2015. Digest No. 3442-011 Naturalization or citizenship Right to citizenship - Children of Canadian Citizens - Application for grant of citizenship - Appeals and judicial review HELD: Appeals allowed. The Federal Court failed to properly apply the reasonableness standard. The citizenship officer interviewed the respondents and their grandmother. The resulting findings of fact were entitled to deference. Based on the available record, the officer could reasonably conclude that no genuine parent-child rela- Sanofi Pasteur Ltd. v. UPS SCS Inc., [2015] O.J. No. 577, Ontario Court of Appeal, A. Hoy A.C.J.O., J.M. Simmons and M.H. Tulloch JJ.A., February 9, 2015. Digest No. 3442-012 Legal Profession Barristers and solicitors Insurance Law Liability insurance Appeals by the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration from judicial review decisions setting aside refusals of citizenship for the respondents, Terika and Lancia Davis. The respondents were citizens of Jamaica. They arrived in Canada in 2008 to visit their grandmother for six weeks. They sought to remain in Canada permanently and their grandmother adopted them in April 2009. At the time of adoption, Terika was 17 years of age and Lancia was 19. In June 2009, the respondents applied for citizenship. In 2013, the applications were refused. The officer was not satisfied that a genuine parent and child relationship existed between the respondents and their grandmother, as their relationship with their birth parents remained unchanged. The officer was not satisfied that the adoptive relationship was not entered into primarily for the purpose of acquiring citizenship. The respondents each sought judicial review. The Federal Court found that the refusal decisions were unreasonable and set them aside. The Minister appealed to the Federal Court of Appeal. As no facts were at issue, summary judgment was available. The judge properly interpreted the parties’ contract in finding that Sanofi assumed all risk of damage to the medications, except for up to $100,000 caused solely by the negligence of UPS. It was commercially reasonable to imply Sanofi and UPS intended to extend the benefit of their insurance covenant to the third party manufacturers and installers. To hold otherwise would unfairly subject the third parties, mostly small companies, to significant liabilities for acts over which they had little or no control. Business and commercial insurance Appeal by Sanofi from the summary dismissal of its action against UPS and others arising from the total loss of medications stored at a UPS warehouse. Sanofi stored its products with UPS pursuant to a contract providing that they needed to be maintained at a certain temperature. The parties’ contract obliged Sanofi to maintain insurance coverage for the total value of its products, and limited UPS’s liability to a total of $100,000 per year for property damage due to its negligence. Over a weekend, the cooling equipment at the UPS warehouse malfunctioned, and alarms intended to alert UPS to temperature fluctuations failed to activate. All of Sanofi’s products were rendered unsaleable. UPS paid Sanofi the $100,000 it considered owing under the contract. Sanofi sued UPS and others, including the manufacturer of the cooling equipment and the installer of the alarm system, for the full value of the lost medications. The claim was summarily dismissed on UPS’s application. The judge concluded that the insurance covenant in the parties’ contract signified Sanofi’s assumption of risk of the very damage for which it sued, and was therefore a complete answer to Sanofi’s action. HELD: Appeal dismissed. A factual determination of the cause of the loss forming the basis of Sanofi’s action was not necessary to interpret the parties’ contract. Liability - Relationship with client Constitutional issues - Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms Appeal by the Attorney General of Canada from a judgment of the British Columbia Court of Appeal affirming a judgment concluding that some provisions of Canada’s anti-money laundering and antiterrorist financing legislation violated s. 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Charter). The Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Act (Act) and Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Regulations (Regulations) imposed duties on financial intermediaries, including lawyers and accountants, who were required to collect information in order to verify the identity of those on whose behalf they paid or received money, to keep records of the transactions, and to establish internal programs to ensure compliance. The legislation also subjected financial intermediaries, including lawyers, to searches and seizures of the material that they were required to collect, record and retain. The Federation of Law Societies of Canada argued that the scheme made lawyers unwilling state agents. The application judge held that the challenged provisions were contrary to s. 7 of the Charter. The Court of Appeal unanimously held that the obligations imposed on lawyers by the provisions breached s. 7 of the Charter and that they were not saved by s. 1. HELD: Appeal allowed in part. The search powers in sections 62, 63 and 63.1 of the Act authorized sweeping searches of law offices, and there was a significant risk that at least some privileged material would be found among the documents that were the sub- MARCH 20 , 2015 • THE LAWYERS WEEKLY 19 Digest ject of the search powers in the Act. Although s. 64 set up a procedure to protect against disclosure of privileged material in the course of a search, it required the lawyer to seal, identify and retain the document and to claim privilege in court. There was no requirement for notice to the client, who was the holder of the privilege. These defects constituted a very significant limitation of the right to be free of unreasonable searches and seizures guaranteed by s. 8 of the Charter. The justification failed the minimal impairment test. There were other less drastic means of pursuing the same identified objectives. Moreover, the provisions infringed s. 7 of the Charter. The lawyer’s duty of commitment to the client’s cause was a principle of fundamental justice, as it constituted a legal principle, there was significant societal consensus that it was fundamental to the way in which the legal system ought to fairly operate and it was sufficiently precise so as to yield a manageable standard against which to measure deprivations of life, liberty or security of the person. As such, the state could not impose duties on lawyers that undermined their duty of commitment to their clients’ causes. Under the Act and the Regulations, lawyers were required to gather and retain considerably more information than the profession thought was needed for ethical and effective client representation and they were liable to imprisonment if they did not comply with these requirements. This, coupled with the inadequate protection of solicitorclient privilege, undermined the lawyers’ ability to comply with their duty of commitment to the client’s cause. The provisions, taken as a whole, limited the liberty of lawyers in a manner that was not in accordance with the principle of fundamental justice. The Attorney General failed to demonstrate that these limitations of Charter rights were demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society, and they were therefore not saved by s. 1 of the Charter. Section 64 of the Act was of no force or effect and ss. 62, 63 and 63.1 were read down so that they did not apply to documents in the possession of legal counsel or in law office premises. Sections 33.3, 33.4, 33.5, and 59.4 of Regulations were of no force and effect, and s. 11.1 of the Regulations was read down so that it did not apply to documents in the possession of legal counsel or in law office premises. Canada (Attorney General) v. Federation of Law Societies of Canada, [2015] S.C.J. No. 7, Supreme Court of Canada, McLachlin C.J. and LeBel, Abella, Cromwell, Moldaver, Karakatsanis and Wagner JJ., February 13, 2015. Digest No. 3442-013 Real Property Law Registration of documents Land Registry system - Registry Acts Registration of deeds - Instruments that may be registered - Court orders and judgments - Effect of registration Appeal by MacIsaac from an order directing the registration of two judgments against a property. MacIsaac was a lawyer who represented the vendors and purchasers in the sale of the property. He did not check the judgment roll prior to conveying the property to the purchasers, and therefore was unaware of two judgments against the vendors recorded against the property. The vendors subsequently disappeared with the purchasers’ money, having failed to make good on the two judgments against them, which remained on the judgment roll. The court held that the purchasers obtained their interest in the property subject to the judgments recorded against the vendors prior to closing, but after the agreement of purchase and sale was executed. It ordered that the parcel register be amended to add the two judgments. HELD: Appeal dismissed. The signing of the agreement of purchase and sale by the vendors did not relieve them of their interest in the property such that the judgments could not subsequently attach to the property. MacIsaac failed in his duty to conduct a proper search of the judgment roll and to bring the judgments into the parcel register. The court was correct to direct the amendment of the parcel register to include the two judgments. Royal Bank of Canada v. Marmura, [2015] N.S.J. No. 44, Nova Scotia Court of Appeal, P. Bryson, M.J. Hamilton and J.E. Scanlan JJ.A., February 5, 2015. Digest No. 3442-014 Tort Law tionship. The plaintiff was arrested and charged with harassing the defendant, unlawfully loitering near the defendant’s residence, and mischief. Despite being released on terms that he could not contact the defendant, the plaintiff contacted her on several occasions, leading to further arrests and charges. The plaintiff was found guilty of six counts of breach of recognizance by contact with the defendant. He was acquitted of the other charges. The plaintiff claimed the defendant’s false statements to the police led to his arrest and charges. He sought damages for loss of reputation, loss of career opportunities, legal costs incurred in defence of the criminal action and general damages. The judge granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment to dismiss the claim. The motion judge found that it was plain and obvious the plaintiff had no reasonable cause of action. The judge found that while the defendant’s report initiated the police investigation which resulted in criminal proceedings, and the plaintiff was successful at the criminal proceeding, the defendant did not act maliciously. He concluded that the defendant had reasonable and probable grounds to fear the plaintiff and to suspect that he was responsible for breaking the basement window because at the relevant time he was obsessed, fanatic and irrational. HELD: Appeal dismissed. The plaintiff had not demonstrated any palpable or overriding error. The judge’s conclusion that the plaintiff had reasonable and probable cause to suggest to police that the plaintiff was a possible suspect was justified. Although the judge applied the old test, which asked whether there was a genuine issue for trial, whereas Rule 7.3 permitted summary judgment where there was “no merit to the claim,” under either test, the plaintiff could not succeed. It followed that if there was no genuine issue for trial, the claim had no merit. Abuse of legal procedure or process Transportation Law PROCEEDINGS Constitutional issues - Federal v. provincial jurisdiction - Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms Application by four motorists challenging the constitutionality of Alberta’s administrative licence suspension regime. The amendments at issue provided for the immediate suspension of a driver’s licence upon being charged with an alcohol-related driving offence. Prior to the amendments, the legislation provided for a 24-hour suspension with a 21-day grace period before a longer suspension took effect. Under the amended s. 88.1 of the Act, a suspension was no longer for a stipulated duration, as the suspension ended at the earlier point of resolution of the charge or a successful appeal by the driver from the suspension. Under the amended s. 39.2 of the Act, the appeal process remained fundamentally the same as under the old Act and outlined the relevant evidentiary record on appeal. The amendments provided for suspensions of between three and 30 days for driving with a blood-alcohol concentration of between 50 and 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood. Finally, the amended s. 172.1(1) of the Act compelled seizure of the vehicle for three or seven days, whereas seizure was optional and for a shorter period under the previous provisions. The applicants submitted that the amendments were criminal law in substance, and therefore ultra vires the jurisdiction of Alberta. In the alternative, the applicants submitted that the impugned provisions were inconsistent with ss. 7, 8 and 11(d) of the Charter. HELD: Application dismissed. The Province of Alberta had jurisdiction to enact the impugned amendments pursuant to its authority to enact laws in relation to local works, property and civil rights, and matters of a local nature. The purpose and effect of s. 88.1 of the Traffic Safety Act was to reduce the risk posed by drinking and driving. The provincial highway traffic safety dimensions of the law were pronouncedly more important than the federal criminal law dimension and did not conflict with the Criminal Code. None of the challenged provisions were inconsistent with the Charter. An alcohol-related administrative licence suspension did not deprive any person of the right to life, liberty and the security of the person. There was no constitutional right to drive or hold a driver’s licence. No liberty aspect of s. 7 was engaged, as the duration of the suspension did not deprive a licensee of his or her free will when deciding whether to plead guilty or not guilty to the charges that triggered the suspension. To the extent a s. 7 right was engaged, the Province’s response to the substantial harm posed by drinking and driving complied with the substantive and procedural elements of the principles of fundamental justice. The amendments did not occasion a breach of s. 8 of the Charter, as the authority for a breath sample demand came from s. 254 of the Criminal Code rather than the Traffic Safety Act. The presumption of innocence was not engaged, as a suspension pursuant to s. 88.1 did not give rise to charges or an offence. To the extent that drinking and driving charges resulted, they were pursuant to the Criminal Code and an individual charged thereunder was entitled to the constitutional protection of s. 11(d) of the Charter. Sahaluk v. Alberta (Transportation Safety Board), [2015] A.J. No. 231, Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench, T.W. Wakeling J., February 27, 2015. Digest No. 3443-016 Classifieds Malicious prosecution - Establishing elements - Malice - Relation to want of reasonable and probable cause Appeal by the plaintiff from the summary dismissal of his claim of malicious prosecution against his former girlfriend. The parties were in a tumultuous relationship for five years. In 2010, after the defendant’s home alarm was activated and a basement window was broken, she called the police and identified the plaintiff as a possible suspect. The plaintiff had made several telephone calls and text messages to the defendant following the ending of their rela- Stout v. Track, [2015] A.J. No. 127, Alberta Court of Appeal, P.A. Rowbotham, T.W. Wakeling JJ.A. and D.A. Sulyma J. (ad hoc), February 5, 2015. Digest No. 3442-015 INVESTIGATIONS POSITIONS WANTED MISSING HEIRS Cogan & Associates Inc. International probate research, locators of missing heirs. Toll Free: 1-888-779-2208. www.heirtrace.com SEEKING OPPORTUNITIES IN CORPORATE/ COMMERCIAL LAW 3rd year call with buoyant immigration practice seeking to join a corporate/commercial law firm/section as a junior associate. Open to various financial arrangements. Please contact [email protected] or 416-825-0650. · · Hiring? Office Space? Services? Book Your Ad Today · To advertise, please contact: Jacqueline D’Souza 905-415-5801 1-800-668-6481 ext. 801 [email protected] 20 • MARCH 20, 2015 THE LAWYERS WEEKLY Business & Careers ‘Earn it before you spend it’ Instead of a splashy office, keep it simple and professional when starting out M any lawyers in recent years have decided to take on the challenge of launching their own practice. They might be new graduates entering the profession who are unable to find jobs or veteran lawyers who just want to go it on their own. While the experience can be liberating, allowing lawyers to create their own brand, it can also be very expensive, as there are computers and furniture to buy, an office to rent, software to acquire, a website to build and marketing to be done. Paul Busch, who operates a boutique accounting practice in Mississauga, Ont., that serves small to medium-sized businesses, including law firms, says there’s a whole laundry list of expenses that lawyers face when starting their own practice. In addition to the anticipated expenses, he says, other start-up items that must be covered include a telephone system, business cards and letterhead, law society dues, insurance, perhaps the cost of incorporating the firm, hiring a receptionist to answer calls, as well as money for an accountant to set up the firm’s books, an account with the Canada Revenue Agency, and a system of collecting the HST. When starting a practice, he says, the first thing a lawyer should do is put together a business cash-flow projection for 24 months, as it will help them stay on track. “You’re putting a benchmark out in front of yourself and saying, ‘That’s the hurdle I’ve got to jump so I’d better get my butt in gear.’ It tells you if you’re falling short.” Busch suggests lawyers have enough cash reserves on hand, or at least a number of clients in the pipeline, so they have some type of fee generation at start-up. He looked at a couple of small law firms that he does accounting work for and found that it costs them about $40,000 a year in office costs and $80,000 to $90,000 per year in overhead expenses for each lawyer. That does not include salaries. If a lawyer is strapped for cash, Busch recommends renting office space from an existing firm, saving the practitioner money on library costs and paying a receptionist. He also suggests lawyers think long and hard before purchasing expensive office furniture. “I was in practice five years before I went out and spent $20,000 on really nice oak furniture. I’m a believer in, ‘Earn it before you spend it.’ I tell my clients all the time when they’re starting up, ‘You’re not IBM, so let’s wait a while before you go spending all this money.’” Janice Wright, of Wright Temelini in Toronto, says many of the issues around costs, budgets and marketing will be determined by the type of firm a lawyer is starting. “In many respects, that’s the most important thing to get right and then a lot of the other questions and therefore answers will follow on from that.” Wright is familiar with the financial challenges of starting a practice. She launched Wright Temelini, a litigation boutique, with her partner Greg Temelini just over a year ago. She says setting up the practice was a great learning experience for the two and what they learned is to set priorities, have a plan, and be cautious when spending. “You know the old saying, ‘Plan for the worst and hope for the best.’ That’s what we did.” When Wright and her partner started out, they set up a budget — and stuck to it. They set aside more money for technology because the firm handles complex legal issues like securities and corporate commercial litigation, international trade law and cross-border litigation, so it was critical to have the latest tech tools to keep files organized. “We considered that critical, so our budget in that area was probably quite a bit higher than other small firms but it was absolutely critical for us.” The partners didn’t go over the top on furnishings because they wanted the office to be comfortable for clients but not too extravagant. “We took the time to furnish it in a way we think is professional but we didn’t go out of our way to have it extremely elaborate because neither of us, quite frankly, had a sense that that’s what we want.” Says Temelini: “It really depends on who you’re trying to attract. For us, having marble flooring wasn’t high on our priority list.” Peter Aprile, taxation and litigation lawyer and principal of Counter Tax Lawyers in Toronto, says financial costs can add up when a lawyer decides to hang out their shingle, so it’s wise for them to be cautious. “I always have and would encourage people to be very willing to take risks but be conservative in Cash, Page 21 Vectoraart / iSto ckphoto.com Grant Cameron MARCH 20 , 2015 • THE LAWYERS WEEKLY 21 Business & Careers Cash: Keep eye on finances Continued from page 20 terms of costs and things of that nature. Having a cash reserve, as well as a good relationship with the bank, and a healthy line of credit are other things that I would recommend for a lawyer starting their own practice.” Aprile believes a healthy financial foundation is essential to launching a successful practice because that allows a lawyer to focus on bringing in new business and clients instead of worrying about finances. “Starting a practice is hard enough and I wouldn’t want to be in a position where I’m worried about making rent right off the bat.” At the end of the day, he says, reputation is the most valuable asset a lawyer has and it’s a recipe for disaster if decisions are made based on finances as opposed to servicing clients. When starting out, says Aprile, lawyers should consider whether a purchase they make will have benefits down the road. “People tend to focus on things like fancy office furniture, but that is where people would be wise not to take on those expenses, at least not in the short term. I think you need to be projecting the right image, but I don’t think it needs to be over the top.” Aprile has carried that frugal philosophy to his daily dealings with clients. Instead of going for lunch or a round of golf, he prefers to visit clients at their offices or partake in “modest” activities and develop a deeper understanding of their needs. “Making personal connections with people and having a cup of coffee with them and taking the time to go and meet with them at their offices is just as valuable.” BENCHER ELECTIONS BENCHER ELECTIONS Re-Elect Barbara Murchie A bencher committed to: ¾ A competent, honourable, diverse profession with higher entry standards ¾ Proportional, fair and effective regulation ¾ Increased access to justice through support for soles and smalls and increased legal aid ¾ Support for local libraries A bencher with a track-record for: ¾ Taking her duties as a bencher and LawPro director seriously ¾ Sitting as an adjudicator on panels hearing discipline matters ¾ Supporting the advancement of women and working on competence initiatives Re-Elect Barbara Murchie For Sensible and Effective Regulation For more, go to: electmurchie.wordpress.com RELEVANT INVOLVED FRESH THINKING PERSPECTIVE COMMITMENT RELEVANT INVOLVED FRESH THINKING PERSPECTIVE COMMITMENT RELEVANT INVOLVE RELEVANT INVOLVED FRESH THINKING PERSPECTIVE COMMITMENT RELEVANT INVOLVED FRESH THINKING P RELEVANT INVOLVED FRESH THINKING PERSPECTIVE COMMITMENT RELEVANT IN RELEVANT INVOLVED FRESH THINKING PERSPECTIVE COMMITMENT RELEVANT INVOLVED FRESH THINKING PERSPECTIVE COMMITMENT RELEVANT INVOLVED FRESH THINKING PERSPECTIVE COMMITMENT RELEVANT INVOLVED FRESH THINKING PERSPECTIVE COMMITME Be Inspired by OBA Members Running for Bencher Outside Toronto Ray Mikkola Joseph Groia Raj Sharda Barbara Hendrickson Fred James Whelan Bickford Daniel Strigberger William C. McDowell R. P. (Bob) Tchegus Malcolm Mercer Jack Braithwaite Jerry B. Udell Janet E. Minor Toronto Barbara Murchie Paul M. Cooper Paul DioGuardi Lee Akazaki, C.S. Doug Downey Raj Anand, LSM Ross F. Earnshaw Steven Benmor Robert F. Evans Christopher Bredt Vincenzo (Enzo) Rondinelli Kimberly D. Graber John Callaghan Jeffrey B. Rosekat Ben V. Hanuka Henry J. Chang Paul Schabas Carol Hartman Morris Chochla David Smagata Jacqueline A. Horvat Peter Downard Bob Tarantino David Howell Rebecca Catherine Durcan Sidney Troister Tanya L. Carlton the WILL to carry on. Will McDowell for Bencher To find out where Will stands, visit willmcdowell.ca Colin Lachance Rene Larson Michael M. Lerner M. Virginia MacLean Susan T. McGrath Julian Falconer Rocco Galati Avvy Yao-Yao Go Howard Goldblatt Visit oba.org/2015Candidates and learn more about OBA Bencher candidates. Sandra Nishikawa Gina Papageorgiou Dan Revington Tanya C. Walker Peter Wardle John B. West Heather Zordel 22 • MARCH 20, 2015 THE LAWYERS WEEKLY Business & Careers Does Canada need a corporate tax? Vern Krishna Tax Views T he subject of corporate taxation has troubled tax policy gurus for more than half a century in Canada. The Carter Commission recognized the problems associated with taxing corporations as far back as 1966, when it said: “Equity and neutrality would best be achieved under a tax system in which there were no taxes on organizations as such, and all individuals and families holding interests in organizations were taxed on the accrued net gains from such interests on the same basis as all other net gains.” Since corporations cannot deduct dividends paid to their shareholders, corporate income is potentially subject to economic “double taxation,” first at the corporate level and then again in the individual shareholder’s hands. Ultimately, only individuals pay tax. Artificial entities do not really “pay” tax — they are merely legal conduits for individuals who bear the real economic burden of taxation. Thus, the first question we must answer is whether we should have a separate corporate tax at all. What if we adopted Carter’s notion that simply attributed income on an annual basis to the corporation’s individual shareholders, regardless of whether the corporation actually paid out its income as dividends? Under this scheme, the corporation would merely be a conduit for its shareholders in much the same way as a partnership is for its partners, or a trust is for its beneficiaries. By adjusting the tax rate on dividends, we could raise the same amount of revenues as we do under the dual regime of corporate and shareholder taxation. Although appealing in theory, the concept of notionally flowing through corporate income to individual shareholders creates practical problems. Notional flow-through of corporate income that would be taxed in the hands of individuals could create liquidity problems for some taxpayers if the corporation did not actually pay out cash dividends. Shareholders might be compelled to sell portions of their shareholdings to raise the necessary funds to pay their tax liabilities. This could have a significant effect on private corporations. There would also be difficulties with corporate control if individual shareholders had to sell a portion of their private corporation shareholdings in order to raise cash for their tax bills. Corporate control could change from the liquidation of shares, and familyowned businesses in particular would be vulnerable. Private corporations might encounter difficulties in finding a suitable market for their shares, which would need to be valued annually if they were to be sold. Also, non-residents would escape the income tax under Part I of the Income Tax Act and pay only the substantially lower withholding tax (generally five to 15 per cent) on dividends under Part XIII as modified by Canada’s bilateral tax treaties. The Carter Commission recognized these difficulties: “Although we can see no grounds in principle for taxing corporations and other organizations, we have reluctantly reached the conclusion that there are good and sufficient reasons for continuing to collect a tax from them. The main reason is the practical difficulty of taxing accrued share gains as required under the ideal approach we have just described. Another reason is the loss in economic benefit to Canada that would result if non-residents holding shares in Canadian corporations were not taxed by Canada on their share of corporate income at approximately the rates that now prevail.” The rationale for the structure of our cor- If we are to have a separate corporate tax, what is the ideal tax rate? Vern Krishna TaxChambers LLP porate tax model becomes clearer if we accept the proposition that corporate income should not flow through and be taxed annually in the hands of individual shareholders. In the absence of a flow-through of income to shareholders, corporate income must bear its own tax annually if we are to prevent tax deferral. If corporate income is not taxed at its full rate, there would be incentive to accumulate income in the corporation in order to defer any tax that would otherwise be payable if it were paid out to shareholders. Thus, the prevention of tax deferral is an important reason for levying an annual tax on corporate income. As it is, however, within specified limits, we do allow Canadian-controlled private corporations to defer taxes on their active business income by taxing them at a corporate rate that is lower than top marginal rates applicable to individuals. If we are to have a separate corporate tax, what is the ideal tax rate? The problem now assumes additional dimensions. The corporate tax rate determines the extent to which one can defer tax by using the corporate form to conduct business. A corporate tax rate lower than individual rates invites deferral. Assume, for example, that the corporate tax rate is 25 per cent and that the top marginal rate for individuals is 50 per cent. If an individual can shift $200,000 income into his or her corporation and invest the tax savings ($50,000) at eight per cent per year, the tax saved will be worth $233,000 ANNOUNCEMENT in 20 years. Thus, each dollar of tax savings accumulates to 4.7 times its value in 20 years. If the taxpayer could do this annually for 20 years, the tax savings for each year would accumulate to $2.521 million. If the individual sold his or her shares in the 20th year, the value of the tax savings would transform into a taxable capital gain of $1.2605 million. If the capital gains tax rate is 23 per cent, the taxpayer, in addition to the tax deferral advantage, saves 27 per cent of $2.521 million, or $680,670. Thus, the taxpayer benefits both from tax deferral and from shifting his or her income to the corporation. To be sure, we could eliminate tax deferral by making the corporate tax rate equal to the highest marginal rate for individuals. If we did this, the tax system would be substantially neutral at the top end, and businesses could make their decisions on the basis of non-tax criteria. There would be no taxdeferral advantage to earning income through a corporation. A corporate rate equal to the top individual tax rate (approximately 50 per cent) would also remove business and economic incentives from those who presently obtain special low rates of taxation — for example, small businesses. Thus, any gain in tax neutrality between different types of taxpayers would carry with it the cost of lost tax incentives for certain sectors of the economy. This would have significant economic and political implications. Several factors determine the corporate tax rate, but the desirability of having competitive international tax rates is increasingly important in an era of capital mobility. Canadian corporations must compete internationally, and the tax rates of our principal trading partners have a significant influence on the structure and location of Canadian corporations. Prof. Vern Krishna, CM, QC, of the University of Ottawa Law School and Of Counsel, TaxChambers LLP (Toronto). Vern.Krishna@ TaxChambers.ca. www.vernkrishna.com CAREERS WILLS, ESTATES AND TRUST LAWYER Kronis, Rotsztain, Margles, Cappel LLP (Maternity Leave Contract) Barristers and Solicitors Kronis, Rotsztain, Margles, Cappel LLP (KRMC) is a mid-sized Toronto law rm offering services to businesses and individuals across a broad range of practice areas. KRMC is currently seeking a Wills, Estates and Trust lawyer to cover a maternity leave for a six month period, with the possibility of an extension. This position is expected to commence mid-April, 2015. The successful candidate will have a minimum of 5-10 years of experience preparing both simple and complex wills and establishing and implementing trusts. He or she will be comfortable meeting with clients and have related interpersonal skills. This role is well-suited to someone with outside obligations as late hours and weekend work are not requirements of the position. This is an excellent opportunity for an individual seeking to gain experience practicing with a collaborative, growth-oriented rm that is supportive of work-life balance and has a collegial and exible work environment. This position will be held at our main ofce at Yonge and Sheppard, which has convenient access to the Sheppard subway station. If you are interested in learning more about this opportunity, please forward your cover letter and resume, in condence, to [email protected]. For more information about our rm, please visit our website at www.krmc-law.com. KRMC is an equal opportunity employer and encourages individuals from diverse backgrounds to apply. MARCH 20 , 2015 • THE LAWYERS WEEKLY 23 News Sherrin: Repetition does not bolster credibility Continued from page 3 noon. She left to prepare dinner for her teenage daughter, Angel Laplante, who lived with her, but returned to Mackenzie’s apartment at about 10 or 11 that evening, and eventually fell asleep on his makeshift cot. When she woke up and told him she wanted to go home, she testified, an argument ensued and Mackenzie “went ballistic,” punching her in the head, choking her, and preventing her from leaving. She said she eventually escaped and returned to her apartment, naked and without her belongings. According to police testimony, when they arrived at the apartment in response to a 911 call from her older daughter, Ethier was initially reluctant to speak to them because Mackenzie had made death threats, telling them instead she had fallen and hit a doorknob. However, she later gave them a statement. Mackenzie argued on appeal that the convictions were flawed because the trial judge relied on inadmissible evidence from one of the police officers to confirm that the complainant’s testimony met the Crown’s standard of proof. Counsel for the appellant also claimed that the judge relied too much on the testimony of various witnesses about what the complainant said to them about the cause of her injuries shortly after her return home from the The trial judge gave too much credence to the police officer’s opinion. It’s a good reminder to just get the facts. Lee Stuesser Lakehead University law appellant’s apartment. In his written decision in R. v. Mackenzie [2011] O.J. No. 5216, Justice Lalonde specifically stated that the evidence of lead investigator Joshua Pulfer “is to be given a lot of weight.” Pulfer told the court that Ethier’s demeanour when he saw her within an hour of her return home was “consistent with someone who was physically assaulted, confined and threatened with death.” He added that marks on Ethier’s thighs could not have been made by her, that the marks on her neck were consistent with someone who had been choked, and that he was certain fear had caused her initial lack of co-operation with the police. The Appeal Court concluded the trial judge was correct in trying to confirm the complainant’s testimony, and said much of Pulfer’s evidence was admissible as narrative. But the police officer was not a medical or forensic evidence expert, it added, and was not qualified to draw conclusions about Ethier’s demeanour or the marks on her neck or thighs. The decision also notes that his testimony went beyond the “compendious statement of facts” exception for lay evidence. “The trial judge gave too much credence to the police officer’s opinion,” said Stuesser. “It’s a good reminder to just get the facts.” Stuesser said the decision has some parallels with R. v. Graat [1982] S.C.J. No. 102, the Supreme Court’s leading decision on lay opinion which The basic theory is that saying the same thing on multiple occasions does not make the statement any more credible. The trial judge is not allowed to rely on consistency to confirm the credibility of the complainant. Christopher Sherrin Western University law “reminded us that just because they’re police officers, let’s not give their opinion increased weight,” he noted. The Appeal Court also said the trial judge relied on the daughters’ testimony, admitted as part of the “res gestae” —a collection of exceptions to the hearsay rule. In fact, the decision notes, they were prior consistent statements, which are considered a form of hearsay and therefore considered unreliable, irrelevant, and lacking probative value. “The basic theory is that saying the same thing on multiple occasions does not make the statement any more credible,” said Christopher Sherrin, a law professor at Western University in London. Ont. who specializes in criminal law and procedure, evidence, and the Charter. “The trial judge is not allowed to rely on consistency to confirm the credibility of the complainant.” Sherrin said it’s understandable why Crown counsel wanted to introduce the evidence. “It’s an example of evidence that seems helpful on the surface,” he said. “But you have to take the extra step and make sure the person who is giving that evidence is qualified to give it. If you scratch below the surface, you realize there are real problems with its reliability.” The case also points to the challenges of keeping track of the admissibility of evidence, added Sherrin. A piece of evidence may be admissible for one purpose, he said, and not admissible for another. Ontario provincial employees lose in clash over anonymity Christopher Guly Ontario’s Court of Appeal has held that provincial government employee names cited via a request for access to personal records under the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act (FIPPA) cannot be withheld unless a specific threshold is met. In Ontario (Minister of Community and Social Services) v. John Doe [2015] O.J. No. 727, Associate Chief Justice Alexandra Hoy and Justices Katherine van Rensburg and David Brown upheld a lower court ruling that public servant names must be identified if the disclosure — as outlined in FIPPA — would not “reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety” or “seriously threaten the safety or health” of government employees. The appellants, including the Ministry of Community and Social Services and the Ontario Public Service Employees Union (OPSEU), challenged a divisional court decision dismissing their Korte application for an order setting aside another order made by an Information and Privacy Commissioner (IPC) of Ontario adjudicator. That order required the ministry to disclose records, including the full names of some Family Responsibility Office (FRO) employees, to an individual who had requested personal information from the office responsible for enforcing court orders involving child and spousal support arising from family law proceedings. The requester alleged the FRO had mismanaged his file and sought to discover the cause by obtaining documents, including correspondence and internal records, some of which contained FRO employee names. IPC adjudicator Steve Faughnan concluded the ministry was not entitled to rely on the FIPPA provisions to redact the names, a ruling the divisional court found to be reasonable. (Faughnan also found that the FRO employees’ job function didn’t require anonymity, as is the case with police officers often working undercover or in plainclothes assignment). The appellants argued that a 2000 grievance health-and-safety settlement addressing employee full-name disclosure gave FRO employees the option of publicly revealing only their first name and employee identification number. The appellants also contended that the IPC only considered whether the requester himself could reasonably be expected to pose a risk to FRO employees (not whether he could also disseminate their names) and that FIPPA section 47.1, which addresses disclosure of information to an individual, should be considered as “disclosure to the world,” resulting in a generalized risk to employees as a result. However, the appeal court noted that between 2002 and 2006, FRO employees received only 24 documented threats out of an estimated 2.988 million phone calls. There was no evidence that the employees, whose names were going to be disclosed, had been threatened, or that the requester posed any threat to employees, or that he would circulate their names after obtaining his records. IPC counsel Lawren Murray, who argued the appeal, said the risk of harm resulting from disclosure must extend “well beyond the mere possibility,” as the Supreme Court of Canada affirmed in two rulings. In Ontario (Community Safety and Correctional Services) v. Ontario (Information and Privacy Commissioner) [2014] S.C.J. No. 31, the Supreme Court of Canada referred to a finding in its earlier ruling in Merck Frosst Canada Ltd. v. Canada (Health) [2012] S.C.J. No. 3, and held that the “could reasonably be expected to” standard in FIPPA provides “a middle ground between that which is probable and that which is merely possible.” Catherine Korte, a partner with McCague Borlack in Toronto who practises privacy law, said the test to determine disclosure, as advanced in Merck, is a “reasonable expectation of probable harm,” and that the appellants in John Doe failed to meet that burden. “The possibility of harm can’t be based on feared, fanciful, imaginary or contrived harm,” she said. Murray said John Doe is consistent with FIPPA s. 2.3 in which personal information doesn’t include the name and title of someone in a business, professional or official capacity, and that civil servants “can’t remain anonymous absent evidence of a health or safety threat that goes well beyond a mere possibility.” Mergers & Acquisitions with Lexis Market Tracker – The latest module from Lexis Practice AdvisorSM is now here Benefit from the experience of over 200 of the best legal minds from more than 50 of Canada’s top law firms and our internal team of 11 lawyers with practice area expertise Find precedents quickly Get a head start on drafting Included with the M&A module is Market Tracker, a deal analysis tool that gives you real-time access to deal terms, language and provisions of more than 2,000 M&A transactions The M&A module includes practical guidance on the following topic areas: • • Get up to speed Structuring and Financing Regulatory Considerations • Auction Process • Due Diligence • Negotiated Acquisitions • Hostile Bids and Defensive Tactics • And much more, including crossborder M&A Visit lexisnexis.ca/m&a to learn more and download content. 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