1. law, govt and politics
2. immigration

REPORT AND BRIEF
WILL EU ‘IMMIGRATION’ INTO THE UK LEAD TO UK EXIT FROM THE EU?
MONDAY 2 MARCH 2015 - LADY VIOLET ROOM, NATIONAL LIBERAL CLUB, 1 WHITEHALL PLACE, SW1A 2HE
This timely session attracted 45 participants from the Liberal International British Group (LIBG),
Liberal Democrat European Group (LDEG), Liberal Democrat party, the D66 party in the
Netherlands, European activists, diplomats, journalists, and other opinion formers. After a welcome
by Wendy Kyrle-Pope, LIBG Chair, the session was chaired Nick Hopkinson, LDEG Chair. The
speakers were Sir Andrew Stunell, MP, Liberal Democrat lead on immigration policy; Stientje van
Veldhoven, D66 Member of the Dutch Parliament, Sunder Katwala, Director, British Future,
London; Camino Mortera-Martinez, Research Fellow, Centre for European Reform, and Roger
Casale, Founder and Director, New Europeans. This report includes a personal interpretation of
the contributions of speakers and participants, to which have been added some research and
commentary undertaken in light of the result of the 7 May General Election. As such, this document
does not necessarily reflect the views of LIBG, LDEG, or any other organisation, and any errors
are the responsibility of the undersigned.
Should immigration be linked to EU membership?
The number of UK citizens who want stricter immigration controls is greater than those against the
UK’s continued membership of the European Union (EU). Since 2004 net immigration into the UK,
in particular from new EU member states, mostly in Central Europe, and from Southern Eurozone
states, has risen sharply. This flow has given rise to a widespread negative perception of EU
citizens coming into the UK (net immigration from EU Central Europe alone was almost 400,000
from 2004-11). Many UK native-born fear losing their identity - they perceive their country doesn’t
look and sound like them anymore. The United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) has
successfully leveraged such anti-immigration sentiment and linked it to increase support for UKIP’s
core goal of leaving the EU. By arguing the only way to control immigration is for the UK to leave
the EU, UKIP has successfully put pressure on the Conservative Party to take a tougher line on EU
membership, potentially with disastrous implications for the UK’s national interest.
David Cameron promised an EU referendum in his January 2013 Bloomberg speech should he
and his Conservative party be re-elected in 2015. The ‘In’ side should win the EU membership
referendum. If the ‘Ins’ lose, it will primarily be because a convincing case for free
movement of EU citizens, and appropriate policy responses to address it, have not been
persuasive. With the surprise Conservative victory in the 7 May 2015 General Election, and with a
referendum now a certainty, the UK could very well sleepwalk towards leaving the EU (BREXIT).
The immigration debate needs to be brought into the centre ground. Concerns about immigration
have to be taken seriously, but to do so the issue needs to be dissected. The public narrative on
EU free movement needs to be reframed as only a part of the ‘immigration’ issue, otherwise
it will contaminate the wider debate on membership of the EU. If the public narrative is not
more precise, and based on facts and clear and communicable arguments, the challenges
posed by the free movement of EU 27 nationals can neither be resolved nor can the
argument for staying in the EU be won.
A common misperception is the free movement of EU nationals being a one way flow which can be
resolved if we control our own borders. However, there is roughly an equal number of UK citizens
living and working in the other 27 EU member states (estimates vary between 2 and 2.5 million). It
should not be forgotten UK ‘expats’ are also immigrants in their host countries! The UK is
furthermore not a member of the EU Schengen free travel area. By adhering to only some of the
EU’s Justice and Home Affairs and Schengen provisions, the UK does in fact have more direct
control of its own borders (although of course EU 27 nationals have the right to work in the UK, as
do UK workers elsewhere in the EU).
Cross-border population movements are a consequence of factors such as globalisation, income
inequalities, climate change, war and different rates of population growth amongst different ethnic
groups which are beyond the control of nation states. Strengthening the management of border
controls alone cannot stop these trends. The 2008-9 recession and the failure of the largest UK
parties to produce a positive vision for the UK in face of global challenges has left open a space for
populist, anti-establishment and nationalist parties. The targets of populist attention have moved
from the Irish in the 1980s and 1990s to Muslims since 9/11 to central Europeans since 2004.
Immigration is often blamed for creating pressures on the provision of social services such as
education, health, social housing, welfare benefits and transport infrastructure.
Whilst
immigration can add pressure on local services, EU ‘immigration’ is not necessarily the
primary cause. If the diagnosis of problems is wrong, then the Eurosceptics recommended
prescription, i.e. leaving the EU, will not cure them. However, addressing and reforming pull
factors such as generous access to benefit systems through national legislation might help
alleviate pressures on service delivery.
The Cameron proposals for a re-negotiated relationship with the EU
Immigration was at the core of David Cameron’s second term proposals for a renegotiated UK
relationship with the EU which he outlined in his 15 March 2014 article in the Daily Telegraph. The
seven ‘specific changes’ Cameron wanted to achieve were (followed by a brief assessment
whether change in the EU treaties is needed and/or feasible in bracketed italics):
“new mechanisms to prevent migrations from new member states joining the EU (does not require
treaty change because, as with past accessions, up to seven year transitional periods are normally
negotiated. The UK was one of the few EU 15 member countries to allow the immediate free
movement of Central Europeans after the A8 accessions in 2004, resulting in larger flows than
expected. In the case of any future accession, the UK could easily agree the simultaneous
implementation of a longer transitional period).
tighter immigration rules to ensure that migrants come to Britain to work, not as tourists planning to
cash in on free benefits; (the Conservative Fresh Start and Open Europe paper Strategies for
Fundamental EU reform - How to achieve Treaty change without changing the Treaties!
(December 2014) concludes any renegotiation should amend treaty provisions on nondiscrimination and citizenship (Articles 18 & 20-21 TFEU) and the provisions on workers and social
security (Articles 45. 46 and 48 TFEU). Provided UK and EU 27 citizens are treated equally, treaty
change may not be required as many measures limiting national contributory arrangements for
benefits can be legislated by Westminster. Whilst restricting free movement of workers would
contravene EU treaties, tightening up access to UK benefits may not);
national parliaments work together to block unwanted European legislation (depending on how
formal this arrangement, much can be achieved without treaty change through enhanced cooperation between national parliaments and improved parliamentary scrutiny of EU legislation);
businesses liberated from red tape and benefiting from the strength of the EU’s own market (a UK
outside the EU would still most likely be bound by EU legislation and onerous Whitehall legislation
and implementation – reforming EU ‘red tape’ is best progressed by remaining at the EU table, and
streamlining Whitehall ‘gold-plating’ (over-bureaucratisation) of EU legislation);
(ensure) our police forces and justice systems are able to protect British citizens, unencumbered
by unnecessary interference from European institutions, including the European Court of Human
Rights (ECHR) (this may be problematic even though the UK has opt outs from many Schengen
area provisions. It is worth noting the ECHR is not an EU institution);
more power ‘flowing away’ from Brussels to Britain and other member states, rather than (greater)
centralisation of laws in the EU (the principle of subsidiarity, which states powers should be
exercised at the lowest appropriate level of government, is already enshrined in EU treaties);
abolishing the principle of ‘ever closer union’ among EU member states.” (this declaratory goal
does not require treaty change as a protocol to EU treaties could probably be agreed by the
Council of EU member states).
The Cameron speech on immigration
The free movement issue is at the heart of David Cameron’s envisaged package to
renegotiate the terms of UK membership of the EU, and presents the most problematic
aspect of what is known to date about the UK Government’s possible negotiation demands.
Member state governments, notably Germany’s Chancellor Merkel, have already stated the
principle of free movement is non-negotiable. No doubt heeding this, Cameron’s major speech on
Immigration and Borders on 28 November 2014 at JCB Staffordshire broadly favoured our
continued membership: “Britain supports the principle of the free movement of workers. We benefit
from it… Accepting the principle of free movement of workers is a key to being part of the single
market… those who argue that Norway or Switzerland offer a better model for Britain, ignore one
crucial fact: they each had to sign up to the principle of the freedom of movement in order to get
access to the single market.”
However, Cameron goes on to say he wishes “to reduce the exceptionally high level of migration
from within the EU into the UK” (the UK has the highest proportion of those without a job seeking
work (40%) of any member state). He suggests dealing with abuse of free movement includes
stronger powers to deport criminals and stopping them returning, tougher and longer re-entry bans
for beggars, rough sleepers, fraudsters and those who collude in sham marriages. He wants
jobseekers to have a job offer before they come to the UK and to stop UK taxpayers having to
support them if they don’t. The government has scrapped housing benefit for EU jobseekers and
limited benefit claims to three months for those EU migrants who have no prospect of a job.
Universal Credit, which is consistent with EU law, is already replacing existing benefits such as job
seekers allowance. Cameron therefore wants to restrict the time jobseekers can stay legally stay in
the UK so if an EU jobseeker has not found work within 6 months, they should be required to
leave.
The UK benefit system is unusual in the EU in that it pays out before claimants pay in. Incentives
such as ‘in work benefits’, eg benefits for workers with two children back in their home country, are
more than twice what workers receive in Germany and three times what they receive in France.
The most problematic part of Cameron’s proposals for a second Tory Government therefore
relates to “those who want to claim tax credits and child benefit must live here and contribute … for
a minimum of 4 years. If their child is living abroad, then there should be no child benefit or no tax
credit at all, no matter how long they’ve worked in the UK and no matter how much tax they have
paid. We’ll introduce a new residency requirement for social housing, meaning that you can’t even
be considered for a council house, unless you’ve been here for at least 4 years”. Such measures
are likely to be in contravention of EU law as EU and UK citizens are not treated equally. It is
unlikely other member states would agree such a change as it would prompt a treaty renegotiation,
opening up a Pandora’s box of protracted inter-governmental negotiations and risky referenda in
some other member states.
It should be recalled EU law does not give EU citizens an unconditional right to claim benefits in
another EU member state. Under existing rules, EU migrants can stay for three months but to stay
longer they would have to be in work or actively seeking work with a genuine chance of being hired
or show they have enough money not to be a burden on public services. Once an EU national has
permission to stay, s/he still has to pass a ‘habitual residence test’ under EU law covering factors
such as the duration of the EU citizen’s stay such as their activity, source of income, family status,
and housing situation. The UK applies an additional ‘right to reside’ test (which is being reviewed
by the European Court of Justice) which goes beyond the EU test.
Most of Cameron’s proposals would appear to be achievable within the existing EU Treaties and
through changes in EU procedures and domestic legislation*. It must therefore be asked whether
insisting on the few exceptions, which involve only a miniscule cost to the national budget, is worth
throwing the UK’s whole future in the EU into doubt?
From what the Prime Minister has sketched out so far, he could feasibly conduct a largely
successful renegotiation of a de facto package of modest concessions from EU partners and
present this as a major victory to both party and the UK public. The difficulty of course is whether
the estimated 100 Conservative hardline Eurosceptic MPs, who are determined to UK leave the
EU no matter what, will support whatever deal the Prime Minister secures. At the end of the day,
the renegotiation process may be more important than the packaged delivered.
Winning the referendum: distinguishing different categories of immigrants
Pro-Europeans need to change the public narrative and elaborate convincing arguments for EU
free movement. The public debate on ‘immigration’ rarely distinguishes between the different
categories of people who cross borders: refugees and asylum seekers (those fleeing political or
racial persecution and denial of human rights in their home countries); economic migrants (those
seeking to improve their economic situation); EU citizens who have the right to work freely
throughout the 28 Member States of the EU, and temporary workers, visitors, and residents (for
example, foreign students). The immigration debate is further confused with the changing ethnic
composition of the UK population (the non-white population is estimated to grow to about 30% of
the total by 2030), and how the increasingly multicultural UK population challenges traditional
perceptions of the UK’s national identity.
To most native-born people, an immigrant is anyone born outside the host country. From a legal
perspective though, EU citizens resident in a member state not of their birth have many of the
same rights to live and work as a native-born national. Therefore EU nationals cannot be
considered similarly to immigrants from outside the EU. By referring to EU citizens as
immigrants, rather than EU citizens resident in the UK, pro-Europeans are not framing the
narrative, and risk losing the argument from the outset. Although the label ‘EU immigrant’ is
easily communicated, pro-Europeans could usefully refer to the less pejorative ‘EU 27
citizens living in the UK’ (or more simply ‘EU citizens’).
Winning the referendum: using facts to underpin the arguments
Eurosceptics use simplistic arguments blaming poor provision of educational, social, health and
housing services on immigrants. More facts and statistics need to be disseminated to underpin the
case for EU free movement. However, it should be recalled facts alone are not enough to win.
Debates (such as those between Nick Clegg and Nigel Farage) demonstrated it is a mistake to rely
on countering falsehoods with the facts – the public do not know who to believe. Winning the
argument extends beyond facts: above all there must also be an appeal to the heart.
The pressures on housing, education and other social services in the South East is caused
primarily by the growth of the London and south east economies which is attracting more migrants
from other parts of the UK than from continental Europe. Leaving the EU will not materially
reduce pressures on state services. Ending free movement from the rest of the EU will not
stop immigration. Most ‘immigrants’ come from outside the EU (EU citizens accounted for just
30.7% of total ‘immigrant’ inflows in 2011). If the UK leaves the EU, how many of the two million
UK expatriates currently residing elsewhere in the EU would have to return to the UK?
A key public concern is whether migrants contribute their fair share to tax revenues and draw on
the UK benefits system. Most studies on free movement (e.g. the November 2014 University
College London study) have found EU citizens make a positive contribution to the UK economy (£
5 billion per annum). EU citizens overwhelmingly come to the UK to work. EU citizens paid 37%
more in taxes than they received in UK benefits between 2004 and 2009.
National Institute of Economic and Social Research (NIESR) discussion paper 386, (2012)
concluded migrant workers are not stealing jobs from British nationals. There is a negligible link of
0.02% between migrant inflows and changes in native employment. Similarly in the Netherlands, it
is estimated only 1 % of immigrants take native-born jobs. More than half of UK firms with 50 plus
employees are frustrated by the low skill level amongst native born UK nationals and require EU
citizens to fill positions. For example, EU nationals fill in a gap in the UK skills set, eg the delivery
of the National Health Service (NHS) would be harmed without the contribution of nurses from EU
member states. A typical EU citizen resident in the UK is better educated (40% of EEA women and
32% of men have higher levels of educational attainment); more likely to work (95% for males,
83% natives); and are 59% less likely to receive welfare benefits.
Only 1% of Polish migrants claim income support compared to 4% of native-born British nationals
(IPPR). 8% of Poles live in social housing compared to 17% of UK nationals. In 2011, 16.6% of
working age UK nationals (5.5 million) were claiming a working–age benefit from the Department of
Work and Pensions (DWP) compared to 6.6% (371,000) non-UK nationals. Of the 1.44 million
people claiming job seekers allowance in 2011, 8.5% were non-UK nationals, of which fewer than
38,000 claimants were EU nationals (approx. 2.6% of all claimants).
UK expatriates living elsewhere in the EU are major beneficiaries of state services in other EU
member states. At least 400,000 UK citizens live in Spain full-time, a quarter of them pensioners,
and they have free access to the Spanish health service. According to the Department of Health, it
cost other EU member states £155 million in 2013-4 to treat UK visitors using their health services,
five times more than EU 27 citizens using the NHS.
In 2012-3, there were 125,290 EU students studying in the UK (6% of all UK university students)
who generated £2.27 billion per annum for the UK economy and 19,000 jobs (Universities UK).
Winning the referendum: knowing who we are trying to influence
Studies, arguments and facts are unlikely to persuade those who perceive or are affected
negatively by immigration. High immigrant concentrations in parts of the country (e.g. Boston) and
in certain economic sectors (e.g. construction) can place disproportionately high pressure on local
employment, wage levels, social services, and housing. Domestic policy responses, such as
greater funding for services and grants in areas most seriously affected by relatively large inflows,
merit serious consideration.
The British Social Attitudes to Immigration survey in 2013 found 2% believed immigration should
be increased a lot, 2% wanted it increased a little, 17% wanted it to remain the same, 21% want it
reduced a little, and 56% want it reduced a lot. Those over 60 (and more likely to turn out at
elections), the less educated and those ‘left behind’ are less favourable towards immigration (and
hence the EU) given perceptions of threats to jobs, national identity, pressure on state services etc.
Pro-Europeans (most graduates, the under 40s, youth, ethnic minorities and Liberal Democrats)
need to find arguments which appeal to those ‘left behind’ and most non-graduates (who are 3 to 1
against EU membership). Pointing to the possible implications of BREXIT such as restrictions on
European footballers, less free travel to the EU, higher costs of EU goods may be worthwhile.
Those over 60 who remember the UK pre-EU might be appealed to on the basis of thinking about
the future of their children and grandchildren. Accusations of racism are easily countered by UKIP
which cleverly advocates the immigration of skilled Indian immigrants (and in so doing appeals to
nostalgia for the English Commonwealth) and points to its ethnic minority members. Instead proEuropeans should expose the divisiveness and simplistic solutions offered by Eurosceptics. Most
voters are however are pretty moderate, and simply want a more efficient immigration system.
Winning the referendum: policy proposals for Westminster
Scare-mongering about immigration has hijacked the national political discourse. It diverts
political energy and resources from addressing the root causes of the health, housing,
unemployment and education crises whose remedies are within national competences.
Instead of being perceived as the main source of these problems, immigration can help bring into
sharper focus domestic policy failures. Curbing immigration is best addressed by changing
domestic legislation, reforming benefit entitlement systems and improving the funding and
management of government services. Any final EU negotiation package may likely contain many
measures which can in fact be achieved by Westminster. Some of the following measures might
usefully form part of that package or complement it:
1. The talents of British youth should not be squandered – there should be more investment in
education and improving skills. This could simultaneously help reduce youth unemployment and
reduce fears about immigrants taking away ‘British jobs’.
2. Immigration pull factors could be reduced by transforming the UK benefits system from a noncontributory to contributory system as in other EU member states like Germany and France. A
move from the current as of rights system to a contributory system would however be politically
controversial as it would also apply to British nationals and would require a major bureaucratic
overhaul.
3. A law could prevent the advertising of UK-based jobs only outside the UK.
4. Reintroducing tighter exit checks can make border management more effective by counting
people both entering and leaving the UK.
5. Foreign students should be taken out of net immigration statistics as most are only temporary
residents.
6. The licenses of colleges and businesses which fail to screen bogus applicants using their places
to enter the UK illegally should be revoked.
7. An annual debate and vote in Parliament on immigration could help take the heat out of the
issue. Would MPs actually go through the voting lobby opposing the entry of genuine foreign
students?
8. Areas most seriously affected by disproportionately large inflows should be targeted and receive
increased funding for local services. The £50 million Migrants Impact Fund, which was scrapped in
2010, or a similar fund should be revived and funding increased. Failure to do so can only
contaminate the national debate.
Free movement of workers cannot be seen is isolation from the EU’s other three core freedoms of
movement of goods, capital, and services. A member state cannot restrict free movement of one
without potentially prompting an unpicking of the EU package, i.e. would the UK like it if another
member state restricted UK exports or stopped direct investment into the UK? If there is no free
movement of workers into the UK, some firms would invest elsewhere in the EU. Free movement
has in fact created more UK jobs than the inflow of EU citizens into the UK in recent years. Free
movement is good for employing the UK native-born population - pro-Europeans must popularise
this and generate more winning arguments.
Nick Hopkinson
11 May 2015
[email protected]
*
For
a
detailed
analysis
of
the
legality
of
the
Cameron
proposals
http://wwwutm.cer.org.uk/print/4155?_source=all%20email%2007.05.15&utm_campaign=8ff9a4f9dd&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_38f0222bef-8ff9a4f9dd-303520785
LDEG EU Free Movement 2315
see